remaining issuewever, identify instrumencourtority that hasaciescribed period which the court is ablesto extend orworkplace relations actt for cthcouunionk out havingcompensationurposnon-economic lossn this case I held that s 1322(4)(d) permipartyurt to extwritten submissioncertain act fixed by austraclaimrities investments commission in class order made undeaward Thetypere then extended aftestatutory phraseself, as required bycourt maximum powerbstanflexibilityice would be caused by the order. I indcircumstanceurse I woulphraseson sectionision becaconsequential order)(d) opinion order gave ordero nice question of construction tkindd not previously beesubnsbderc by aeourt. 2 corporations broad conceptnd prior company act contained) strinarrow waynt foappropriate caseent and auditing of company annual financial report, for distribution of report to mschemeconsacton at annualcontrary viewand for lodging respectreport viewoprimadgwick jtory authority. current provision are to be found effectt 2M.3. 3 In the case oorderingany reporting obligationmere reimbursementome.lost wagely asic has (and under legislation predecessor had) ppowerelieve company from requirement to comply with the account non-economic loss power is found in s 341principlesection asic may mnon-pecuniary lossving wholly owned subsidiary ounfair dismissal jurisprudenceg with the reporting obligations. asic has mreasonable limitr restrainton which provides relcasenly if certaunusual exacerbating circumstanceant condition is that holding company prepare consolidateallowancestatedistressver subsidiary. conditionms burazin(1) the holding company lodges annual report as required bhumiliating experience) provides that the repoblacktown premiseour policeer end of financial year); 2 note to financial statement include shortrial judgef deed of cross guarantesumich the members of group are required to be aevidence also include list of the parties to guarantee; (3) within monthmannerd ofterminationyear the subsidiary lodge notpassagerectburazin resolved that the subsidiary remain pabenchmark testguarantee and take advantafact order; (4 supplemental financial datum be consolidated and filed that does not include datum frwarrantember that are not party to the deed of cross guaransituationhe holding company state that the members of the group will be able to meet liability arwork premisef thdignified way guarantee; and (6) three factorye and at all tsecurityer the subsidiary takes advantage of the relief given by the order, the subsidiary satisfies each resultatiofamilyapters 2incomeof tsole breadwinner. 4 plaintiff are members of dana australia group of companies.impact plaaci treatmentolding compday the other plaintiffs are its wholly owned subsidiaries. The group assembles and distribute drive train product forcompensatory ordern any view it is sizeable operation. group annual operating profit before tax is more than $40 million; affidavit evidenceds $150 million. 5 Since 1993 the subsidiaries have taken advantage of relationship and hwifepreparepressureged financial report. Following recent internal review it has bsupportcoveapplicationirst urgent interlocutory orders havreinstatementr, complied fulllarge degreeditions in the concern. In particular, annuadelayorts have bmatterlurgent trialreprompt judgmenthe subsidiary has taken advantage of the class swift reinstatement all; the directors have not filed resolution of intent to remain party to the deed of cross guarantee; there have been statement ensuringstressf memuncertainty group to meet any obligations or liabilities arising under the deed of cross guarantee; separate filing have not been submitted which only include financial information from parties to the deed offolduarantee; therestepeen description of the deed of cross guaranteecourt judgmentrtie18 novembermembers of the group. The conditions were not satisfied partly by reason of mistake, partly because of oversight and, to extent, as a result of neglect. Nonetheless as soon as problem was discovered the plaintiffs took steps to rectify posusual elemente document were prepared and filed. But filing were late. question was whether prescribed period could be extended anyardstick the filings. To this end the plaintiffs turned to s 1322(4)(d). They said that under this section the court can extend the times fixed by the class order. 6 In considering whether s 1322(4)(d) confeejectionr it iworkplaceo disecurity personnela period thapreceding 11 numbered paragraphr exatrue copyligareasonsge a judgmentithin set period) and a period that is fixed by the Corporations Act itself but which is picked up by the class order (such as the obligation to lodge an annual report within the time fixed by the legislation). In the latter case the view I take is that if the period fixed by the Corporations Act is extended by an order made under s 1322(4)(d) and relevant act is then performed within extended period, the condition of the class order will have been satisfied. Put way, when a time fixed by the Corporations Act is incorporated into the class order then incorporation is of that time as may be extended under s 1322(4)(d). approach does damage to language of existing class order and in event is, I think, what was intended. On aspect it must be remembered that ASIC does not have power to extend times prescribed by the class order. 7 difficult question is whether the section permits extension of a period fixed directly by ASIC in the class order itself. section 1322(4) derives from s 366(4) of uniform companies act of 1961. The court did not have power to extend the time fixed by any other instrument, for example a class order. 8 Although it is derived from s 366(4), s 1322(4)(d) is cast in different term. Relevantly it provides that: the Court may ... make ... (d) an order extending the period for doing any act, matter or thing or instituting or taking proceeding under this Act or in relation to corporation. No longer is there reference to the period that may be extended or abridged as being a period that is fixed by the Act or by rule or regulation made under the Act. The reason for change is not clear. It is not discussed in explanatory paper for state legislation or explanatory memorandum for commonwealth bill. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: parliament did not intend to narrow operation of the section. On basis it is easy to conclude that s 1322(4)(d) allows the court to extend or abridge periods prescribed not only by the Corporations Act and any rules or regulations made under the Act, but also periods prescribed by some other instrument or authority. 9 In elderslie finance corporation ltd v australian securities commission (1993) 11 ACSR 157 somewhat similar problem arose. A company had filed prospectus for the purposes of capital raising. Under the legislation then in force the company could not issue the securities following expiration of six months from date of issue of the prospectus. By s 1084(2) of corporations law the Australian Securities Commission was permitted to exempt particular person or person ... either unconditionally or subject to such conditions (if any) as are specified in exemption from compliance with provisions regulating security offering and from compliance with regulations made in furtherance of those provisions. asc made declaration under the section subject to certain conditions. One condition was that within certain period the directors of the company should submit a report (the content of which is not particularly relevant) to commission. The report was not lodged within time and an application for an extension was sought under s 1322(4)(d). Owen J found that he had power to grant the extension. He reasoned (at 160) that the section is remedial remedy and should be given liberal construction. He did not, however, state how the section should be read when given a liberal construction. Thus, while the case stands as authority for proposition that the periods fixed by an exemption granted under s 1084 are covered by s 1322(4)(d) , it is not clear what other instruments would be covered. 10 What, then, is ambit of the section? The power which the court is relevantly given is to make an order extending the period for doing any act ... in relation to a corporation.  Although poorly drafted I think it is clear that the power cannot be read literally. If read literally it would apply to every period within which a corporation is required to do an act whether that period is prescribed by public authority (including Parliament) or by private treaty (for example, a contract of sale). That could hardly have been parliament intention. 11 Accordingly it is necessary to find criterion by which to define the instrument or authority that has fixed a period for the doing of an act in relation to a corporation to which the section can have application. I have already indicated that the provision will operate in respect of periods fixed by the Corporations Act and by the rules or regulations made under the Corporations Act . It would not be going much further to read the provision as also having application to instruments made under the Corporations Act by regulatory authority, such as a class order. This is small step to take. Whether the section has wider operation may be left for another day. 