# **The Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation (TADR)**

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## **Abstract**

This paper develops the Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation (TADR), which asks what conditions must obtain for finite human beings to possess genuine knowledge of an infinite and transcendent God. The argument begins not with historical claims or natural theology, but with the ontological and epistemic asymmetry between finite minds and a divine reality that transcends conceptual grasp. TADR shows that no mode of unaided human cognition—empirical, inferential, or analogical—is sufficient to secure reference to the divine or guarantee truth-bearing theological cognition. Therefore, if knowledge of God is possible, it must originate from divine self-disclosure. The paper formally presents this argument (H1–H6), responds to major objections, and develops a set of criteria—ontological adequacy, explanatory power, coherence, historicity, and transformative participation—to evaluate alleged revelations. Finally, the paper applies these criteria to naturalistic, deistic, Islamic, and other frameworks, arguing that only a personal and participatory mode of divine revelation can satisfy the transcendental preconditions for genuine knowledge of God.

## **Keywords**

Divine revelation; Transcendental arguments; Epistemic normativity; Rationality; Philosophy of religion; Natural theology; Religious epistemology

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## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1 Background and Motivation**

Philosophy of religion has traditionally approached God through natural theology, evidential reasoning, or historical investigation. These methods assume that human rational capacities are capable of accessing or describing the divine. Yet if God is transcendent, infinite, and metaphysically distinct from creation, then a fundamental question precedes all others: *How is divine knowledge even possible?* The Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation (TADR) addresses this deeper issue. Instead of arguing from evidence to God, TADR examines the conditions under which finite human beings could have genuine cognitive access to a transcendent God in the first place.

### **1.2 The Problem: The Possibility of Theological Knowledge**

Human cognition is finite, conceptual, and dependent on empirical conditions. If God is infinite, uncreated, and transcendent, then no purely human mode of cognition can bridge this ontological gap. Analogical reasoning, metaphysical inference, or moral intuition cannot guarantee contact with an actually existing divine referent. The problem is structural, not merely practical: the finite cannot autonomously reach the infinite. Thus, if knowledge of God exists, it must depend on an act of divine self-disclosure.

### **1.3 Method: The Transcendental Approach**

TADR employs transcendental reasoning—not to ground rational inquiry in general, but to ground the possibility of *theological* inquiry. It asks: What must be true for humans to know God at all? By analyzing the necessary conditions for divine reference, theological predication, and knowledge of a personal transcendent agent, TADR identifies revelation as the only possible bridge between infinite and finite.

### **1.4 Scope and Distinctions**

This paper distinguishes the Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation (TADR) from several neighboring philosophical methods.  
 First, unlike classical natural theology— which typically argues from created effects toward a divine cause—TADR addresses the deeper question of how finite human beings could acquire *any knowledge of a transcendent God* in the first place. Its focus is not inferential proof but the transcendental conditions for meaningful reference to, and cognition of, the divine.

Second, in contrast to presuppositional formulations of the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG), TADR does not analyze the preconditions of rationality or intelligibility in general. Instead, it isolates the unique epistemic and ontological conditions required specifically for *theological knowledge*. Thus, TADR does not begin with rational normativity but with the asymmetry between finite cognition and an infinite God, making the argument philosophically accessible without assuming any confessional commitments.

Third, the paper evaluates competing accounts of divine self-disclosure—including naturalistic, deistic, Islamic, and other theistic models—to determine whether they can, even in principle, satisfy the transcendental requirements for genuine knowledge of God. These requirements are then articulated as formal criteria for authentic revelation: ontological adequacy, explanatory power, coherence, historical rootedness, and transformative participation. The application of these criteria shows that many purported revelations fail to bridge the structural gap between finite knowers and a transcendent divine reality.

### **1.5 Contribution of This Paper**

This paper contributes to the philosophy of religion in two ways. First, it develops a formal transcendental argument showing that revelation is a necessary condition for knowledge of God—not one religious claim among others. Second, it derives from this argument a set of objective criteria for genuine revelation. These criteria reveal why many religious and philosophical systems cannot, even in principle, provide the necessary conditions for theological knowledge.

### **1.6 Structure of the Argument**

The paper proceeds in five parts.

**Section 2.1** analyzes the ontological asymmetry between finite knowers and a transcendent source of truth, establishing the metaphysical problem that motivates the argument.

**Section 2.2** examines the epistemic consequences of this asymmetry, arguing that *the possibility of genuine knowledge of a transcendent God* requires an authoritative mode of divine self-disclosure.

**Section 2.3** argues that if the transcendent ground of theological knowledge is personal and self-disclosing, then revelation must satisfy specific rational and metaphysical standards. This section therefore, introduces the criteria for genuine revelation that follow from the transcendental structure of the argument.

**Section 2.4** evaluates objections and competing frameworks—including naturalistic, relativist, and Islamic models—by assessing whether they satisfy these criteria and whether they can supply the epistemic authority required for rational normativity.

**Section 2.5** synthesizes the argument and outlines its broader implications for metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion.

## **2. The Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation**

### **2.1 Ontological Asymmetry and the Problem of Infinite Distance**

TADR begins from the premise of ontological asymmetry: finite human knowers are metaphysically distinct from an infinite and transcendent God. Human cognition is conditioned by temporality, embodiment, and contingency, whereas the divine—if it exists at all—is unconditioned, eternal, and metaphysically necessary. This asymmetry produces what may be termed the *Problem of Infinite Distance*: no finite cognitive act can bridge the qualitative gap between creature and Creator.

If this asymmetry is granted, the transcendent cannot be epistemically accessed through unilateral human initiative. A reality that is infinite, simple, and unconditioned cannot be proportionally grasped by finite minds whose concepts are formed within spatiotemporal constraints. Inferential ascent, analogical extension, or abstract speculation all presuppose a proportionality of cognitive power to the object known; finite minds lack such proportionality with respect to the divine.

Thus, if knowledge of God is possible, it cannot originate from the human side of the relation. It must begin with divine initiative—an act whereby God grants a mode of participation suited to finite knowers. Absent such initiative, human reasoning remains confined to conceptual projections that cannot secure reference to an actually existing transcendent reality. This yields the transcendental conclusion: revelation is not a supplementary theological resource but a necessary condition for the very possibility of genuine theological cognition.

### **2.2 Epistemic Implications: Revelation as the Condition of Possible Reference**

The epistemic dimension of TADR deepens this analysis by raising a further question: even if human beings can form the concept *God*, can they secure its referent? Rational discourse presupposes stable, universally binding norms of inference, truth, and meaning. Yet purely human or naturalistic epistemic frameworks struggle to justify these norms without collapsing into arbitrariness, relativism, or regress.

This difficulty becomes acute in the case of God-talk. Externalist theories of reference cannot secure the referent of "God" because finite agents lack the epistemic access needed to determine whether the concept successfully tracks the intended transcendent object. Without revelatory self-identification, competing interpretations—across cultures, languages, and philosophical systems—remain semantically underdetermined. In such a context, the term "God" becomes infinitely ambiguous rather than truth-bearing.

Revelation uniquely resolves this problem. Only a transcendent agent can fix the referent of the term "God" by identifying Himself as the object of that term. Revelation secures semantic content, grounds epistemic authority, and establishes the normative conditions under which statements about God may be true or false.

Appeals to analogical language, though useful for explaining how finite language can be extended toward transcendent realities, do not bridge the ontological distance or secure reference. Analogy clarifies how language stretches, but not how epistemic contact is achieved. Absent revelation, analogical predication lacks a mechanism for verifying whether the analogies align with the reality of the divine nature.

Thus, revelation functions as a transcendental condition for the intelligibility of theological discourse. Without it, claims about God lack the epistemic grounding necessary for meaningful reference, truth-evaluation, or rational coherence.

#### **2.2.1 Formal Presentation of TADR (H1–H6)**

The argument may be formalized as follows:

**H1 (Conditional Realism):** If any human cognition of God is truth-bearing, there must exist a sufficient condition that makes such cognition possible.

**H2 (Ontological Asymmetry):** There exists an ontological gap between finite human intellect and the infinite divine being; the finite cannot of itself contain the infinite.

**H3 (Epistemic Limitation):** Human cognition operates via finite concepts and experience and thus cannot yield direct knowledge of the infinite.

**H4 (Impossibility of Autonomous Ascent):** Any attempt to reach the divine solely by human ascent will remain within finitude and cannot reach the divine essence.

**H5 (Necessity of Self-Disclosure):** Therefore, knowledge of the divine is possible only if the infinite voluntarily discloses itself.

**H6 (Transcendental Condition):** If such self-disclosure has occurred, then revelation functions as the transcendental ground of all genuine theology.

**Conclusion:** Hence, the possibility of knowing God (if it is possible) requires divine self-disclosure.

### **2.3 Personhood, Self-Disclosure, and the Epistemic Necessity of Revelation**

If the transcendent source of epistemic normativity is personal rather than impersonal, then the appropriate mode of access to that source cannot be purely inferential. Personhood entails agency, intention, and the capacity for self-disclosure. Thus, knowledge of a personal being requires not merely conceptual adequacy but relational accessibility. One can infer that some rational agent exists, but one cannot infer who that agent is. Identity, character, intention, and will are intrinsically first-personal realities. They can only be made known through intentional communication from the agent in question. This principle holds with maximal force when the finite seeks to know the infinite.

Human inference—even in its most sophisticated metaphysical forms—can only yield a generic conception of a divine ground: a necessary, unconditioned source of intelligibility. But inference alone cannot bridge the gap between that abstract concept and the concrete identity of a personal God. Thus, if God is personal, revelation is not an optional supplement to natural theology but the only epistemically adequate means of securing true knowledge of God. Revelation is structurally required for any coherent account of divine personhood. Without self-disclosure, finite minds lack the epistemic proportionality necessary to reach a personal God. Only revelation can move us from the universal abstraction "God" to the living, concrete agent who bears that name.

#### **2.3.1 Criteria for Genuine Revelation**

Once it is established that the transcendent source is personal and self-disclosing, it follows that not every purported revelation can satisfy the standards necessary for genuine divine disclosure. If revelation is the required condition for intelligible discourse about God, then it must meet specific rational, metaphysical, and epistemic criteria. From within the structure of TADR, five criteria naturally emerge:

**Criterion 1: Ontological Adequacy**

A genuine revelation must bridge the ontological gap between finite creatures and an infinite God without collapsing the Creator-creature distinction. It must reconcile transcendence and immanence in a way that permits real participation in divine life while avoiding both abstraction and anthropomorphism. This criterion meets the Problem of Infinite Distance identified earlier, ensuring that revelation grants epistemic access in a manner neither reductive nor incoherent.

**Criterion 2: Explanatory Power**

Authentic revelation must offer a metaphysical framework capable of addressing the perennial problems that precede and ground philosophical inquiry: the One and the Many, unity and diversity, being and becoming, the problem of universals, and related issues. A revelation that anticipates or implicitly resolves these tensions before their philosophical articulation exhibits both transcendental priority and divine authorship. By grounding intelligibility itself, it provides the necessary conditions for rational inquiry to occur.

**Criterion 3: Coherence**

A legitimate revelation must display internal consistency across its metaphysical, ethical, and anthropological claims. Any inherent contradiction would undercut the claim that the revelation originates from a perfectly rational and omniscient source. Coherence thus secures the epistemic authority of revelation and aligns with TADR's insistence that divine self-disclosure provides the normative stability required for reasoning about God.

**Criterion 4: Historicity**

Since a personal God acts, divine revelation must manifest through concrete historical events rather than existing merely as abstract text, private intuition, or allegory. Historicity provides an objective anchor for finite agents, ensuring that revelation is not subjective projection but a real entry of God into the temporal sphere. This concreteness renders revelation accessible, verifiable, and participatory.

**Criterion 5: Transformative and Participatory Power**

A genuine revelation must not only convey information but effect real transformation in the human knower. It must enable participation in the uncreated divine energies—understood here as God's uncreated operations or activities (following the terminology of St. Gregory Palamas and the Orthodox theological tradition), the mode by which God is present and active in the world, allowing epistemic and relational participation without implying access to the divine essence—rather than merely instructing or prescribing moral behavior. This requirement reflects the relational character of knowledge of a personal God: revelation aims not at external conformity but at a form of ontological and interpersonal participation appropriate to finite creatures encountering a transcendent personal agent.

**Clarification on the Participatory Criterion.**

The appeal to “participatory transformation” does not presuppose any specific theological tradition but reflects a minimal philosophical requirement derived from the structure of TADR itself. If God is personal, then knowledge of God cannot be merely inferential or propositional; it must involve a relational mode of access appropriate to a personal agent. This requirement parallels, though does not depend on, the classical Christian distinction articulated by Gregory Palamas between God’s essence (which remains inaccessible) and God’s uncreated energies (the modes of divine presence and activity). In this paper, the term *participation* is used in a purely philosophical sense to denote an epistemically sufficient relation in which the divine agent makes Himself knowable without implying metaphysical fusion or essence-level access. This relational dimension grounds the possibility of genuine knowledge of a personal God while avoiding both anthropomorphism and metaphysical collapse.

### **2.4 Objections and Competing Frameworks**

The transcendental conclusion that divine revelation is a necessary precondition for *meaningful and truth-bearing discourse about a transcendent God* invites several objections. This section evaluates major competing frameworks by assessing whether they satisfy the transcendental conditions for genuine revelation established in §2.3.1.

These conditions—ontological adequacy, explanatory power, coherence, historicity, and transformative participation—are not externally imposed or specific to any religious tradition. Rather, they arise logically from the requirements for bridging ontological asymmetry, fixing reference to a transcendent infinite, and grounding universal epistemic normativity in theological contexts. Frameworks that fail these conditions do not merely fall short theologically; they fail philosophically at the level of the preconditions for intelligibility in any attempt to speak meaningfully about God.

#### **2.4.1 Objection: "Any Religion Can Be Tailored to Fit TADR"**

A common objection asserts that TADR's criteria are broad enough that any religious system could be artificially adjusted to satisfy them. On this view, TADR merely provides a flexible template that can accommodate all religions with minor conceptual modifications (Hick 1989).

However, this objection misconstrues the criteria developed in §2.3.1. These criteria are not descriptive checklists but logical consequences of the conditions required for meaningful discourse about a transcendent personal God. They follow from: (1) the Problem of Ontological Asymmetry, (2) the need for referent-fixation for terms such as "God," (3) the grounding of epistemic normativity, and (4) the requirement of personal self-disclosure for knowledge of a personal agent.

Most religions fail precisely because they cannot meet these constraints. The issue is not doctrinal incompatibility but philosophical insufficiency. For example:

* Traditions with an impersonal ultimate (Advaita Vedānta, Taoism) fail ontological adequacy, since no personal self-disclosure is available to bridge the finite–infinite divide.
* Polytheistic systems fail coherence, since they cannot ground universal rational normativity in a non-arbitrary way.
* Systems lacking historical revelation fail the historicity criterion, offering no objective anchor for divine self-disclosure.
* Traditions without participatory ontology fail the transformative criterion, reducing revelation to moral instruction or mythic narrative.

Thus, the transcendental criteria are not met because they cannot be met given the metaphysical commitments of these systems. The objection misunderstands the nature of transcendental conditions. They are generated by the logic of intelligibility, not by religious preference. As Kant demonstrated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, conditions of possibility are simultaneously conditions of reality (Kant 1781/1998).

This response also addresses potential concerns about circularity. TADR does not presuppose a specific revelation and then construct criteria to validate it. Rather, it begins with the conditional premise (H1) that *if* rational theological discourse is possible, certain conditions must obtain. The criteria emerge from analyzing what those conditions entail, not from prior theological commitment.

#### **2.4.2 Naturalistic and Secular Epistemologies**

Naturalistic frameworks attempt to explain human cognition through evolutionary processes, linguistic convention, or pragmatic success. However, none of these accounts can meet the transcendental requirements for genuine revelation or for rational normativity itself.

**(1) Failure of Ontological Adequacy**

Naturalism, by definition, denies transcendence. Thus, it cannot supply a transcendent source capable of grounding epistemic universals—truth, validity, obligation. Without such a source, ontological asymmetry is not even recognized, much less bridged.

**(2) Failure of Explanatory Power**

Naturalism cannot account for: the unity/diversity structure necessary for rational categories, the universality of logical norms, or the aboutness (intentionality) of mental content. Evolutionary explanations may describe how we formed cognitive capacities, but cannot justify why cognitive norms track truth (Plantinga 1993).

**(3) Failure of Coherence**

Conventionalist theories (Quine 1953; Rorty 1979) reduce truth and meaning to social-linguistic agreement. But if all norms are conventional, no universal rational obligation exists, no claim can be binding beyond linguistic tribes, and self-referential incoherence arises (they rely on universal claims while denying universality).

**(4) No Historicity or Transformative Revelation**

Naturalistic frameworks do not acknowledge divine action in history and cannot ground transformative participation. Thus, revelation is excluded *a priori*.

**Conclusion:** Naturalistic epistemologies do not satisfy the transcendental conditions identified by TADR. They lack the ontological resources to ground universal epistemic norms, semantic reference, and the unity of truth, and therefore cannot supply the preconditions required for rational inquiry—let alone for divine revelation.

#### **2.4.3 Islamic Revelation Claims (Philosophically Evaluated)**

Islam affirms divine revelation through the Qur’ān. The question TADR investigates is not theological but philosophical: *Does the Islamic framework satisfy the transcendental conditions required for genuine divine self-disclosure?*

**(1) Ontological Adequacy** Classical Islamic kalām emphasizes a strict form of divine simplicity (tawḥīd). In its Ashʿarite formulation, divine attributes such as speech, will, and knowledge exist only as conceptual distinctions within an undifferentiated unity. This raises a problem for revelation: if God’s “speech” is not meaningfully distinct from His essence, then the metaphysical basis for personal self-disclosure becomes thin. For revelation to occur, “God speaks” must refer to a genuinely intentional act, not a conceptual abstraction.

**(2) Explanatory Power** Islam affirms robust monotheism, but the Qur’ānic discourse does not explicitly address metaphysical questions such as the one-and-many, participation, or the relation between finite and infinite being—questions that arise naturally from TADR’s analysis of the conditions for intelligibility. Without a metaphysics of participation or a mediating structure, it is unclear how divine meaning can be communicated across ontological asymmetry.

**(3) Coherence and Epistemic Normativity** In Ashʿarite occasionalism, natural causality is denied in favor of continuous divine intervention. This undermines the stability of rational norms and renders epistemic reasoning dependent on divine volition moment to moment. TADR requires a consistent framework in which rational inference is possible; occasionalism challenges this coherence.

**(4) Historicity and Mode of Disclosure** Islam affirms that the Qur’ān is historically delivered, but the mode of revelation is textual-propositional rather than personal. On the TADR model, genuine knowledge of a transcendent personal God requires a mode of revelation that bridges infinite–finite asymmetry by disclosing the divine reality itself, not merely instructions or propositions.

**(5) Transformative Participation** Islamic theology offers moral and legal transformation but lacks an ontology of participatory union with the divine. Revelation, on TADR's criteria, must not only inform but ontologically elevate the knower to participate in divine life in a manner consistent with finite capacity.

**Conclusion** Islamic revelation contains significant theological insight, but under dominant interpretations it does not satisfy several transcendental criteria required for genuine divine self-disclosure. This analysis remains philosophical rather than doctrinal, assessing Islam only in terms of whether it answers the conditions generated by the problem of infinite distance.

### **2.4.4 Deism**

Deism posits a non-interventionist creator who does not reveal Himself (Tindal 1730). Within the TADR framework, Deism is structurally incapable of grounding knowledge of God, because it withholds the very condition that makes theological cognition possible: divine self-disclosure.

**1. Ontological Adequacy** A non-revealing deity leaves the ontological asymmetry between finite and infinite being unaddressed. Without divine initiative, finite cognition lacks any proportionate mode of access to a transcendent referent.

**2. Referent-Fixation** If God never discloses Himself, the term *“God”* cannot secure a determinate referent. Human conjectures about a silent deity collapse into projection, indeterminacy, or semantic emptiness.

**3. Epistemic Normativity** Without revelation, no transcendent ground exists for universally binding norms of truth, rational obligation, or epistemic authority. A non-communicative deity cannot underwrite the conditions for rational inquiry.

**4. Historicity** A silent God performs no historical acts that could serve as loci of divine self-disclosure. In Deism, revelation is not merely absent but impossible.

**5. Transformative Participation** Because Deism rejects divine initiative and relational engagement, no participatory or relational knowledge of God is possible. Transformation reduces to moral or philosophical improvement rather than communion with the divine.

**Conclusion** A non-disclosing deity cannot supply the transcendental conditions for intelligibility, semantic reference, or rational normativity (cf. Plantinga 2000). Thus, Deism is not merely theologically insufficient; it is philosophically excluded within TADR because it denies the very possibility condition that makes knowledge of a transcendent personal God achievable at all.

#### **2.4.5 Skeptical and Deflationary Objections**

Deflationary views of truth and meaning (Dummett 1978; Horwich 1990; Rorty 1979) attempt to dissolve transcendental requirements altogether by claiming that truth is merely a linguistic convention, meaning is a pragmatic tool, and norms are socially constructed.

However, these accounts cannot meet TADR's criteria and collapse under self-reference.

**(1) Self-Referential Failure**

If truth is a convention, the claim "truth is a convention" is not universally true. If normativity is local, no one is rationally obligated to accept deflationism. If meaning is pragmatic, deflationism cannot claim philosophical necessity.

**(2) Lack of Explanatory Power**

Deflationary theories provide no account of the universality of logical laws, reference to transcendent objects, or rational obligation.

**(3) No Ontological Adequacy, Historicity, or Participation**

Deflationism denies transcendence entirely, and thus fails all revelation-related criteria. As McDowell (1994) demonstrates, such anti-realist positions are self-undermining.

A further objection might invoke Kantian epistemic caution: the noumenal realm is unknowable, and TADR illegitimately claims access to it. However, TADR is compatible with Kantian limits. It does not claim direct noumenal knowledge but argues that *if* rational discourse about the transcendent is possible, it requires revelation. The Kantian limitation does not defeat TADR; it reinforces the necessity of divine initiative to overcome the epistemic boundaries Kant identified.

**Conclusion:** Deflationary views are self-undermining and cannot supply the preconditions for intelligible inquiry or revelation.

### **2.5 Synthesis and Implications**

The analyses above converge upon a unified conclusion: divine revelation is not simply a theological construct but a transcendental precondition for the coherence of rational inquiry itself. Ontological asymmetry demonstrates that finite, contingent minds cannot, by their own cognitive means, bridge the metaphysical distance to an infinite and transcendent source of truth. Epistemic examination further shows that reference, normativity, and truth cannot be secured within purely human or naturalistic frameworks without resulting in arbitrariness or incoherence. If rational discourse about the divine is possible at all, it requires a mode of divine self-disclosure that establishes epistemic access, fixes semantic reference, and grounds universally binding rational norms.

This yields implications across several philosophical domains:

**Epistemology.** Revelation provides the absolute grounding for epistemic normativity. Without a transcendent source, rational obligation loses universality, and coherence collapses into relativism or convention.

**Metaphysics.** Revelation bridges the ontological divide between finite and infinite being, making participation in the source of intelligibility metaphysically possible. The finite can engage the infinite only through divine initiative.

**Philosophy of Language.** Revelation secures the referential stability of theological terms. Without divine self-identification, expressions such as “God,” “truth,” and “goodness” remain ambiguous or indeterminate.

**Philosophy of Religion.** TADR reframes religious epistemology by shifting the debate from evidential claims to transcendental conditions. Competing worldviews—secular, naturalistic, or theistic—must be assessed by whether they can sustain the conditions that make rational inquiry possible in the first place.

In this light, revelation is not an event inserted into a preexisting intelligible order; rather, it is the foundation that renders such an order possible at all. Rationality, meaning, and truth ultimately depend on the self-disclosure of the transcendent source that grounds them. TADR therefore demonstrates that divine revelation is a structural necessity of intelligibility, not merely a doctrinal affirmation.

## **3. Conclusion**

The Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation (TADR) demonstrates that knowledge of a transcendent and personal God is not principally a matter of empirical confirmation or speculative inference, but arises from the very conditions that make rational inquiry possible. Finite human cognition—bound by temporality, contingency, and conceptual limitation—cannot independently bridge the ontological gap to the infinite. Neither analogical language, nor inferential metaphysics, nor cultural convention can secure referent-fixation, epistemic normativity, or the intelligibility of moral and rational principles.

TADR establishes that only a self-disclosing, personal divine agent can supply the necessary conditions for meaningful discourse about God. Revelation is therefore not an optional supplement to reason but the transcendental ground of rational theology itself. By shifting the debate from evidential disputes to the conditions of possibility for intelligibility, TADR provides a principled framework for evaluating all claims about God—religious, philosophical, or secular—according to whether they can sustain the structures rational thought requires.

Philosophically, the argument unifies metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. It shows that the transcendence of God imposes structural limits on human cognition, and that these limits can be overcome only through divine initiative. TADR thereby yields normative criteria for assessing purported revelations: a genuine revelation must bridge ontological asymmetry, secure semantic reference, and enable rational engagement with a personal divine agent.

Finally, TADR opens avenues for further inquiry into the nature of divine self-disclosure and its epistemic and metaphysical implications. Future research may examine comparative models of revelation across traditions, the role of analogical predication in theological discourse, and the interplay between divine agency and human rationality. In every case, TADR underscores its central claim: if rational discourse about God is possible, it is possible only because God has revealed Himself.

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