

functions of musical language. II. Hysterical hypermusia — pathological exaggeration of musical expression. III. Hysterical paramusia — a morbid aberration of musical expression.

The author insists always upon the functional nature of these anomalies of musical speech and of their systematization, as characteristic of hysteria. The hypermusias and paramusias are less systematized and require no special comment. Of the six cases of hysterical amusia the most significant deserve mention.

The first is an instance of a *pure, total* amusia — a musical aphasia involving all the functions of musical speech, but only of musical speech, the functions of verbal language remaining completely intact.

Another case of interest, since it shows the absence of a parallelism in the forms affected in the two systems of language, is that of a patient who lost the ability to write the ordinary symbols of language, but was still able to write the musical ones.

A third case illustrates a dissociation of the memory form of musical language which Dr. Ingegnieros has been the first to signalize — that of a *pure* instrumental amusia, the subject's memory for the remaining forms of language, both verbal and musical, being unaffected.

The interpretation of these functional derangements of musical expression is interestingly discussed in a comparative survey of the psychological point of view of Janet and of the physiological of Sollier, from which emerges the author's synthesis of the two seemingly opposed theories, as follows: "The two fundamental theories, in so far as concerns the genesis and the nature of hysteria, are complementary, in spite of their contradictory appearance. The first is a clinical, essentially descriptive explanation of the phenomena, and the second is a physiopathological interpretation of these same phenomena."

Dr. Ingegnieros' work is rich in bibliographic citations and possesses the charm of an exceptionally facile literary style.

TRIGANT BURROW.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

FEELING.

Feeling Analysis and Experimentation. CHARLES HUGHES JOHNSTON. Journ. of Phil., Psych., and Sci. Methods, 1907, IV., 209-215.

The object of this article is to suggest certain new methods of experimentation which could profitably be employed in a future study of the affective phases of consciousness.

In past years experimenters generally have looked for an explanation of feelings in the reactions of the respiratory and circulatory systems. Drawing any conclusions from these involuntary movements is a difficult matter. Johnston believes the voluntary types of movement would lend themselves more fully to characterization and classification, and that to describe feelings one must describe bodily attitudes or incipient tendencies to adjustments which always accompany the feeling. Feelings may show themselves by different bodily modifications in different persons so that no definite localization can be made which would apply to all persons.

The author shows the difficulties which are presented in an experimental study of this problem. These may briefly be summarized as follows:

Good introspective notes are difficult. Feelings have qualitative relations to other feelings. Feelings tend to fuse into a single elemental feeling. Feelings cannot exist without the sensational elements. A brief summary of the views held in regard to feelings precedes this discussion.

In connection with this article should be noted the author's earlier published experiment in the *Harvard Psychological Studies* entitled 'Combination of Feelings.'

ROBERT D. WILLIAMS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

Ueber Urtheilsgefühle. THEODOR LIPPS. Arch. f. d. ges. Psych., VII., 1-33.

This is one of Lipps' bits of logical deductions marked, as is usual, by fine distinctions and strict respect for his premises. The premises for the argument are that feeling arises only through checking or furthering of activities. Judgment on the other hand is an act, the goal of a completed activity, and therefore no longer open to the influence of furtherance or retardation. There can then be no feeling attached to judgment itself.

Every object must, however, be apperceived and as this process may be furthered or checked, the perception of every object gives rise to pleasure or its opposite. Similarly, we picture ourselves or others as having acted freely or as opposed in action and these remembered or possible struggles or lack of struggle give rise to pleasure. Æsthetic pleasure too is an *Einfühlung* of activity of this kind. There attaches to every judgment a feeling; but it is not inherent in the judgment itself but is connected with the uncontested presence of the idea; it is idea feeling not judgment feeling.