remaining issue to determine is whether court should order aci to pay Mr Williams compensation under s 298U(c) of workplace relations act 1996 cth). union only seeks compensation for non-economic loss which it alleges Mr Williams suffered. 2 party provided written submission to the Court dealing with claim for compensation for non-economic loss. It said that award of type has yet to be made. statutory phrase is aimed at giving court maximum power and flexibility [to] do what it thinks appropriate in circumstance. Further, phrase in section 298U(f); consequential order in opinion, refers to order consequential upon any order of kind falling within ... sub (b), c) or e). Compensation is broad concept which should not be interpreted in narrow way. In appropriate case the Court is able to order compensation for non-economic loss. There is nothing in scheme of act to support contrary view. I agree, with respect, with view of madgwick j as to the flexibility the Court possesses to, in effect, correct injustice by ordering of compensation beyond mere reimbursement of lost wage. 5 ACI submitted that if the Court held that it had power to make an order for compensation which took into account non-economic loss it should be guided by principle for the award of non-pecuniary loss which have been developed in unfair dismissal jurisprudence. To ensure compensation is confined within reasonable limit, restraint is required. But in case there were unusual exacerbating circumstance that make it appropriate to include in the compensation allowance for distress unnecessarily caused to ms burazin. These circumstances include Ms Burazin having to suffer humiliating experience of being escorted from blacktown premise by police. Having regard to these circumstances, the compensation assessed by trial judge should be increased by sum of $2000, to $5,000. It said that there was evidence about any unusual exacerbating circumstances associated with manner of termination. 7 The Union submitted that passage in burazin relied upon by ACI did not articulate benchmark test but only stated why, on fact before the Court, compensation for distress was appropriate. The Union contended that there is warrant for limiting compensation for non-economic loss to situation which are unusual and exacerbating. First, it said that he was not permitted to leave work premise in dignified way but was pressed to leave factory quickly with security summoned. Second, it said that Mr Williams sudden unemployment caused him stress and tension as result of family losing income of sole breadwinner. 9 The Union conceded that Mr Williams gave no evidence about impact of aci treatment on him on day of his termination. It further accepts that some restraint is called for but contends that, in the circumstances, compensatory order should be made. It also submitted that some compensation should be given to Mr Williams as a result of affidavit evidence that his termination caused him shock and emotional strain and placed relationship with wife under pressure. The affidavit evidence referred to at [9] above was filed in support of application for urgent interlocutory order for reinstatement. The Court, to large degree, accommodated concern of the parties about delay by giving matter urgent trial. prompt judgment was later given. ACI co-operated in effecting swift reinstatement of Mr Williams. In those circumstances I do not consider that it is appropriate to make an order for compensation for non-economic loss. stress and uncertainty suffered by Mr Williams and his family was short lived. Any amount of compensation ordered would only be nominal and not worth imposing on ACI which appears to have accepted Mr Williams back into fold. It has taken step to seek to stay or delay reinstatement after court judgment of 18 november 2005. 11 I make no order as to compensation in the circumstances of this case. To do otherwise would not be acting with restraint. In my view Burazin establishes that something more is required for compensation for non-economic loss than usual element of distress which accompanies most terminations. Whilst unusual and exacerbating circumstances is not necessarily yardstick, there must be something attending a termination which justifies an order for non-economic loss. Such an order may have been made in this case had Mr Williams given evidence of the effect on him of ejection from workplace by security personnel. I certify preceding 11 numbered paragraph are true copy of reasons for judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall. 