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Boutroux' Études, Döring's Socratic System, and Zeller's Aristotle (Translated) *Études d'Histoire de la Philosophie*, par Émile Boutroux. Paris. Alcan. 1897. Pp. 443. 7 Fr. 50. *Die Lehre des Sokrates als sociales Reformsystem*, Dr. Prof. von August Döring. Munich. Beck. 1895. Pp. x, 614. 11 M. 50. *Zeller's Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics*, translated by B. F. C. Costelloe, M.A., and J. H. Muirhead, M.A. Longmans. 1897. 2 vols. Pp. xii, 520 and viii, 512. 24s.

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must be approximately correct, assigning the *ἐπωβελία* to civil suits, the *χίλια* to public cases. The *πρόεδροι* are brought in on p. 86 without any explanation; and if we turn to p. 232 we find that they are the same people as the *πρυτάνεις*, which is impossible. In the map of Syracuse intended to elucidate the Athenian operations, the wall of Dionysios which would have rendered those operations impossible is marked as 'Ancient Wall,' and nothing said of its later date. Among the Greek Proverbs appears *λύκον ἰδεῖν* (p. 216) with the explanation that 'to see a wolf' meant

'to be struck dumb' because that affliction befell a man who did not see the wolf before he was seen. If it is too bold to alter one letter in the text of Theokritos, the proverb would be better away; the belief that a Greek or Roman said 'You saw a wolf,' when he meant 'You did not see a wolf,' flourishes sufficiently without encouragement. The gap might be filled by adding the Socratic *σὺν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ ἢ λῆξ ἤλυκα τέρπει*. And *γνώθι σεαυτὸν* ought to be in the list as well as *μηδὲν ἄγαν*.

M. ALFORD.

BOUTROUX' *ÉTUDES*, DÖRING'S *SOCRATIC SYSTEM*, AND ZELLER'S *ARISTOTLE* (TRANSLATED).

Études d'Histoire de la Philosophie, par ÉMILE BOUTROUX. Paris. Alcan. 1897. Pp. 443. 7 Fr. 50.

Die Lehre des Sokrates als sociales Reformsystem, von Prof. Dr. AUGUST DÖRING. Munich. Beck. 1895. Pp. x, 614. 11 M. 50.

Zeller's Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics, translated by B. F. C. COSTELLOE, M.A., and J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A. Longmans. 1897. 2 vols. Pp. xii, 520 and viii, 512. 24s.

HOWEVER dissimilar at first sight, these works have much in common to justify a reviewer in noticing them together. Of the essays on the history of philosophy which M. Boutroux has republished, one half, including a striking estimate of Kant, deal with modern philosophy and do not concern us here. There remains a study of Socrates, which invites comparison with the longer and more ambitious treatise of Prof. Döring, and an encyclopaedia article on Aristotle which may serve as a contrast to the English translation of Zeller.

It is but natural that the personality of Socrates should exercise a perennial attraction, and that from different sides attempts should be made to determine the true character of his teaching. This fascinating problem, never at any time easy, has in our time become almost hopeless owing to the divergent views held respecting the authorities. It has been the fashion to question the integrity of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and most of the chapters have, at one time or another, been denounced as interpolations. Krohn admitted as genuine only 26½ pages

out of 145 (counting by the Teubner text) and of these 17 would be condemned by Hartman, who however takes as his standard of the genuine Xenophontic style two chapters, II. 7 and III. 11, which Krohn has pronounced spurious. Mr. Herbert Richards has lately shown in this review how little the language of Xenophon countenances such violent excisions. Both M. Boutroux and Prof. Döring have our hearty sympathy in their reaction from this mistaken tendency of the higher criticism. Both admit that the *Memorabilia* as an apology for Socrates answers the pamphlet of the sophist Polycrates and not the indictment of Anytus. Prof. Döring thinks he can distinguish in B. II. additions by Xenophon himself of later date, but his careful and elaborate analysis of the whole treatise triumphantly establishes the unity of authorship. M. Boutroux urges that Xenophon brought to his task the fidelity and impartiality which, though often questioned, are nevertheless the characteristics of his other writings.

In their conception of the Socratic teaching our authors greatly diverge. To Prof. Döring Socrates was an ardent social reformer. He had been led from teleology to monotheism: whether consciously or not, he had ceased to be an orthodox adherent of the national religion. The public which Xenophon wished to influence would hardly have understood, much less sympathized with, the martyr in the cause of progress, the regenerator of society. Yet we may gather what Socrates' ultimate aims were from his plain, unassuming talk about

common advantage and public utility, from his anxiety to train promising pupils for public life, and to impart to them the science whereby a household and a state are well administered. In other words, the Socratic society aimed at constitutional reform by means of persuasion: it objected to the appointment of officials by lot and cherished the ideal of a genuine ruler of men, capable of moulding his subjects to his ends. 'A beautiful but unpractical Utopia' is the author's own comment on the picture he has drawn (p. 527).

M. Boutroux regards Socrates as the founder of moral science, and compares his aims (p. 405) with those of Descartes and Kant. Socrates proposed to show that, even assuming the end of human activity to be practical, it cannot exclude science, that in reality it supposes it; similarly the Cartesian doubt became the ground of certitude and Kant's experience is found ultimately to repose on reason. By a careful examination of the Socratic method it is shown that both the outward form—the dialogue, Socratic irony, maieutic art, and personal attachment (*ἔπος*)—and the logical groundwork of elenchus, induction and definition, are primarily applicable to conduct alone and have nothing to do with physics. Even the teleology and theology, Socrates' 'pious opinions,' are but complements, and never essential parts, of his ethical science. But the method reacted on the subject-matter. Socrates was thus led to declare all the virtues forms of knowledge, i.e. of practical science, and hence to affirm his famous paradox, which was no denial of free-will, but a hasty assumption of the identity between moral and material good. Virtue is always a man's interest: *οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως*. Under the principle thus postulated the rules of ordinary morality can

be brought; for they are deductions made by tradition or positive law. It is not true that Socrates tried custom and legality by the standard of abstract reason and justice; it was in the positive and traditional that he sought the expression of the rational. Plato and Aristotle applied the Socratic method to subjects never contemplated by its author; but contemporary ethics may be content once more to return to the limits which Socrates marked out for an independent science dealing with the totality of the ethical facts of human nature.

To present anything but an imperfect sketch of Aristotle's system in a little over a hundred pages is impossible; yet the clear, though condensed, summary of M. Boutroux contains many valuable hints and abundantly testifies to his mastery of the interminable detail. The last section, on the influence of Aristotle, concludes the historical sketch with a few pages of criticism, indicating in a temperate manner, though with something of partisanship, Aristotle's position in regard to Kantianism, evolution, and teleology.

The English version of that part of Zeller's monumental work which treats of Aristotle, supplies a want long recognised. It has been executed in a praiseworthy manner, which, both in accuracy and style, marks an immense advance upon preceding sections. Four-fifths of the *Philosophie der Griechen* now wears an English dress, and from the translators' note it may be inferred that there is at present no intention of adding the last section, treating of Neoplatonism.¹

R. D. H.

¹ The reviewer begs to apologise for the unforeseen delay in noticing these works.

FAIRBANKS'S FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE.

The First Philosophers of Greece, an Edition and Translation of the Remaining Fragments of the Pre-socratic Philosophers, together with a Translation of the more important Accounts of their Opinions contained in the early Epitomes of their Works. By ARTHUR FAIRBANKS. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1898. Pp. x, 300. Price 7s.

THE idea of this book is an excellent one. For the sources of our knowledge concerning

the Presocratics students have been in the habit of resorting to Ritter and Preller's *Historia Philosophiae*, now in the eighth edition. That invaluable handbook presents in 200 pages a selection of the more important fragments, the biographical and doxographical detail, with a scanty Latin commentary, containing the most important textual variants, occasionally a note or two on the meaning, and a number of parallel passages. So useful is this selection, that once or twice an attempt has been made to