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## An Organisation of the Nation for Defence

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# THE JOURNAL

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## ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

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### AN ORGANISATION OF THE NATION FOR DEFENCE.

*By Major-General WEBBER, C.B., R.E., p.s.c.*

Tuesday, 3rd March, 1903.

General Sir RICHARD HARRISON, K.C.B., C.M.G., in the Chair.

#### DURING PEACE FOR A STATE OF WAR.

FIFTY years of the nineteenth century—during which very costly “tinkering” by the Nation of the Military Forces of the Crown, has been going on—have brought us face to face with the fact that the peace administration of the “Navy and Army have, under the reaction following the late war, reached the bed-rock of supply of men *fit to be trained*,” and “that it is dry.”<sup>1</sup>

For the twentieth time this theatre is made the sole arena where the professional sailor and soldier can make himself heard on questions of the reform of systems which have grown up under party government and all its disabling conditions which can produce only second best results.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> But a fresh breakdown of recruiting would bring compulsory or universal short service in the ranks into the arena of practical politics. . . . The voluntary principle has many arguments in its favour provided that it supplies the number of men required, but, if it fails of that essential, all arguments are unavailing, and the recourse to compulsion, the admission that to receive a soldier's training is the duty of every citizen, will be inevitable. This is a question which will have to be squarely faced on the basis of facts, rather than of sentiment or theory, within the next twelve months.—*Morning Post*.

<sup>2</sup> In 1900, an effort was made to form an Army Association, somewhat on the lines of the Navy League. In a letter to the *Times*, in March of that year, Sir J. Wolfe Barry proposed that the “influential and commercial classes of this country should, apart from the Government, look into this momentous question,” the increase of the Army, “for themselves.” . . . to study the duties of our Army” . . . the “investigation ought to be outside any question of party politics.” The writer felt “profoundly the inadequacy of the proposals of the Government, and urged on his countrymen the imperative necessity of their studying for themselves matters which affect our very existence as a Great Power, and which make all questions of whether we should have a Conservative or Liberal Government sink into insignificance,” also that “nothing would so successfully make for the peace of the world as the fact that we were strong by land as well as by sea.”

In February of 1902, Mr. George Shee, an earnest student of the subject, dealt most ably with it from the citizen's point of view. Mr. Shee's book, "The Briton's First Duty," formed the text of his lecture to us. His present position as secretary of the National Service League shows that the result of his devotion to study of the subject is not being left idle.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the sharp lesson we have had, the *insouciance* on the subject is strongly marked in the peoples, in their representatives, and, largely, in the Press. One is inclined to exclaim at the helplessness of a Constitution for securing wise measures in connection with national defence, which requires that the big majority must be convinced of the need for a reform, and under which the conviction of the amateur is more necessary and influential with the voters than that of the man who is master of his subject.

### THREE CONDITIONS.

In the case of our existing Regular and Auxiliary land forces—under their civilian administration—three conditions have accentuated the difficulty:—One, that the business of an Army in peace, unless entirely subordinate to preparation for war, is a purely anomalous one. Another, is due to tradition—the effect of which mars most of the work done by the Mother of Parliaments in connection with Navy and Army—namely, that the professional sailor and soldier "can only be half trusted" to create and build up the weapon he is expected to wield in war.<sup>2</sup> A third, the tenacity with which Governments hold to the prerogative which constitutes the Ministry the sole advisers of the Crown and nation in matters of defence, and which only a truly patriotic party leader is likely to get them to resign.

### "THE UNEXPECTED."


As regards the lessons of the late war, can anything be more striking than the conditions existing in 1899 in the minds of these peoples and their representatives?

It must have struck many people that one of the most startling lessons of the past is the fact that the Boer war was absolutely unlikely and unnecessary, so far as the information in the mind of the general British public was concerned. It shows what is as possible now as ever in history, how—in spite of the absence of all real provocation—a small body of dishonest and irritated men can still bring about war. In their own way, the Boer rank and file were not more ignorant nor prejudiced against us than the ordinary populace of many parts of Europe. The one factor that was necessary to give them confidence—and which is

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<sup>1</sup> "With the shrinkage of the English Channel, brought about by the advent of steam, the growth of foreign fleets and armies, the enormous increase in our wealth, and the dislike with which we are regarded by most foreign Powers, we can no longer refuse to recognise the possibility of invasion."—*Shee*.

<sup>2</sup> They entirely overlook that the Indian (since 1860) and the Egyptian (since 1883) Armies have been entirely brought to their present condition of efficiency and supremacy of economy by soldiers alone.



PHOTOGRAPH OF THE RUSSIAN ICE-BREAKER "YERMAK," FORCING HER WAY THROUGH THE ICE IN KRONSTADT HARBOUR.

*J. J. K. S. Co., Limited, London.*

patent to all Europe—existed, and continues to exist, namely, our unpreparedness for warfare on land.

SIR WILLIAM CROOKES.

Another civilian student of the subject, in 1898, described, at Bristol, one of the causes for anticipation of an early struggle for existence amongst the bread-eating nations in the following words. As President of the British Association, he said:—

"There is a growing danger from the cupidity of other nations being emphasised by the certainty that at the present moment the area under wheat production is already deficient to meet the world demand, and, that only by pressing every acre of suitable land into cultivation within the temperate zone can the increasing population of wheat-eaters be fed during the next 30 years."

"Should all the wheat-growing countries add to their area to the utmost capacity, on the most careful calculation the yield would give us only an addition of some 100,000,000 acres, supplying at the average world yield of 12·7 bushels to the acre, 1,270,000,000 bushels, just enough to supply the increase of population among bread-eaters till the year 1931. . . . At present there is a deficit in the wheat area of 31,000 square miles. . . . When provision has been made . . . to feed the 230,000,000 people likely to add to the bread-eating population by 1931—by the complete occupancy of the arable area of the temperate zone— . . . where can be grown the additional 330,000,000 bushels of wheat required 10 years later by a hungry world?"<sup>1</sup>

Simultaneous with this incentive to rob us of the accumulated wealth which alone enables us to feed our growing population of the future, is the reckless national hourly and daily extravagance, in food, and waste of sewage, which will weaken our reserves of endurance when our wheat supply is so far reduced and the cost of bread increased as to produce revolution against a Constitution which provides a form of Government that, when the fatal day comes, will have lost the confidence of the peoples whom they have, in the past encouraged in ignorance of truths, which such as we in this Institution have for 30 years been fruitlessly proclaiming.

Mr. Shee's cry for universal military service, and Sir William Crooke's warnings, both voice the yearning to see these peoples under some form of moral and physical discipline in time of peace. The inertia which has to be overcome is the latent form of uninstructed reliance which they have in their own powers of self-organisation for all peaceful ends, and their complete ignorance of the economic and other forces that are in—and ever increasing—existence, and of the fact that the self-organising power of which they are conscious will not, without previous preparation, suffice in the day of need. It should be the mission of Mr. Shee and his friends<sup>2</sup> and of all patriots to "peg

<sup>1</sup> Sir William foretold the early exhaustion of the world's stock of fixed nitrates as a matter of far more immediate importance than the exhaustion of coal. It meant, he said, not only a catastrophe little short of starvation for the wheat-eaters, but scarcity for those who exist on inferior grain.

<sup>2</sup> On the 5th of April, 1902, the objects of "The National Service League" were described in a letter to the Press, signed by the Duke of Wellington. After concisely describing the future difficulties of the recruiting question, and after mentioning "the situation into which we are drifting," and the "many indirect advantages, physical, moral, and educational to be derived from general training," the letter gave the names of the Executive Committee, namely, the Duke of Wellington, Sir John Wolfe Barry, Mr. H. Birchenough, Mr. Clinton Dawkins, Viscount Hardinge, Lord Newton, Major Seeley, M.P., Admiral Sir N. Bowden-Smith, Mr. Walter, Mr. E. P. Warren, and Mr. Yerburch, M.P.

away" at and wear out this optimism by every form of agitation and propaganda of which they are capable.<sup>1</sup>

#### ORGANISATION OF THE NATION.

In a paper entitled "Army Reform based on some Nineteenth Century Lessons," which I read to a meeting of this Institution in February, 1901, I promised, if the Council would give me the opportunity, to enlarge in papers (to be in continuation of the first) on the subjects then submitted for discussion.

I have already dealt with one of those subjects in a paper entitled "An Advisory Board," read at a meeting of the Institution on 10th June, 1901; and I now venture to deal with the question of "Organisation of the Nation for a time of War."

I am led to take this, the last one of the suggestions made in my paper of February, 1901, next in order, because of the appointment last year of a *War Enquiry Commission*, as to which the Prime Minister, on the 8th August, expressed the hope that the Commission "would not lose themselves in detail," and would "confine their enquiry to the larger issues involved."<sup>2</sup>

I am also led to believe that the subject was not in any way exhausted by the paper read here by Mr. George Shee, entitled "*The Advantage of Compulsory Service for Home Defence*," and the interesting discussion which followed, on the 14th, 19th, and 27th February last.

The risk of repeating (what has been over and over again said before) the arguments in favour of compulsory service in some form for the defence of the fatherland is best avoided by assuming that my audience have more or less familiarised their minds with all that can be said for and against the proposition.

I will, therefore, first enlarge on the contention in my former paper, namely, that the system of compulsory service as inaugurated in the continental countries of Europe is not only *unscientific*, but it is, moreover, unadapted to the peoples of these kingdoms, and, amongst other conditions, to those connected with their political history and insular position.

First, as to the scientific point of view. I have contended that, in the event of these kingdoms becoming the object of invasion, when face to face with a state of things brought about by a war, which would entail the possibility of invasion or attack on our shores, the demands on the male population for purposes of defence will require, for *every man* who will be trained to wield or serve a weapon to kill the opponent almost exclusively with projectiles, in other words, to enter the line of battle, *two or three men*, not necessarily skilled in the use of weapons of offence and defence, to work with their hands, in the service of the fighting line and of the community in general.

<sup>1</sup> In a pamphlet, *Our Food Supply in time of European War* (which has no date in it), Captain Stewart Murray has collected some very valuable data on the subject. Further on in the paper I may use some of his suggestions in reference to the organisation necessary in time of peace to permit of the supply and distribution of food available being at once brought under control of local authorities.

<sup>2</sup> The pinch is felt, but confusion of ideas exists as to the direction in which reform is needed, and, now that Army re-organisation is contemplated, there is danger it may be misdirected.—*Sir C. Warren*.

Unlike the conditions of compulsory service as understood abroad, the obligation, as my proposals define it, would not entail the necessity of being trained to use a weapon. Every male between certain ages, *without any exemption whatever*, would be compulsorily enrolled in local companies of the National Auxiliary Defence Corps, and would be obliged to give, at 18 years of age, or on joining, sufficient time to acquire at least as much company, foot, and physical, drill as, for instance, is taught to our Metropolitan policeman, to enable him to move as a unit of an organised body, and, until a maximum age is reached, to attend, during peace, once, twice, or so, a year and report himself at the headquarters or rendezvous of the unit or company of the corps to which he originally belonged, or to which he may have been transferred when he may have changed his residence.

This Corps would require neither arms nor military equipment; and each individual would be identifiable by his register and by a badge of number and locality.

Except an allowance for food, on the days of training, in foot or physical drill, and, of assembly afterwards, he would receive, beyond the cost of locomotion, no pay. The value of his time would be his obligatory contribution to help to insure the safety of the fatherland.<sup>1</sup>

#### DISCIPLINE.

The highest order of "national sense of discipline" is acquired by nations with such a history as ours. Under that marvellous instinct for self-discipline which is found in our races at home and abroad we daily see its application. But it cannot do everything. With a definite object before it, such as the defence of the fatherland, it requires the aid of organisation.<sup>2</sup>

The Board of Education, in 1902, has issued a "Model Course of Physical Training," for use in upper departments of public elementary schools, which "consists mainly of the elementary notions of drill." This admirable little book is no more nor less than a *drill-book* (with out the use of arms or equipment). It absolutely supplies in detail the instructions for the nation in drill advocated by me here in February, 1901.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A writer on "Army Re-organisation" in *Blackwood* recognises a system as a substitute for compulsory personal service under which a *contribution* from all men who do not elect to serve either in the county Militia or Volunteers. He proposes to appropriate this to defray local expenses; but the system represents the worst form of conscription as it existed in France before 1870.

<sup>2</sup> "What good will the 'man in the street' and the working man be, without discipline, if you teach him to shoot? Ask column commanders their opinion of the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa during the latter part of the war. The most successful leaders declined to have . . . them in their columns if they could get Regulars . . . What can we expect when we send out to war absolutely untrained . . . sweepings of the big English towns? They have not had the bringing-up, the home education, which inculcates patriotism, and therefore they do not understand how to play the game."—*H.T.*, in the "*Times*," December, 1902.—i.e., "They have no sense of discipline."—*C.E.W.*

<sup>3</sup> This is the outcome of proposals which have for a long time been advocated by Lord Meath, Chairman of the Lads' Drill Association, of which Lieut.-Colonel O. T. Duke is Honorary Secretary. The "model course" was planned in 1899, and was printed in January, 1901.



## THE DISCUSSION ON MR. SHEE'S PAPER.

The following spoke, namely:—*Sir R. Giffen; Mr. Clinton Dawkins; Colonel Brookfield, M.P., R.V.; Colonel Cave, R.V.; Major-General Webber; Major-General Sterling; Admiral Bowden-Smith; Bishop of Chester; Earl of Wemyss, R.V.; Colonel Sir Howard Vincent, M.P., R.W.F.; Sir John Colomb, M.P., R.M.L.I.; Lieut.-Colonel O. T. Duke; Colonel Pilkington, M.P., R.V.; Viscount Hardinge, 7th Bn. Rifle Brigade; Colonel Dooner, p.s.c.; Admiral Fremantle; Major Seeley, M.P., Imperial Yeomanry; Major-General B. Strange, R.A.; Lieut.-Colonel Underwood, 4th Hussars; Colonel Price Jones, M.P., R.V.; Dr. Miller Maguire; Captain Stewart Murray, Gordons; Mr. E. P. Warren; Colonel Graves; Lieut.-Colonel Baylis, K.C., R.V.; Sir Ralph Knox; Major Heron Maxwell, Royal Fusiliers; Lieut.-Colonel Holden, 4th Bn. Cameronians; Colonel Mountstevens, R.M.L.I.; Commander Shore, R.N.; Fleet Engineer G. Quick, R.N.; Major Yate; Lieut.-Colonel Gunter, p.s.c.; Mr. Shee, Lord Newton;*

making a total, including the lecturer and the chairman, of 35 speakers. Of these, 6 were civilians, one being a bishop, the experience of 5 was Naval, of 10 it had been gained in the Volunteers (2 having seen service in Africa), 11 speakers had served as professional soldiers (of whom 6 or 7 had been with troops under fire). In this remarkable discussion 24 speakers agreed entirely with the lecturer in the advocacy of what is known as *compulsory, general, and manhood, military training and service* on lines generally similar to those adapted on the Continent of Europe.

The civilian expressions of approval were "*of the general line of argument*"; "*general sympathy*"; that "*the young men of our country would gain a great deal*"; that "*there was no answer to the lecturer's arguments in favour of compulsory service*"; that "*amongst working men the speaker had met with a positive enthusiasm for compulsory service.*"

The officers whose experience had been obtained in the Auxiliary Forces expressed themselves that "*the lecturer's recommendation contained a rational system of national defence*"; that "*compulsory service is a most excellent thing for any country*"; that "*the lecturer's plan ought to be formulated into a Bill which could be brought before Parliament*"; that "*we should get a Reserve for the Army if the scheme, or a modified form of it, were carried.*" One speaker "*thoroughly agreed with nearly all Mr. Shee's propositions*"; another, speaking as a member of Parliament, considered it would "*be extremely desirable that it should be obligatory for every male in this country to be trained to arms.*" Again, another "*believed that the country would agree with this moderate form of compulsion*"; and still one more desired "*to strengthen the arguments . . . in favour of the principle of compulsory or universal military service for home defence.*"

The criticisms on the scheme as put forward by Mr. Shee, both in his lecture and his book "*The Briton's First Duty*," came from those who accepted it in principle, and from those, like Sir Howard Vincent, Lord Wemyss, and Colonel Dooner, who more or less rejected it as being inexpedient or unpractical.

Those who agreed with compulsion in some form of service preparatory to defence were Colonel J. B. Sterling, Sir John Colomb, Lieut.-Colonel Duke, Colonel Pilkington, Lieut.-Colonel Bayliss, and I think I may include, besides myself, Sir Ralph Knox.

Several speakers, including Lord Newton (the Chairman) considered that our meeting on the 14th February, 1902, would be the starting-

point from which a movement would be set on foot and would spread until the country became convinced of the necessity for compulsory service.

### THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE.

The duty of those leading such a movement will be to bring about a clear understanding in the country:—*First*: As to the greater or lesser probabilities of the Fleet, under the best conditions, in addition to its first duty—namely, to attack the enemy's fleet—(a) being able to keep open the sea-ways by which these islands can be re-victualled; (b) or being unable, while occupied in protecting the food supply, to prevent a landing for the purpose of invasion. *Second*: As to disastrous consequences of inability on the part of the Navy to successfully perform all these duties. *Third*: As to the inevitable results of such an inability, through starvation on the one hand, or, on the other, through the landing of a powerful army or armies in these islands.

This work, conscientiously carried out and persisted in, in spite of all discouragement, must in time bring home to the minds of the voters in our constituencies but one conclusion, and that is, that in any case there is absolutely no present security against the Fleet being so far crippled as to leave the country for a shorter or longer time short of food or open to invasion, or even both.

In the discussion we were told, that this propaganda in no case can be carried on by Parliament, or by the Government for the time being. I do not remember if it was regarded as probable that the nation would listen to the military experts (I include Army and Navy) who have during the nineteenth century made up their minds as to the existence and the extent of the danger. Unfortunately, without an independent standing "Advisory Board"—who, being independent of party Ministers, would be listened to by the country—all Service voices on this subject "cry vainly in the wilderness."

Possibly a petition to the throne, as one voice, independent of a party Government, to move the Sovereign himself to appeal to the sense of the nation, signed by our greatest admirals and generals, might have some effect; but it is a procedure that would probably be deprecated as conducive to alarm, or as a threat against our neighbours.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the 15th September last there was a letter in the *Times* from Sir Edmund Du Cane, respecting "Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Highbury." Sir Edmund showed that the Minister's claim for responsibility as to the "sufficiency of provision for the services" of "our rulers and our rulers alone" was historically inaccurate.

Referring to 1846, when (he states) "we were even more without friends in Europe than we are now," the Government took the question of an "attack on England" in hand.

Estimates, etc., were brought in. The Duke of Wellington's warning got into the papers. "But an agitation arose . . . the ignorant multitude gave ear to people as ignorant as themselves, the Duke was charged with stirring up animosity . . . the Opposition was ready to profit by the agitation."

The Government gave in. Event after event followed, all, leading up to and terminating in the Crimean war. The public, after allowing themselves to be deluded, complacently threw the blame on their rulers, "and especially on the heads of the professions."

In any case, the task to arouse these peoples to their folly will be colossal.

None of the hundreds of expressions of warning that have been spoken in this theatre during the last 50 years have been too strong.<sup>1</sup>

Can we hope that this new organisation will succeed?

Those who never let the subject drop fervently wish it success. One of its difficulties will lie in the gloomy fact that the political leaders of these peoples are never convinced of anything which comes from the lips of an expert; and their constituents have, in the later generations, been educated, on most public questions, to the same mode of thought.<sup>2</sup>

The nation is led to seize on the loose statements of any non-expert as a plea for postponement.

The next question for this organisation to consider carefully is what panacea they will prescribe to the awakening public.

If the clergy of all denominations will follow the Bishop of Chester, who believes that "a strong England means peace for the world," and can at the same time teach their people that England is as "weak as ditch-water" in these respects, then the cause will have a powerful auxiliary.<sup>3</sup>

#### INFLUENCE OF THE WOMEN.

If the women of England will rouse themselves to use their immense aggregate power to work up the true feeling which their dependent position can best influence, the cause will have the most powerful auxiliary of all.

Their love of country may be, and no doubt is, the most stimulating influence on them, but their love of home and hearth and children appeals to their instincts of self-preservation all the more powerfully, as they would personally, if anything, be the direst sufferers in every detail of their daily lives.

If they could see, as I have, every house and cottage, every mansion, and every public building crowded with foreign soldiery, they would realise what invasion means. It is true the invasion which I witnessed did not bring destruction and disaster by massacre with fire and sword, pestilence, and subsequent famine. The soldiery were

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<sup>1</sup> I hope Major-General Sterling was not too sanguine in looking upon a meeting at the R.U.S. Institution . . . as the yeast which leavens the whole mass of military opinion in the country. Can any view of the question be more dangerous than the following? see the *Times* leader of 24th February: "A regular invasion can never occur while our fleets hold the sea, and our ruin will be complete on the day that the failure of our fleet renders it possible."

<sup>2</sup> On the 27th February last Captain Shore, R.N., said: "Unless people can be persuaded that invasion is not only possible but extremely probable . . . they will never consent to be compelled to serve their country."

<sup>3</sup> Britons say they never will be slaves, they look to their Constitution to preserve them from slavery. How very few understand its weaknesses! Who realises that its working is the cause of most of the defective results of which they complain? When they and the Press blame individuals, soldiers and sailors, they shut their eyes to the fact that the action or inaction of those individuals is mostly due to conditions which do not tie down men in other countries where national defence is looked at as a Constitutional and not a Party question.

civilised beings, themselves, sons, husbands, and fathers; but even with all these mitigations of land warfare, all the conditions of civil popular life had to give way to the military ones.

Under no circumstances can war bring anything but disruption and disorder in the civil conditions of life throughout the theatre of its operations. The more highly civilised and crowded the population the more emphatic the effects.

In respect to one minor interruption of our daily life, it has often occurred to me: How would the women and children of London, for instance, take the cessation, or material reduction of their milk supply (say) for only three days?

I do not say that their heroism would not be equal to that of the people of Paris in 1870, but that is not the question. It is, have they ever allowed themselves for a moment to contemplate such contingencies, or to imagine their effects on themselves and their families?

If there is one half of the membership of our social life which should never cease, day or night, crying out for measures that will provide in peace an organisation which will make our position so safe in war, that no one will dare to invade our shores, it is the female half. To them I would now appeal in words only too feeble to express the vast importance of the cause, and the enormity of abstention from its advocacy.

Our religious teachers and our women will be safe in repeating the unanswerable proposition "*that it is obligatory on every citizen to give personally of his strength and intelligence to ensure as far as possible in time of peace the success of the cause of his country, when obliged to undertake war.*"<sup>1</sup>

This can mean nothing but "compulsion" in some form or other if the obligation is to be met, no matter how it is softened down by other titles.

The suggestion of some people to substitute the word "general" for "compulsory service" is only trifling.

#### RECAPITULATION OF MR. SHEE'S SCHEME.

So that there may be no mistake, let me repeat what I interpret to be his meaning.

He proposes to substitute a Pan-Britannic Militia of all arms for the existing Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteer Forces. The permanently embodied portions of that Militia will be the first year's men selected from those males of the population aged 20 or thereabouts, who are not specially exempted by Statute from compulsory

<sup>1</sup> My hearers may with advantage be here reminded that the Militia laws of the United States established universal compulsory service in May, 1792, (amended in March, 1803).

"Every able-bodied male citizen . . . who is of the age of 18 years and under the age of 45, shall be enrolled . . . every captain of a company shall enroll every such citizen residing within the bounds of his company, . . . who comes to reside within such bounds . . . shall without delay notify every such citizen of his enrolment . . . and to attend . . . muster . . . and for that purpose it shall be deemed a legal notice."

Section 1628 of the Statute obliges each citizen to provide himself with a "fire lock or rifle," "bayonet and belt," "powder and ball," "knapsack," "ammunition pouch," but no uniform is mentioned.

"military" service, and numbering, he believes, about 205,000 men, and by this substitution he proposes to effect a large saving in the present expenditure. It is entirely illusory, as I shall try to show.<sup>1</sup>

#### EXAMINATION OF HIS PROPOSALS.

When, however, we come to dissect Mr. Shee's scheme, we are met with such questions as the following:—Major-General J. B. Sterling said, "*Now I would ask the lecturer to consider . . . because it is one of the gravest questions we have to deal with, How are you going to organise these men in the enormous numbers he proposes?*" He referred to the 300,000 or 400,000 males who might yearly have to be considered.

I don't find that the lecturer's example of the late volunteering for China in the German Army in any way answers Sir John Colomb's question, namely:—"Supposing by the application of the compulsory principle you have created these immense reservoirs of military force, and rely upon their units to provide by volunteering the elements of a great striking army for use beyond the sea . . . is anybody sure that the very fact of adopting compulsion would not kill the spirit of volunteering for war service altogether?"

The speakers probably had on their minds that it is the spirit of volunteering in time of peace which might be killed. Peace is the rule, war the exception. The danger of injuring that spirit, is in the lazy times of peace, not when war has begun. The Defence League should carefully consider this part of the question. It is easy to upset or pull down, not so easy to restore and build up. It will not do to aggravate the famine of recruits while trying for something that is still out of reach.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following table, which shows the actual expenditure before and during the war in South Africa—exclusive of the non-effective services,—will assist those who wish to go into costs in some detail:—

—	1896-7	1897-8	1898-9	1899-00	1900-01	Estimate. 1901-02	Estimate. 1902-03
1. Pay of the Army ...	5,996,827	5,931,399	5,980,229	8,951,618	16,201,361	21,657,500	18,940,190
2. Medical Establishment...	290,071	301,811	330,910	454,855	1,183,341	1,038,600	1,025,000
3. Militia ...	533,901	533,004	516,965	817,789	2,160,389	2,662,000	1,331,000
4. Yeomanry ...	74,273	75,551	76,488	75,342	180,994	375,000	555,000
5. Volunteers ...	885,952	888,611	872,516	627,793	1,789,203	1,230,000	1,237,000
6. Transport and Remounts	708,126	886,126	989,332	10,762,233	23,630,326	15,977,000	11,242,000
7. Provision Supplies ...	2,430,623	2,632,722	3,234,266	8,753,394	19,795,317	18,762,000	16,066,000
8. Clothing ...	897,056	1,147,297	1,135,558	2,386,410	5,140,704	4,825,000	3,970,000
9. Stores ...	1,823,031	2,298,027	2,421,344	5,431,601	13,918,085	13,450,000	8,332,000
10. Works and Buildings ...	950,743	1,114,621	1,002,957	1,233,645	3,711,342	3,231,000	2,190,000
11. Establishment Education	117,963	115,812	113,804	108,782	106,860	119,000	120,800
12. Miscellaneous Effective...	49,756	59,287	51,650	59,061	107,242	218,000	110,800
13. War Office ...	214,704	215,123	213,037	261,179	313,033	305,000	332,000
Total Effective Services...	15,002,332	16,484,451	17,057,506	40,034,007	83,023,713	83,970,500	65,532,000

<sup>2</sup> If, as some suggest, our present auxiliary forces, who ought to, and probably must, form the "*ordre de bataille*" of our Armies destined to repel invasion, are "*no better than an armed crowd*," an "*armed mob of brave men with rifles*," then, if that is true, do the advocates of compulsory service in a National Militia, who wish to wipe out the existing auxiliary forces and all that is represented by voluntary service, believe that *they* will have created in substitution an Army that will have fewer of those characteristics?

Mr. Shee gave no answer to the questions of Lord Hardinge:—

1. "If we had such a large number of men for universal military service for home defence, how does he propose to find the men for foreign service: . . . ?"

2. "If by his scheme this large number of men were procured for universal service for one year . . . how would those men be housed?"

He tells us his system abolishes what he calls "*the overlapping system of Volunteers, Militia, Yeomanry, and so on,*" by the establishment of a national or Pan-Britannic Militia under training, with its first, second, and third reserves, which is to be an immense reserve of trained men, to be called upon. . . to fill up the casualties in the ranks of a professional Imperial Army.<sup>1</sup>

For the professional Army, he tells us that the "voluntary system"—which elsewhere he decries—"is necessary." He uses the word "*foreign*" before the words "*professional Army*," but he tells us that he allows for "*a nucleus of highly-trained, long-service soldiers in the United Kingdom*," and elsewhere he allows for a professional Army outside India of 100,000.

For India he provides for the "*professional Army*" 74,000 men, but for them he makes no allowance for the recruits under training at home, or reliefs.

The answer to Lord Hardinge's question apparently is, that he *must* still fall back on the voluntary system, with all the attendant drawbacks which he so graphically describes and also condemns—"to find the men for foreign service."

#### BARRACKS OR HOUSING.

As to the housing, Mr. Shee gives no indication. At present the 288,000 Volunteers and 29,800 Yeomanry, which he proposes to disband, house themselves. The 123,993 Militia, as now constituted, are housed or placed under canvas for one or two months. He did not try to get out of part of this big difficulty by adopting Major-General B. Strange's suggestion to reduce the training from one year to six months, and "*to put the townsmen recruits into camp.*"

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<sup>1</sup> Let me here remind the reader that those who have not "*cut the painter*" and gone in wholesale for universal compulsory armed service, advocate *voluntary* engagement for:—

- a. An overpowering Navy;
- b. As large and efficient a professional Army as we can afford;
- c. A strong Militia (by ballot as an alternative);
- d. A *generously encouraged* Volunteer force;
- e. A Reserve of the rest of the nation, trained in rifle clubs.

For the professional Army chiefly destined, except in the form of "*cadres*" to service in India and abroad, and as to whose training they insist on the "*highest possible efficiency, high pay* (to be made up by reducing the numbers) is the panacea. This highly-paid professional Army they set down at 115,000 abroad, 15,000 at home, and 70,000 colonial contingents—presumably entirely provided by the Colonies—total, 200,000. As it must include 70 to 80 thousand in India and all depôts and *cadres* at home and abroad, it is a very "*tight fit*" to provide the mobile Army Corps of 100,000 strong, ready to go anywhere at a day's notice.

They give no estimate of the increased cost of the "*generous encouragement.*"

Colonel Gunter's alternative, namely, that an option might be given to "*put in 60 days' training for three consecutive years in place of a whole year's consecutive service,*" seemed to have no attractions.

Nor did he accept Major Seely's example of "*Colonials*" who have "*acquitted themselves well*" in the South African war, as a proof that in time of peace, it is not essential that the soldier should be trained in barracks!

In any case he did not answer the question. The cost I shall refer to further on. But it was when he had to answer Sir Ralph Knox's practical criticisms that the theoretical aspect of his system was made clear.

### COSTS.

Mr. Shee commends his so-called system to the taxpayer by a claim that he will effect a large saving in the Army estimates, namely, of £6,000,000 on £30,000,000.

In his reply in the discussion he allowed for what is called the professional Army (officially the Regular Army) 100,000 men at £110 a head, and in his paper he provided for 205,000 to 210,000 first year National Militia men, who would be permanently under training at £45 to £60 a head.

For simplicity I purposely leave out the question of the cost of the Naval part of the annual compulsory contingent and its reserves, because he gave no clear description of how his Pan-Britannic Militia is to help the Navy.

The cost, therefore, I presume, of the Regular Army, without non-effectives, would, according to him, *outside India*, be £10,000,000.

I adopt the mean, between his own figure of £110 a head instead of that of Sir R. Knox, namely, £90 a head, as I have no means of analysing either figure.<sup>1</sup>

It is doubtless an under-estimate. In the first place 100,000 men outside India cannot be held to include either the recruits under training or the reliefs of the Regular Army in India and elsewhere abroad. Experience shows that we have continually been in the habit of counting immature recruits in the "strength." As I said in this room on the 20th February, 1901, these cannot be estimated at less than 10,000. Without providing for the extra Colonial reliefs required for South Africa, 16,000 men is clearly too few for all the other Imperial and Colonial stations.

Apparently, then, it would be absolutely necessary to provide for at least 130,000 men (including establishments), which, instead of £10,000,000 makes £13,000,000.

For purpose of discussion, I propose to adopt as the cost per head of the embodied portion of the proposed Pan-Britannic Militia Mr. Shee's figures, including establishments, of £60 a head (not inclusive of housing).

<sup>1</sup> On the 8th November, 1902, in reply to Sir Edgar Vincent, Mr. Brodrick stated that the average cost of a private soldier is approximately: Infantry of Line, £52 6s. 4d.; Cavalry of Line, £58 16s. 9d., which when increased pay takes effect, will be £59 6s. 1d. and £65 16s. 6d. respectively. There are no means of knowing how much (if any) of the costs of stores or retired and non-effective pay are charged in these amounts.

Probably, if all "arms" are considered, it is a fair figure.

For these 205,000 men undergoing a first year's training the cost at £60 will therefore be £12,300,000.

Total for the Regular Army and the Pan-Britannic Militia added together £25,300,000.

#### TRAINING OF THE PAN-BRITANNIC MILITIA RESERVES.

But where he (Mr. Shee) provides for the cost of the annual trainings of his first, second, and third reserves, I cannot discover. It is clear it cannot be done for nothing. So far as I understand him, each man, assuming that he selects his year's training to be when he is between 18 and 20, would subsequently have:—

5 years in the first reserve with 8 weeks' training in each year.

Total, 40 weeks.

5 years in the second reserve, with 4 weeks' training in each year. Total, 20 weeks.

10 years in the third reserve with 2 weeks' training in each year. Total, 20 weeks.

How is this to be paid for, and what will it cost?

Let us consider the number to be trained, and probable cost of this annual work.

#### WASTE.

In estimating the wastage, it seems fair to assume that during—

						Per cent.
The first	3	years it will be	...	...	...	5
The next	2	" "	...	...	...	4
The next	5	" "	...	...	...	3
The next	10	" "	...	...	...	2

Up to 40 there are fewer casualties as men get older, and less loss by migration.

#### TOTAL NUMBER OF MEN OF THE "NATIONAL MILITIA" RESERVE TO BE TRAINED EACH YEAR.

Class 1.	Of those in their first to fifth year, inclusive,	
	there will be	886,631
" 2.	In their sixth to tenth years, inclusive	740,756
" 3.	In their eleventh to twentieth years, inclusive	1,250,659
Total	...	2,878,046

In counting by "weeks of a man" the work to be done by those who have to keep up the training, some idea of its extent can be estimated.

The first class	will require weeks of a man	7,893,048
The second "	" "	2,963,024
The third "	" "	2,501,318

Total weeks of a man ... 13,357,390



## TRAINING SHELTER.

I do not know if Mr. Shee proposed to find covered-in spaces for the training of his 205,000 one-year men, who would be continually embodied, but I hardly think he expects that the Reserve men can be trained under cover. Therefore, unless there is to be a good deal of the men's time wasted by bad weather, the training must be in the open, and crowded into about 35 out of 52 weeks. Admitting this to be reasonable, to get at the numbers of Reserves actually under training at the same time, divide 13,357,390 by 35 = 381,639.

## TRAINING STAFF OF THE RESERVE.

In the German Army with 3 years' embodied service, the yearly contingents are under the same colours as those who are in their second and third years of embodiment, and the permanent officers and non-commissioned officers, who suffice for one year's contingent, are available for the rank and file contingents. The converse could not be expected, *i.e.*, that there would be a reduction in the permanent staff by reducing the training to one year. Much rather the other way: and that the permanent staff, with one year's service men only, should be larger, if anything.

I dwell on this because it demonstrates that the permanent staff of the embodied units would not be available to train the Reserves.

If the Regular Army—the original training-ground for the staff—can provide from its retired ranks, for the service of the *standing embodied units*, 3 officers and 7 non-commissioned officers for every 200 men—namely, 3,075 of the former and 7,175 of the latter, exclusive of staff, the limits of the supply would probably have been reached, if not exceeded.

## PROVISION OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS FOR THE TRAINING STAFF OF THE RESERVES.

Where, then, are trained officers and non-commissioned officers to be found to keep up continuously the efficiency of the 2,878,046 men of the Reserve?

These, if they can be provided, would be kept at actual work  $35 + 5 = 40$  weeks a year, with 12 weeks' leave.

I am under the impression that Mr. Shee would admit that the possibility of making provision of professional officers and non-commissioned officers of long experience for this enormous body is very problematical.

The standing embodied units *might* absorb, for training, with the one-year men, many of the first, second, and third year Reserve men (about, say, 555,524), but this does not give much relief.

There would be over 2,000,000 National Militia Reservists who would have to find their own officers and non-commissioned officers out of the product of one year's training.

Allowing 2 of the first and 15 of the second per 1,000 men at drill at one time, you could not get the 800 permanent officers for less pay than, an average of £365, and the 6,000 permanent non-commissioned officers, £75 a year. Their pay alone would amount to £742,000.

I cannot think that less provision than 10s. for food and lodging per week of a man in the Reserve can be allowed in an estimate. This

will cost  $12,557,390 \div 2 = £6,278,695$ . Total cost of the proposed Pan-Britannic Militia £19,320,695.<sup>1</sup>

Total costs of all services £32,320,695.

For home defence there would be some 2,500,000 men, *rated* to be trained to arms. All of them probably would be able to *discharge*, "let off," a rifle or a gun, and have learnt tactical drill. A very small proportion would be able to ride, or drive a gun team, or to do the work of engineers of the line of battle, and not 40 per cent. could be trusted to hit with a rifle any object in the field of view visible to the naked eye beyond 300 yards, or with a rifle on wheels (a gun), beyond a mile.

A *vast armed crowd*, without the "soul" or discipline as essential to an army as life is to the body, would exist.

That is all.

A real army of 250,000 men—one-tenth their numbers—of 3 to 7 years' service, equipped, trained, and organised up to the pitch that science and art now permit,<sup>2</sup> with the "soul" that nothing but steady, continuous discipline and *esprit de corps* can give, would sweep such a half-disciplined armed mob before it to destruction or surrender.

I pretend, therefore, to have shown that the expenditure I have quoted, which is besides the interest on the capital outlay and the cost of up-keep of considerable additional building accommodation for stores, magazines, etc., absorbs all Mr. Shee's alleged saving of £6,000,000 and a great deal more.

I have also, I hope, indicated how, the moment any proposal of compulsory service makes the *training to arms* also compulsory, a maze of difficulties are entered, of which it is hard to see the end.

The scheme is a second-rate attempt to imitate the Continental system. Even its advocates will not, I think, try to escape its burthens on the population and on the exchequer by increasing the percentage of exemptions. It would break down, if only, because it is divested of an element essential to success found in those Armies. This lies in the existence of one land service in those countries. One Service, one

<sup>1</sup> "Europe must give up the system of general conscription, both for military and social reasons. It is better to have one million experienced soldiers who are worth something, than three million cheap ones who are worth nothing." . . . "No State is in the position to bear the necessary cost of making the conscript army really fit for service and useful."—*Count Sternberg*.

Incidentally each of these men may be said to be able to produce (on a low average, including all classes) that which can be valued at 20 shillings a week, which means a productive loss of £13,357,390.—*C.E.W.*

<sup>2</sup> General Joseph Wheeler, U.S.A., writes, with reference to projectiles from weapons on wheels: "The effort should be to train an army that the missing of a shot would be the exception, and not the rule." . . .

"The nations which will win victory in the future will be those who use the most skill in the application of scientific methods. . . . The training and drill of the soldier will be carried to a high standard of perfection, and he will be taught that every shot must be well directed, and count for a purpose. . . . Even one hit, with good marksmanship, out of seventy-six shots, gives a conception of the fearful waste of ammunition which has heretofore been tolerated. A vast proportion of this waste is through the taking it for granted that every man can be taught to fire a projectile from the shoulder.

Army. There are no sub-divisions into "professional Army" and "National Militia," and so on. Unity of localisation, of service, of tradition, and of command, is a fundamental condition. One system of discipline, training, and one spirit, exist throughout. While under arms every man is a soldier—nothing more or less. All tends to cohesion, to uniformity, and to devotion to one chief and to one object.

The certainty of a breakdown of the scheme is greater when one regards the Naval National Militia, which presumably is a part of it. The professional Navy is each year becoming more technical and more highly-trained. There is no place on a war-ship for a Militia sailor. One year on a training-ship—even if the training-ship existed—cannot fit a man to take his place beside the genuine article.

The experiences of our nearest neighbour with their own "Services Maritimes," established long before 1870, and assimilated as far as possible to the compulsory service system, which started in that year, are a warning, even when a fishing population is concerned.

#### UNSCIENTIFIC AND IRRATIONAL.

As I have said, I will not repeat all the well-known advantages of Continental compulsory military service, national and social, reiterated (for the twentieth time; I may say, as if they were new) at the three meetings in question. They are mostly of importance in time of peace. I shall try to prove that the scheme, as recommended by Mr. Shee, is, from the soldier's point of view, utterly "unscientific," and that it is not a "rational system of defence," as Colonel Brookfield called it on the 14th February last.

I am sure its advocates believe that all that is wanted is, to compel the annual attendance of two or three hundred thousand men. to train, arm and equip them, in order to provide a few millions, not only to deter invasion, but to deal with it, if it actually took place.

Well, the soldier can only dwell on the question from one point of view, and that is, Whether the instrument provided as Mr. Shee proposes is one fitted for the shock of battle? First, he will remember that every available professional soldier (officers and men) at such a moment will be in the ranks of the professional Army, either at home or abroad. This Pan-Britannic Militia, to form the fighting units of armies, would have to depend entirely, for its strategical and tactical organisation, for mobility, on itself, and on what it has built up and prepared in time of peace. The small Regular or professional Army, upon which the scheme is dependent, could provide no "stiffening."

If, then, it is not the "professional Army," what shall we call it; is there any other name than the "amateur Army"?

#### THE SOUL OF ARMIES.

Listening to Lord Newton, Mr. Shee, and most of the speakers at the recent meetings, I could not help feeling how well they had used their observation and reading as (so called) business men, to grasp much of what might be called the *letter* of the subject of war, but how absolutely they had failed to understand and realise the *spirit* of the matter. I do not mean that any of them would not in battle possess all the individual spirit which impels men to face death. But I mean that they would then only for the first time fully grasp the absolute necessity that the spirit of the individual should infuse the body, and that, to win, there must (other things being equal) be more of it on their side than on that of the opponent. The presence of that spirit, whether in the company, or the battalion, or the brigade, or the division, or the army, is as essential at the moment of battle as the weapon

which is carried on the back or shoulder, on horse-back or on foot, or dragged along on wheels, with which it is intended to hit the enemy.

In spite of much that is always being done in peace to kill or injure that military spirit in the British Army, we have, in a wonderful way, preserved a good deal of it in our so-called "professional Army."

Will any student of the history of Armies pretend it is a growth of a day, or even of a year, or of seven years? Does he not know that it is a thing of subtle growth with which what is called "patriotism" has but little to do?<sup>1</sup> Easily undermined, its deterioration often only appears in war.

The so-called "business man" has never been able to understand an army, except as a machine. The very essence of its usefulness, namely the spirit in it, he takes for granted.<sup>1</sup>

And I feel that I am not exaggerating when I assert that the speakers have taken the presence of all it means in the day of battle, in that huge agglomeration of amateurs compelled to fight, entirely for granted.

Let them not confound it with the instinct of patriotism, or with what is called the military spirit, which has very mixed motives. No; it is a *something* which is found in what the professional Army understands by the regimental or corps system, blended with tradition and loyalty to the Sovereign. If this cannot be founded and built up in the units of the great "amateur" Army<sup>2</sup> which Mr. Shee and his supporters propose, that Army will, if the picture of invasion drawn by Colonel Chesney 30 years ago, and by others since then, and by Major Heron Maxwell on the 27th February last, are correct, be only a sure source of national humiliation. Because, when face to face with the professional soldiers of the invader, an organisation deficient in what that invader knows to be vital, and has put before anything else, must fall to pieces, no matter how well commanded or staffed, and cannot fail to provide a bigger list of killed, wounded, and prisoners, than the one which France had to produce after 1870.

Some speakers, who, I presume, have never studied on the spot the organisation, discipline, and national sacrifices to *esprit de corps*, of the German Army, glibly refer to the Swiss and Swedish Armies, as if we had only to imitate the letter of *their* organisation to get all we require. One would think, as practical men, they would have taken the German Army—the only one which has been raised on the lines advocated that has been tested—as the object of their study.

If they had they would find that there is very little resemblance between the German Army—which is one great, compact, and perfect professional organisation, with the Sovereign at its head—and the amateur assemblage, which could be the only outcome of their system.

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<sup>1</sup> The life of Sir Harry Smith gives many suggestive examples of the value in battle at the crucial moment of the devotion inspired by continued discipline and genuine *esprit de corps*.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Hale, who, if anything, trusts only in high efficiency of every unit destined for the line of battle, considers that the "manhood of the country should not leave to its Regular Army, to its professional soldiers, the monopoly of defending hearths and homes," but naturally scouts Dr. Conan Doyle's suggestion of the large body of patriotic people who "cannot or will not volunteer," but who, having "no pleasure in drill" . . . "can be made into riflemen," which he computes (to make up his million) would number 600,000. These are Colonel Hale's "army of non-professional fighting men," and describes, when based on the "number theory" as crude, as impracticable, and dangerous.

He shows up the danger of the weight that is attached to the writings of so distinguished a man, as well as the words of Lord Salisbury, which lead the country to believe that Army re-organisation, *i.e.*, for the fighting line, is after all not so pressing as soldiers declare it to be.—C.E.W.

I appeal to their common sense. Do they really want, like Dr. Conan Doyle,<sup>1</sup> to frighten the would-be invader by the newspaper bogey of every male behind a hedge with a rifle in his hands, or do they really think that they are going to provide and train a weapon that can meet the flower of the invader's forces on the battle-field—if that field is to be at home? I hope I have said enough to suggest to the minds of those who are going to be active supporters of the National Service League that so-called compulsory military service—which, in their view, means placing a rifle in the hands of 200,000 to 400,000 young men every year, and giving them one year's training—will not provide the "armed people" upon which Colonel Duke considers the Government could call in the day of danger.

#### THE GERMAN SYSTEM UNSUITABLE.

I repeat, the German system—for practically all the nations have copied Germany more or less—on which Mr. Shee arranges his scheme of Pan-Britannic Militia, is unscientific and now moreover unsuitable as applied to these islands and to our race.

It was created when the range of projectiles fired from the shoulder was within the bayonet charge distance—and when the so-called "arms of the Service" were organised and equipped subject to that condition—when every man on foot carried a firearm, with which he could be easily taught to make fair practice at 100 yards.

Germany's sea frontier was not then its side of danger; and she had to be ready with a professional Army—not an Army of which the reservoir is Militia—to encounter the attack, at short notice, of other professional Armies, which had no sea to cross.

She had to deal with the question of exemptions<sup>2</sup> from points of view which did not in many respects adapt themselves to the circumstances of either peace or war, and which are consequently contradictory.

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<sup>1</sup> I feel I ought to give Sir Conan Doyle the opportunity of explaining himself in this room, as he was so good as to do to me in a personal letter in February, 1901. I have taken the text of his views in the *Nineteenth Century* of February and March, 1901, to be p. 514: "One of the most certain lessons . . . is at once to reduce the bugbear of an invasion to an absurdity." He proposed to do this "with a moderate efficiency with the rifle," by which "the able-bodied population could, without its professional soldiers, defy the united forces of Europe." In explanation, in a letter to the *Times*, he wrote: "I meant that, given the actual conditions, the temporary loss of the command of the sea or the absence of most of the Regular Army, would not be fatal if we had a million men accustomed to the rifle." Leaving out the "hedge-row" question as an advantage to attack or defence—and on that I hope to convince him in time—we have, I am glad to know, wide fields in common.

In the *Nineteenth Century*, Colonel Hale wrote insisting on the *extra need of discipline in defensive warfare in the United Kingdom*, adding in this country "the control of the attack will be mere child's play to that of the defence." This was confirmation of every word of my paper read in this room in the previous February.

<sup>2</sup> In Switzerland these represent 39 per cent. of the male population, who—mostly through no fault of their own—are deprived of the advantages of such military training as is given.

For instance, a large percentage are compulsorily excluded for causes which deprives the fighting line of many men who are by nature keen fighters.

Thousands of men who in this country are rescued from penury and its consequences in time of peace by a voluntarily placing themselves under Army discipline, and who, we know, turn out splendid fighters, have little chance of entering such a path under the German system. The great body of men who are adjudged, physically or otherwise, unfit, no matter what their aspirations, never have the opportunity of receiving the moral and physical benefits of which the advocates of compulsory service boast, or of giving of their energy in some form to the cause of patriotic defence.<sup>1</sup>

Then comes the other aspect, which is that the annual selection of the "conscripts"—who must present themselves in person—is chiefly guided by the more or less perfect physique of each individual, whose personal desire to become a soldier or a sailor, if he has any, does not count.

Again, it is assumed that every one so selected for the Army can be taught to aim a rifle, either from his shoulder or from wheels, with fair prospect of becoming expert. All experience of the men who have been born and lived under the conditions of what we call modern civilisation goes to prove that these qualifications are not infrequently absent from human males who are *physically* well-developed, and the endurance, presence of mind, intelligence, "*esprit*," good sight, sense of proportion, and all that goes to make up the modern rifleman, either for foot or mounted service, are in many instances absent from the organism of many a young Hercules.<sup>2</sup>

#### TWENTIETH CENTURY CONDITIONS.

All this has now changed, and, to help in the defence of one's country, a man need not have been in the Royal Navy or have fired a rifle or have served a gun or have passed the riding school. Indeed, as I propose to try and show, the large majority of the manhood of a nation are not wanted in the fighting line; and also I will try and show that those who are, should be there, not only *voluntarily*, but also, *only after having been subject to a training of a much higher order than could be guaranteed in the force Mr. Shee proposes to create.*

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<sup>1</sup> From the *Compte rendu sur le recrutement de l'Armée en 1901*, France, we gather, out of 309,332 young men of 20 years of age, 25,526 were exempted as unfit for all service, 44,337 were postponed for reasons of doubtful health and insufficient development; of these latter many never reached a standard of fitness for training, and most of them are let off with one or two years' training. The actual exemptions total 50,262, and besides that 18,627 young men were posted to the "auxiliary services" and thus escaped military training with arms.

<sup>2</sup>In 1840, the French, whose Army was still leavened with men experienced in real warfare, organised from out of the existing ranks of the Army, ten battalions of "*tirailleurs*," all *volunteers*. The scheme was evolved out of the conviction that to extract the best efforts of men in war, *volunteers* form the best material. These battalions were sent to Algeria, where they proved the wisdom of the measure.

It will now, perhaps, be fully realised by my hearers, that, while I advocate compulsion for one object, namely for service to the State in war, and preparation for the same,<sup>1</sup> *I stick to voluntary engagement by those destined to use weapons of offence and to fill the ranks of the line of battle on sea and land; and such engagement should include, for the (so-called) Auxiliary forces, the necessary training to make a man into a sailor or soldier, as skilled as the time allotted to his training and his intelligence will permit.*

This system has one fundamental advantage for us. It alters as little as possible the existing national organisations, and leaves the would-be sailor or soldier to select between the Royal Navy, the Regulars, the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Yeomanry.

The present territorial system, as will be seen further on in my address, under my proposal receives greater development, and the deficiency described by General Chapman<sup>2</sup> as an incomplete "incorporation of the Army with the nation" would be remedied. In his article the writer admits that the "limit of numbers" of "recruits attainable under the present system has been reached."

General Chapman proposes to adopt a method of a Recruiting Commission, like that which meets every May in every town and village in Germany.

One must necessarily be constituted under the measure of compulsion which I propose.

General Chapman believes that the "existing barriers which now divide the Army from the nation, would gradually disappear, and that the maintenance of the Army by voluntary enlistment would be secured" by the incorporation of "a civilian element with the too purely military machinery which now attempts the work of raising men for the King's service." I agree.

I submit that my scheme would supply the motive for the annual meeting of the Recruiting Commission, which General Chapman overlooks. It is a necessity in Germany, because the recruits *must* present themselves. Here, under General Chapman's suggestion, the Commission might have a meeting, and no recruits need appear. Under my proposal, every male, on attaining 18 or 19 years of age (and there is no exemption), *must* present himself, and must continue to do so, at least once a year, until his obligation to do so ceases.

This voluntary recruiting reservoir—to use Mr. Shee's expression—will always be running over with a living stream. Into his reservoir the "bucket of *compulsion to fight*" must be dipped.

Those who are on the other side believe that the "reservoir" of latent *voluntary* military spirit is sufficient to recruit our Regular Navy

<sup>1</sup> Fortunately the public at large are too sensible of the enormous advantage of a voluntary service, which alone is consistent with the existence of a really free nation.—Sir C. Warren.—*The National Review*, 1901. If the voluntary service referred to is service in the line of battle, we are in accord.—C.E.W.

<sup>2</sup> See *The Army and the Nation*, by General E. F. Chapman, C.B., R.A., *p.s.c.*, in the JOURNAL R.U.S.I. of 15th March, 1902, No. 289.

and Army. I contend that the measure of compulsion which I propose is necessary to stimulate it to overflow in full sufficiency.<sup>1</sup>

#### RIFLE CLUBS:

Since I pointed out, just two years ago, that the Continental system is not scientific or suitable to these peoples, several writers have taken up the subject.

The suggestion of local rifle clubs was brought into active prominence by Lord Salisbury; but that great statesman will be the first to acknowledge that there was nothing new in the idea. It was, to use a modernism, "placarded" by his speech. Many associations, more or less tributary to our old friend the National Rifle Association, have come into existence. Miniature ranges have been set up, and a latent spirit of emulation in the competition for prizes has been developed. This, however good, is only a means to a great end. It is a branch of the Voluntary system, and so far as it stimulates recruiting into the existing voluntarily-enlisted Forces it is a step in the right direction; but, following on to the "rifleman-hedge-row-lined" idea of defence, it stops short of all that would raise these riflemen out of the condition of an unorganised and dangerous crowd. Unfortunately, by those who think that all is fish that enters their net, it has been suggested that training in the use of a rifle will catch those who do not care to submit their bodies and minds to the influence of drill and discipline. These men would be even more in the way and out of place when real work in the presence of an organised enemy had to be done, than the man whose training in the ranks had only been superficial.

#### CADET TRAINING.<sup>2</sup>

The more advanced proposals which, although not new, have come more into prominence during the discussion on the Education Act are an advocacy of some form of compulsion. To Lord Charles Beresford

<sup>1</sup> In an article of the *Fortnightly Review* of March, 1901, Mr. Baillie Grolmann's text is: "The nation's unpreparedness to respond to a sudden call to arms." The chief object of the article is to show that the "sudden call" should be "to arms." And he goes on to point out, "the rifle is an unknown weapon to the bulk of the population." He adds, "verily we are an unarmed nation to an extent never witnessed in history before." His mind dwells on the necessity of being able to "quickly arm large numbers of men."

His article does good work in pointing out the necessity of either maintaining a great store of arms, as "from the moment war is declared, all foreign markets would, of course, be closed;" or of increasing the possible output of Government and private works.

He adds: "If the Empire which the nineteenth century has created is to be preserved, is to be rendered fit to face the struggles of the twentieth century, the nation must arm." "If the sons of Greater Britain once begin to lose faith in the ability of the Mother Country and in her military . . . administration . . . then bands will be loosened that have made the Empire what it is to-day."

All this equally applies if the words "organise" and "organisation" are substituted for the words "arm for the line of battle."

A scientific projectile projector (rifle or gun) placed in the hands of a man untrained, or half-trained, is a personal and general source of danger to everyone but the invader.—*C.E.W.*

<sup>2</sup> The boy well fitted for the ideal life of a soldier is likely to be well suited for any other walk of life; for the ideal soldier is a man whose training in mind and body is perfected for any other walk of life.—*Sir Charles Warren in the "National Review," 1901.*



alone, of all the so-called Service Members, is due the credit of moving that "*Physical and military instruction shall be compulsory in all schools supported by public funds.*"

In a letter to the Duke of Devonshire, dated 9th December, 1902, Lord Charles advocated "*military instruction,*" by which he stated he meant "*marching, swimming, and giving orders.*"

He also advocated "*that every boy capable shall be taught to fire a rusk or small-bore rifle at a target.*" He repeated the well-known reasons—as old as Sparta—in favour of the physical training of youth, adding, "it is computed that nine-tenths of the people get no physical training whatever, and three-quarters are town-bred."

To get a hearing, I presume, he had to play up to the prejudice against compulsion by stating that "conscription is opposed, and, I believe, rightly opposed, to the sentiments of English-speaking nations; compulsion of any form is only possible in the schools."

That the motion was ruled "out of order," and that the Ministry regarded the question as one more for the War Office than for the Board of Education, almost goes without saying, under the conditions of party Government.<sup>1</sup>

Quite lately an article in the *Times* has enlarged in the same direction:—<sup>2</sup>

The writer asks: "Would not the whole problem, at any rate as regards home defence, be enormously simplified in every way if that military element"—i.e., the underlying military spirit in the nation, with a military and patriotic element in our national education—"were enlarged in its scope and duration until it became a regular military training?"

The article goes on to suggest "that the whole boyhood of the nation between the ages of 16 and 17 should receive a military training concurrently with the final stages of its mental training."

The article admits that "this would undoubtedly be universal service: but it would be something very different from the universal services enforced in Continental nations by their necessities."

The weak point in these proposals is a vital one, and that is, that the compulsion is bristling with exemptions and exceptions. Chiefly in respect to the great mass of working-class boys who leave the elementary school to begin their apprentice or wage-earning life at an age much earlier than that at which the best results can be obtained from the training—16 to 17, as suggested by the article.

At the same time there is every reason why a system of "cadet training" should be in force on all within reach of the Education Act. It dovetails with my proposals, and would be a preliminary preparation to them by beginning at an earlier age than 18 to cultivate the patriotic and military spirit.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See correspondence between Lord Charles Beresford and Mr. Riversdale Walrond on behalf of the Duke of Devonshire, published in the *Times* of the 26th December, 1902.

<sup>2</sup> In a sixth article in "The Problem of the Army," on 4th February, 1903.

<sup>3</sup> Although the census of Ireland gives no assistance in respect to the number of males between the ages of 14 and 15, and the information in that respect for Scotland is not yet published, the average in Yorkshire is a little over and in London a little under 2 per cent. That figure may be regarded as sufficiently nearly accurate for the 3 kingdoms. The published statistics of the Board of Education for 1900-1 do not distinguish between the sexes, all "scholars" being "children." They, however, show that in England and Wales 85.7 per cent. of the children between 14 and 15 were that year scholars in the 31,315 elementary schools, and that this total fell to 14 per cent. for all ages above 15.

## AN ORGANISATION OF THE NATION.

The scheme, then, before the meeting is to *leave all the existing fighting organisations intact*, and to construct behind them an organisation which will, first, be a more fruitful reservoir for recruiting into those services than now exists,<sup>1</sup> and second, will provide for the performance of duties, and for the safe guarding of social order, when required, for which at present no provision is foreshadowed or any disciplined organisation which includes every citizen, has been prepared.

## POPULATION.

The Census returns of 1901, now in course of publication, give enough material to allow of general, and average, statistics, for the illustration of my scheme.

These are submitted in substitution of those in my paper of February, 1901.

On account of Scotland being most behindhand in its issue of detailed information, I have been unable to be as exact as I might otherwise have been. However, for all the purposes of this demonstration, the figures available can be averaged, and are sufficiently near the truth.

The number of persons present in these Kingdoms on the 31st March, 1901, were 41,454,724,<sup>2</sup> of whom the males numbered 20,093,222.

<sup>1</sup>The following figures, which are approximately correct, are furnished as a reminder to the reader of actual conditions of the effective strength of the Regular Army, Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry, before and after the South African war:—

All Ranks.	1898.	1901.
Regular Army—		
At Home ... ..	102,202	125,042
Colonies and Egypt ... ..	49,932	225,864
India ... ..	72,893	67,063
	225,071	417,969
1st Class Army Reserve (at home) ...	82,005	2,398
	307,032	420,337
Militia and its Reserve ... ..	113,439	110,557
Yeomanry ... ..	10,207	18,986
Volunteers... ..	231,798	288,612
	355,444	418,155
	662,476	838,492

2	Persons, Male.	Persons, Female.	Total.
England and Wales ... ..	15,721,728	16,804,347	32,526,075
Scotland... ..	2,173,755	2,298,348	4,472,103
Ireland ... ..	2,197,739	2,258,807	4,456,546
	20,093,222	21,361,502	41,454,724

The average percentages under the following age classification are as follows<sup>1</sup> :—

	Per cent.
Under 5 years of age ... ..	11·75
Over 5 years and under 18 ... ..	27·14
Over 18 and inclusive of 20 ... ..	4·03
Over 20        „        „    40 ... ..	38·52
Over 40        „        „    60 ... ..	14·82
Over 60        „        „    ... ..	3·74
	<hr/>
	100·00

Of the males over 18 years who are *unmarried*, exclusive of widowers with children, there are 47·5 per cent.

In the average totals of the urban and rural populations, those living under conditions of exemption, and therefore excluded from the total males who would be under compulsion to appear to be registered, organised, and trained, there are of the total male population 9·95 per cent.<sup>2</sup>

Practically this works out in round figures, total males available at one time—

Under training 18 and under 19	379,000	} Average 370,000 Juniors
19        „        20	362,000	
Active        .. 20        „        40	6,974,000	
	<hr/>	
	7,715,000	
Reserve, males 40 and under 60	2,549,000	
	<hr/>	
Grand total        ..        ..	10,264,000	

Each year 370,000<sup>3</sup> young men (juniors) would be under training and being taught marching, company, and boat drill. On a day, or days, each year 7,344,000 men (who eventually would have trained as above) would report themselves at the headquarters of their respective units, and would go through the drill and exercise which has been taught them when they were between 18 and 20 years of age. The men over 40 years of age should be exempted, as “*veterans*.”

<sup>1</sup>The Board of Trade abstract of labour statistics, 1901, page 176, gives the following for England and Wales only, for the male populations :—

Under 20 years of age ... ..	46·5 per cent.
Over 20 and under 40 years of age	30·0        „
40 and over ... ..	23·5        „

Of the total males.

<sup>2</sup> Of deaf, dumb, blind, lunatic, and imbecile, in prisons, hospitals, and foreigners ... ..	1·45 per cent.
Employed permanently in the Civil Service of the State and of Local Authorities ... ..	0·9        „
In the Navy on land, the Regular Army at home, Naval and Army Reserve, Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, and of Army and Navy Pensioners.	7·6        „
	<hr/>
	9·95 per cent.

<sup>3</sup>If this estimate is correct, and Mr. Shee's of the annual contingent to be trained under his scheme, namely, 210,000, is also correct, the exemptions under the latter would be 44 per cent.!

## THE UNIT.

The territorial unit to which each man would belong would be a Parliamentary Registration Sub-District, and would bear the name of the same. If it be an urban one, the unit would have two names, that is, the name of the town or city and that of the sub-district.

If there is more than one unit in a sub-district, it would have two names and a number. In most rural districts the name would suffice.

The established strength of a unit would be 200 men of all ranks.

## THE CENSUS RETURNS OF 1902 (BY ELECTORAL SUB-DISTRICTS).

In these are to be found all the information that is wanting where-with to prepare muster-rolls of every male, under the aforesaid age classification.

These rolls could be prepared and (if need be) printed. *Muster officers* should be appointed, and the males (by classes) would be summoned to the muster places by means of posted notices, which in most cases would be the meeting place of the local authorities or the school-houses.

The first year after a law on the subject is passed, the summons (to commence with) might be limited to all males under 40 years of age and, to reduce confusion, all between 30 and 40 should meet on the first day, all between 20 and 30 on a day following, and all between 18 and 20 on a third day.

The number of Registration Sub-Districts is as follows :—

London	...	...	...	...	...	114
Rest of England and Wales	...	...	...	...	...	2,021
Scotland	...	...	...	...	...	1,087
Ireland <sup>1</sup>	...	...	...	...	...	3,751
Total	...	...	...	...	...	6,973

## MUSTER OFFICERS.

The *muster officers* should be appointed so as to provide one for about every 100 men—two per unit; and their duty would be, in the first instance, to acquire identification of each individual, and to give him his number and badge.

No attempt would be made, at the start, to give instruction in marching drill and boat and physical exercise, at any of the musters of the men over 30. And, even of those between 20 and 30 the instruction would have to be distributed over, say, the 3 first years after the Defence Organisation Law is passed.

By the second or third year, additional *Muster Officers* would be selected, so that eventually there would be 3 to each 100 men, and included in that number. These officers would be responsible that each individual was made acquainted with the conditions of the service, and with each new regulation as it required promulgation.

They would be selected for their qualifications as *leaders*; and, in time, one at least of each three should be elected by the men themselves.

The units, though drilled together, should always fall in at muster in two sections—as married and widowed with children, and as unmarried men.

## ANNUAL GATHERINGS.

As soon as the annual gatherings for drill of the *Juniors*, and the mustering of those who had been trained, had been regularised, and

<sup>1</sup> These would have to be grouped.

the community had become accustomed to it, then, much might be done to give some additional interest to the gatherings—by further classification, and by indicating to each class the work or duty that would be required of it when, if the “alarm” came and *national mobilisation* was proclaimed, they were, *when found to be out of regular employment*, taken on to the permanent strength of their unit.

The community would by degrees get to take an interest in the musters by localities, and the units would become proud of their local titles. The gatherings themselves would promote intercourse between classes and occupations, and the daily wage earner would appreciate that the scheme in no way interferes with his regular employment, but on the contrary, that after National Mobilisation has been proclaimed, it ensures him occupation, protection and food, *if*, owing to the dislocation of industry, he finds himself without work.

On the other hand, the Regular Army at home, the Militia, the Yeomanry, and Volunteers, of the armed land forces would find themselves entirely freed from all work and duty behind the fighting line, duties which, but for the proposed Defence Auxiliary Corps (D.A.C.) or Auxiliary Defence Corps (A.D.C.) would occupy a very considerable portion of the armed forces which, *if* efficiently trained to arms, ought to be face to face with the opponent.

#### THE SEA LITTORAL.

It is not unreasonable, in island kingdoms like these, to expect that every man who has not, in time of peace, voluntarily joined the fighting line, either on sea or land, who lives within a mile or two of the sea shore, should regard himself especially as destined to give of his physical and mental strength in work and duty especially connected with the coast.

On the units in the registration sub-districts bordering the sea a special obligation would be imposed, namely, in time of peace, besides mustering for drill, to give a few days to go through a training in boat, swimming, and along-shore work.<sup>1</sup>

In the electoral sub-districts which form as it were a belt, say from 2½ miles to 5 miles wide, round these islands, a proportion of the units would be required to undergo their additional sea-shore training. There are 969<sup>2</sup> of these out of a total of 6,973. On an average the numbers so trained and resident in their district would number 400 per district=387,600 men. This will help to fertilise the field for recruiting into the Navy.

<sup>1</sup> It was a privilege to have been a witness, in 1884-5, of the ascent of the Nile in whale-boats by British soldiers. Although assisted at the cataracts, it was the work of 9 soldiers to navigate each boat, loaded close to the gunwhale, by rowing, towing, and sailing when the north wind blew against stream, up some 300 miles of the Nile. Probably not 10 per cent. of the men had ever been in a boat before. Yet discipline, and power of adapting themselves, carried them through with comparatively no loss of men or stores.

<sup>2</sup> England and Wales	...	...	...	...	305
Scotland	...	...	...	...	251
Ireland	...	...	...	...	410

## THE OFFICERS OF THE A.D.C.

Under the system of registration, training, and annual gatherings, compulsory on all males who have not volunteered into one or other of the fighting forces, advantages would be offered to men of independent means, to professional men, to large farmers, and others, to become *muster officers* in the first instance, and *leaders of units* in the second. Preference would be given to those whose habits of life had accustomed them to control or direct hand labour of any kind. For instance, these would be found in the ranks of the civil engineers in all branches of engineering, and amongst, architects and surveyors, builders and contractors,<sup>1</sup> factory and mining managers, and supervisors of locomotion in all branches.

To commence with, these would be appointed from those who were (say) between the ages of 30 and 40. Any decision at the beginning of the operation of the law, only to enforce training on the rank and file who are under 30, would not be allowed to exempt these. That decision, as a matter of convenience in respect to training, would exempt no one from registration and annual gatherings. Men of leisure, who are well acquainted with the men within their registration district, and who had not entered the Militia, or the Volunteers, or the Yeomanry, would be also appointed.

By the time (say after 3 years from the date of the Organisation of the Nation becoming law) the *musters* having reached the normal dimensions 80,000 *muster officers* will be in full work. Those 80,000 *muster officers*, between the ages of 25 and 40, will have selected, or seen to the election by their men, of 160,000 more assistants to them in their duties so that at least 3 in every 100 will be officers.

The privileges to be attached to the position, such as holding the King's commission, will have some attraction. But there is the strongest evidence that, in the classes to which I have referred, there is a spirit of patriotism which voluntarily gives time to public duties to a degree which exists in no other part of the world. A latent spirit only waiting to be made use of.

The *muster officers* will be required to superintend the annual gatherings and trainings in time of peace, and take charge of their units in war.

## COST OF THE A.D.C.

In estimating the annual cost of the scheme, it is premised, that, the young men of 18 or 19 (the juniors), would receive sufficient training in about 3 weeks, some more, some less, to pass a standard of efficiency, that, the places of rendezvous for each unit, or sub-unit in scattered rural districts, would, at furthest, be within 2 or 3 miles of the place of residence of each; that, on each day, each man will

<sup>1</sup> The following numbers are approximately accurate :—

Institution of Civil Engineers at home ... ..	4,250
Institution of Mechanical Engineers ... ..	2,935
Institution of Electrical Engineers ... ..	3,015
Architects and Surveyors ... ..	5,500
Builders and Building Contractors ... ..	23,300
Probable minimum numbers of Managers of work in the other Industries ... ..	10,000
	<hr/> 50,000
Large Farmers ... .. (about)	200,000
	<hr/> 250,000

receive the sum of ninepence to provide a mid-day meal; that, as the period of training would include 35 weeks in the year, the muster officers of the unit would be allowed to apportion the period of training of each man to suit, as nearly as possible, the circumstances of his employment.

Qualification being obligatory on employers and employed, the Organisation Law would impose an individual and mutual responsibility to give every facility to enable the "juniors" to qualify themselves.

This is made up as follows:—

370,000 men for 3 weeks each, is 1,110,000 weeks of a man, at 10s. (ten shillings) is ...	£555,000	
Two Instructors to every 100 men under training during 35 weeks of the year, with 10 per cent. spare and 1 extra for each 10 littoral districts = 437 with expenses = £120 ...	£52,440	
		£607,440
Add 10 per cent. for Inspection Staff, etc.		60,744
		<hr/> £668,184

The annual gatherings of trained men will require an expenditure, under the muster officers, whose personal expenses should be repaid, on the insignia badges of the unit and their upkeep, and on stationery and other incidental expenses.

The cost is made up as follows:—

7,344,000 men in units of 200, 36,720 units, under 73,440 muster officers, and their inspection, including the hire of boats for longshore training cannot exceed £20 a unit ... ..	734,400
Total annual cost ... ..	<hr/> £1,402,584

An expenditure which, with some reason, might be charged to the Consolidated Fund.

#### SOME WORKS TO BE DONE BY THE A.D.C.

Works, for putting in a state of defence all towns, villages, hamlets, and groups of buildings, which are suitably situated for defence, according to the configuration of the country, within the areas or zones of defence near and in rear of certain lengths of coast-line along which the disembarkation of invading forces is practicable.

Works, by which, what is known as field fortifications, shall be rapidly made, consisting of detached forts and lines of blockhouses by which certain areas of these kingdoms shall be denied to an invader, and others which shall constitute safe *place d'armes* and *depôts* for military reserves, food stuffs, and *matériel* of war.

The following are examples of the areas to be thus dealt with, the need for, and possibility of, forming an "enceinte," in each case being conditional on circumstances.

The defences of the existing fortified places would be perfected.	
The Metropolis, the area being about 2,000 square miles, periphery of about ... ..	180 miles.
The Coalfields of South Wales, having collectively a periphery of about ... ..	120 "
The Coalfields of Durham and Northumberland, having collectively a periphery of about ... ..	80 "
The Coalfields of Scotland, having collectively a periphery of about ... ..	70 "

An area of which each of the following places form the nucleus :						
Thanet (to be denied to an invader), having a periphery of about	...	...	...	...	...	35 miles.
<i>In Scotland.</i>						
The areas of which Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, each form the nucleus, having together a periphery with a length of about	...	...	...	...	...	190 „
<i>In Ireland.</i>						
The same for Dublin, Cork, Belfast, and Athlone, having together a periphery with a length of about	...	...	...	...	...	200 „
Total	...	...	...	...	...	875 miles.
To commence this work not less than a unit, <i>i.e.</i> , 200 men,						
per mile will be wanted, namely	...	...	...	...	...	175,000 men.
Add Reinforcements at certain points	...	...	...	...	...	25,000 „
Total	...	...	...	...	...	200,000 men.

## RAILWAYS.

Works, of the large blockhouse nature would have to be erected, or buildings adapted, at all railway junctions within 30 miles of the coast, as these would be the points towards which an invader's scouts would push, so as effectively to injure lines of communication.

The existence of all defence works of these natures would compel an invader to increase largely, and in proportion, the weight, size, and means of traction, of his appliances for attack.

The demolition of bridges and the removal of sections of the permanent way may be required at many points simultaneously, which are widely separated. The military engineers of the defending army in the field, *i.e.*, the line of battle engineers, who must do their engineering under the enemy's fire, will have no time, and will not be in sufficient numbers to undertake the engineering work behind or outside the actual area of combat. At every point where work is foreseen, which must be quickly done, strong bodies of the A.D.C. will have to be concentrated. Having plenty of labour, the work of denying the use of the railway to the enemy can be done more scientifically by removal instead of destruction, with eventual less cost in restoration.

This, it is estimated, will require that, on an average, A.D.C. units will have to be concentrated at each of about 800 points, being railway junctions and intersections in the United Kingdom, which will absorb  $800 \times 200 = 160,000$  men. Patrols to watch 80 per cent. of the 20,325 miles of railway line in the United Kingdom, at visual signalling distance, to the number of about 6 men to the mile will be required, and would absorb 97,500 men.

These 257,500 men would not be required all at once. Many of them—say, 5,000 or 6,000—would be available at an early moment to temporarily replace reserve men in the employment of the railway companies who had to join their corps in the fighting line. The remainder would be made up of units, or fractions of units, as they became available through the cessation of employment.

## CLEARING OF FENCES, ETC.

Wherever the configuration of the country indicates that an invader can be forced to attack a position, the fences and obstructions to view, which will afford (as it were) "stepping-stones" for the attack, must be cleared away, and to their rear, gaps in the fences, along lines perpendicular in their direction to the front of the position, must be made so that reinforcements to any point, ammunition, ambulance, rifles on wheels of the lighter description (*i.e.*, "guns") can be moved to front or rear irrespective of the existence of roads.



In some cases these "works" would include the damming up of small rivers and streams, so that the invader would have to encumber his disembarkation with large quantities of impedimenta in the shape of bridging material. A study of the maps of any of the groups of counties in these kingdoms, which constitute the collecting areas of any of our systems of streams and rivers, will show any intelligent enquirer where the deepening of the streams so as to be unfordable would form important lines of obstruction to an invader's movements.

Under ordinary circumstances such works would be carried out in peace or war by the Military Engineers of the Regular Army, and Militia and Volunteers, or by civil contractors under their directions; but under the extraordinary circumstances of a war, which might be repelling an invader, every trained military engineer would be required in the area of combat, and every labour contractor and every contractor's employee would be, either at his regular work so long as that work continues, or in his place in the ranks of the A.D.C.

These works might easily require the labour of 2 units a mile on 500 miles =  $400 \times 500 = 200,000$  men.

#### TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE.

All lines of telegraph along roads and canals outside the towns, apart from those along the railways, should be watched by special patrols, as in the case of the railways. These watchmen would move in twos and threes between armed posts. Where there were no armed posts the watchmen would be continuously on duty, in three reliefs, and report to the post offices.

As there are 28,375 miles of such lines belonging to the General Post Office, of which 80 per cent. are outside towns, this work of watching with 6 men (3 reliefs of 2) for every two miles, would occupy over 27,000 men — say, 30,000 men.

The above works and duties will require about 700,000 of the unmarried men.

#### FOOD SUPPLY.

As I have described, the prevention of dislocation in the industries of the country would be one of the first objects of the Government. This is quite as important from military as from civil considerations. The presence of a conscript crowd forcibly withdrawn under the ordinary conditions of compulsory military service, most of them mere tyros in military discipline, training, and use of arms and equipment, would only be a source of anxiety and worry to those whose minds should be intent on the efficient employment of the trained forces. The best service which every male can render to the State at such times is to *stick to his own work*. He may be tremendously keen to fight when the danger comes, but it would be too late then. He should have joined either the Navy or Army, or the Militia or Volunteers or Yeomanry in peace-time, if he wanted to fight. As long as he is at work and his employment does not fail him, he must depend on the ordinary sources of the country and locality for food for himself and family. Prices would go up, no doubt, but in that respect he would be no worse off than any other wage-earner of any class. It is, when his employment fails that he will come into the daily service of the State, and with his family must be fed, *i.e.*, supplied with the bare necessities of life, and, if he is unmarried, and

belongs to a unit which has to be sent away for work out of his district, he would be supplied with a ration.<sup>1</sup>

As in the case of the siege of Paris, Food Depôts<sup>2</sup> in every district, sub-district, and in towns, in every sub-division of a sub-district, would be established. To the service of these the units composed of *married* men of the A.D.C., within their own district, in a proportion varying with circumstances, would be detailed. In this important service the Corps would be of vital assistance to the Local Authorities in undertaking the labour of food supply and distribution of "siege rations" to women and children. Such an organisation would anticipate and prevent a large amount of distress and famine, which would be unavoidable, and would, if intelligently worked, preclude disorder, riot, and popular terror, all which conditions are certain to ensue in the event of short food supply, more particularly in a (so-called) civilised country, especially amongst the town populations accustomed to see every necessary of life brought to their doors (as it were) without consideration of the machinery by which the wonderful task of (say) feeding a town of a million people is achieved. In any case, the small traders would be the first to fail, and the existence of an organisation which would provide the local authorities with organised, and, for such purposes, partly disciplined labour, with which they could at once step in and replace the deficiencies, would be invaluable.

The provision of the services of men to help to deliver food to the 5 million women and children that might in 6 weeks have to be assisted, would be 20 to every 1,000, *i.e.*, 105,000 of the married men—(say) 3 from each unit.

Under the present conditions, without an Organisation Law, the resort of the Administration must be to the contract market at a time when all power of making a fair contract would have disappeared, and when the resources of contractors would be so uncertain that their undertaking to do anything would be conditional and unreliable.

The anticipation of such a state of things would justify an embargo being placed by Government on all necessities of life. With the organisation that has been submitted to you in this paper this is possible. At present it is not so, and contract labour would have to be resorted to on a scale which no supervision that is not organised in time of peace could embrace, and the mere attempt would by itself entail a cost resulting in national ruin and bankruptcy.

#### SPECIAL CONSTABLES.

Every man in the *married* units would be liable to be employed as a special constable under the magistrates; and for the officering of these all professional men connected with the Law, its administration and

<sup>1</sup> Uniform clothing is not necessary, but it might be found convenient to provide with a tweed Norfolk jacket each *unmarried* man actually enrolled with his unit.

It should be remembered that in the late war, when clothing wore out, whole squadrons and mounted companies occasionally were clad with oat sacks.

<sup>2</sup> Captain Stewart Murray described a special "Food Supply Department," with a *personnel* numbering 28,181. In this "Organisation of the Nation," that department would be included, and would automatically go to work when required.

working, would be, according to the circumstances of the unit to which each belonged, appointed. It must be remembered that a large number of Reservists are employed in the Constabulary, and that every man who has been trained to arms and been under military discipline will be wanted back in his combatant place. The maintaining of public order, the enforcement of the law, especially of the Organisation for Defence Law, will require that a large body of men, sworn in as constables, should be available. It is no exaggeration to estimate their number at least 70,000 men—(say) 2 from each unit.

### THE METROPOLIS.

It may be of interest to consider the subject for a moment in its application to London, where the question of the provision of places for drill and assembly in time of peace presents some difficulty. The total number of males is 2,142,085. There are 114 registration sub-districts. Each year the number of Juniors who would have to give three weeks' instruction in drill is 63,160. If the drilling goes on for 35 weeks in the year, and small drill units (say of 50 men) assemble for instruction, one drill space will have to be found at each of the 114 centres.

Of males between 20 and 40 there are in round numbers 1,280,000, of whom 45,000 are foreigners. To the difference, namely 1,235,000, after deducting 10 per cent. for permanent exemptions, there remains 1,111,500. These will form 926 battalions, each of 6 companies, each company of 200 men, 46 per cent. (in London) of whom are married or widowed. If in time of peace there are eight annual gathering days of assembly, classified by age and numbers of each age, one battalion of six companies, 1,200 men, will assemble on each of the selected days at the 114 centres.

### OCCUPATIONS.

In reference to my proposal that, those men, who are out of occupation when war breaks out, or who, through the incidence of war, lose it, shall, on account of that condition, be permanently enrolled in their unit, it is a matter of interest to enquire what are these numbers likely to be.

Again take the Metropolis. The available returns show:—

	Per cent.
<i>a.</i> In employments that will exempt those who hold them	4
<i>b.</i> The professional and commercial classes represent ...	12
<i>c.</i> Those employed in the building trades ... ..	9
<i>d.</i> In the occupations connected with lodging, feeding and supplying the public ... ..	13
<i>e.</i> In occupations engaged in productive trades, in metals, woods, skins, paper, dress, and textile fabrics ...	24½
<i>f.</i> In occupations connected with locomotion, carriage, and and conveyance ... ..	14½
<i>g.</i> Other workers and dealers ... ..	7
<i>h.</i> Of the total males in London who are unoccupied or without specified occupations, the total represent	16

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100

It may be estimated that those unoccupied would be:—

On the date of the order to mobilise.		In 2 weeks.	In 6 weeks.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
<i>a.</i> ... ..	0	0	0
<i>b.</i> ... ..	2	2	4
<i>c.</i> ... ..	1	1	4
<i>d.</i> ... ..	0	0	1
<i>e.</i> ... ..	2	4	8
<i>f.</i> ... ..	0	0	2½
<i>g.</i> ... ..	1	1	2
<i>h.</i> ... ..	10	2	2
	16	10	23½
Representing men ..	178,000	111,000	261,000
Besides those between 18 and 20 ..	63,000		
	241,000		

The above figures mean that under *extreme* conditions within 6 weeks after the outbreak of a great war half the male population *may* have lost their occupations.

	Men.
So that in London immediately the order for assembling is given there will be available ... ..	241,000
In two weeks this may be increased by ... ..	111,000
In six weeks this may be increased by ... ..	261,000
	613,000
Of these 46 per cent. are married or widowed ... ..	282,000
	331,000
Of these 10 per cent., it may be estimated, will in time of peace have joined the fighting forces ... ..	33,100
	297,900
The strength of the Auxiliary Defence Corps in London within 6 weeks who are available for work anywhere in the Kingdoms will be nearly ... ..	300,000

#### EXAMPLE.

The day the "Alarm" goes out the Royal Proclamation would require each unit to assemble, on 2 days of the same week, of men under, and men over 40. The muster officers will "fall in" the men, with a full knowledge, as regards nearly every individual, of his employment and circumstances. Each, whose employment exists, will be sent back to his work. The remainder will be divided off in sections, as "*married and widowers*," and as "*unmarried*," and will join their units. The married and widowers will be organised for local employment, in which that of Special Constable is included,

those dependent on them will be registered, and in special cases, such as those of unmarried men who have to support parents, these will join the same section. A money allowance for food or "siege rations" from the Food Depôts will be issued to each. Each man's duties will be apportioned. The unmarried sections will at once be available for work anywhere, and will be rationed as if they were soldiers. As, from time to time, men lose their employment they would report at the rendezvous of their unit. One of the duties of the Special Constables would be to arrest any man, who had not, either an employment certificate, or, who was not enrolled with his unit.

### WHAT I CLAIM.

I claim, that, the Continental system is out of date, and also that it is unsuited to these peoples.

*That*, the compulsory enlistment nominally of every male who is physically fit, into the Forces destined for the fighting line for home defence is nominal, that the exceptions are very many, and therefore it is unscientific.

*That*, it would only provide physical training and the advantage of being brought under discipline for 57 per cent. of the male population between 18 and 40 years of age, and that it would cost over £19,000,000 per annum.

*That*, exclusive of those in their first year's continuous training, it would withdraw every year from the occupations of civil life a period represented by weeks of a man of 13,357,390 weeks which, for productive purposes, valued at £1 = £13,357,390.

*That*, the scheme of compulsion which I propose makes no change in the existing Forces of the Crown, as in our system of voluntary enlistment into the Navy, Regular Army, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers.

*That*, it proposes to establish compulsion for every male to serve in an Auxiliary Defence Corps; to be trained in military exercises without arms, equipment or uniform.

*That*, it recognises, the want of wisdom, in trying to train vast bodies of men, in the efficient use, of modern appliances for warfare, and in the scientific tactics for their application, and, the fact, that for every man in the line of battle, two or three men are wanted for the other duties connected with defence.

*That*, this compulsion instead of injuring the spirit of volunteering for armed service will, on the contrary, stimulate it.

*That*, it provides the *main d'œuvre* for all that is required in the defence of a crowded civilised country, for military works of all sorts, distribution of food, maintenance of order, and the hundred objects for which "hands" would be required if the nation were engaged in European war.

*That*, it affords the minimum of dislocation of occupations in time of peace as well as in war, and at once when war comes, enrolls each wage-earner in the employment of the State who at the time of the outbreak or through the consequences of a state of war is thrown out of his regular employment. At the same time offers him no inducement to leave his regular employment, rather obliges him to stick to it as long as it continues.

*That*, it imposes the minimum of compulsion on the manhood of the nation, and goes no further than legalising the obligation of seven

million males to qualify themselves in time of peace to do *something* to help in time of war in the defence of his native land.

*That*, it especially inclines the 400,000 males between 18 and 46 years of age who reside within a couple of miles of the sea coast all round these islands by training them in boating, swimming and long-shore work, to voluntarily enter the Naval Service.

*That*, in distinguishing between the *married* and *unmarried*, it recognises, that the first duty of a man, in the defence of his native land, is to provide that the care of his wife and children shall be as little encumbrance to the State as possible.

*That*, it tends to neutralise all disorder, tumult, or revolt at the critical moment, and, in peace-time to bring classes closer together to give them a common object, and to make them feel that the moment war is declared, each man will know where to go, and will be told what to do.

*That*, without what is called, militarising the nation, it will bring all under an organised system of simple discipline.

#### CONCLUSION.

My audience may feel assured that I am fully alive to the objections which my proposals will give rise to. The most forcible are probably those which are psychological. To a remarkable degree the understanding of the nation has been prepared by the last three years' contest for the reception of such a scheme.<sup>1</sup> Many of the old ideals have been demolished. Above all, the careful watching of what has been going on in South Africa has, we may feel sure, impressed the common sense of these peoples, if only that they realise the wide difference there is between the external display, pomp, pride, and pageantry of Armies in peace and the actualities of war.

If my contentions have any degree of soundness in them, then I urge on this meeting to vote with unanimity, that the sympathy of every woman and a share of the work of muscle and brain of every man, in the defence of these lands, should and must be at the disposal of King and country, and that everyone so convinced who neglects to advocate unceasingly legislative measures with that end in view is a traitor and a moral coward.

Mr. GEORGE F. SHEE (Secretary, National Service League):— I think there can hardly be any doubt in regard to our opinion of the gallant General's last sentence, though perhaps some of us might differ as to whether the unanimity is to be based on the soundness of his contentions. The General has done me the honour of selecting my book and my scheme as the point of his attack on the principle of compulsory service. While I think that that is a very great honour, it puts me under a difficulty, because I wrote that book some years ago. I began it in 1898, and finished it in 1900, and I wrote it as a private individual, trying "to give of my brains to the service of my country." Since that time the principle which I enunciated, and which I thought in the first instance was only accepted by a few, has been accepted by a large number of people, and last year a League was founded

<sup>1</sup> The representative gathering at the Mansion House, last Friday, on the question of the Food Supply, was a remarkable and impressive confirmation of this.

to promote that principle. They did me the honour of asking me to become the Secretary, and I accepted the position. That being the case, I am very anxious that the criticisms which the General has directed against my scheme as such should not be taken to apply to the objects of the National Service League. The *principles* of the National Service League are exactly the same, and I am perfectly prepared to defend them, both on my own behalf and as the League's Secretary. With regard to the attack upon my scheme, it is obviously impossible, as I think nearly half the paper is taken up with the attack, to answer it at all satisfactorily in the short time at my disposal. I must, therefore, try to touch upon a few points, then say a few words upon the General's own scheme, and finally deal with what I think you will all agree with me is the main thing, namely, the principle which he has attacked. I will therefore try to avoid the mistake which is attributed to Mr. Brodrick, that he is too much wedded to his scheme, on the one hand, and that he avoided tackling the principle of those who attacked him, and only dealt with the detail of their criticism. I will, at any rate, try to act on the Prime Minister's advice, and not lose myself in detail, but confine myself to the larger issues involved. I will first say a few words upon the remarks the General made on my own scheme. The most important criticism was that compulsory training would interfere with recruiting for the foreign service Army, and it is alleged that I did not answer that difficulty in my reply. The General will find a complete reply to it in my answer, but at the same time it is just as well to deal with the question now. The lecturer himself admits that in time of war compulsory training will not interfere with recruiting for the professional Army; and in time of peace we should have men of sound physique, who have had a military training, from which to recruit our voluntary and long-service Army. I think it is perfectly obvious that, if you provide that basis, the military spirit that is present already will be largely increased, and we should get a very much better quality of soldier. The lecturer is, moreover, apparently in confusion as to the principles which I, and I may say the National Service League, urge in regard to the total separation of the foreign and home service Army, when he speaks of my being "obliged to fall back upon the voluntary system for the foreign Army." That is the very principle on which we go. There has never been any idea of urging compulsory service for our foreign service Army. The real principle was very briefly alluded to by Lord Stanley in the debate the other day, in which he said that what we shall eventually have to come to, and what we must aim at, is an adequately long-service professional Army on voluntary lines, and a very short-service compulsory home Army. With regard to my estimates, I certainly did not take into any consideration the capital outlay on barracks or housing, but I did not pretend to do so. The estimate I gave represented the annual cost per man, and I must express my surprise that, as the gallant General has done me the honour to attack my scheme, he did not take a little more trouble to ascertain the exact nature of the proposals I made, and also to quote me a little more accurately. As regards my estimate of £60 a man, I explained in my book how I arrived at that figure. I divided the total Army estimates in each case by the total number of effective men on a peace footing. I took the total Army estimates in each country, including not only the men on the peace footing, but the cost of housing, staff, ammunition, reserve of officers, and every item complete. Therefore, the division by the total peace footing gives the same relative result in each case. I found that troops on a compulsory footing cost from £33 per head in Austria, to about £50 per

head in Germany. I allowed £10 per head extra for the additional cost of living in England, and that brought my estimate to £60, which it will be acknowledged is a very safe estimate on that principle. I find, therefore, that the whole of the additional amount which the General thinks ought to be added, £740,000 for officers, and £6,278,000 for housing, immediately falls away.

Major-General C. E. WEBBER :—The six million is for the training of the Reserve; I did not allude to any price for housing throughout the whole paper.

Mr. GEORGE F. SHEE :—The cost of the training of the Reserve is also included in the estimates of foreign Armies, and therefore it is included in the £60. I may be wrong in the estimates at which I have arrived, but at any rate the basis is perfectly correct, and includes every annual cost. Similarly, with regard to the foreign service Army, on the basis on which I worked, there would be no useless recruits, and there would be no inefficient boys of 17 and 18. Therefore there is no need to add the 30,000 long-service men, costing three millions, to allow for such inefficients. With regard to the training of the Reserve, the General has misquoted me in the most extraordinary way. He has exactly doubled each of the Reserve trainings which I suggested, and he has also put the Reserve training in each year instead of in every two years, which I proposed. The result makes an extraordinary difference in the figures he gives. First of all the whole of the 1,250,000 men of the "eleventh to the twentieth years" fall away entirely, and the 13,000,000 "weeks of a man" are reduced to a little over two million weeks. There would then be, on the General's own basis (if we divided that number by 35) 62,000 men training at the same time; but the training should not be spread over 35 weeks, but over 16 weeks, the summer months of the year, which would enable these men to be trained under canvas, and not in houses at all; and in that case the number of men trained at the same time would be 123,000 instead of 395,000 men. These are details which I think show that, as far as cost is concerned, my estimate was pretty accurate, supposing the numbers I took were accurate. I come to a much more important question. The General speaks of this national Militia trained for a year, as I proposed—and he cannot presume that the training would be otherwise than sound—there is no reason to suppose that it should not be sound—as "a vast armed crowd." I am really at a loss to follow his arguments and his ideas. Does he consider that our Militia, which has a month's training in the year, is "a vast armed crowd"? Are our Yeomanry, of 29,000 men, who have a fortnight's training, "a vast armed crowd"? Are our Volunteers, 250,000 men, a vast armed crowd? But perhaps he will tell us they are something quite different. There is the voluntary spirit, and that makes all the difference. I am quite willing to take it on another basis. Are the Swiss, that splendid nation of soldiers, trained on a basis of 45 days' training, "a vast armed crowd"? That is not the opinion of some of the most competent and experienced officers in Continental Armies. Major Manceau, in an excellent book on *Les Armées Étrangères*, has spoken of the Swiss Army in the highest terms, comparing it, as it stands, without taking into consideration the shortness of its training, with the French and German Armies. But I may mention a force nearer home, and one which will appeal to our recent experience even more than the Swiss. We have just been dealing with an armed rabble, of the kind the General despises so much, "an armed crowd" of 70,000 men, who had, of course, not one-twelfth or one-twentieth part of the training I



proposed. Well, Sir, it took us  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years, 240 millions of money, and 448,000 men, to overcome the resistance of those 70,000 men. And why? Simply because, meagre as their training was, and imperfect as was their organisation, they were fighting on the basis of national strength. They had behind them the physique, moral, and intelligence of a nation, and that is exactly what General Webber seems to have forgotten in considering the Militia I proposed. He forgets the enormous power for defence of a nation fighting for its hearths and homes against a foreign invader. In the whole attitude of his criticism of the length of training, he entirely ignores the whole tendency of modern Armies, which is to reduce the length of service more and more. To any student of military history, the way in which all nations have shortened the time of training from 8 to 7, and 7 to 5, and 5 to 3 years, must be remarkable; and I think it is safe to say there is not a single European nation at the present moment which is not tending, slowly and gradually, towards the adoption of a one year's system. When I heard the destructive criticism of the General, I hoped to hear something very much better put in its stead. I hoped to have the result of his experience and long training as a soldier, and to hear a system proposed which would give us a real auxiliary defence organisation, not only an organisation, but a defence. I confess that I have listened to his proposals with interest, but also with surprise; because I cannot understand, with the best will in the world—I desire to speak with all respect of the gallant General, who has had far more experience of these things than I have—I cannot understand how the system he proposes will advance us one jot or tittle. So far as I can make out, 370,000 young men are to be taught company and foot drill every year. I would like to ask why? On a certain date in the year,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  millions of men are to report themselves, and to take a part in the drill. These men are to be organised in the most minute and careful way. But it is to be observed that they are only to do company and foot drill. They are not to have any weapons; they are never to fire a rifle; they are to have no dealings at all with any tools of any kind. When we ask what this home organisation is for, we find that when war breaks out these men are to be set to work to dig trenches, and make earthworks and build blockhouses. Men who have never had a spade in their hands are, under this scheme, suddenly to be set to work to throw up earthworks and blockhouses! I confess I cannot understand the value of this scheme. These are matters of detail. I now come to the question of principle, which I think you will agree with me is far more important. What it really comes to is this, that General Webber holds with the present system of recruiting on a solely voluntary basis. He thinks we should go on paying an enormous sum for our voluntary Army, which must be increasingly taken from the lower strata of the population. We are to go on with a Militia, always 30,000 or 40,000 under strength, and with a Naval Reserve completely inadequate for our means. We are to go on demanding that the Volunteers should bear the whole burden of home defence. I think I may say, speaking now on behalf of the National Service League, that that is not the view the National Service League accepts. We believe it is time that this recruiting of the defensive forces of the nation *solely* on the voluntary basis should cease, and that compulsion should be applied to that vast mass of the inhabitants of these islands which take absolutely no share in the defence of the country. We contend, in fact, in a phrase used by both the mover and seconder of the debate in the House, that "the defence of the country is the affair of its citizens, and them alone." We believe that by adopting that principle all our recruiting difficulties will

disappear. We believe that the voluntary system, as the sole basis of national defence, is inadequate to our needs, and essentially unjust. It is inadequate to our needs because it provides for a voluntary Army at a vast expenditure, and yet quite inefficient in material—inefficient physically, morally, and intellectually. The voluntary system has never supplied the number required for the foreign service Army, and it is never likely to do so; and, above all, it has failed to supply men fit for war. I will give you the details for one year only, 1900. The admissions to hospital in the Regular Army in 1900—this is on a peace footing, taking no account of the South African war—were 827·7 per 1,000. There were over 10,000 men “constantly non-effective from sickness,” that is, 46 per 1,000 of the total strength. In the ten years from 1890 to 1899—I would like everybody to mark this fact—there were 117,000 men “constantly non-effective from sickness” in our Regular Army, representing 59·15 per 1,000; that is to say, that during those 10 years there were 117,000 men, not one of whom ever did a stroke for his country, but for whom we were paying at the rate of well over £100 a year per man, which means that well over eleven millions sterling were absolutely thrown away. That gives you one idea of the enormous waste that goes on under our voluntary system. With regard to the death rate, the death rate was 9·5 per 1,000 in 1900, exactly 450 per cent. higher than the death rate in the same year in the German Army. The constantly non-effective list in 1900 was 46·8 per 1,000, which was also exactly 450 per cent. higher than the German, and the admissions to hospitals were 827 per 1,000 against the German 689. If we look to the results in war, we find the same thing. Looking at the casualties in the South African war we find that the deaths from disease, as against from deaths due to wounds, were exactly twice as many in proportion as those in the Franco-German war. Then, General Sir Frederick Maurice has assured us that only 2 out of 5 accepted for the Army are efficient after two years’ service. I might add that 7,500 men were in prison last year in the Regular Army. I think that gives you some notion of what our boasted voluntary system means. I think it means, in Kipling’s words, that we :

“Weigh the Word above the Fact,  
And make and take excuse for sloth.”

in this continual appeal to the sacredness of the voluntary system as the only basis for recruiting. Again, there is no doubt that the costliness of the voluntary system must continually increase. It must increase, because wages are going up in every other trade and industry; and we must continuously tend to get the poorer and less efficient sections of the population. Any recruiting officers here will bear me out that the term “voluntary” is a very misleading statement to apply in regard to the enlistment of these men. As a rule they are the men who are the failures in civil life, physically, morally, and mentally. Do not misunderstand me. Many of these men, under the discipline of the Army, turn out magnificent fellows, and we know how splendidly they have behaved on the field of battle. But surely that is a matter of pride to them, and not to the nation. It is exactly the same when we boast of the number of the Volunteers. There are 250,000 Volunteers, and there are about five million men who do nothing. It seems to me that the Volunteers have every right to speak of their patriotism, but I think that is very little proof of the patriotism of the nation. I would like particularly to put aside one error that might be arrived at from General Webber’s lecture, namely, in regard to the time of service proposed by the National Service

League. They propose a very short service—a very short training in camp under canvas, simply for those men who do not qualify in some way, either by enlisting in the Army or in the Auxiliary Forces, in the defence of their country. We believe that by applying that principle of compulsion, we should make the task of the Volunteers much easier; in fact, we know we should. There is a growing feeling amongst the Volunteers that it is about time other people did something, and that they should not be asked to take upon themselves the whole burden of home defence. In that connection I cannot help referring to an extraordinary phrase, which is sometimes greeted by applause, which you will often hear at Volunteer dinners and Volunteer assemblies. In the course of a speech, we often hear it said, "We beseech you to go on Volunteering, because you stand between this country and compulsory training." I think that is a most extraordinary statement. It really means this: "Each of you men is serving, and allowing other men to shirk their work. I beseech you to go on doing it; because, if you don't, a most awful thing will happen, namely, every man will have to do it!" It seems to me that we might as well say, "Let us have an association for voluntary taxation: nobody in this free country ought to be obliged to do anything." Then one might address the small, the *very* small assembly of voluntary taxpayers: "Pray go on paying your taxes, because, if you don't, other people will have to pay them instead, or rather as well, which would be dreadful!" The subject is so large, and the time so short, that I will say no more, except to remark with regard to the Navy that we stand in urgent need of an adequate Naval Reserve, which would be developed under a system of compulsory training applied to the maritime population. In any case, we believe that, in the words of Mr. Chamberlain: "The privileges enjoyed involve corresponding obligations; the responsibilities must be reciprocal, and must be shared in common; and I do not think that any Empire can be said to rest on a sure foundation which is not based upon a recognised community of sacrifice."

Mr. CHARLES LART :—I wish to speak as a Volunteer who has ten years to his credit, four as an officer and six as a private and non-commissioned officer. I consider I am one of the victims of the system of voluntary soldiering. I have to do duty for five other people who shirk it, and I also have to pay taxes to keep up my own organisation. The Government allow the Volunteers 1½ millions a year, but the Volunteers are taxed to raise that amount. Therefore, we are taxed twice over in money, and we also give our voluntary service, and officers, at all events, are further mulcted to the extent of £20 a year at least out of their own pockets. It seems to me that the net result of the voluntary patriotism of a free people is that we make it possible for the rest of the country to play golf and football. I do not know whether we are going to do it much longer, but it is possible we shall dwindle away bit by bit. I am very sorry that all the resignations which are now taking place are not stopped by utilising the force which is now escaping in leaks to bring about some system of compulsory service, because it is quite certain that if we demand it we must get it. I have no objection to doing twice the amount of service that I have done in the past; I have done as many as 250 drills in one year, whereas 15 was the maximum required, but I shall be glad to do twice my normal number if other people will stand up beside me and do them too. That is the feeling of the Volunteer force now. Our feelings have undergone many changes during the last few years, but we now see that we are no longer an amateur adjunct, but

a cheap substitute. Mr. Brodrick cannot get his last three Army Corps without us; he must, at all events, have an equivalent number of men for home defence; and he can only get them through the Volunteers. My own idea is this—it may not be worth much—that in districts or counties where the number of Volunteers is below the establishment, that the Militia Ballot should be enforced to bring it up to the number. It is very certain that under a system of voluntary patriotism the first whisper of the Militia Ballot would fill up the ranks of the Volunteers.

Lieut.-Colonel C. F. COLVILLE (late Devonshire Regiment) :—Various opinions may be expressed in this meeting on the subject under discussion, but I think there is no doubt we are all agreed on one point, namely, that this paper of General Webber's is a most able and valuable contribution to the subject we are all interested in. I gather that the scheme of General Webber briefly is this, that the Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers, are to remain as they were, or as they are, and he suggests to organise the whole civil population to do certain work in the event of an invasion, not to be a fighting unit. How does this improve the Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers as a fighting machine, which soldiers past and present believe is necessary? If they are to remain as at present, the suggested organisation of the civil population would be most valuable, but what we want to see is the fighting force greatly improved, and the lecturer's scheme, I submit, does not do that. He makes one suggestion which is deserving of approval, namely, that he does, in a tentative sort of way, advocate the system of compulsion, that is, that the civilian element is to be compelled to organise and drill without arms. To go a little further, and say that they are to be compelled to organise and drill with arms, is not a very long step. I am one of those, probably in the minority, who believe that the day of the Volunteers has passed. There is no man living who admires the Volunteers more than I do, and the spirit which has animated them in the work which they have done. I am afraid that the recent war in South Africa has tended to magnify, and unduly increase, in the minds of many people, the importance of the Volunteers. The line taken by Mr. Shee was that a Volunteer Army of 70,000 men, such as the Boers, were able to hold in check a very large number of men, and so on; but it must be remembered that the circumstances of that particular war were peculiar, and will never occur again. There was no large civil population which we could starve and over-awe, and thus bring pressure to bear upon the fighting men. Non-combatants were carefully cared for by our own troops. There was no definite objective, no base, no lines of communication: they were practically a huge band of mounted gypsies, who were able to wander over a vast extent of country, where, and when they pleased. It was like a game of football: we were never certain where the ball would go. The chief point is that the Boers were unable, at all events at first to any great extent, to assume the offensive as an organised body. Towards the end of the war, when the men became more trained, they were able to assume the offensive in small numbers, but as an army they were not; consequently, they gave us plenty of time to organise and make soldiers on the field of operations. Such a state of things can never possibly occur again if we have another war with white men—and it is quite possible that we may have another war, much could be said to prove that it is not only possible, but probable, with a European force. Time will not be given you then, and therefore you must be prepared by having your men sufficiently trained to increase the fighting army at the commencement of the operations.

One of the objections raised to having compulsory training has been that the men cannot be housed. But the lecturer does not propose to house his large civilian army. If he can house those men and drill them for three weeks without arms, why cannot he equally drill them for ten or eighteen weeks with arms? It always annoys me—of course, that is not a matter of much importance—to hear soldiers and others discussing the cost, and taking up a lot of time by going into intricate figures. My view, such as it is, is this, that questions of cost are all very well for bankers and stockbrokers “on the make,” but what does it signify to us? Our business is to say that given the existence of the nation and of the Empire is of vital importance, such and such a thing is necessary. Let us come to some conclusion as to what is the absolute necessary minimum in order to ensure the safety of the Empire. When you have settled that, do not trouble yourself whether it will cost one million or five millions; the country will have to pay for it, no matter what it costs, or take the responsibility. If you have a war, you have to pay whatever is asked for; it is far better to put your hands in your pockets in time of peace, and get value for cash, and avoid unlimited liabilities. What I wish to impress upon this audience is that the scheme of General Webber’s does not tend one jot or iota towards the solution of the question of how to improve the Army and the Auxiliary Forces. What is necessary, is a trained body of men, and men spelt with a big “M,” not men that die like flies when they go on active service, but full-sized able-bodied men, who can stand the wear and tear, and rough and tumble, of a campaign. You must get those men, and, if you cannot get them in any other way, you must get them by compulsion. We are compelled to do a thousand things every day in our lives which we do not like; why not be compelled to do one more, especially if the interests of the country are at stake?

Lieut.-Colonel T. MYLES SANDYS, M.P. (late 3rd Bn. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment):—As an old soldier I would like to make a few remarks upon the lecture we have all had the advantage of hearing. I confess that it is a portion of Army organisation which, perhaps the more it is thought about the more its value becomes apparent. General Webber started with telling us that for each combatant in the front or fighting line there are requisite three persons who are not fighters to carry out the subsidiary services in order that the combatant’s hands may be free. That, I take it, is the basis of his paper to-day. The scheme that he has brought forward for giving the civil population of the country a kind of organisation and cohesion would be of infinite value in time of war, in order that the fighting Services may be free for carrying out their work. That is a subject which I think is worthy of consideration, and which, I venture to say, has not been laid before a thinking professional audience like this previous to to-day. Therefore, on that account, I feel that as far as I myself am concerned, and I hope for many present, General Webber’s scheme is one which is worthy of being considered, and possibly carried further. There is another point I would like to touch upon which arises out of that. The primary subject in all our minds is the defence of the country, and the means by which it is to be carried out. I have noticed that the tendency, I may say the military tendency, among earnest young soldiers to-day is to take the military policy of this country from the South African war, and to consider it—as was touched upon by the gallant speaker who preceded me—from the point of view that the value of the Volunteer force seems to be the end-all and be-all of modern military legislation. We all admire the Volun-

teen forces : we know what excellent work was done by scores of them in the South African war. Of course we all know the gallant work that was done by the Army in South Africa : that goes without saying. But I am one of those who believe in the British Army as it was before, and I consider up to the present time the British Army has done nothing to cause it to be practically put into the melting pot and abolished in order to turn out some brand-new organisation, as was advocated by Mr. Shee, of a Home Defence Army supported by a Foreign Service Army. I am a member of the National Defence League, but I do not at all endorse Mr. Shee's opinion that we wish to have a short-service Home Army and a long-service Foreign Army. If it was advocated the other day by Lord Stanley in the House of Commons, all I can say is that when the military debate comes on I shall stand up in the House of Commons, and tell Lord Stanley that I do not agree to that at all. What we desire in regard to the Army is, that it shall be developed and made a thoroughly reliable Army, that the Militia—which is the true Army Reserve—shall be strengthened to any reasonable extent by the exercise of the Militia Ballot. We have the weapon all ready to our hands. At present the Militia Ballot Act is upon the Statute Book, and it has obtained in this country from the time of King Alfred down to the present time. The Militia is the old Constitutional force of the country, and the ballot has been put into operation numberless times in cases of stress and difficulty, and at the present time it is simply hung upon a peg on the wall of the House of Commons, and in case of necessity it could be brought into operation over the whole of the country to-morrow. Therefore, I maintain you have an effective weapon for the strengthening of your second line. The Volunteers are really what used to be called in the old days the second Militia. We have a Militia of two classes : we have the active Militia, which is in reality the Constitutional force, and we have the Volunteers. We have the Regular Army in the front line, the Militia recruited by the ballot in the second line, the Volunteers in the third, and then the force suggested by the gallant lecturer, the civil population, which shall have some sort of aggregate military value by being trained and divided into manageable units, and shown how they are to support the other three parts. Let me pass to the Regular Army for a moment. What has been done in the Regular Army? There have been three glaring mistakes made in the organisation of the Regular Army by those who have had to deal with it, but who have had no professional knowledge. The first was the introduction of short service ; the second was the amalgamation of battalions, under the idea that you could balance the requirements of a nation in war time, and the requirements of the nation at home ; and the third was the enlisting of the short-service men and the trying to establish a reserve from half-trained, inadequately-trained, soldiers. We have got to go back, in my opinion, upon all those three mistakes. If we are to have an Army which is reliable as a Regular Army, we must recruit that Regular Army with fully-trained men got by voluntary enlistment—by boys if you like : I would have a boy corps in every regiment. But when you have got your men trained for 3, or 5, or 7 years, do not fling them away as trained soldiers, but let a very large proportion of them stay on to obtain the pension at the end, because I know if that is done we shall have no difficulty in recruiting. Let me give you an instance of what is occurring at the present time. The best scheme before the country at the present time is in the Royal Garrison regiments raised by the present Secretary of State for War. I assure you that I have this straight from those who are serving with these regiments. Men are coming in to those Garrison Regiments, trained soldiers, men who have done their service with the colours, at the

rate of ten or twelve a day, and if instead of having 7 regiments he would have 17, or 27, or 30, or 40, I believe he would get the necessary men, the reason being that after two years' service every one of those men is entitled to a pension. A short-service man is put into the reserve when he does not want to leave the Army; he gets 6d. a day for ten years, and I really think that when we balance efficiency—and after all, in the case of national defence, our watchword should be efficiency first and economy second—when you come to total up the amount which is paid to these Reserve men, who are allowed to go into civil life, and who are deteriorating as soldiers every year that they are away from their regiments—when you come to put the money which is paid at 6d. a day for ten years to these men, against the 1s. a day at the end of twenty-two years for an army of perhaps 200,000 men, men of all arms, fully trained, I think the balance will not be so largely in favour of short service. But I am quite sure of one thing, that the balance of deterioration will be upon the side of the short-service soldier. I think the meeting for having listened to what I have said in regard to this matter. It is a subject which, as an old soldier, and one who is anxious to see an effective Army, is very dear to me, and I am sorry that I have not more time at my disposal for going into the question. I trust that these remarks will be carefully considered.

Lieut.-Colonel W. C. UNDERWOOD (late 4th Hussars):—General Webber has divided his lecture into two parts. In the first part he criticised the scheme of the National Service League as too expensive, unsuited to the country's needs, and generally impracticable, though he cordially approves of the application of compulsion for the general defence of the country. The second part consisted in developing his scheme for a general training of the mass of the young men of the country in exercises of a non-military nature, which would improve the physique of the nation, and indirectly assist the Regular Army in its duties of offence and defence, by taking up those non-military duties, which are necessarily required in general operations. Now, it seems to me that the General has raised a bogey, in assuming that a scheme of national training would raise enormous forces, which could neither be (except at great expense) equipped nor officered. The Army Authorities need not place on the Reserve one more man than they consider necessary, and as the French annual levy is on the average only 11,000 men per annum, it is much more probable that this number would be nearer the mark than the 30,900 men suggested by the lecturer. But I take it that the National Service League and the General are in entire agreement, that the large proportion of the physically unfit, that is, those who can neither shoot nor march well, should receive a suitable training to enable them to perform such duties as hospital orderlies, clerks, barrack sweeps, and cyclists; or even trench diggers and block-house builders, if the country would submit to such expenses, for a passive defence. Full provision is made in all foreign Armies for the training of casuals in duties other than actual fighting. There are two great advantages attached to a system of compulsory service. The first is that our foreign service voluntarily-raised Regular Army would have a greatly extended field for recruiting, and the other is that it would be a great factor for peace, since the personnel of our Naval and Military forces being assured, our foreign policy could be strong and firm, instead of weak and vacillating as at present. The Reserves which we did not require might be emigrated to the wheat-bearing lands of Canada, with Government assistance, there to form Colonies of irregular troops similar to the Russian Cossacks, at a small cost to the country, who would form a great addition to the military strength of the Empire. They would be food producers

to the Mother Country, and could raise large numbers of remounts for our Army. Unfortunately, though many of our military members in this theatre have expressed themselves favourable to universal compulsory training, not one of them in the debates in the House of Commons on Army Reform have said one word on the subject. It is extremely unfair to the Government to charge them with extravagance in their present policy, unless they show, and are prepared to advocate, that there is a much cheaper and more excellent way, by means of national service for home defence, and a small, well-equipped voluntarily enlisted Army with adequate reserves drawn from the patriotism of the trained nation.

Major-General T. BLAND STRANGE (Late R.A.):—I think we are all greatly indebted to the gallant lecturer for helping us to realise the enormous number of what he is pleased to call Auxiliary Defence Corps, that we shall require—to put it roughly; fellows to dig ditches, and so on. I have the profoundest respect for my sister corps, the Royal Engineers, but I cannot help feeling that a little of *Æsop's* fables enters into this matter, and that there is "nothing like leather." We are all deeply impressed with the value of ditches, especially those who served in South Africa, and we would all like to have lots of British Kaffirs to dig those ditches. But when they are dug, we must have some British Boers to put inside, and we will not always find a foreign general to run his head against our Colensoes—they might go round them sometimes. However, General Webber has done a valuable service; he has done a great deal of what my other gallant friend sniffs at—the broker business. I quite agree that it is the main business of the soldier to tell the truth, and let the people arrange the payments. But our instructive General of Engineers has rendered us excellent service from another point of view: he has pointed out, as well as any broker, and better, what the expense will be. And, in pointing out the immense number of men that will be required for auxiliary and subsidiary services, he has shown us that we do not want all these anticipated barracks, and that the expense will be so much less, because we do not want everyone to be a rifleman, thereby leaving no one to dig the ditches, etc. Of course we must have such auxiliaries as the Army Service, and so forth; but, taking these into consideration, it relieves the National Service scheme, which has been brought forward by Mr. Shee, from a very large part of the expense, because we will not have these enormous numbers of men to train as soldiers. Then we are told that so many men cannot shoot. I have done 30 years' service with an eye-glass and a field-glass, and if you have a man who cannot see very well, why, give him spectacles! But the main point we are all agreed on, is that we have got to have men spelt with a capital "M," and it is very evident that we cannot get them without compulsion. If we have compulsory education, in the name of goodness why do we make a fuss about compulsory training for military purposes, any more than about the compulsory payment of taxes? I will not take up your time any longer, because it is valuable, but will you forgive a man for speaking about something that he has seen, and done, and known. I have made many soldiers in three months with the aid of the printing press and systematic training,<sup>1</sup> and several other things that appear to have been forgotten

<sup>1</sup> The issue of simple, technical and tactical handbooks to intelligent recruits eliminates much of the "as you were" weariness and waste of time of the old-fashioned drill sergeant.—T.B.S.



to-day. What I am driving at is the Canadian system. Canada, as you know, has no Regular Army; they have, strictly speaking, nothing but Militia. We always forget that the Boers were a conscripted Militia. They had no regular force except artillery and police. A small proportion of the Canadian Militia are permanently embodied for the instruction of the local Volunteer Militia; Field and Garrison Artillery, Cavalry, Mounted Infantry, and Infantry Corps, are maintained as military schools, and the rest of the Militia are supposed to pass through these schools, three months at a time.<sup>1</sup> Now, if we take this plan, and divide by four the number of men, of conscripts, for the year—I like to call them by their proper name—who come up for three months at a time, you will have the new barracks that will have to be made for the New Army Corps to drill the national recruits in winter;<sup>2</sup> you will have tents in summer, and you will be able to billet some of them, as General Webber means to billet his navvies. I do not mean to say that the Canadian system is perfect—very far from it—but when we come to look at about six million people, the population of London, standing at bay against, possibly, the United States, it is a big question not only for them but for us. I believe, with compulsory training, they could defend their country as the Boers did, with but little help from us, but I will not go into that now, because it would take too long. I only point out that I think General Webber has solved a good deal of the difficulty by saying that we do not want these enormous numbers of men to be trained in the ranks only as soldiers, but that so many of them will be utilised in civil departments. I do not know why he hates so much having them taught to shoot: one would almost imagine that he belonged to the Society of Friends.

The Rev. W. SMITH DAVIS :—You have been told this afternoon that a clergyman well known to us all, a very leading man in the Church, takes an interest in the defence of this Empire. He does this as a man of peace. I venture to address you this afternoon also as a man of peace. I have written on this subject in the public Press, and I have done so as a man of peace. I was induced in a great measure to take the subject up years ago by what was told me in conversation with a foreign relative, who opened my eyes very considerably. Since then I have been doing the little that I could in advocating what appeared to me to be a desirable system for the maintenance of the interests of the Empire—the provision of reserves as regards the *personnel* of the Navy, as well as of reserves for the Army. General Webber has laid before us this afternoon many matters which are worthy of our consideration. I do not advocate the acceptance of his scheme, but it seems to me that if we get men under our control for the purpose of teaching them a little drill, we should avail ourselves of the opportunity to teach them as much as possible, and if everything is done that is possible in the time available for the purpose, they should be taught much which would enable them to discharge those duties which necessity might constrain us to allot to them.

<sup>1</sup> Here the Canadian system breaks down. Conscription not being enforced, the local Militia cannot be compelled to go through the schools. But no officer is permanently gazetted to the Militia unless he has been three months at the school of the arm to which he belongs.—T.B.S.

<sup>2</sup> Regular Armies of long-service soldiers are apt to become hide-bound by useless routine, unless employed during peace in the military instruction of local Militia.—T.B.S.

as sappers and miners.<sup>1</sup> It seems to me that Mr. Shee has gone over the subject of the General's paper with very considerable ability. I have had a correspondence with Mr. Shee upon this subject. In a great measure we are quite agreed, but there is one point on which we are not, namely, concerning the utility of the Volunteers in this scheme of military organisation.<sup>2</sup> It must have appeared to a great many people, who have

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<sup>1</sup>General Webber's scheme seems to me to be inadequate, chiefly because he does not apply the principle that every able-bodied male is responsible for playing his part in the defence of his country (the Empire in our case) in the way that his capabilities best enable him to be of service—a principle that would always secure that the round man would be found in the round hole, and the square man in the square hole.—W.S.D.

<sup>2</sup>Applying the principle I have referred to in the foregoing footnote, our mercantile seamen and deep-sea fishermen would receive a training in the Naval Reserve; the most suitable of our foundries and ironworks, etc., firemen would be trained as stokers for the Navy; grooms, and men accustomed to horses, as reserve men for our cavalry, or Army Service Corps; artificers and mechanics, some for the Royal Engineers and some for the Navy; men capable of navy work would be organised, under Volunteer officers (preferably Civil Engineers, who should receive special training for the purpose), in Pioneer Companies, while men who had not received a training which would fit them specially for service in either of these branches of the Navy or the Army, would be trained as infantry, excepting, of course, those who already possessing saddle horses, or who can afford, with the help now given, to hire them, prefer to fit themselves for service in the Yeomanry. Young men who have no preference for cavalry service, but who can afford to make themselves efficient at their own expense, as infantry Volunteers, would be permitted to do so as members of the local Volunteer battalion, while those who could not afford to so comply with their country's requirements, would have each one to train with the Militia battalion of his county.

With regard to the question of the supply of officers in sufficient numbers for the Militia and Volunteers, the fact that the young men of our well-to-do, and rich, classes, would find themselves liable to service with the rank and file, unless qualified for service in the commissioned ranks, would constrain them to fit themselves for commissions in these corps. Until some such system is adopted, we shall never have a sufficiency of officers for our Reserves.

Under my scheme, every Militia and Volunteer battalion would continue a unit of its territorial regiment, as at present, as conducive to *esprit de corps*, and for the preservation of facilities for training, etc.

As reserves for the foreign-going (Regular) battalions of each territorial regiment, Militiamen and Volunteers under 20 or 21 years of age would be liable only to service at home; those of 20 or 21 to 30 or 31 years of age, to service, in case of emergency, with the foreign-going battalions, abroad, as they may be needed, while those above 31 years of age would again be liable only for service at home with their Militia or Volunteer battalion, etc., etc., as the case might be. Other details and particulars as, *e.g.*, in regard to the organisation of the Reserves for the cavalry, artillery, etc., I should be pleased to give if asked to do so.

All able-bodied males then, above 18 years of age, under my scheme would be liable to compulsory service in the Militia, the Pioneers, the Naval Reserve, the Yeomanry, or the Volunteers, who are not already at

been resident at different times in Switzerland—(and a large number of English people gravitate to that country, passing many winter months there, thus becoming more or less acquainted with the institutions of the country, and as regards those who are interested in military matters, particularly with the way in which the national system is recruited, and the way in which it is efficiently maintained)—that the utility of such a force as we have in our Volunteers, is a point which should be well considered by our country. Two or three speakers have quoted authors well competent to form an opinion upon this subject, who have testified to the excellency of the Swiss Army. The brevity of their service, I think, would very much astonish anyone who has not given attention to the subject. It is sufficient to remind you that we can utilise our Volunteers to as much effect for the defence of our Empire as the Swiss are able to utilise their Army for securing the integrity of their country and its interests. With regard to the question of housing, we have that point settled for us by the example of what is done in regard to the Swiss Army. No housing is provided for it at all. When the men are out training they go into camp, or they are billeted in the villages. Surely what is done by the Swiss military authorities, and is found sufficient for the Swiss Army, will be found sufficient for our Volunteers as well. But our Volunteers, it seems to me, from what I have been able to gather, do a far greater amount of drill throughout the year than is done by the Swiss conscripts, and we can point to Volunteer regiments which obtain an amount of efficiency, at all events on the parade ground, which you never see in the battalions of Switzerland. We owe an immense debt of gratitude to our Volunteers, and I am sure they would be perfectly willing to fall in with a compulsory scheme, which would put them in a position of supporting our foreign-going Army in case of need with all the reserves which we could draw from such a source, in co-operation, of course, with the Militia. My scheme, which perhaps may be known to some of those present, is this, that the Reserve should be formed by our Militia and the Volunteers, and that they should still be part, as they are at present, of the territorial Army. Each territorial regiment should practically—I believe theoretically, at all events, it is so now—form a staff for training the Militia and Volunteers in case of need. But it should be always the case. Every Volunteer regiment would then feel itself part of the Army, and one would have no difficulty in thus adopting a compulsory scheme which fell in with the convenience of all branches of the community, and would give all the reserves we need, not only for our Army, but would provide the round men for the round holes, and the square men for the square holes. It would also provide the artificers we need for the Navy.

Mr. W. W. KETTLEWELL (late Lieutenant, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers) :—I only wish to maintain two points. I may say that I am a very old member of this Institution, although I have never had the pleasure of speaking in this theatre before. I once did make a few remarks on a naval matter at another meeting, and then I was very much of an

that age on the strength of some branch of the so-called Regular Army or Navy. The Regular Army and the *personnel* of the Navy being recruited at present by voluntary enlistment—a system which would be found successful both as regards the quality and quantity of our recruits, if those inducements are held out to our young men to enlist which I have set forth elsewhere.—W.S.D.

amateur, because I am no seaman. But to-day I feel I am in a rather different position, because I served for some time in the Army, and although I do not claim to be an expert in the gallant General's sense, I can claim some experience, although, unfortunately, I never saw any active service. I did see a little service during the Franco-German war—not on my own account, but I saw something of what war was like. I have also taken a considerable interest in military subjects ever since I left the Service, and I have had exceptional opportunities for observing foreign Armies. The point I really wish to speak to is this. I think it is a little hard on those of us who, like Mr. Shee, advocate compulsory service for home defence, to accuse us of not valuing *esprit de corps*. I am sure anybody who knows anything about soldiering or soldiers must know that *esprit de corps* is the soul of the whole thing, and that if any military body is not thoroughly imbued with *esprit de corps* it is of no value. You may teach drill, shooting, or anything you like, but if *esprit de corps* is not there, as a fighting body the regiment, or brigade, or whatever it may be, is absolutely worthless. As the lecturer very rightly says, our Regular Army gets its feeling of *esprit de corps* from the long association of men together. They get to know each other's value, they get to appreciate each other, to know their officers and understand them, and the officers get to understand the men. That begets what I call regimental feeling—call it *esprit de corps* if you like—which is the life of a military body. I was glad to hear Colonel Sandys say that he is in favour of reverting to long service, because I do think this *esprit de corps* is not so strongly marked as it used to be in the old days. I quite agree with him in thinking that short service and weak battalions have more or less impaired the magnificent feeling which used to exist, and which I hope may some day exist again. But if you must have this feeling in any military body it is just as essential in a short-service force as it is in a long-service one: you must have it, and if you cannot get it one way you must get it another. If you cannot get it by long association you must get it in some other way, and I believe the solution of the question is pure and absolute localisation, so that men who live together shall serve together. If they cannot be associated for a long time together in a regiment, they must come from the same part of the country, they must know each other at home, and I believe that will supply what I may call *esprit de place*. Take the German Army, for instance. The gallant lecturer has told us, at which I was rather surprised, that the German Army is a professional force. I prefer to look upon it as a very highly-trained militia. I do not see anything professional about it, because the rank and file of the German Army serve only for two years. The gallant lecturer has told us that it is three years, but it is now really only two. Therefore, I can see nothing professional about that Army. I take it that a professional soldier is a man who makes soldiering a career in life, who is going to keep on at it as long as he can, and wants to make a livelihood of it. There is nothing of that kind in the German Army. The private serves two years, and, except under very exceptional conditions in the special arms, he cannot serve any more. In time of peace the officer and non-commissioned officer are both professionals in the highest sense, but in time of war both of these have to be very much supplemented by reserve officers, who are nothing more or less than civilians, who are called back to the ranks. I do not suppose any of us think the German Army is not imbued with *esprit de corps*: I know very well it exists there in a high degree. It cannot be obtained in very short service by the association which long service alone gives, and there-

fore I think it is due entirely to the absolutely strict localisation of every unit, which is the rule in the German Army.

Major-General C. E. WEBBER, in reply, said :—It is always a misfortune when one brings a subject of this kind before a meeting to have to skip over so much as I have had to do to-day in my paper, and simply read out what might almost be looked upon as detached sentences. If I had been enabled to read all I have written, but which, from the shortness of the time I was not able to do, I could have shown you that no link in my line of thought and reasoning is wanting. A great many of the remarks that have been made are due, perhaps, to those who were present not having read the paper through; and, without boasting, I must say it requires to be read through with a great deal of care, and also to be read as following on the two previous papers read in this theatre, to which I have alluded—for they all three, in so far as they deal with my subject of to-day, have the same intention. As regards what Mr. Shee said, I am sure he will excuse me if I appeared to make my paper an attack on him. I felt very much the frequent use of his name, which I should like to have struck out in a great many cases; but still, Mr. Shee will excuse me when he knows that my idea was not so much an attack upon him as upon the system which he represents, a system which I believe is totally inapplicable to this country and the people of these islands, that is to say, compulsory service similar to the Continental system. It is no use my enlarging upon that point at this moment, because my paper fully deals with it. I should like to point out to Mr. Shee that he does not in any way tell us how he is going to provide accommodation for the training of the 205,000 men for a year, and, who, he should recollect, represent only 57 per cent. of those who are available, meaning that there are 43 per cent. exemptions. I do not know what he will do with the exemptions; they will never come under his system of training, and will never be able to do anything for the service of their country.

Mr. G. SHEE :—Forty-three per cent. would be excluded for physical reasons. I am bound to say that sounds perhaps incredible, but I have gone into the matter of the physical side of the question very thoroughly, and I can assure the gallant General that 43 per cent. of rejections on physical grounds would be about the figure.

Major-General C. E. WEBBER :—I should like to tackle Mr. Shee face to face on that question. I still maintain that, with the limited means we have in this highly-civilised country of training men in the tactical use of fire-arms, it is more rational to rely on voluntary enlistment into the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, for home defence, than to obliterate these services, and to substitute for them the compulsory Pan-Britannic Militia which he described. He has not shown us how he is going to work to train his Militia—every man serving under compulsion—or to repel an invading force with the two or three million men whom he proposes to raise. It has been said it is a blot upon my paper that I have not gone into the question of the reform of our existing forces. My paper was not written for that purpose. It was written with the view of showing how the nation may be organised, so that every man should be compulsorily obliged to do something at the moment of danger. That is the object of my paper. If I have failed to do that, I have failed altogether. I still maintain that the body which Mr. Shee proposes to raise

will be, and never can be more than, a vast armed crowd. I do not think it necessary to refer to what Mr. Lart said, because although it was extremely interesting, it was more or less personal to his own service in the Volunteers. Again I refer to the misunderstanding about my paper. Colonel Colville asks me how I propose to reform or improve the existing forces. I repeat my paper was not written for that purpose. It was written for the purpose of showing how that very great residuum, the vast majority, of our male population could, in time of war, be utilised. Colonel Sandys very clearly and aptly put my proposal before you in his own words. Colonel Colville asks me—at which I express my surprise—why, if I teach all these men to drill without arms, I could not go one step further and drill them with arms. Now, the dividing line between drill with arms and drill without arms is a broad one, evident to anyone who thinks and appreciates the subject thoroughly, and I am sure that they will admit that fact. Shooting with a rifle, as it will be required in the wars of the twentieth century, is a scientific matter. General Wheeler, of the United States Army, one of the most celebrated soldiers on the other side of the ocean, says that the idea of hitting with one shot in seventy-five is ridiculous for the wars of the future. If you put these scientific weapons into the hands of men who can never be taught to use them, except merely to fire them off and shoot at a man they can see on the other side of a hedge, it is of no use; that is not teaching men to be soldiers. The soldier of the future will have to be a man who can use the weapon in a way it was never thought of or realised in the nineteenth century. It would be in this direction that I propose to reform the existing forces. I say, do not let us change them: let us make them as perfect as they can be, and let us utilise all the rest of the nation, not as General Strange said, to dig, but in performing those various services, some of which I have detailed, and which I referred to in a very cursory way. As regards the annual training of the First, Second, and Third Militia Reserves of Mr. Shee's proposals, and the inclusion of the cost of their training subsequent to their first year's service, in the £60 per annum, which he allows for each of the 210,000 effective men on a peace footing, I am still in doubt. In the first place the cost, per man per annum of the training in Continental Armies (which he takes as his basis), has been shown in the discussions on the respective budgets to have increased largely in proportion when the period of service was reduced from 2 to 3 years, and it has been estimated officially in France that a training of one year will cost but a little less than that of two years if the maximum efficiency is to be attained. Such being the case the accuracy of the estimate cannot be admitted, viz.:—that £60 per man (in his first year) would also include the cost of the training of the Militia Reserves, which moreover can have no assistance from the 50,000 "professional soldiers" in that part of the "Foreign Service Professional Army," which he allows for the peace home establishment, and who will be entirely occupied in their own duties and in supplying the establishment of 74,000 men which he allows for India. Mr. Shee will pardon me if I have misquoted him as to the time he allows for the periodical training of his Militia Reserves of 2,000,000 men. It appears that he proposes to be satisfied with giving these men on an average five days' training each year between the ages of 20 and 40. His correction of my figures more than confirms my claim that these 2,000,000 would be something worse than a "vast armed crowd," an expression which he deprecates. This is the force which he proposes to place in line of battle against an invader, who would certainly not leave his best divisions at home.

The CHAIRMAN (General Sir Richard Harrison, K.C.B., C.M.G.):—I believe it is my business, as Chairman, to sum up to a certain extent what has been said, and also to carry out that very pleasant duty of proposing a vote of thanks to the lecturer. I should like, before I touch on the lecture, to just say one thing in reference to this Institution. When I heard the debate in the House of Commons the other night it was said, I believe, that no reforms in the Navy or Army ever came from experts, that is to say, that experts never bring forward anything that is of the least use. I think the gentleman who made that remark could have known nothing of this Institution and the JOURNAL that comes out so regularly, and which has for the past 30 years been full of the most valuable and carefully thought-out matter affecting the two Services. I am perfectly certain that if those essays and lectures were studied more carefully by those who have to legislate, it would be the better for them. There have been certain misunderstandings with regard to the subject that our lecturer has been lecturing upon to-day. A nation, when it wishes to organise, has to do two things. It has first to make the best possible use it can of the raw material in men and stores that it possesses, and, secondly, it has to make a complete and carefully thought-out scheme for turning that raw material into the machine that we call a Navy or Army. What General Webber has been lecturing about is not the second, as I understand, of those subjects, but the first, *i.e.*, he has confined himself entirely to dealing with the raw material that this country possesses. Personally, I may say, I have frequently thought over this subject, and I have also had the privilege of looking over, I think, as many as thirty, essays on the question of compulsory service, when the Committee of this Institution was good enough to appoint me one of the arbiters for lectures: and I believe, myself, that our lecturer is right: and that those “growths” in this country that have sprung up at various times, that is to say, the old Militia, the Volunteers, the Yeomanry, and the Regulars, if properly organised, would give this country all that it requires for its protection. At the same time, if those forces are not carefully handled, if the circumstances under which they enlist are forgotten, or put on one side, no doubt great difficulties arise. What I hope we shall see in future, now that we are going to have a great council, will be that not only the organisation as between the Navy and Army will be more carefully worked out than it has been in the past, but that the conditions of every branch of our Service will be also more carefully thought out and utilised. I should like to say a word on one subject that was touched on, I think by Mr. Shee, in reference to our late enemy, the Boers. I think he quoted them as an example of what forces might do which were not highly organised. But, gentlemen, the Boers learned soldiering from the Zulus, who had the most extraordinary organisation: the most wonderful and the most carefully thought-out organisation that has ever existed on the face of this earth. The Boers learned their mode of fighting from them—(as Lord Chelmsford might have told you if he had not gone away)—and, in addition to what they learned from the Zulus, in regard to their teaching as soldiers they had the best possible field-training from the time almost that they were born, until the time they went into the field and fought. I suppose there never have been men more capable of fighting than were the Boers, with whom we had to carry on our late campaign. In regard to the lecture, I think that what General Webber has put before us is well worthy of consideration, for four reasons. First, it contains the very least amount of compulsion that the people of this country would probably bear. Secondly, it gives

good practical instruction in organisation to all classes: it gathers the classes together, as you will remember, and it inculcates in them a system of organisation. Thirdly, it carries on the physical instruction of the young, which has been begun, of late years, in our elementary and secondary schools, and is now part of our educational system, and thereby no doubt would greatly improve the physique of our young men. And, lastly, it provides a safeguard against what may be a great danger, in time of any big war, viz., the people who are unemployed breaking out in riots, and almost compelling the Government of the country to give in. One thought has been in my mind while I have been listening to the lecture which I should like to mention before I sit down, and it is this: I do not quite know how many young men are enlisted into the Navy every year, I should think there must be from 10,000 to 20,000.

Mr. G. SHEE :—About 16,000.

The CHAIRMAN :—In addition to that, 50,000 young men will be required every year, in future, to keep up our own Army. What has been on my mind is this: What would happen to all those 65,000 young men who are enlisted every year into the Services if they were not so enlisted, and trained in the Navy and Army? Of course all of them are not of the best type, though most of them do have a germ of goodness, and no doubt nearly all of them have the craving for adventure which is so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race. But I think the people of this country ought to think of that, and they ought to value the training that these young men get in the Navy and Army, not only because as soldiers and sailors they defend the country, but because, by that training, they are improving the physique of the race. I think those who saw the Naval Brigade march with their guns through London not long ago, in the Jubilee procession of Queen Victoria, will feel that we are improving the race by the training that we give these sailors. And I am quite sure that those who were out in South Africa, and saw the way in which our British infantry stormed many a strongly defended hill, and then sat down, took their rations out of their haversacks, and shared them with the foe they had conquered, would feel that we are improving the race, and improving the manhood of our country, by the training that we give to our soldiers and sailors. I believe that what General Webber has proposed will carry out that idea to a still greater extent, and that it is thereby well-deserving of the consideration of everyone, and the money that is spent on it will not be thrown away. I ask you now to cordially pass a vote of thanks to General Webber for the exceedingly valuable and well thought-out lecture he has given us to-day.