THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war in which
									the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought against one another.
									He began to write when they first took up arms, believing that
									it would be great and memorable above any previous war. For he
									argued that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he saw the rest of
									the Hellenes either siding or intending to side with one or
									other of them.

No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was
									shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to
									affect the world at large.

The character of the events which preceded, whether immediately
									or in more remote antiquity, owing to the lapse of time cannot
									be made out with certainty. But, judging
									from the evidence which I am able to trust after most careful
										enquiry , I should
									imagine that former ages were not great either in their wars or
									in anything else.

The country which is now called Hellas was not regularly
										settled in ancient times . The people were migratory, and
									readily left their homes whenever they were overpowered by
									numbers.

There was no commerce, and they could not safely hold
										intercourse with one another either by land or sea. The several
									tribes cultivated their own soil just enough to obtain a
									maintenance from it. But they had no accumulations of wealth,
									and did not plant the ground; for, being without walls, they
									were never sure that an invader might not come and despoil them.
									Living in this manner and knowing that they could anywhere
									obtain a bare subsistence, they were always ready to migrate; so
									that they had neither great cities nor any considerable
									resources.

The richest districts were most constantly changing their
									inhabitants; for example, the countries which are now called
									Thessaly and Boeotia, the greater part of the Peloponnesus with
									the exception of Arcadia, and all the best parts of
									Hellas.

For the productiveness of the land increased the power
									of individuals; this in turn was a source of quarrels by which
										communities were ruined, 
								 while at the same time they were more exposed to attacks from
									without.

Certainly Attica, of which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed
									a long freedom from civil strife, and therefore retained its
									original inhabitants.

And a striking confirmation of my argument is afforded by the
										fact that Attica through immigration
									increased in population more than any other region. 
								 For the leading men of Hellas , when driven out of their
									own country by war or revolution, sought an asylum at
									Athens; 
								 and from the very earliest times, being admitted to rights of
									citizenship, so greatly increased the number of inhabitants that
									Attica became incapable of containing them, and was at last
									obliged to send out colonies to Ionia.

The feebleness of antiquity is further proved to me 
								 by the circumstance that there appears to have been no common action in Hellas before the Trojan
									War.

And I am inclined to think that the very name was not as yet
									given to the whole country, and in fact did not exist at all
									before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion; the different
									tribes, of which the Pelasgian was the most widely spread, gave
									their own names to different districts. But when Hellen and his
									sons became powerful in Phthiotis, their aid was invoked by
									other cities, and those who associated with them gradually began
									to be called Hellenes, though a long time elapsed before the
									name prevailed over the whole country.

Of this Homer affords the best evidence; 
								 for he, although he lived long after the Trojan War, nowhere
									uses this name collectively, but confines it to the followers of
									Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes; when
									speaking of the entire host he calls them Danaans, or Argives,
									or Achaeans. 
								 Neither is there any mention of Barbarians in his poems,
									clearly because there were as yet no Hellenes opposed to them by
									a common distinctive name.

Thus the
									several Hellenic tribes (and I mean by the term Hellenes those
									who, while forming separate communities, had a common language,
									and were afterwards called by a common name) , owing to their
									weakness and isolation, were never united in any
									great enterprise before the Trojan War. 
								 And they only made the expedition against Troy after they had
									gained considerable experience of the sea.

Minos is the first to whom tradition ascribes the possession of
									a navy. 
								 He made himself master of a great part of what is now termed the
									Hellenic sea; 
								 he conquered the Cyclades, and was the first coloniser of most
									of them, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons to
									govern in them. 
								 Lastly, it was he who, from a natural desire to protect his
									growing revenues, sought, as far as he was able, to clear the
									sea of pirates.

For in ancient times both the Hellenes, and those Barbarians,
									whose homes were on the coast of the mainland or in islands,
									when they began to find their way to one another by sea had
									recourse to piracy. They were commanded by powerful chiefs, who
									took this means of increasing their wealth and providing for
									their poorer followers. 
								 They would fall upon the unwalled and straggling towns, or
									rather villages, which they plundered, 
								 and maintained themselves chiefly by the plunder of them; for,
									as yet, such an occupation was held to be honourable and not
									disgraceful.

This is proved by the practice of certain tribes on the
									mainland who, to the present day, glory in piratical exploits,
									and by the witness of the ancient poets, in whose verses the
									question is invariably asked of newly-arrived voyagers, whether
									they are pirates ; which implies that neither those who are questioned
									disclaim, nor those who are interested in knowing censure the
									occupation.

On land also neighboring communities plundered each
									other; 
								 and there are many parts of Hellas in which the old practices
									still continue, as for example among the Ozolian Locrians,
									Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the adjacent regions of the
									continent. 
								 The fashion of wearing arms among these continental tribes is
										a relic of their old predatory habits.

For in ancient times all Hellenes carried weapons because their homes were undefended and intercourse was
									unsafe; 
								 like the Barbarians they went armed in their every-day
									life.

And the continuance of the custom in certain parts of the
									country indicates that it once prevailed everywhere.

The Athenians were the first who laid aside arms 
								 and adopted an easier and more luxurious way of life. 
								 Quite recently the old-fashioned refinement of dress still
									lingered among the elder men of their richer class, who wore
									under-garments of linen, and bound back their hair in a knot
									with golden clasps in the form of grasshoppers; 
								 and the same customs long survived among the elders of Ionia,
									having been derived from their Athenian ancestors.

On the other hand, the simple dress which is now common was
									first worn at Sparta; 
								 and there, more than anywhere else, the life of the rich was
									assimilated to that of the people.

The Lacedaemonians too were the first who in their athletic
									exercises stripped naked and rubbed themselves over with
									oil. 
								 But this was not the ancient custom; athletes formerly, even
									when they were contending at Olympia, wore girdles about their
									loins, 
								 a practice which lasted until quite lately, 
								 and still prevails among Barbarians, especially those of Asia,
									where the combatants in boxing and wrestling matches 
								 wear girdles.

And many other customs which are now confined to the Barbarians
									might be shown to have existed formerly in Hellas.

In later times, when navigation had become general and wealth
									was beginning to accumulate, cities were built upon the sea-shore and fortified;
									peninsulas too were occupied and walled-off with a view to
									commerce and defence against the neighboring tribes. 
								 But the older towns both in the islands and on the continent,
									in order to protect themselves against the piracy which so long
									prevailed, were built inland; 
								 and there they remain to this day. 
								 For the piratical tribes plundered, not only one another, but
									all those who, without being seamen, lived on the sea-coast.

The islanders were even more addicted to piracy than the
									inhabitants of the mainland. 
								 They were mostly Carian or Phoenician settlers. 
								 This is proved by the fact that 
								 when the Athenians purified Delos during the Peloponnesian War and the tombs of the dead
									were opened, more than half of them were found to be Carians.
									They were known by the fashion of their arms which were buried
									with them, and by their mode of burial, the same which is still
									practised among them.

After Minos had established his navy, communication by sea
									became more general. 
								 For, he having expelled the marauders when he colonised
									the greater part of the islands,

the dwellers on the sea-coast began to grow richer and to live
									in a more settled manner; and some of them, finding their wealth
									increase beyond their expectations, surrounded their towns with
									walls. 
								 The love of gain made the weaker willing to serve the
										stronger, and the command of wealth enabled
									the more powerful to subjugate the lesser cities .

This was the state of society which was beginning to prevail at
									the time of the Trojan War.

I am inclined to think that Agamemnon succeeded in collecting
									the expedition, not because the suitors of Helen had bound themselves by oath to
									Tyndareus, but because he was the most powerful king of his
										time.

Those Peloponnesians who possess the most accurate traditions
									say that originally Pelops gained his power by
									the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia
									into a poor country, whereby he was enabled, although a
									stranger, to give his name to the Peloponnesus; and that still
									greater fortune attended his descendants after the death of
									Eurystheus, king of Mycenae, who was slain in Attica by the
									Heraclidae. For Atreus the son of Pelops was the maternal uncle
									of Eurystheus, who, when he went on the expedition, naturally
									committed to his charge the kingdom of Mycenae. Now Atreus had
									been banished by his father on account of the murder of
									Chrysippus. But Eurystheus never returned; and the Mycenaeans,
									dreading the Heraclidae, were ready to welcome Atreus, who was
									considered a powerful man and had ingratiated himself with the
									multitude. So he succeeded to the throne of Mycenae and the
									other dominions of Eurystheus. Thus the house of Pelops
									prevailed over that of Perseus.

And it was, as I believe, because Agamemnon inherited this
									power and also because he was the greatest naval potentate of
									his time that he was able to assemble the expedition; and the
									other princes followed him, not from good-will, but from
									fear.

Of the chiefs who came to Troy, he, if the witness of Homer be
									accepted, brought the greatest number of ships himself, besides
									supplying the Arcadians with them. 
								 In the Handing down of the Sceptre he is
									described as 
								 
 
										 The king of many islands, and of all Argos. 
										 Il. 2.108 
									 
								 
								 But, living on the mainland, he could not have ruled over any
									except the adjacent islands (which would not be
										'many') unless he had possessed a considerable
									navy. 
								 From this expedition we must form our conjectures about the
									character of still earlier times.

When it is said that Mycenae was but a small place, or that any
									other city which existed in those days is inconsiderable in our
									own, this argument will hardly prove that the expedition was not
									as great as the poets relate and as is commonly imagined.

Suppose the city of Sparta to be deserted, and
									nothing left but the temples and the ground-plan, distant ages
										would be very unwilling to believe that the power of the
									Lacedaemonians was at all equal to their fame. 
								 And yet they own two-fifths of the Peloponnesus, and are
									acknowledged leaders of the whole, as well as of numerous allies
									in the rest of Hellas. 
								 But their city is not built continuously, and has no splendid
									temples or other edifices; it rather resembles a group of
									villages like the ancient towns of Hellas, and would therefore
									make a poor show. 
								 Whereas, if the same fate befell the Athenians, the ruins of
									Athens would strike the eye, and we should infer their power to
									have been twice as great as it really is.

We ought not then to be unduly sceptical. The greatness of
									cities should be estimated by their real power and not by
									appearances. And we may fairly suppose the Trojan
										expedition to have been greater than any which preceded it,
									although according to Homer, if we may once more appeal to his
									testimony, not equal to those of our own day. He was a poet, and
									may therefore be expected to exaggerate; 
								 yet, even upon his showing, the expedition was comparatively
									small.

For it numbered, as he tells us, twelve hundred ships, those of
									the Boeotians 
									carrying one hundred and twenty men each, those of
										Philoctetes 
									fifty; and by these numbers he may be presumed to indicate the
									largest and the smallest ships; 
								 else why in the catalogue is nothing said about the size of any
									others? 
								 That the crews were all fighting men as well as rowers he
									clearly implies when speaking of the ships of Philoctetes; 
								 for he tells us that all the oarsmen were likewise
									archers. 
								 And it is not to be supposed that many who were not sailors
									would accompany the expedition, except the kings and principal
									officers; for the troops had to cross the sea, 
									bringing with them the materials of war, in vessels without
									decks, built after the old piratical fashion.

Now if we take a mean between the crews, the invading forces
									will appear not to have been very numerous when we remember that
									they were drawn from the whole of Hellas.

The cause of the inferiority was not so much the want of men as
									the want of money; 
								 the invading army was limited, by the difficulty of obtaining supplies, to such a number as might be
									expected to live on the country in which they were to fight.
									After their arrival at Troy, when they had won a battle 
								 (as they clearly did, for otherwise they could not have
									fortified their camp), 
								 even then they appear not to have used the whole of their
									force, but to have been driven by want of provisions to the
									cultivation of the Chersonese and to pillage. 
								 And in consequence of this dispersion of their forces, the
									Trojans were enabled to hold out against them during the whole
									ten years, being always a match for those who remained on the
									spot.

Whereas if the besieging army had brought abundant supplies,
									and, instead of betaking themselves to agriculture or pillage,
									had carried on the war persistently with all their forces, they
									would easily have been masters of the field and have taken the
									city; since, even divided as they were, and with only a part of
									their army available at any one time, they held their
									ground. 
								 Or, again, they might have regularly invested Troy, and the
									place would have been captured in less time and with less
									trouble. 
								 Poverty was the real reason why the achievements of former ages
									were insignificant, and why the Trojan War, the most celebrated
									of them all, when brought to the test of facts, falls short of
									its fame and of the prevailing traditions to which the poets
									have given authority.

Even in the age which followed the Trojan War, Hellas was still
									in process of ferment and settlement, and had no time for
									peaceful growth.

The return of the Hellenes from Troy after their long absence
									led to many changes: 
								 
								 quarrels too arose in nearly every city, and those who were
									expelled by them went and founded other cities.

Thus in the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy, the Boeotian
									people, having been expelled from Arnè by the Thessalians,
									settled in the country formerly called Cadmeis, but now
									Boeotia: 
								 a portion of the tribe already dwelt there, and some of these
									had joined in the Trojan expedition. 
								 In the eightieth year after the war, the Dorians led by the
									Heraclidae conquered the Peloponnesus.

A considerable time elapsed before Hellas became finally
									settled; after a while, however, she recovered tranquillity and
									began to send out colonies. 
								 The Athenians colonised Ionia and most of the islands; the
									Peloponnesians the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and various
									places in Hellas. 
								 These colonies were all founded after the Trojan War.

As Hellas grew more powerful and the acquisition of wealth
									became more and more rapid, the revenues of her cities increased, and in most of
									them tyrannies were established; 
								 they had hitherto been ruled by hereditary kings, having fixed
									prerogatives. 
								 The Hellenes likewise began to build navies and to make the sea
									their element.

The Corinthians are said to have first adopted something like
									the modern style of marine, 
								 and the oldest Hellenic triremes to have been constructed at
									Corinth.

A Corinthian ship-builder, Ameinocles, appears to have built
									four ships for the Samians; 
								 he went to Samos about three hundred years before the end of
									the Peloponnesian War.

And the earliest naval engagement on record is that between the
									Corinthians and Corcyraeans 
								 which occurred about forty years later.

Corinth, being seated on an isthmus, was naturally from the
									first a centre of commerce; 
								 for the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnese in the old
									days, when they communicated chiefly by land, had to
									pass through her territory in order to reach one another. 
								 Her wealth too was a source of power, as the ancient poets
									testify, who speak of 
										 Corinth the rich 
										 Il. 2.570 
									 . 
								 When navigation grew more common, the Corinthians, having
									already acquired a fleet, were able to put down piracy; 
								 they offered a market both by sea and land, and with the
									increase of riches the power of their city increased yet
									more.

Later, in the time of Cyrus, the first Persian king, and
									of Cambyses his son, the Ionians had a large navy; 
								 they fought with Cyrus, and were for a time masters of the sea
									around their own coasts. 
								 Polycrates, too, who was a tyrant of Samos in the reign
									of Cambyses, had a powerful navy and subdued several of the
									islands, among them Rhenea, which he dedicated to the Delian
										Apollo . 
								 And the Phocaeans, when they were colonising Massalia, defeated
									the Carthaginians on the sea.

These were the most powerful navies, 
								 and even these, which came into existence many generations after the Trojan War, appear to have consisted chiefly
									of fifty-oared vessels and galleys of war, as in the days of
									Troy; as yet triremes were not common.

But a little before the Persian War and the death of
										Darius, 
									who succeeded Cambyses, the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans
									had them in considerable numbers. 
								 No other maritime powers of any consequence arose in Hellas
									before the expedition of' Xerxes.

The Aeginetans, Athenians, and a few more had small fleets, and
									these mostly consisted of fifty-oared vessels. 
								 
								 Even the ships which the Athenians built quite recently at the
									instigation of Themistocles, when they were at war with the
										Aeginetans and in expectation of the
									Barbarian, 
								 even these ships with which they fought at Salamis were not
									completely decked.

So inconsiderable were the Hellenic navies in recent as well as
									in more ancient times. 
								 And yet those who applied their energies to the sea obtained
									a great accession of strength by the increase of their revenues
									and the extension of their dominion. 
								 For they attacked and subjugated the islands, especially when
									the pressure of population was felt by them.

Whereas by land, no conflict of any kind which brought increase
									of power ever occurred; 
								 what wars they had were mere border feuds. 
								 Foreign and distant expeditions of conquest the Hellenes never
									undertook; 
								 for they were not as yet ranged under the command of the great
									states, 
								 nor did they form voluntary leagues or make expeditions on an
									equal footing. 
								 Their wars were only the wars of the several neighboring tribes
									with one another.

The conflict in which the rest of Hellas was most divided,
									allying itself with one side or the other, was the ancient war
									between the Chalcidians and Eretrians .

There were different impediments to the progress of the
									different states. 
								 The Ionians had attained great prosperity when Cyrus and the Persians, having
									overthrown Croesus and subdued the countries between the river
									Halys and the sea, made war against them and enslaved the cities on the mainland. Some time afterwards, Darius,
									strong in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, conquered the
									islands also.

Nor again did the tyrants of the Hellenic cities extend their
									thoughts beyond their own interest, that is, the security of their persons, and the
									aggrandisement of themselves and their families. They were
									extremely cautious in the administration of their
									government, 
								 and nothing considerable was ever effected by them;
									except in wars with their neighbours, 
								 as in Sicily, where their power attained its greatest
									height. 
								 Thus for a long time everything conspired to prevent Hellas
									from uniting in any great action and to paralyse enterprise in
									the individual states.

At length the tyrants both at Athens and in the rest of Hellas
									(which had been under their dominion long before Athens), at least the
									greater number of them, and with the exception of the Sicilian the last who ever ruled,
									were put down by the Lacedaemonians. 
								 For although Lacedaemon, after the conquest of the country by the Dorians who now inhabit it,
									remained long unsettled, and indeed longer than any country
									which we know, nevertheless she obtained good laws at an earlier
									period than any other, and has never been subject to
									tyrants; 
								 she has preserved the same form of government for rather more
									than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the 
									Peloponnesian War. It was the excellence of her
									constitution 
								 which gave her power, and thus enabled her to regulate the
									affairs of other states. 
								 Not long after the overthrow of the tyrants by the
									Lacedaemonians, the battle of Marathon was fought between the
									Athenians and the Persians;

ten years later, the Barbarian returned with the vast armament
									which was to enslave Hellas. 
								 In the greatness of the impending danger, the Lacedaemonians, who
									were the most powerful state in Hellas, assumed the lead of the
									confederates, 
								 while the Athenians, as the Persian host advanced, resolved to
									forsake their city, broke up their homes, and, taking to their ships,
									became seamen. 
								 The Barbarian was repelled by a common effort: but soon the
										Hellenes, as well those who had revolted from
									the King as those who formed the original confederacy ,
									took different sides and became the allies either of the
									Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians; 
								 for these were now the two leading powers, 
								 the one strong by land and the other by sea.

The league between them was of short duration; 
								 they speedily quarrelled and, with their respective allies,
									went to war. 
								 Any of the other Hellenes who had differences of their own now
									resorted to one or other of them. 
								 So that from the Persian to the Peloponnesian War, the
									Lacedaemonians and the Athenians were perpetually fighting or
									making peace, either with one another or with their own revolted
									allies; thus they attained military efficiency, and learned
									experience in the school of danger.

The Lacedaemonians did not make tributaries of those who
									acknowledged their leadership, but took care that they should be governed by
									oligarchies in the exclusive interest of Sparta. 
								 The Athenians, on the other hand, after a time deprived the
									subject cities of their ships and made all of them pay a fixed
									tribute, except Chios and Lesbos . 
								 And the single power of Athens at the beginning of
									this war was greater than that of Athens and Sparta together at
									their greatest, while the confederacy remained intact.

Such are the results of my enquiries, though the early history of
									Hellas is of a kind which forbids implicit reliance on
										every particular of the evidence . 
								 Men do not discriminate, and are too ready to receive ancient
									traditions about their own as well as about other
									countries.

For example, most Athenians think that Hipparchus
									was actually tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and
									Aristogeiton; 
								 they are not aware that Hippias was the eldest of the sons of
									Peisistratus, and succeeded him, and that Hipparchus and
									Thessalus were only his brothers . At the last moment, Harmodius and Aristogeiton suddenly
									suspected that Hippias had been forewarned by some of their
									accomplices. They therefore abstained from attacking him, but,
									wishing to do something before they were seized, and not to risk
									their lives in vain, they slew Hipparchus, with whom they fell
									in near the temple called Leocorium as he was marshalling the
									Panathenaic procession.

There are many other matters, not obscured by time, but
									contemporary, about which the other Hellenes are equally
									mistaken. For example, they imagine that the kings of Lacedaemon
									in their council have not one but two votes each , and that in
									the army of the Lacedaemonians there is a division called the
									Pitanate division ; whereas they
									never had anything of the sort. 
								 So little trouble do men take in the search after truth; so
									readily do they accept whatever comes first to hand.

Yet any one who upon the grounds which I have given arrives at
									some such conclusion as my own about those ancient times, would not be far wrong.
									He must not be misled by the exaggerated fancies of the poets,
									or by the tales of chroniclers who seek to please the ear rather
									than to speak the truth. Their accounts cannot be tested by him;
									and most of the facts in the lapse of ages have passed into the
									region of romance. At such a distance of time he must make up
									his mind to be satisfied with conclusions resting upon the
									clearest evidence which can be had.

And, though men will always judge any war in which they are
									actually fighting to be the greatest at the time, but, after it
									is over, revert to their admiration of some other
									which has preceded, still the Peloponnesian, if estimated by the
									actual facts, will certainly prove to have been the greatest
									ever known.

As to the speeches which were made either before or during the
									war, it was hard for me, and for others who reported them to me, to recollect the
									exact words. 
								 I have therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the
									sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he
									would be likely to express them, while at the same time I
									endeavoured, as nearly as I could, to give the general purport
									of what was actually said.

Of the events of the war I have not ventured to speak from any
									chance information, nor according to any notion of my own; I
									have described nothing but what I either saw myself, or learned
									from others of whom I made the most careful and particular
									enquiry.

The task was a laborious one, because eye-witnesses of the same
									occurrences gave different accounts of them, as they remembered
									or were interested in the actions of one side or the
									other.

And very likely the strictly historical character of my
									narrative may be disappointing to the ear. 
								 But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of
									the events which have happened, and of the like events which may
									be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things,
									shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall
									be satisfied. 
								 My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize
									composition which is heard and forgotten.

The greatest achievement of former times was the Persian War;
									yet even this was speedily decided in two battles by sea and two by
									land. 
								 But the Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and
									attended by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a
									like period of time.

Never were so many cities captured and depopulated— some by
										Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves
									fighting against one another; and several of them after their
									capture were repeopled by strangers. Never were exile and
									slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about by
									civil strife.

And traditions which had often been current before, but rarely
									verified by fact, were now no longer doubted. For there were
									earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses
									of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in
									any former age; there were also in some places great droughts
									causing famines, and lastly the plague which did immense harm
									and destroyed numbers of the people. 
								 All these calamities fell upon Hellas simultaneously with the
									war,

which began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians violated the
									thirty years' truce concluded by them after the recapture of
										Euboea .

Why they broke it and what were the grounds of quarrel I will
									first set forth, that in time to come no man may be at a loss to
									know what was the origin of this great war.

The real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the
									growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians
									and forced them into war; 
								 but the reasons publicly alleged on either side were as
									follows.

The city of Epidamnus is situated on the right hand as you sail
									up the Ionian Gulf. 
								 The neighboring inhabitants are the Taulantians, a barbarian
									tribe of the Illyrian race.

The place was colonised by the Corcyraeans, 
								 but under the leadership of a Corinthian, Phalius, son of
									Eratocleides, who was of the lineage of Heracles; he was
									invited, according to ancient custom, from the mother
									city, 
								 and Corinthians and other Dorians joined in the colony.

In process of time Epidamnus became great and populous,

but there followed a long period of civil commotion, and the
									city is said to have been brought low in a war against the
										neighboring barbarians, and to have lost her
									ancient power.

At last, shortly before the Peloponnesian War, the notables
									were overthrown and driven out by the people; the exiles
										went over to the barbarians, and, uniting with them,
									plundered the remaining inhabitants both by sea and land.

These, finding themselves hard pressed, sent an embassy to the mother-city Corcyra, begging the
									Corcyraeans not to leave them to their fate, but to reconcile
									them to the exiles and settle the war with the barbarians.

The ambassadors came, and sitting as suppliants in the temple
									of Herè preferred their request; 
								 but the Corcyraeans would not listen to them, and they returned
									without success.

The Epidamnians, finding that they had no hope of assistance
									from Corcyra, knew not what to do, 
								 and sending to Delphi enquired of the God whether they should
									deliver up the city to their original founders, the Corinthians,
									and endeavour to obtain aid from them. 
								 The God replied that they should, and bade them place
									themselves under the leadership of the Corinthians.

So the Epidamnians went to Corinth, and informing the
									Corinthians of the answer which the oracle had given, delivered
									up the city to them. They reminded them that the original leader
									of the colony was a citizen of Corinth; 
								 and implored the Corinthians to come and help them, and not
									leave them to their fate.

The Corinthians took up their cause, partly in vindication of
									their own rights (for they considered that Epidamnus belonged to
									them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans), partly too because
									they hated the Corcyraeans, who were their own colony but
									slighted them.

In their common festivals they would not allow them the
									customary privileges of founders, and at their sacrifices denied
									to a Corinthian the right of receiving first the lock of hair
									cut from the head of the victim, an honour usually granted by
									colonies to a representative of the mother-country. 
								 In fact they despised the Corinthians, for they
									were more than a match for them in military strength, and as
									rich as any state then existing in Hellas. 
								 They would often boast that on the sea they were very far
									superior to them, and would appropriate to themselves the naval
									renown of the Phaeacians, who were the ancient inhabitants of
									the island. 
								 Such feelings led them more and more to strengthen their navy,
									which was by no means despicable; 
								 for they had a hundred and twenty triremes when the war broke
									out.

Irritated by these causes of offence, the Corinthians were too
									happy to assist Epidamnus; accordingly they invited any one who was willing to
									settle there, and for the protection of the colonists despatched
									with them Ambracian and Leucadian troops and a force of their
									own.

All these they sent by land as far as Apollonia, which is a
									colony of theirs, fearing that if they went by sea the
									Corcyraeans might oppose their passage.

Great was the rage of the Corcyraeans when they discovered that
									the settlers and the troops had entered Epidamnus and that the
									colony had been given up to the Corinthians. 
								 They immediately set sail with five and twenty ships, followed
									by a second fleet, and in insulting terms bade the Epidamnians
									receive the exiled oligarchs, 
								 who had gone to Corcyra and implored the Corcyraeans to restore
									them, appealing to the tie of kindred and pointing to the
									sepulchres of their common ancestors . 
								 They also bade them send away the troops and the new
									settlers.

But the Epidamnians would not listen to their demands. 
								 Whereupon the Corcyraeans attacked them with forty ships. They
									were accompanied by the exiles whom they were to restore, and
									had the assistance of the native Illyrian troops.

They sat down before the city, and made proclamation that any
									Epidamnian who chose, and the foreigners, might depart in safety, but that all who remained would be treated
									as enemies. 
								 This had no effect, and the Corcyraeans proceeded to invest the
										city, which is built upon an isthmus .

When the news reached the Corinthians that Epidamnus was
									besieged, they equipped an army 
 
								 and proclaimed that a colony was to be sent thither; all who
									wished might go and enjoy equal rights of citizenship; 
								 but any one who was unwilling to sail at once might remain at
									Corinth, and, if he made a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae,
									might still have a share in the colony. 
								 
								 Many sailed, and many deposited the money.

The Corinthians also sent and requested the Megarians to assist
									them with a convoy in case the Corcyraeans should intercept the
									colonists on their voyage. 
								 The Megarians accordingly provided eight ships, and the
									Cephallenians of Palè four; 
								 the Epidaurians, of whom they made a similar request, five; the
									Hermionians one; the Troezenians two; the Leucadians ten; and
									the Ambraciots eight. 
								 Of the Thebans and Phliasians they begged money, and of the
									Eleans money, and ships without crews. 
								 On their own account they equipped thirty ships and three
									thousand hoplites.

When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to
									Corinth, taking with them Lacedaemonian and Sicyonian envoys, and summoned the Corinthians to
									withdraw the troops and the colonists, telling them that they
									had nothing to do with Epidamnus.

If they made any claim to it, the Corcyraeans expressed
									themselves willing to refer the cause for arbitration to such
									Peloponnesian states as both parties should agree upon, 
								 and their decision was to be final; 
								 or, they were willing to leave the matter in the
									hands of the Delphian oracle.

But they deprecated war, 
								 and declared that, if war there must be, they would be
									compelled by the Corinthians in self-defence to discard their
									present friends and seek others whom they would rather not, for
									help they must have.

The Corinthians replied that if the Corcyraeans would withdraw
									the ships and the barbarian troops they would consider the
									matter, 
								 but that it would not do for them to be litigating while
									Epidamnus and the colonists were in a state of siege.

The Corcyraeans rejoined that they would consent to this
									proposal if the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their
									forces from Epidamnus: 
								 or again, they were willing that both parties should remain on
									the spot, and that a truce should be made until the decision was
										given.

The Corinthians turned a deaf ear to all these overtures, 
								 and, when their vessels were manned and their allies had arrived, they sent a herald before
									them to declare war, and set sail for Epidamnus with seventyfive
									ships and two thousand hoplites, intending to give battle to the
									Corcyraeans.

Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichus,
									Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of
									Timanthes; the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus,
									and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus.

When they arrived at Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at
									the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo
									stands, the Corcyraeans sent a herald to meet them in a small
									boat forbidding them to come on. 
								 Meanwhile their crews got on board; they had previously put
									their fleet in repair, and strengthened the old ships with
									cross-timbers, so as to make them serviceable.

The herald brought back no message of peace from
									the Corinthians. The Corcyraean ships, numbering eighty 
								 (for forty out of the hundred and twenty were engaged in the
									blockade of Epidamnus, were now fully manned;

these sailed out against the Corinthians and, forming line,
									fought and won a complete victory over them, and destroyed
									fifteen of their ships. 
								 On the very same day the forces besieging Epidamnus succeeded
									in compelling the city to capitulate, the terms being that the
									Corinthians until their fate was determined should be imprisoned
									and the strangers sold.

After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans raised a trophy on
									Leucimnè, a promontory of Corcyra, and put to death all their prisoners with the exception
									of the Corinthians, whom they kept in chains.

The defeated Corinthians and their allies then returned home,
									and the Corcyraeans (who were now masters of the Ionian
									sea), 
								 sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, devastated the
									country. 
								 They also burnt Cyllene, where the Eleans had their docks,
									because they had supplied the Corinthians with money and
									ships.

And, during the greater part of the summer after the battle,
									they retained the command of the sea and sailed about plundering
									the allies of the Corinthians. But, before the season was over,
									the Corinthians, perceiving that their allies were suffering,
									sent out a fleet and took up a position at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in
									Thesprotia, that they might protect Leucas and other friendly
									places.

The Corcyraeans with their fleet and army stationed themselves
									on the opposite coast at Leucimnè. 
								 Neither party attacked the other, but during the remainder of
									the summer they maintained their respective stations, and at the
									approach of winter returned home.

For the whole year after the battle and for a year after that,
									the Corinthians, exasperated by the war with Corcyra, were busy
									in building ships. 
								 They took the utmost pains to create a great navy:
									rowers were collected from the Peloponnesus and from the rest
										of Hellas by the attraction of pay.

The Corcyraeans were alarmed at the report of their
									preparations. 
								 They reflected that they had not enrolled themselves in the
									league either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, and
									that allies in Hellas they had none. 
								 They determined to go to Athens, join the Athenian alliance,
									and get what help they could from them.

The Corinthians, hearing of their intentions, also sent
									ambassadors to Athens, fearing, lest the combination of the
									Athenian and Corcyraean navies might prevent them from bringing
									the war to a satisfactory termination.

Accordingly an assembly was held at which both parties came forward
									to plead their respective causes; and first the Corcyraeans
									spoke as follows:—

'Men of Athens, those who, like ourselves, come to
											others who are not their allies and to whom they have never rendered any considerable
											service and ask help of them, are bound to show, in the
											first place, that the granting of their request is
											expedient, or at any rate not inexpedient, and,
											secondly, that their gratitude will be lasting. 
										 If they fulfil neither requirement they have no right
											to complain of a refusal.

Now the Corcyraeans, when they sent us hither to ask for an
										alliance, were confident that they could establish to your
										satisfaction both these points.

But, unfortunately, we have had a practice alike
										inconsistent with the request which we are about to make and
										contrary to our own interest at the present moment:—
										Inconsistent; for hitherto we have never, if we could avoid
										it, been the allies of others, and now we come and ask you
										to enter into an alliance with us:— Contrary to our
										interest;

for through this practice we find ourselves isolated in our
										war with the Corinthians. 
									 The policy of not making alliances lest they should
										endanger us at another's bidding, instead of being wisdom, as we once fancied, has now unmistakably proved
										to be weakness and folly.

True, in the last naval engagement we repelled the Corinthians
										single-handed. 
									 But now they are on the point of attacking us with a much
										greater force which they have drawn together from the
										Peloponnesus and from all Hellas. We know that we are too
										weak to resist them unaided, and may expect the worst if we
										fall into their hands. We are therefore compelled to ask
										assistance of you and of all the world; 
									 and you must not be hard upon us if now, renouncing our
										indolent neutrality which was an error but not a crime, we
										dare to be inconsistent.

'To you at this moment the request which we are making
										offers a glorious opportunity. 
									 In the first place, you will assist the oppressed and not
										the oppressors; secondly, you will admit us to your alliance
										at a time when our dearest interests are at stake, and will
										lay up a treasure of gratitude in our memories which will
										have the most abiding of all records. 
									 Lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own.

Reflect; 
									 what good fortune can be more extraordinary, what more
										annoying to your enemies than the voluntary accession of a
										power for whose alliance you would have given any amount of
										money and could never have been too thankful? This power now
										places herself at your disposal; you are to incur no danger
										and no expense, and she brings you a good name in the world,
										gratitude from those who seek your aid, and an increase of
										your own strength. 
									 Few have ever had all these advantages offered them at
										once; equally few when they come asking an alliance are able
										to give in the way of security and honour as much as they
										hope to receive.

'And if any one thinks that the war in which our services
										may be needed will never arrive, he is mistaken. 
									 He does not see that the Lacedaemonians, fearing the
											growth of your empire, are eager to take up
										arms, and that the Corinthians, who are your enemies, are all-powerful with them. They begin with us, but
										they will go on to you, that we may not stand united against
										them in the bond of a common enmity; they will not miss the
										chance of weakening us or strengthening themselves.

And it is our business to strike first, we offering and you
										accepting our alliance, and to forestall their designs
										instead of waiting to counteract them.

'If they say that we are their colony and that therefore
										you have no right to receive us, they should be made to understand that all colonies
										honour their mother-city when she treats them well, but are
										estranged from her by injustice. 
									 For colonists are not meant to be the servants but the
										equals of those who remain at home.

And the injustice of their conduct to us is manifest: 
									 for we proposed an arbitration in the matter of Epidamnus,
										but they insisted on prosecuting their quarrel by arms and
										would not hear of a legal trial .

When you see how they treat us who are their own kinsmen,
										take warning: if they try deception, do not be misled by
										them; and if they make a direct request of you,
										refuse. 
									 For he passes through life most securely who has least
										reason to reproach himself with complaisance to his enemies.

' But again, you will not break the treaty with the
											Lacedaemonians by receiving us: for we are not allies either of you or of them.

What says the treaty?— Any Hellenic
											city which is the ally of no one may join whichever
											league it pleases.

And how monstrous, that they should man their ships, not
										only from their own confederacy, but from Hellas in general,
										nay, even from your subjects, while they would debar us
											from the alliance which naturally offers and
										from every other, and will denounce it as a crime if you
										accede to our request.

With far better reason shall we complain of you if you
										refuse. 
									 For you will be thrusting away us who are not your enemies
										and are in peril; and, far from restraining the enemy and
										the aggressor, you will be allowing him to gather fresh
										forces out of your own dominions. 
									 How unjust is this! Surely if you would be impartial you
										should either prevent the Corinthians from hiring soldiers
										in your dominions, or send to us also such help as you can
										be induced to send; but it would be best of all if you would
										openly receive and assist us. 
									 Many, as we have already intimated, are the advantages
										which we offer.

Above all, our enemies are your enemies, which is the best
										guarantee of fidelity in an ally; and they are not weak but
										well able to injure those who secede from them. 
									 Again, when the proffered alliance is that of a maritime
										and not of an inland power, it is a far more serious matter
										to refuse. 
									 You should, if possible, allow no one to have a fleet but
										yourselves; or, if this is impossible, whoever is strongest
										at sea, make him your friend.

'Some one may think that the course which we recommend is
										expedient, but he may be afraid that if he is convinced by our arguments he
										will break the treaty. To him we reply, that as long as he
										is strong he may make a present of his fears to the enemy,
										but that if he reject the alliance he will be weak, and then
										his confidence, however reassuring to himself, will be
										anything but terrifying to enemies who are strong. 
									 It is Athens about which he is advising, and not Corcyra:
										will he be providing for her best interests if, when war is
										imminent and almost at the door, he is so anxious about the
										chances of the hour that he hesitates to attach to him a
										state which cannot be made a friend or enemy without
										momentous consequences?

Corcyra, besides offering many other advantages, is
											conveniently situated for the coast voyage
										to Italy and Sicily; it stands in the way of any fleet
										coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, and can also protect
										a fleet on its way to Sicily.

One word more, which is the sum of all and everything we
										have to say, and should convince you that you must not
										abandon us. 
									 Hellas has only three considerable navies:— there is ours,
										and there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. 
									 Now, if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the
										two to become one, you will have to fight against the united
										navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. 
									 But, if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in
										addition to your own ranged at your side in the impending
										conflict.'

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans: 
								 the Corinthians replied as follows:—

'Since these Corcyraeans have chosen to speak, not only of
										their reception into your alliance, but of our misdoings and of the unjust war which has
										been forced upon them by us, we too must touch on these two
										points before we proceed to our main argument, that you may
										be better prepared to appreciate our claim upon you, and may
										have a good reason for rejecting their petition.

They pretend that they have hitherto refused to make
										alliances from a wise moderation, but they really adopted
										this policy from a mean and not from a high motive. 
									 They did not want to have an ally who might go and tell of
										their crimes, and who would put them to the blush whenever
										they called him in.

Their insular position makes them judges of their own
										offences against others, and they can therefore afford to
										dispense with judges appointed under treaties; for they
										hardly ever visit their neighbours, but foreign ships are
										constantly driven to their shores by stress of
										weather.

And all the time they screen themselves under the specious
										name of neutrality, making believe that they are unwilling
										to be the accomplices of other men's crimes. But the truth
										is that they wish to keep their own criminal
										courses to themselves: where they are strong, to oppress;
										where they cannot be found out, to defraud; and whatever
										they may contrive to appropriate, never to be ashamed.

If they were really upright men, as they profess to be, the
										greater their immunity from attack the more clearly they
										might have made their honesty appear by a willingness to
										submit differences to arbitration.

'But such they have not shown themselves either towards us
										or towards others. 
									 Although they are our colony they have always stood aloof
										from us, and now they are fighting against us on the plea
										that they were not sent out to be ill used.

To which we rejoin that we did not send them out to be
										insulted by them, but that we might be recognized as their
										leaders and receive proper respect.

Our other colonies at any rate honour us; 
									 no city is more beloved by her colonies than Corinth.

That we are popular with the majority proves that the
										Corcyraeans have no reason to dislike us; and, if it seems
										extraordinary that we should go to war with them, our
										defence is that the injury which they are doing us is
											unexampled .

Even if we had been misled by passion, it would have been
										honourable in them to make allowance for us, and
										dishonourable in us to use violence when they showed
										moderation. 
									 But they have wronged us over and over again in their
										insolence and pride of wealth; and now there is our colony
										of Epidamnus which they would not acknowledge in her
										distress, but, when we came to her rescue, they seized and
										are now holding by force.

'They pretend that they first offered to have the matter decided
									by arbitration. The appeal to justice might have some meaning in
									the mouth of one who before he had recourse to
									arms acted honourably, as he now talks fairly 
 of security and advantage.

Whereas these men began by laying siege to Epidamnus, and
										not until they feared our vengeance did they put forward
										their specious offer of arbitration. 
									 And as if the wrong which they have themselves done at
										Epidamnus were not enough, they now come hither and ask you
										to be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and
										would have you receive them when they are at enmity with
										us.

But they ought to have come when they were out of all
										danger, not at a time when we are smarting under an injury
										and they have good reason to be afraid. You have never
										derived any benefit from their power, but they will now be
										benefited by yours, and, although innocent of their crimes,
										you will equally be held responsible by us. f you were to
										have shared the consequences with them, they ought long ago
										to have shared the power with you .

'We have proved that our complaints are justified and that
										our adversaries are tyrannical and dishonest; 
									 we will now show you that you have no right to receive
										them.

Admitting that the treaty allows any unenrolled cities to
										join either league, this provision does not apply to those
										who have in view the injury of others, but only to him who
										is in need of protection,— certainly not to one who forsakes
										his allegiance and who will bring war instead of peace to
										those who receive him, or rather, if they are wise, will not
										receive him on such terms. 
									 And war the Corcyraeans will bring to you if you listen to
										them and not to us.

For if you become the allies of the Corcyraeans
										you will be no longer at peace with us, but will be
										converted into enemies; 
									 and we must, if you take their part, in defending ourselves
										against them, defend ourselves against you.

But you ought in common justice to stand aloof from both;
										or, if you must join either, you should join us and go to
										war with them; to Corinth you are at all events bound
											by treaty, but with Corcyra you never even entered into
											a temporary negotiation. And do not set the
											precedent of receiving the rebellious subjects of
										others.

At the revolt of Samos , when the other
										Peloponnesians were divided upon the question of giving aid
										to the rebels, 
									 we voted in your favour and expressly maintained that every one should be allowed to
											chastise his own allies.

If you mean to receive and assist evil-doers, we shall
										assuredly gain as many allies of yours as you will of ours;
										and you will establish a principle which will tell against
										yourselves more than against us.

Such are the grounds of right which we urge; and they are
										sufficient according to Hellenic law. And may we venture to recall to your minds an
										obligation of which we claim the repayment in our present
										need, we and you being not enemies who seek one another's
										hurt, nor yet friends who freely give and take?

There 
										was a time before the Persian invasion when you were in want
										of ships for the Aeginetan war, and we Corinthians lent you
										twenty: 
									 the service which we then rendered to you gave you the
										victory over the Aeginetans , as the
										other, which prevented the Peloponnesians from aiding the
										Samians, enabled you to punish Samos. 
									 Both benefits were conferred on one of those critical
										occasions when men in the act of attacking their enemies are
										utterly regardless of everything but victory,

and deem him who assists them a friend though
										he may have previously been a foe, him who opposes them a
										foe, even though he may happen to be a friend; nay, they
										will often neglect their own interests in the excitement of
										the struggle.

Think of these things; let the younger be informed of them
										by their elders, and resolve all of you to render like for
										like. 
									 Do not say to yourselves that this is just, but that in the
										event of war something else is expedient;

for the true path of expediency is the path of right. 
									 The war with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into
										doing wrong is distant, and may never come; 
									 is it worth while to be so carried away by the prospect of
										it, that you bring upon yourselves the hatred of the
										Corinthians which is both near and certain? Would you not be
										wiser in seeking to mitigate the ill-feeling which your
										treatment of the Megarians has already inspired ?

The later kindness done in season, though small in
										comparison, may cancel a greater previous offence.

And do not be attracted by their offer of a great naval
										alliance; 
									 for to do no wrong to a neighbour is a surer source of
										strength than to gain a perilous advantage under the
										influence of a momentary illusion.

We are now ourselves in the same situation in which you
										were, when we declared at Sparta that every one so placed
										should be allowed to chastise his own allies; and we claim
										to receive the same measure at your hands. 
									 You were profited by our vote, and we ought not to be
										injured by yours.

Pay what you owe, knowing that this is our time of need, in
										which a man's best friend is he who does him a service, he
										who opposes him, his worst enemy.

Do not receive these Corcyraeans into alliance in despite
										of us, and do not support them in injustice.

In acting thus you will act rightly, and will consult your
										own true interests.'

Such were the words of the Corinthians. 
								 The Athenians heard both sides, and they held two assemblies;
									in the first of them they were more influenced by the words of the
									Corinthians, 
								 but in the second they changed their minds and inclined towards
									the Corcyraeans. They would not go so far as to make an alliance
									both offensive and defensive with them; 
								 for then, if the Corcyraeans had required them to join in an
									expedition against Corinth, the treaty with the Peloponnesians
									would have been broken. 
								 But they concluded a defensive league, by which the two states
									promised to aid each other if an attack were made on the
									territory or on the allies of either.

For they knew that in any case the war with Peloponnesus was
									inevitable, and they had no mind to let Corcyra and her navy
									fall into the hands of the Corinthians. 
								 Their plan was to embroil them more and more with one another, and
									then, when the war came, the Corinthians and the other naval
									powers would be weaker.

They also considered that Corcyra was conveniently situated for
									the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily.

Under the influence of these feelings, they received the
									Corcyraeans into alliance; 
								 the Corinthians departed;

and the Athenians now despatched to Corcyra ten ships commanded
									by Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of
									Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles.

The commanders received orders not to engage with the
									Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra or to any place
									belonging to the Corcyraeans, and attempted to land there, in
									which case they were to resist them to the utmost. 
								 These orders were intended to prevent a breach of the
										treaty.

The Corinthians, when their preparations were cormpleted,
									sailed against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships, 
								 — ten Elean, twelve Megarian, ten Leucadian, twenty-seven
									Ambraciot, one from Anactorium, and ninety of their own.

The contingents of the several cities were commanded by their
									own generals. 
								 The Corinthian commander was Xenocleides the son of Euthycles,
									with four others.

The fleet sailed from Leucas, and, arriving at the mainland
									opposite Corcyra, came to anchor at Cheimerium in the country of
										Thesprotia.

Cheimerium is only a harbour ; above it, at some distance from
									the sea, in that part of Thesprotia called Eleatis, lies the
									city of Ephyrè, 
								 near which the Acherusian lake finds a way out to the
									sea; 
								 the river Acheron, whence the name is derived, flows through
									Thesprotia and falls into the lake. 
								 Another river, the Thyamis, forms the boundary of Thesprotia
									and Cestrine, and the promontory of Cheimerium runs out between
									these two rivers.

Here the Corinthians anchored and formed a camp.

The Corcyraeans, observing their approach, manned a hundred and
									ten ships. These, which were placed under the command of Meiciades, Aesimides,
									and Eurybatus, took up a position off one of the islands called
									Sybota; 
								 the ten Athenian ships accompanied them.

The land forces occupied the promontory of Leucimnè, whither a
									thousand Zacynthians had come to the aid of Corcyra.

The Corinthians on their part were supported by a large force
									of barbarians, which collected on the mainland; 
								 for the inhabitants of this region have always been well
									disposed towards them.

The Corinthians had now made their preparations, and, taking
									with them three days' provisions, put off by night from
									Cheimerium, intending to give battle:

at break of day they described the Corcyraean fleet, which had
										also put out to sea and was sailing to meet
									them.

As soon as they saw one another, they ranged themselves in
									order of battle. 
								 On the right Corcyraean wing were the Athenian ships. 
								 The Corcyraeans themselves occupied the centre and the left
									wing, and were drawn up in three divisions, each under the
									command of one of the generals.

On the right wing of the Corinthians were the Megarian and
									Ambraciot ships, in the centre the contingents of their other
									allies; 
								 they themselves with their swiftest vessels formed the left
									wing, which was opposed to the Athenians and to the right
									division of the Corcyraeans.

The standards were now raised on both sides, and the two fleets
									met and fought. The decks of both were crowded with heavy infantry, with archers
									and with javelin-men; for their naval arrangements were still of
									the old clumsy sort.

The engagement was obstinate, but more courage than skill was
									displayed, and it had almost the appearance of a battle by
									land.

When two ships once charged one another it was hardly possible
									to part company, for the throng of vessels was dense, and the
									hopes of victory lay chiefly in the heavy-armed, who maintained
									a steady fight upon the decks, the ships meanwhile remaining
									motionless. 
								 There were no attempts to break the enemy's line. 
								 Brute force and rage made up for the want of tactics.

Everywhere the battle was a scene of tumult and
									confusion. 
								 At any point where they saw the Corcyraeans distressed, the
									Athenians appeared and kept the enemy in check; 
								 but the generals, who were afraid of disobeying their
									instructions, would not begin the attack themselves.

The Corinthians suffered most on their right wing. 
								 For the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them, drove
									them in disorder to the shore, and sailed right up to their
									encampment; there landing, they plundered and burnt the deserted
									tents.

So in this part of the battle the Corinthians and their allies
									were worsted, and the Corcyraeans prevailed. 
								 But the left wing of the Corinthians, where their own ships
									were stationed, had greatly the advantage, because the
									Corcyraeans, whose numbers were originally inferior, had now
									twenty vessels detached in the pursuit.

When the Athenians saw the distress of the Corcyraeans, they began to assist
									them more openly. 
								 At first they had abstained from actual collision, but when the
									Corcyraeans fled outright and the Corinthians pressed them hard,
									then every man fell to work; all distinctions were forgotten;—
									the time had arrived when Corinthian and Athenian were driven to
									attack one another.

The Corinthians, having put to flight their enemies, never
									stopped to take in tow the hulls of the vessels which they had
									disabled, 
								 but fell upon the men; they rowed up and down and slew them,
									giving no quarter, and unintentionally killing their own
									friends; for they were not aware that their right wing had been
									defeated.

There were so many ships on one side and on the other, and they
									covered so great an extent of water, that, when the engagement
									had once begun, it was hard among conquerors and conquered to
									distinguish friend from foe. 
								 For never before had two Hellenic navies so numerous met in
									battle.

When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore,
									they turned their attention to their own wrecks and the bodies
									of their dead. 
								 Most of these were recovered by them and conveyed to
									Sybota, 
								 a desert harbour of Thesprotia, 
								 whither their barbarian allies had come to support them.

They then formed afresh and once more made a movement towards
									the Corcyraeans, who, taking such vessels as had not been
									disabled, and any others which they had in their docks, together
									with the Athenian ships, put out to meet them, dreading a
									descent upon Corcyra.

It was now late in the day 
								 and the Paean had been already sounded for the onset, 
								 when the Corinthians suddenly began to row astern. They had
									described sailing towards them twenty vessels which
									the Athenians had sent to reinforce the former ten, fearing what had actually happened, that the Corcyraeans would
									be defeated, and that the original squadron would be
									insufficient to protect them.

The Corinthians, who had the first view of these vessels,
									suspecting that they were Athenian and that there were more of them than they saw, were
									beginning to retreat.

The Corcyraeans, owing to their position, could not see
									them, 
								 and they wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern. 
								 At length some of them who spied the advancing fleet exclaimed,
									'Yonder are ships coming up;' 
								 and then the Corcyraeans, as it was getting dark, likewise
									retired, and the Corinthians turned about and sailed away.

Thus the two fleets separated after a battle which lasted until
									nightfall.

The twenty ships which came from Athens under the command of
									Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogoras,
									made their way through the wrecks and corpses and sailed into
									the Corcyraean station at Leucimnè almost as soon as they were
									sighted.

At first in the darkness the Corcyraeans feared that they were
									enemies, but they soon recognized them 
								 and the Athenian vessels came to anchor.

On the next day the thirty Athenian and all the Corcyraean
									ships which were fit for service, wanting to ascertain whether the Corinthians
									would fight, sailed to the harbour at Sybota where their fleet
									lay.

The Corinthians, putting out into deep water, drew up their
									ships in line and so remained, but they did not intend to begin
									the battle. For they saw that fresh ships, which had received no
									damage in the action, had arrived from Athens, and their own
									position was one of great difficulty. They had to guard the
									prisoners in their vessels, and there were no means of refitting
									in such a desert place.

They were more disposed to consider how they should
									get home than to fight. For they feared that the Athenians,
									deeming the peace, now that blows had been exchanged, to be
									already broken, would intercept their return.

They therefore determined to send a few men in a boat without a
									flag of truce to the Athenians, and so test their intentions. 
								 The men were to deliver the following message:

You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and violate the
										treaty. 
									 We were only chastising our enemies, and you come with a
										hostile force and place yourselves between us and
										them. 
									 If it is your intention to hinder us from sailing to
										Corcyra, or whithersoever we choose, and you are going to
										break the treaty, take us first and deal with us as
										enemies.

Whereupon all the Corcyraeans who were within hearing cried out
										 Take and kill them . 
								 But the Athenians replied:

Men of Peloponnesus, we are not beginning war, and we
											are not violating the treaty; we are only aiding the
											Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. 
										 If you mean to sail against Corcyra or any place
											belonging to the Corcyraeans, we will do our utmost to
											prevent you, 
										 but, if you want to go anywhere else, you may.

Reassured by this reply, the Corinthians prepared to sail home,
									first setting up a trophy at the Sybota which is on the mainland. 
								 The Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which were
									carried towards them, the current and the wind which had risen
									during the night having scattered them in all directions. 
								 They then set up a rival trophy on the island of Sybota.

Both parties claimed the victory, but on different
									grounds. 
								 The Corinthians had retained the advantage in the seafight
									until nightfall, and had thus secured a greater number of wrecks
									and dead bodies; they had taken not less than a thousand
									prisoners and had disabled about seventy ships. 
								 The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, had destroyed some thirty
									sail, and when reinforced by the Athenians had taken
									up the wrecks and dead bodies which had drifted in their
									direction; whereas the enemy on the evening of the battle had
									rowed astern at sight of the Athenian ships, and after their
									arrival had not come out against them from Sybota.

Upon these grounds both sides raised trophies and claimed the
									victory. 
								 On their homeward voyage the Corinthians took by stratagem
									Anactorium, a town situated at the mouth of the Ambracian
									Gulf, 
								 which they and the Corcyraeans held in common; 
								 there they settled colonists of their own, and returned to
									Corinth. 
								 Of their Corcyraean captives eight hundred who were slaves they
									sold, but two hundred and fifty they detained in prison,
									treating them with much consideration, in the hope that, when
									they returned, they would win over Corcyra to the Corinthian
										interest : 
								 it so happened that the majority of them were among the most
									influential men of the state.

Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and the
									Athenian fleet returned home. 
								 This was the first among the causes of the Peloponnesian War,
									the Corinthians alleging that the Athenian fleet had taken part
									with the Corcyraeans and had fought against them in a time of
									truce.

There soon arose another cause of quarrel between the Athenians
									and Peloponnesians.

Potidaea, which is situated on the isthmus of Pallenè, was
									originally a Corinthian colony, although at this time the
									tributary and ally of Athens. Now the Corinthians were forming
									plans of vengeance, and the Athenians, who suspected their
									intentions, commanded the Potidaeans to raze their walls on the
									side of Pallenè and give hostages; also to send away and not to
									receive for the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians
									annually sent to them. For they were afraid lest the Potidaeans
									might be persuaded by the Corinthians and Perdiccas to
										revolt, and might induce the rest of Chalcidicè
									to follow their example.

These measures of precaution were taken by the Athenians
									immediately after the sea-fight off Corcyra.

The hostility of the Corinthians was no longer doubtful, and
									Perdiccas, king of Macedon, the son of Alexander, hitherto the
									friend and ally of Athens, had now become an enemy.

He had quarrelled with the Athenians because they had made an
									alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were
									league against him.

Alarmed by their attitude, he sent envoys to Sparta and did all
									he could to stir up a war between Athens and the
									Peloponnese. 
								 He also sought the alliance of Corinth, for he had an eye to
									the revolt of Potidaea;

and he proposed to the Chalcidians and to the Bottiaeans that
									they should join in the revolt, thinking, that if he had the
									assistance of the neighboring peoples, the difficulties of the
									war would be diminished.

The Athenians became aware of his designs and resolved to
									forestall the revolt of the cities. They were already intending
									to send against Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites
									under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, and they told their admirals to
									take hostages from the Potidaeans and to demolish their wall.
									They were also to keep a watch over the towns in the
									neighbourhood and prevent any attempt at rebellion.

Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to the Athenians in the
									hope of persuading them to take no strong measures; but at the same time other envoys of
									theirs accompanied a Corinthian embassy to Lacedaemon and
									exerted themselves to procure assistance in case of need. 
								 A long negotiation was carried on at Athens which came to no
									satisfactory result; the ships destined for Macedonia were also sent against Potidaea. But at Lacedaemon they
									were promised by the magistrates that if the Athenians attacked Potidaea they would invade
									Attica. So they seized the opportunity and revolted: the
									Chalcidians and Bottiaeans swore alliance with them and joined in the
									revolt.

Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down
									their towns on the sea-coast, and settling at Olynthus inland,
									there to form one strong city. 
								 On their removal he gave them part of his own territory of
									Mygdonia about the lake Bolbè to cultivate while the contest
									lasted. 
								 So, dismantling their cities, they settled up the country and
									made preparation for war.

The Athenians, when the thirty ships arrived in
									Chalcidicè, 
								 found that Potidaea and the other cities had already revolted.

Whereupon the generals, thinking that they were not able
									without a stronger force to act against all the rebels as well
									as against Perdiccas, directed their attention to Macedonia,
									which was their original destination, 
								 and there carried on a regular campaign in concert with Philip
									and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the
									interior.

Now that Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian ships were on
									the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians grew anxious about the town; they felt that
									the danger came home to them, and despatched thither volunteers
									of their own and other troops whom they attracted by pay from
									various parts of the Peloponnese, numbering in all sixteen
									hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed.

Their commander was Aristeus the son of Adeimantus, who
										had always been a great friend of the Potidaeans; it
									was mainly out of regard for him that most of the Corinthian
									soldiers volunteered on the expedition.

They arrived in Chalcidicè forty days after the revolt of
										Potidaea.

The news of the revolt in Chalcidicè quickly reached
									Athens, 
								 and the Athenians, when they heard that Aristeus had come with reinforcements, sent
									against the revolted towns forty ships and two thousand of their
									own hoplites under the command of Callias the son of Calliades,
									and four others.

The expedition, sailing first of all to Macedonia, found that
									the former thousand had just taken Thermè and were blockading
									Pydna;

they joined in the siege themselves; 
								 but before long the Athenian army were constrained to come to
									an understanding and make an alliance with Perdiccas. For
									Potidaea, now that Aristeus had arrived, urgently demanded their
									presence; so they prepared to quit Macedonia.

They first marched out of their way to Beroea, which they
									attempted to take without success. Returning to their route,
									they moved on by land towards Potidaea with three thousand
									hoplites of their own and a large force of allies; they had also
									six hundred Macedonian horse, who fought under Philip and
									Pausanias; 
								 meanwhile their ships, in number seventy, sailed along the
									coast.

Proceeding by slow marches, they arrived on the third day at
									Gigonus and there encamped.

The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesian force under Aristeus had
									now taken up a position at the isthmus on the side towards Olynthus , where they awaited the coming of the Athenians; 
								 they held their market outside the walls of Potidaea.

The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and
									of the cavalry Perdiccas, 
								 for he had no sooner joined than he again deserted the
									Athenians and was now fighting on the side of the Potidaeans,
									having appointed Iolaus to be his lieutenant at home .

The plan of Aristeus was as follows:— His own army was to
									remain on the isthmus and watch for the approach of
									the Athenians, while the Chalcidians, their allies from beyond
									the isthmus, and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas
									were stationed at Olynthus; and as soon as the Athenians
									attacked Aristeus himself and his army, they were to fall upon
									them in the rear; thus the enemy would be assailed on both
									sides.

But Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues sent the
									Macedonian horse and a few of the allied troops towards Olynthus
									that they might check any movement in that quarter, 
								 while they themselves, quitting their position, marched against
									Potidaea.

When they had reached the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing
									for battle, they did the same. 
								 The two armies soon closed.

The wing led by Aristeus, which was composed of his Corinthian
									followers and other picked troops, routed their opponents and
									chased them far away; 
								 but the rest of the army, both Potidaeans and Peloponnesians,
									were defeated by the Athenians and fled into the city.

Aristeus, when he returned from the pursuit and perceived that
									the other wing of his army was defeated, hesitated whether he should make for
									Olynthus or return to Potidaea. 
								 Both courses were hazardous; but at last he determined to
									contract his troops into the smallest compass and force his way
									at full speed into Potidaea. 
								 Harassed by the missiles of the enemy he pushed forward through
									the water along the bank in front of the
									sea-wall, not without loss; but he contrived to save the greater
									part of his men.

When the battle began, the allies of the Potidaeans in
									Olynthus, which is only about seven miles distant, and is visible from Potidaea,
									seeing the signals raised, came out a little way to support
									their friends; and the Macedonian horse drew up in order of
									battle to oppose them. 
								 But victory quickly declared for the Athenians; and
									when the signals were torn down the Olynthian auxiliaries
									retired within the walls, and the Macedonians rejoined the
									Athenians: 
								 thus on neither side did the cavalry take any part in the
									action.

The Athenians raised a trophy and granted the Potidaeans a
									truce for the burial of their dead. 
								 Of the Potidaeans and their allies, there fell somewhat less
									than three hundred; of the Athenians, a hundred and fifty, and
									their general Callias.

The Athenians instantly blockaded the town on the side towards
									the isthmus, 
								 raising a wall, which they guarded; but the side towards Pallenè was
									left open. 
								 They were conscious that they were too weak both to guard the
									isthmus and, crossing over to Pallenè, there to build another
									wall; they feared that their forces if divided would be attacked
									by the Potidaeans and their allies.

Afterwards, when the Athenians at home heard that on the side
									towards Pallenè Potidaea was not invested, they sent out sixteen
									hundred hoplites of their own under the command of Phormio the
									son of Asopius. 
								 On his arrival in Pallenè he made Aphytis his head-quarters,
									and brought his army by slow marches up to Potidaea, wasting the
									country as he went along. 
								 No one came out to meet him, and so he built a wall towards
									Pallenè.

Potidaea was now closely invested on both sides, while the
									Athenian ships, lying off the city, cut off all communication
									from the sea.

Aristeus despaired of saving the place unless aid came from
									Peloponnesus or he was relieved in some unforeseen manner. Being anxious to husband
									provisions, he proposed to the garrison that they should avail
									themselves of the first favourable wind and sail away, leaving
									behind five hundred men, 
								 of whom he offered to be one. 
								 But they would not listen to him; so, wanting to do the best he
									could, and to further the Peloponnesian interests beyond the
									walls, he sailed out undiscovered by the Athenian
									guard-ships.

He did not leave the country, but assisted the Chalcidians in
									carrying on the war. 
								 He succeeded in cutting off a large force of Sermylians by an
									ambuscade which he laid near their city; 
								 he also exerted himself to obtain aid from Peloponnesus. 
								 Phormio with his sixteen hundred hoplites, now that Potidaea
									was invested, ravaged Chalcidicè and Botticè, and captured
									several places.

Such were the causes of ill-feeling which at this time existed
									between the Athenians and Peloponnesians: the Corinthians
									complaining that the Athenians were blockading their colony of
									Potidaea, and a Corinthian and Peloponnesian garrison in it; the
									Athenians rejoining that a member of the Peloponnesian
									confederacy had excited to revolt a state which was an ally and
									tributary of theirs, and that they had now openly joined the
									Potidaeans, and were fighting on their side. 
								 The Peloponnesian war, however, had not yet broken out; the
									peace still continued; 
								 for thus far the Corinthians had acted alone.

But now, seeing Potidaea besieged, they bestirred themselves in
									earnest. 
								 Corinthian troops were shut up within the walls, and they were afraid of
									losing the town; so without delay they invited the allies to
									meet at Sparta. 
								 There they inveighed against the Athenians, whom they affirmed
									to have broken the treaty and to be wronging the
									Peloponnese.

The Aeginetans did not venture to send envoys openly, but
									secretly they acted with the Corinthians, and were among the
									chief instigators of the war, declaring that they had been
									robbed of the independence which the treaty guaranteed
									them.

The Lacedaemonians themselves then proceeded to summon any of the
									allies who had similar charges 
									 to bring against the Athenians, and calling their
									own ordinary assembly told them to speak.

Several of them came forward and stated their wrongs. The
									Megarians alleged, among other grounds of complaint, that they
									were excluded from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and
									from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty.

The Corinthians waited until the other allies had stirred up
									the Lacedaemonians; at length they came forward, and, last of
									all, spoke as follows:—

The spirit of trust, Lacedaemonians, which animates your
										own political and social life, 
										 makes you
										distrust others who, like ourselves, have something
										unpleasant to say , 
									 and this temper of mind, though favourable to moderation,
										too often leaves you in ignorance of what is going on
										outside your own country,

but instead of taking our words to heart, you chose to
										suspect that we only spoke from interested motives. 
									 And this is the reason why you have brought the allies to
										Sparta too late, not before but after the injury has been
										inflicted, and when they are smarting under the sense of it.
										Which of them all has a better right to speak than
										ourselves, who have the heaviest accusations to make,
										outraged as we are by the Athenians, and neglected by
										you?

If the crimes which they are committing against Hellas were
										being done in a corner, then you might be ignorant, and we
										should have to inform you of them: 
									 but now, what need of many words? Some of us, as you see,
										have been already enslaved; they are at this moment
										intriguing against others, notably against allies of ours;
										and long ago they had made all their preparations in the
										prospect of war.

Else why did they seduce from her allegiance Corcyra, which
										they still hold in defiance of us, and why are
										they blockading Potidaea, the latter a most advantageous
										post for the command of the Thracian peninsula, the former a
										great naval power which might have assisted the
										Peloponnesians?

And the blame of all this rests on you; for you originally
										allowed them to fortify their city after the Persian War , and
										afterwards to build their Long Walls ; and to
										this hour you have gone on defrauding of liberty their
										unfortunate subjects, and are now beginning to take it away
										from your own allies. 
									 For the true enslaver of a people is he who can put an end
										to their slavery but has no care about it; and all the more,
										if he be reputed the champion of liberty in Hellas.—

And so we have met at last, but with what difficulty! and
										even now we have no definite object. 
									 By this time we ought to have been considering, not whether
										we are wronged, but how we are to be revenged. 
									 The aggressor is not now threatening, but advancing; he has
										made up his mind, while we are resolved about nothing.

And we know too well how by slow degrees and with stealthy
										steps the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours. 
									 While they think that you are too dull to observe them,
										they are more careful, but, when they know that you wilfully
										overlook their aggressions, they will strike and not
										spare.

Of all Hellenes, Lacedaemonians, you are the only people
										who never do anything: on the approach of an enemy you are
										content to defend yourselves against him, not by acts, but
										by intentions, and seek to overthrow him, not in the infancy
										but in the fulness of his strength.

How came you to be considered safe? That reputation of
										yours was never justified by facts. 
									 We all know that the Persian made his way from the ends of
										the earth against Peloponnesus before you encountered him in
										a worthy manner; and now you are blind to the doings of the
										Athenians, who are not at a distance as he was,
										but close at hand. 
									 Instead of attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked,
										and take the chances of a struggle which has been deferred
										until his power is doubled. 
									 And you know that the Barbarian miscarried chiefly through
										his own errors; and that we have oftener been delivered from
										these very Athenians by blunders of their own, than by any
										aid from you. Some have already been ruined by the hopes
										which you inspired in them; for so entirely did they trust
										you that they took no precautions themselves.

These things we say in no accusing or hostile spirit— let
										that be understood— but by way of expostulation. 
									 For men expostulate with erring friends, they bring
										accusation against enemies who have done them a wrong.

And surely we have a right to find fault with our
										neighbours, if any one ever had. There are important interests at stake to which, as far as
										we can see, you are insensible. And you have never
										considered what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will have to fight,
										and how utterly unlike yourselves.

They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and
										in the execution of every new plan; 
									 while you are conservative— careful only to keep what you
										have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action
										is most urgent.

They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which
										prudence would condemn; and in the midst of misfortune they
										are full of hope. 
									 Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly;
										when your plans are most prudent, to distrust them; and when
										calamities come upon you, to think that you will never be
										delivered from them.

They are impetuous, and you are dilatory; they are always
										abroad, and you are always at home. 
									 For they hope to gain something by leaving their homes; but
										you are afraid that any new enterprise may
										imperil what you have already.

When conquerors, they pursue their victory to the utmost;
										when defeated, they fall back the least.

Their bodies they devote to their country as though they
										belonged to other men; their true self is their mind, which
										is most truly their own when employed in her service.

When they do not carry out an intention which they have
										formed, they seem to themselves to have sustained a personal
										bereavement; 
									 when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained a mere
										instalment of what is to come; 
									 but if they fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so
										fill up the void. 
									 With them alone to hope is to have, for they lose not a
										moment in the execution of an idea.

This is the lifelong task, full of danger and toil, which
										they are always imposing upon themselves. 
									 None enjoy their good things less, because they are always
										seeking for more. To do their duty is their only holiday,
										and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as
										the most tiresome business.

If a man should say of them, in a word, that they were born
										neither to have peace themselves nor to allow peace to other
										men, he would simply speak the truth.

In the face of such an enemy, Lacedaemonians, you persist
										in doing nothing. 
									 You do not see that peace is best secured by those who use
										their strength justly, but whose attitude shows that they
										have no intention of submitting to wrong. 
									 Justice with you seems to consist in giving no annoyance to
										others and in defending yourselves only
										against positive injury .

But this policy would hardly be successful, even if your
										neighbours were like yourselves; 
									 and in the present case, as we pointed out just now, your
										ways compared with theirs are old-fashioned.

And, as in the arts, so also in politics, the new must
										always prevail over the old. 
									 In settled times the traditions of government 
										should be observed: but when circumstances are changing and
										men are compelled to meet them, much originality is
										required. 
									 The Athenians have had a wider experience, and therefore
										the administration of their state unlike yours has been
										greatly reformed.

But here let your procrastination end; 
									 send an army at once into Attica and assist your allies,
										especially the Potidaeans, to whom your word is pledged . Do not betray friends and kindred into the hands of
										their worst enemies; or drive us in despair to seek the
										alliance of others;

in taking such a course we should be doing nothing wrong
										either before the Gods who are the witnesses of our oaths,
										or before men whose eyes are upon us. 
									 For the true breakers of treaties are not those who, when forsaken, turn to others,
										but those who forsake allies whom they have sworn to
										defend.

We will remain your friends if you choose to bestir
										yourselves; 
									 for we should be guilty of an impiety if we deserted you
										without cause; and we shall not easily find allies equally
										congenial to us.

Take heed then: you have inherited from your fathers the
										leadership of Peloponnesus; see that her greatness suffers
										no diminution at your hands.

Thus spoke the Corinthians. 
								 Now there happened to be staying at Lacedaemon an Athenian embassy which had come on other business, 
								 and when the envoys heard what the Corinthians had said, they
									felt bound to go before the Lacedaemonian assembly, not with the
									view of answering the accusations brought against them by the
									cities, but they wanted to put the whole question before the
									Lacedaemonians, and make them understand that they should take
									time to deliberate and not be rash. 
								 They also desired to set forth the greatness of their city,
									reminding the elder men of what they knew, and informing the
									younger of what lay beyond their experience. They
									thought that their words would sway the Lacedaemonians in the
									direction of peace.

So they came and said that, if they might be allowed, they too
									would like to address the people. 
								 The Lacedaemonians invited them to come forward, and they spoke
									as follows:—

We were not sent here to argue with your allies, but on a
										special mission; 
									 observing, however, that no small outcry has arisen against
										us, we have come forward, not to answer the accusations
										which they bring (for you are not judges before whom either
										we or they have to plead), but to prevent you from lending
										too ready an ear to their bad advice and so deciding wrongly
										about a very serious question. We propose also, in reply to
										the wider charges which are raised against us, to show that
										what we have acquired we hold rightfully and that our city
										is not to be despised.

'Of the ancient deeds handed down by tradition and which no
										eye of any one who hears us ever saw, why should we speak? 
									 But of the Persian War, and other events which you
										yourselves remember, speak we must, although we have
										brought them forward so often that the repetition of them is
										disagreeable to us . 
									 When we faced those perils we did so for the common
										benefit: in the solid good you shared, and of the glory,
										whatever good there may be in that, we would not be wholly
										deprived.

Our words are not designed to deprecate hostility, but to
										set forth in evidence the character of the city with which,
										unless you are very careful, you will soon be involved in
										war.

We tell you that we, first and alone, dared to engage with
										the Barbarian at Marathon, and that when he came again,
										being too weak to defend ourselves by land, we and our whole
										people embarked on shipboard and shared with the other
										Hellenes in the victory of Salamis. Thereby he
										was prevented from sailing to the Peloponnesus and ravaging
										city after city; for against so mighty a fleet how could you
										have helped one another?

He himself is the best witness of our words; 
									 for when he was once defeated at sea, he felt that his
										power was gone and quickly retreated with the greater part
										of his army.

The event proved undeniably that the fate of Hellas
										depended on her navy. And the three chief elements of
										success were contributed by us; namely, the greatest number
										of ships, the ablest general, the most devoted
										patriotism. 
									 The ships in all numbered four hundred , and of these, our own contingent amounted to nearly
										two-thirds. To the influence of Themistocles our general it
										was chiefly due that we fought in the strait, which was
										confessedly our salvation; and for this service you
										yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited
										you.

Thirdly, we displayed the most extraordinary courage and
										devotion; there was no one to help us by land; for up to our
										frontier those who lay in the enemy's path were already
										slaves; so we determined to leave our city and sacrifice our
										homes. Even in that extremity we did not choose to desert
										the cause of the allies who still resisted, or by dispersing
										ourselves to become useless to them; but we embarked and
										fought, taking no offence at your failure to assist us
										sooner.

We maintain then that we rendered you a service at least as
										great as you rendered us. 
									 The cities from which you came to help us were still
										inhabited and you might hope to return to them; your concern
										was for yourselves and not for us; 
									 at any rate you remained at a distance while we had
										anything to lose. 
									 But we went forth from a city which was no more, and fought
										for one of which there was small hope; and yet we saved
										ourselves, and bore our part in saving you.

If, in order to preserve our land, like other states, we
										had gone over to the Persians at first, or afterwards had
										not ventured to embark because our ruin was
										already complete, it would have been useless for you with
										your weak navy to fight at sea, but everything would have
										gone quietly just as the Persian desired.

Considering, Lacedaemonians, the energy and sagacity which
										we then displayed, do we deserve to be so bitterly hated by the other Hellenes merely
										because we have an empire?

That empire was not acquired by force; but you would not
										stay and make an end of the Barbarian, and the allies came
										of their own accord and asked us to be their leaders.

The subsequent development of our power was originally
										forced upon us by circumstances; fear was our first motive;
										afterwards honour, and then interest stepped in.

And when we had incurred the hatred of most of our allies;
										when some of them had already revolted and been subjugated,
										and you were no longer the friends to us which you once had
										been, but suspicious and ill-disposed, how could we without
										great risk relax our hold? 
									 For the cities as fast as they fell away from us would have
										gone over to you.

And no man is to be reproached who seizes every possible
										advantage when the danger is so great.

At all events, Lacedaemonians, we may retort that you, in
										the exercise of your supremacy, manage the cities of Peloponnesus to suit your own
										views; 
									 and that if you, and not we, had persevered in the command
										of the allies long enough to be hated, you would have been
										quite as intolerable to them as we are, and would have been
										compelled, for the sake of your own safety, to rule with a
										strong hand.

An empire was offered to us: can you wonder that,
										acting as human nature always will, we accepted it and
										refused to give it up again, constrained by three
										allpowerful motives, honour, fear, interest? 
									 We are not the first who have aspired to rule; the world
										has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the
										stronger. And we think that we are worthy of
										power; and there was a time when you thought so too; but
										now, when you mean expediency you talk about justice. Did
										justice ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he
										could?

Men who indulge the natural ambition of empire deserve
										credit if they are in any degree more careful of justice
										than they need be.

How moderate we are would speedily appear if others took
										our place; 
									 indeed our very moderation, which should be our glory, has
										been unjustly converted into a reproach.

For because in our suits with our allies, regulated by
										treaty, we do not even stand upon our rights, but have instituted the practice of deciding
										them at Athens and by Athenian law, we are supposed to be
										litigious.

None of our opponents observe why others, who exercise
										dominion elsewhere and are less moderate than we are in
										their dealings with their subjects, escape this
										reproach. 
									 Why is it? Because men who practise violence have no longer
										any need of law.

But we are in the habit of meeting our allies on terms of
										equality, and, therefore, if through some legal decision of
										ours, or exercise of our imperial power, contrary to their
										own ideas of right, they suffer ever so little, they are not
										grateful for our moderation in leaving them so much, but are
										far more offended at their trifling loss than if we had from
										the first plundered them in the face of day, laying aside
										all thought of law. 
									 For then they would themselves have admitted that the
										weaker must give way to the stronger.

Mankind resent injustice more than violence, 
									 because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an
										equal, the other is the irresistible force of a
										superior.

They were patient under the yoke of the Persian, who
										inflicted on them far more grievous wrongs; but now our dominion is odious in their
										eyes. 
									 And no wonder: the ruler of the day is always detested by
										his subjects.

And should your empire supplant ours, may not
										you lose the good-will which you owe to the fear of us? Lose
										it you certainly will, if you mean again to exhibit the
										temper of which you gave a specimen when, for a short time,
										you led the confederacy against the Persian. 
									 For the institutions under which you live are incompatible
										with those of foreign states; and further, when any of you
										goes abroad, he respects neither these nor any other
										Hellenic customs

Do not then be hasty in deciding a question which is
										serious; and do not, by listening to representations and complaints which concern others,
										bring trouble upon yourselves. 
									 Realise, while there is time, the inscrutable nature of
										war;

and how when protracted it generally ends in becoming a
										mere matter of chance, over which neither of us can have any
										control, the event being equally unknown and equally
										hazardous to both.

The misfortune is that in their hurry to go to war, men
										begin with blows, and when a reverse comes upon them, then
										have recourse to words.

But neither you, nor we, have as yet committed this
										mistake; and therefore while both of us can still choose the
										prudent part, we tell you not to break the peace or violate
										your oaths. Let our differences be determined by
										arbitration, according to the treaty. 
									 If you refuse we call to witness the Gods, by whom your
										oaths were sworn, that you are the authors of the war; and
										we will do our best to strike in return.

When the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the
									allies against the Athenians, and their rejoinder, they ordered
									everybody but themselves to withdraw, and deliberated
									alone.

The majority were agreed that there was now a clear case
									against the Athenians, and that they must fight at once. 
								 But Archidamus their king, who was held to be both
									an able and a prudent man, came forward and spoke as follows:—

At my age, Lacedaemonians, I have had experience of many
										wars, and I see several of you who are as old as I am, and who will not, as men too
										often do, desire war because they have never known it, or in
										the belief that it is either a good or a safe thing.

Any one who calmly reflects will find that the war about
										which you are now deliberating is likely to be a very great
										one.

When we encounter our neighbours in the Peloponnese, their
										mode of fighting is like ours, and they are all within a
										short march. 
									 But when we have to do with men whose country is a long way
										off, and who are most skilful seamen and thoroughly provided
										with the means of war,— having wealth, private and public,
										ships, horses, infantry, and a population larger than is to
										be found in any single Hellenic territory, not to speak of
										the numerous allies who pay them tribute,— is this a people
										against whom we can lightly take up arms or plunge into a
										contest unprepared? To what do we trust?

To our navy? 
									 There we are inferior; 
									 and to exercise and train ourselves until we are a match
										for them, will take time. 
									 To our money? 
									 Nay, but in that we are weaker still; we have none in a
										common treasury, and we are never willing to contribute out
										of our private means.

Perhaps some one may be encouraged by the superior
										equipment and numbers of our infantry, which will enable us regularly to invade and ravage
										their lands.

But their empire extends to distant countries, and they
										will be able to introduce supplies by sea.

Or, again, we may try-to stir up revolts among their
										allies. But these are mostly islanders, and we shall have to
										employ a fleet in their defence, as well as in our
										own.

How then shall we carry on the war? 
									 For if we can neither defeat them at sea, nor
										deprive them of the revenues by which their navy is
										maintained, we shall get the worst of it.

And having gone so far, we shall no longer be able even to
										make peace with honour, especially if we are believed to
										have begun the quarrel.

We must not for one moment flatter ourselves that if we do
										but ravage their country the war will be at an end. 
									 Nay, I fear that we shall bequeath it to our
										children; 
									 for the Athenians with their high spirit will never barter
										their liberty to save their land, or be terrified like
										novices at the sight of war.

Not that I would have you shut your eyes to their designs
										and abstain from unmasking them, or tamely suffer them to injure our allies.
										But do not take up arms yet. Let us first send and
										remonstrate with them: we need not let them know positively
										whether we intend to go to war or not. In the meantime our
										own preparations may be going forward; we may seek for
										allies wherever we can find them, whether in Hellas or among
										the Barbarians, who will supply our deficiencies in ships
										and money. 
									 Those who, like ourselves, are exposed to Athenian intrigue
										cannot be blamed if in self-defence they seek the aid not of
										Hellenes only, but of Barbarians. 
									 And we must develop our own resources to the utmost.

If they listen to our ambassadors, well and good; 
									 but, if not, in two or three years' time we shall be
											in stronger position, should
										we then determine to attack them.

Perhaps too when they begin to see that we are getting
											ready, and that our words are to
										be interpreted by our actions a, they may be more likely to
										yield; for their fields will be still untouched and their
										goods undespoiled, and it will be in their power to save
										them by their decision.

Think, of their land simply in the light of a hostage, all
										the more valuable in proportion as it is better
										cultivated; 
									 you should spare it as long as you can, and not by reducing
										them to despair make their resistance more
										obstinate.

For if we allow ourselves to be stung into premature action
										by the reproaches of our allies, and waste their country
										before we are ready, we shall only involve Peloponnesus in
										more and more difficulty and disgrace.

Charges brought by cities or persons against one another
										can be satisfactorily arranged; 
									 but when a great confederacy, in order to satisfy private
										grudges, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the
										issue, it is not easy to terminate it with honour.

And let no one think that there is any want of courage in
										cities so numerous hesitating to attack a single one.

The allies of the Athenians are not less numerous; they pay
										them tribute too; 
									 and war is not an affair of arms, but of money which gives
										to arms their use, and which is needed above all things when
										a continental is fighting against a maritime power:

let us find money first, 
									 and then we may safely allow our minds to be excited by the
										speeches of our allies. We, on whom the future
										responsibility, whether for good or evil, will chiefly fall,
										should calmly reflect on the consequences which may follow.

Do not be ashamed of the slowness and procrastination with
										which they are so fond of charging you; 
									 if you begin the war in haste, you will end it at your
										leisure, because you took up arms without sufficient
										preparation. 
									 Remember that we have always been citizens of a free and
										most illustrious state,

and that for us the policy which they condemn may well be
										the truest good sense and discretion. 
									 It is a policy which has saved us from growing insolent in
										prosperity or giving way under adversity, like other
										men. 
									 We are not stimulated by the allurements of flattery into
										dangerous courses of which we disapprove; nor are we goaded
										by offensive charges into compliance with any man's
										wishes.

Our habits of discipline make us both brave and
										wise; brave, because the spirit of loyalty quickens the
										sense of honour, and the sense of honour inspires courage;
										wise, because we are not so highly educated that we have
										learned to despise the laws, and are too severely trained
										and of too loyal a spirit to disobey them. We have not
										acquired that useless over-intelligence which makes a man an
										excellent critic of an enemy's plans, but paralyses him in
										the moment of action. We think that the wits of our enemies
										are as good as our own, and that the element of fortune
										cannot be forecast in words.

Let us assume that they have common prudence, and let our
										preparations be, not words, but deeds . 
									 Our hopes ought not to rest on the probability of their
										making mistakes, but on our own caution and foresight. 
									 We should remember that one man is much the same as
										another, and that he is best who is trained in the severest
										school.

These are principles which our fathers have handed down to
										us, and we maintain to our lasting benefit; we must not lose sight of them, and
										when many lives and much wealth, many cities and a great
										name are at stake, we must not be hasty, or make up our
										minds in a few short hours; we must take time. 
									 We can afford to wait, when others cannot, because we are
										strong.

And now, send to the Athenians and remonstrate with them
										about Potidaea first, 
									 and also about the other wrongs of which your allies
										complain. They say that they are willing to have the matter
										tried; 
									 and against one who offers to submit to justice you must
										not proceed as against a criminal until his cause has been
										heard. 
									 In the meantime prepare for war. 
									 This decision will be the best for yourselves and the most
										formidable to your enemies.

Thus spoke Archidamus. 
								 Last of all, Sthenelaidas, at that time one of the Ephors, came
									forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows:—

I do not know what the long speeches of the Athenians
										mean. 
									 They have been loud in their own praise, but they do not pretend to say that they
										are dealing honestly with our allies and with the
										Peloponnesus. 
									 If they behaved well in the Persian War and are now
										behaving badly to us they ought to be punished twice over,
										because they were once good men and have become bad.

But we are the same now as we were then, 
									 and we shall not do our duty if we allow our allies to be
										ill-used, and put off helping them, 
									 for they cannot put off their troubles.

Others may have money and ships and horses, but we have
										brave allies and we must not betray them to the Athenians.
										If they were suffering in word only, by words and legal
										processes their wrongs might be redressed; but now there is
										not a moment to be lost, and we must help them with all our
										might.

Let no one tell us that we should take time to think when
										we are suffering injustice. 
									 Nay, we reply, those who mean to do injustice should take a
										long time to think.

Wherefore, Lacedaemonians, prepare for war as the honour of
										Sparta demands. 
									 Withstand the advancing power of Athens. Do not let us
										betray our allies, but, with the Gods on our side, let us
										attack the evil-doer.

When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken he, being Ephor, himself put
									the question to the Lacedaemonian assembly.

Their custom is to signify their decision by cries and not by
									voting. But he professed himself unable to tell on which side
									was the louder cry, and wishing to call forth a demonstration
									which might encourage the warlike spirit, he said, Whoever of
										you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken
										and that the Athenians are in the wrong, let him rise and go
										yonder (pointing to a particular spot), and those who
										think otherwise to the other side. 
 
								 So the assembly rose and divided,

and it was determined by a large majority that the treaty had
									been broken.

The Lacedaemonians then recalled the allies and 
									told them that in their judgment the Athenians were guilty, but
									that they wished to hold a general assembly of the allies and
									take a vote from them all;

then the war, if they approved of it, might be undertaken by
									common consent. 
								 Having accomplished their purpose, the allies returned home;
									and the Athenian envoys, when their errand was done, returned
									likewise.

Thirteen years of the thirty years' peace which was concluded after the
									recovery of Euboea had elapsed and the fourteenth year had begun
									when the Lacedaemonian assembly decided that the treaty had been
									broken.

In arriving at this decision and resolving to go to war, the
									Lacedaemonians were influenced, not so much by the speeches of
									their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians and of their
									increasing power. For they saw the greater part of Hellas already subject
									to them.

How the Athenians attained the position in which they rose to
									greatness I will now proceed to describe.

When the Persians, defeated by the Hellenes on sea and
										land, had retreated from Europe, and the remnant of the fleet,
									which had taken refuge at Mycale, had there perished,
									Leotychides, the Lacedaemonian king, who had commanded the
									Hellenes in the battle, returned home with the allies from
									Peloponnesus. But the Athenians and their allies from Ionia and
									the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, persevered
									and besieged Sestos, at that time still in the hands of the
									Persians. Remaining there through the winter they took the
									place, which the Barbarians deserted. 
								 The allies then sailed back from the Hellespont to their
									respective homes.

Meanwhile the Athenian people, now quit of the Barbarians,
									fetched their wives, their children, and the remains of their
									property from the places in which they had been deposited, and
									set to work, rebuilding the city and the walls. 
								 Of the old line of wall but a small part was left
									standing. Most of the houses were in ruins 
								 a few only remaining in which the chief men of the Persians had
									lodged.

The Lacedaemonians knew what would happen and sent an embassy
									to Athens. They would rather themselves have seen neither the Athenians nor
									any one else protected by a wall; but their main motive was the
									importunity of their allies, who dreaded not only the Athenian
									navy, which had until lately been quite small, but also the
									spirit which had animated them in the Persian War.

So the Lacedaemonians requested them not to restore their
										walls , but on the contrary to join with them in razing the
									fortifications of other towns outside the Peloponnesus which had
									them standing. They did not reveal their real wishes or the
									suspicion which they entertained of the Athenians, but argued
									that the Barbarian, if he again attacked them, would then have
									no strong place which he could make his head-quarters as he
									had lately made Thebes. 
								 Peloponnesus would be a sufficient retreat for all Hellas and a
									good base of operations.

To this the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied,
									that they would send an embassy of their own to discuss the
									matter, and so got rid of the Spartan envoys. 
								 He then proposed that he should himself start at once for
									Sparta, and that they should give him colleagues who were not to
									go immediately, but were to wait until the wall reached the
									lowest height which could possibly be defended. 
								 The whole people, who were in the city, men, women, and
									children, should join in the work, and they must spare no
									building, private or public, which could be of use, but demolish
									them all.

Having given these instructions and intimated that he would
									manage affairs at Sparta, he departed.

On his arrival he did not at once present himself officially to
									the magistrates, but delayed and made excuses; 
								 and when any of them asked him why he did not appear before
										the assembly, he said that he was waiting for his
										colleagues, who had been detained by some engagement; he was
										daily expecting them, and wondered that they had not
										appeared.

The friendship of the Lacedaemonian magistrates for
									Themistocles induced them to believe him; but when everybody who came from Athens declared
									positively that the wall was building and had already reached a
									considerable height, they knew not what to think.

He, aware of their suspicions, desired them not to be misled by
									reports, but to send to Athens men whom they could trust out of
									their own number who would see for themselves and bring back
									word.

They agreed; and he at the same time privately instructed the
									Athenians to detain the envoys as quietly as they could, and not
									let them go until he and his colleagues had got safely
									home. 
								 For by this time Habronichus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides
									the son of Lysimachus, who were joined with him in the embassy,
									had arrived, bringing the news that the wall was of sufficient
									height; 
								 and he was afraid that the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the
									truth, might not allow them to return.

So the Athenians detained the envoys, 
								 and Themistocles, coming before the Lacedaemonians, at length
									declared in so many words that Athens was now provided with
									walls and could protect her citizens; henceforward, if the
									Lacedaemonians or their allies wished at any time to negotiate,
									they must deal with the Athenians as with men who knew quite
									well what was for their own and the common good.

When they boldly resolved to leave their city and go on board
									ship, they did not first ask the advice of the Lacedaemonians,
									and, when the two states met in council, their own judgment had
									been as good as that of any one.

And now they had arrived at an independent opinion that it was
									better far, and would be more advantageous both for themselves
									and for the whole body of the allies, that their city should have a wall;

when any member of a confederacy had not equal military
									advantages, his counsel could not be of equal weight or
									worth. 
								 Either all the allies should pull down their walls, or they
									should acknowledge that the Athenians were in the right.

On hearing these words the Lacedaemonians did not openly
									quarrel with the Athenians; for 
 
								 they professed that the embassy had been designed, not to
									interfere with them, but to offer a suggestion for the public
									good; 
								 besides at that time the patriotism which the Athenians had
									displayed in the Persian War had created a warm feeling of
									friendliness between the two cities. 
								 They were annoyed at the failure of their purpose, but they did
									not show it. 
								 And the envoys on either side returned home without any formal
									complaint.

In such hurried fashion did the Athenians build the walls of
									their city.

To this day the structure shows evidence of haste. 
								 The foundations are made up of all sorts of stones, in some
									places unwrought, and laid just as each worker brought them;
									there were many columns too, taken from sepulchres, and many old
									stones already cut, inserted in the work. 
								 The circuit of the city was extended in every direction, and the
									citizens, in their ardour to complete the design, spared
									nothing.

Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish the 
									Piraeus, 
								 of which he had made a beginning in his year of office as
									Archon. 
								 The situation of the place, which had three natural havens,
									was excellent; and now that the Athenians had become seamen, he
									thought that they had great advantage for the attainment of
									empire.

For he first dared to say that they must make the sea their
										domain, 
 
								 and he lost no time in laying the foundations of their
									empire.

By his advice, they built the wall of such a width that
										 two waggons carrying the stones could meet and pass on
										the top; this width may still be traced at the Piraeus; 
								 inside there was no rubble or mortar, but the whole wall was
									made up of large stones hewn square, which were clamped on the
									outer face with iron and lead. 
								 The height was not more than half what he had originally
									intended;

he had hoped by the very dimensions of the wall to paralyse the
									designs of an enemy, 
								 and he thought that a handful of the least efficient citizens
									would suffice for its defence, while the rest might man the
									fleet.

His mind was turned in this direction, as I conceive, from
									observing that the King's armament had met with fewer obstacles
									by sea than by land. 
								 The Piraeus appeared to him to be of more real consequence than
									the upper city. 
								 He was fond of telling the Athenians that if ever they were
									hard pressed on land they should go down to the Piraeus and
									fight the world at sea.

Thus the Athenians built their walls and restored their city
									immediately after the retreat of the Persians.

Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was now sent from Peloponnesus
									with twenty ships in command of the Hellenic forces; 
								 thirty Athenian ships and a number of the allies sailed with
									him.

They first made an expedition against Cyprus, of which they
									subdued the greater part; 
								 and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the
									Persians, and was taken while he was still in command.

He had already begun to be oppressive , and the allies were offended with him,
									especially the Ionians and others who had been recently
									emancipated from the King. 
								 So they had recourse to their kinsmen the Athenians and
									begged them to be their leaders, and to protect them against
									Pausanias, if he attempted to oppress them.

The Athenians took the matter up and prepared to interfere,
									being fully resolved to manage the confederacy in their own way.

In the meantime the Lacedaemonians summoned Pausanias to
									Sparta, intending to investigate certain reports which had
									reached them; 
								 for he was accused of numerous crimes by Hellenes returning
									from the Hellespont, and appeared to exercise his command more
									after the fashion of a tyrant than of a general.

His recall occurred at the very time when the hatred which he
									inspired had induced the allies, with the exception of the
									Peloponnesians, to transfer themselves to the Athenians.

On arriving at Lacedaemon he was punished for the wrongs which
									he had done to particular persons, 
								 but he had been also accused of
									conspiring with the Persians, and of this, which was the
									principal charge and was generally believed to be proven, 
								 he was acquitted.

The government however did not continue him in his command, but
									sent in his place Dorcis and certain others with a small
									force. 
								 To these the allies refused allegiance, and Dorcis, seeing the
									state of affairs, returned home.

Henceforth the Lacedaemonians sent out no more
									commanders, 
								 for they were afraid that those whom they appointed would be
									corrupted, as they had found to be the case with Pausanias; they
									had had enough of the Persian War; and they thought that the
									Athenians were fully able to lead, and at that time believed
									them to be their friends.

Thus the Athenians by the good-will of the allies, who detested
									Pausanias, obtained the leadership. They immediately fixed which
										of the cities should supply money and which of them ships
									for the war against the Barbarians, 
								 the avowed object being to compensate themselves and the allies
									for their losses by devastating the King's country.

Then was first instituted at Athens the office of Hellenic
									treasurers (Hellenotamiae), who received the tribute, 
								 for so the contributions were termed. 
								 The amount was originally fixed at 460 talents . 
								 The island of Delos was the treasury, and the meetings of the
									allies were held in the temple.

At first the allies were independent and deliberated in a
									common assembly under the leadership of Athens. But in the interval between the Persian and
									the Peloponnesian Wars, by their military success and by policy
									in dealing with the Barbarian, with their own rebellious allies
									and with the Peloponnesians who came across their path from time
									to time, the Athenians made immense strides in power.

I have gone out of my way to speak of this period because the
									writers who have preceded me treat either of Hellenic affairs
									previous to the Persian invasion or of that invasion
									itself; 
								 the intervening portion of history has been omitted by all of
									them, with the exception of Hellanicus; and he, where he has
									touched upon it in his Attic history, is very brief; and
									inaccurate in his chronology. 
								 The narrative will also serve to explain how the Athenian
									empire grew up.

First of all under the leadership of Cimon, the son of
									Miltiades, the Athenians besieged and took Eion upon the
									Strymon, then in the hands of the Persians, and sold the inhabitants into slavery.

The same fate befell Scyros, an island in the Aegean inhabited
									by Dolopes; this they colonised themselves.

They also made war on the Carystians of Euboea, who, after a
									time, capitulated; the other Euboeans took no part in the
									war.

Then the Naxians revolted, and the Athenians made war against
									them and reduced them by blockade. 
								 This was the first of the allied cities which was enslaved
									contrary to Hellenic right; 
								 the turn of the others came later.

The causes which led to the defections of the allies were of
									different kinds, the principal being their neglect to pay the tribute or to furnish
									ships, and, in some cases, failure of military service. 
								 For the Athenians were exacting 
								 and oppressive, using coercive measures towards men who were
									neither willing nor accustomed to work hard.

And for various reasons they soon began to prove less agreeable
									leaders than at first. 
								 They no longer fought upon an equality with the rest of the
									confederates, 
								 and they had no difficulty in reducing them when they
									revolted.

Now the allies brought all this upon themselves; 
								 for the majority of them disliked military service and absence
									from home, and so they agreed to contribute their share of the
									expense instead of ships. 
								 Whereby the Athenian navy was proportionally increased, 
								 while they themselves were always untrained and unprepared for
									war when they revolted.

A little later the Athenians and their allies fought two
									battles, one by land and the other by sea, against the Persians, at the river Eurymedon in
									Pamphylia. 
								 The Athenians, under the command of Cimon the son of Miltiades,
									on the same day conquered in both, 
								 and took and destroyed all the Phoenician triremes numbering
									two hundred.

After a while the Thasians revolted; a quarrel had arisen between them
									and the Athenians about the Thracian markets and the mine on the
									Thracian coast opposite, of which the Thasians received the
									profits. 
								 The Athenians sailed to Thasos and, gaining a victory at
									sea, 
								 landed upon the island.

About the same time they sent ten thousand of their own people
									and of their allies to the Strymon, intending to colonise the
									place then called the Nine Ways and now Amphipolis. 
								 They gained possession of the Nine Ways, which were inhabited
									by the Edoni, 
								 but, advancing into the interior of Thrace, they were destroyed
									at Drabescus in Edonia by the united Thracians, whose country
									was threatened by the new settlement.

The Thasians, now blockaded after several defeats, had recourse
									to the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to invade
									Attica.

Unknown to the Athenians they agreed, and were on the point of
									setting out 
								 when the great earthquake occurred and was immediately followed by the revolt of the Helots
									and with them the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea, who seized
									Ithomè. 
								 These Helots were mostly the descendants of the Messenians who
									had been enslaved in ancient times, 
								 and hence all the insurgents were called Messenians.

While the Lacedaemonians were thus engaged, the 
 
								 Thasians, who had now been blockaded for more than two years,
									came to terms with the Athenians; they pulled down their walls
									and surrendered their ships; they also agreed to pay what was
									required of them whether in the shape of immediate indemnity or
									of tribute for the future; and they gave up their claim to the
									mainland and to the mine.

The siege of Ithomè proved tedious, and the Lacedaemonians
									called in, among other allies, the Athenians, 
								 who sent to their aid a considerable force under Cimon.

The Athenians were specially invited because they were reputed
									to be skilful in siege operations, 
								 and the length of the blockade proved to the Lacedaemonians
									their own deficiency in that sort of warfare; 
								 else why had they not taken the place by assault?

This expedition of the Athenians led to the first open quarrel
									between them and the Lacedaemonians. 
								 For the Lacedaemonians, not succeeding in storming the place,
									took alarm at the bold and original spirit of the Athenians.
									They reflected that they were aliens in race, and fearing that,
									if they were allowed to remain, they might be tempted by the
									Helots in Ithomè to change sides, they dismissed them, while
									they retained the other allies. But they concealed their
									mistrust, and merely said that they no longer needed their
									services.

Now the Athenians saw that their dismissal was due to some
									suspicion which had arisen and not to the less offensive reason
									which was openly avowed; 
								 
								 they felt keenly that such a slight ought not to have been offered
									them by the Lacedaemonians; and so, on their return home, they
									forthwith abandoned the alliance which they had made with them
									against the Persians and went over to their Argive
									enemies. 
								 At the same time both Argos and Athens bound themselves to
									Thessaly by a common oath of alliance.

In the tenth year of the siege the
									defenders of Ithomè were unable to hold out any longer, and
									capitulated to the Lacedaemonians. The terms were as follows:
									They were to leave Peloponnesus under a safeconduct, and were
									never again to return; 
								 if any of them were taken on Peloponnesian soil, he was to be
									the slave of his captor.

Now an ancient oracle of Delphi was current among the
									Lacedaemonians, bidding them let the suppliant of Ithomaean Zeus
									go free.

So the Messenians left Ithomè with their wives and
									children; 
								 and the Athenians, who were now the avowed enemies of Sparta,
									gave them a home at Naupactus, 
								 a place which they had lately taken from the Ozolian
									Locrians.

The Athenians obtained the alliance of the Megarians, who
									revolted from the Lacedaemonians because the Corinthians were
										pressing them hard in a war arising out of a question of
									frontiers. 
								 Thus they gained both Megara and Pegae; and they built for the
									Megarians the long walls, extending from the city to the port of
									Nisaea, which they garrisoned themselves. 
								 This was the original and the main cause of the intense hatred
									which the Corinthians entertained towards the Athenians.

Meanwhile Inaros the son of Psammetichus, king of the Libyans
									who border on Egypt, had induced the greater part of Egypt
									to revolt from King Artaxerxes. He began the rebellion 
									 at Mareia, a city opposite the island of
									Pharos, 
								 and, having made himself ruler of the country, called in the
									Athenians.

They were just then engaged in an expedition against Cyprus
									with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies; and,
									quitting the island, 
								 they went to his aid. They sailed from the sea into the Nile,
									and, making themselves masters of the river and of two-thirds of
									Memphis, proceeded to attack the remaining part called the White
									Castle, 
								 in which some of the Persians and Medes had taken refuge, and
									with them such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt.

An Athenian fleet made a descent upon Halieis, where a battle
									took place against some Corinthian and Epidaurian troops; 
								 the Athenians gained the victory. 
								 Soon afterwards the Athenians fought at sea off Cecryphaleia
									with a Peloponnesian fleet, 
								 which they defeated.

A war next broke out between the Aeginetans and the Athenians,
									and a great battle was fought off the coast of Aegina, 
								 in which the allies of both parties joined; 
								 the Athenians were victorious, 
								 and captured seventy of the enemy's ships; they then landed on
									Aegina and, under the command of Leocrates the son of Stroebus,
									besieged the town.

Thereupon the Peloponnesians sent over to the assistance of the
									Aeginetans three hundred hoplites who had previously been
									assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. The Corinthians
										seized on the heights of Geraneia, and thence made a descent
									with their allies into the Megarian territory, thinking that the
									Athenians, who had so large a force absent in Aegina and in
									Egypt, would be unable to assist the Megarians; or, if they did,
									would be obliged to raise the siege of Aegina.

But the Athenians, without moving their army from Aegina, 
								 sent to Megara under the command of Myronides a force
									consisting of their oldest and youngest men, who had 
									remained at home.

A battle was fought, which hung equally in the balance; and
									when the two armies separated, 
								 they both thought that they had gained the victory.

The Athenians, who did however get rather the better, on the
									departure of the Corinthians erected a trophy. 
								 And then the Corinthians, irritated by the reproaches of the
									aged men in the city, after about twelve days' preparation came
									out again, and, claiming the victory, raised another
									trophy. 
								 Hereupon the Athenians sallied out of Megara, killed those who
									were erecting the trophy, and charged and defeated the rest of
									the army.

The Corinthians now retreated, 
								 but a considerable number of them were hard pressed, and missing their way got into an enclosure belonging to
									a private person, 
								 which was surrounded by a great ditch 
								 and had no exit.

The Athenians, perceiving their situation, closed the entrance
									in front with heavy-armed troops, 
								 and, placing their light troops in a circle round, stoned all
									who had entered the enclosure. 
								 This was a great blow to the Corinthians. 
								 The main body of their army returned home.

About this time the Athenians began to build their Long Walls
									extending to the sea, one to the harbour of Phalerum, and the other to the
									Piraeus.

The Phocians made an expedition against the Dorians, who
									inhabit Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineum, and are the mother people
									of the Lacedaemonians; one of these towns they took. Thereupon
									the Lacedaemonians under the command of Nicomedes the son of
									Cleombrotus, who was general in the place of the king
									Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias (he being at that time a
									minor), came to the assistance of the Dorians with fifteen
									hundred hoplites of their own, and, of their allies, ten
									thousand, 
								 and compelled the Phocians to make terms and to restore the
									town. They then thought of returning; but there were
									difficulties.

Either they might go by sea across the Crisaean
									Gulf, in which case the Athenian fleet would be sure to sail
									round and intercept them, 
								 or they might march over Mount Geraneia; but this seemed
									dangerous when the Athenians were holding Megara and
									Pegae. 
								 The pass was not easy, and was always guarded by the Athenians,
									who were obviously intending to stop them by that route
									also.

So they determined to remain in Boeotia and consider how they
									could best get home. 
								 They had another motive:— Certain Athenians were privately
									making overtures to them, in the hope that they would put an end
									to the democracy and the building of the Long Walls.

But the Athenians were aware of their embarrassment, and they
									also suspected their design against the democracy.

So they went out to meet them with their whole force, together
									with a thousand Argives and contingents from the other
									allies; 
								 they numbered in all fourteen thousand men.

Among them were some Thessalian cavalry, who came to their aid
									in accordance with the treaty , but these deserted to the Lacedaemonians during the
									engagement.

The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, and the
									Lacedaemonians and their allies, after great slaughter on both sides, gained the
									victory.

They then marched into the Megarian territory, and, cutting
									down the fruit-trees, returned home by way of Geraneia and the
									Isthmus. 
								 But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians made another
									expedition into Boeotia under the command of Myronides,

and there was a battle at Oenophyta, in which they defeated the
									Boeotians and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. 
								 They pulled down the walls of Tanagra 
								 and took as hostages from the Opuntian Locrians a hundred of
									their richest citizens. 
								 They then completed their own Long Walls.

Soon afterwards the Aeginetans came to terms with the
									Athenians, dismantling their walls, surrendering their ships,
									and agreeing to pay tribute for the future.

The Athenians, under the command of Tolmides the
									son of Tolmaeus, sailed round Peloponnesus and burnt the
									Lacedaemonian dockyard . They also took the Corinthian town of
									Chalcis, and, making a descent upon Sicyon, defeated a Sicyonian
									force.

The Athenians and their allies were still in Egypt, 
								 where they carried on the war with varying fortune.

At first they were masters of the country. 
								 The King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian, who was well
									supplied with money, in the hope that he might persuade the
									Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and so draw off the Athenians
									from Egypt.

He had no success; the money was being spent and nothing done;
									so, with what remained of it, he found his way back to
									Asia. 
								 The King then sent into Egypt Megabyzus the son of Zopyrus, a
									Persian,

who marched overland with a large army and defeated the
									Egyptians and their allies. 
								 He drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, 
								 and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, 
								 where he blockaded them for eighteen months. 
								 At length he drained the canal and diverted the water, thus
									leaving their ships high and dry and joining nearly the whole
									island to the mainland. 
								 He then crossed over with a land force, and took the island.

Thus, after six years' fighting, the cause of the Hellenes in
									Egypt was lost. 
								 A few survivors of their great army found their way through Libya to
									Cyrenè; 
								 by far the larger number perished.

Egypt again became subject to the Persians, although Amyrtaeus,
									the king in the fens, still held out. 
								 He escaped capture owing to the extent of the fens 
								 and the bravery of their inhabitants, who are the most warlike
									of all the Egyptians.

Inaros, the king of Libya, the chief author of the revolt, was
									betrayed and impaled.

Fifty additional triremes, which had been sent by the
										Athenians and their allies to relieve their
									other forces, in ignorance of what had happened, sailed into the
									Mendesian mouth of the Nile. 
								 But they were at once attacked both from the land and from the
									sea, and the greater part of them destroyed by the Phoenician
									fleet, a few ships only escaping. 
								 Thus ended the great Egyptian expedition of the Athenians and
									their allies.

About this time Orestes, the exiled son of the Thessalian king
									Echecratides, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. 
								 Taking with them a force of the Boeotians and Phocians, who
									were now their allies, they marched against Pharsalus in
									Thessaly. 
								 They made themselves masters of the country in the
									neighbourhood of their camp, 
								 but the Thessalian cavalry stopped any further advance. 
								 They could not take the place, 
								 and none of their plans prospered; 
								 so they returned unsuccessful and brought back Orestes.

A short time afterwards a thousand Athenians, under the command
									of Pericles the son of Xanthippus, embarking on board the fleet which they had at Pegae, now in their
										possession, coasted along to Sicyon, 
								 and there landing, defeated the Sicyonians who came out to meet
									them.

With the least possible delay taking on board Achaean troops
									and sailing to the opposite coast, they attacked 
								 and besieged Oeniadae, a town of Acarnania; 
								 but failing to reduce it, 
								 they returned home.

After an interval of three years a five years' truce was
									concluded between the Peloponnesians and Athenians.

The Athenians now abstained from war in Hellas itself, 
								 but made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred ships of
									their own and of their allies, under the command of Cimon.

Sixty ships were detached from the armament and sailed to
									Egypt, at the request of Amyrtaeus the king in the fens; 
								 the remainder proceeded to blockade Citium.

Here Cimon died, and a famine arose in the country;
									so the fleet 
									quitted Citium. 
								 Arriving off Salamis in Cyprus they fought at sea 
								 and also on land with Phoenician and Cilician forces. 
								 Gaining a victory in both engagements, they returned
									home, 
								 accompanied by the ships which had gone out with them and had
									now come back from Egypt.

After this the Lacedaemonians engaged in the so-called Sacred
									War 
								 and gained possession of the temple of Delphi, which they
									handed over to the Delphians. 
								 But no sooner had they retired than the Athenians sent an
									expedition and recovered the temple, which they handed over to
									the Phocians.

Some time afterwards the Athenians, under the command of
									Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus, with a thousand hoplites of their own and
									contingents of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and certain
									other places in Boeotia which were in the hands of oligarchical
									exiles from different Boeotian towns, and so were hostile to
									them. 
								 They took Chaeronea, and leaving a garrison there,
									departed.

But while they were on their march, the exiles who had occupied
									Orchomenus, some Locrians, some Euboean exiles and others of the
									same party, set upon them at Coronea 
								 and defeated them, killing many and taking many
									prisoners.

The Athenians then agreed to evacuate the whole of Boeotia upon
									condition that the prisoners should be restored.

And so the Boeotian exiles returned to their homes, and all the
									Boeotians regained their independence.

Not long afterwards Euboea revolted from Athens. 
								 Pericles had just arrived in the island with an Athenian army when
									the news came that Megara had likewise revolted, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading
									Attica, and that the Megarians had slaughtered the Athenian
									garrison, of whom a few only had escaped to 
									Nisaea. 
								 The Megarians had introduced a force of Corinthians,
									Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the city, and by their help had
									effected the revolt. 
								 Pericles in haste withdrew his army from Euboea.

The Peloponnesians then invaded Attica under the command of
									Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian king. 
								 They advanced as far as Eleusis and Thria but no further, and
									after ravaging the country, returned home.

Thereupon the Athenians under the command of Pericles again
									crossed over to Euboea and reduced the whole country; 
								 the Hestiaeans they ejected from their
									homes and appropriated their territory; 
								 the rest of the island they settled by
									agreement.

Soon after their return from Euboea they made a truce for
									thirty years with the Lacedaemonians and their allies, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and
									Achaia, 
								 which were the places held by them in Peloponnesus.

Six years later the Samians and Milesians went to war about the
									possession of Priene, 
								 and the Milesians, who were getting worsted, came to Athens and
									complained loudly of the Samians. 
								 Some private citizens of Samos, who wanted to overthrow the
									government, supported their complaint.

Whereupon the Athenians, sailing to Samos with forty ships,
									established a democracy, 
								 and taking as hostages fifty boys and fifty men 
								 whom they deposited at Lemnos, 
								 they returned leaving a garrison.

But certain of the Samians who had quitted the island 
								 and fled to the mainland entered into an alliance with the
									principal oligarchs who remained in the city, and with
									Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, then governor of Sardis, 
								 and collecting troops to the number of seven hundred they
									crossed over by night to Samos.

First of all they attacked the victorious populace and got most
									of them into their power; 
								 then they stole away their hostages from Lemnos, and finally
									revolted from Athens. 
								 The garrison of the Athenians and the officials who were in their power were delivered by them into the
									hands of Pissuthnes. 
								 They at once prepared to make an expedition against
									Miletus. 
								 The Byzantians joined in their revolt.

When the Athenians heard of the insurrection they sailed for
									Samos with sixty ships. 
								 But of this number they sent away sixteen, some towards
									Caria to keep a look out for the Phoenician fleet, others to
									summon aid from Chios and Lesbos. 
								 With the remaining forty-four ships they fought at sea under
									the command of Pericles and nine others, near the island of
									Tragia, against seventy Samian vessels, all sailing from
										Miletus, of which twenty were transports; 
								 the Athenians gained the victory.

After receiving a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens and
									of twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos 
								 they disembarked, and their infantry proving superior, invested
									the city with three walls; they also blockaded it by sea.

At the same time Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading
									force and sailed hastily towards Caunus in Caria, news having
									arrived that a Phoenician fleet was approaching; 
								 Stesagoras and others had already gone with five ships from
									Samos to fetch it.

Meanwhile the Samians made a sudden sally, and attacking the
									naval station of the Athenians which was unprotected, destroyed the guard-ships 
								 and engaged and defeated the other vessels which put out to
									meet them. 
								 During some fourteen days they were masters of the sea about
									their own coasts, 
								 and carried in and out whatever they pleased.

But when Pericles returned, they were again closely
									blockaded; 
								 and there soon arrived from Athens forty additional ships
										under Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, twenty more under
									Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos.

The Samians made a feeble attempt at a sea-fight, but soon they
									were unable to resist, 
								 and after nine months were forced to surrender. 
								 The terms of capitulation were as follows:— They were to
										raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their
									ships, and pay a full indemnity by regular instalments. 
								 The Byzantians too made terms and became subjects as before.

Not long afterwards occurred the affairs of Corcyra and
									Potidaea, which have been already narrated, and the various other circumstances which led
									to the Peloponnesian War.

Fifty years elapsed between the retreat of Xerxes and the
									beginning of the war; during these years took place all those
									operations of the Hellenes against one another and against the
									Barbarian which I have been describing. 
								 The Athenians acquired a firmer hold over their empire 
								 and the city itself became a great power. 
								 The Lacedaemonians saw what was going on, 
								 but during most of the time they remained inactive and hardly
									attempted to interfere. They had never been of a temper prompt
									to take the field unless they were compelled; and they were in
									some degree embarrassed by wars near home. But the Athenians
									were growing too great to be ignored and were laying hands on
									their allies. 
								 They could now bear it no longer: they made up their minds that
									they must put out all their strength and overthrow the Athenian
									power by force of arms. And therefore they commenced the
									Peloponnesian War.

They had already voted in their own assembly that the treaty
									had been broken and that the Athenians were guilty ; they now sent to Delphi and asked the God if it would
									be for their advantage to make war. 
								 He is reported to have answered that, if they did their best,
									they would be conquerors, 
								 and that he himself, invited or uninvited, would take their
									part.

So they again summoned the allies, intending to put to them the
									question of war or peace. 
 
								 When their representatives arrived, an assembly was held; and
									the allies said what they had to say, most of them complaining
									of the Athenians and demanding that the war should
										proceed. 
									The Corinthians had already gone the round of the cities and
									entreated them privately to vote for war; they were afraid that
									they would be too late to save Potidaea. 
								 At the assembly they came forward last of all and spoke as
									follows:—

Fellow allies, we can no longer find fault with the
										Lacedaemonians; they have themselves resolved upon war and have brought us hither to
										confirm their decision. 
									 And they have done well; for the leaders of a confederacy,
										while they do not neglect the interests of their own state,
										should look to the general weal: as they are first in
										honour, they should be first in the fulfilment of their
										duties.

Now those among us who have ever had dealings with the
										Athenians, do not require to be warned against them; 
									 but such as live inland and not on any maritime highway
										should clearly understand that, if they do not protect the
										sea-board, they will find it more difficult to carry their
										produce to the sea, or to receive in return the goods which
										the sea gives to the land. They should not lend a careless
										ear to our words, for they nearly concern them; they should
										remember that, if they desert the cities on the sea-shore,
										the danger may some day reach them, and that they are
										consulting for their own interests quite as much as for
										ours.

And therefore let no one hesitate to accept war in exchange
										for peace. 
									 Wise men refuse to move until they are wronged, but brave
										men as soon as they are wronged go to war, and when there is
										a good opportunity make peace again. They are not
										intoxicated by military success; but neither will they
										tolerate injustice from a love of peace and ease.

For he whom pleasure makes a coward will quickly lose, if
										he continues inactive, the delights of ease which he is so
										unwilling to renounce; 
									 and he whose arrogance is stimulated by victory does not
										see how hollow is the confidence which elates
										him.

Many schemes which were ill-advised have succeeded through
										the still greater folly which possessed the enemy, 
									 and yet more, which seemed to be wisely contrived, have
										ended in foul disaster. 
									 The execution of an enterprise is never equal to the conception of it 
									 in the confident mind of its promoter; 
									 for men are safe while they are forming plans, 
									 but, when the time of action comes, then they lose their
										presence of mind and fail.

We, however, do not make war upon the Athenians in a spirit
										of vain-glory, but from a sense of wrong; there is ample justification, 
									 and when we obtain redress, we will put up the sword.

For every reason we are likely to succeed. First, because
										we are superior in numbers and in military skill; secondly,
										because we all obey as one man the orders given to us.

They are doubtless strong at sea, but we too will provide a
										navy, for which the means can be supplied partly by
										contributions from each state, partly out of the funds at
										Delphi and Olympia. 
									 A loan will be granted to us, and by the offer of higher
										pay we can draw away their foreign sailors. 
									 The Athenian power consists of mercenaries, and not of
										their own citizens; 
									 but our soldiers are not mercenaries, and therefore cannot
										so be bought, for we are strong in men if poor in
										money.

Let them be beaten in a single naval engagement and they
										are probably conquered at once; 
									 but suppose they hold out, we shall then have more time in
										which to practise at sea. 
									 As soon as we have brought our skill up to the level of
										theirs our courage will surely give us the victory. 
									 For that is a natural gift which they cannot learn, but
										their superior skill is a thing acquired, which we must attain by practice .

'And the money which is required for the war, we will
										provide by a contribution. 
									 What! shall their allies never fail in paying the tribute
										which is to enslave them, and shall we refuse to
										give freely in order to save ourselves and be avenged on our
										enemies, or rather to prevent the money which we refused to
										give from being taken from us by them and used to our
										destruction?

These are some of the means by which the war may be carried
										on; but there are others. We may induce their allies to revolt,— a sure mode of
										cutting off the revenues in which the strength of Athens
										consists; or we may plant a fort in their country; and there
										are many expedients which will hereafter suggest
										themselves. 
									 For war, least of all things, conforms to prescribed
										rules; 
									 it strikes out a path for itself when the moment
										comes. 
									 And therefore he who has his temper under control in
										warfare is safer far, 
									 but he who gets into a passion is, through his own fault,
										liable to the greater fall.

'If this were merely a quarrel between one of us and our
										neighbours about a boundary line it would not matter; but reflect: the truth is that
										the Athenians are a match for us all, and much more than a
										match for any single city. 
									 And if we allow ourselves to be divided or are not united
										against them heart and soul— the whole confederacy and every
										nation and city in it— they will easily overpower us. 
									 It may seem a hard saying, but you may be sure that defeat
										means nothing but downright slavery,

and the bare mention of such a possibility is a disgrace to
										the Peloponnese:— shall so many states suffer at the hands
										of one? 
									 Men will say, some that we deserve our fate, others that we
										are too cowardly to resist: and we shall seem a degenerate
										race. For our fathers were the liberators of Hellas, 
									 but we cannot secure even our own liberty; 
									 and while we make a point of overthrowing the rule of a
										single man in this or that city, we allow a city which is a
										tyrant to be set up in the midst of us.

Are we not open to one of three most serious charges—
											folly, cowardice, or carelessness? 
 
									 For you certainly do not escape such imputations by
										wrapping yourselves in that contemptuous wisdom which has so
											often brought men to ruin, as in the end to
										be pronounced contemptible folly.

But why should we dwell reproachfully upon the past, except
										in the interest of the present? 
									 We should rather, looking to the future, devote our energies to the task which we have
										immediately in hand. 
									 By labour to win virtue,— that is the lesson which we have learnt from our fathers, and which you ought
										not to unlearn, because you chance to have some trifling
										advantage over them in wealth and power; for men should not
										lose in the time of their wealth what was gained by them in
										their time of want. 
									 There are many reasons why you may advance with
										confidence. 
									 The God has spoken and has promised to take our part
										himself. 
									 All Hellas will fight at our side, from motives either of
										fear or of interest.

And you will not break the treaty,— the God in bidding you
										go to war pronounces it to have been already broken,— 
									 but you will avenge the violation of it. 
									 For those who attack others, not those who defend
										themselves, are the real violators of treaties .

On every ground you will be right in going to war: it is
										our united advice; 
										and if you believe community of interests to be the surest
										ground of strength both to states and individuals, send
										speedy aid d to the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and now
										besieged by Ionians (for times have changed), and recover
											the liberties which the rest of the allies
										have lost. We cannot go on as we are: for some of us are
										already suffering, and if it is known that we have met, but
										do not dare to defend ourselves, others will soon share
										their fate.

Acknowledging then, allies, that there is no alternative,
										and that we are advising you for the best, vote for war; and
										be not afraid of the immediate danger, but fix your thoughts
										on the durable peace which will follow. 
									 For by war peace is assured, but to remain at peace when
										you should be going to war may be often very
										dangerous.

The tyrant city which has been set up in Hellas is a
										standing menace to all alike; she rules over some of us
										already, and would fain rule over others. 
									 Let us attack and subdue her, that we may ourselves live
										safely for the future and deliver the Hellenes whom she has
										enslaved. 
								 
							 
							 
								 Such were the words of the Corinthians.

The Lacedaemonians, having heard the opinions of all the
									allies, put the question to them all, one after the other, great and small alike, 
								 and the majority voted for war.

But, although they had come to this decision, they were not
									ready, and could not take up arms at once; 
								 so they determined to make the necessary preparations, each for
									themselves, with the least possible delay. 
								 Still nearly a whole year was passed in preparation before they
									invaded Attica and commenced open hostilities.

During this interval they sent embassies to Athens and made
									various complaints that their grounds for going to war might be all the stronger in
									case the Athenians refused to listen.

The first ambassadors desired the Athenians to drive out the
										curse of the Goddess. 
 
 
								 The curse to which they referred was as follows:—

In the days of old there was an Athenian named Cylon, who had
									been an Olympic victor; 
								 he was powerful and of noble birth; and he had married the
									daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian who was at that time tyrant of
									Megara.

In answer to an enquiry which Cylon made at Delphi,
									the God told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens at the
									greatest festival of Zeus.

Thereupon he obtained forces from Theagenes, and, persuading
									his friends to join him, when the time of the Olympic festival
									in Peloponnesus came round, he took possession of the Acropolis,
									intending to make himself tyrant. He thought that this was the
									greatest festival of Zeus, and, having been an Olympic victor,
									he seemed to have a special interest in it.

But whether the greatest festival spoken of was in Attica or in
									some other part of Hellas was a question which never entered
									into his mind, and the oracle said nothing about it. 
								 (For the Athenians also have a greatest festival of Zeus— the
									festival of Zeus the Gracious, or Diasia, as it is called — this is held outside the city and the whole people
									sacrifice at it, some, ordinary victims, others, a kind of
									offering peculiar to the country.)

However, Cylon thought that his interpretation was right, and
									made the attempt at the Olympic festival.

The Athenians, when they saw what had happened, came in a body
									from the fields and invested the Acropolis. 
								 After a time they grew tired of the siege and most of them went
									away, committing the guard to the nine Archons, and giving them
									full powers to do what they thought best in the whole
									matter; 
								 for in those days public affairs were chiefly administered by
									the nine Archons .

Cylon and his companions were in great distress from want of
									food and water.

So he and his brother made their escape; 
								 the rest, being hard pressed, and some of them ready to die of
									hunger, sat as suppliants at the altar which is in the
									Acropolis.

When the Athenians, to whose charge the guard had been
									committed, saw them dying in the temple, they bade them rise,
									promising to do them no harm, and then led them away and put
									them to death. 
								 They even slew some of them in the very presence of the awful
									Goddesses at whose altars, in passing by, they had sought refuge. 
								 The murderers and their descendants are held to be accursed,
									and offenders against the Goddess.

These accursed persons were banished by the Athenians; and
									Cleomenes, 
								 the Lacedaemonian king, again banished them from Athens in a
									time of civil strife by the help of the opposite faction,
									expelling the living and disinterring and casting forth the
									bones of the dead . 
								 Nevertheless they afterwards returned, and to this day their
									race still survives in the city.

The Lacedaemonians desired the Athenians to drive away this
									curse, as if the honour of the Gods were their first object, but in reality because
									they knew that the curse attached to Pericles, the son of
									Xanthippus, by his mother's side, and they thought that if he
									were banished they would find the Athenians more
									manageable.

They did not really expect that he would be driven into exile,
									but they hoped to discredit him with the citizens and make them
									believe that his misfortune was to a certain extent the cause of
									the war.

For he was the leader of the state and the most powerful man of
									his day, and his policy was utterly opposed to the
									Lacedaemonians. 
								 He would not suffer the Athenians to give way, 
								 but was always urging upon them the necessity of war.

The Athenians retaliated by demanding that the Lacedaemonians
									should drive away the curse of Taenarus. 
								 They referred to the murder of certain Helots who had taken
									refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus; these the
									Lacedaemonians, having first raised by the hand, had then led
									away and slain. 
								 The Lacedaemonians themselves believe this act of theirs to
									have been the cause of the great earthquake which visited
										Sparta .

The Athenians also bade them drive out the curse of
									Athenè of the Brazen House. 
								 The story is as follows:—

When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was originally summoned by the
									Spartans to give an account of his command at the
										Hellespont , and had been tried and acquitted,
									he was no longer sent out in a public capacity, but he hired a
									trireme of Hermionè on his own account and sailed to the
									Hellespont, pretending that he had gone thither to fight in the
									cause of the Hellenes. In reality he wanted to prosecute an
									intrigue with the King, by which he hoped to obtain the empire
									of Hellas.

He had already taken the first steps after the return from
									Cyprus, when he captured Byzantium . 
								 The city was at that time held by the Persians and by certain
									relatives and kinsmen of the King, who were taken
									prisoners. 
								 These he restored to the King without the knowledge of the
									allies, 
								 to whom he declared that they had made their escape.

This act was the beginning of the whole affair, and thereby he
									originally placed the King under an obligation to him.

His accomplice was Gongylus the Eretrian, to whose care he had
									entrusted Byzantium and the captives. 
								 To this same Gongylus he also gave a letter addressed to the
									King, 
								 of which, as was afterwards discovered, the terms were as
									follows:—

Pausanias, the Spartan commander, desiring to do you a
										service, sends you back these captives of his spear. 
									 And I propose, if you have no objection, to marry your
										daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under
										your sway. 
									 I think that I can accomplish this if you and I take
										counsel together. 
									 Should you approve of my proposal, send a trusty person to
										the sea and through him we will negotiate.

Thus far the letter. 
								 Xerxes was pleased, 
								 and sent Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding
										him to assume the government of the satrapy of Dascylium in
									the room of Megabates. 
								 An answer was entrusted to him, which he was to
									send as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium; he was to
									show him at the same time the royal seal. If Pausanias gave him
									any order about his own affairs, he was to execute it with all
									diligence and fidelity.

Artabazus came down to the sea, as he was desired, and
									transmitted the letter.

The answer of the King was as follows:— 
							 
							 
								 
									 Thus saith Xerxes, the King, to Pausanias. 
									 The benefit which thou hast done me in saving the captives
										who were taken at Byzantium beyond the sea is recorded in my
										house for ever, 
									 and thy words please me. 
									 Let neither day nor night hinder thee from fulfilling
										diligently the promise which thou hast made to me; 
									 spare not gold or silver, and take as large an army
										as thou wilt, wheresoever it may be required. 
									 I have sent to thee Artabazus, a good man; act with him for
										my honour and welfare, and for thine own, and be of good
										courage.'

Pausanias received the letter. 
								 He had already acquired a high reputation among the
										Hellenes when in command at Plataea, and now he was so great that
									he could no longer contain himself or live like other men. 
								 Whenever he marched out of Byzantium he wore Persian
									apparel. 
								 On his way through Thrace he was always attended by a
									body-guard of Medes and Egyptians, and he had his table served
									after the Persian fashion. 
								 He could not conceal his ambition, 
								 but indicated by little things the greater designs which he was
									meditating.

He made himself difficult of access, 
								 and displayed such a violent temper towards everybody that no
									one could come near him; 
								 and this was one of the chief reasons why the confederacy
									transferred themselves to the Athenians.

The news of his behaviour soon reached the Lacedaemonians; who
									had recalled him in the first instance on this ground . 
								 And now, when he had sailed away in the ship of
									Hermione without leave , and was evidently
									carrying on the same practices; when he had been forced out of Byzantium and the gates had been shut
									against him by the Athenians; and when, instead of returning to
									Sparta, he settled at Colonae in Troas, and was reported to the
									Ephors to be negotiating with the Barbarians, and to be staying
									there for no good purpose, then at last they made up their minds
									to act. 
								 They sent a herald to him with a despatch rolled on a scytalè,
									commanding him to follow the officer home, and saying that, if
									he refused, Sparta would declare war against him.

He, being desirous as far as he could to avoid suspicion and
									believing that he could dispose of the accusations by bribery,
									returned for the second time to Sparta. 
								 On his return he was at once thrown into prison by the
									Ephors, 
								 who have the power to imprison the king himself. 
								 But after a time he contrived to come out, and challenged any
									one who asserted his guilt to bring him to trial.

As yet however neither his enemies among the citizens nor the
									Spartan government had any trustworthy evidence such as would have justified them
									in inflicting punishment upon a member of the royal family
									holding royal office at the time. 
								 For he was the guardian as well as cousin of the king,
									Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was still a minor.

But his disregard of propriety and affectation of Barbarian
									fashions made them strongly suspect that he was dissatisfied
									with his position in the state. 
								 They examined into any violation of established usage which
									they could find in his previous life; and they remembered among
									other things how in past times he had presumed on his own
									authority to inscribe on the tripod at Delphi, which the
										Hellenes dedicated as the first-fruits of their
									victory over the Persians, this elegiac couplet:—
										 
 
 
										 
											 Pausanias, captain of the Hellenes, having destroyed
												the Persian host, 
											 Made this offering to Phoebus for a memorial.

The Lacedaemonians had at once effaced the lines 
								 and inscribed on the tripod the names of the cities which took
									part in the overthrow of the Barbarian and in the dedication of
									the offering. 
								 But still this act of Pausanias gave offence at the time, 
								 and, now that he had again fallen under suspicion, seemed to
									receive a new light from his present designs.

They were also informed that he was intriguing with the
									Helots; 
								 and this was true, 
								 for he had promised them emancipation and citizenship if they
									would join him in an insurrection and help to carry out his
									whole design.

Still the magistrates would not take decided measures; they
									even refused to believe the distinct testimony which certain
									Helots brought against him; their habit having always been to be
									slow in taking an irrevocable decision against a Spartan without
									incontestable proof. At last a certain man of Argilus, who had
									been a favourite and was still a confidential servant of
									Pausanias, turned informer. He had been commissioned by him to
									carry to Artabazus the last letters for the King, but the
									thought struck him that no previous messenger had ever returned;
									he took alarm, and so, having counterfeited the seal of
									Pausanias in order to avoid discovery if he were mistaken, or if
									Pausanias, wanting to make some alteration, should ask him for
									the letter, he opened it, and among the directions given in it
									found written, as he had partly suspected, an order for his own
									death.

He showed the letter to the Ephors, who were now more inclined
									to believe, 
								 but still they wanted to hear something from Pausanias' own
									mouth, and so, according to a plan preconcerted with them, the
									man went to Taenarus as a suppliant and there put up a hut
									divided by a partition. In the inner part of the hut he placed
										some of the Ephors, and when Pausanias came to
									him and asked him why he was a suppliant, the whole truth was at once revealed to them. There was the man
									reproaching Pausanias with the directions which he had found in
									the letter, and going into minute details about the whole
									affair; he protested that never on any occasion had he brought
									him into any trouble when sent on his service in this matter to
									the King: why then should he share the fate of the other
									messengers, and be rewarded with death? And there was Pausanias,
									admitting the truth of his words, and telling him not to be
									angry at what had happened, offering to raise him by the hand
									that he might safely leave the temple, and bidding him start at
									once and not make difficulties.

The Ephors, who had heard every word, went away for the
									present, 
								 intending, now that they had certain knowledge, to take Pausanias in the
									city. 
								 It is said that he was on the point of being arrested in the
									street, when the face of one of them as they approached revealed
									to him their purpose, and another who was friendly warned him by
									a hardly perceptible nod. Whereupon he ran and fled to the
									temple of Athenè of the Brazen House and arrived before
									them, 
								 for the precinct was not far off. 
								 There, entering into a small chamber which belonged to the
									temple, that he might not suffer from exposure to the weather,
									he remained.

His pursuers, failing to overtake him, 
								 afterwards unroofed the building, 
								 and watching when he was within, and preventing him from
									getting out, they built up the doors, 
								 and, investing the place, starved him to death.

He was on the point of expiring in the chamber where he lay,
									when they, observing his condition, brought him out; he was
									still breathing, 
								 but as soon as he was brought out he died.

The Spartans were going to cast his body into the Caeadas, a
									chasm into which they throw malefactors, but they 
									changed their minds and buried him somewhere in the
									neighbourhood. 
								 The God of Delphi afterwards come manded them to transfer him
									to the place where he died, 
								 and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as the
									inscription on the column testifies. 
								 The oracle also told them that they had brought a curse upon
									themselves, and must offer two bodies for one to Athenè of the
									Brazen House. 
								 Whereupon they made two brazen statues, which they dedicated,
									intending them to be an expiation for Pausanias.

To this judgment of the God himself the Athenians referred when
									they retorted on the Lacedaemonians, telling them to banish the
									curse.

Now the evidence which proved that Pausanias was in league with
									Persia implicated Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians
									charging him likewise with treason, 
								 and demanding that he should receive the same punishment.

The Athenians agreed, but having been ostracised he was living
									at the time in Argos, whence he used to visit other parts of the
									Peloponnese. 
								 The Lacedaemonians were very ready to join in the pursuit; so
									they and the Athenians sent officers, who were told to arrest
									him wherever they should find him.

Themistocles received information of their purpose, and fled
									from the Peloponnesus to the Corcyraeans, who were under an obligation to him. 
								 The Corcyraeans said that they were afraid to keep him, lest
									they should incur the enmity of Athens and Lacedaemon; so they
									conveyed him to the neighboring continent,

whither he was followed by the officers, who constantly
									enquired in which direction he had gone and pursued him
									everywhere. Owing to an accident he was compelled to stop at the
									house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not his
										friend.

He chanced to be absent from home, 
								 but Themistocles presented himself as a suppliant to his wife,
									and was instructed by her to take their child and sit at the
									hearth.

Admetus soon returned, and then Themistocles told him who he
									was, 
								 adding that if in past times he had opposed any request which
									Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to retaliate on
									an exile. 
								 He was now in such extremity that a far weaker adversary than
									he could do him a mischief; but a noble nature should not be
									revenged by taking at a disadvantage one as good as
									himself. 
								 Themistocles further argued that he had opposed Admetus in some
									matter of business, and not when life was at stake; but that, if
									Admetus delivered him up, he would be consigning him to
									death. 
								 At the same time he told him who his pursuers were and what was
									the charge against him.

Admetus, hearing his words, raised him up, together with his
									own son, from the place where he sat holding the child in his arms, 
								 which was the most solemn form of supplication. 
								 Not long afterwards the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and
									pressed him to give up the fugitive, but he refused; 
								 and as Themistocles wanted to go to the King, sent him on foot
									across the country to the sea at Pydna (which was in the kingdom
									of Alexander).

There he found a merchant vessel sailing to Ionia, in which he
									embarked; it was driven, however, by a storm to the station of
									the Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. 
								 He was unknown to his fellow passengers, 
								 but, fearing what might happen, he told the captain who he was
									and why he fled, 
								 threatening if he did not save his life to say that he had been
									bribed to take him on board. 
								 The only hope was that no one should be allowed to leave the
									ship while they had to remain off Naxos; 
								 if he complied with his request, the obligation should be
									abundantly repaid. 
								 The captain agreed, 
								 and after anchoring in a rough sea for a day and a
									night off the Athenian station, he at length arrived at
									Ephesus.

Themistocles rewarded him with a liberal present; 
								 for he received soon afterwards from his friends the property
									which they had in their keeping at Athens, and which he had
									deposited at Argos. 
								 He then went up the country in the company of one of the
									Persians who dwelt on the coast, and sent a letter to Artaxerxes
									the son of 
									Xerxes, who had just succeeded to the throne.

The letter was in the following words: — 
 I,
											Themistocles, have come to you, I who of all Hellenes did your
										house the greatest injuries so long as I was compelled to
										defend myself against your father; but still greater
										benefits when I was in safety and he in danger during his
										retreat. 
									 And there is a debt of gratitude due to me 
 
								(here he noted how he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the
								resolution of the Hellenes to withdraw , and how
								through his influence, as he pretended, they had refrained from
								breaking down the bridges) . 
 Now
										I am here, able to do you many other services, and
										persecuted by the Hellenes for your sake. 
									 Let me wait a year, and then I will myself explain why I
										have come.

The King is said to have been astonished at the boldness of his
									character, 
								 and told him to wait a year as he proposed. 
								 In the interval he made himself acquainted, as far as he could,
									with the Persian language and the manners of the country.

When the year was over, he arrived at the court and became a
									greater man there than any Hellene had ever been before. This
									was due partly to his previous reputation, and partly to the hope which he inspired in
									the King's mind that he would enslave Hellas to him; above all,
									his ability had been tried and not found wanting.

For Themistocles was a man whose natural force was
									unmistakable; this was the quality for which he was
									distinguished above all other men; 
								 from his own native acuteness, and without any study either
									before or at the time, he was the ablest judge of the course to
									be pursued in a sudden emergency, 
								 and could best divine what was likely to happen in the remotest
									future. 
								 Whatever he had in hand he had the power of explaining to
									others, 
								 and even where he had no experience he was quite competent to
									form a sufficient judgment; 
								 no one could foresee with equal clearness the good or evil
									event which was hidden in the future. 
								 In a word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind and with the
									least preparation, was of all men the best able to extemporise
									the right thing to be done.

A sickness put an end to his life, 
								 although some say that he poisoned himself because he felt that
									he could not accomplish what he had promised to the King.

There is a monument of him in the agora of the Asiatic
									Magnesia, 
								 where he was governor— the King assigning to him, for bread,
									Magnesia, which produced a revenue of fifty talents in the year; for wine,
									Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest in wine
										of any district then known ; and Myus for meat.

His family say that his remains were carried home at his own
									request and buried in Attica, but secretly; 
								 for he had been accused of treason and had fled from his
									country, and he could not lawfully be interred there. 
								 Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, and
									Themistocles the Athenian, the two most famous Hellenes of their
									day.

Thus the demand for the banishment of the accursed made by the
									Lacedaemonians on the occasion of their first embassy was met by a
									counter demand on the part of Athens. 
								 They came again and again, and told the Athenians that they
									must raise the siege of Potidaea and restore Aegina to
										independence. 
								 
								 Above all, and in the plainest terms, they insisted that if they
									wanted to avert war, they must rescind the decree which excluded
									the Megarians from the market of Athens and the harbours in the
									Athenian dominions.

But the Athenians would not listen to them, nor rescind the
									decree; alleging in reply that the Megarians had tilled the holy
									ground and the neutral borderland, and had received their
									runaway slaves.

Finally, there came from Sparta an embassy, consisting of
									Rhamphias, Melesippus, and Hegesander, who said nothing of all
									this, but only, 
 The Lacedaemonians desire to
											maintain peace; 
 and peace there may be, if you
											will restore independence to the
									Hellenes. 
 
 
								 Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and held a
									discussion; 
								 it seemed best to them to make up their minds and to give a
									complete and final answer.

Many came forward to speak, and much was said on both sides,
									some affirming that they ought to go to war, and others that
									this decree about the Megarians should be rescinded and not
									stand in the way of peace. 
								 At last Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was the first man
									of his day at Athens, and the greatest orator and statesman,
									came forward and advised as follows:—

Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must never
										yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are persuaded to go to war
										in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in
										another, and that their resolutions change with the changes
										of fortune. 
									 But I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same
										advice which I gave before, and I call upon those whom my
										words may convince to maintain our united determination,
										even if we should not escape disaster; or else, if our
										sagacity be justified by success, to claim no share of the
											credits. 
										 
 
									 The movement of events is often as wayward and
											incomprehensible as the course of human thought; 
									 and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever belies our
										calculation.

For some time past the designs of the Lacedaemonians have
										been clear enough, and they are still clearer now. 
									 Our agreement says that when differences arise, the two
										parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the mean
										time both are to retain what they have. But for arbitration
										they never ask; and when it is offered by us, they refuse
											it . 
									 They want to redress their grievances by arms and not by
										argument; 
									 and now they come to us, using the language, no longer of
										expostulation, but of command.

They tell us to quit Potidaea, to leave Aegina independent,
										and to rescind the decree respecting the Megarians. 
									 These last ambassadors go further still, and announce that
										we must give the Hellenes independence.

I would have none of you imagine that he will be fighting
										for a small matter if we refuse to annul the Megarian
										decree, of which they make so much, telling us that its
										revocation would prevent the war. 
									 You should have no lingering uneasiness about this; you are
										not really going to war for a trifle.

For in the seeming trifle is involved the trial and
										confirmation of your whole purpose. 
									 If you yield to them in a small matter, they will think
										that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some more
										oppressive condition; 
									 but if you are firm, you will prove to them that they must
										treat you as their equals.

Wherefore make up your minds once for all, either to give
										way while you are still unharmed, or, if we are going to
										war, as in my judgment is best, then on no plea small or
										great to give way at all; we will not condescend to possess
										our own in fear. 
									 Any claim, the smallest as well as the
										greatest, imposed on a neighbour and an equal when
										there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but
											slavery.

That our resources are equal to theirs, and that we shall
										be as strong in the war, I will now prove to you in
										detail.

The Peloponnesians cultivate their own lands, 
									 and they have no wealth either public or private. 
									 Nor have they any experience of long wars in countries
										beyond the sea; their poverty prevents them from fighting,
										except in person against each other, and that for a short
										time only.

Such men cannot be often manning fleets or sending out
										armies. They would be at a distance from their own
										properties, upon which they must nevertheless draw, and they
										will be kept off the sea by us.

Now wars are supported out of accumulated wealth, and not
										out of forced contributions. 
									 And men who cultivate their own lands are more ready to
										serve with their persons than with their property ; they do not despair of their lives, but they soon
										grow anxious lest their money should all be spent,
										especially if the war in which they are engaged is
										protracted beyond their calculation, as may well be the
										case.

In a single pitched battle the Peloponnesians and their
										allies are a match for all Hellas, but they are not able to
										maintain a war against a power different in kind from their
											own ; they have no regular general assembly, and
										therefore cannot execute their plans with speed and
										decision. The confederacy is made up of many races; all the
										representatives have equal votes, and press their several
										interests. 
									 There follows the usual result, that nothing is ever done
										properly.

For some are all anxiety to be revenged on an enemy, while
										others only want to get off with as little loss as
										possible. 
									 The members of such a confederacy are slow to
										meet, and when they do meet, they give little time
										to the consideration of any common interest, and a great
										deal to schemes which further the interest of their
										particular state. 
									 Every one fancies that his own neglect will do no harm, but
										that it is somebody else's business to keep a look-out for
										him, and this idea, cherished alike by each, is the secret
										ruin of all.

Their greatest difficulty will be want of money, which they
										can only provide slowly; 
									 delay will thus occur, and war waits for no man.

Further, no fortified place which they can raise against
											us is to be feared any more than their navy.

As to the first, even in time of peace it would be hard for
										them to build a city able to compete with Athens; and how
										much more so when they are in an enemy's country, and our
										walls will be a menace to them quite as much as theirs to
										us!

Or, again, if they simply raise a fort in our territory,
										they may do mischief to some part of our lands by sallies,
										and the slaves may desert to them; 
									 but that will not prevent us from sailing to the
										Peloponnese and there raising forts against them, and
										defending ourselves there by the help of our navy, which is
										our strong arm.

For we have gained more experience of fighting on land from
										warfare at sea than they of naval affairs from warfare on
										land.

And they will not easily acquire the art of seamanship ;

even you yourselves, who have been practising ever since
										the Persian War, are not yet perfect. 
									 How can they, who are not sailors, but tillers of the soil,
										do much? They will not even be permitted to practise,
										because a large fleet will constantly be lying in wait for
										them.

If they were watched by a few ships only, they might run
										the risk, trusting to their numbers and forgetting their
										inexperience; 
									 but if they are kept off the sea by our superior
										strength, 
									 their want of practice will make them
										unskilful, and their want of skill timid.

Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, 
									 not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times;
										it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind
										for an instant from itself.

Suppose, again, that they lay hands on the treasures at
										Olympia and Delphi, and tempt our mercenary sailors with the
										offer of higher pay , there might be serious danger, if we and our
											metics embarking alone were not still a match for
										them. 
									 But we are a match for them: 
									 and, best of all, our pilots are taken from our own
										citizens, while no sailors are to be found so good or so
										numerous as ours in all the rest of Hellas.

None of our mercenaries will choose to fight on their side
										for the sake of a few days' high pay, when he will not only
										be an exile, but will incur greater danger, and will have
										less hope of victory.

Such I conceive to be the prospects of the
										Peloponnesians. 
									 But we ourselves are free from the defects which I have noted in them; and we
										have great advantages.

If they attack our country by land, we shall attack theirs
										by sea; 
									 and the devastation, even of part of Peloponnesus, will be
										a very different thing from that of all Attica. 
									 For they, if they want fresh territory, must take it by
										arms, whereas we have abundance of land both in the islands
										and on the continent;

such is the power which the empire of the sea gives. 
									 Reflect, 
									 if we were islanders, who would be more invulnerable? 
									 Let us imagine that we are, and acting in that spirit let
										us give up land and houses, but keep a watch over the city
										and the sea. We should not under any irritation at the loss
										of our property give battle to the Peloponnesians, who far
										outnumber us. If we conquer, we shall have
											to fight over again with as many more; 
										 and 
											if we fail, besides the defeat, our confederacy, which
											is our strength, will be lost to us; 
										 for our allies will rise in revolt when we are no
											longer capable of making war upon them. Mourn not
										for houses and lands, but for men; men may gain these, but
										these will not gain men. 
									 If I thought that you would listen to me, I would say to
										you, 
											 Go yourselves and destroy them, and thereby prove
												to the Peloponnesians that none of these things will
												move you.

I have many other reasons for believing that you will
										conquer, but you must not be extending your empire while you are at war, or run into
										unnecessary dangers. 
									 I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies'
										designs.

But of all this I will speak again when the time of action
										comes; for the present, let us send the ambassadors away,
										giving them this answer: 
											 That we will not exclude the Megarians from our
												markets and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians will
												cease to expel foreigners, whether ourselves or our
												allies, from Sparta; for the treaty no more forbids
												the one than the other. 
											 That we will concede independence to the cities, if
												they were independent when we made the treaty, and
												as soon as the Lacedaemonians allow their allied
												states a true independence, not for the interest of
												Lacedaemon, but everywhere for their own. 
											 Also that we are willing to offer arbitration
												according to the treaty. 
											 And that we do not want to begin a war, but intend
												to defend ourselves if attacked. 
										 This answer will be just, and befits the dignity of the
										city.

We must be aware however that war will come; 
									 and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the
										less ready will our enemies be to lay hands upon us. 
									 Remember that where dangers are greatest, there the
										greatest honours are to be won by men and states.

Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian,
										had no such power as we have; what little they had they
										forsook: not by good fortune but by wisdom, and not by power
										but by courage, they drove the Barbarian away and raised us
										to our present height of greatness. 
									 We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies to the
										utmost, that we may hand down our empire unimpaired to
										posterity.

Such were the words of Pericles. 
								 The Athenians, approving, voted as he told them, 
								 and on his motion answered the Lacedaemonians in detail as
									he had suggested, and on the whole question to the effect
										 that they would do nothing upon compulsion, but were
										ready to settle their differences by arbitration upon fair
										terms according to the treaty. 
 
								 So the ambassadors went home and came no more.

These were the causes of offence alleged on either side before
									the war began. 
								 The quarrel arose immediately out of the affair of Epidamnus and
									Corcyra. 
								 But, although the contest was imminent, the contending parties
									still kept up intercourse and visited each other, without a
									herald, but not with entire confidence. 
								 For the situation was really an abrogation of the treaty, and
									might at any time lead to war.

AND now the war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and
									the allies of both actually began. 
								 Henceforward the struggle was uninterrupted, and they
									communicated with one another only by heralds. 
								 The narrative is arranged according to summers and winters and
									follows the order of events.

For fourteen years the thirty years' peace which was concluded
									after the recovery of Euboea remained unbroken. 
								 But in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis the high-priestess of
									Argos was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood, Aenesias
									being Ephor at Sparta, and at Athens Pythodorus having two
									months of his archonship to run , in the sixth month after the engagement at
									Potidaea and at the beginning of spring, about the first watch
									of the night an armed force of somewhat more than three hundred
									Thebans entered Plataea, a city of Boeotia, which was an ally of
									Athens, under the command of two Boeotarchs, Pythangelus the son
									of Phyleides, and Diemporus the son of Onetorides.

They were invited by Naucleides, a Plataean, and his partisans,
									who opened the gates to them. 
								 These men wanted to kill certain citizens of the opposite
									faction and to make over the city to the Thebans, in the hope of
									getting the power into their own hands.

The intrigue had been conducted by Eurymachus the son of
										Leontiades, one of the chief citizens of
									Thebes. 
								 There was an old quarrel between the two cities, and the Thebans,
									seeing that war was inevitable, were anxious to surprise the
									place while the peace lasted and before hostilities had actually
									broken out. 
								 No watch had been set;

and so they were enabled to enter the city unperceived. 
								 They grounded their arms in the Agora, but instead of going to
									work at once and making their way into the houses of their
									enemies, as those who invited them suggested, they resolved to
									issue a conciliatory proclamation and try to make friends with
									the citizens. 
								 The herald announced that if any one wished to become their
									ally and return to the ancient constitution of Boeotia, he
									should join their ranks. 
								 In this way they thought that the inhabitants would easily be
									induced to come over to them.

The Plataeans, when they found that the city had been surprised
									and taken and that the Thebans were within their walls, were
									panic-stricken. 
								 In the darkness they were unable to see them and greatly
									over-estimated their numbers. 
								 So they came to terms, and accepting the proposals which were
									made to them, remained quiet, the more readily since the Thebans
									offered violence to no one.

But in the course of the negotiations they somehow discovered
									that their enemies were not so numerous as they had supposed,
									and concluded that they could easily attack and master
									them.

They determined to make the attempt, for the commons at Plataea
									were strongly attached to the Athenian alliance. 
								 They began to collect inside the houses, breaking through the
									party-walls that they might not be seen going along the streets;
									they likewise raised barricades of waggons (without the beasts
									which drew them), and took other measures suitable to the
									emergency.

When they had done all which could be done under the
									circumstances, they sallied forth from their houses, choosing
									the time of night just before daybreak, lest, if
									they put off the attack until dawn, the enemy might be more
									confident and more a match for them. 
								 While darkness lasted they would be timid, and at a
									disadvantage, not knowing the streets so well as
									themselves. 
								 So they fell upon them at once hand to hand.

When the Thebans found that they had been deceived they closed
									their ranks and resisted their assailants on every side.

Two or three. times they drove them back. 
								 But when at last the Plataeans charged them, and the women and
									slaves on the housetops screamed and yelled and pelted them with
									stones and tiles, the confusion, which was aggravated by the
									rain which had been falling heavily during the night, became too
									much for them, and they turned and fled in terror through the
									city. 
								 Hardly any of them knew the way out, and the streets were dark
									as well as muddy, for the affair happened at the end of the
									month when there was no moon; whereas their pursuers knew well
									enough how to prevent their escape;

and thus many of them perished. 
								 The gates by which they entered were the only ones open, and
									these a Plataean fastened with the spike of a javelin, which he
									thrust into the bar instead of the pin.

So this exit too was closed and they were chased up and down
									the city. 
								 Some of them mounted upon the wall and cast themselves down
									into the open. 
								 Most of these were killed. 
								 Others got out by a deserted gate, cutting through the bar
									unperceived with an axe which a woman gave them; but only a few,
									for they were soon found out.

Others lost themselves in different parts of the city, and were
									put to death. 
								 But the greater number kept together and took refuge in a large
									building abutting upon the wall, of which the doors on the near
									side chanced to be open, they thinking them to be the gates of
									the city, and expecting to find a way through them into the
									country.

The Plataeans, seeing that they were in a trap, began to
									consider whether they should not set the building on fire, and burn them where they were.

At last they and the other Thebans who were still alive, and were
									wandering about the city, agreed to surrender themselves and
									their arms unconditionally.

Thus fared the Thebans in Plataea.

The main body of the Theban army, which should have come during
									the night to the support of the party entering the city in case of a reverse,
									having on their march heard of the disaster, were now hastening
									to the rescue.

Plataea is about eight miles distant from Thebes, and the heavy
									rain which had fallen in the night delayed their arrival; for
									the river Asopus had swollen, and was not easily fordable.

Marching in the rain, and with difficulty crossing the river,
									they came up too late, some of their friends being already slain
									and others captives.

When the Thebans became aware of the state of affairs, they
									resolved to lay hands on what was outside the walls; for there
									were men and property left in the fields, as would naturally
									happen when a sudden blow was struck in time of peace. 
								 They meant to keep any one whom they caught as a hostage and
									exchange him for one of their own men, if any of them were still
									alive.

But before they had executed their plan, the Plataeans,
									suspecting their intentions, and fearing for their friends
									outside, sent a herald to the Thebans protesting against the
									crime of which they had been guilty in trying to seize their
									city during peace, and warning them not to touch anything which
									was outside the walls. 
								 If they persisted they threatened in return to kill the
									prisoners; but if they retired, they would give them up. 
								 This is the Theban account, and they add that the Plataeans
									took an oath.

The Plataeans do not admit that they ever promised to restore
									the captives at once, but only if they could agree after
									negotiations; and they deny that they took an oath.

However this may have been, the Thebans withdrew,
									leaving the Plataean territory unhurt; but the Plataeans had no
									sooner got in their property from the country than they put the
									prisoners to death. 
								 Those who were taken were a hundred and eighty in number, and
									Eurymachus, with whom the betrayers of the city had negotiated,
									was one of them.

When they had killed their prisoners, they sent a messenger to
									Athens and gave back the dead to the Thebans under a flag of truce; they then
									took the necessary measures for the security of the city.

The news had already reached Athens, and the Athenians had
									instantly seized any Boeotians who were in Attica, and sent a
									herald to Plataea bidding them do no violence to the Theban
									prisoners, but wait for instructions from Athens. 
								 The news of their death had not arrived.

For the first messenger had gone out when the Thebans entered,
									and the second when they were just defeated and captured; but of
									what followed the Athenians knew nothing; they sent the message
									in ignorance, and the herald, when he arrived, found the
									prisoners dead. 
								 The Athenians next despatched an army to Plataea, and brought
									in supplies.

Then leaving a small force in the place they conveyed away the
									least serviceable of the citizens, together with the women and
									children.

The affair of Plataea was a glaring violation of the thirty
									years' truce, and the Athenians now made preparations for war. 
								 The Lacedaemonians and their allies made similar
									preparations. 
								 Both they and the Athenians meditated sending embassies to the
										King ,
									and to the other Barbarian potentates from whom either party might hope to
									obtain aid; they likewise sought the alliance of independent
									cities outside their own dominion.

The Lacedaemonians ordered their friends in Italy
									and Sicily to build others in number proportioned to the size of
									their cities, in addition to the ships which they had on the
									spot; for they intended to raise the Peloponnesian navy to a
									total of five hundred. 
								 The cities were also required to furnish a fixed sum of money;
									they were not to receive more than one ship of the Athenians at
									a time, but were to take no further measures until these
									preparations had been completed.

The Athenians reviewed their confederacy, and sent ambassadors
									to the places immediately adjacent to Peloponnesus— Corcyra,
									Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus. 
								 They perceived that if they could only rely upon the friendship
									of these states , they might completely encircle Peloponnesus with war.

On neither side were there any mean thoughts; they were both
									full of enthusiasm: and no wonder, for all men are energetic when they are making a
									beginning. 
								 At that time the youth of Peloponnesus and the youth of Athens
									were numerous;

they had never seen war, and were therefore very willing to
									take up arms.

All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two
									chief cities. 
								 Many were the prophecies circulated and many the oracles
									chanted by diviners, not only in the cities about to engage in
									the struggle, but throughout Hellas.

Quite recently the island of Delos had been shaken by an
									earthquake for the first time within the memory of the
									Hellenes;

this was interpreted and generally believed to be a sign of
									coming events. 
								 And everything of the sort which occurred was curiously noted.

The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the
									Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. 
								 Cities and individuals were eager to assist them to the utmost,
									both by word and deed;

and where a man could not hope to be present,
									there it seemed to him that all things were at a stand. 
								 For the general indignation against the Athenians was intense;
									some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of
									falling under their sway. 
							 
							 
								 Such was the temper which animated the Hellenes, and such were
									the preparations made by the two powers for the war.

Their respective allies were as follows:— The Lacedaemonian
									confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with the exception
									of the Argives and the Achaeans— they were both neutral; only
									the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at
									first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined them .

Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians,
									Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians
									were their allies. 
								 Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians,
									Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy, the
									Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry, the other
									states only infantry. 
								 The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the
									Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra,
									Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their
									tributaries. 
								 There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian
									peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands
									that lie to the east within the line of Peloponnesus and Crete,
									including all the Cyclades with the exception of Melos and
									Thera.

Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished a navy;

the rest, land forces and money. 
								 Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character
									of their respective forces.

Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians sent
									round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding them equip
									troops and provide all things necessary for a foreign
									expedition, with the object of invading
									Attica.

The various states made their preparations as fast as they could, and
									at the appointed time, with contingents numbering two-thirds of
									the forces of each, met at the Isthmus.

When the whole army was assembled, Archidamus, the king of the
									Lacedaemonians, and the leader of the expedition, called
									together the generals of the different states and their chief
									officers and most distinguished men, and spoke as follows:—

'Men of Peloponnesus, and you, allies, many are the expeditions
									which our fathers made both within and without the Peloponnese, and the
									veterans among ourselves are experienced in war; and yet we
									never went forth with a greater army than this. 
								 But then we should remember that, whatever may be our numbers
									or our valour, we are going against a most powerful city.

And we are bound to show ourselves worthy of our fathers, and
									not wanting to our own reputation. 
								 For all Hellas is stirred by our enterprise, and her eyes are
									fixed upon us: she is friendly and would have us succeed because
									she hates the Athenians.

Now although some among you, surveying this great host, may
									think that there is very little risk of the enemy meeting us in
									the field, we ought not on that account to advance heedlessly;
									but the general and the soldier of every state should be always
									expecting that his own division of the army will be the one
									first in danger.

War is carried on in the dark; attacks are generally sudden and
									furious, and often the smaller army, animated by a proper fear,
									has been more than a match for a larger force which, disdaining
									their opponent, were taken unprepared by him.

When invading an enemy's country, men should always be
									confident in spirit, but they should fear too, and take measures
									of precaution; and thus they will be at once most valorous in
									attack and impregnable in defence.

'And the city which we are attacking is not so utterly powerless
									against an invader, but is in the best possible state of
										preparation, and for this reason our enemies may be quite expected to
									meet us in the field. 
								 Even if they have no such intention beforehand, yet as soon as
									they see us in Attica, wasting and destroying their property,
									they will certainly change their mind.

For all men are angry when they not only suffer but see, and
									some strange form of calamity strikes full upon the eye; the
									less they reflect the more ready they are to fight;

above all men the Athenians, who claim imperial power, and are
									more disposed to invade and waste their neighbour's land than to
									look on while their own is being wasted.

Remembering how great this city is which you are attacking, and
									what a fame you will bring on your ancestors and yourselves for
									good or evil according to the result, follow whithersoever you
									are led; maintain discipline and caution above all things, and
									be on the alert to obey the word of command. 
								 It is both the noblest and the safest thing for a great army to
									be visibly animated by one spirit.'

Having thus spoken, Archidamus dismissed the assembly. 
								 His first step was to send Melesippus, the son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens in the hope
									that the Athenians might after all give way, when they saw their
									enemies actually on the march.

But they would not admit him to the assembly, nor even into the
									city. 
								 For Pericles had already carried a motion to the effect that
									they would have nothing to do with herald or embassy while the
									Lacedaemonians were in the field. 
								 So Melesippus was sent away without a hearing and told that he
									must cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedaemonians
									wanted to hold any parley with the Athenians, they must go home
									first. 
								 He was attended by an escort in order to prevent his
										communieating with any one.

When he arrived at the Athenian frontier, and was about to
									leave them, he uttered these words: 'This day will be to the
									Hellenes the beginning of great sorrows.'

On the return of the herald to the camp Archidamus learned that
									the Athenians were not as yet at all in the mood to yield; so at
									last he moved forward his army and prepared to enter
									Attica.

The Boeotians who had sent their contingent of two-thirds,
									including their cavalry, to the Peloponnesian army, marched to
									Plataea with the remainder of their forces and wasted the
									country.

While the Peloponnesians were gathering at the Isthmus, and
									were still on their way, but before they entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who
									was one of the ten Athenian generals, knowing that the invasion
									was inevitable, and suspecting that Archidamus in wasting the
									country might very likely spare his lands, either out of
									courtesy and because he happened to be his friend, or by the
									order of the Lacedaemonian authorities (who had already
									attempted to raise a prejudice against him when they demanded the expulsion of the polluted
									family, and might take this further means of injuring him in the
									eyes of the Athenians), openly declared in the assembly that
									Archidamus was his friend, but was not so to the injury of the
									state, and that supposing the enemy did not destroy his lands
									and buildings like the rest, he would make a present of them to
									the public; and he desired that the Athenians would have no
									suspicion of him on that account.

As to the general situation, he repeated his previous advice;
									they must prepare for war and bring their property from the
									country into the city; they must defend their walls but not go
									out to battle; they should also equip for service the fleet in
									which lay their strength. 
								 Their allies should be kept well in hand, for
									their power depended on the revenues which they derived from them;
									military successes were generally gained by a wise policy and
									command of money. 
								 The state of their finances was encouraging;

they had on an average six hundred talents of tribute coming in annually from
									their allies, to say nothing of their other revenue; and there
									were still remaining in the Acropolis six thousand talents of
									coined silver. 
								 (The whole amount had once been as much as nine thousand seven
									hundred talents ,
									but from this had to be deducted a sum of three thousand seven
									hundred expended on various buildings, such as the Propylaea of
									the Acropolis, and also on the siege of Potidaea.)

Moreover there was uncoined gold and silver in the form of
									private and public offerings, sacred vessels used in processions
									and games, the Persian spoil and other things of the like
									nature, worth at least five hundred talents more.

There were also at their disposal, besides what they had in the
									Acropolis, considerable treasures in various temples. 
								 If they were reduced to the last extremity they could even take
									off the plates of gold with which the image of the goddess was
									overlaid; these, as he pointed out, weighed forty talents, and
									were of refined gold, which was all removeable. 
								 They might use this treasure in self-defence, but they were
									bound to replace all that they had taken.

By this estimate of their wealth he strove to encourage
									them. 
								 He added that they had thirteen thousand hoplites, besides the
									sixteen thousand who occupied the fortresses or who manned the
									walls of the city.

For this was the number engaged on garrison duty at the
									beginning of the war , whenever the enemy invaded Attica; they were made up of
									the elder and younger men, and of such metics as bore heavy arms. 
								 The Phaleric wall extended four miles from Phalerum to the city
									walls: the portion of the city wall which was guarded was
									somewhat less than five miles; that between the Long Wall and
									the Phaleric requiring no guard. 
								 The Long Walls running down to the Piraeus were rather more
									than four and a half miles in length; the outer only was
									guarded. 
								 The whole circuit of the Piraeus and of Munychia was not quite
									seven miles, of which half required a guard.

The Athenian cavalry, so Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve
									hundred, including mounted archers; the foot-archers, sixteen
									hundred;

of triremes fit for service the city had three hundred.— The
									forces of various kinds which Athens possessed at the
									commencement of the war, when the first Peloponnesian invasion
									was impending, cannot be estimated at less.— To these Pericles
									added other arguments, such as he was fond of using, which were
									intended to prove to the Athenians that victory was certain.

The citizens were persuaded, and brought into the city their
									children and wives, their household goods, and even the wood-work of their houses, which
									they took down. 
								 Their flocks and beasts of burden they conveyed to Euboea and
									the adjacent islands.

The removal of the inhabitants was painful; for the Athenians
									had always been accustomed to reside in the country.

Such a life had been characteristic of them, more than of any
									other Hellenic people, from very early times. 
								 In the days of Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign
									of Theseus, Attica was divided into communes, having their own
									town halls and magistrates. 
								 Except in case of alarm the whole people did not assemble in
									council under the king, but administered their own affairs, and
									advised together in their several townships. 
								 Some of them at times even went to war with him,
									as the Eleusinians under Eumolpus with Erectheus.

But when Theseus came to the throne, he, being a powerful as
									well as a wise ruler, among other improvements in the
									administration of the country, dissolved the councils and
									separate governments, and united all the inhabitants of Attica
									in the present city, establishing one council and town
									hall. 
								 They continued to live on their own lands, but he compelled
									them to resort to Athens as their metropolis, and henceforward
										they were all inscribed in the roll of her
									citizens,. 
								 A great city thus arose which was handed down by Theseus to his
									descendants, and from his day to this the Athenians have
									regularly celebrated the national festival of the Synoecia, or
									'union of the communes' in honour of the Goddess Athenè.

Before his time, what is now the Acropolis and the ground lying
									under it to the south was the city.

Many reasons may be urged in proof of this statement:— The
									temples of Athenè and of other divinities are situated in the
									Acropolis itself, and those which are not lie chiefly
									thereabouts; the temples of Olympian Zeus, for example, and of
									the Pythian Apollo, and the temple of Earth and of Dionysus in
									the Marshes, in honour of whom the more ancient Dionysia are
									celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion , a festival which
									also continues to be observed by the Ionian descendants of the
									Athenians.

In the same quarter are other ancient temples, and not far off
									is the fountain now called Enneacrounos, or the Nine Conduits,
									from the form given to it by the tyrants, but originally, before
									the springs were covered in, Callirrhoe, or the Fair
									Stream. 
								 The water of this fountain was used by the ancient Athenians on
									great occasions, it being near the original city; and at
									marriage rites and other ceremonies the custom is still
									retained.

To this day the Acropolis or Citadel is called by
									the Athenians Polis, or City, because that
									neighbourhood was first inhabited.

Thus for a long time the ancient Athenians enjoyed a country
									life in self-governing communities; and although they were now
									united in a single city, they and their descendants, down to the
									time of this war, from old habit generally resided with their
									households in the country where they had been born. 
								 For this reason, and also because they had recently restored
									their country-houses and estates after the Persian War, they had
									a disinclination to move.

They were depressed at the thought of forsaking their homes and
									the temples which had come down to them from their fathers and
									were the abiding memorials of their early constitution. 
								 They were going to change their manner of life, and in leaving
									their villages were in fact each of them going into exile.

When they came to Athens, only a few of them had houses or
									could find homes among friends or kindred. 
								 The majority took up their abode in the vacant spaces of the
									city, and in the temples and shrines of heroes, with the
									exception of those on the Acropolis, the Eleusinium, and any
									other precinct which could be securely closed. 
								 The Pelasgian ground, as it was called, which lay at the foot
									of the citadel, was under a curse forbidding its
									occupation. 
								 There was also a halfline of a Pythian oracle to the same
									effect:— 
								 
									 
										 Better the Pelasgian ground left waste. 
									 
								 
								 Yet even this was filled under the sudden pressure of
									necessity.

And to my mind the oracle came true in a sense exactly contrary
									to the popular expectation; for the unlawful occupation to which
									men were driven was not the cause of the calamities which befell
									the city, but the war was the cause of the occupation; and the
									oracle without mentioning the war foresaw that the place would
									be inhabited some day for no good.

Many also established themselves in the turrets of
									the walls, or in any other place which they could find; for the
									city could not contain them when they first came in.

But afterwards they divided among them the Long Walls and the
									greater part of the Piraeus.

At the same time the Athenians applied themselves vigorously to
									the war, summoning their allies, and preparing an expedition of
									a hundred ships against the Peloponnese.

While they were thus engaged, the Peloponnesian army was
									advancing: it arrived first of all at Oenoè, a fortress on the confines of Attica and Boeotia,
									which was garrisoned by the Athenians whenever war broke out,
									and was the point at which the Peloponnesians intended to enter
									the enemy's country.

There they encamped and prepared to assault the walls by means
									of engines and siege works. 
								 But these and other measures took up time and detained them in
									the neighbourhood.

Archidamus was severely blamed for the delay; he was also
									thought not to have been energetic enough in levying war, and to
									have done the Athenians good service by discouraging vigorous
									action. 
								 After the muster of the forces he had been accused of delay at
									the isthmus, and of loitering on the march. 
								 But his reputation was most affected by his halt at
									Oenoè. 
								 For the Athenians employed the interval in getting away their
									property;

and the Peloponnesians fancied that, if they had advanced
									quickly and he had not lingered, they could have seized
									everything before it was conveyed within the walls.

Such were the feelings entertained towards Archidamus by his
									troops during the halt. 
								 He is said to have held back in the belief that the Athenians,
									while their lands were still unravaged , would yield, and that the thought of allowing them to
									be devastated would be too much for them.

But when they had assaulted Oenoè, and after leaving no means
									untried were unable to take it, and no herald came
									from the Athenians, at last they marched on, and about the
									eightieth day after the entry of the Thebans into Plataea, in
									the middle of the summer , when the corn was in full ear, invaded Attica, under the
									command of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus the Lacedaemonian
									king.

They encamped and ravaged, first of all, Eleusis and the plain
									of Thria, where they put to flight some Athenian horse near the
									streams called Rheiti; they then advanced, keeping Mount
									Aegaleos on the right hand, through the district of Kropeia
									until they reached Acharnae, which is the largest of the
									Athenian townships or demes, as they are called; and at Acharnae
									they encamped, and remained there a considerable time ravaging
									the country.

In this first invasion Archidamus is said to have lingered
									about Acharnae with his army ready for battle, instead of descending into the plain

in the hope that the Athenians, who were now flourishing in
									youth and numbers and provided for war as they had never been
									before, would perhaps meet them in the field rather than allow
									their lands to be ravaged.

When therefore they did not appear at Eleusis or in the plain
									of Thria, he tried once more whether by encamping in the
									neighbourhood of Acharnae he could induce them to come
									out.

The situation appeared to be convenient, and the Acharnians,
									being a considerable section of the city and furnishing three
									thousand hoplites, were likely to be impatient at the
									destruction of their property, and would communicate to the
									whole people a desire to fight. 
								 Or if the Athenians did not come out to meet him during this
									invasion, he could henceforward ravage the plain with more
									confidence, and march right up to the walls of the city. 
								 The Acharnians, having lost their own possessions, would be
									less willing to hazard their lives on behalf of their
										neighoours, and so there would be a division in
									the Athenian counsels.

Such was the motive of Archidamus in remaining at Acharnae.

The Athenians, so long as the Lacedaemonians were in the
									neighbourhood of Eleusis and the plain of Thria, entertained a hope that they would come
									no further. 
								 They remembered how, fourteen years before , the Lacedaemonian king, Pleistoanax the son of
									Pausanias, invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army, and how
									after advancing as far as Eleusis and Thria he came no further,
									but retreated. 
								 And indeed this retreat was the cause of his exile; for he was
									thought to have been bribed.

But when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of Acharnae,
									and barely seven miles from the city, they felt the presence of
									the invader to be intolerable. 
								 The devastation of their country before their eyes, which the
									younger men had never seen at all, nor the elder except in the
									Persian invasion, naturally appeared to them a horrible thing,
									and the whole people, the young men especially, were anxious to
									go forth and put a stop to it.

Knots were formed in the streets, and there were loud disputes,
									some eager to go out, a minority resisting. 
								 Soothsayers were repeating oracles of the most different kinds,
									which all found in some one or other enthusiastic
									listeners. 
								 The Acharnians, who in their own estimation were no small part
									of the Athenian state, seeing their land ravaged, strongly
									insisted that they should go out and fight. 
								 The excitement in the city was universal; the people were
									furious with Pericles, and, forgetting all his previous
									warnings, they abused him for not leading them to battle, as
									their general should, and laid all their miseries to his charge.

But he, seeing that they were overcome by the irritation of the
									moment and inclined to evil counsels, and confident that he was
									right in refusing to go out, would not summon an
									assembly or meeting of any kind, lest, coming together more in
									anger than in prudence, they might take some false step. 
								 He maintained a strict watch over the city, and sought to calm
									the irritation as far as he could.

Meanwhile he sent out horsemen from time to time to prevent
									flying parties finding their way into the fields near the city
									and doing mischief. 
								 A skirmish took place at Phrygia between one of the divisions
									of the Athenian horse assisted by their Thessalian allies on the one hand, and
									the Boeotian cavalry on the other, in which the Athenians and
									Thessalians were at least a match for their opponents, until,
									the Boeotian infantry coming up to support the horse, they were
									compelled to fly. 
								 The Athenians and Thessalians lost a few men, but recovered
									their bodies on the same day without asking for a truce.

On the morrow the Peloponnesians raised a trophy. 
								 The forces which the Thessalians brought to the aid of the
									Athenians, according to the terms of their old alliance , consisted of Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians,
									Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. 
								 The leaders of the Larissaeans were Polymedes and Aristonous,
									one from each of the two leading factions of their city; the
									Pharsalians were commanded by Meno. 
								 The forces of the other cities had likewise generals of their
									own.

When the Peloponnesians found that the Athenians did not come
									out to meet them, they moved their army from Acharnae, and ravaged some of the
									townships which lie between Mount Parnes and Mount
									Brilessus.

While they were still in the country, the Athenians sent the
									fleet of a hundred ships which they had been equipping on an
									expedition round the Peloponnese. 
								 These ships carried on board a thousand hoplites and four
									hundred archers; they were under the command of
									Carcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteas the son of Epicles, and
									Socrates the son of Antigenes.

After the departure of the fleet the Peloponnesians remained in
									Attica as long as their provisions lasted, and then, taking a
									new route, retired through Boeotia. 
								 In passing by Oropus they wasted the country called
										Peiraïkè ,
									inhabited by the Oropians, who are subjects of the
									Athenians. 
								 On their return to Peloponnesus the troops dispersed to their
									several cities.

When they had retreated, the Athenians posted guards to keep
									watch both by land and sea, a precaution which they maintained throughout the
									war. 
								 They then passed a decree reserving of the treasure in the
									Acropolis a thousand talents : this sum was set apart and was not to be
									expended unless the enemy attacked the city with a fleet and
									they had to defend it. 
								 In any other case, he who brought forward or put to the vote a
									proposal to touch the money was to be punished with death.

They also resolved to set apart yearly a hundred triremes, the
									finest of the year, and to appoint trierarchs for them; these
									they were only to use at the same time with the money, and in
									the same emergency.

The Athenian forces, which had lately been dispatched to
									Peloponnesus in the hundred vessels, and were assisted by the Corcyraeans with fifty ships
									and by some of the allies from the same region, did considerable
									damage on the Peloponnesian coast. 
								 They also disembarked and attacked Methone, a fortress in
									Laconia, which was weak and had no regular garrison.

Now Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in
									those parts in command of a force, and, seeing the danger, he
									came to the aid of the inhabitants with a hundred
									hoplites. 
								 He dashed through the scattered parties of Athenian troops,
									whose attention was occupied with the fortress, and threw
									himself into Methonè, suffering a slight loss; he thus saved the
									place. 
								 The exploit was publicly acknowledged at Sparta, Brasidas being
									the first Spartan who obtained this distinction in the
									war.

The Athenians, proceeding on their voyage, ravaged the
									territory of Pheia in Elis for two days, and defeated three
									hundred chosen men from the vale of Elis, as well as some Elean
									perioeci from the neighbourhood of Pheia who came to the
									rescue.

But a violent storm arose, and there was no harbour in which
									the fleet could find shelter; so the greater part of the army
									re-embarked and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys
									towards the harbour of Pheia. 
								 Meanwhile the Messenians and others who were unable to get on
									board marched by land and captured Pheia.

The fleet soon sailed into the harbour and took them up; they
									then evacuated Pheia and put to sea. 
								 By this time the main army of the Eleans had arrived; whereupon
									the Athenians proceeded on their way to other places, which they
									ravaged.

About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise
									off Locris, having an eye also to the safety of Euboea.

Cleopompus the son of Cleinias was their commander. lie made
									descents on the Locrian coast and ravaged various places. 
								 He also captured Thronium, taking hostages of the inhabitants,
									and at Alopè defeated the Locrians who came to defend the place.

In the same summer the Athenians expelled the Aeginetans and
									their families from Aegina, alleging that they had been the main cause of
									the war. 
								 The island lies close to Peloponnesus, and they thought it
									safer to send thither settlers of their own, an intention which
									they shortly afterwards carried out.

The Lacedaemonians gave the Aeginetan exiles the 
									town of Thyrea to occupy and the adjoining country to cultivate,
									partly in order to annoy the Athenians, partly out of gratitude
									to the Aeginetans, who had done them good service at the time of
									the earthquake and the revolt. of the Helots. 
								 The Thyrean territory is a strip of land coming down to the sea
									on the borders of Argolis and Laconia. 
								 There some of them found a home; others dispersed over Hellas.

During the same summer, at the beginning of the lunar month
									(apparently the only time when such an event is possible), and in the afternoon, there
									was an eclipse of the sun, which took the form of a crescent,
									and then became full again; during the eclipse a few stars were
									visible.

In the same summer, Nymphodorus the son of Pythes, a native of
									Abdera and a man of great influence with Sitalces who had married his sister, was
									made by the Athenians their proxenus at that place and invited
									by them to Athens.

He had formerly been considered their enemy, but now they hoped
									that he would gain over to their alliance Sitalces, who was the
									son of Teres and king of Thrace. 
							 
							 
								 This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first founder of
									the great Odrysian empire, which he extended over a large part of Thrace, although many of
									the Thracian tribes are still independent.

He has no connexion with Tereus who took to wife from Athens
									Procnè, the daughter of Pandion; they do not even belong to the
									same Thrace. 
								 For Tereus dwelt in Daulia, a part of the region which is now
									called Phocis but in those days was inhabited by Thracians, and
									in that country Itys suffered at the hands of the women Procnè
									and Philomela. 
								 Many of the poets when they make mention of the nightingale
									(Philomela) apply to the bird the epithet Daulian. 
								 Further, Pandion would surely have formed a
									marriage connexion for his daughter among his neighbours with a
									view to mutual protection, and not at a distance of so many
									days' journey, among the Odrysian Thracians.

And the Teres of whom I am speaking, and who was the first
									powerful king of the Odrysae, has not even the same name . 
							 
							 
								 Now Sitalces, whom the Athenians made their ally, was the son
									of this Teres;

they wanted him to assist them in the conquest of Chalcidicè and of
									Perdiccas. 
								 So Nymphodorus came to Athens, negotiated the alliance with
									Sitalces, and got his son Sadocus enrolled an Athenian
									citizen. 
								 He also undertook to terminate the war in Chalcidicè, promising
									that he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians an army of
									Thracian horsemen and targeteers.

He further reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians, and
									persuaded them to restore Thermè to him Whereupon Perdiccas joined the Athenian army under
										Phormio , and with him fought against the Chalcidians.

Thus Sitalces the son of Teres king of Thrace, and Perdiccas
									son of Alexander king of Macedonia, entered into the Athenian
									alliance.

The Athenians, in the hundred ships which were still cruising
									about Peloponnesus, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, which they
									handed over to the Palaereans of Acarnania, giving to them alone
									of the Acarnanians the right of occupying the city and
									country. 
								 They also stormed the town of Astacus, and driving out Evarchus
									who was tyrant there, added it to the Athenian
									confederacy.

They next sailed to the island of Cephallenia, which they
									gained over without fighting. 
								 The island lies over against Acarnania and Leucas, and contains
									four cities inhabited by the Paleans, Cranians,
									Samaeans, and Pronnaeans. 
								 Soon afterwards the fleet proceeded on its voyage homewards.

About the end of the summer the entire Athenian force,
									including the metics, invaded the territory of Megara, under the command of Pericles the
									son of Xanthippus. 
								 The Athenian fleet had reached Aegina on its way home, and when
									the commanders heard that the whole armed force of the city was
									in Megara, they sailed thither and joined them. 
								 This was the largest army which the Athenians ever had in one
									place;

for the city was still in her full strength, and had not as yet
									suffered from the plague. 
								 The Athenians themselves numbered not less than ten thousand
									hoplites, exclusive of the remaining three thousand who were
									engaged at Potidaea. 
								 A force of metic hoplites amounting to at least three thousand
									took part in the invasion, and also a large number of
									light-armed troops.

After ravaging the greater part of the country they
									retired. 
								 They repeated the invasion, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes
									with the whole Athenian army, every year during the war until
									Nisaea was taken .

At the end of this summer the island of Atalante, which lies
									off the coast of the Opuntian Locrians and had hitherto been uninhabited, was
									fortified and made a guard-station by the Athenians. 
								 They wanted to prevent pirates sailing from Opus and other
									places in Locris and plundering Euboea. 
								 Such were the events which occurred during the remainder of the
									summer after the Peloponnesians had retired from Attica.

During the following winter, Evarchus the Acarnanian, desiring
									to be restored to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty
									ships and fifteen hundred hoplites and reinstate him, he himself hiring some mercenaries. 
								 Of this expedition Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus
									the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis, were the
									commanders.

They sailed to Astacus, and restored Evarchus; they then tried
									to gain over certain other towns on the coast of Acarnania; but,
									failing in their attempt, they proceeded homewards.

Touching at Cephallenia on their voyage, they made a descent on
									the country of the Cranians, but being entrapped by means of a
									pretended agreement, and then unexpectedly attacked, they lost a
									part of their forces; at length, not without a severe struggle,
									they put to sea again and returned home.

During the same winter, in accordance with an old national
									custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the
									Athenians at the public charge. The ceremony is as
									follows:

Three days before the celebration they erect a tent in which
									the bones of the dead are laid out, 
								 and every one brings to his own dead any offering which he
									pleases.

At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of
									cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest
									for each tribe. 
								 They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for
									all whose bodies are missing, and cannot be recovered after the
									battle.

The procession is accompanied by any one who chooses, whether
									citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased
									are present at the place of interment and make
									lamentation.

The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful spot
									outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war;
									only after the battle of Marathon 
								 the dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were
									interred on the field.

When the remains have been laid in the earth, some man of known
									ability and high reputation, chosen by the city, delivers a
									suitable oration over them; after which the people depart.

Such is the manner of interment; and the ceremony
									was repeated from time to time throughout the war.

Over those who were the first buried Pericles was chosen to
									speak. 
								 At the fitting moment he advanced from the sepulchre to a lofty
									stage, which had been erected in order that he might be heard as
									far as possible by the multitude, and spoke as follows:—

'Most of those who have spoken here before me have commended
									the lawgiver who added this oration to our other funeral customs; it
									seemed to them a worthy thing that such an honour should be
									given at their burial to the dead who have fallen on the field
									of battle. 
								 But I should have preferred that, when men's deeds have been
									brave, they should be honoured in deed only, and with such an
									honour as this public funeral, which you are now witnessing.
									Then the reputation of many would not have been imperilled on
									the eloquence or want of eloquence of one, and their virtues
									believed or not as he spoke well or ill.

For it is difficult to say neither too little nor too much; and
									even moderation is apt not to give the impression of
									truthfulness. 
								 The friend of the dead who knows the facts is likely to think
									that the words of the speaker fall short of his knowledge and of
									his wishes; another who is not so well informed, when he hears
									of anything which surpasses his own powers, will be envious and
									will suspect exaggeration. 
								 Mankind are tolerant of the praises of others so long as each
									hearer thinks that he can do as well or nearly as well
									himself, 
								 but, when the speaker rises above him, jealousy is aroused and
									he begins to be incredulous.

However, since our ancestors have set the seal of their
									approval upon the practice, I must obey, and to the utmost of my
									power shall endeavour to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of all
									who hear me.

'I will speak first of our ancestors, 
								 for it is right and seemly that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their
									memory. 
								 There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this
									land, which by their valour they have handed down from
									generation to generation, and we have received from them a free
									state.

But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our
									fathers, 
								 who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle
									transmitted to us their sons this great empire.

And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of
									us in the vigour of life, have carried the work of improvement
									further, 
								 and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she
									is sufficient for herself both in peace and war.

Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were
									acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove
									back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak;
									for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. 
								 But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by
									what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what
									manner of life our empire became great, For I conceive that such
									thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this
									numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may profitably
									listen to them.

'Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the
									institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but are an example to
									them. 
								 It is true that we are called a democracy, for the
									administration is in the hands of the many and not of the
									few. 
								 But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their
									private disputes, 
								 the claim of excellence is also recognized; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is
									preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege,
									but as the reward of merit. 
								 Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country
									whatever be the obscurity of his condition.

There is no exclusiveness in our public life, 
								 and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one
									another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes;
									we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are
									not pleasant.

While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a
									spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented
									from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the
									laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for
									the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws
									which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the
									general sentiment.

'And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits
									many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year;
									our homes are beautiful and elegant; and the delight which we
									daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy.

Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole
									earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other
									countries as freely as of our own.

'Then, again, our military training is in many respects
									superior to that of our adversaries. 
								 
								 Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a
									foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of
									which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We
									rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts
									and hands. 
								 And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth
									are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them
									brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready
									to face 
									the perils which they face .

And here is the proof. 
								 The Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, but with
									their whole confederacy following; we go alone into a
									neighbour's country; and although our opponents are fighting for
									their homes and we on a foreign soil, we have seldom any
									difficulty in overcoming them.

Our enemies have never yet felt our united strength; the care
									of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged to
									send our own citizens everywhere. 
								 But they, if they meet and defeat a part of our army, are as
									proud as if they had routed us all, and when defeated they
									pretend to have been vanquished by us all.

'If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but
									without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by
									law, are we not greatly the gainers? Since we do not anticipate
									the pain, although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as
									those who never allow themselves to rest; and thus too our city
									is equally admirable in peace and in war.

For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes,
									and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. 
								 Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there
									is a real use for it. 
								 To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in
									doing nothing to avoid it.

An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes
									care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged
									in business have a very fair idea of politics. 
								 We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs,
									not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us
									are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great
									impediment to action is, in our opinion, not
									discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by
									discussion preparatory to action.

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of
									acting too, 
								 whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate
									upon reflection. 
								 And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who,
									having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures of
									life, do not on that account shrink from danger.

In doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our friends
									by conferring, not by receiving favours. 
								 Now he who confers a favour is the firmer friend, because he
									would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an obligation;
									but the recipient is colder in his feelings, because he knows
									that in requiting another's generosity he will not be winning
									gratitude but only paying a debt.

We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calculation of
									interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and
									fearless spirit.

To sum up: I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems
									to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms
									of action with the utmost versatility and grace.

This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact; and the
									assertion is verified by the position to which these qualities
									have raised the state.

For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries
									is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her
									is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of
									such a city; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy
									of him.

And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses; there are
									mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of
									this and of succeeding ages; we shall not need the praises of
									Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the
										moment , although his
									representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For
									we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for
									our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our
									friendship and of our enmity.

Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and
									died; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken
									from them; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on
									her behalf.

'I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I want to
									show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these
									privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of
									these men whom I am now commemorating.

Their loftiest praise has been already spoken. 
								 For in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like
									them whose virtues made her glorious. 
								 And of how few Hellenes can it be said as of them, that their
									deeds when weighed in the balance have been found equal to their
									fame! 
								 Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true
									measure of a man's worth; it may be the first revelation of his
									virtues, but is at any rate their final seal.

For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead
									the valour with which they have fought for their country; they
									have blotted out the evil with the good, and have benefited the
									state more by their public services than they have injured her
									by their private actions.

None of these men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to
									resign the pleasures of life; none of them put off the evil day
									in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may
									one day become rich. 
								 But, deeming that the punishment of their enemies was sweeter
									than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler
									cause, they determined at the hazard of their lives to be
									honourably avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope
									their unknown chance of happiness; but in the face of death they
									resolved to rely upon themselves alone. 
								 And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer,
									rather than to fly and save their lives; they ran away from the
									word of dishonour, but on the battle-field their feet stood
									fast, and in an
									instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from
									the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory .

'Such was the end of these men; they were worthy of
									Athens, 
								 and the living need not desire to have a more heroic spirit, although they may pray for
									a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be
									expressed in words. Any one can discourse to you for ever about
									the advantages of a brave defence, which you know already. But
									instead of listening to him I would have you day by day fix your
									eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with
									the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of
									her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who
									knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of
									conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and
									who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their
									virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives
									to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her
									feast.

The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually
									repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a
									praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchers— I
									speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that
									in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on
										every fitting occasion both in word and
									deed.

For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men; not only
									are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own
									country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten
									memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of
									men.

Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom
									and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils
									of war.

The unfortunate who has no hope of a change for the better has
									less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if
									he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to
									whom any accidental fall makes the most serious
									difference.

To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are
									far more bitter than death striking him unperceived at a time
									when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope.

'Wherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of the dead who
									stand here; I would rather comfort them. 
								 You know that your life has been passed amid manifold
									vicissitudes; and that they may be deemed fortunate who have
									gained most honour, whether an honourable death like theirs, or
									an honourable sorrow like yours, and whose days have been so
									ordered that the term of their happiness is likewise the term of
									their life.

I know how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good
									fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness
									which once lightened your hearts. 
								 And sorrow is felt at the want of those blessings, not which a
									man never knew, but which were a part of his life before they
									were taken from him.

Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other
									children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only
									will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget
									their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a
									gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be
									safer. 
								 For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he
									alone has no children to risk in the general danger.

To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: 
										 Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during
											the greater part of your days; remember that your life
											of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the
											glory of those who are gone. 
										 For the love of honour alone is ever young, 
										 and not riches, as some say, but honour is the delight
											of men when they are old and useless.

'To you who are the sons and brothers of the departed, I see
									that the struggle to emulate them will be an arduous one. 
								 For all men praise the dead, and, however preeminent your
									virtue may be, hardly will you be thought, I do not say to
									equal, but even to approach them. 
								 The living have their rivals and detractors, but when a man is
									out of the way, the honour and good-will which he receives is
									unalloyed.

And, if I am to speak of womanly virtues to those of you who
									will henceforth be widows, let me sum them up in one short
									admonition: 
								 To a woman not to show more weakness than is natural to her sex
									is a great glory, and not to be talked about for good or for
									evil among men.

'I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the law,
									making use of such fitting words as I had. 
								 The tribute of deeds has been paid in part; for the dead have
									been honourably interred, and it remains only that their
									children should be maintained at the public charge until they
									are grown up: this is the solid prize with which, as with a
									garland, Athens crowns her sons living and dead, after a
									struggle like theirs. 
								 For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there the noblest
										citizens are enlisted in the service of the
									state.

And now, when you have duly lamented, every one his own dead,
									you may depart.'

Such was the order of the funeral celebrated in this winter,
									with the end of which ended the first year of the Peloponnesian
									War.

As soon as summer returned, the Peloponnesian army, comprising as before two-thirds
									of the force of each confederate state, under the command of the
									Lacedaemonian king Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, invaded
									Attica, where they established themselves and ravaged the
									country.

They had not been there many days when the plague broke out at
									Athens for the first time. 
								 A similar disorder is said to have previously smitten many
									places, particularly Lemnos, but there is no record of such a
									pestilence occurring elsewhere, or of so great a destruction of
									human life. 
								 For a while physicians, in ignorance of the nature of the
									disease, sought to apply remedies;

but it was in vain, and they themselves were among the first
									victims, because they oftenest came into contact with it. 
								 No human art was of any avail, and as to supplications in
									temples, enquiries of oracles, and the like, they were utterly
									useless, and at last men were overpowered by the calamity and
									gave them all up.

The disease is said to have begun south of Egypt in Aethiopia;
									thence it descended into Egypt and Libya, and after spreading over the greater
									part of the Persian empire, suddenly fell upon Athens.

It first attacked the inhabitants of the Piraeus, and it was
									supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns, no
									conduits having as yet been made there. 
								 It afterwards reached the upper city, and then the mortality
									became far greater.

As to its probable origin or the causes which might or could
									have produced such a disturbance of nature, every man, whether a
									physician or not, will give his own opinion. 
								 But I shall describe its actual course, and the
									symptoms by which any one who knows them beforehand may
									recognize the disorder should it ever reappear. 
								 For I was myself attacked, and witnessed the sufferings of
									others.

The season was admitted to have been remarkably free from
									ordinary sickness; and if anybody was already ill of any other disease, it was absorbed in
									this.

Many who were in perfect health, all in a moment, and without
									any apparent reason, were seized with violent heats in the head
									and with redness and inflammation of the eyes. 
								 Internally the throat and the tongue were quickly suffused with
									blood, and the breath became unnatural and fetid. 
								 There followed sneezing and hoarseness;

in a short time the disorder, accompanied by a violent cough,
									reached the chest; then fastening lower down, it would move the
									stomach and bring on all the vomits of bile to which physicians
									have ever given names; and they were very distressing. 
								 An ineffectual retching producing violent convulsions attacked
									most of the sufferers; some as soon as the previous symptoms
									had abated, others not until long afterwards.

The body externally was not so very hot to the touch, nor yet
									pale;

it was of a livid colour inclining to red, and breaking out in
									pustules and ulcers. 
								 But the internal fever was intense; the sufferers could not
									bear to have on them even the finest linen garment; they
									insisted on being naked, and there was nothing which they longed
									for more eagerly than to throw themselves into cold water. 
								 And many of those who had no one to look after them actually
									plunged into the cisterns, for they were tormented by unceasing
									thirst, which was not in the least assuaged whether they drank
									little or much. 
								 They could not sleep;

a restlessness which was intolerable never left them. 
								 While the disease was at its height the body, instead of
									wasting away, held out amid these sufferings in a
									marvellous manner, and either they died on the seventh or ninth
									day, not of weakness, for their strength was not exhausted, but
									of internal fever, which was the end of most; or, if they
									survived, then the disease descended into the bowels and there
									produced violent ulceration; severe diarrhoea at the same time
									set in, and at a later stage caused exhaustion, which finally
									with few exceptions carried them off.

For the disorder which had originally settled in the head
									passed gradually through the whole body, and, if a person got
									over the worst, would often seize the extremities and leave its
									mark, attacking the privy parts and the fingers and the
									toes;

and some escaped with the loss of these, some with the loss of
									their eyes. 
								 Some again had no sooner recovered than they were seized with a
									forgetfulness of all things and knew neither themselves nor
									their friends.

The general character of the malady no words can describe, and
									the fury with which it fastened upon each sufferer was too much for human
									nature to endure. 
								 There was one circumstance in particular which distinguished it
									from ordinary diseases. 
								 The birds and animals which feed on human flesh, although so
									many bodies were lying unburied, either never came near them, or
									died if they touched them.

This was proved by a remarkable disappearance of the birds of
									prey, which were not to be seen either about the bodies or
									anywhere else; while in the case of the dogs the result was even
									more obvious, because they live with man.

Such was the general nature of the disease: I omit many strange
									peculiarities which characterised individual cases. 
								 None of the ordinary sicknesses attacked any one while it
									lasted, or, if they did, they ended in the plague. 
								 Some of the sufferers died from want of care, others equally
									who were receiving the greatest attention.

No single remedy could be deemed a specific; for
									that which did good to one did harm to another. 
								 No constitution was of itself strong enough to resist or weak
									enough to escape the attacks;

the disease carried off all alike and defied every mode of
									treatment. 
								 Most appalling was the despondency which seized upon any one
									who felt himself sickening;

for he instantly abandoned his mind to despair and, instead of
									holding out, absolutely threw away his chance of life. 
								 Appalling too was the rapidity with which men caught the infection; dying like sheep if they
									attended on one another; and this was the principal cause of
									mortality. 
								 When they were afraid to visit one another, the sufferers died
									in their solitude, so that many houses were empty because there
									had been no one left to take care of the sick;

or if they ventured they perished, especially those who aspired
									to heroism. 
								 For they went to see their friends without thought of
									themselves and were ashamed to leave them, at a time when the
									very relations of the dying were at last growing weary and
									ceased even to make lamentations, overwhelmed by the vastness of
									the calamity.

But whatever instances there may have been of such devotion,
									more often the sick and the dying were tended by the pitying
									care of those who had recovered, because they knew the course of
									the disease and were themselves free from apprehension. 
								 For no one was ever attacked a second time, or not with a fatal
									result. 
								 All men congratulated them, and they themselves, in the excess
									of their joy at the moment, had an innocent fancy that they
									could not die of any other sickness.

The crowding of the people out of the country into the city
									aggravated the misery; and the newly-arrived suffered most.

For, having no houses of their own, but inhabiting in the
									height of summer stifling huts, the mortality among them was
									dreadful, and they perished in wild disorder. The
									dead lay as they had died, one upon another, while others hardly
									alive wallowed in the streets and crawled about every
									fountain craving for water. 
								 The temples in which they lodged were full of the corpses of
									those who died in them;

for the violence of the calamity was such that men, not knowing
									where to turn, grew reckless of all law, human and divine. 
								 The customs which had hitherto been observed at funerals
									were universally violated, and they buried their dead each one
									as best he could.

Many, having no proper appliances, because the deaths in their
									household had been so numerous already, lost all shame in the
									burial of the dead . 
								 When one man had raised a funeral pile, others would come, and
									throwing on their dead first, set fire to it; or when some other
									corpse was already burning, before they could be stopped, would
									throw their own dead upon it and depart.

There were other and worse forms of lawlessness which the
									plague introduced at Athens. Men who had hitherto concealed what they took pleasure
									in, now grew bolder. 
								 For, seeing the sudden change,— how the rich died in a moment,
									and those who had nothing immediately inherited their property,—
									they reflected that life and riches were alike transitory,

and they resolved to enjoy themselves while they could, and to
									think only of pleasure.

Who would be willing to sacrifice himself to the law of honour
									when he knew not whether he would ever live to be held in
									honour? 
								 The pleasure of the moment and any sort of thing which conduced
									to it took the place both of honour and of expediency.

No fear of Gods or law of man deterred a criminal. 
								 Those who saw all perishing alike, thought that the worship or
									neglect of the Gods made no difference. 
								 For offences against human law no punishment was to be feared;
									no one would live long enough to be called to account. 
								 Already a far heavier sentence had been passed and was hanging
									over a man's head; before that fell, why should he not take a
									little pleasure?

Such was the grievous calamity which now afflicted the
									Athenians; within the walls their people were dying, and
									without, their country was being ravaged.

In their troubles they naturally called to mind a verse which
									the elder men among them declared to have been current long
									ago:— 
								 
									 
										 A Dorian war will come and a plague with it.

There was a dispute about the precise expression some saying
									that limos, a famine, and not 
									 loimos, a plague, was the original
									word. 
								 Nevertheless, as might have been expected, for men's memories
									reflected their sufferings, the argument in favour of loimos prevailed at the time. 
								 But if ever in future years another Dorian war arises which
									happens to be accompanied by a famine, they will probably repeat
									the verse in the other form.

The answer of the oracle to the Lacedaemonians when the God was
									asked 'whether they should go to war or not,' and he replied
									'that if they fought with all their might, they would conquer,
									and that he himself would take their part ,' was not forgotten by those who had heard of it, and
									they quite imagined that they were witnessing the fulfilment of
									his words.

The disease certainly did set in immediately after the invasion
									of the Peloponnesians, and did not spread into Peloponnesus in
									any degree worth speaking of, while Athens felt its ravages most
									severely, and next to Athens the places which were most
									populous. 
								 Such was the history of the plague .

After the Peloponnesians had wasted the plain they entered what
									are called the coast lands ( Paralus ) and penetrated as far as
									Laurium, where are the silver mines belonging to the
									Athenians. 
								 First they ravaged that part of the coast which looks towards
									Peloponnesus, and afterwards that situated towards Euboea and
									Andros.

But Pericles, who was still general, continued to insist, as in
									the former invasion, that the Athenians should remain within
									their walls.

Before, however, the Peloponnesians had left the plain and
									moved forward into the coast lands he had begun to equip an
									expedition of a hundred ships against Peloponnesus.

When all was ready he put to sea, having on board four thousand
									Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry conveyed in horse
									transports which the Athenians then constructed for the first
									time out of their old ships.

The Chians and Lesbians joined them with fifty vessels.

The expedition did not actually put to sea until the
									Peloponnesians had reached the coast lands. 
								 Arriving at Epidaurus in Peloponnesus the Athenians devastated
									most of the country and attacked the city, which at one time
									they were in hopes of taking, but did not quite succeed.

Setting sail again they ravaged the territory of Troezen,
									Halieis, and Hermionè, which are all places on the coast of
									Peloponnesus.

Again putting off they came to Prasiae, a small town on the
									coast of Laconia, ravaged the country, and took and plundered
									the place. 
								 They then returned home and found that the Peloponnesians had
									also returned and were no longer in Attica.

All the time during which the Peloponnesians remained in the
									country and the armament of the Athenians continued at sea the plague was raging both
									among the troops and in the city. 
								 The fear which it inspired was said to have induced the enemy
									to leave Attica sooner than they intended; for they heard from
									deserters that the disease was in the city, and
									likewise saw the burning of the dead.

Still in this invasion the whole country was ravaged by them,
									and they remained about forty days, which was the longest stay
									they ever made.

In the same summer, Hagnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus
									the son of Cleinias, who were colleagues of Pericles in his military command,
									took the fleet which he had employed and sailed forthwith
									against the Thracian Chalcidians and against Potidaea, which
									still held out. 
								 On their arrival they brought engines up to the walls, and
									tried every means of taking the town.

But they did not succeed; nor did the result by any means
									correspond to the magnitude of their armament; for thither too
									the plague came and made dreadful havoc among the Athenian
									troops. 
								 Even the soldiers who were previously there and had been in
									good health caught the infection from the forces under
									Hagnon. 
								 But the army of Phormio escaped;

for he and his sixteen hundred troops had left
									Chalcidicè. 
								 And so Hagnon returned with his fleet to Athens, having lost by
									the plague out of four thousand hoplites a thousand and fifty
									men in about forty days. 
								 But the original armament remained and prosecuted the siege.

After the second Peloponnesian invasion, now that Attica had
									been once more ravaged, and the war and the plague together lay heavy upon the
									Athenians, a change came over their spirit.

They blamed Pericles because he had persuaded them to go to
									war, declaring that he was the author of their troubles; and
									they were anxious to come to terms with the
									Lacedaemonians. 
								 Accordingly envoys were despatched to Sparta, but they met with
									no success. 
								 And now, being completely at their wits' end, they turned upon
									Pericles.

He saw that they were exasperated by their misery
									and were behaving just as he had always anticipated that they
									would. 
								 And so, being still general, he called an assembly, wanting to
									encourage them and to convert their angry feelings into a
									gentler and more hopeful mood. 
								 At this assembly he came forward and spoke as follows:—

'I was expecting this outburst of indignation; the causes of it
									are not unknown to me. And I have summoned an assembly that I may remind you of
									your resolutions and reprove you for your inconsiderate anger
									against me, and want of fortitude in misfortune.

In my judgment it would be better for individuals themselves
									that the citizens should suffer and the state flourish than that
									the citizens should flourish and the state suffer.

A private man, however successful in his own dealings, if his
									country perish is involved in her destruction; but if he be an
									unprosperous citizen of a prosperous city he is much more likely
									to recover.

Seeing then that states can bear the misfortunes of
									individuals, but individuals cannot bear the misfortunes of the
									state, let us all stand by our country and not do what you are
									doing now, who because you are stunned by your private
									calamities are letting go the hope of saving the state, and
									condemning not only me who advised, but yourselves who consented
									to, the war. 
								 Yet I with whom you are so angry venture to say of myself, that
									I am as capable as any one of devising and explaining a sound
									policy;

and that I am a lover of my country, and incorruptible. 
								 Now a man may have a policy which he cannot clearly expound,
									and then he might as well have none at all;

or he may possess both ability and eloquence, but if he is
									disloyal to his country he cannot, like a true man, speak in her
									interest; or again he may be unable to resist a bribe, and then
									all his other good qualities will be sold for money.

If, when you determined to go to war, you believed
									me to have somewhat more of the statesman in me than others, it
									is not fair that I should now be charged with anything like
									crime.

'I allow that for men who are in prosperity and free to choose
									it is great folly to make war. But when they must either submit and at once surrender
									independence, or strike and be free, then he who shuns and not
									he who meets the danger is deserving of blame.

For my own part, I am the same man and stand where I did. 
								 But you are changed; for you have been driven by misfortune to
									recall the consent which you gave when you were yet unhurt, and
									to think that my advice was wrong because your own characters
									are weak. 
								 The pain is present and comes home to each of you, but the good
									is as yet unrealised by any one; and your minds have not the
									strength to persevere in your resolution, now that a great
									reverse has overtaken you unawares.

Anything which is sudden and unexpected and utterly beyond
									calculation, such a disaster for instance as this plague coming
									upon other misfortunes, enthralls the spirit of a man.

Nevertheless, being the citizens of a great city and educated
									in a temper of greatness, you should not succumb to calamities
									however overwhelming, or darken the lustre of your fame. 
								 For if men hate the presumption of those who claim a reputation
									to which they have no right, they equally condemn the
									faint-heartedness of those who fall below the glory which is
									their own. 
								 You should lose the sense of your private sorrows and cling to
									the deliverance of the state.

'As to your sufferings in the war, if you fear that they may be
									very great and after all fruitless, I have shown you already
									over and over again that such a fear is groundless. 
								 If you are still unsatisfied I will indicate one element of your superiority which
									appears to have escaped you , although it nearly touches your
										imperial greatness. 
								 I too have never mentioned it before, nor would I now, because
									the claim may seem too arrogant, if I did not see that you are
									unreasonably depressed.

You think that your empire is confined to your allies, but I
									say that of the two divisions of the world accessible to man,
									the land and the sea, there is one of which you are absolute
									masters, and have, or may have, the dominion to any extent which
									you please. 
								 Neither the great King nor any nation on earth can hinder a
									navy like yours from penetrating whithersoever you choose to
									sail. 
								 When we reflect on this great power, houses and lands, of which
									the loss seems so dreadful to you, are as nothing.

We ought not to be troubled about them or to think much of them
									in comparison; they are only the garden of the house, the
									superfluous ornament of wealth; and you may be sure that if we
									cling to our freedom and preserve that, we shall soon enough
									recover all the rest. 
								 But, if we are the servants of others, we shall be sure to lose
									not only freedom, but all that freedom gives. 
								 And where your ancestors doubly succeeded, you will doubly
									fail. 
								 For their empire was not inherited by them from others but won
									by the labour of their hands, and by them preserved and
									bequeathed to us. 
								 And to be robbed of what you have is a greater disgrace than to
									attempt a conquest and fail. 
								 Meet your enemies therefore not only with spirit but with
									disdain.

A coward or a fortunate fool may brag and vaunt, but he only is
									capable of disdain whose conviction that he is 
									stronger than his enemy rests, like our own, on grounds of
									reason.

Courage fighting in a fair field is fortified by the
									intelligence which looks down upon an enemy; an intelligence
									relying, not on hope, which is the strength of helplessness, but
									on that surer foresight which is given by reason and observation
									of facts.

'Once more, you are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of
									your city in which you all take pride; for you should not covet the glory unless
									you will endure the toil. 
								 And do not imagine that you are fighting about a simple issue,
									freedom or slavery; you have an empire to lose, and there is the
									danger to which the hatred of your imperial rule has exposed
									you.

Neither can you resign your power, if, at this crisis, any
									timorous or inactive spirit is for thus playing the honest
									man. 
								 For by this time your empire has become a tyranny which in the
									opinion of mankind may have been unjustly gained, but which
									cannot be safely surrendered.

The men of whom I was speaking, if they could find followers,
									would soon ruin a city, and if they were to go and found a state
									of their own, would equally ruin that. 
								 For inaction is secure only when arrayed by the side of
									activity; nor is it expedient or safe for a sovereign, but only
									for a subject state, to be a servant.

'You must not be led away by the advice of such citizens as
									these, nor be angry with me; for the resolution in favour of war was your own as much
									as mine. 
								 What if the enemy has come and done what he was certain to do
									when you refused to yield? 
								 What too if the plague followed? 
								 That was an unexpected blow, but we might have foreseen all the
									rest. 
								 I am well aware that your hatred of me is aggravated by
									it. 
								 But how unjustly, unless to me you also ascribe the credit of
									any extraordinary success which may befall you !

The visitations of heaven should be borne with resignation, the
									sufferings inflicted by an enemy with manliness. 
								 This has always been the spirit of Athens, and should not die
									out in you.

Know that our city has the greatest name in all the world
									because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but has sacrificed
									more lives and endured severer hardships in war than any other;
									wherefore also she has the greatest power of any state up to
									this day; and the memory of her glory will always survive. 
								 Even if we should be compelled at last to abate somewhat of our
									greatness (for all things have their times of growth and decay),
									yet will the recollection live, that, of all Hellenes, we ruled
									over the greatest number of Hellenic subjects;

that we withstood our enemies, whether single or united, in the
									most terrible wars, and that we were the inhabitants of a city
									endowed with every sort of wealth and greatness.

The indolent may indeed find fault, but the man of
										action will seek to rival us, and
									he who is less fortunate will envy us. 
								 To be hateful and offensive has ever been at the time the fate
									of those who have aspired to empire. 
								 But he judges well who accepts unpopularity in a great
									cause. 
								 Hatred does not last long, and, besides the immediate splendour
									of great actions, the renown of them endures for ever in men's
									memories.

Looking forward to such future glory and present avoidance of
									dishonour, make an effort now and secure both. 
								 Let no herald be sent to the Lacedaemonians, and do not let
									them know that you are depressed by your sufferings. 
								 For those are the greatest states and the greatest men, who,
									when misfortunes come, are the least depressed in spirit and the
									most resolute in action.'

By these and similar words Pericles endeavoured to appease the
									anger of the Athenians against himself, and to
									divert their minds from their terrible situation.

In the conduct of public affairs they took his advice, and sent
									no more embassies to Sparta; they were again eager to prosecute the
									war. 
								 Yet in private they felt their sufferings keenly; the common
									people had been deprived even of the little which they
									possessed, while the upper class had lost fair estates in the
									country with all their houses and rich furniture. 
								 Worst of all, instead of enjoying peace, they were now at
									war.

The popular indignation was not pacified until they had fined
									Pericles; but, soon afterwards, with the usual fickleness of a
									multitude, they elected him general and committed all their
									affairs to his charge.

Their private sorrows were Beginning to be less acutely felt,
									and for a time of public need they thought that there was no man
									like him. 
								 During the peace while he was at the head of affairs he ruled
									with prudence;

under his guidance Athens was safe, and reached the height of
									her greatness in his time. 
								 When the war began he showed that here too he had formed a true
									estimate of the Athenian power. 
								 He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six
									months;

and, after his death, his foresight was even better appreciated
									than during his life.

For he had told the Athenians that if they would be patient and
									would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their
									dominion while the war was going on, nor imperil the existence
									of the city, they would be victorious; but they did all that he
									told them not to do, and in matters which seemingly had nothing
									to do with the war, from motives of private ambition and private
									interest they adopted a policy which had disastrous effects in
									respect both of themselves and of their allies; their
										measures, 
									 had they been successful, would only have
										brought honour and profit to
									individuals, and, when unsuccessful, crippled the city in the
									conduct of the war.

The reason of the difference was that he, deriving authority
									from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also a man of
									transparent integrity, was able to control the multitude in a
									free spirit; he led them rather than was led by them; for, not
									seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant
									things, but, on the strength of his own high character, could
									venture to oppose and even to anger them.

When he saw them unseasonably elated and arrogant, his words
									humbled and awed them; and, when they were depressed by
									groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. 
								 Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact
									ruled by her greatest citizen.

But his successors were more on an equality with one another,
									and, each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to
									sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the
									people.

Such weakness in a great and imperial city led to many errors,
									of which the greatest was the Sicilian expedition; not that the
									Athenians miscalculated their enemy's power, but they
									themselves, instead of consulting for the interests of the
									expedition which they had sent out, were occupied in intriguing
									against one another for the leadership of the democracy , and not only hampered the operations of
									the army, but became embroiled, for the first time, at
									home.

And yet after they had lost in the Sicilian expedition the
									greater part of their fleet and army, and were now distracted by revolution,
									still they held out three years not only against their former
									enemies, but against the Sicilians who had combined with them,
									and against most of their own allies who had risen in
									revolt. 
								 Even when Cyrus the son of the King joined in the
									war and supplied the Peloponnesian fleet with money, they
									continued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by their
									enemies, but by themselves and their own internal
									dissensions.

So that at the time Pericles was more than justified in the
									conviction at which his foresight had arrived, that the
									Athenians would win an easy victory over the unaided forces of
									the Peloponnesians.

During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies sent
									a fleet of a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies opposite
									Elis. 
								 The Zacynthians are colonists of the Peloponnesian Achaeans,
									and were allies of the Athenians.

There were on board the fleet a thousand Lacedaemonian
									hoplites, under the command of Cnemus the Spartan admiral. 
								 They disembarked and ravaged the greater part of the country;
									but as the inhabitants would not come to terms, they sailed away
									home.

At the end of the same summer, Aristeus the Corinthian, the
									Lacedaemonian ambassadors Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, Timagoras of Tegea, and
									Pollis of Argos who had no public mission, were on their way to
									Asia in the hope of persuading the King to give them money and
									join in the war. 
								 They went first of all to Sitalces son of Teres, in Thrace,
									wishing if possible to detach him from the Athenians, and induce
									him to lead an army to the relief of Potidaea, which was still
									blockaded by Athenian forces; they also wanted him to convey
									them across the Hellespont on their intended journey to
									Pharnaces, the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on to
									the King.

At the time of their arrival two Athenian envoys, Learchus the
									son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, chanced
									to be at the court of Sitalces; and they entreated his son
									Sadocus, who had been made an Athenian citizen , to deliver the envoys into their hands, that they might
									not find their way to the King and so injure a city which was in
									some degree his own.

He consented, and, sending a body of men with Learchus and
									Ameiniades, before they embarked, as they were on their way
									through Thrace to the vessel in which they were going to cross
									the Hellespont, seized them;

they were then, in accordance with the orders of Sadocus,
									handed over to the Athenian envoys, who conveyed them to
									Athens. 
								 On the very day of their arrival the Athenians, fearing that
									Aristeus, whom they considered to be the cause of all their
									troubles at Potidaea and in Chalcidicè, would do them still
									further mischief if he escaped, put them all to death without
									trial and without hearing what they wanted to say; they then
									threw their bodies down precipices. 
								 They considered that they had a right to retaliate on the
									Lacedaemonians, who had begun by treating in the same way the
									traders of the Athenians and their allies when they caught their
									vessels off the coast of Peloponnesus. 
								 For at the commencement of the war, all whom the Lacedaemonians
									captured at sea were treated by them as enemies and
									indiscriminately slaughtered, whether they were allies of the
									Athenians or neutrals.

About the end of the same summer the Ambraciots, with a large
									Barbarian force which they had called out, made war upon the Amphilochian
									Argos and upon Amphilochia.

The original cause of their enmity against the Argives was as
									follows:—

The Amphilochian territory had been occupied and the city
									founded by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaraus, who on returning
									home after the Trojan War was dissatisfied at the state of
									Argos. 
								 He fixed the site on the shore of the Ambracian Gulf, and
									called the new city by the name of his native place;

it was the greatest city in that region, and its 
									inhabitants were the most powerful community.

Many generations afterwards, these Amphilochians in a time of
									distress invited their neighbours the Ambraciots to join in the
									settlement, and from them they first learned the Hellenic
									language which they now speak;

the other Amphilochians are Barbarians. 
								 After a while the Ambraciots drove out the Amphilochian Argives
									and themselves took possession of the city.

The expelled Amphilochians placed themselves under the
									protection of the Acarnanians, and both together called in the
									Athenians, who sent them a fleet of thirty ships under the
									command of Phormio. 
								 When Phormio arrived, they stormed Argos, and sold the
									Ambraciots into slavery;

and the Amphilochians and Acarnanians dwelt together in the
									place. 
								 The alliance between the Acarnanians and Athenians then first
									began.

The hatred of the Ambraciots towards the Amphilochian Argives
									commenced with the enslavement of their countrymen; and now when
									the war offered an opportunity they invaded their territory,
									accompanied by the Chaonians and some others of the neighboring
									Barbarians. 
								 They came as far as Argos and made themselves masters of the
									country; but not being able to take the city by assault they
									returned, and the several tribes dispersed to their own
									homes. 
								 Such were the events of the summer.

In the following winter the Athenians sent twenty ships on an
									expedition round Peloponnesus. These were placed under the command of Phormio, who,
									stationing himself at Naupactus, guarded the straits and
									prevented any one from sailing either out of or into Corinth and
									the Crisaean Gulf. 
								 Six other vessels were sent to collect tribute in Lycia and
									Caria; they were under the command of Melesander, who was to see
									that Peloponnesian privateers did not establish themselves in
									those parts, and damage merchant vessels coming from Phaselis
									and Phoenicia and all that region.

But he, going up the country into Lycia with an army
										composed of Athenians taken from the crews and
									of allied troops, was defeated, and himself and a part of his
									forces slain.

In the same winter the Potidaeans, who were still blockaded,
									found themselves unable to hold out; for the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica did
									not make the Athenians withdraw; and they had no more
									food. 
								 When they had been reduced to such straits as actually in some
									cases to feed on human flesh, they entered into communications
									with the Athenian generals, Xenophon the son of Euripides,
									Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus the son of
									Callimachus, to whom the siege had been entrusted.

They, seeing that the army was suffering from the exposed
									situation, and considering that the city had already spent two
									thousand talents on the
									siege, accepted the terms proposed.

The Potidaeans, with their wives and their children, and
									likewise the foreign troops , were to come out of
									the city, the men with one garment, the women with two, and they
									were allowed a certain fixed sum of money for their
									journey.

So they came out under a safe-conduct, and went into
									Chalcidicè, or wherever they could find a home. 
								 But the Athenians blamed the generals for coming to terms
									without their authority, thinking that they could have made the
									city surrender at discretion. 
								 Soon afterwards they sent thither colonists of their own. 
								 Such were the events of the winter. 
								 And so ended the second year in the Peloponnesian War of which
									Thucydides wrote the history.

In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies
									under the command of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, the
									Lacedaemonian king, instead of invading Attica, made an expedition against Plataea. 
								 There he encamped and was about to ravage the 
									country, when the Plataeans sent envoys to him bearing the
									following message:— 
							 
							 
								 'Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, in making war upon Plataea
									you are acting unjustly, and in a manner unworthy of yourselves and of your ancestors.

Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, when he
									and such Hellenes as were willing to share the danger with him
									fought a battle in our land and liberated Hellas from the
									Persian, offered up sacrifice in the Agora of Plataea to Zeus
									the God of Freedom, and in the presence of all the confederates
									then and there restored to the Plataeans their country and city
									to be henceforth independent; no man was to make unjust war upon
									them at any time or to seek to enslave them; and if they were
									attacked, the allies who were present promised that they would
									defend them to the utmost of their power.

These privileges your fathers granted to us as a reward for the
									courage and devotion which we displayed in that time of
									danger. 
								 But you are acting in an opposite spirit; for you have joined
									the Thebans, our worst enemies, and have come hither to enslave
									us.

Wherefore, calling to witness the Gods to whom we all then
									swore, and also the Gods of your race and the Gods who dwell in
									our country, we bid you do no harm to the land of Plataea. 
								 Do not violate your oaths, but allow the Plataeans to be
									independent, and to enjoy the rights which Pausanias granted to
									them.'

To this appeal Archidamus rejoined:— 
							 
							 
								 'What you say, Plataeans, is just, but your acts should
									correspond to your words. 
								 Enjoy the independence which Pausanias granted to you, but also
									assist us in freeing the other Hellenes who were your sworn
									confederates in that time of danger and are now in subjection to
									the Athenians. 
								 With a view to the emancipation of them and of the other
									subject states, this great war has been undertaken
									and all these preparations made. 
								 It would be best for you to join with us, and observe the oaths
									yourselves which you would have us observe. 
								 But if you prefer to be neutral, a course which we have already
									once proposed to you, retain possession of your lands, and
									receive both sides in peace, but neither for the purposes of
									war;

and we shall be satisfied.' 
							 
							 
								 The Plataean ambassadors then returned to the city and reported
									these words of Archidamus to the people, who made answer that they could not do what
									they were asked without the sanction of the Athenians, in whose
									power they had left their wives and children, and that they also
									feared for the very existence of their state. 
								 When the Lacedaemonians were gone the Athenians might come and
									not allow them to carry out the treaty; or the Thebans, who
									would be included in the clause requiring them 'to receive both
									sides,' might again attempt to seize their town.

To this Archidamus, wanting to reassure them, made the
									following answer:— 
							 
							 
								 'Then deliver over your city and houses to the Lacedaemonians;
									mark the boundaries of your land, and number your fruit-trees and anything else
									which can be counted. 
								 Go yourselves whithersoever you please, while the war lasts,
									and on the return of peace we will give back to you all that we
									have received. 
								 Until then we will hold your property in trust, and will
									cultivate your ground, paying you such a rent as will content
									you.'

Upon hearing these words the envoys again returned into the
										city, and, after holding a consultation with the people, told
									Archidamus that they wished first to communicate his proposals
									to the Athenians, and if they could get their 
									consent they would do as he advised; in the meantime they
									desired him to make a truce with them, and not to ravage their
									land. 
								 So he made a truce which allowed sufficient time for their
									ambassadors to return from Athens;

and meanwhile he spared their land.

The Plataean envoys came to Athens, and after advising with the
									Athenians they brought back the following message to their
									fellow-citizens:— 'Plataeans, the Athenians say that never at
									any time since you first became their allies have they
									suffered any one to do you wrong, and that they will not forsake
									you now, but will assist you to the utmost of their power; and
									they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to
									forsake the Athenian alliance.'

When the answer came, the Plataeans resolved not to desert the
									Athenians, but patiently to look on, if they must, while the Lacedaemonians wasted
									their country, and to endure the worst. 
								 No one was henceforward to leave the town, but answer was to be
									made from the walls that they could not possibly consent to the
									Lacedaemonian proposal.

King Archidamus, as soon as he received the reply, before
									proceeding to action, fell to calling upon the Gods and heroes
									of the country in the following words:— 
							 
							 
								 'O ye Gods and heroes who possess the land of Plataea, be our
									witnesses that our invasion of this land in which our fathers prayed to you when they
									conquered the Persians, and which you made a propitious
									battle-field to the Hellenes, has thus far been justified, for
									the Platacans first deserted the alliance; and that if we go
									further we shall be guilty of no crime, for we have again and
									again made them fair proposals and they have not listened to
									us. 
								 Be gracious to us and grant that the real authors of the
									iniquity may be punished, and that they may obtain revenge who
									lawfully seek it.'

After this appeal to the Gods he began military
									operations. 
								 In the first place, the soldiers felled the fruit-trees and surrounded the city with a
									stockade, that henceforth no one might get out.

They then began to raise a mound against it, thinking that with
									so large an army at work this would be the speediest way of
									taking the place. 
								 So they cut timber from Cithaeron and built on either side of
									the intended mound a frame of logs placed cross-wise in order
									that the material might not scatter.

Thither they carried wood, stones, earth, and anything which
									would fill up the vacant space. 
								 They continued raising the mound seventy days and seventy
									nights without intermission; the army was divided into relays,
									and one party worked while the other slept and ate.

The Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the contingents of the
									allies stood over them and kept them at work. 
								 The Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, constructed a wooden
									frame, which they set upon the top of their own wall opposite
									the mound;

in this they inserted bricks, which they took from the
									neighboring houses; the wood served to strengthen and bind the
									structure together as it increased in height; they also hung
									curtains of skins and hides in front; these were designed to
									protect the wood-work and the workers, and shield them against
									blazing arrows.

The wooden wall rose high, but the mound rose quickly
									too. 
								 Then the Plataeans had a new device;— they made a hole in that
									part of the wall against which the mound pressed and drew in the
									earth.

The Peloponnesians discovered what they were doing, and threw
									into the gap clay packed in wattles of reed, which could not scatter and like the
									loose earth be carried away.

Whereupon the Plataeans, baffled in one plan, resorted to
									another. 
								 Calculating the direction, they dug a mine from
									the city to the mound and again drew the earth inward. 
								 For a long time their assailants did not find them out, and so
									what the Peloponnesians threw on was of little use, since the
									mound was always being drawn off below and settling into the
									vacant space.

But in spite of all their efforts, the Plataeans were afraid
									that their numbers would never hold out against so great an
									army; and they devised yet another expedient. 
								 They left off working at the great building opposite the mound,
									and beginning at both ends, where the city wall returned to its
									original lower height, they built an inner wall projecting
									inwards in the shape of a crescent, that if the first wall were
									taken the other might still be defensible. 
								 The enemy would be obliged to begin again and carry the mound
									right up to it, and as they advanced inwards would have their
									trouble all over again, and be exposed to missiles on both
									flanks.

While the mound was rising the Peloponnesians brought battering
									engines up to the wall; one which was moved forward on the mound
									itself shook a great part of the raised building, to the terror
									of the Plataeans. 
								 They brought up others too at other points of the wall. 
								 But the Plataeans dropped nooses over the ends of these
									engines and drew them up; they also let down huge beams
									suspended at each end by long iron chains from two poles leaning
									on the wall and projecting over it. 
								 These beams they drew up at right angles to the advancing
									battering-ram, and whenever at any point it was about to attack
									them they slackened their hold of the chains and let go the
									beam, which fell with great force and snapped off the head of
									the ram.

At length the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines were
									useless, and that the new wall was rising opposite to the mound, and perceiving that
									they could not without more formidable means of attack hope to
									take the city, made preparations for a blockade.

But first of all they resolved to try whether, the
									wind favouring, the place, which was but small, could not be set
									on fire; they were anxious not to incur the expense of a regular
									siege, and devised all sorts of plans in order to avoid
									it.

So they brought faggots and threw them down from the mound
									along the space between it and the wall, which was soon filled
									up when so many hands were at work; then they threw more faggots
									one upon another into the city as far as they could reach from
									the top of the mound, and casting in lighted brands with
									brimstone and pitch, set them all on fire.

A flame arose of which the like had never before been made by
									the hand of man; I am not speaking of fires in the mountains,
									when the forest has spontaneously blazed up from the action of
									the wind and mutual attrition.

There was a great conflagration, and the Plataeans, who had
									thus far escaped, were all but destroyed; a considerable part of
									the town was unapproachable, and if a wind had come on and
									carried the flame that way, as the enemy hoped, they could not
									have been saved.

It is said that there was also a violent storm of thunder and
									rain, which quenched the flames and put an end to the danger.

The Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their former
									attempts, sent away a part of their army but retained the rest, and dividing the task among the contingents of the
									several cities, surrounded Plataea with a wall. 
								 Trenches, out of which they took clay for the bricks, were
									formed both on the inner and the outer side of the wall.

About the rising of Arcturus all was completed. 
								 They then drew off their army, leaving a guard on one half of
									the wall, while the other half was guarded by the
									Boeotians;

the disbanded troops returned to their homes. 
								 The Plataeans had already conveyed to Athens their wives, children, and old men, with
									the rest of their unserviceable population. 
								 Those who remained during the siege were four hundred
									Plataeans, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to make
									bread.

These were their exact numbers when the siege began. 
								 There was no one else, slave or freeman, within the
									walls. 
								 In such sort was the blockade of Plataea completed.

During the same summer, when the corn was in full ear, and
									about the time of the attack on Plataea, the Athenians sent an
										expedition against the Chalcidians of Thrace and against the
									Bottiaeans, consisting of two thousand heavy-armed troops of
									their own and two hundred horsemen under the command of Xenophon
									the son of Euripides, and two others.

They came close up to the Bottian Spartolus and destroyed the
									crops. 
								 They expected that the place would be induced to yield to them
									by a party within the walls. 
								 But the opposite party sent to Olynthus and obtained from
									thence a garrison, partly composed of hoplites, which sallied
									out of Spartolus and engaged with the Athenians under the walls
									of the town.

The Chalcidian hoplites and with them certain auxiliaries were
									defeated and retreated into Spartolus, but their cavalry and
									lightarmed troops had the advantage over those of the
									Athenians.

They were assisted by a few targeteers, who came from the
									district called Crusis. 
								 The engagement was scarcely over when another body of
									targeteers from Olynthus came up to their aid.

Encouraged by the reinforcement and their previous success, and
									supported by the Chalcidian horse and the newly-arrived troops,
									the light-armed again attacked the Athenians, who began to fall
									back upon the two companies which they had left with their
									baggage: as often as the Athenians charged, the enemy
									retired;

but when the Athenians continued their retreat, they pressed
									upon them and hurled darts at them. 
								 The Chalcidian cavalry too rode up, and wherever
									they pleased charged the Athenians, who now fled utterly
									disconcerted and were pursued to a considerable distance.

At length they escaped to Potidaea, and having recovered their
									dead under a flag of truce, returned to Athens with the
									survivors of their army, out of which they had lost four hundred
									and thirty men and all their generals. 
								 The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, having set up a trophy and
									carried off their dead, disbanded and dispersed to their several
									cities.

In the same summer, not long afterwards, the Ambraciots and
									Chaonians, designing to subjugate the whole of Acarnania
										and detach it from the Athenian alliance, persuaded the
									Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet out of the confederate forces
									and to send into that region a thousand hoplites. 
								 They said that if the Lacedaemonians would join with them and
									attack the enemy both by sea and land, the Acarnanians on the
									sea-coast would be unable to assist the inland tribes, and they
									might easily conquer Acarnania. 
								 Zacynthus and Cephallenia would then fall into their hands, and
									the Athenian fleet would not so easily sail round
									Peloponnesus.

They might even hope to take Naupactus. 
								 The Lacedaemonians agreed, and at once despatched Cnemus, who
									was still admiral , with the thousand hoplites in a
									few ships;

they ordered the rest of the allied navy to get ready and at
									once sail to Leucas. 
								 The interests of the Ambraciots were zealously supported by
									Corinth, their mother city. 
								 The fleet which was to come from Corinth, Sicyon, and the
									adjacent places was long in preparation; but the contingent from
									Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia was soon equipped, and waited
									at Leucas.

Undiscovered by Phormio, the commander of the twenty Athenian
									ships which were keeping guard at Naupactus, Cnemus
									and his thousand hoplites crossed the sea and began to make
									preparations for the land expedition.

Of Hellenes he had in his army Ambraciots, Leucadians,
									Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he brought
									with him,— of Barbarians a thousand Chaonians, who, having no
									king, were led by Photyus and Nicanor, both of the governing
									family and holding the presidency for a year. 
								 With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who, like them, have
									no king.

A Molossian and Atintanian force was led by Sabylinthus, the
									guardian of Tharypas the king, who was still a minor; the
									Paravaeans were led by their king Oroedus, and were accompanied
									by a thousand Orestians placed at the disposal of Oroedus by
									their king Antiochus.

Perdiccas also, unknown to the Athenians, sent a thousand
									Macedonians, who arrived too late.

With this army Cnemus, not waiting for the ships from Corinth,
									began his march. 
								 They passed through the Argive territory and plundered Limnaea,
									an unwalled village. 
								 At length they approached Stratus, which is the largest city in
									Acarnania, thinking that, if they could take it, the other
									places would soon come over to them.

The Acarnanians, seeing that a great army had invaded their
									territory, and that the enemy was threatening them by sea as well as by land, did not
									attempt any united action, but guarded their several districts,
									an sent to Phormio for aid. 
								 He replied that a fleet of the enemy was about to sail from
									Corinth, and that he could not leave Naupactus unguarded.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their allies marched in three
									divisions towards Stratus, intending to encamp near and try
									negotiations; if these failed, they would take stronger measures
									and assault the wall.

The Chaonians and the other Barbarians advanced in the centre;
									on the right wing were the Leucadians, Anactorians,
									and their auxiliaries; on the left was Cnemus with the
									Peloponnesians and Ambraciots. 
								 The three divisions were a long way apart, and at times not
									even in sight of one another.

The Hellenic troops maintained order on the march and kept a
									look out, until at length they found a suitable place in which
									to encamp; the Chaonians, confident in themselves, and having a
									great military reputation in that part of the country, would not
									stop to encamp, but they and the other Barbarians rushed on at
									full speed, hoping to take the place by storm and appropriate to
									themselves the glory of the action.

The Stratians perceiving their approach in time, and thinking
									that, if they could overcome them before the others arrived, the
									Hellenic forces would not be so ready to attack them, set
									ambuscades near the city. 
								 When they were quite close, the troops came out of the city and
									from the ambuscades and fell upon them hand to hand. 
								 Whereupon the Chaonians were seized with a panic and many of
									them perished;

the other Barbarians, seeing them give way, no longer stood
									their ground, but took to flight. 
								 Neither of the Hellenic divisions knew of the battle;

the Chaonians were far in advance of them, and were thought to
									have hurried on because they wanted to choose a place for their
									camp.

At length the Barbarians in their flight broke in upon their
									lines; they received them, and the two divisions uniting during
									that day remained where they were, the men of Stratus not coming
									to close quarters with them, because the other Acarnanians had
									not as yet arrived, but slinging at them from a distance and
									distressing them greatly. 
								 For they could not move a step without their armour. 
								 Now the Acarnanians are famous for their skill in slinging.

When night came on, Cnemus withdrew his army in haste to the
									river Anapus, which is rather more than nine miles from Stratus,
									and on the following day carried off his dead under a flag of
									truce. 
								 The people of Oeniadae were friendly and had
									joined him; to their city therefore he retreated before the
										Acarnanians had collected their forces. 
								 From Oeniadae all the Peloponnesian troops returned home. 
								 The Stratians erected a trophy of the battle in which they had
									defeated the Barbarians.

The fleet from Corinth and the other allied cities on the
									Crisaean Gulf, which was intended to support Cnemus and to prevent the Acarnanians on the
									sea-coast from assisting their friends in the interior of the
									country, never arrived, but was compelled, almost on the day of
									the battle of Stratus, to fight with Phormio and the twenty
									Athenian ships which were stationed at Naupactus.

As they sailed by into the open sea, Phormio was watching them,
									preferring to make his attack outside the gulf.

Now the Corinthians and their allies were not equipped for a
									naval engagement, but for the conveyance of troops into
									Acarnania, and they never imagined that the Athenians with
									twenty ships would venture to engage their own
									forty-seven. 
								 But, as they were coasting along the southern shore, they saw
									the Athenian fleet following their movements on the northern;
									they then attempted to cross the sea from Patrae in Achaea to
									the opposite continent in the direction of Acarnania, when they
									again observed the enemy bearing down upon them from Chalcis and
									the mouth of the river Evenus. 
								 They had previously endeavoured to anchor under cover of
										night , but had been detected. 
								 So at last they were compelled to fight in the middle of the
									channel.

The ships were commanded by generals of the cities which had
									furnished them; the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates,
									and Agatharchidas.

The Peloponnesians arranged their ships in such a
									manner as to make the largest possible circle without
										leaving space to break through, turning their prows outwards and
									their sterns inwards; within the circle they placed the smaller
									craft which accompanied them, and five of their swiftest ships
									that they might be close at hand and row out at whatever point
									the enemy charged them.

The Athenians ranged their ships in a single line and sailed
									round and round the Peloponnesian fleet, which they drove into a narrower and narrower
									space, almost touching as they passed, and leading the crews to
									suppose that they were on the point of charging.

But they had been warned by Phormio not to begin until he gave
									the signal, for he was hoping that the enemy's ships, not having
									the steadiness of an army on land, would soon fall into disorder
									and run foul of one another; they would be embarrassed by the
									small craft, and if the usual morning breeze, for which he
									continued waiting as he sailed round them, came down from the
									gulf, they would not be able to keep still for a moment. 
								 He could attack whenever he pleased, because his ships were
									better sailers;

and he knew that this would be the right time. 
								 When the breeze began to blow, the ships, which were by this
									time crowded into a narrow space and were distressed at once by
									the force of the wind and by the small craft which were knocking
									up against them, fell into confusion; ship dashed against ship,
									and they kept pushing one another away with long poles; there
									were cries of 'keep off' and noisy abuse, so that nothing could
									be heard either of the word of command or of the coxswains'
									giving the time; and the difficulty which unpractised rowers had
									in clearing the water in a heavy sea made the vessels
									disobedient to the helm. 
								 At that moment Phormio gave the signal; the Athenians, falling
									upon the enemy, began by sinking one of the
									admirals' vessels, and then wherever they went made havoc of
									them;

at last such was the disorder that no one any longer thought of
									resisting, but the whole fleet fled away to Patrae and Dymè in
									Achaea. 
								 The Athenians pursued them, captured twelve ships, and taking
									on board most of their crews, sailed away to Molycrium.

They set up a trophy on Rhium, and having there dedicated a
									ship to Poseidon, retired to Naupactus. 
								 The Peloponnesians likewise, with the remainder of their fleet,
									proceeded quickly along the coast from Dymè and Patrae to
									Cyllenè, where the Eleans have their docks. 
								 Cnemus with the ships from Leucas, which should have been
									joined by these, arrived after the battle of Stratus at Cyllenè.

The Lacedaemonians at home now sent to the fleet three
									commissioners, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, to advise Cnemus. 
								 He was told that he must contrive to fight again and be more
									successful; he should not allow a few ships to keep him off the
									sea.

The recent sea-fight had been the first attempt of the
									Lacedaemonians, and they were quite amazed and could not imagine
									that their own fleet was so inferior to that of the enemy. 
								 They suspected that there had been cowardice, not considering
									that the Athenians were old sailors and that they were only
										beginners So they despatched the
									commissioners in a rage.

On their arrival they and Cnemus sent round to the allied
									cities for ships, and equipped for action those which were on
									the spot.

Phormio likewise sent home messengers to announce the
										victory, and at the same time to inform the Athenians of the
									preparations which the enemy were making. 
								 He told them to send him immediately as large a reinforcement
									as possible, for he might have to fight any day.

They sent him twenty ships, but ordered the
									commander of them to go to Crete first; for Nicias of Gortys in
									Crete, who was the proxenus of the Athenians, had induced them
									to send a fleet against Cydonia, a hostile town which he
									promised to reduce. 
								 But he really invited them to please the Polichnitae, who are
									neighbours of the Cydoniatae.

So the Athenian commander took the ships, went to Crete, and
									joined the Polichnitae in ravaging the lands of the Cydoniatae;
									there, owing to contrary winds and bad weather, a considerable
									time was wasted.

While the Athenians were detained in Crete the Peloponnesians
									at Cyllene, equipped for a naval engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achaia,
									whither the Peloponnesian army had gone to co-operate with
									them.

Phormio also coasted along to the Molycrian Rhium and anchored
									outside the gulf with the twenty ships which had fought in the
									previous engagement.

This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; there is another
									Rhium on the opposite coast in Peloponnesus; the space between
									them, which is rather less than a mile, forms the mouth of the
									Crisaean Gulf.

When the Peloponnesians saw that the Athenians had come to
									anchor, they likewise anchored with seventyseven ships at the
									Rhium which is in Achaia, not far from Panormus where their land
									forces were stationed.

For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite one another,
									and were busy in practising and getting ready for the
									engagement— the one resolved not to sail into the open sea,
									fearing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to sail
									into the strait, because the confined space was favourable to
									their enemies.

At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian
									generals determined to bring on an engagement at once, and not
									wait until the Athenians too received their
									reinforcements. 
								 So they assembled their soldiers and, seeing that they were
									generally dispirited at their former defeat and
									reluctant to fight, encouraged them in the following words:—

'The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, may have made some of you
									anxious about the one which is impending, but it really affords no just ground
									for alarm.

In that battle we were, as you know, ill-prepared, and our
									whole expedition had a military and not a naval object. 
								 Fortune was in many ways unpropitious to us, and this being our
									first sea-fight we may possibly have suffered a little from
									inexperience. 
								 The defeat which ensued was not the result of cowardice;

nor should the unconquerable quality which is inherent in our
									minds, and refuses to acknowledge the victory of mere force, be
									depressed by the accident of the event. 
								 For though fortune may sometimes bring disaster, yet the spirit
									of a brave man is always the same, and while he retains his
									courage he will never allow inexperience to be an excuse for
									misbehaviour. 
								 And whatever be your own inexperience, it is more than
									compensated by your superiority in valour.

The skill of your enemies which you so greatly dread, if united
									with courage, may be able in the moment of danger to remember
									and execute the lesson which it has learned, but without courage
									no skill can do anything at such a time. 
								 For fear makes men forget, and skill which cannot fight is
									useless.

And therefore against their greater skill set your own greater
									valour, and against the defeat which so alarms you set the fact
									that you were unprepared. 
								 But now you have a larger fleet;

this turns the balance in your favour; and you will fight close
									to a friendly shore under the protection of heavy-armed
									troops. 
								 Victory is generally on the side of those who are more numerous
									and better equipped.

So that we have absolutely no reason for anticipating
									failure. 
								 Even our mistakes will be an additional advantage, because they
									will be a lesson to us.

Be of good courage, then, and let every one of
									you, pilot or sailor, do his own duty and maintain the post
									assigned to him.

We will order the attack rather better than your old
									commanders, and so give nobody an excuse for cowardice. 
								 But, if any one should be inclined to waver, he shall be
									punished as he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with
									the due rewards of their valour.'

Such were the words of encouragement addressed to the
									Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio too, fearing that his sailors might be
									frightened, and observing that they were gathering in knots and
									were evidently apprehensive of the enemy's numbers, resolved to
									call them together and inspirit them by a suitable
									admonition.

He had always been in the habit of telling them and training
									their minds to believe that no superiority of hostile forces
									could justify them in retreating. 
								 And it had long been a received opinion among the sailors that,
									as Athenians, they were bound to face any quantity of
									Peloponnesian ships.

When, however, he found them dispirited by the sight which met
									their eyes, he determined to revive their drooping courage, and,
									having assembled them together, he spoke as follows:—

'Soldiers, I have summoned you because I see that you are
									alarmed at the numbers of the enemy, and I would not have you
									dismayed when there is nothing to fear.

In the first place, the reason why they have provided a fleet
									so disproportionate is because we have defeated them already,
									and they can see themselves that they are no match for us;
										next, as to the courage which they
									suppose to be native to them and which is the ground of their
									confidence when they attack us , that reliance is
									merely inspired by the success which their experience on land usually gives them, and will, as they fancy,
									equally ensure them by sea.

But the superiority which we allow to them on land we may justly claim for
									ourselves at sea; for in courage at least we are their equals,
									and the superior confidence of either of us is really based upon
									greater experience.

The Lacedaemonians lead the allies for their own honour and
									glory; the majority of them are dragged into battle against
									their will;

if they were not compelled they would never have ventured after
									so great a defeat to fight again at sea. 
								 So that you need not fear their valour; they are far more
									afraid of you and with better reason, not only because you have
									already defeated them, but because they cannot believe that you
									would oppose them at all if you did not mean to do something
									worthy of that great victory.

For most men when, like these Peloponnesians, they are a match
									for their enemies rely more upon their strength than
									upon their courage; but those who go into battle against far
									superior numbers and under no constraint must be inspired by
									some extraordinary force of resolution.

Our enemies are well aware of this, and are more afraid of our
									surprising boldness than they would be if our forces were less
									out of proportion to their own. 
								 Many an army before now has been overthrown by smaller numbers
									owing to want of experience;

some too through cowardice; and from both these faults we are
									certainly free. 
								 If I can help I shall not give battle in the gulf, or even sail
									into it. 
								 For I know that where a few vessels which are skilfully handled
									and are better sailers engage with a larger number which are
										badly managed the confined space is a
									disadvantage. 
								 Unless the captain of a ship see his enemy a good way off he
									cannot come on or strike properly, nor can he retreat when he is
									pressed hard. 
								 The manœuvres suited to fast-sailing vessels, such as breaking
									of the line or returning to the charge, cannot be practised in a
									narrow space.

The seafight must of necessity be reduced to a land-fight 
									in which numbers tell. 
								 For all this I shall do my best to provide. 
								 Do you meanwhile keep order and remain close to your
									ships. 
								 Be prompt in taking your instructions, for the enemy is near at
									hand and watching us. 
								 In the moment of action remember the value of silence and
									order, which are always important in war, especially at
									sea. 
								 Repel the enemy in a spirit worthy of your former
									exploits.

There is much at stake; for you will either destroy the rising
									hope of the Peloponnesian navy, or bring home to Athens the fear
									of losing the sea.

Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of the enemy's
									fleet already; and, once defeated, men do not meet the same
									dangers with their old spirit.' 
								 Thus did Phormio encourage his sailors.

The Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athenians would
									not enter the straits or the gulf, determined to draw them in against their will. 
								 So they weighed anchor early in the morning, and, ranging their
									ships four deep, stood in towards the gulf along their own
										coast , keeping the order in which they were
									anchored. 
								 The right wing, consisting of twenty of their fastest vessels,
									took the lead.

These were intended to close upon the Athenians and prevent
									them from eluding their attack and getting beyond the wing in
									case Phormio, apprehending an attack upon Naupactus, should sail
										along shore to its aid. 
								 He, when he saw them weighing anchor, was alarmed, as they
									anticipated, for the safety of the town, which was
									undefended.

Against his will and in great haste he embarked and sailed
									along the shore; the land forces of the Messenians
									followed.

The Peloponnesians, seeing that the enemy were in single file
									and were already within the gulf and close to land, which was
									exactly what they wanted, at a given signal suddenly brought
									their ships round, and the whole line faced the Athenians and
									bore down upon them, every ship rowing at the utmost speed, for
									they hoped to cut off all the Athenian fleet.

Eleven vessels which were in advance evaded the sudden turn of
									the Peloponnesians, and rowed past their right wing into the
									open water; but they caught the rest, forced them aground, and
									disabled them. 
								 All the sailors who did not swim out of them were slain. 
								 Some of the empty ships they fastened to their own and began to
									tow away;

one they had already taken with the crew, but others were saved
									by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, dashed armed as they
									were into the sea, boarded them, and, fighting from their decks
									when they were being already towed away, finally recovered them.

While in this part of the engagement the Lacedaemonians had the
									victory and routed the Athenian ships, their twenty vessels on the right wing
									were pursuing the eleven of the Athenians which had escaped from
									their attack into the open water of the gulf. 
								 These fled and, with the exception of one, arrived at Naupactus
									before their pursuers. 
								 They stopped off the temple of Apollo, and, turning their beaks
									outward, prepared to defend themselves in case the enemy
									followed them to the land.

The Peloponnesians soon came up; they were singing a paean of
									victory as they rowed, and one Leucadian ship far in advance of
									the rest was chasing the single Athenian ship which had been
									left behind.

There chanced to be anchored in the deep water a merchant vessel, round which the Athenian ship rowed just
									in time, struck the Leucadian amidships, and sank her.

At this sudden and unexpected feat the Peloponnesians were
									dismayed; they had been carrying on the pursuit in disorder
									because of their success. 
								 And some of them, dropping the blades of their oars, halted,
									intending to await the rest, which was a foolish thing to do
									when the enemy were so near and ready to attack them. 
								 Others, not knowing the coast, ran aground.

When the Athenians saw what was going on their hopes revived,
									and at a given signal they charged their enemies with a shout. 
								 The Lacedaemonians did not long resist, for they had made
									mistakes and were all in confusion, but fled to Panormus, whence
									they had put to sea.

The Athenians pursued them, took six of their ships which were
									nearest to them, and recovered their own ships which the
									Peloponnesians had originally disabled and taken in tow near the
									shore. 
								 The crews of the captured vessels were either slain or made
									prisoners.

Timocrates the Lacedaemonian was on board the Leucadian ship which went down near the
									merchant vessel; when he saw the ship sinking he killed himself;
									the body was carried into the harbour of Naupactus.

The Athenians then retired and raised a trophy on the place
									from which they had just sailed out to their victory. 
								 They took up the bodies and wrecks which were floating near
									their own shore, and gave back to the enemy, under a flag of
									truce, those which belonged to them.

The Lacedaemonians also set up a trophy of the victory which
									they had gained over the ships destroyed by them near the
									shore;

the single ship which they took they dedicated on the Achaean
									Rhium, close to the trophy. 
								 Then, fearing the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, they
									sailed away at nightfall to the Crisaean Gulf and to Corinth, all with the exception of the Leucadians.

And not long after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from
									Crete, which ought to have come to the assistance of Phormio
									before the battle, arrived at Naupactus. 
								 So the summer ended.

Before breaking up the fleet which had returned to Corinth and
									the Crisaean Gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, it
									being now the beginning of winter, wished to make an attempt,
									suggested by some Megarians, on Piraeus, the harbour of
									Athens. 
								 The entrance was unclosed and unguarded; as was natural, since
									the Athenians were complete masters of the sea.

Each sailor was to carry his cushion and his oar with its
									thong, and cross on foot with all haste from Corinth to the
									Athenian side of the Isthmus; they were to go to Megara and from
									Nisaea, the harbour of Megara, to launch forty ships which
									happened to be lying in the docks; thence they were to sail
									straight for the Piraeus.

No guard ships were stationed there, for no one ever
										expected that the enemy
									would attempt a surprise of this kind. 
								 As to an open and deliberate attack, how was he likely to
									venture on that? and if he even entertained such a design, would
									he not have been found out in time ?

The plan was immediately carried out. 
								 Arriving at night, they launched the ships from Nisaea and
									sailed away, but not to the Piraeus; the danger seemed too
									great, and also the wind is said to have been
									unfavourable. 
								 So they gave up their original idea and made for the projecting
									point of Salamis which looks towards Megara; here there was a
									fort, and three ships were stationed in order to prevent
									anything being conveyed by sea into or out of Megara. 
								 This fort they assailed, towed away the ships
									without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis which was
									unprepared for their attack.

By this time fire-signals had carried the alarm to
									Athens. 
								 Nothing which happened in the war caused a greater panic. 
								 The inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy had already
									sailed into the Piraeus; the belief in the Piraeus was that
									Salamis had been taken and that the enemy were on the point of
									sailing into the harbour, which, if they had been bolder, they
									might easily have done, and no wind would have prevented
									them.

But as soon as day dawned, the Athenians, coming down with the
									whole strength of the city to the Piraeus, launched their ships
									and, embarking in tumultuous haste, sailed to Salamis, while
									their landforces remained and guarded the Piraeus.

When the Peloponnesians saw the fleet coming they sailed
									quickly back to Nisaea, but not until they had ravaged the
									greater part of Salamis and taken many prisoners and much spoil,
									as well as the three ships which lay off the fort of
									Budorum. 
								 There was some apprehension about their own ships; for they had
									long been lain up and were not sea-worthy.

Arriving at Megara they marched back again to Corinth, and the
									Athenians, having failed to overtake them in Salamis, sailed
									back likewise. 
								 Henceforth they kept more careful watch over the Piraeus, among
									other precautions closing the entrance to the harbour.

About the same time, at the beginning of winter, Sitalces the
									Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas, the son of Alexander,
									king of Macedon, and upon the Thracian Chalcidians. 
								 There were two promises, of which he wished to perform one, and
									exact fulfilment of the other.

The promise of which he claimed fulfilment had been made to him
									by Perdiccas, when, being hard pressed at the 
									beginning of the war, he wanted Sitalces to reconcile him to the
										Athenians , and not to restore
									and place on the throne his brother Philip, who was his enemy;
									but Perdiccas did not keep his word. 
								 The other was a promise which Sitalces had himself made to the
									Athenians when he entered into alliance with them, that he would
									put an end to their war with the Chalcidians.

For these two reasons he invaded the country, taking with him
									Amyntas the son of Philip, whom he intended to make king of
									Macedon, and also certain Athenian envoys who had just come to
									remind him of his engagement, and an Athenian commander
									Hagnon. 
								 For the Athenians on their part were bound to assist him
									against the Chalcidians with ships and with as large an army as
									they could provide.

Accordingly Sitalces, beginning with the Odrysae, made a levy
									of all his Thracian subjects dwelling between Mount Haemus and Mount Rhodope as far
									as the shores of the Euxine and of the Hellespont. 
								 Beyond the Haemus he made a levy of the Getae and of all the
									tribes lying more towards the Euxine on this side of the
									Ister. 
								 Now the Getae and their neighbours border on the Scythians, and
									are equipped like them, for they are all horse-archers.

He also summoned to his standard many of the highland
									Thracians, who are independent and carry dirks; they are called
									Dii, and most of them inhabit Mount Rhodopè; of these some were
									attracted by pay, while others came, as volunteers.

He further called out the Agrianians, the Laeaeans, and the
									other Paeonian nations who were his subjects. 
								 These tribes were the last within his empire; they extended as
									far as the Graaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which rises
									in Mount Scombrus and flows through the country of the Graaeans
									and Laeaeans;

there his dominion ended and the independent Paeonians
									began. 
								 In the direction of the Triballi, who are likewise
									independent, the Treres and the Tilataeans formed his
									boundary. 
								 These tribes dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and reach
									westward as far as the Oscius. 
								 This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and the
									Hebrus, an uninhabited and extensive range which adjoins
									Rhodopè.

The empire of the Odrysae measured by the coast-line reaches
									from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the Ister in the Euxine. 
								 The voyage round can be made by a merchant vessel, if the wind
									is favourable the whole way, at the quickest in four days and as
									many nights. 
								 Or an expeditious traveller going by land from Abdera to the
									mouth of the Ister, if he takes the shortest route, will
									accomplish the journey in eleven days.

Such was the extent of the Odrysian empire towards the sea: up
									the country the land journey from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and
									to the Strymon, this being the longest line which can be drawn
									from the sea into the interior, may be accomplished by an
									expeditious traveller in thirteen days.

The tribute which was collected from the Hellenic cities and
									from all the barbarous nations in the reign of Seuthes, the
									successor of Sitalces, under whom the amount was greatest, was
									valued at about four hundred talents of coined money , reckoning only gold and
									silver. 
								 Presents of gold and silver equal in value to the tribute,
									besides stuffs embroidered or plain and other articles, were
									also brought, not only to the king himself, but to the inferior
									chiefs and nobles of the Odrysae.

For their custom was the opposite of that which prevailed in
									the Persian kingdom; they were more ready to receive than to
									give; and he who asked and was refused was not so much
									discredited as he who refused when he was asked. 
								 The same custom prevailed among the other Thracians in a less
									degree, but among the Odrysae, who were richer, more
									extensively; nothing could be done without presents.

By these means the kingdom became very powerful,
									and in revenue and general prosperity exceeded all the nations
									of Europe which lie between the Ionian Sea and the Euxine; in
									the size and strength of their army being second only, though
									far inferior, to the Scythians.

For if the Scythians were united, there is no nation which
									could compare with them, or would be capable of resisting
										them ; I do not say in Europe, but even in
									Asia— not that they are at all on a level with other nations in
									sense, or in that intelligence which uses to advantage the
									ordinary means of life.

Such was the great country over which Sitalces ruled. 
								 When he had collected his army and his preparations were complete he marched into
									Macedonia, passing first of all through his own territory, and
									then through Cercinè, a desert mountain which lies between the
									Sinti and the Paeonians. 
								 He went by the road which he had himself constructed when he
									made his expedition against the Paeonians and cut down the
									forest.

As he left the Odrysian territory in going through the mountain
									he had on the right hand the Paeonians and on the left hand the
									Sinti and Maedi; on quitting the mountain he arrived at Doberus
									in Paeonia.

He lost no part of his army on the march, except by sickness,
									but rather increased it; for many of the independent Thracian
									tribes followed him of their own accord in hopes of
									plunder. 
								 The whole number of his forces was estimated at a hundred and
									fifty thousand, of which about two-thirds were infantry and the
									rest cavalry.

The largest part of the cavalry was furnished by the Odrysae
									themselves, and the next largest by the Getae. 
								 Of the infantry, those armed with dirks who came from the
									independent tribes of Mount Rhodopè were the most warlike. 
								 The remainder of the army was a mixed multitude, chiefly
									formidable from its numbers.

Having mustered at Doberus, they made ready to 
									descend over the heights into the plains of Macedonia, which
									were the territory of Perdiccas.

There is an upper Macedonia, which is inhabited by Lyncestians,
									Elimiots, and other tribes; these are the allies and tributaries
									of the lower Macedonians, but have kings of their own.

The maritime country which we now call Macedonia was conquered
									and formed into a kingdom by Alexander the father of Perdiccas
									and his ancestors the Temenidae, who originally came from
										Argos . 
								 They defeated and drove out of Pieria the Pierians, who
									afterwards settled in Phagres and other places at the foot of
									Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon; the land which lies under
									Mount Pangaeus towards the sea is still called the Pierian
									vale. 
								 They also drove out of Bottia, as it is called, the Bottiaeans,
									who are now the neighbours of the Chalcidians, and they acquired
									a narrow strip of Paeonia by the river Axius, reaching down to
									Pella and the sea.

Beyond the Axius they possess the country called Mygdonia
									reaching to the Strymon, out of which they have driven the
									Edonians.

They expelled from the country still called Eordia the
									Eordians, of whom the greater part perished, but a small remnant
									of them settled in the neighbourhood of Physca; and from Almopia
									the Almopians.

They and their subjects further subdued and still hold various
									places belonging to other tribes, Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia,
									and a great part of the original Macedonia. 
								 But the whole of this. country is now called Macedonia, and was
									under the rule of Perdiccas the son of Alexander at the time of
									the invasion of Sitalces.

The Macedonians were unable to defend themselves against the
									onset of so vast a host; they therefore retired into their
									strongholds and forts, which at that time were few.

For those which now exist were built by Archelaus the son of
									Perdiccas, who, when he became king, made straight roads and in
									various ways improved the country. 
								 
								 In his force of cavalry and infantry and in his military
									resources generally he surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him.

The Thracian army, leaving Doberus, invaded first of all the
									country which had formerly been the principality of Philip, and
									took Eidomenè by storm. 
								 Gortynia, Atalantè, and some other towns came to terms out of
									regard for Amyntas the son of Philip, who accompanied the
									expedition. 
								 They also besieged but failed to take Europus; they next
									advanced into that part of Macedonia which lay on the left of
									Pella and Cyrrhus.

Farther south into Bottiaea and Pieria they did not penetrate,
									but were content to ravage the territory of Mygdonia, Grestonia,
									and Anthemus.

The Macedonians had no idea of facing them with infantry, but
									sent for additional cavalry from their allies in the upper part
									of the country, and, although a handful of men, dashed in
									amongst the great Thracian host wherever they pleased. 
								 No one withstood their onset; for they were excellent horsemen
									and well protected with coats of mail. 
								 But hemmed in as they continually were by a multitude many
									times their own number, they ran into great danger. 
								 At last, feeling that they were not strong enough to encounter
									such superiority of force, they desisted.

Sitalces now held a conference with Perdiccas touching the
									matters which gave occasion to the war. 
								 The fleet which the Athenians had promised never arrived; for
									not believing that Sitalces would come they only sent gifts and
									envoys to him. 
								 After waiting for them in vain he despatched a part of his army
									against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and, driving them within
									their walls, devastated the country.

While he was encamped in these parts, the Thessalians, who lie
									towards the south, the Magnesians and other
									dependants of the Thessalians, and all the Hellenes as far as
									Thermopylae were afraid that his army would move on them, and
									took measures of precaution.

Those independent Thracian tribes to the north beyond the
									Strymon who dwelt in the plains, namely the Panaeans,
									Odomantians, Droans, and Dersaeans, were also in great
									alarm.

A belief arose, which spread far and wide among the enemies of
									Athens, that the Athenians meant to lead their Odrysian allies
									against the rest of Hellas.

Meanwhile Sitalces overran and ravaged Chalciicè, Botticè, and
									Macedonia, but could not effect his objects; and, his army being
									without food and suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by
									his nephew, who next to himself had the greatest authority,
									Seuthes the son of Spardacus , to return home at once. 
								 Now Perdiccas had secretly gained over Seuthes, promising to
									give him his sister in marriage, with a portion.

And so Sitalces and his army, having remained thirty days in
									all, of which eight were passed among the Chalcidians, returned
									home in haste. 
								 Perdiccas in fulfilment of his promise gave his sister
									Stratonicè in marriage to Seuthes. 
								 Thus ended the expedition of Sitalces.

During the same winter the Athenian forces at Naupactus, after
									the Peloponnesian fleet had dispersed, made an expedition under the command of
									Phormio into the centre of Acarnania with four hundred hoplites
									of their own taken from the fleet and four hundred Messenian hoplites. 
								 They first coasted along towards Astacus and disembarked. 
								 From Stratus, Coronta, and other places they expelled those of
									the inhabitants whom they distrusted, and restoring Cynes the
									son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned to their ships. 
								 Oeniadae, of which the inhabitants, unlike the rest of the Acarnanians, were their persistent enemies,
									was unapproachable in winter.

For the town is in the midst of a marsh formed by the river Achelous,
									which, rising in Mount Pindus and passing first through the
									territory of the Dolopians, Agraeans, and Amphilochians, and
									then through the Acarnanian plain, at some distance from its
									mouth flows by the city of Stratus and finds an exit into the
									sea near Oeniadae: an expedition in winter is thus rendered
									impossible by the water.

Most of the islands called Echinades are situated opposite to
									Oeniadae and close to the mouth of the Achelous. 
								 The consequence is that the river, which is large, is always
									silting up: some of the islands have been already joined to the
									mainland, and very likely, at no distant period, they may all be
									joined to it. 
								 The stream is wide and strong and full of mud;

and the islands are close together and serve to connect the
									deposits made by the river, not allowing them to dissolve in the
									water. 
								 For, lying irregularly and not one behind the other, they
									prevent the river from finding a straight channel into the
									sea. 
								 These islands are small and uninhabited.

The story is that when Alcmaeon the son of Amphiaraus was
									wandering over the earth after the murder of his mother, he was
									told by Apollo that here he should find a home, the oracle
									intimating that he would never obtain deliverance from his
									terrors until he discovered some country which was not yet in
									existence and not seen by the sun at the time when he slew his
									mother; there he might settle, but the rest of the earth was
									accursed to him.

He knew not what to do, until at last, according to the story,
									he spied the deposit of earth made by the Achelous, and he
									thought that a place sufficient to support life must have
									accumulated in the long time during which he had been wandering
									since his mother's death. 
								 There, near Oeniadae, he settled, and, becoming 
									ruler, left to the country the name of his son Acarnan. 
								 Such is the tradition which has come down to us concerning
									Alcmaeon.

The Athenians under Phormio sailed back from Acarnania to
									Naupactus, and later at the beginning of spring returned to Athens, bringing with
									them the ships which they had captured, besides the prisoners of
									free birth whom they had taken in the naval engagements. 
								 These were exchanged man for man.

And so the winter ended, and with it the third year in the
									Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

IN the following summer, when the corn was in full ear, the
									Peloponnesians and their allies, under the command of
									Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, invaded Attica, and
									encamping wasted the country.

The Athenian cavalry as usual attacked them whenever an
									opportunity offered, and prevented the great body of the
									light-armed troops from going beyond their lines and injuring
									the lands near the city.

The invaders remained until their supplies were exhausted; they
									were then disbanded, and returned to their several homes.

No sooner had the Peloponnesians quitted Attica than the whole
									people of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnaeans, revolted from
									Athens. 
								 They had entertained the design before the war began, but the
									Lacedaemonians gave them no encouragement. 
								 And now they were not ready, and were compelled to revolt
									sooner than they had intended.

For they were waiting until they had completed the work of
									closing their harbours, raising walls, and building ships, and
									they had not as yet received from Pontus the force of archers,
									the corn and the other supplies for which they had sent.

But the inhabitants of Tenedos, who were not on good terms with
									them, and the Methymnaeans, and individual citizens who were of
									the opposite faction and were proxeni of Athens,
									turned informers and told the Athenians that the Mytilenaeans
									were forcibly making Mytilenè the centre of government for the
									whole island; that the preparations which they were pressing
									forward had been throughout undertaken by them in concert with
									the Lacedaemonians and with their Boeotian kinsmen, and meant
									revolt; and that if something were not immediately done, Lesbos
									would be lost to Athens.

The Athenians, who were suffering severely from the plague and
									from the war, of which they had begun to feel the full effects, refleeted that it
									was a serious matter to bring upon themselves a second war with
									a naval power like Lesbos, whose resources were unimpaired; and
									so, mainly because they wished that the charges might not be
									true, they at first refused to listen to them. 
								 But, when they had sent envoys to Mytilenè and found that the
									Mytilenaeans, in spite of remonstrances,, continued their
									preparations and persisted in the attempt to concentrate the
									government in Mytilenè, they took alarm and determined to be
									beforehand with them.

Without losing a moment, they sent to Lesbos, under the command
									of Cleïppides the son of Deinias, and two others, forty ships
									which had been intended to cruise about Peloponnesus.

They had heard that there was a festival of Apollo Maloeis held
									outside the walls in which the whole population took part, and
									that if they made haste they might hope to surprise them. 
								 The attempt would very likely succeed; but, if not, they might
									bid the Mytilenaeans give up their fleet and dismantle their
									walls, and in case they refused they might go to war with
									them.

So the ships sailed; and as there happened to be at Athens ten
									Mytilenaean triremes, serving in accordance with the terms of
									the alliance, the Athenians seized them and threw their crews
									into prison.

But the Mytilenaeans were warned by a messenger from Athens,
									who crossed to Euboea and went on foot to Geraestus; there he found a merchant vessel just about to sail; he
									took ship, and arriving at Mytilenè on the third day after he
									left Athens, announced the coming of the Athenian fleet. 
								 Whereupon the Mytilenaeans abstained from going out to the
									temple of Apollo Maloeis. 
								 They also kept good watch about their walls and harbours, and
									barricaded the unfinished works.

Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived. 
								 The commanders of the fleet, seeing that they were foiled, delivered the message entrusted to them;
									the city refused to yield and they commenced hostilities.

Taken by surprise, and unprepared for the war which was forced
									upon them, the Mytilenaeans came out once and made a show of
									fighting a little in front of the harbour; but they were soon
									driven back by the Athenian ships, and then they began to parley
									with the generals, in the hope of obtaining tolerable terms of
									some kind, and getting rid of the fleet for the time.

The Athenian generals accepted their proposals, they too
									fearing that they were not strong enough to make war against the
									whole island.

Having got the armistice, the Mytilenaeans sent envoys to
									Athens; one of them was a person who had given information
									against his fellow-citizens, but was now repentant.

They had a faint hope that the Athenians would be induced to
									withdraw their ships and believe in their good intentions. 
								 But as they did not really expect to succeed in their Athenian
									mission, they also sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, unperceived by
									the Athenian fleet, which was stationed at Malea to the
									north of the city .

After a troublesome voyage through the open sea, the envoys
									arrived at Lacedaemon and solicited aid for their countrymen.

The other envoys who had been sent to Athens met with no
									success. 
								 When they returned, the Mytilenaeans and the rest of Lesbos, with the
									exception of Methymna, commenced hostilities; the Methymnaeans,
									with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and a few of the allies, had come
									to the support of the Athenians.

The Mytilenaeans with their whole force sallied out against the
									Athenian camp, and a battle took place, in which they got the
									better; but they had no confidence in themselves, and, instead
									of encamping on the field, retired. 
								 They then remained quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement
									without the additional help which they were expecting from
									Peloponnesus and elsewhere. 
								 For Meleas a Lacedaemonian, and Hermaeondas a Theban, had now
									arrived at Mytilenè; they had been sent before the revolt, but
									the Athenian fleet anticipated them, and they sailed in by
									stealth after the battle in a single trireme. 
								 The envoys recommended the Mytilenaeans to send an embassy of
									their own in another trireme to accompany them on their return
									to Sparta; which they accordingly did.

The Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inactivity of their
									adversaries, summoned their allies, who came all the more readily because they saw
									that the Lesbians displayed no energy. 
								 They then anchored the fleet round the south of the city, and
									having fortified two camps, one on either side of it, they
									established a blockade of both the harbours.

Thus they excluded the Mytilenaeans from the sea. 
								 They likewise held the country in the immediate neighbourhood
									of their two camps; but the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians,
									who had now taken up arms, were masters of the rest of the
									island. 
								 At Malea the Athenians had, not a camp, but a station for their
									ships and for their market.

Such was the course of the war in Lesbos. 
								 In the same summer, and about the same time, the Athenians
										sent thirty ships to Peloponnesus; they were
									placed under the command of Asopius, the son of Phormio;

for the Acarnanians had desired them to send out a son or
									relation of Phormio to be their leader.

The ships in passing ravaged the coast of Laconia, and then
									Asopius sent most of them home, but kept twelve, with which he
									sailed to Naupactus. 
								 Next he made a general levy of the Acarnanians and led his
									forces against Oeniadae, his ships sailing up the river
									Achelous, while his army ravaged the country by land.

As the inhabitants refused to yield, he disbanded his
									land-forces, but himself sailed to Leucas and made a descent
									upon Nericus, where he and part of his army in returning to their ships were slain by the
									inhabitants, assisted by a few Peloponnesian guards.

The Athenians then put to sea, and received their dead from the
									Leucadians under a flag of truce.

The envoys whom the Mytilenaeans had sent out in their first
									vessel were told by the Lacedaemonians to come to the Olympic festival, in order that the
									allies, as well as themselves, might hear them and determine
									what should be done. 
								 So they went to Olympia, The Olympiad was that in which the
									Rhodian Dorieus won his second victory.

When the festival was over, the allies met in council, and the
									ambassadors spoke as follows:—

'We know, Lacedaemonians and allies, that all Hellenes
									entertain a fixed sentiment against those who in time of war revolt and desert an old
									alliance. 
								 Their new allies are delighted with them in as far as they
									profit by their aid; but they do not respect them, for they deem
									them traitors to their former friends.

And this opinion is reasonable enough; but only when the
									rebels, and those from whom they sever themselves,
									are naturally united by the same interests and feelings and
									equally matched in power and resources, and when there is no
									reasonable excuse for a revolt.

But our relation to the Athenians was of another sort, and no
									one should be severe upon us for deserting them in the hour of
									danger although we were honoured by them in time of peace.

'Since an alliance is our object, we will first address
									ourselves to the question of justice and honour. 
								 We know that no friendship between man and man, no league
									between city and city, can ever be permanent unless the friends
									or allies have a good opinion of each other's honesty, and are
									similar in general character. 
								 For the diversity in men's minds makes the difference in their
									actions.

'Now our alliance with the Athenians first began when you
									ceased to take part in the Persian War, and they remained to complete the work. 
								 But we were never the allies of the Athenians in their design
									of subjugating Hellas;

we were really the allies of the Hellenes, whom we sought to
									liberate from the Persians.

And while in the exercise of their command they claimed no
									supremacy, we were very ready to follow them. 
								 But our fears began to be aroused when we saw them relaxing
									their efforts against the Persians and imposing the yoke of
									their dominion upon the allies, who could not unite and defend
									themselves, for their interests were too various.

And so they were all enslaved, except ourselves and the
									Chians. 
								 We forsooth were independent allies, free men— that was the
									word— who fought at their side.

But, judging from previous examples, how could we any longer
									have confidence in our leaders? 
								 For they had subjugated others to whom, equally with ourselves,
									their faith was pledged; and how could we who
									survived expect to be spared if ever they had the power to
									destroy us?

'Had all the allies retained their independence, we should have
									had better assurance that they would leave us as we were; but when the majority had
									been subjugated by them, they might naturally be expected to
									take offence at our footing of equality; they would contrast us
									who alone maintained this equality with the majority who had
									submitted to them; they would also observe that in proportion as
									their strength was increasing, our isolation was increasing
									too.

Mutual fear is the only solid basis of alliance; for he who
									would break faith is deterred from aggression by the
									consciousness of inferiority. 
								 And why were we left independent?

Only because they thought that to gain an empire they must use
									fair words and win their way by policy and not by
									violence. 
								 On the one hand, our position was a witness to their
									character.

For, having an equal vote with them, we could not be supposed
									to have fought in their wars against our will, but those whom
									they attacked must have been in the wrong. 
								 On the other hand, they were thus enabled to use the powerful
									against the weak; they thought that they would leave us to the
									last;

when the lesser states were removed, the stronger would fall an
									easier prey. 
								 But if they had begun with us while the power of the allies was
									still intact, and we might have afforded a rallying-point, they
									would not so easily have mastered them.

Besides, our navy caused them some apprehension; they were
									afraid that we might join you, or some other great power, and
									that the union would be dangerous to them.

For a time, too, we saved ourselves by paying court to the
									people and to the popular leaders of the day.

But we were not likely to have survived long, judging by the
									conduct of the Athenians towards others, if this war had not
										arisen.

'What trust then could we repose in such a friendship or such a
									freedom as this? 
								 The civility which we showed to one another was at variance
									with our real feelings. 
								 They courted us in time of war because they were afraid of us,
									and we in time of peace paid a like attention to them. 
								 And the faith which is generally assured by mutual good-will
									had with us no other bond but mutual fear; from fear, and not
									from love, we were constrained to maintain the alliance, and
									which ever of us first thought that he could safely venture
									would assuredly have been the first to break it.

And therefore if any one imagines that we do wrong in striking
									first, because they delay the blow which we dread, and thinks
									that we should wait and make quite sure of their intentions, he
									is mistaken.

If we were really on an equality with them and in a position to
									counteract their designs and imitate their threatening attitude,
									how was it consistent with this equality that we had still to be
									at their mercy? 
								 The power of attack is always in their hands, and the power of
									anticipating attack should always be in ours.

'These were the reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, and the
									grievances which led us to revolt. 
								 They were clear enough to prove to all hearers the justice of
									our cause, and strong enough to alarm us and drive us to seek
									some deliverance. 
								 We have acted from no sudden impulse; long ago, before the war
									began, we sent envoys to you, and proposed to revolt. 
								 But we could not, because you refused our request. 
								 Now, however, when the Boeotians have invited us, we have at
									once obeyed the call. 
								 We were intending to make a double severance of ourselves, from
										the Hellenes and from the Athenians; from the
									guilt, that is, of oppressing the Hellenes, in concert with the
									Athenians, instead of aiding in their liberation, and from the
									ruin which the Athenians were sooner or later sure to bring upon
									us, unless we anticipated them.

But the step has been taken hastily and without due
									preparation; hence you are the more bound to receive us into
									alliance and to send us speedy help, thereby showing that you
									are ready to protect those who have claims upon you and to
									strike a blow at your enemies.

Never was there such an opportunity before. 
								 The Athenians are exhausted by pestilence and by a costly war;
									some of their ships are cruising about your shores; the
									remainder are threatening us;

so that they are not likely to have many to spare if you, in
									the course of this summer, make a second attack upon them by
									land and by sea. 
								 They will not be able to meet you at sea; or, if they do, they
									will have to withdraw their forces both from Lesbos and from
									Peloponnesus.

And let no one say to himself that he is going to incur a
									danger which will be his own on behalf of a country which is not
									his own. 
								 He may think that Lesbos is a long way off; but he will find
									that the help which we bring will be very near him. 
								 For the war will not be fought in Attica, as might be
									imagined;

but in those countries by which Attica is supported. 
								 The revenues of the Athenians are derived from their allies,
									and, if they subdue us, will be greater than ever; no one will
									revolt again, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we
									shall suffer worse things than those who have been enslaved
									already.

But, if you assist us heartily, you will gain the alliance of a
									great naval power, and a navy is your chief want; you will draw
									away the allies of the Athenians, who will fearlessly come over
									to you; thus you will more easily overthrow the power of
									Athens. 
								 And you will no longer incur, as in times past, the reproach of
									deserting those who revolt 
									 If you come forward as their liberators your final
									triumph will be assured.

'Do not then for very shame frustrate the hopes which the
									Hellenes rest on you, or dishonour the name of Olympian Zeus in whose temple we are in a
									manner suppliants, but be our allies and helpers. 
								 Do not betray us; we, the people of Mytilenè, risk our lives
									alone in the common cause of Hellas: universal will be the
									benefit which we confer if we succeed, and still more universal
									the ruin if you are inflexible and we fall.

Wherefore prove yourselves worthy of your reputation in Hellas,
									and be such as we in our fear would have you.' 
							 
							 
								 These were the words of the Mytilenaeans.

The Lacedaemonians and the allies immediately accepted their
									proposals and took the Lesbians into alliance. 
								 The confederates, who were present at Olympia, were told to
									make ready quickly for another expedition into Attica, and to
									assemble at the isthmus, bringing the usual contingent of
									two-thirds. 
								 The Lacedaemonians arrived first, and at once set to work
									making machines for hauling ships over the isthmus, from Corinth
									to the Saronic Gulf. 
								 For they intended to attack the Athenians both by sea and
									land.

But although they were energetic themselves, the other allies
									assembled slowly; they were gathering in their fruits and in no
									mood for war.

The Athenians, perceiving that the activity of the
									Lacedaemonians was due to a conviction of their weakness, determined to show them their mistake,
									and to prove that, without moving the fleet from Lesbos, they
									were fully able to repel this new force which threatened
									them. 
								 They manned a hundred ships, in which they embarked, both
									metics and citizens , all but the highest class and the Knights;
									they then set sail, and, after displaying their strength along
									the shores of the isthmus, made descents upon the Peloponnesian
									coast wherever they pleased.

The Lacedaemonians were astounded, and thought that the
									Lesbians had told them what was not true. 
								 Their allies too had not yet arrived, and they heard that the
									Athenians in the thirty ships which had been sent to cruise around Peloponnesus were
									wasting their country districts; and so, not knowing what else
									to do, they returned home.

However, they afterwards prepared a fleet to go to Lesbos, and
									ordered the allies to equip forty ships: these they placed under
									the command of Alcidas, who was to take them out.

When the Athenians saw that the Peloponnesians had gone home,
									they and their fleet of a hundred ships did the same.

At the time when the fleet was at sea, the Athenians had the
									largest number of ships which they ever had all together, effective and in good trim,
									although the mere number was as large or even larger at the
									commencement of the war.

For then there were a hundred which guarded Attica, Euboea, and
									Salamis, and another hundred which were cruising off
										Peloponnesus , not including the ships employed in blockading Potidaea
									and at other places; so that in one and the same summer their
									fleet in all numbered two hundred and fifty.

This and the money spent in the war against Potidaea was the
									chief call upon their treasury.

Every one of the hoplites engaged in the siege received two
										drachmae a-day, one for himself, and one for his servant; the
									original force amounted to three thousand , and this number was maintained as long as the siege
									lasted. 
								 Sixteen hundred more came with Phormio, but went away before the end . 
								 The sailors in the fleet all received the same pay as the
									soldiers. 
								 So great was the drain on the resources of the Athenians in the
									early part of the war, and such was the largest number of ships
									which they ever manned.

While the Lacedaemonians were at the isthmus, the Mytilenaeans
									and their auxiliaries marched against Methymna, which they expected to be betrayed to them, but, making an
									assault, and finding that they were mistaken, they went off to
									Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and, having strengthened the walls
									of these places and established their interest in them, they
									hastily returned. 
								 As soon as they had retired, the Methymnaeans retaliated by
									making an expedition against Antissa;

but the people of Antissa and their auxiliaries sallied out and
									defeated them with heavy loss; the survivors made a hasty
									retreat.

The Athenians heard that the Mytilenaeans were masters of the
									country, and that their own troops in Lesbos were not sufficient
									to confine them within the walls. 
								 So about the beginning of autumn they sent to Mytilenè, under
									the command of Paches the son of Epicurus, a thousand Athenian
									hoplites who handled the oars themselves.

On arriving, they surrounded the town with a single line of
									wall; and in some strong places forts were erected which formed
									part of the wall.

Thus Mytilenè was effectually blockaded both by sea and by
									land. 
								 The winter now began to set in.

The Athenians, being in want of money to carry on the siege,
									raised among themselves for the first time a property-tax of two hundred talents , and sent out twelve ships
									to collect tribute among the allies, under the command of
									Lysicles and four others.

He sailed to various places and exacted tribute;
									but as he was going up from Myus in Caria, through the plain of
									the Maeander, he was attacked at the hill of Sandius by the
									Carians and the Samians of Anaea , and, with a great part of his army, perished.

During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still besieged
									by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, began to suffer from the failure of
									provisions. 
								 They had no hope of assistance from Athens and no other chance
									of deliverance. 
								 So they and the Athenians who were shut up with them contrived
									a plan of forcing their way over the enemy's walls. 
								 The idea was suggested by Theaenetus the son of Tolmides, a
									diviner, and Eupompidas, the son of Daïmachus, one of their
									generals.

At first they were all desirous of joining, but afterwards half
									of them somehow lost heart, thinking the danger too great, and
									only two hundred and twenty agreed to persevere.

They first made ladders equal in length to the height of the
									enemy's wall, which they calculated by the help of the layers of
									bricks on the side facing the town, at a place where the wall
									had accidentally not been plastered. 
								 A great many counted at once, and, although some might make
									mistakes, the calculation would be oftener right than wrong; for
									they repeated the process again and again, and, the distance not
									being great, they could see the wall distinctly enough for their
									purpose.

In this manner they ascertained the proper length of the
									ladders, taking as a measure the thickness of the bricks.

The Peloponnesian wall was double, and consisted of an inner
									circle looking towards Plataea, and an outer intended to guard against an attack from
									Athens; they were at a distance of about sixteen feet from one
									another.

This interval of sixteen feet was partitioned off into lodgings
									for the soldiers, by which the two walls were joined together,
									so that they appeared to form one thick wall with
									battlements on both sides.

At every tenth battlement there were large towers, filling up
									the space between the walls, and extending both to the inner and
									outer face; there was no way at the side of the towers, but only
									through the middle of them.

During the night, whenever there was storm and rain, the
									soldiers left the battlements and kept guard from the towers,
									which were not far from each other and were covered
									overhead. 
								 Such was the plan of the wall with which Plataea was invested.

When the Plataeans had completed their preparations they took
									advantage of a night on which there was a storm of wind and rain and no moon and
									sallied forth. 
								 They were led by the authors of the attempt. 
								 First of all they crossed the ditch which surrounded the town;
									then they came right up to the wall of the enemy. 
								 The guard did not discover them, for the night was so dark that
									they could not be seen, while the clatter of the storm drowned
									the noise of their approach.

They marched a good way apart from each other, that the
									clashing of their arms might not betray them; and they were
									lightly equipped, having the right foot bare that they might be
									less liable to slip in the mud.

They now set about scaling the battlements, which they knew to
									be deserted, choosing a space between two of the towers. 
								 Those who carried the ladders went first and placed them
									against the wall; they were followed by twelve others, armed
									only with sword and breastplate, under the command of Ammeas the
									son of Coroebus: he was the first to mount; after him came the
									twelve, ascending the wall and proceeding to the towers on the
									right and left, six to each . 
								 To these succeeded more men lightly armed with short spears,
									others following who bore their shields, that they might have
									less difficulty in mounting the wall;

the shields were to be handed to them as soon as
									they were near the enemy. 
								 A considerable number had ascended, when they were discovered
									by the guards in the towers.

One of the Plataeans, taking hold of the battlements, threw
									down a tile which made a noise in falling: immediately a shout
									was raised and the army rushed out upon the wall; for in the
									dark and stormy night they did not know what the alarm
									meant. 
								 At the same time, in order to distract their attention, the
									Plataeans who were left in the city made a sally against the
									Peloponnesian wall on the side opposite to the place at which
									their friends were getting over.

The besiegers were in great excitement, but every one remained
									at his own post, and dared not stir to give assistance, being at
									a loss to imagine what was happening.

The three hundred who were appointed to act in any sudden
									emergency marched along outside the walls towards the spot from
									which the cry proceeded;

and fire-signals indicating danger were raised towards
									Thebes. 
								 But the Plataeans in the city had numerous counter signals
									ready on the wall, which they now lighted and held up, thereby
									hoping to render the signals of the enemy unintelligible, that
									so the Thebans, misunderstanding the true state of affairs,
									might not arrive until the men had escaped and were in safety.

Meanwhile the Plataeans were scaling the walls. 
								 The first party had mounted, and, killing the sentinels, had gained possession of the towers on
									either side. 
								 Their followers now began to occupy the passages, lest the
									enemy should come through and fall upon them. 
								 Some of them placed ladders upon the wall against the towers,
									and got up more men. 
								 A shower of missiles proceeding both from the upper and lower
									parts of the towers kept off all assailants. 
								 Meanwhile the main body of the Plataeans, who were still below,
									applied to the wall many ladders at once, and, pushing down the
									battlements, made their way over through the space
									between the towers.

As each man got to the other side he halted upon the edge of
									the ditch, whence they shot darts and arrows at any one who came
									along under the wall and attempted to impede their
									passage.

When they had all passed over, those who had occupied the
									towers came down, the last of them not without great difficulty,
									and proceeded towards the ditch. 
								 By this time the three hundred were upon them;

they had lights, and the Plataeans, standing on the edge of the
									ditch, saw them all the better out of the darkness, and shot
									arrows and threw darts at them where their bodies were exposed;
									they themselves were concealed by the darkness, while the enemy
									were dazed by their own lights. 
								 And so the Plataeans, down to the last man of them all, got
									safely over the ditch, though with great exertion and only after
									a hard struggle;

for the ice in it was not frozen hard enough to bear, but was
									half water, as is commonly the case when the wind is from the
									east and not from the north. 
								 And the snow which the east wind brought in the night had
									greatly swollen the water, so that they could scarcely accomplish the
										passage It was the violence of the storm, however,
									which enabled them to escape at all.

From the ditch the Plataeans, leaving on the right hand the
									shrine of Androcrates, ran all together along the road to Thebes. 
								 They made sure that no one would ever suspect them of having
									fled in the direction of their enemies. 
								 On their way they saw the Peloponnesians pursuing them with
									torches on the road which leads to Athens by Cithaeron and
									Dryoscephalae.

For nearly a mile the Plataeans continued on the Theban road;
									they then turned off and went by the way up the mountain leading
									to Erythrae and Hysiae, and so, getting to the hills, they
									escaped to Athens. 
								 Their number was two hundred and twelve , though they had been originally more, for some of them
									went back to the city and never got over the wall; one who was
									an archer was taken at the outer ditch.

The Peloponnesians at length gave up the pursuit and returned
									to their lines. 
								 But the Plataeans in the city, knowing nothing of what had
									happened, for those who had turned back had informed them that
									not one was left alive, sent out a herald at daybreak, wanting
									to make a truce for the burial of the dead; they then discovered
									the truth and returned. 
								 Thus the Plataeans scaled the wall and escaped.

At the end of the same winter Salaethus the Lacedaemonian was
									despatched in a trireme from Lacedaemon to Mytilenè. 
								 He sailed to Pyrrha, and thence, proceeding on foot, made his
									way, by the channel of a torrent at a place where the line of
									the Athenian wall could be crossed, undiscovered into
									Mytilenè. 
								 He told the government that there was to be an invasion of
									Attica, and that simultaneously the forty ships which were
									coming to their assistance would arrive at Lesbos; he himself
									had been sent in advance to bring the news and take charge of
									affairs.

Whereupon the Mytilenaeans recovered their spirits, and were
									less disposed to make terms with the Athenians. 
								 So the winter ended, and with it the fourth year in the
									Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

With the return of summer the Peloponnesians despatched the two
									and forty ships which they intended for Mytilenè in charge of Alcidas,
									the Lacedaemonian admiral. They and their allies then invaded Attica, in order that
									the Athenians, embarrassed both by sea and land, might have
									their attention distracted from the ships sailing to
									Mytilenè. 
								 Cleomenes led the invasion.

He was acting in the place of his nephew, the king
									Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was still a minor.

All the country which they had previously overrun, wherever
									anything had grown up again, they ravaged afresh, and devastated
									even those districts which they had hitherto spared. 
								 This invasion caused greater distress to the Athenians than
									any, except the second.

For the Peloponnesians, who were daily expecting to hear from
									Lesbos of some action on the part of the fleet, which they
									supposed by this time to have crossed the sea, pursued their
									ravages far and wide. 
								 But when none of their expectations were realized, and their
									food was exhausted, they retired and dispersed to their several
									cities.

Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans, finding as time went on that the
									ships from Peloponnesus never came, and that their provisions had run short, were
									obliged to make terms with the Athenians.

The immediate cause was as follows:— Salaethus himself began to
									despair of the arrival of the ships, and therefore he put into
									the hands of the common people (who had hitherto been
									light-armed) shields and spears, intending to lead them out
									against the Athenians.

But, having once received arms, they would no longer obey their
									leaders; they gathered into knots and insisted that the nobles
									should bring out the corn and let all share alike; if not, they
									would themselves negotiate with the Athenians and surrender the
									city.

The magistrates, knowing that they were helpless, and that they
									would be in peril of their lives if they were left out of the convention, concluded
									a general agreement with Paches and his army, stipulating that
									the fate of the Mytilenaeans should be left in the hands of the
									Athenians at home. 
								 They were to receive him and his forces into the city; but
									might send an embassy to Athens on their own
									behalf. 
								 Until the envoys returned, Paches was not to bind, enslave, or
									put to death any Mytilenaean.

These were the terms of the capitulation. 
								 Nevertheless, when the army entered, those Mytilenaeans who had
									been principally concerned with the Lacedaemonians were in an
									agony of fear, and could not be satisfied until they had taken
									refuge at the altars. 
								 Paches raised them up, and promising not to hurt them,
									deposited them at Tenedos until the Athenians should come to a
									decision.

He also sent triremes to Antissa, of which he gained
									possession, and took such other military measures as he deemed
									best.

The forty ships of the Peloponnesians, which should have gone
									at once to Mytilenè, lost time about the Peloponnesian, and proceeded very
									leisurely on their voyage. 
								 They arrived safely at Delos, before they were heard of at
									Athens; but on touching at Icarus and Myconus they found, too
									late, that Mytilenè was taken.

Wanting to obtain certain information, they sailed to Embatum
									near Erythrae, which they reached, but not until seven days
									after the fall of Mytilenè. 
								 Having now made sure of the fact, they consulted as to what
									measures should next be taken, and Teutiaplus, an Elean,
									addressed them as follows:—

'My opinion, Alcidas, and you, my fellow-commanders of the
									Peloponnesian forces, is that we should attack Mytilenè at once, just as we are, before
									our arrival is known.

In all probability we shall find that men who have recently
									gained possession of a city will be much off their guard, and
									entirely so at sea, on which element they do not fear the attack
									of an enemy, and where at this moment we can strike with
									effect. 
								 Probably too their land forces, in the carelessness of victory,
									will be scattered up and down among the houses of
									the city.

If we were to fall upon them suddenly by night, with the help
									of our friends inside, should there be any left, I have no doubt
									that Mytilenè would be ours.

The danger should not deter us; for we should consider that the
									execution of a military surprise is always dangerous, and that
									the general who is never taken off his guard himself, and never
									loses an opportunity of striking at an unguarded foe, will be
									most likely to succeed in war.'

His words failed to convince Alcidas; whereupon some Ionian
									exiles and the Lesbians who were on board the fleet recommended that, if this enterprise appeared too
									hazardous, he should occupy one of the Ionian towns or the
									Aeolian Cymè: having thus established their head-quarters in a
									city, the Peloponnesians might raise the standard of revolt in
									Ionia. 
								 There was a good chance of success, for every one was glad of
									his arrival; they might cut off a main source of Athenian
									revenue; and although they themselves would incur expense, for
									the Athenians would blockade them , the attempt was worth making. 
								 Pissuthnes might very likely be persuaded to co-operate.

But Alcidas objected to this proposal equally with the last;
									his only idea was, now that he had failed in saving Mytilenè, to
									get back as fast as he could to Peloponnesus.

Accordingly he sailed from Embatum along the coast, touching at
									Myonnesus in the terriory of Teos; he there slew most of the captives whom he had
									taken on his voyage.

He then put into harbour at Ephesus, where a deputation from
									the Samians of Anaea came to him. 
								 They told him that it was an ill manner of liberating Hellas,
									to have put to death men who were not his enemies
									and were not lifting a hand against him, but were allies of
									Athens from necessity: if he went on in this way he would
									convert few of his enemies into friends, and many of his friends
									into enemies.

He was convinced by them, and allowed such of the Chian
									prisoners as he had not yet put to death and some others to go
									free. 
								 They had been easily taken, because, when people saw the ships,
									instead of flying, they came close up to them under the idea
									that they were Athenian; the thought never entered into their
									minds that while the Athenians were masters of the sea,
									Peloponnesian ships would find their way across the Aegean to
									the coast of Ionia.

From Ephesus Alcidas sailed away in haste, or rather fled; for
									while he was at anchor near Clarus he had been sighted by the Athenian sacred
									vessels, Paralus and Salaminia, which happened to be on a voyage
									from Athens. 
								 In fear of pursuit he hurried through the open sea, determined
									to stop nowhere, if he could help it, until he reached
									Peloponnesus.

News of him and his fleet was brought to Paches from the
									country of Erythrae, and indeed kept coming in from all
									sides. 
								 For Ionia not being fortified, there was great apprehension
									lest the Peloponnesians, as they sailed along the coast, might
									fall upon the cities and plunder them, even though they had no
									intention of remaining. 
								 And the Paralus and Salaminia reported that they had themselves
									seen him at Clarus. 
								 Paches eagerly gave chase and pursued him as far as the island
									of Patmos, but, seeing that he was no longer within reach, he
									returned.

Not having come up with the fleet of the Peloponnesians upon
									the open sea, he congratulated himself that they had not been
									overtaken somewhere near land, where they would have been forced
									to put in and fortify themselves on shore, and the Athenians
									would have had the trouble of watching and blockading them.

As he was sailing along the coast on his return he touched at
									Notium, the port of Colophon. Here some inhabitants of the upper town had taken up
									their abode; for it had been captured by Itamenes and the
									Barbarians, who had been invited into the city by a certain
									local faction.

The capture took place about the time of the second invasion of
									Attica. 
								 The refugees who settled in Notium again quarrelled among
									themselves. 
								 The one party, having introduced Arcadian and Barbarian
									auxiliaries whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, stationed
									them in a fortified quarter of the town; the Persian faction
									from the upper city of Colophon joined them and were living with
									them. 
								 The other party had retired from the city, and being now in
									exile, called in Paches.

He proposed to Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the
									fortress, that they should hold a conference, undertaking, if
									they could not agree, to put him back in the fort, safe and
									sound. 
								 So he came out, and Paches kept him in custody without
									fetters. 
								 In the meantime he made an attack upon the unsuspecting
									garrison, took the fortress, and slaughtered all the Arcadians
									and Barbarians whom he found within. 
								 He then conducted Hippias into the fort, according to the
									agreement, and when he was inside seized him and shot him to
									death with arrows.

He next handed over Notium to the Colophonians, excluding the
									Persian party. 
								 The Athenians afterwards gathered together all the Colophonians
									who could be found in the neighboring cities and colonised the
									place, to which they gave laws like their own, under new
									founders whom they sent out from Athens.

On returning to Lesbos, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and
									finding Salaethus, the Lacedaemonian governor, concealed in Mytilenè, sent him
									to Athens. 
								 He also sent thither the Mytilenaeans whom he had
									deposited in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to have been
									implicated in the revolt.

He then dismissed the greater part of his army, and, by the aid
									of the remainder, settled as seemed best to him the affairs of
									Mytilenè and Lesbos.

When the captives arrived at Athens the Athenians instantly put
									Salaethus to death, although he made various offers, and among other things promised
									to procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea,
									which was still blockaded.

Concerning the other captives a discussion was held, and in
									their indignation the Athenians determined to put to death not
									only the men then at Athens, but all the grown-up citizens of
									Mytilenè, and to enslave the women and children; the act of the
									Mytilenaeans appeared inexcusable, because they were not
									subjects like the other states which had revolted, but
									free. 
								 That Peloponnesian ships should have had the audacity to find
									their way to Ionia and assist the rebels contributed to increase
									their fury; and the action showed that the revolt was a long premeditated affairs .

So they sent a trireme to Paches announcing their
									determination, and bidding him put the Mytilenaeans to death at
									once.

But on the following day a kind of remorse seized them; they
									began to reflect that a decree which doomed to destruction not
									only the guilty, but a whole city, was cruel and
									monstrous.

The Mytilenaean envoys who were at Athens perceived the change of feeling, and they and the
									Athenians who were in their interest prevailed on the
									magistrates to bring the question again before the people; this
									they were the more willing to do, because they saw themselves
									that the majority of the citizens were anxious to have an
									opportunity given them of reconsidering their
									decision.

An assembly was again summoned, and different opinions were
									expressed by different speakers. 
								 In the former assembly, Cleon the son of Cleaenetus had carried
									the decree condemning the Mytilenaeans to death. 
								 He was the most violent of the citizens, and at that time
									exercised by far the greatest influence over the people . 
								 And now he came forward a second time and spoke as follows:—

'I have remarked again and again that a democracy cannot manage
									an empire, but never more than now, when I see you regetting your
									condemnation of the Mytilenaeans.

Having no fear or suspicion of one another in daily life , you deal with your allies upon the same principle,. and
									you do not consider that whenever you yield to them out of pity
									or are misled by their specious tales, you are guilty of a
									weakness dangerous to yourselves, and receive no thanks from
									them. 
								 You should remember that your empire is a despotism exercised over unwilling subjects, who are always
									conspiring against you; they do not obey in return for any
									kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in so far as
									you are their masters; they have no love of you, but they are
									held down by force.

Besides, what can be more detestable than to be perpetually
									changing our minds? 
								 We forget that a state in which the laws, though imperfect, are
									inviolable, is better off than one in which the laws are good
									but ineffective . 
								 Dullness and modesty are a more useful combination than
									cleverness and licence; and the more simple sort generally make
									better citizens than the more astute.

For the latter desire to be thought wiser than the laws ; they want to be always getting their own way in public
									discussions; they think that they can nowhere have
									a finer opportunity of displaying their intelligence , and their folly generally ends in the ruin of their
									country; whereas the others, mistrusting their own capacity,
									admit that the laws are wiser than themselves: they do not
									pretend to criticise the arguments of a great speaker; and being
									impartial judges, not ambitious rivals, they hit the mark. 
								 That is the spirit in which we should act;

not suffering ourselves to be so excited by our own cleverness
									in a war of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to
									our own better judgment.

'I myself think as I did before, and I wonder at those who have
									brought forward the case of the Mytilenaeans again, thus interposing a delay which
									is in the interest of the evil-doer. 
								 For after a time the anger of the sufferer waxes dull, and he
									pursues the offender with less keenness; but the vengeance which
									follows closest upon the wrong is most adequate to it and exacts
									the fullest retribution. 
								 And again I wonder who will answer me, and whether he will
									attempt to show that the crimes of the Mytilenaeans are a
									benefit to us, or that when we suffer, our allies suffer with
									us.

Clearly he must be some one who has such confidence in his
									powers of speech as to contend 
									that you never adopted what was most certainly your
										resolution ; or else he
									must be some one who, under the inspiration of a bribe,
									elaborates a sophistical speech in the hope of diverting you
									from the point.

In such rhetorical contests the city gives away the prizes to
									others, while she takes the risk upon herself.

And you are to blame, for you order these contests amiss. 
								 When speeches are to be heard, you are too fond of using your
									eyes, but, where actions are concerned, you trust your ears; you
										estimate the possibility of future enterprises
									from the eloquence of an orator, but as to accomplished facts,
									instead of accepting ocular demonstration, you believe only what
									ingenious critics tell you .

No men are better dupes, sooner deceived by novel notions, or
									slower to follow approved advice. 
								 You despise what is familiar, while you are worshippers of
									every new extravagance. 
								 Not a man of you but would be an orator if he could;

when he cannot, he will not yield the palm to a more successful
									rival: he would fain show that he does not let his wits come
									limping after, but that he can praise a sharp remark before it
									is well out of another's mouth; he would like to be as quick in
									anticipating what is said, as he is slow in foreseeing its
									consequences.

You are always hankering after an ideal state, but you do not
									give your minds even to what is straight before you. 
								 In a word, you are at the mercy of your own ears, and sit like
									spectators attending a performance of sophists, but very unlike
									counsellors of a state.

'I want you to put aside this trifling, and therefore I say to
									you that no single city has ever injured us so deeply as Mytilenè.

I can excuse those who find our rule too heavy to bear, or who
									have revolted because the enemy has compelled them. 
								 But islanders who had walls, and were unassailable by our
									enemies, except at sea, and on that element were sufficiently
									protected by a fleet of their own, who were independent and
									treated by us with the highest regard, when they act thus, they
									have not revolted (that word would imply that they were
									oppressed), but they have rebelled, and entering the ranks of
									our bitterest enemies have conspired with them to seek our
									ruin. 
								 And surely this is far more atrocious than if they
									had been led by motives of ambition to take up arms against us
									on their own account.

They learned nothing from the misfortunes of their neighbours
									who had already revolted and been subdued by us, nor did the
									happiness of which they were in the enjoyment make them hesitate
									to court destruction. 
								 They trusted recklessly to the future, and cherishing hopes
									which, if less than their wishes, were greater than their
									powers, they went to war, preferring might to right. 
								 No sooner did they seem likely to win than they set upon us,
									although we were doing them no wrong.

Too swift and sudden a rise is apt to make cities insolent and,
									in general, ordinary good-fortune is safer than
									extraordinary. 
								 Mankind apparently find it easier to drive away adversity than
									to retain prosperity. 
								 We should from the first have made no difference between the
									Mytilenaeans and the rest of our allies, and then their
									insolence would never have risen to such a height;

for men naturally despise those who court them, but respect
									those who do not give way to them. 
								 Yet it is not too late to punish them as their crimes
									deserve. 
								 And do not absolve the people while you throw the blame upon
									the nobles.

For they were all of one mind when we were to be
									attacked. 
								 Had the people deserted the nobles and come over to us, they
									might at this moment have been reinstated in their city; but
									they considered that their safety lay in sharing the dangers of
									the oligarchy, and therefore they joined in the revolt. 
								 Reflect:

if you impose the same penalty upon those of your allies who
									wilfully rebel and upon those who are constrained by the enemy,
									which of them will not revolt upon any pretext however trivial,
									seeing that, if he succeed, he will be free, and, if he fail, no
									irreparable evil will follow? 
								 We in the meantime shall have to risk our lives and our
									fortunes against every one in turn.

When conquerors we shall recover only a ruined city, and, for
									the future, the revenues which are our strength will be lost to
										us . 
								 But if we fail, the number of our adversaries will
									be increased. 
								 And when we ought to be employed in repelling the enemies with
									whom we have to do, we shall be wasting time in fighting against
									our own allies.

'Do not then hold out a hope, which eloquence can secure or
									money buy, that they are to be excused and that their error is
										to be deemed human and venial. 
								 Their attack was not unpremeditated; that might have been an
									excuse for them;

but they knew what they were doing. 
								 This was my original contention, and I still maintain that you
									should abide by your former decision, and not be misled either
									by pity, or by the charm of words, or by a too forgiving
									temper.

There are no three things more prejudicial to your power. 
								 Mercy should be reserved for the merciful, and not thrown away
									upon those who will have no compassion on us, and who must by
									the force of circumstances always be our enemies. 
								 And our charming orators will still have an arena , but one in which the questions at stake will not be so
									grave, and the city will not pay so dearly for her brief
									pleasure in listening to them, while they for a good speech get
									a good fee. 
								 Lastly, forgiveness is naturally shown to those who, being
									reconciled, will continue friends, and not to those who will
									always remain what they were, and will abate nothing of their
									enmity.

In one word, if you do as I say, you will do what is just to
									the Mytilenaeans, and also what is expedient for yourselves;
									but, if you take the opposite course, they will not be grateful
									to you, and you will be self-condemned. 
								 For, if they were right in revolting, you must be wrong in
									maintaining your empire. 
								 But if,-right or wrong, you are resolved to rule, then rightly
									or wrongly they must be chastised for your good. 
								 Otherwise you must give up your empire, and, when
									virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you
									please.

Punish them as they would have punished you; let not those who
									have escaped appear to have less feeling than those who
									conspired against them. 
								 Consider: what might not they have been expected to do if they
									had conquered?— especially since they were the aggressors.

For those who wantonly attack others always rush into extremes,
									and sometimes, like these Mytilenaeans, to their own
									destruction. 
								 They know the fate which is reserved for them by an enemy who
									is spared: when a man is injured wantonly he is more dangerous
									if he escape than the enemy who has only suffered what he has
										inflicted .

Be true then to yourselves, and recall as vividly as you can
									what you felt at the time; think how you would have given the
									world to crush your enemies, and now take your revenge. 
								 Do not be soft-hearted at the sight of their distress, but
									remember the danger which was once hanging over your
									heads. 
								 Chastise them as they deserve, and prove by an example to your
									other allies that rebellion will be punished with death. 
								 If this is made quite clear to them, your attention will no
									longer be diverted from your enemies by wars against your own
									allies.'

Such were the words of Cleon; and after him Diodotus the son of
									Eucrates, who in the previous assembly had been the chief opponent of the decree which
									condemned the Mytilenaeans, came forward again and spoke as
									follows:—

'I am far from blaming those who invite us to reconsider our
									sentence upon the Mytilenaeans, nor do I approve of the censure
									which has been cast on the practice of deliberating more than
									once about matters so critical. 
								 In my opinion the two things most adverse to good counsel are
									haste and passion; the former is generally a mark 
									of folly, the latter of vulgarity and narrowness of mind.

When a man insists that words ought not to be our guides in action he is either wanting in sense or wanting in honesty: he
									is wanting in sense if he does not see that there is no other
									way in which we can throw light on the unknown future; and he is
									not honest if, seeking to carry a discreditable measure, and
									knowing that he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he reflects
									that he can slander well and terrify his opponents and his
									audience by the audacity of his calumnies.

Worst of all are those who, besides other topics of abuse,
									declare that their opponent is hired to make an eloquent
									speech. 
								 If they accused him of stupidity only, when he failed in
									producing an impression he might go his way having lost his
									reputation for sense but not for honesty;

whereas he who is accused of dishonesty, even if he succeed, is
									viewed with suspicion, and, if he fail, is thought to be both
									fool and rogue. 
								 And so the city suffers; for she is robbed of her counsellors
									by fear. 
								 Happy would she be if such citizens could not speak at all, for
									then the people would not be misled.

The good citizen should prove his superiority as a speaker, not
									by trying to intimidate those who are to follow him in debate,
									but by fair argument; and the wise city ought not to give
									increased honour to her best counsellor, any more than she will
									deprive him of that which he has; while he whose proposal is
									rejected not only ought to receive no punishment, but should be
									free from all reproach.

Then he who succeeds will not say pleasant things contrary to
									his better judgment in order to gain a still higher place in
									popular favour, and he who fails will not be striving to attract
									the multitude to himself by like compliances.

'But we take an opposite course; and still worse. 
								 Even when we know a man to be giving the wisest counsel, a suspicion of corruption is set on
									foot; and from a jealousy which is perhaps groundless we allow
									the state to lose an undeniable advantage.

It has come to this, that the best advice when offered in plain
									terms is as much distrusted as the worst; and not only he who
									wishes to lead the multitude into the most dangerous courses
									must deceive them, but he who speaks in the cause of right must
									make himself believed by lying.

In this city, and in this city only, to do good openly and
									without deception is impossible, because you are too clever;
									and, when a man confers an unmistakable benefit on you, he is
									rewarded by a suspicion that, in some underhand manner, he gets
									more than he gives.

But, whatever you may suspect , when great interests are at stake, we who advise ought
									to look further and weigh our words more carefully than you
									whose vision is limited. 
								 And you should remember that we are accountable for our advice
									to you, but you who listen are accountable to nobody.

If he who gave and he who followed evil counsel suffered
									equally, you would be more reasonable in your ideas; but now,
									whenever you meet with a reverse, led away by the passion of the
									moment you punish the individual who is your adviser for his
									error of judgment, and your own error you condone, if the
									judgments of many concurred in it.

'I do not come forward either as an advocate of the
									Mytilenaeans or as their accuser; the question for us rightly considered is not, what are
									their crimes? but, what is for our interest?

If I prove them ever so guilty, I will not on that account bid
									you put them to death, unless it is expedient. 
								 Neither, if perchance there be some degree of
									excuse for them, would I have you spare them, unless it be
									clearly for the good of the state.

For I conceive that we are now concerned, not with the present,
									but with the future. 
								 When Cleon insists that the infliction of death will be
									expedient and will secure you against revolt in time to come, I,
									like him taking the ground of future expediency, stoutly
									maintain the contrary position;

and I would not have you be misled by the apparent fairness of
									his proposal, and reject the solid advantages of mine. 
								 You are angry with the Mytilenaeans, and the superior justice
									of his argument may for the moment attract you; but we are not
									at law with them, and do not want to be told what is just; we
									are considering a question of policy, and desire to know how we
									can turn them to account.

'To many offences less than theirs states have affixed. the
									punishment of death; nevertheless, excited by hope, men still risk their lives. 
								 No one when venturing on a perilous enterprise ever yet passed
									a sentence of failure on himself.

And what city when entering on a revolt ever imagined that the
									power which she had, whether her own or obtained from her
									allies, did not justify the attempt?

All are by nature prone to err both in public and in private
									life, and no law will prevent them. 
								 Men have gone through the whole catalogue of penalties in the
									hope that, by increasing their severity, they may suffer less at
									the hands of evil-doers. 
								 In early ages the punishments, even of the worst offences,
									would naturally be milder; but as time went on and mankind
									continued to transgress, they seldom stopped short of
									death.

And still there are transgressors. 
								 Some greater terror then has yet to be discovered; certainly
									death is no deterrent. 
								 For poverty inspires necessity with daring; and wealth
									engenders avarice in pride and insolence; and the various
									conditions of human life, as they severally fall 
									under the sway of some mighty and fatal power, lure men through
									their passions to destruction.

Desire and hope are never wanting, the one leading, the other
									following the one devising the enterprise, the other suggesting
									that fortune will be kind; and they are the most ruinous, for,
									being unseen, they far outweigh the dangers which are
									seen.

Fortune too assists the illusion, for she often presents
									herself unexpectedly, and induces states as well as individuals
									to run into peril, however inadequate their means; and states
									even more than individuals, because they are throwing for a
									higher stake, freedom or empire, and because when a man has a
									whole people acting with him, he magnifies
										himself out of all reason.

In a word then, it is impossible and simply absurd to suppose
									that human nature when bent upon some favourite project can be
									restrained either by the strength of law or by any other terror.

'We ought not therefore to act hastily out of a mistaken
									reliance on the security which the penalty of death affords. 
								 Nor should we drive our rebellious subjects to despair; they
									must not think that there is no place for repentance, or that
									they may not at any moment give up their mistaken policy.

Consider: at present, although a city may actually have
									revolted, when she becomes conscious of her weakness she will
									capitulate while still able to defray the cost of the war and to
									pay tribute for the future; but if we are too severe, will not
									the citizens make better preparations, and, when besieged,
									resist to the last, knowing that it is all the same whether they
									come to terms early or late? 
								 Shall not we ourselves suffer?

For we shall waste our money by sitting down before a city
									which refuses to surrender; when the place is taken it will be a
									mere wreck, and we shall in future lose the
									revenues derived from it ; and in these revenues lies our military strength.

Do not then weigh offences with the severity of a judge, when
									you will only be injuring yourselves, but have an eye to the
									future; let the penalties which you impose on rebellious cities
									be moderate, and then their wealth will be undiminished and at
									your service. 
								 Do not hope to find a safeguard in the severity of your laws,
									but only in the vigilance of your administration. 
								 At present we do just the opposite;

a free people under a strong government will always revolt in
									the hope of independence; and when we have put them down we
									think that they cannot be punished too severely.

But instead of inflicting extreme penalties on free men who
									revolt, we should practise extreme vigilance before they revolt,
									and never allow such a thought to enter their minds. 
								 When however they have been once put down we ought to extenuate
									their crimes as much as possible.

'Think of another great error into which you would fall if you
									listened to Cleon.

At present the popular party are everywhere our friends; either they do not join with the oligarchs, or,
									if compelled to do so, they are always ready to turn against the
									authors of the revolt; and so in going to war with a rebellious
									state you have the multitude on your side.

But, if you destroy the people of Mytilenè who took no part in
									the revolt, and who voluntarily surrendered the city as soon as
									they got arms into their hands; in the first place they were
									your benefactors, and to slay them would be a crime; in the
									second place you will play into the hands of the oligarchic
									parties, who henceforward, in fomenting a revolt, will at once
									have the people on their side; for you will have proclaimed
										to all that the innocent and the guilty will
									share the same fate.

Even if they were guilty you should wink at their conduct, and
									not allow the only friends whom you have left to be converted
									into enemies.

Far more conducive to the maintenance of our empire would it be
									to suffer wrong willingly, than for the sake of justice to put
									to death those whom we had better spare. 
								 Cleon may speak of a punishment which is just and also
									expedient, but you will find that, in any proposal like his, the
									two cannot be combined.

'Assured then that what I advise is for the best, and yielding
									neither to pity nor to lenity, for I am as unwilling as Cleon can be that you should be
									influenced by any such motives, but simply weighing the
									arguments which I have urged, accede to my proposal: Pass
									sentence at your leisure on the Mytilenaeans whom Paches,
									deeming them guilty, has sent hither;

but leave the rest of the inhabitants where they are. 
								 This will be good policy for the future, and will strike
									present terror into your enemies. 
								 For wise counsel is really more formidable to an enemy than the
									severity of unreasoning violence.'

Thus spoke Diodotus, and such were the proposals on either side
									which most nearly represented the opposing parties. 
								 In spite of the reaction, there was a struggle between the two
									opinions; the show of hands was very near, but the motion of
									Diodotus prevailed.

The Athenians instantly despatched another trireme, hoping
									that, if the second could overtake the first , which had a start of about twenty-four hours, it might
									be in time to save the city.

The Mytilenaean envoys provided wine and barley for the crew,
									and promised them great rewards if they arrived first. 
								 And such was their energy that they continued rowing whilst they ate their barley, kneaded with wine and oil, and
									slept and rowed by turns.

Fortunately no adverse wind sprang up, and, the first of the
									two ships sailing in no great hurry on her untoward errand, and
									the second hastening as I have described, the one did indeed
									arrive sooner than the other, but not much sooner. 
								 Paches had read the decree and was about to put it into
									execution, when the second appeared and arrested the fate of the
									city. 
							 
							 
								 So near was Mytilenè to destruction.

The captives whom Paches had sent to Athens as being the most
									guilty numbered about a thousand, or rather more ; these the
									Athenians, upon the motion of Cleon, put to death. 
								 They razed the walls of the Mytilenaeans and took away their
									fleet.

Then, instead of imposing tribute on them, they divided the
									whole island, exclusive of the territory of Methymna, into three
									thousand portions, of which they dedicated three hundred to the
									Gods; the remainder they let out to cleruchi taken from their own citizens, whom they
									chose by lot and sent to Lesbos. 
								 The Lesbians undertook to pay them a yearly rent of two
										minae for each portion and cultivated the land
									themselves.

The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the
									continent which the Mytilenaeans held , and these henceforward were subject to Athens. 
							 
							 
								 Thus ended the revolt of Lesbos.

During the same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the
									Athenians, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made an expedition against
									the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara; the
									Megarians had built a fort there and used the island as a
									military station.

But Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep a watch
									over Megara, not as hitherto from Budorum in Salamis, but from
									this spot, which was nearer, the Peloponnesians would then be no
									longer able to send out triremes, as they had already done on
									one occasion , or
									privateers from the harbour unobserved, and nothing could be
									brought in by sea to Megara.

First of all he took two projecting towers on the
									side of the island towards Nisaea by the help of
									engines from the sea, and, having thus freed a way into the
									channel dividing Minoa from the coast of Megara, he fortified
									the point nearest the mainland, where, by a bridge through a
									lagoon, aid could be brought by the enemy to the island, lying
									as it did at that point close to the shore.

The work was completed in a few days. 
								 Nicias then proceeded to build a fort on the island, and,
									leaving a garrison, returned with the rest of his army.

In this summer and about the same time the Plataeans, who had
									exhausted their food and could no longer hold out, capitulated to the
									Peloponnesians.

The enemy had assaulted their wall and they were unable to
									defend themselves. 
								 But the Lacedaemonian commander knew their weakness, and was
									desirous that the place should be surrendered and not stormed;
									he had instructions from home to this effect, the intention
									being that if some day a treaty of peace were concluded, and
									both parties agreed to give up all the places which they had
									taken by force of arms , Plataea might be excepted on the ground that the
									inhabitants had come to terms of their own accord. 
								 So he sent a herald to enquire whether they would surrender the
									place to the Lacedaemonians and submit to their decision;

the guilty were to be punished, but no one without a just
									cause. 
								 The Plataeans, now in the last stage of weakness,
									surrendered the city; and for a few days, until the five men who
									were appointed judges came from Lacedaemon, the Peloponnesians
									supplied them with food.

On the arrival of the judges no accusation was brought against
									them; they were simply asked one by one, Whether they had done
									any kind of service to the Lacedaemonians or to their allies in
									the present war.

Before making their reply they requested leave to speak at
									length, and appointed two of their number, Astymachus the son of
									Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus, who was the
									Lacedaemonian proxenus, to be their advocates. 
								 They came forward and spoke as follows:—

'Men of Lacedaemon, we surrendered our city because we had
									confidence in you; we were under the impression that the trial to which we
									submitted would be legal, and of a very different kind from
									this; and when we accepted you and you alone to be our judges,
									which indeed you are, we thought that at your hands we had the
									best hope of obtaining justice.

But we fear that we are doubly mistaken, having too much reason
									to suspect that in this trial our lives are at stake, and that
									you will turn out to be partial judges. 
								 So we must infer, because no accusation has been preferred
									against us calling for a defence, but we speak at our own
									request; and because your question is a short one, to which the
									answer, if true, condemns us, and, if false, is exposed at
									once.

In the extremity of our helplessness, our only and our safest
									course is to say something, whatever may be our fate; for men in
									our condition are sure to reproach themselves with their
									silence, and to fancy that the unuttered word, if spoken, would
									have saved them.

'But by what arguments can we ever convince you? 
								 If we were unacquainted with one another we might with
									advantage adduce in evidence matters of which you were ignorant, but now you know all that we can say;
									and we are afraid, not that we are criminals in your eyes
									because you have decided that we fall short of your own standard
									of virtue , but that we are being sacrificed to please others, and
									that the cause which we plead is already prejudged.

'Still we may urge our claims of justice against our Theban
									enemies, and our claims of gratitude upon you and the other Hellenes; the
									recollection of our good deeds may perhaps move you.

To your short question, 
										 Whether in this war we have done any service to the
											Lacedaemonians and their allies, 
									 we reply that 
										 if we are enemies you are not wronged, because you have
											received no good from us; and if you deem us friends,
											you who have made war upon us, and not we, are to
											blame. 
									 During the late peace and in the Persian War our conduct
									was irreproachable;

we were not the first to violate the peace, and we were the
									only Boeotians who took part in repelling the Persian invader
									and in the liberation of Hellas.

Although we are an inland city, we joined in the sea-fight off
									Artemisium; we were at your side when you fought in our land
									under Pausanias, and, whatever dangers the Hellenes underwent in
									those days, we took a share beyond our strength in all of
									them.

And you, Lacedaemonians, more especially should remember how at
									the time when Sparta was panic-stricken by the rebellion of the
									Helots, who seized Ithomè after the earthquake , we sent a third part of our own
									citizens to your aid; these are things not to be forgotten.

'Such was the spirit which animated us in the great days of
									old; not until later did we become your enemies, and that was
									originally your own fault. 
								 For when we sought your help against the violence of the
									Thebans, you had rejected us and had bade us turn to the
									Athenians, who were near, whereas you were at a
									distance.

Yet even in this war you have neither suffered nor were ever
									likely to suffer anything very atrocious at our hands.

If we refused to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we
									were quite right; for they assisted us against the Thebans when
									you shrank from the task; and after this it would have been
									dishonourable to betray them. 
								 They had been our benefactors; we had been at our own request
									admitted to their alliance, and we shared the rights of
									citizenship with them. 
								 How could we refuse to respond loyally to their call?

When you or they in the exercise of your supremacy have acted,
									it may be, wrongly and led your allies into evil courses, the
									leaders and not the followers are to be blamed.

`The Thebans have inflicted many injuries upon us, and their
									latest crime, as you are well aware, is the cause of our present misfortunes.

They came, not only in time of peace, but at a holy season, and
									attempted to seize our city; we righteously and in accordance
									with universal law defended ourselves and punished the
									aggressor; and there is no reason why we should now suffer for
									their satisfaction.

If you take your own present advantage and their present hatred
									to be the measure of justice, you will prove yourselves, not
									upright and impartial judges, but the slaves of
									expediency.

The Thebans may appear serviceable now, but of far greater
									service to you were we and the other Hellenes when you were in
									far greater danger. 
								 For now you invade and menace others, but in those days the
									Barbarian was threatening to enslave us all, and they were on
									his side. 
								 May we not fairly set our former patriotism against our present
									offence, if indeed we have offended?

You will find that the one more than outweighs the
									other; for our service to you was performed at a time when very
									few Hellenes opposed their courage to the power of Xerxes; they
									were then held in honour, not who,
									looking to their own advantage, made terms with the invader and were safe, but who, in the face
									of danger, dared the better part.

Of that number were we, and there was a time when we received
									the highest honour at your hands, but now we fear that these
									same principles, which have led us to prefer a just alliance
									with the Athenians to an interested alliance with you, will be
									our destruction.

Yet when men have been consistent in their conduct, others
									should show themselves consistent in their judgment of it . 
								 For true expediency is only this— to have an enduring sense of
									gratitude towards good allies for their services, while we do not neglect our own immediate interest.

'Consider, before you act, that hitherto you have been
									generally esteemed among Hellenes to be a pattern of nobility; if you decide unjustly (and
									this judgment cannot be hidden, for you, the judges, are famous,
									and we, who are judged by you, are of good repute), mankind will
									be indignant at the strange and disgraceful sentence which will
									have been passed against good men by men still better . 
								 They will not endure to see spoils taken from us, the
									benefactors of Hellas, dedicated by our enemies in the common
									temples.

Will it not be deemed a monstrous thing that the Lacedaemonians
									should desolate Plataea; that they, whose fathers inscribed the
									name of the city on the tripod at Delphi in token of her
										valour , should for the sake of the Thebans blot out the whole people from the Hellenic world?

For to this we have come at last. 
								 When the Persians conquered our land, we were all but ruined;
									and now, when we plead before you, who were once our dearest
									friends, the Thebans have prevailed against us. 
								 We have had to meet two terrible trials, the danger first of
									starvation, if we had not given up the city;

and secondly, of condemnation to death. 
								 The Plataeans, who were zealous in the cause of Hellas even
									beyond their strength, are now friendless, spurned and rejected
									by all. 
								 None of our old allies will help us, and we fear that you, O
									Lacedaemonians, our only hope, are not to be depended upon.

'Yet once more for the sake of those Gods in whose name we made
									a league of old, and for our services to the cause of Hellas, relent and change
									your minds, if the Thebans have at all influenced you: in return for the wicked request which they
									make of you, ask of them the righteous boon that you should not
									slay us to your own dishonour . 
								 Do not bring upon yourselves an evil name merely to gratify
									others.

For, although you may quickly take our lives, you will not so
									easily obliterate the infamy of the deed. 
								 We are not enemies whom you might justly punish, but friends
									who were compelled to go to war with you;

and therefore piety demands that you should spare our
									lives. 
								 Before you pass judgment, consider that we surrendered
									ourselves, and stretched out our hands to you; the custom of
									Hellas does not allow the suppliant to be put to death.

Remember too that we have ever been your benefactors: Cast your
									eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers slain by the Persians
									and buried in our land, whom we have honoured by a yearly
										public offering of garments, and other
									customary gifts. 
								 We were their friends, and we gave them the firstfruits in
									their season of that friendly land in which they rest; we were
									their allies too, who in times past had fought at their
									side;

and if you now pass an unjust sentence, will not your conduct
									strangely contrast with ours? 
								 Reflect: when Pausanias buried them here, he thought that he
									was laying them among friends and in friendly earth. 
								 But if you put us to death, and make Plataea one with Thebes,
									are you not robbing your fathers and kindred of the honour which
									they enjoy, and leaving them in a hostile land inhabited by
									their murderers? 
								 Nay more, you will enslave the land in which the Hellenes won
									their liberty; you bring desolation upon the temples in which
									they prayed when they conquered the Persians; and you will take
									away the sacrifices which our fathers instituted from the city
									which ordained and established them.

'These things, O Lacedaemonians, would not be for your
									honour. 
								 They would be an offence against the common feeling of Hellas and against your
									ancestors. 
								 You should be ashamed to put us to death, who are your
									benefactors and have never done you any wrong, in order that you
									may gratify the enmity of another. 
								 Spare us, and let your heart be softened towards us; be wise,
									and have mercy upon us, considering not only how terrible will
									be our fate, but who the sufferers are; think too of the
									uncertainty of fortune, which may strike any one however
									innocent.

We implore you, as is becoming and natural in our hour of need,
									by the Gods whom the Hellenes worship at common altars, to
									listen to our prayers. 
								 We appeal to the oaths which your fathers swore, and entreat
									you not to forget them. 
								 We kneel at your fathers' tombs, and we call upon the dead not
									to let us be betrayed into the hands of the Thebans, their
										dearest friends to their bitterest
									enemies. 
								 We remind you of the day on which we shared in their glorious
									deeds— we who on this day are in danger of meeting a fearful
									doom.

And now we say no more; to men in our case, though we must,
									there is nothing harder than to make an end; for with the end
									comes the decisive hour. 
								 Our last word is that we did not surrender Plataea to the
									Thebans,— far rather would we have perished from hunger, the
									most miserable of deaths,— but to you, in whom we trusted, and,
									if you will not listen to us, you ought at least to replace us
									in the same position, and allow us to choose our destiny,
									whatever it may be.

We adjure you not to deliver us, the Plataeans, who were so
									loyal to the cause of Hellas, and who are now suppliants to you,
									O Lacedaemonians, out of your own hands and your own good faith,
									into the hands of the Thebans, our worst enemies. 
								 Be our saviours. 
								 You are liberating the other Hellenes; do not destroy us.'

Such were the words of the Plataeans; whereupon the Thebans,
									fearing that the Lacedaemonians might give way, came forward and said that since,
									against their judgment, the Plataeans had been allowed, instead
									of answering the question, to make a long defence, they too
									wished to speak. 
								 Permission was granted, and they spoke as follows:—

'We should never have asked to speak, if the Plataeans had
									briefly answered the question which was put to them , and had not turned
									upon us and arraigned us while they made a long and irrelevant
									defence of their own doings, excusing themselves from charges
									which nobody brought against them, and praising what nobody
									blamed. 
								 We must answer their accusations of us, and look a little
									closely into their glorification of themselves, 
									that neither our baseness nor their superior reputation may
									benefit them, and that, before you judge, you may hear the truth
									both about us and them.

Our quarrel with them arose thus:— Some time after our first
									occupation of Boeotia we settled Plataea
									and other places, out of which we drove a mixed multitude. 
								 But the Plataeans refused to acknowledge our leadership
									according to the original agreement, and, separating themselves
									from the other Boeotians, deserted the traditions of their
									ancestors. 
								 When force was applied to them they went over to the Athenians,
									and, assisted by them, did us a great deal of mischief; and we
									retaliated.

'They say that when the Barbarian invaded Hellas they were the
									only Boeotians who did not join the Persian; and this is their great glory, and our
									great reproach.

But we say that if they did not side with the Persians, it was
									only because the Athenians did not; and on the same principle,
									they alone of all the Boeotians afterwards sided with the
									Athenians when the liberties of Hellas were attacked by
									them.

But, consider how different were the circumstances in which we
									and they acted. 
								 In those days our state was not governed by an oligarchy which
									granted equal justice to all, nor yet by a democracy; the power
									was in the hands of a small cabal, than which nothing is more
									opposed to law or to true political order, or more nearly
									resembles a tyranny.

The rulers of the state, hoping to strengthen their private
									interest if the Persian won, kept the people down and brought
									him in. 
								 The city at large, when she acted thus, was not her own
									mistress; and she cannot be fairly blamed for an error which she
									committed when she had no constitution.

After the Persian departed and she obtained a constitution, you
									may see how we fought against the Athenians when they became aggressive and endeavoured to subjugate us as well
									as the rest of Hellas. 
								 Owing to our divisions they actually conquered the greater part
									of the country; but we defeated them at Coronea, and liberated
										Boeotia ; and at this moment we are zealously co-operating in the
									liberation of Hellas, providing cavalry and munitions of war
									more largely than any of the allies. 
								 Thus much in answer to the charge respecting our Persian
									tendencies.

'And now we will proceed to show that you, and not we, have
									done the greater wrong to Hellas, and are deserving of every sort of
									punishment.

You say that you became allies and citizens of Athens in order
									that you might be protected against us. 
								 If so, you ought to have invited their aid only against us, and
									not to have assisted them in their attacks upon others; such a
									course was certainly open to you: even if you had been in some
									degree constrained against your will by the Athenians, you had
									previously made the alliance with the Lacedaemonians against the
									Persians, to which you are so fond of appealing. 
								 That alliance would at any rate have restrained our hands, and
									above all would have secured to you freedom of
									deliberation. 
								 But you acted willingly, and were no longer under compulsion
									when you made common cause with the Athenians.

Your allegation is that they were your benefactors and that you
									could not honourably betray them; but how far more dishonourable
									and wicked to betray all the Hellenes with whom you had sworn
									alliance, than the Athenians only, the one the liberators, the
									other the enslavers of Hellas!

The return which you made to them is unequal, nay, infamous,;
									you say that you invited them to assist you because you were
									wronged, and then you became their accomplices in wronging
									others. 
								 Surely ingratitude is shown in refusing to return an honourable
									kindness, when it can be done honourably, not in refusing to
										return a kindness which, however justly due,
									cannot be repaid without a crime.

'You have thus made it plain that, when you alone among the
									Boeotians refused to join the Persian cause, this was not out of any love for Hellas , but because the
									Athenians did not ;

and that you wanted to act with them and not with us; and now
									you claim the benefit of the virtue which others inspired in
									you. 
								 But this is not reasonable; having once chosen the Athenians,
									fight on their side, and do not at the last moment be saying
									that the old alliance ought to save you.

For you have abandoned it, and by the violation of it, instead
									of striving to prevent, have aided in the enslavement of the
										Aeginetans and of other members of the alliance. 
								 And you were not, like us, under compulsion, but free, living
									under your ancient laws. 
								 Moreover, you persisted in refusing that last offer of peace
									and neutrality which we made to you before the siege began .

Who more thoroughly than you deserve the hatred of the
									Hellenes? than you who have only displayed your virtues to their
									injury? 
								 You have given proof that the merit which you claim for your
									former actions does not properly belong to you! 
								 Your true nature and constant desire are now revealed in the
									light of day; for you have followed the Athenians in the path of
									injustice.

Thus much we have to say as to our involuntary dealings with
									the Persians, and your voluntary dealings with the Athenians.

'The last offence which you lay to our charge is that we
									unlawfully assailed your city in time of peace, and at a holy season; even in that affair
									we do not think ourselves more in fault than you.

We do not deny that we were wrong if of our own
									mere motion we went to your city, fought with you, and ravaged
									your land. 
								 But when certain of the noblest and richest of your citizens,
									who wished to withdraw you from a foreign alliance and to bring
									you back to the national institutions of Boeotia, came and
									invited us, wherein are we to blame? 
								 As you say yourselves, the leaders rather than the followers
									are the transgressors .But in our opinion, neither we nor they were really
									guilty.

Like yourselves they were citizens, and they had a greater
									stake in the country than you have; they opened their own gates
									and received us into their native city, not as her enemies but
									as her friends. 
								 They desired that the bad among you should not grow worse, and
									that the good should have their reward. 
								 They wanted to reform the principles of your citizens, and not
									to banish their persons; they would have brought them back into
									a natural union with their kindred, that Plataea might be at
									peace with all and the enemy of none.

'And the proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is that we
									did no harm to any one, but made a proclamation that whoever wished to live under the
									national institutions of Boeotia should join us.

You came to us gladly, and, entering into an agreement, for a
									time offered no opposition; but afterwards, when you discovered
									that we were few, you turned upon us. 
								 Even allowing that we did act somewhat inconsiderately in
									entering your town without the consent of your whole people,
									still how different was your conduct and ours! 
								 For if you had followed our example you would have used no
									violence, but thought only of getting us out by persuasion,
									whereas you broke the agreement and attacked us. 
								 Now we do not so much complain of the fate of those whom you
									slew in battle— for they indeed suffered by a kind of law— but
									there were others who stretched out their hands to
									you; and although you gave them quarter, and then promised to us
									that you would spare them, in utter defiance of law you took
									their lives— was not that a cruel act?

Here are three crimes which you committed within a few hours;
									the breach of the agreement, the slaughter of the prisoners
									which followed, and the lying promise which you made to us that
									you would not slay them if we did no injury to your property in
									the fields; and yet you insist that we are the criminals, and
									that you ought to be acquitted. 
								 Not so; if the Lacedaemonians give just judgment: but for all
									these offences you shall suffer.

'We have entered into particulars, Lacedaemonians, both for
									your sakes and for our own, that you may know the sentence which you are going to
									pass on them to be just, and still more righteous the vengeance
									which we have taken.

Do not let your hearts be softened by tales about their ancient
									virtues, if they ever had any; such virtues might plead for the
									injured, but should bring a double penalty on the
									authors of a base deed, because they are false to their own
									character. 
								 Let them gain nothing by their pitiful lamentations, or by
									appealing to your fathers' tombs and their own desolate
									condition.

We tell you that a far sadder fate was inflicted by them on our
									murdered youth, of whose fathers some fell at Coronea in the act
									of bringing Boeotia to join you, while others are left in their
									old age by their solitary hearths, and entreat you, with far
									better reason, to punish the Plataeans.

Men who suffer an unworthy fate are indeed to be pitied, but
									there should be joy over those who suffer justly, as these
									do. 
								 For their present desolation they may thank themselves;

they might have chosen the worthier alliance, but 
									they wilfully renounced it. 
								 They sinned against us though we had never injured them; the
									spirit of hatred and not of justice possessed them, and even now
									they are not punished half enough. 
								 For they are going to suffer by a lawful sentence, not, as they
									pretend, stretching out their suppliant hands on the field of
									battle, but delivering themselves up to justice under the terms
									of a capitulation.

Maintain then, Lacedaemonians, the common Hellenic law which
									they have outraged, and give to us, who have suffered contrary
									to law, the just recompense of our zeal' in your cause. 
								 Do not be moved by their words to spurn and reject us but show Hellas by example that, when a cause is tried
									at your tribunal, deeds and not words will prevail. 
								 If the deeds be good, a brief statement of them is enough; if
									they be evil, speeches full of fine sentiments do but veil
									them.

If all persons in authority were like you, and would sum up a
									case in a short question, and pass sentence upon all the
									offenders at once, men would be less tempted to seek out fair
									words in order to excuse foul deeds.'

Thus spoke the Thebans. 
								 The Lacedaemonian judges thought that no objection could
										be made to their question, whether the Plataeans had done
									them any service in the war. For they pretended
									to have expected neutrality from them in the times before the
									war, on the strength of the original treaty concluded with
									Pausanias after the defeat of the Persians. 
								 And just before the siege they had made to them a proposal of neutrality in accordance with
									the terms of the same treaty; but the Plataeans had
									refused. 
								 Considering that they had been wronged by them, after their own
									fair proposals had released them from the
									obligations of the treaty, they again brought up the Plataeans
									one after another, and asked each of them separately, Whether he
									had done any service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in
									the war? 
								 When he said No, they took him away and slew him;

no one was spared. 
								 They put to death not less than two hundred Plataeans, as well
									as twenty-five Athenians who had shared with them in the
									siege;

and made slaves of the women. 
								 For about a year the Thebans gave possession of the city to
									certain Megarians, who had been driven out by a revolution , and to any surviving Plataeans who were of their own
									party; but they afterwards razed the whole place to the very
									foundations, and built near the precinct of Herè an inn forming
									a square of two hundred feet; it had two stories, and chambers
									all round. 
								 They used the roofs and the doors of the Plataeans; and of the
									brass and iron articles of furniture found within the walls they
									made couches, which they dedicated to Herè; they also built in
									her honour a stone temple a hundred feet long. 
								 The Plataean territory they converted into public land, and let
									it out for terms of ten years;

some of their own citizens occupied it. 
								 Throughout the whole affair the severity shown by the
									Lacedaemonians to the Plataeans was mainly promoted by a desire
									to gratify the Thebans, who seemed likely to be useful allies to
									them in the war then just beginning.

Such was the fate of Plataea, which was overthrown in the
									ninety-third year after the Plataeans entered into alliance with
										Athens .

The forty Peloponnesian ships which had been sent to the aid of
									Lesbos, as they fled through the open sea pursued by the Athenians , were caught in a storm near Crete, and, making their
									way in a straggling condition from Crete to the Peloponnesus,
									found at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot 
									triremes, and Brasidas the son of Tellis, who had been sent out
									as a commissioner to advise Alcidas.

The Lacedaemonians at home, after the failure of their attempt
									on Lesbos, had determined to increase their navy and sail to
									Corcyra, which was in a state of revolution. 
								 The Athenian squadron at Naupactus consisted of twelve ships
									only, and the Lacedaemonians wanted to reach the island before
									any more vessels could arrive from Athens. 
								 Brasidas and Alcidas made their preparations accordingly.

Now Corcyra had been in an unsettled state ever since the
									return of the prisoners who were taken at sea in the Epidamnian war , and afterwards released by the Corinthians. 
								 They were nominally let out on bail for a sum of eight hundred
										talents on the
									security of their proxeni, but in reality they had been induced
									to try and gain over Corcyra to the Corinthian interest.

They went from one citizen to another, and did their best with
									them to bring about a revolt from Athens. 
								 On the arrival of an Athenian and also of a Corinthian vessel
									conveying ambassadors, there was a discussion in the assembly,
									and the Corcyraeans voted that they would continue allies of
									Athens according to their agreement , but would
									renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians.

A certain Peithias, who voluntarily acted as the proxenus
										of the Athenians and was the popular leader, was summoned
									by the partisans of the Peloponnesians to take his trial, they
									affirming that he wanted to bring Corcyra under the yoke of
									Athens.

He was acquitted, and then he in turn summoned their five
									richest men, declaring that they were in the habit of cutting
									poles for vines in the sacred precinct of Zeus and
									Alcinous;

now for each pole the, penalty was fixed at a
										state They were condemned; but the fine was so
									excessive that they went and sat as suppliants in the temple of
									Zeus and Alcinous, begging that they might pay the money by
									instalments.

Peithias, who happened to be a member of the senate as well as
									the popular leader, persuaded the senators to put the law in
									execution. 
								 The culprits, knowing that the law was against them, and
									perceiving that Peithias as
									long as he remained in the senate would try to induce the
										people to make an
									alliance offensive and defensive with Athens, conspired
									together, and, rushing into the council chamber with daggers in
									their hands, slew him and others to the number of sixty, as well
									private persons as senators. 
								 A few who were of the same party with him took refuge in the
									Athenian trireme, which had not yet left.

The next step taken by the conspirators was to assemble the
									people and tell them that they had acted for the best, and in order to secure them against
									the tyranny of Athens. 
								 For the future they should receive neither Athenians nor
									Peloponnesians, unless they came peaceably with one ship; to
									bring more should be deemed the act of an enemy;

and this proposal they compelled the people to ratify. 
								 They also sent envoys to Athens, who were to put the most
									favourable colour on the affair, and to dissuade the refugees
									who had fled thither from taking any inconvenient step which
									might lead to a counter-revolution.

When the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as
									disturbers of the peace, and deposited them in Aegina, together with any of the refugees whom
									they had gained over.

In the meantime, the Corcyraean oligarchs who were
									now in power, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and
									Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked and defeated the people,

who at nightfall took refuge in the Acropolis and the higher
									parts of the city, and there concentrated their forces. 
								 They also held the Hyllaic harbour; the other party seized the
									Agora, where most of them lived, and the adjacent harbour which
									looked towards the continent.

On the following day they skirmished a little, and both parties
									sent messengers round the country inviting the slaves to join them, and promising
									them liberty; the greater number came to the aid of the people,
									while the other faction was reinforced by eight hundred
									auxiliaries from the mainland.

After resting a day they fought again, and the people, who had
									the advantage in numbers and in the strength of their positions, gained the
									victory. 
								 Their women joined vigorously in the fray, hurling tiles from
									the housetops, and showing amid the uproar a fortitude beyond
									their sex.

The conflict was decided towards evening; the oligarchy,
									fearing lest the people should take the arsenal with a sudden
									rush and so make an end of them, set fire to the private houses
									which surrounded the Agora, as well as to the larger blocks of
									buildings, sparing neither their own property nor that of any
									one else in their determination to stop them. 
								 Much merchandise was burnt, and the whole city would have been
									destroyed if the wind had carried the flame in that
									direction.

Both parties now left off fighting, and kept watch in their own
									positions during the night. 
								 When the popular cause triumphed, the Corinthian vessel stole
									away and most of the auxiliaries crossed over unobserved to the
									continent.

On the following day, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, an
									Athenian general, arrived from Naupactus with twelve ships and
									five hundred Messenian hoplites. 
								 He tried to effect a reconciliation between the
									two parties, and on his suggestion they agreed to bring to trial ten of the most guilty persons, who immediately
									fled. 
								 The rest were to live together, and to make peace with one
									another, and with Athens an alliance offensive and
									defensive.

Having accomplished his purpose he was about to sail away, when
									the leaders of the people induced him to leave five of his own
									vessels, that the enemy might be less inclined to stir,
									promising to man five ships of their own and send them with
									him.

He agreed, and they selected the crews of the ships out of the
									opposite faction. 
								 But the men were afraid of being sent to Athens, and sat as
									suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri.

Nicostratus sought to raise them up and reassure them, but they
									would not trust him; whereupon the people armed themselves,
									arguing that their mistrust and unwillingness to sail was a
									proof of their evil designs. 
								 They took their enemies' arms out of their houses, and some of
									them whom they chanced to meet would have been slain if
									Nicostratus had not interfered.

The rest, to the number of about four hundred, when they saw
									what was going on, took refuge afresh in the temple of
									Herè. 
								 But the people, fearing that they would resort to violence,
									persuaded them to rise and conveyed them at once to the island
									that lies in front of the temple of Herè, whither provisions
									were regularly sent to them.

At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day
									after the suppliants had been conveyed to the island, the Peloponnesian ships from Cyllene,
									which since the expedition to Ionia had been in harbour
										there arrived on the scene, fifty-three
									in number, still under the command of Alcidas. 
								 Brasidas his adviser was on board. 
								 They anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbour on the
									mainland, and when the morning broke they sailed upon
										Corcyra.

The whole place was in an uproar; the people dreaded their
									enemies within the city no less than the Peloponnesian fleet. 
								 They hastened to equip sixty ships, and as fast as they were
									manned sent them out against the Peloponnesians, although the
									Athenians entreated to be allowed to sail out first, leaving
									them to follow as soon as they had got their fleet
									together.

But when in this straggling fashion their ships approached the
									enemy, two of them at once deserted; in others the crews were
									fighting with one another, and everything was in disorder.

The Peloponnesians, seeing the confusion, employed twenty ships
									only against the Corcyraeans, and opposed the remainder of their
									fleet to the twelve Athenian ships, of which two were the
									Salaminia and Paralus.

The Corcyraeans, coming up few at a time and in this disorderly
									fashion, had trouble enough among themselves. 
								 The Athenians, afraid of being surrounded by superior numbers,
									did not attack the main body nor the centre of those opposed to
									them, but fell upon the wings and sank a single ship; then, the
									enemy forming in a circle, they sailed round them and
									endeavoured to throw them into confusion.

But those who were opposed to the Corcyraeans, seeing this
									movement and fearing a repetition of what happened at
										Naupactus , came to the rescue, and the united
									fleet charged the Athenians.

Thereupon they rowed astern, hoping that by retreating very
									leisurely they might give the Corcyraeans time to escape,
									especially as the attack of the enemy was now directed against
									themselves.

The naval engagement ended at sunset.

The Corcyraeans, who were afraid that the victorious enemy
									would sail to the city and have recourse to some decisive
									measure, such as taking on board the prisoners in
									the island, conveyed them back to the temple of Herè and guarded
									the city.

But the Peloponnesians, although they had won the battle, did not venture to
									attack the city, but returned to their station on the mainland
									with thirteen Corcyraean ships which they had taken.

On the next day they still hesitated, although there was great
									panic and confusion among the inhabitants. 
								 It is said that Brasidas advised Alcidas to make the attempt,
									but he had not an equal vote with him. 
								 So they only disembarked at the promontory of Leucimnè and
									ravaged the country.

Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, dreading that the fleet of the
									Peloponnesians would attack them, held a parley with the other faction, especially
									with the suppliants, in the hope of saving the city; they even
									persuaded some of them to go on board the fleet; for the
									Corcyraeans still contrived to man thirty ships.

But the Peloponnesians, after devastating the land till about
									midday, retired. 
								 And at nightfall the approach of sixty Athenian vessels was
									signalled to them from Leucas. 
								 These had been sent by the Athenians under the command of
									Eurymedon the son of Thucles, when they heard of the revolution
									and of the intended expedition of Alcidas to Corcyra.

The Peloponnesians set out that very night on their way home,
									keeping close to the land, and transporting the ships over the Leucadian isthmus, that
									they might not be seen sailing round .

When the Corcyraeans perceived that the Athenian fleet was
									approaching, while that of the enemy had disappeared, they took
									the Messenian troops, who had hitherto been outside the walls,
									into the city, and ordered the ships which they had manned to
									sail round into the Hyllaic harbour. 
								 These proceeded on their way. 
								 Meanwhile they killed any of their enemies whom
									they caught in the city. 
								 On the arrival of the ships they disembarked those whom they
									had induced to go on board, and despatched them ; they also went to the temple of Herè, and
									persuading about fifty of the suppliants to stand their trial
									condemned them all to death.

The majority would not come out, and, when they saw what was
									going on, destroyed one another in the enclosure of the temple
									where they were, except a few who hung themselves on trees, or
									put an end to their own lives in any other way which they
									could.

And, during the seven days which Eurymedon after his arrival
									remained with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued
									slaughtering those of their fellow-citizens whom they deemed
									their enemies; they professed to punish them for their designs
									against the democracy, but in fact some were killed from motives
									of personal enmity, and some because money was owing to them, by
									the hands of their debtors. 
								 Every form of death was to be seen;

and everything, and more than everything, that commonly happens
									in revolutions, happened then. 
								 The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the
									temples and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in
									the temple of Dionysus, and there perished. 
								 To such extremes of cruelty did revolution go; and this seemed
									to be the worst of revolutions, because it was the first.

For not long afterwards nearly the whole Hellenic world was in
									commotion; in every city the chiefs of the democracy and of the oligarchy were
									struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the
									Lacedaemonians. 
								 Now in time of peace, men would have had no excuse for
									introduring either, and no desire to do so; but, when they
										were at war , the introduction of a
									foreign alliance on one side or the other to the hurt of their
									enemies and the advantage of themselves was easily effected by
									the dissatisfied party And revolution brought upon the cities of
									Hellas many terrible calamities, such as have been and always
									will be while human nature remains the same, but which are more
									or less aggravated and differ in character with every new
									combination of circumstances.

In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are
									actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the
									dominion of imperious necessities; but war, which takes away the
									comfortable provision of daily life, is a hard master and tends
									to assimilate men's characters to their conditions. 
							 
							 
								 When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who followed
									carried the revolutionary spirit further and further, and determined to outdo the
									report of all who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their
									enterprises and the atrocity of their revenges.

The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things,
									but was changed by them as they thought proper. 
								 Reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was
									the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly
									weakness;

to know everything was to do nothing. 
								 Frantic energy was the true quality of a man. 
								 A conspirator who wanted to be safe was a recreant in
									disguise. 
								 The lover of violence was always trusted, and his opponent
									suspected. 
								 He who succeeded in a plot was deemed knowing, but a still
									greater master in craft was he who detected one.

On the other hand, he who plotted from the first to have
									nothing to do with plots was a breaker up of parties and a
									poltroon who was afraid of the enemy. 
								 In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil
									one who had no idea of it. 
								 The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a
									partisan was more ready to dare without asking why.

(For party associations are not based upon any established law,
									nor do they seek the public good; they are formed in defiance of
									the laws and from self-interest.) The seal of good faith was not
									divine law, but fellowship in crime. 
								 If an enemy when he was in the ascendant offered fair words,
									the opposite party received them not in a generous spirit , but
									by a jealous watchfulness of his actions .

Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. 
								 Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do
									nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless. 
								 But he who on a favourable opportunity first took courage, and
									struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard, had greater
									pleasure in a perfidious than he would have had in an open act
									of revenge; he congratulated himself that he had taken the safer
									course, and also that he had overreached his enemy and gained
									the prize of superior ability. 
								 In general the dishonest more easily gain credit for cleverness
									than the simple for goodness; men take a pride in the one, but
									are ashamed of the other. 
							 
							 
								 The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating
									in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit which is engendered by them when
									men are fairly embarked in a contest.

For the leaders on either side used specious names, the one
									party professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the
									many, the other the wisdom of an aristocracy, while they made
									the public interests, to which in name they were devoted, in
									reality their prize. 
								 Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed
									the most monstrous crimes; yet even these were surpassed by the
									magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to
									the very utmost , neither party observing any definite limits either of
									justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice
									of the moment their law. 
								 Either by the help of an unrighteous sentence, or grasping
									power with the strong hand, they were eager to satiate the
									impatience of party-spirit. 
								 Neither faction cared for religion; but any fair pretence which
									succeeded in effecting some odious purpose was greatly
									lauded. 
								 And the citizens who were of neither party fell a prey to both;
									either they were disliked because they held aloof, or men were
									jealous of their surviving.

Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness in
									Hellas. 
								 The simplicity which is so large an element in a noble nature was laughed to scorn
									and disappeared. 
								 An attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere
									prevailed;

for there was no word binding enough, nor oath terrible enough
									to reconcile enemies. 
								 Each man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was
									secure; he must look to his own safety, and could not afford to
									trust others.

Inferior intellects generally succeeded best. 
								 For, aware of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity
									of their opponents, for whom they were no match in powers of
									speech, and whose subtle wits were likely to anticipate them in
									contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once.

But the cleverer sort, presuming in their arrogance that they
									would be aware in time, and disdaining to act when they could
									think, were taken off their guard and easily destroyed.

Now in Corcyra most of these deeds were perpetrated, and for
									the first time. 
								 There was every crime which men could commit in revenge who had
									been governed not wisely, but tyrannically, and now had the
									oppressor at their mercy. 
								 There were the dishonest designs of others who
									were longing to be relieved from their habitual poverty, and
									were naturally animated by a passionate desire for their neighbour's goods; and
									there were crimes of another class which men commit, not from
									covetousness, but from the enmity which equals foster towards
									one another until they are carried away by their blind rage into
									the extremes of pitiless cruelty.

At such a time the life of the city was all in disorder, and
									human nature, which is always ready to transgress the laws,
									having now trampled them under foot, delighted to show that her
									passions were ungovernable, that she was stronger than justice,
									and the enemy of everything above her. 
								 If malignity had not exercised a fatal power, how could any one
									have preferred revenge to piety, and gain to innocence?

But, when men are retaliating upon others, they are reckless of
									the future, and do not hesitate to annul those common laws of
									humanity to which every individual trusts for his own hope of
									deliverance should he ever be overtaken by calamity; they forget
									that in their own hour of need they will look for them in vain.

Such were the passions which the citizens of Corcyra first of
									all Hellenes displayed towards one another.

After the departure of Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet the
									surviving oligarchs, who to the number of five hundred had
									escaped, seized certain forts on the mainland, and thus became
									masters of the territory on the opposite coast which belonged to
									Corcyra. 
								 Thence issuing forth, they plundered the Corcyraeans in the
									island, and did much harm, so that there was a great famine in
									the city.

They also sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth, begging
									that they might be restored, but, failing of their object, they
									procured boats and auxiliaries, and passed over to Corcyra about
										six hundred in all; then, burning their boats,
									that they might have no hope but in the conquest of the island,
									they went into Mount Istonè, and building a fort there, became
									masters of the country to the ruin of the inhabitants of the
									city.

At the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships
									to Sicily under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus, and Charoeades the son
									of Euphiletus.

Syracuse and Leontini were now at war with one another. 
								 All the Dorian cities, except Camarina, were in alliance with
									Syracuse; they were the same which at the beginning of the war
									were reckoned in the Lacedaemonian confederacy, but they had
									taken no active part .The allies of the Leontines were the Chalcidian cities
									and Camarina. 
								 In Italy the Locrians sided with the Syracusans, and the
									Rhegians with the Leontines, who were their kinsmen .

The Leontines and their allies sent to Athens, and on the
									ground, partly of an old alliance, partly of their Ionian
									descent, begged the Athenians to send them ships, for they were
									driven off both sea and land by their Syracusan enemies.

The Athenians sent the ships, professedly on the ground of
									relationship, but in reality because they did not wish the
									Peloponnesians to obtain corn from Sicily. 
								 Moreover they meant to try what prospect they had of getting
									the affairs of Sicily into their hands.

So the commanders of the fleet came to Rhegium in Italy, where
									they established themselves, and carried on the war in concert
									with their allies. 
								 Thus the summer ended.

In the following winter the plague, which had never entirely
									disappeared, although abating for a time, again attacked the Athenians.

It continued on this second occasion not less than a year,
									having previously lasted for two years. 
								 To the power of Athens certainly nothing was more
									ruinous;

not less than four thousand four hundred Athenian
									hoplites who were on the roll died, and also three hundred
									horsemen;

how many of the common people could never be ascertained. 
								 This too was the time when the frequent earthquakes occurred at
									Athens, in Euboea, and in Boeotia, especially at Orchomenos

During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians
									made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Aeolus, as they are
									called, which in summer time cannot be attacked owing to the
									want of water.

These islands belong to the Liparaeans, who are colonists of
									the Cnidians: they inhabit one of them, which is not large, and
									is called Lipara; from this they go and cultivate the rest,
									Didymè, Strongylè, and Hiera.

The inhabitants believe that the forge of Hephaestus is in
									Hiera, because the island sends up a blaze of fire in the
									night-time and clouds of smoke by day. 
								 The Aeolian islands lie off the territory of the Sicels and
									Messenians; they were in alliance with Syracuse.

The Athenians wasted the country, but finding that the
									inhabitants would not yield, sailed back to Rhegium. 
								 And so ended the winter, and with it the fifth year in the
									Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians and their allies,
									under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king,
									came as far as the isthmus. 
								 They intended to invade Attica, but were deterred from
									proceeding by numerous earthquakes , and no invasion took place in this year.

About the time when these earthquakes prevailed, the sea at
									Orobiae in Euboea, retiring from what was then the line of coast
									and rising in a great wave, overflowed a part of the city; and
										although it subsided in some places, yet in
									others the inundation was permanent, and that which was formerly
									land is now sea. 
								 All the people who could not escape to the high ground
									perished.

A similar inundation occurred in the neighbourhood of Atalantè,
									an island on the coast of the Opuntian Locri, which carried away
									a part of the Athenian fort , and dashed in pieces
									one of two ships which were drawn up on the beach.

At Peparethus also the sea retired, but no inundation followed;
									an earthquake, however, overthrew a part of the wall, the
									Prytaneum, and a few houses.

I conceive that, where the force of the earthquake was
									greatest, the sea was driven back, and the suddenness of the
									recoil made the inundation more violent; and I am of opinion
									that this was the cause of the phenomenon, which would never
									have taken place if there had been no earthquake.

During the same summer war was going on in various parts of
									Sicily, the Hellenes in Sicily fighting against one another, the Athenians helping
									their own allies. 
								 I will mention the chief actions in which the Athenians took
									part, whether by the help of their allies attacking, or attacked
									by their enemies.

Charoeades, the Athenian general, had been killed in battle by
									the Syracusans, and, Laches having taken the entire command of
									the fleet, he and the allies made an expedition against Mylae, a
									town belonging to Messenè. 
								 Two tribes of the Messenians were keeping guard there, and they
									had set an ambuscade for the force which they were expecting to
									land;

but the Athenians and their allies put to flight with heavy
									loss the troops which came out of the ambush. 
								 Then, attacking the fortress, they compelled its defenders to
									come to terms, surrender the citadel, and march with them
									against Messenè.

Finally, upon the approach of the Athenians and their allies,
									the Messenians themselves came to terms, giving
									hostages and the other pledges which were required of them.

In the same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round the
									Peloponnese under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Procles the
									son of Theodorus. 
								 They also sent sixty ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos,
									under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus,

wishing to subdue the Melians, who, although they were
									islanders, resisted them and would not join their alliance .

So they ravaged their country, but finding that the Melians
									would not yield, they sailed away to Oropus, opposite
									Euboea. 
								 There they put in at nightfall, and the hoplites disembarking
									went at once by land to Tanagra in Boeotia.

Meanwhile the entire Athenian force, under the command of
									Hipponicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles,
									upon a signal given marched to meet them at the same spot. 
								 There they encamped, and all together devastated the country,
									remaining at Tanagra during that day and the following
									night.

On the morrow they defeated the Tanagraeans who sallied out
									upon them, and also some Thebans who had come to their aid; they
									then took up the arms of the slain, raised a trophy, and
									returned, the one part of the forces back again to the city, the
									other to their ships.

Nicias with his sixty ships then sailed to the coast of Locris;
									after ravaging the country he returned home.

About the same time the Lacedaemonians founded Heraclea, their
									colony in Trachinia. The intention was as follows:— The Trachinians are one
									of the three Melian tribes;

the other two being the Paralians and the Hiereans. 
								 These Trachinians, having suffered greatly in war from their
										neighbours the Oetaeans, at first thought of
									attaching themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that they
									could not trust them , sent Tisamenus, whom they appointed their envoy, to
									Lacedaemon.

The Dorians, who were the mother state of Lacedaemon, joined in
									the embassy and also requested help, for they too were suffering
									from the Oetaeans.

The Lacedaemonians heard their appeal, and, being desirous of
									assisting both the Trachinians and Dorians, made up their minds
									to send out a colony. 
								 They also thought that the situation of the new city would be
									convenient for carrying on the war against the Athenians. 
								 There a navy could be equipped if they wanted to attack Euboea,
									which was quite near, and the station would be handy for the
									conveyance of troops to Chalcidicè. 
								 For every reason they were eager to colonise the place.

First they enquired of the God at Delphi; he bade them go, and
									they sent out settlers taken from their own citizens and the
									Perioeci, announcing that any Hellenes who desired, not being of
									the Ionian, Achaean, or certain other races, might accompany
									them. 
								 The leaders of the colony were three Lacedaemonians, Leon,
									Alcidas, and Damagon.

They set to work and built afresh the walls of the city, which
									received the name of Heraclea, and is situated about four miles
									and a half from Thermopylae and a little more than two from the
									sea. 
								 They also constructed docks ,
									beginning the works near Thermopylae, at the pass, that the city
									might be perfectly defended.

While the new colonists were collecting at Heraclea, the
									Athenians grew alarmed; the scheme appeared to be aimed at Euboea, for Cape Cenaeum
									on the opposite coast is within a short sail. 
								 But their fears were not realized; no harm whatever
									ensued.

The reasons were these:— In the first place the Thessalians are
									strong in that part of the country, and fearing
									that Heraclea, which was built to control them, would be a
									powerful and dangerous neighbour, they carried on uninterrupted
									war against the young colony until they completely wore the
									settlers out, although originally they had been very
									numerous. 
								 For every one joined without hesitation, encouraged by the
									promise of security which a Lacedaemonian colony seemed to
									offer. 
								 But another great cause of the ruin and depopulation of the
									place was the conduct of the governors sent out from Lacedaemon,
									who frightened the people away by their severe and often unjust
										administration . 
								 Thus the Heracleans fell an easy prey to their neighbours.

During the same summer, and just about the same time when the
									Athenians were engaged at Melos, the troops which were cruising in the thirty
									Athenian ships about Peloponnesus set an ambuscade at Ellomenus in
									Leucadia and killed a few of the guards of the country. 
								 They next attacked Leucas itself with a larger armament,
									consisting of the Acarnanians, who followed them with their
									whole forces, all but the inhabitants of Oeniadae , and some Zacynthians and Cephallenians, together with
									fifteen ships from Corcyra.

The Leucadians saw their territory both on the mainland and
									within the isthmus, where the town of Leucas and the temple of
									Apollo are situated, ravaged by the enemy; but being powerless
									against a superior force, they remained inactive. 
								 The Acarnanians begged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to
									cut Leucas off by a wall, thinking that they could easily take
									the city and so rid themselves of an old enemy.

But just then he was persuaded by the Messenians that, having
									such an army in the field, it would be a great thing to attack
									the Aetolians: they were the enemies of Naupactus, and if he
									defeated them he would easily subjugate the
									adjoining part of the mainland to the Athenians.

The Aetolians, they said, though a large and warlike people,
									dwelt in unwalled villages, which were widely scattered, and as
									they had only light-armed soldiers, they would be subdued
									without difficulty before they could combine. 
								 They told him that he should first attack the Apodotians, then
									the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians.

The last are the largest tribe of the Aetolians; they speak a
									dialect more unintelligible than any of their neighbours, and
									are believed to eat raw flesh. 
								 They said that, if he conquered these, the rest would readily
									come over to him.

He was influenced by his regard for the Messenians, and still
									more by the consideration that without reinforcements from Athens, and with no other
									help than that of the allies on the mainland, to whom he hoped
									to add the Aetolians, he could make his way by land to attack
									Boeotia. 
								 He might proceed through the Ozolian Locri to the Dorian
									Cytinium, keeping Mount Parnassus on the right, until he came
									down upon the Phocians. 
								 They would probably be eager to join in the expedition because
									they had always been friendly to Athens, or, if unwilling, they
									might be coerced; and once in Phocis he would be on the borders
									of Boeotia.

So he left Leucas with all his army, much against the will of
									the Acarnanians, and sailed to Sollium. 
								 He there communicated his design to them, but they would not
									accompany him because he had refused to blockade Leucas; so with
									the remainder of his army, which consisted of Cephallenians,
									Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred marines belonging to
									the Athenian fleet ,
									the fifteen Corcyraean vessels having left, he marched against
									the Aetolians, starting from Oeneon in Locris.

The Ozolian Locrians were allies of the Athenians, and they were to meet him with their whole force in
									the interior of the country. 
								 They dwelt on the border of the Aetolians, and as they were
									armed in a similar manner and knew their country and ways of
									fighting, their help in the expedition seemed likely to be very
									valuable.

He encamped the first night at the temple of Nemean Zeus, where
									the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the inhabitants in fulfilment of an
									oracle which foretold that he should die at Nemea. 
								 Early the next morning he proceeded on his march into
									Aetolia.

On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleium,
									on the third Teichium. 
								 There he stayed and sent back the spoils-to Eupalium in
									Locris. 
								 For he did not intend to attack the Ophioneans yet; when he had
									subjugated the rest of the country he would return to Naupactus
									and make a second expedition against them if they continued to
									resist.

The Aetolians were aware of his designs from the very first;
									and no sooner did he enter their territory than they all
									collected in great force; even the most distant of the
									Ophioneans, the Bomieans and Callieans who reach down towards
									the Malian Gulf, came to the aid of their countrymen.

The Messenians repeated the advice which they had originally
									given to Demosthenes. 
								 They assured him that there would be no difficulty in
									conquering the Aetolians, and told him to march as quickly as he
									could against the villages. 
								 He should not wait until they could combine and meet him with
									an army, but should endeavour to take any place which was
									nearest.

He, trusting to their advice, and confident in his good fortune
									since everything was going favourably, did not wait for the
									Locrians, who should have supplied his deficiency in
									javelin-men, but at once marched towards Aegitium, which he
									attacked, and forced his way in. 
								 The inhabitants had stolen away and taken up a position on the
									top of the hills overhanging the town, which was itself built
										upon heights at a distance of about nine miles
									from the sea.

The other Aetolians, who had by this time come to the rescue of
									Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies. 
								 Some ran down from one hill and some from another and hurled
									darts at them; when the Athenian army advanced they retired, and
									when the Athenians retreated they pressed upon them. 
								 The battle, which lasted long, was nothing but a series of
									pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians were at a
									disadvantage.

While their archers had arrows and were able to use them, the
									Athenians maintained their ground, for the Aetolians, being lightarmed, were driven
									back by the arrows. 
								 But at length the captain of the archers was slain, and the
									forces under his command no longer kept together. 
								 The Athenians themselves grew weary of the long and tedious
									struggle. 
								 The Aetolians came closer and closer, add never ceased hurling
									darts at them. 
								 At last they turned and fled, and falling into ravines, out of
									which there was no way, or losing themselves in a strange
									country, they perished. 
								 Their guide, Chromon the Messenian, had been killed.

The Aetolians, who were light-armed and swift of foot, followed
									at their heels, hurling darts, and caught and slew many of them
									in the actual rout. 
								 The greater number missed their way and got into the woods, out
									of which no path led;

and their enemies brought fire and burnt the wood about
									them. 
								 So the Athenian army tried every means of escape and perished
									in all manner of ways. 
								 The survivors with difficulty made their way to the sea at
									Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out.

Many of the allies fell, and of the Athenian heavyarmed about a
									hundred and twenty, all in the flower of their youth; they were
									the very finest men whom the city of Athens lost during the
									war. 
								 Procles, one of the two generals, was also killed.

When they had received the bodies of their dead under a flag of
									truce from the Aetolians, they retreated to
									Naupactus, and returned in their ships to Athens. 
								 Demosthenes remained behind in Naupactus and the neighbourhood;
									for, after what had happened, he feared the anger of the
									Athenians.

About the same time the Athenian forces engaged in Sicily,
									sailing to the territory of Locri and there disembarking, defeated the Locrians who came
									out to meet them, and took a small garrison fort, which was
									situated upon the river Halex.

During the same summer the Aetolians, who had some time before
									despatched Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytanian, and Tisander the
									Apodotian on an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, induced the
									Lacedaemonians to aid them by sending an army against Naupactus,
									in order to punish the inhabitants for inviting the Athenian
										invasion .

So in the autumn they sent out three thousand hoplites of their
									allies, including five hundred from Heraclea, the newly-founded
									city in Trachis. 
								 Eurylochus, a Spartan, was general, and with him were
									associated in the command Macarius and Menedaeus, also Spartans,

When the army was collected at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald
									to the Ozolian Locrians, for he had to pass through their country on the way to
									Naupactus; and he also wished to detach them from the Athenian
									alliance.

Of the Locrians, the inhabitants of Amphissa were most willing
									to co-operate with him, being anxious for protection against
									their enemies the Phocians; they were the first who gave
									hostages, and by them the other Locrians, who were alarmed at
									the impending invasion, were persuaded to do the like:— first
									their neighbours the Myoneans, who commanded the most difficult
									pass into Locris; then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeantheans;
									all these tribes also joined the expedition. 
								 The Olpaeans gave hostages but did not join; the Hyaeans would
									not give hostages until the Lacedaemonians had taken one of
									their villages, called Polis.

When everything was ready, and Eurylochus had deposited the
									hostages at Cytinium of the Dorians, he marched with his army against Naupactus,
									through the territory of the Locrians. 
								 On his march he an took Oeneon and Eupalium , two Locrian towns which refused to come to terms.

When they had arrived in the territory of Naupactus and the
									Aetolians had at length joined them, they devastated the
									country, and after taking the unwalled suburbs of the town
									marched against Molycrium, a colony of the Corinthians subject
									to Athens, which they captured.

But Demosthenes the Athenian, who after his misfortune in
									Aetolia was still in the neighbourhood of Naupactus, having
									previous intelligence, and fearing for the town, went and
									persuaded the Acarnanians, much against their will— for they had
									not forgotten his withdrawal from Leucas— to assist
									Naupactus.

So they sent with him on board the Athenian ships a thousand hoplites; these got in and saved the
									place, which was in danger of having to capitulate, owing to the
									extent of the wall and the paucity of its defenders.

Eurylochus and his soldiers, when they saw that the garrison
									had been reinforced, and that there was no possibility of taking
									the city by storm, instead of going back to Peloponnesus,
									retired into the country of Aeolis, which is now called by the
									names of the towns Calydon and Pleuron, and to other places in
									the neighbourhood; also to Proschium in Aetolia.

For the Ambraciots sent and persuaded them to take part in an
									attack on the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania, declaring that, if they gained
									possession of these places, all the tribes of the mainland would
									at once come over to the Lacedaemonians.

Eurylochus assented and, dismissing the Aetolians, waited with
									his army in that region until the time for the Ambraciots to
									make their expedition and for him to join them in the
									neighbourhood of Argos. 
								 Thus the summer ended.

In the following winter the Athenians in Sicily and their
									Hellenic allies made an attack upon the Sicel fort of Inessa, a Sicel town of which the
									citadel was held by the Syracusans. 
								 They were joined by many of the Sicels, who had formerly been
									allies to the Syracusans, and, having been held down by them,
									had now revolted to the Athenians.

The attempt failed, and they retreated. 
								 But during their retreat the Syracusans sallied out and fell
									upon the allies who were in the rear of the Athenians, routed
									them, and put to flight a part of their forces with great
									loss.

Soon afterwards, Laches and the Athenians in the fleet made
									several descents upon Locris. 
								 At the river Caecinus they defeated about three hundred
									Locrians who came out to meet them under Proxenus the son of
									Capaton, took arms from the slain, and returned.

In the same winter the Athenians, by command of an oracle,
									purified the island of Delos. Pisistratus the tyrant had already purified it, but
									imperfectly, for the purification only extended to that part
									which was within sight of the temple.

The whole island was now purified in the following manner:— The
									Athenians took away all the coffins of the dead which were in
										Delos , and passed a decree that
									henceforward no one should die or give birth to a child there,
									but that the inhabitants when they were near the time of either
									should be carried across to Rhenea. 
								 Now Rhenea is near to Delos, so near indeed that
									Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for a time had a powerful
									navy, attached this island, which he conquered with the rest of
									the islands and dedicated to the Delian Apollo, by a chain to
									Delos.

After the purification, the Athenians for the first time
									celebrated the Delian games, which were held every four
									years. 
								 There had been in ancient days a great gathering of the Ionians
									and the neighboring islanders at Delos; whither they brought
									their wives and children to be present at the Delian games, as
									the Ionians now frequent the games at Ephesus.

Musical and gymnastic contests were held there, and the cities
									celebrated choral dances.

The character of the festival is attested by Homer in the
									following verses, which are taken from the hymn to Apollo:— 
								 
									 
										 At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to thy
											heart, 
									 
									 
										 Where are gathered together the Ionians in flowing
											robes, 
									 
									 
										 With their wives and children in thy street: 
									 
									 
										 There do they delight thee with boxing and dancing and
											song, 
									 
									 
										 Making mention of thy name when they gather at the
											assembly. 
									 
								 
								 And that there were musical contests which attracted
									competitors is implied in the following words of the same
									hymn. 
								 After commemorating the Delian dance of women, Homer ends their
									praises with these lines, in which he alludes to himself:— 
								 
									 
										 And now may Apollo and Artemis be gracious, 
									 
									 
										 And to all of you, maidens, I say farewell. 
									 
									 
										 Yet remember me when I am gone; 
									 
									 
										 And if some other toiling pilgrim among the sons of
											men 
									 
									 
										 Comes and asks: O maidens, 
									 
									 
										 Who is the sweetest minstrel of all who wander
											hither, 
									 
									 
										 And in whom do you delight most? 
									 
									 
										 Make answer with one voice, in gentle words, 
									 
									 
										 The blind old man of Chios' rocky isle.

Thus far Homer, who clearly indicates that even in days of old
									there was a great gathering and festival at Delos. 
								 In after ages the islanders and the Athenians led choruses in
									procession, and sacrificed. 
								 But the games and the greater part of the ceremonies naturally
									fell into disuse, owing to the misfortunes of
									Ionia. 
								 The Athenians now restored the games and for the first time
									introduced horse-races.

During the same winter the Ambraciots, in fulfilment of the
									promise by which they had induced Eurylochus and his army to remains , made an expedition against the Amphilochian Argos with
									three thousand hoplites. 
								 They invaded the Argive territory and seized Olpae, a strong
									fort on a hill by the sea-side, which in former days the
									Acarnanians had fortified and used as a common hall of
									justice. 
								 The place is about three miles from Argos, which is also on the
									sea-shore.

One division of the Acarnanians came to the aid of Argos, while
									another encamped at a spot called the Wells, where they could
									lie in wait for Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, and prevent
									them from joining the Ambraciots unobserved.

They also despatched a messenger to Demosthenes, who had led
									the Athenian expedition into Aetolia, asking him to be their
									commander, and sent for twenty Athenian ships which were just
									then cruising about the Peloponnese under the command of
									Aristoteles the son of Timocrates, and Hierophon the son of
									Antimnestus.

The Ambraciots sent a messenger from Olpae to their own
									citizens, bidding them come and help them with their entire
									force; for they were afraid that Eurylochus and his followers
									might not be able to make their way through the Acarnanians, and
									then they would have either to fight alone, or to attempt a
									hazardous retreat.

Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, when they heard that the
									Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, left Proschium and went with all speed to help
									them. 
								 Passing over the river Achelous they marched through Acarnania, leaving the city and garrison of Stratus on the
									right hand, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. 
								 The land was deserted, for the inhabitants had gone to the
									assistance of Argos.

Crossing the territory of Stratus they proceeded through Phytia
									and by the extreme border of Medeon, and so through Limnaea; at
									last they left Acarnania, and reached the friendly territory of
									the Agraeans.

Then taking to Mount Thyamus, which is open country, they
									marched on and descended into the plain of Argos after
									dark. 
								 Making their way unobserved between the city of Argos and the
									Acarnanian force stationed at the Wells, they at length reached
									the Ambraciots at Olpae.

The two armies having effected this junction moved at break of
									day to a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. 
								 Soon afterwards the Argives received the expected reinforcement
									of twenty Athenian ships, which arrived in the Ambracian
									Gulf. 
								 With them came Demosthenes, who brought two hundred Messenian
									hoplites and sixty Athenian archers.

The ships anchored about the hill of Olpae, while the
									Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians (the greater part of
									them were prevented from stirring by the Ambraciots ), having mustered at Argos, were now preparing to give
									battle. 
								 They associated Demosthenes with their own generals in the
									command of the allied forces. 
								 He led them to the neighbourhood of Olpae, and there encamped
									at a place where they were divided from the enemy by a great
									ravine.

During five days they remained inactive; on the sixth day both
									armies drew up in battle array. 
								 Demosthenes, fearing that he would be surrounded by the
									Peloponnesians who were more numerous and extended beyond his
									own line, placed hoplites and light-armed troops, 
									numbering altogether four hundred, in a deep lane overgrown with
									brushwood, intending them to lie in wait until the moment of
									conflict, when they were to rush out from the rear on the line
									of the enemy where it overlapped.

The preparations of both armies were now complete and they
									engaged. 
								 Demosthenes led his own right wing, on which were the
									Messenians and a few Athenians, while the other was held by the
									Acarnanians, who were disposed according to their cities, and by
									the Amphilochian javelinmen who were in the battle. 
								 The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were intermingled, with the
									exception of the Mantineans, who were all collected on the left
									wing; but the extremity of the wing was occupied by Eurylochus
									and his division, who were opposed to the Messenians under
									Demosthenes.

When the two armies were at close quarters, the left wing of
									the Peloponnesians out-flanked the right wing of their opponents and threatened to
									surround them; whereupon the Acarnanians, coming upon them from
									behind out of the ambuscade, charged and turned them. 
								 They fled without striking a blow, and their panic caused the
									greater part of the army to run with them. 
								 For, when they saw Eurylochus and their best troops routed,
									they lost whatever courage they had. 
								 The Messenians, who were in this part of the field under the
									command of Demosthenes, were foremost in the action.

The right wing of the enemy, however, and the Ambraciots, who
									are the most warlike nation in those parts, vanquished their
									opponents and drove them back to Argos.

But, returning, they saw the greater part of the army defeated,
									and were hard pressed by the victorious division of the
									Acarnanians, whereupon, escaping with difficulty, they made
									their way to Olpae. 
								 Numbers of the defeated were killed, for they dashed into the
									fort wildly and in confusion, except the Mantineans, who kept
									together and retreated in better order than any
									other part of the army. 
								 The battle, which had lasted until evening, now ended.

On the next day Menedaeus took the command, for Eurylochus and
									Macarius, the two other generals, had been slain . 
								 He knew not what to do after so serious a defeat. 
								 He could not hope, if he remained, to stand a siege, hemmed in
									as he was by land, and at sea blockaded by the Athenian ships;
									neither could he safely retire;

so entering into a parley with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian
									generals about the burial of the dead, he tried to negotiate
									with them at the same time for a retreat. 
								 The Athenians gave back to the enemy their dead, erected a
									trophy, and took up their own dead, in number about three
									hundred. 
								 They would not openly agree to the proposal for a general
									retreat, but Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues made a
									secret treaty with the Mantineans, and Menedaeus, and the other
									Peloponnesian generals and chief persons, allowing their army to
									depart. 
								 He wanted partly to isolate the Ambraciots and their foreign
									mercenary troops, but much more to take away the character of
									the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians among the Hellenes in
									those parts and convict them of selfishness and treachery.

Accordingly the Peloponnesians took up their dead, and burying
									them quickly as well as they could, consulted secretly how those
									who had permission could best depart.

Meanwhile news was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians
									that the whole remaining force of the Ambraciots, who some time previously had
									been summoned from the city to join the troops in Olpae, were now on their way
									through the territory of the Amphilochians and were in entire
									ignorance of what had occurred.

Whereupon he at once sent forward a part of his
									army to lie in ambush in the roads and to occupy the strong
									places, himself at the same time preparing to support them with
									the rest of his forces.

In the meantime the Mantineans and the others who were included
									in the truce went out on pretence of gathering herbs and sticks, and stole away
									one by one, picking up as they went along what they pretended to
									be looking for.

But, as they got farther away from Olpae, they quickened their
									steps, and then the Ambraciots and others who happened to
									collect on the instant, when they saw that they were leaving,
									ran after them at full speed, wanting to get up with them.

The Acarnanians at first thought that none of those who were
									going away were protected by a truce, and pursued the
									Peloponnesians. 
								 Some of the generals tried to keep them back and explained how
									matters stood; whereupon a soldier, suspecting that there was
									treachery, hurled a javelin at them.

At length the soldiers understood, and let the Mantineans and
									other Peloponnesians go, but began to kill the Ambraciots. 
								 There was great dispute and uncertainty as to who was an
									Ambraciot and who a Peloponnesian. 
								 Of the former they killed about two hundred; the Peloponnesians
									escaped into the neighboring country of Agraea, and were
									received by king Salynthius who was their friend.

Meanwhile the reinforcement from the city of Ambracia had
									reached Idomenè, which is the name of two lofty peaks. 
								 The higher of the two had been already occupied unobserved at
									nightfall by the troops which Demosthenes had sent forward; of
									the lower the Ambraciots first obtrained possession and encamped
									there.

As soon as it was dark, after supper, Demosthenes advanced with
									the rest of his army, himself leading half of them towards the
									pass between the mountains, while the rest made their way through the Amphilochian hills.

At the first dawn of day he fell upon the Ambraciots, who were
									still half-asleep, and so far from knowing anything of what had
									happened that they imagined his troops to be their own
									comrades.

For Demosthenes had taken care to place the Messenians in the
									first rank and desired them to speak to the enemy in their own
									Doric dialect, thereby putting the sentinels off their guard;
									and as it was still dark, their appearance could not be
									distinguished.

So they fell upon the Ambraciots and routed them. 
								 Most of them were slain on the spot; the remainder fled over
									the mountains.

But the paths were beset; the Amphilochians were lightly-armed,
									and in their own country which they knew, while their enemies
									were heavy-armed and the country was strange to them. 
								 And so, not knowing which way to turn, they fell into ravines
									and into ambuscades which had been set for them, and
									perished.

Every means of escape was tried. 
								 Some even fled to the sea which was not far distant, and seeing
									the Athenian ships which were sailing by while the action was
									taking place, swam out to them, thinking in the terror of the
									moment that they had better be killed, if die they must, by the
									Athenians in the ships than by their barbarous and detested
									enemies the Amphilochians.

So the Ambraciots were cut to pieces, and but few out of many
									returned home to their city. 
								 The Acarnanians, having despoiled the dead and raised trophies,
									returned to Argos.

On the following day there arrived a herald from the Ambraciots
									who had escaped out of Olpae to the Agraeans. 
								 He came to recover the bodies of the dead who had been slain
									subsequently to the first engagement, when, unprotected by the
									treaty, they tried to get out of Olpae in company with the
									Mantineans and others protected by it.

The herald saw the arms of the Ambraciot troops from the city
									and wondered at the number of them; he knew nothing of the later disaster, and he imagined that they belonged
									to his own division of the army.

Some one present thought that the herald had come from the army
									defeated at Idomenè, and asked why he looked so astonished, and
									how many of their men had fallen; he replied, 'about two
										hundred '; whereupon the other rejoined, 'These which you see
									are not the arms of two hundred men, but of more than a
									thousand.'

The herald replied, 'Then they cannot be the arms of our
									men.' 
								 The other answered, 'They must be, if you were fighting
									yesterday at Idomenè.' 
								 'But yesterday we did not fight at all; it was the day before,
									in the retreat.' 
								 'All I know is that we fought yesterday with these men, who
									were marching to your aid from Ambracia.'

When the herald heard these words, and knew that the army
									coming from the city had perished, he uttered a cry of anguish,
									and, overwhelmed by the greatness of the blow, went away at once
									without doing his errand, no longer caring to demand the
									dead.

And indeed in the whole war no such calamity happened within so
									few days to any Hellenic state . 
								 I have not ventured to set down the number of those who fell,
									for the loss would appear incredible when compared with the size
									of the city. 
								 Of this I am certain, that if the Acarnanians had been willing
									to destroy Ambracia as Demosthenes and the Athenians desired,
									they might have taken it at the first onset. 
								 But they were afraid that the Athenians, if they once got
									possession of the place, would be more troublesome neighbours
									than the Ambraciots .

After assigning a third part of the spoils to the Athenians,
									the Acarnanians divided the remainder among their cities. 
								 The spoils of the Athenians were captured on the voyage. 
								 But three hundred panoplies which were allotted to Demosthenes
									he brought home with him, and they are still preserved in the
									Athenian temples. 
								 This good service of his enabled him to return to
									Athens with less apprehension after his misfortune in
										Aetolia. The twenty Athenian ships sailed away to
									Naupactus.

The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after the Athenians and
									Demosthenes had left them, granted a truce to the Ambraciots and
									Peloponnesians who had fled to Salynthius and the Agraeans; they
									were thus enabled to return home from Oeniadae, whither they had
									removed from the country of Salynthius.

The Acarnanians and Amphilochians now made a treaty of alliance
									for one hundred years with the Ambraciots, of which the terms
									were as follows:— 'The Ambraciots shall not be required to join
									the Acarnanians in making war on the Peloponnesians, nor the
									Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots in making war on the
									Athenians. 
								 But they shall aid in the defence of one another's
									territory. 
								 The Ambraciots shall give up such places or hostages of the
									Amphilochians as they possess , and they shall not assist Anactorium' (which was
									hostile to the Acarnanians) .

Upon these terms they put an end to the war. 
								 Soon afterwards the Corinthians sent a force of their own,
									consisting of three hundred hoplites under the command of
									Xenocleidas the son of Euthycles, to guard Ambracia, whither
									they made their way with some difficulty by land. 
								 Such was the end of the Ambracian war.

During the same winter the Athenian fleet in Sicily, sailing to
									Himera, made a descent upon the country in concert with
									the Sicels, who had invaded the extreme border of the Himeraeans
									from the interior; they also attacked the Aeolian Isles.

Returning to Rhegium, they found that Pythodorus son of
									Isolochus, one of the Athenian generals, had superseded Laches
									in the command of the fleet.

The allies of the Athenians in Sicily had sailed
									to Athens, and persuaded the Athenians to send a larger fleet to
									their aid; for their territory was in the power of the
									Syracusans, and they were kept off the sea by a few ships
									only;

so they were preparing to resist, and had begun to collect a
									navy. 
								 The Athenians manned forty ships for their relief, partly
									hoping to finish the war in Sicily the sooner, partly because
									they wanted to exercise their fleet.

They despatched one of the commanders, Pythodorus, with a few
									ships, intending to send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and
									Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the larger division of the
									fleet afterwards.

Pythodorus, having now succeeded Laches in the command, sailed
									at the end of the winter against the Locrian fort which Laches
									had previously taken , but he was defeated
									by the Locrians and retired.

In the early spring the burning lava, not for the first time,
									issued from Mount Aetna, which is the highest mountain in Sicily, and devastated a portion of
									the territory of the Catanaeans who dwell-on the skirts of
									Aetna.

The last eruption is said to have taken place fifty years
									before; and altogether three eruptions are recorded since the
									Hellenes first settled in Sicily.

Such were the events of the winter; and so ended the sixth year
									in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the
									history.

IN the following summer, about the time when the corn comes into ear,
								ten Syracusan and ten Locrian ships took possession of Messenè in Sicily,
								whither they had gone by the
								invitation of the inhabitants. And so Messenè revolted from the
								Athenians.

The Syracusans took part in this affair chiefly because they saw that
								Messenè was the key to Sicily. They were afraid that the Athenians
								would one day establish themselves there and come and attack them
								with a larger force. The Locrians took part because the Rhegians
								were their-enemies, and they wanted to crush them by sea as well as
								by land.

They had already invaded the territory of Rhegium with their whole
								army, in order to hinder the Rhegians from assisting the Messenians;
								they were also partly instigated by certain Rhegian exiles who had
								taken refuge with them. For the Rhegians had been for a long time
								torn by revolution, and in their present condition could not resist
								the Locrians, who for this very reason were the more disposed to
								attack them.

After wasting the country, the Locrians withdrew their land forces;
								but the ships remained to protect Messenè. Another fleet which the
								allies were manning was intended to lie in the harbour of Messenè,
								and to carry on the war from thence.

During the spring and about the same time, before the corn was in
								full ear, the Peloponnesians and their
								allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis the son of
								Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king. They encamped and
								ravaged the country.

The Athenians sent to Sicily the forty ships , which
								were-now ready, under the command general, Pythodorus, having gone thither
								beforehand.

Orders were given to them, as they passed Corcyra, to assist the
								Corcyraeans in the city, who were harassed by the exiles in the
									mountain . The Peloponnesians had already sent
								sixty ships to the assistance of the exiles, expecting to make
								themselves masters of the situation with little difficulty; for
								there was a great famine in the city.

Demosthenes, since his return from Acarnania, had been in no command,
								but now at his own request the Athenians allowed him to make use of
								the fleet about the Peloponnese according to his judgment.

When they arrived off the coast of Laconia and heard that the
								Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra,
								Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hasten thither, but Demosthenes
								desired them first to put in at Pylos and not to proceed on their
								voyage until they had done what he wanted. They objected, but it so
								happened that a storm came on and drove them into Pylos. Instantly
								Demosthenes urged them to fortify the place;

this being the project which he had in view when he accompanied the
									fleet . He pointed
								out-to them that there was abundance of timber and stone ready to
								their hand, and that the position was naturally strong, while both
								the place itself and the country for a long way round was
								uninhabited. Pylos is distant about forty-six miles from Sparta, and
								is situated in the territory which once belonged to the Messenians;
								by the Lacedaemonians it is called Coryphasium.

The other generals argued that there were plenty of desolate
								promontories on the coast of Peloponnesus which he might occupy if
								he wanted to waste the public money. But Demosthenes thought that
								this particular spot had exceptional advantages. There was a harbour
								ready at hand; the Messenians, who were the ancient inhabitants of
								the country and spoke the same language with the Lacedaemonians,
								would make descents from the fort and do the greatest mischief; and
								they would be a trusty garrison.

As neither generals nor soldiers would listen to him, he at last
								communicated his idea to the officers of divisions; who would not
								listen to him either. The weather was still unfit for sailing; he
								was therefore compelled to remain doing nothing;

until at length the soldiers, who had nothing to do, were themselves
								seized with a desire to come round and fortify the place forthwith.
								So they put their hands to the work; and, being unprovided with iron
								tools, brought stones which they picked out and put them together as
								they happened to fit; if they required to use mortar, having no
								hods, they carried it on their backs, which they bent so as to form
								a resting-place for it, clasping their hands behind them that it
								might not fall off.

By every means in their power they hurried on the weaker points,
								wanting to finish them before the Lacedaemonians arrived. The
								position was in most places so strongly fortified by nature as to
								have no need of a wall.

The Lacedaemonians, who were just then celebrating a festival , made light of the news, being under the impression that they
								could easily storm the fort whenever they chose to attack it, even
								if the Athenians did not run away of themselves at their approach.

They were also delayed by the absence of their army in
								Attica. In six days the Athenians finished the wall on the land
								side, and in places towards the sea where it was most required; they
								then left Demosthenes with five ships to defend it, and with the
								rest hastened on their way to Corcyra and Sicily.

The Peloponnesian army in Attica, when they heard that Pylos had been
								occupied, quickly 
								returned home, Agis and the Lacedaemonians thinking that this matter
								touched them very nearly. The invasion had been made quite early in
								the year while the corn was yet green, and they were in want of food
								for their soldiers; moreover the wet and unseasonable weather had
								distressed them, so that on many grounds they were inclined to
								return sooner than they had intended.

This was the shortest of all the Peloponnesian invasions; they only
								remained fifteen days in Attica.

About the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, collecting a few
								troops from the Athenian garrisons, and a larger force from
								their allies in that neighbourhood, took Eion in Chalcidicè, a
								colony of Mendè, which had been hostile to Athens; the place was
								betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans quickly came to
								the rescue and he was driven out with considerable loss.

On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans and the
									Perioeci in the neighbourhood of the city went
								at once to attack Pylos, but the other Lacedaemonians, having only
								just returned from an expedition, were slower in arriving.

A message was sent round the Peloponnesus bidding the allies come
								without a moment's delay and meet at Pylos; another message summoned
								the sixty Peloponnesian ships from Corcyra. These were carried over
								the Leucadian isthmus , and, undiscovered
								by the Athenian ships, which were by this time at Zacynthus, reached
								Pylos, where their land forces had already assembled.

While the Peloponnesian fleet was still on its way, Demosthenes
								succeeded in despatching unobserved two vessels to let Eurymedon and
								the Athenian fleet know of his danger, and to bid them come at once.

While the Athenian ships were hastening to the assistance of
								Demosthenes in accordance with his request, the Lacedaemonians
								prepared to attack the fort both by sea and by land; they thought
								that there would be little difficulty in taking a work hastily
								constructed and defended by a handful of men.

But as they expected the speedy arrival of the Athenian fleet they
								meant to close the entrances to the harbour, and prevent the
								Athenians from anchoring there should they fail in taking the fort
								before their arrival. 
							 The island which is called Sphacteria stretches along the land and is
								quite close to it, making the harbour safe and the
								entrances narrow;

there is only a passage for two ships at the one end, which was
								opposite Pylos and the Athenian fort, while at the other the strait
								between the island and the mainland is wide enough to admit eight or
								nine. The length of the island is about a mile and threequarters; it
								was wooded, and being uninhabited had no roads. The Lacedaemonians
								were intending to block up the mouths of the harbour by ships placed
								close together with their prows outwards;

meanwhile, fearing lest the Athenians should use the island for
								military operations, they conveyed thither some hoplites, and posted
								others along the shore of the mainland. Thus both the island and the
								mainland would be hostile to the Athenians;

and nowhere on the mainland would there be a possibility
								of landing. For on the shore of Pylos itself, outside the entrance
								of the strait, and where the land faced the open sea, there were no
								harbours, and the Athenians would find no position from which they
								could assist their countrymen. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians,
								avoiding the risk of an engagement at sea, might take the fort,
								which had been occupied in a hurry and was not provisioned.

Acting on this impression they conveyed their hoplites over to the
								island, selecting them by lot out of each division of the army. One
								detachment relieved another; those who went over last and were taken
								in the island were four hundred and twenty men, besides the Helots
								who attended them; they were under the command of Epitadas the son
								of Molobrus.

Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack him
								both by sea and by land, made his own
								preparations. He drew up on shore under the fort the three triremes
									remaining to him out of the
								five which had not gone on to Corcyra, and protected them by a
								stockade; their crews he armed with shields, but of a poor sort,
								most of them made of wickerwork. In an uninhabited country there was
								no possibility of procuring arms, and these were only obtained from
								a thirty-oared privateer and a light boat belonging to some
								Messenians who had just arrived. Of these Messenians about forty
								were hoplites, whom Demosthenes used with the others.

He placed the greater part of his forces, armed and unarmed, upon the
								side of the place which looks towards the mainland and was stronger
								and better fortified; these he ordered, if they should be attacked,
								to repel the land forces, while he himself selected out of the whole
								body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and marched out
								of the fort to the sea-shore at the point where the Lacedaemonians
								seemed most likely to attempt a landing. The spot which he chose lay
								towards the open sea, and was rocky and dangerous; but
								he thought that the enemy would be attracted thither and would be
								sure to make a dash at that point because the fortifications were
								weaker.

For the Athenians, not expecting to be defeated at sea, had left the
								wall just there less strong, while if the enemy could once force a
								landing, the place would easily be taken.

Accordingly, marching down to the very edge of the sea, he there
								posted his hoplites; he was determined to keep the enemy off if he
								could, and in this spirit he addressed his men:—

'My companions in danger, let none of you now on the eve of battle
								desire to display his wits by reckoning up the sum of the perils
								which surround us; let him rather resolve to meet the enemy without
								much thought, but with a lively hope that he will survive them all.
								In cases like these, when there is no choice, reflection is useless,
								and the sooner danger comes the better.

I am sure that our chances are more than equal if we will only stand
								firm, and, having so many advantages, do not take fright at the
								numbers of the enemy and throw them all away. The inaccessibility of
								the place is one of them;

this, however, will only aid us if we maintain our position; when we
								have once retreated, the ground, though difficult in itself, will be
								easy enough to the enemy, for there will be no one to oppose him.
								And if we turn and press upon him he will be more obstinate than
								ever; for his retreat will be next to impossible. On ship-board the
								Peloponnesians are easily repelled, but once landed they are as good
								as we are. Of their numbers again we need not be so much afraid;

for, numerous as they are, few only can fight at a time, owing to the
								difficulty of bringing their ships to shore. We are contending
								against an army superior indeed in numbers, but they are not our
								equals in other respects; for they are not on land but
								on water, and ships require many favourable accidents before they
								can act with advantage. So that I consider their embarrassments to
								counterbalance our want of numbers.

You are Athenians, who know by experience the difficulty of
								disembarking in the presence of an enemy, and that if a man is not
								frightened out of his wits at the splashing of oars and the
								threatening look of a ship bearing down upon him, but is determined
								to hold his ground, no force can move him. It is now your turn to be
								attacked, and I call on you to stand fast and not to let the enemy
								touch the beach at all. Thus you will save yourselves and the
								place.'

The Athenians, inspirited by the words of Demosthenes, went down to
								the shore and formed a line along the water's
								edge.

The Lacedaemonians now began to move, and assaulted the fort with
								their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of forty-three
								ships, by sea. The admiral in command was Thrasymelidas, son of
								Cratesicles, a Spartan; he made his attack just where Demosthenes
								expected.

The Athenians defended themselves both by sea and land. The
								Peloponnesians had divided their fleet into relays of a few ships—
								the space would not allow of more— and so resting and fighting by
								turns they made their attack with great spirit, loudly exhorting one
								another to force back the enemy and take the fort. Brasidas
								distinguished himself above all other men in the engagement;

he was captain of a ship, and seeing his fellow-captains and the
								pilots, even if they could touch anywhere, hesitating and afraid of
								running their ships on the rocks, he called out to them: ' Not to be
								sparing of timber when the enemy had built a fort in their country;
								let them wreck their ships to force a landing': this he said to his
								own countrymen, and to the allies that 'they should not hesitate at
								such a moment to make a present of their ships to the
								Lacedaemonians, who had done so much for them; they
								must run aground, and somehow or other get to land and take the fort
								and the men in it.'

While thus upbraiding the others he compelled his own pilot to run
								his ship aground, and made for the
								gangway. But in attempting to disembark he was struck by the
								Athenians, and, after receiving many wounds, he swooned away and
								fell into the fore part of the ship; his shield slipped off his arm
								into the sea, and, being washed ashore, was taken up by the
								Athenians and used for the trophy which they raised in commemoration
								of this attack.

The Peloponnesians in the other ships made great efforts to
								disembark, but were unable on account of the roughness of the ground
								and the tenacity with which the Athenians held their position.

It was a singular turn of fortune which drove the Athenians to repel
								the Lacedaemonians, who were attacking them by sea, from the
								Lacedaemonian coast, and the Lacedaemonians to fight for a landing
								on their own soil, now hostile to them, in the face of the
								Athenians. For in those days it was the great glory of the
								Lacedaemonians to be a land power distinguished for their military
								prowess, and of the Athenians to be a nation of sailors and the
								first sea power in Hellas.

The Peloponnesians, having continued their efforts during this day
								and a part of the next, at length desisted; on the third day they
								sent some of their ships to Asinè for timber with which to make
								engines, hoping by their help to take the part of the fort looking
								towards the harbour where the landing was easier, although it was
								built higher.

Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus; they had been
								increased in number to fifty by the arrival of some guardships from
								Naupactus and of four Chian vessels.

Their commanders saw that both the mainland and the island were full
								of hoplites, and that the ships were in the harbour and
								were not coming out: so, not knowing where to find anchorage, they
								sailed away for the present to the island of Protè, which is close
								at hand and uninhabited, and there passed the night. Next day,
								having made ready for action, they put off to sea, intending, if, as
								they hoped, the Peloponnesians were willing to come out against
								them, to give battle in the open;

if not, to sail into the harbour. The Peloponnesians did not come
								out, and had somehow neglected to close the mouths as they had
								intended. They showed no sign of moving, but were on shore, manning
								their ships and preparing to fight, if any one entered the harbour,
								which was of considerable size.

The Athenians, seeing how matters stood, rushed in upon them at both
								mouths of the harbour. Most of
								the enemies' ships had by this time got into deep water and were
								facing them. These they put to flight and pursued them as well as
								they could in such a narrow space, damaging many and taking five,
								one of them with the crew. They charged the remaining vessels even
								after they had reached the land, and there were some which they
								disabled while the crews were getting into them and before they put
								out at all.

Others they succeeded in tying to their own ships and began to drag
								them away empty, the sailors having taken flight. At this sight the
								Lacedaemonians were in an agony, for their friends were being cut
								off in the island; they hurried to the rescue, and dashing armed as
								they were into the sea, took hold of the ships and pulled them
									back;

that was a time when every one thought that the action was at a stand
								where he himself was not engaged .
								The confusion was tremendous; the two combatants in this battle for
								the ships interchanging their usual manner of fighting;
								for the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and desperation did, as
								one may say, carry on a sea-fight from the land, and the Athenians,
								who were victorious and eager to push their good fortune to the
								utmost, waged a land-fight from their ships.

At length, after giving each other much trouble and inflicting great
								damage, they parted.

The Lacedaemonians saved their empty ships, with the exception of
								those which were first taken. Both sides retired to their
								encampments; the Athenians then raised a trophy, gave up the dead,
								and took possession of the wrecks. They lost no time in sailing
								round the island and establishing a guard over the men who were cut
								off there. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had now been
								joined by all their contingents, remained in their position before
								Pylos.

At Sparta, when the news arrived, there was great consternation; it
								was resolved that the magistrates should go down to
								the camp and see for themselves; they could then take on the spot
								any measures which they thought necessary.

Finding on their arrival that nothing could be done for their
								soldiers in the island, and not liking to run the risk of their
								being starved to death or overcome by force of numbers ,
								they decided that with the consent of the Athenian generals they
								would suspend hostilities at Pylos, and sending ambassadors to ask
								for peace at Athens, would endeavour to recover their men as soon as
								possible.

The Athenian commanders accepted their proposals, and a truce was
								made on the following conditions:— 
							 The 
								Lacedaemonians shall deliver into the hands of the Athenians at
								Pylos the ships in which they fought, and shall also bring thither
								and deliver over any other ships of war which are in Laconia; and
								they shall make no assault upon the fort either by sea
								or land. The Athenians shall permit the Lacedaemonians on the
								mainland to send to those on the island a fixed quantity of kneaded
								flour, viz. two Attic quarts of barley-meal for each man, and a pint of wine,
								and also a piece of meat; for an attendant, half these quantities;
								they shall send them into the island under the inspection of the
								Athenians, and no vessel shall sail in by stealth. The Athenians
								shall guard the island as before, but not land, and shall not attack
								the Peloponnesian forces by land or by sea.

If either party violate this agreement in any particular, however
								slight, the truce is to be at an end. The agreement is to last until
								the Lacedaemonian ambassadors return from Athens, and the Athenians
								are to convey them thither and bring them back in a trireme. When
								they return the truce is to be at an end, and the Athenians are to
								restore the ships in the same condition in which they received
								them.'

Such were the terms of the truce. The ships, which were about sixty
								in number, were given up to the Athenians. The ambassadors went on
								their way, and arriving at Athens spoke as follows:—

'Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to negotiate for the
								recovery of our countrymen in the island, in
								the hope that you may be induced to grant us terms such as will be
								at once advantageous to you and not inglorious to us in our present
								misfortune.

If we speak at length, this will be no departure from the custom of
								our country. On the contrary, it is our manner not to say much where
								few words will suffice, but to be more liberal of speech when something important has to be said and words
								are the ministers of action .

Do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit, or
								imagine that we deem you ignorant and are instructing you, but
								regard us simply as putting you in mind of what you already know to be good
								policy.

For you may turn your present advantage to excellent account, not
								only keeping what you have won, but gaining honour and glory as
								well. You will then escape the reverse which is apt to be
								experienced by men who attain any unusual good fortune; for, having
								already succeeded beyond all expectation, they see no reason why
								they should set any limit to their hopes and desires.

Whereas they who have oftenest known the extremes of either kind of
								fortune ought to be most suspicious of prosperity; and this may
								naturally be expected to be the lesson which experience has taught
								both us and you.

'Look only at the calamity which has just overtaken us, who formerly
								enjoyed the greatest 
								prestige of any Hellenic state, but are now come hither to ask of
								you the boon which at one time we should have thought ourselves
								better able to confer.

You cannot attribute our mishap to any want of power; nor to the
								pride which an increase of power fosters. We were neither stronger
								nor weaker than before, but we erred in judgment, and to such errors
								all men are liable.

Therefore you should not suppose that, because your city and your
								empire are powerful at this moment, you will always have fortune on
								your side.

The wise ensure their own safety by not making too sure of their
								gains, and when disasters come they can meet them more
								intelligently; they know that war will go on its way whithersoever
								chance may lead, and will not restrict itself to the limits which he
								who begins to meddle with it would fain prescribe. They of all men
								will be least likely to meet with reverses, because they are not
								puffed up with military success, and they will be most inclined to
								end the struggle in the hour of victory. It will be for
								your honour, Athenians, to act thus towards us.

And then the victories which you have gained already cannot be
								attributed to mere luck; as they certainly will be if, rejecting our
								prayer, you should hereafter encounter disasters, a thing which is
								not unlikely to happen. Whereas you may if you will leave to
								posterity a reputation for power and wisdom which no danger can
								affect.

'The Lacedaemonians invite you to make terms with them and to finish
								the war. They offer peace and alliance and a general
								friendly and happy relation, and they ask in return their countrymen
								who are cut off in the island. They think it better that neither
								city should run any further risk, you of the escape of the besieged,
								who may find some means of forcing their way out, we of their being
								compelled to surrender and passing absolutely into your hands.

We think that great enmities are most effectually reconciled, not
								when one party seeks revenge and, getting a decided superiority,
								binds his adversary by enforced oaths and makes a treaty with him on
								unequal terms, but when, having it in his power to do all this, he
								from a generous and equitable feeling overcomes his resentment, and
								by the moderation of his terms surprises his adversary,

who, having suffered no violence at his hands, is bound to
								recompense his generosity not with evil but with good, and who
								therefore, from a sense of honour, is more likely to keep his word.

And mankind are more ready to make such a concession to their greater
								enemies than to those with whom they have only a slight
									difference . Again, they joyfully give way to those
								who first give way themselves, although against overbearing power
								they will risk a conflict even contrary to their own better
								judgment.

'Now, if ever, is the time of reconciliation for us both, before
								either has suffered any irremediable calamity, which must cause, besides the
								ordinary antagonism of contending states, a personal and inveterate
								hatred, and will deprive you of the advantages which we now offer.

While the contest is still undecided, while you may acquire
								reputation and our friendship, and while our disaster can be
								repaired on tolerable terms, and disgrace averted, let us be
								reconciled, and choosing peace instead of war ourselves, let us give
								relief and rest to all the Hellenes. The chief credit of the peace
								will be yours. Whether we or you drove them into war is uncertain;
								but to give them peace lies with you, and to you they will be
								grateful.

If you decide for peace, you may assure to yourselves the lasting
								friendship of the Lacedaemonians freely offered by them, you on your
								part employing no force but kindness only.

Consider the great advantages which such a friendship will yield. If
								you and we are at one, you may be certain that the rest of Hellas,
								which is less powerful than we, will pay to both of us the greatest
								deference.'

Thus spoke the Lacedaemonians, thinking that the Athenians, who had
								formerly been desirous of making terms with them, and
								had only been prevented by their refusal , would now, when
								peace was offered to them, joyfully agree and would restore their
								men.

But the Athenians reflected that, since they had the Lacedaemonians
								shut up in the island, it was at any time in their power to make
								peace, and they wanted more.

These feelings were chiefly encouraged by Cleon the son of
								Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the day who had the greatest
								influence over the multitude . He persuaded them to reply that the men in the island must first of
								all give up themselves and their arms and be sent to Athens; the
								Lacedaemonians were then to restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and
								Achaia— places which had not been taken in war, but had been
								surrendered under a former treaty in a time of
								reverse, when the Athenians were more anxious to
								obtain peace than they now were On these
								conditions they might recover the men and make a treaty of such
								duration as both parties should approve.

To this reply the Lacedaemonians said nothing, but only requested
								that the Athenians would appoint
								commissioners to discuss with them the details of the agreement and
								quietly arrive at an understanding about them if they could. This
								proposal was assailed by Cleon in unmeasured language:

he had always known, he said, that they meant no good, and now their
								designs were unveiled; for they were unwilling to speak a word
								before the people, but wanted to be closeted with a select few ; if
								they had any honesty in them, let them say what they wanted to the
								whole city.

But the Lacedaemonians knew that, although they might be willing to
								make concessions under the pressure of their calamities, they could
								not speak openly before the assembly (for if they spoke and did not
								succeed, the terms which they offered might injure them in the
								opinion of their allies); they saw too that the Athenians would not
								grant what was asked of them on any tolerable conditions. So, after
								a fruitless negotiation, they returned home.

Upon their return the truce at Pylos instantly came to an end, and
								the Lacedaemonians demanded back their ships according
								to the agreement. But the Athenians accused them of making an
								assault upon the fort, and of some other petty infractions of the
								treaty which seemed hardly worth mentioning. Accordingly they refused to restore them,
								insisting upon the clause which said that if 'in any particular,
								however slight,' the agreement were violated, the treaty was to be
								at an end.

The Lacedaemonians remonstrated, and went away protesting against the
								injustice of detaining their ships. Both parties then renewed the
								war at Pylos with the utmost vigour. The Athenians had two triremes
								sailing round Sphacteria in opposite directions throughout the day,
								and at night their whole fleet was moored about the island, except
								on the side towards the sea when the wind was high. Twenty
								additional ships had come from Athens to assist in the blockade, so
								that the entire number was seventy. The Peloponnesians lay encamped
								on the mainland and made assaults upon the fort, watching for any
								opportunity which might present itself of rescuing their men.

Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and the allies brought up the
								fleet which they had been equipping to Messenè, and
								joining the other fleet which was keeping guard there, carried on
								the war from thence.

They were instigated chiefly by the Locrians, who hated the Rhegians,
								and had already invaded their territory with their whole force.

They were eager to try their fortune in a naval engagement, for they
								saw that the Athenians had only a few ships actually on the spot,
								the larger portion of the fleet which had been despatched to Sicily
								being, as they heard, engaged in the siege of Sphacteria.

If they conquered at sea they hoped to blockade Rhegium both by sea
								and land; they would easily master the place, and their
								affairs would then be really gaining strength. Rhegium, the extreme
								point of Italy, and Messenè, of Sicily, are close to one another;
								and if Rhegium were taken the Athenians would not be able to lie
								there and command the strait.

Now the strait is that portion of sea between Rhegium and Messenè
								where Sicily is nearest to the continent; it is the so-called
								Charybdis by which Odysseus is said to have passed. The channel was
								naturally considered dangerous; for the strait is narrow, and the
								sea flowing into it from two great oceans, the Tyrrhenian and
								Sicilian, is full of currents.

In this strait the Syracusans and their allies, who had somewhat more
								than thirty ships, were compelled to fight late in the day for a
								vessel which was sailing through. They put out against sixteen
								Athenian and eight Rhegian ships;

but, being defeated by the Athenians, they made a hasty retreat, each
								ship as it best could, to their stations at Messenè and near
								Rhegium; one ship was lost. Night closed the engagement.

After this the Locrians quitted the Rhegian territory, and the
								Syracusans and their confederates united their fleet
								and anchored at the promontory of Pelorus near Messenè, where their
								land-forces were also stationed.

The Athenians and Rhegians, sailing up to them, and seeing that the
								crews were not there, fell upon the empty vessels, but an iron
								grapnel was thrown out at them, and they in their turn lost a ship,
								from which the crew escaped by swimming.

Then the Syracusans embarked, and, as they were being towed along the
								shore towards Messenè, the Athenians again attacked them. Making a
								sudden twist outwards they struck the first blow at the Athenians,
								who lost another ship.

Thus both in the movement along the coast and in the naval engagement
								which ensued, the Syracusans proved themselves quite a match for the
									 Athenians, and at length made their way into the
								harbour at Messenè.

The Athenians, hearing that Camarina was to be betrayed to the
								Syracusans by a certain Archias and his confederates, sailed thither.
								Meanwhile the Messenians, with their whole power by land and with
								the allied fleet, made war upon Naxos, a Chalcidian city which was
								their neighbour.

On the first day they forced the Naxians to retire within their walls
								and ravaged the country;

on the morrow they sailed round to the mouth of the river Acesines,
								again ravaged the country, and with their land-forces made
								incursions right up to the city. But in the meantime a large body of
								Sicels came down over the heights to assist the Naxians against the
								Messenians. Perceiving this the besieged took heart, and shouting to
								one another that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were
								coming to succour them, they sallied out of the city, charged the
								Messenians, and put them to flight with a loss of more than a
								thousand men;

the rest with difficulty escaped, for the barbarians fell upon them
								in the roads and destroyed most of them. The allied fleet, putting
								into Messenè, broke up and returned home. Whereupon the Leontines
								and their allies, in concert with the Athenians, marched against the
								now enfeebled Messenè. The Athenian fleet attempted an assault of
								the harbour while the army attacked the city.

But the Messenians and a Locrian garrison under Demoteles, which
								after their disaster at Naxos had been left to protect the place,
								suddenly falling upon them put to flight the main body of the
								Leontines with great loss; whereupon the Athenians disembarked, came
								to their aid, and, falling on the Messenians while they were still
								in confusion, chased them back to the city. They then erected a
								trophy and retired to Rhegium.

After this the Hellenes in Sicily went on fighting against one
								another by land; but the Athenians took no part in their operations.

At Pylos meanwhile the Athenians continued to blockade the
								Lacedaemonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the
									mainland remained in their old position.

The watch was harassing to the Athenians, for they were in want both
								of food and water; there was only one small well, which was in the
								acropolis, and the soldiers were commonly in the habit of scraping
								away the shingle on the sea-shore, and drinking such water as they
								could get. The Athenian garrison was crowded into a narrow space,
								and, their ships having no regular anchorage, the crews took their
								meals on land by turns;

one half of the army eating while the other lay at anchor in the open
								sea. The unexpected length of the siege was a great discouragement
								to them;

they had hoped to starve their enemies out in a few days, for they
								were on a desert island, and had only brackish water to drink.

The secret of this protracted resistance was a proclamation issued by
								the Lacedaemonians offering large fixed prices, and freedom if he
								were a Helot, to any one who would convey into the island meal,
								wine, cheese or any other provision suitable for a besieged place.
								Many braved the danger, especially the Helots;

they started from all points of Peloponnesus, and before daybreak
								bore down upon the shore of the island looking towards the open sea.
								They took especial care to have a strong wind in their favour, since
								they were less likely to be discovered by the triremes when it blew
								hard from the sea.

The blockade was then impracticable, and the crews of the boats were
								perfectly reckless in running them aground; for a value had been set
								upon them, and Lacedaemonian hoplites were waiting to receive them
								about the landing-places of the island. All however who ventured
								when the sea was calm were captured.

Some too dived and swam by way of the harbour, drawing after them by
								a cord skins containing pounded linseed and poppy-seeds
								mixed with honey. At first they were not found out, but afterwards
								watches were posted.

The two parties had all sorts of devices, the one determined to send
								in food, the other to detect them.

When the Athenians heard that their own army was suffering and that
								supplies were introduced into the island, they began
								to be anxious and were apprehensive that the blockade might extend
								into the winter. They reflected that the conveyance of necessaries
								round the Peloponnese would then be impracticable. Their troops were
								in a desert place, to which, even in summer, they were not able to
								send a sufficient supply. The coast was without harbours; and
								therefore it would be impossible to maintain the blockade. Either
								the watch would be relaxed and the men would escape; or, taking
								advantage of a storm, they might sail away in the ships which
								brought them food.

Above all they feared that the Lacedaemonians, who no longer made
								overtures to them, must now be reassured of the strength of their
								own position, and they regretted having rejected their advances.

Cleon, knowing that he was an object of general mistrust because he
								had stood in the way of peace, challenged the reports of the
								messengers from Pylos; who rejoined that, if their words were not
								believed, the Athenians should send commissioners of their own. And
								so Theogenes and Cleon himself were chosen commissioners.

As he knew that he could only confirm the report of the messengers
								whom he was calumniating, or would be convicted of falsehood if he
								contradicted them, observing too that the Athenians were now more
								disposed to take active measures, he advised them not to send
								commissioners, which would only be a loss of valuable time, but, if
								they were themselves satisfied with the report, to send a fleet
								against the island.

Pointedly alluding to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was one of the
								generals and an enemy of his, he declared sarcastically
								that, if the generals were men, they might easily sail with an
								expedition to the island and take the garrison, and that this was
								what he would certainly have done, had he been general.

Nicias perceived that the multitude were murmuring at Cleon, and
								asking 'why he did not sail in any case— now was his time if he
								thought the capture of Sphacteria to be such an easy matter'; and
								hearing him find fault, he told him that, as far as they, the
								generals, were concerned, he might take any force which he required
								and try.

Cleon at first imagined that the offer of Nicias was only a pretence,
								and was willing to go; but finding that he was in earnest, he tried
								to back out, and said that not he but Nicias was general. He was now
								alarmed, for he never imagined that Nicias would go so far as to
								give up his place to him.

Again Nicias bade him take the command of the expedition against
								Pylos, which he formally gave up to him in the presence of the
								assembly. And the more Cleon declined the proffered command and
								tried to retract what he had said, so much the more the multitude,
								as their manner is, urged Nicias to resign and shouted to Cleon that
								he should sail.

At length, not knowing how to escape from his own words, he undertook
								the expedition, and, coming forward, said that he was not afraid of
								the Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without taking a single
								man from the city if he were allowed to have the Lemnian and Imbrian
								forces now at Athens, the auxiliaries from Aenus, who were
								targeteers, and four hundred archers from other places. With these
								and with the troops already at Pylos he gave his word that within
								twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive or kill
								them on the spot.

His vain words moved the Athenians to laughter; nevertheless the
								wiser sort of men were pleased when they reflected that
								of two good things they could not fail to obtain one— either there
								would be no more trouble with Cleon, which they would have greatly
								preferred, or, if they were disappointed, he would put the
								Lacedaemonians into their hands.

When he had concluded the affair in the assembly, and the Athenians
								had passed the necessary vote for his expedition, he made choice of
								Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, to be his colleague, and
								proceeded to sail with all speed.

He selected Demosthenes because he heard that he was already
								intending to make an attack upon the island; for the soldiers, who
								were suffering much from the discomfort of the place, in which they
								were rather besieged than besiegers , were eager to strike
								a decisive blow, He had been much encouraged by a fire which had
								taken place in the island.

It had previously been nearly covered with wood and was pathless,
								having never been inhabited; and he had feared that the nature of
								the country would give the enemy an advantage. For, however large
								the force with which he landed, the Lacedaemonians might attack him
								from some place of ambush and do him much injury. Their mistakes and
								the character of their forces would be concealed by the wood;
								whereas all the errors made by his own army would be palpable, and
								so the enemy, with whom the power of attack would rest, might come
								upon them suddenly wherever they liked.

And if they were compelled to go into the wood and there engage, a
								smaller force which knew the ground would be more than a match for
								the larger number who were unacquainted with it. Their own army,
								however numerous, would be destroyed without knowing it, for they
								would not be able to see where they needed one another's assistance.

Demosthenes was led to make these reflections from his experience in
									Aetolia , where his defeat 
								had been in a great measure owing to the forest.

However, while the Athenian soldiers were taking their midday meal,
								with a guard posted in advance, at the extremity of the island,
								compelled as they were by want of room to land on the edge of the
								shore at meal-times, some one unintentionally set fire to a portion
								of the wood; a wind came on;

and from this accident, before they knew what was happening, the
								greater part of it was burnt. Demosthenes, who had previously
								suspected that the Lacedaemonians when they sent in provisions to
								the besieged had exaggerated their number, saw that the men were
								more numerous than he had imagined. He saw too the
								increased zeal of the Athenians, who were now convinced that the
								attempt was worth making; and the island seemed to him more
								accessible.

So he prepared for the descent, despatching messengers to the allies
								in the neighbourhood for additional forces and putting all in
								readiness. Cleon sent and announced to Demosthenes his approach, and
								soon afterwards, bringing with him the army which he had requested,
								himself arrived at Pylos. On the meeting of the two generals they
								first of all sent a herald to the Lacedaemonian force on the
								mainland, proposing that they should avoid any further risk by
								ordering the men in the island to surrender with their arms; they
								were to be placed under surveillance but well treated until a
								general peace was concluded.

Finding that their proposal was rejected, the Athenians waited for a
								day, and on the night of the day following put off, taking with
								them all their heavy-armed troops, whom they had embarked in a few
								ships. A little before dawn they landed on both sides of the island,
								towards the sea and towards the harbour, a force
								amounting in all to about eight hundred men.

They then ran as fast as they could to the first station on the
								island. Now the disposition of the enemy was as follows: This first
								station was garrisoned by about thirty hoplites, while the main body
								under the command of Epitadas was posted near the spring in the
								centre of the island, where the ground was most level. A small force
									guarded the
								furthest extremity of the island opposite Pylos, which was
								precipitous towards the sea, and on the land side the strongest
								point of all, being protected to some extent by an ancient wall made
								of rough stones, which the Spartans thought would be of use to them
								if they were overpowered and compelled to retreat. Such was the
								disposition of the Lacedaemonian troops.

The Athenians rushed upon the first garrison and cut them down, half
								asleep as they were and just
								snatching up their arms. Their landing had been unobserved, the
								enemy supposing that the ships were only gone to keep the customary
								watch for the night. When the dawn appeared, the rest of the army
								began to disembark.

They were the crews of rather more than seventy ships, including all
								but the lowest rank of rowers, variously equipped. There were also
								archers to the number of eight hundred, and as many targeteers,
								besides the Messenian auxiliaries and all who were on duty about
								Pylos, except the guards who could not be spared from the walls of
								the fortress.

Demosthenes divided them into parties of two hundred more or less,
								who seized the highest points of the island in order that the enemy,
								being completely surrounded and distracted by the number of their
								opponents, might not know whom they should face first, but might be
								exposed to missiles on every side. For if they attacked those who
								were in front, they would be assailed by those behind;
								and if those on one flank, by those posted on the other;

and whichever way they moved, the light-armed troops of the enemy
								were sure to be in their rear. These were their most embarrassing
								opponents, because they were armed with bows and javelins and slings
								and stones, which could be used with effect at a distance. Even to
								approach them was impossible, for they conquered in their very
								flight, and when an enemy retreated, pressed close at his heels.
								Such was the plan of the descent which Demosthenes had in his mind,
								and which he now carried into execution.

The main body of the Lacedaemonians on the island under Epitadas,
								when they saw the first garrison cut
								to pieces and an army approaching them, drew up in battle array. The
								Athenian hoplites were right in front, and the Lacedaemonians
								advanced against them, wanting to come to close quarters; but having
								lightarmed adversaries both on their flank and rear, they could not
								get at them or profit by their own military skill, for they were
								impeded by a shower of missiles from both sides.

Meanwhile the Athenians instead of going to meet them remained in
								position, while the light-armed again and again ran up and attacked
								the Lacedaemonians, who drove them back where they pressed closest.
								But though compelled to retreat they still continued fighting, being
								lightly equipped and easily getting the start of their enemies. The
								ground was difficult and rough, the island having been uninhabited;
								and the Lacedaemonians, who were incumbered by their arms, could not
								pursue them in such a place.

For some little time these skirmishes continued. But soon the
								Lacedaemonians became too weary to
								rush out upon their assailants, who began to be sensible that their
								resistance grew feebler. The sight of their own number, which was
								many times that of the enemy, encouraged them more than anything;
								they soon found that their losses were trifling 
								compared with what they had expected; and familiarity made them
								think their opponents much less formidable than when they first
								landed cowed by the fear of facing Lacedaemonians. They now despised
								them and with a loud cry rushed upon them in a body, hurling at them
								stones, arrows, javelins, whichever came first to hand.

The shout with which they accompanied the attack dismayed the
								Lacedaemonians, who were unaccustomed to this kind of warfare.
								Clouds of dust arose from the newlyburnt wood, and there was no
								possibility of a man's seeing what was before him, owing to the
								showers of arrows and stones hurled by their assailants which were
								flying amid the dust.

And now the Lacedaemonians began to be sorely distressed, for their
								felt cuirasses did not protect them against the arrows, and the
								points of the javelins broke off where they struck them. They were
								at their wits' end, not being able to see out of their eyes or to
								hear the word of command, which was drowned by the cries of the
								enemy. Destruction was staring them in the face, and they had no
								means or hope of deliverance.

At length, finding that so long as they fought in the same narrow
								spot more and more of their
								men were wounded, they closed their ranks and fell back on the last
								fortification of the island, which was not far off, and where their
								other garrison was stationed.

Instantly the light-armed troops of the Athenians pressed upon them
								with fresh confidence, redoubling their cries. Those of the
								Lacedaemonians who were caught by them on the way were killed, but
								the greater number escaped to the fort and ranged themselves with
								the garrison, resolved to defend the heights wherever they were
								assailable.

The Athenians followed, but the strength of the position made it
								impossible to surround and cut them off, and so they attacked them
								in face and tried to force them back.

For a long time, and indeed during the greater part of the day, both
								armies, although suffering from the battle and thirst
								and the heat of the sun, held their own; the one endeavouring to
								thrust their opponents from the high ground, the other determined
								not to give way. But the Lacedaemonians now defended themselves with
								greater ease, because they were not liable to be taken in flank.

There was no sign of the end. At length the general of the Messenian
								contingent came to Cleon and
								Demosthenes and told them that the army was throwing away its pains,
								but if they would give him some archers and light-armed troops and
								let him find a path by which he might get round in the rear of the
								Lacedaemonians, he thought that he could force the approach.

Having obtained his request he started from a point out of sight of
								the enemy, and making his way wherever the broken ground afforded a
								footing and where the cliff was so steep that no guards had been
								set, he and his men with great difficulty got round unseen and
								suddenly appeared on the summit in their rear, striking panic into
								the astonished enemy and redoubling the courage of his own friends
								who were watching for his reappearance.

The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and to compare a
								smaller thing to a greater, were in the same case with their own
								countrymen at Thermopylae. For as they perished when the Persians
								found a way round by the path, so now the besieged garrison were
								attacked on both sides, and no longer resisted. The disparity of
								numbers, and the failure of bodily strength arising from want of
								food, compelled them to fall back, and the Athenians were at length
								masters of the approaches.

Cleon and Demosthenes saw that if the Lacedaemonians gave way one
								step more they would be destroyed by the Athenians; so
								they stopped the engagement and held back their own army, for they
								wanted, if possible, to bring them alive to Athens. They were in hopes that when they heard the offer of terms their
								courage might be broken, and that they might be induced by their
								desperate situation to yield up their arms.

Accordingly they proclaimed to them that they might, if they would,
								surrender at discretion to the Athenians themselves and their arms.

Upon hearing the proclamation most of them lowered their shields and
								waved their hands in token of their
								willingness to yield. A truce was made, and then Cleon and
								Demosthenes on the part of the Athenians, and Styphon the son of
								Pharax on the part of the Lacedaemonians, held a parley. Epitadas,
								who was the first in command, had been already slain; Hippagretas,
								who was next in succession, lay among the slain for dead;

and Styphon had taken the place of the two others, having been
								appointed, as the law prescribed, in case anything should happen to
								them.

He and his companions expressed their wish to communicate with the
								Lacedaemonians on the mainland as to the course which they should
								pursue. The Athenians allowed none of them to stir, but themselves
								invited heralds from the shore; and after two or three
								communications, the herald who came over last from the body of the
								army brought back word, 'The Lacedaemonians bid you act as you think
								best, but you are not to dishonour yourselves.'

Whereupon they consulted together, and then gave up themselves and
								their arms. During that day and the following night the Athenians
								kept guard over them; on the next day they set up a trophy on the
								island and made preparations to sail, distributing the prisoners
								among the trierarchs. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and conveyed
								away their own dead.

The number of the dead and the prisoners was as follows:— Four
								hundred and twenty hoplites in all passed over into the island; of
								these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought to Athens alive, the remainder had perished. Of the survivors the Spartans
								numbered about a hundred and twenty. But few Athenians fell, for
								there was no regular engagement.

Reckoned from the sea-fight to the final battle in the island, the
								time during which the blockade lasted was ten weeks and two days.

For about three weeks the Lacedaemonians were supplied with food
								while the Spartan ambassadors were gone to solicit peace, but during
								the rest of this time they lived on what was brought in by stealth.
								A store of corn and other provisions was found in the island at the
								time of the capture;

for the commander Epitadas had not served out full rations. The
								Athenians and Peloponnesians now withdrew their armies from Pylos
								and returned home. And the mad promise of Cleon was fulfilled; for
								he did bring back the prisoners within twenty days, as he had said.

Nothing which happened during the war caused greater amazement in
								Hellas; for it was universally imagined that the
								Lacedaemonians would never give up their arms, either under the
								pressure of famine or in any other extremity, but would fight to the
								last and die sword in hand.

No one would believe that those who surrendered were men of the same
								quality with those who perished. There is a story of a reply made by
								a captive taken in the island to one of the Athenian allies who had
								sneeringly asked 'Where were their brave men-all killed?' He answered that 'The spindle'
								(meaning the arrow) 'would be indeed a valuable weapon if it picked
								out the brave.' He meant to say that the destruction caused by the
								arrows and stones was indiscriminate.

On the arrival of the captives the Athenians resolved to
								put them in chains until peace was concluded, but if in the meantime
								the Lacedaemonians 
								invaded Attica, to bring them out and put them to death.

They placed a garrison in Pylos; and the Messenians of Naupactus,
								regarding the place as their native land (for Pylos is situated in
								the territory which was once Messenia), sent thither some of
								themselves, being such troops as were best suited for the service,
								who ravaged Laconia and did great harm, because they spoke the same
								language with the inhabitants.

The Lacedaemonians had never before experienced this irregular and
								predatory warfare; and finding the Helots desert, and dreading some
								serious domestic calamity, they were in great trouble. Although
								reluctant to expose their condition before the Athenians, they sent
								envoys to them and endeavoured to recover Pylos and the prisoners.

But the Athenians only raised their terms, and at last, after they
								had made many fruitless journeys, dismissed them. Thus ended the
								affair of Pylos.

During the same summer and immediately afterwards the Athenians
								attacked the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand
								heavy-armed, and cavalry to the number of two hundred conveyed in
								horse transports. They were accompanied by allies from Miletus,
								Andros, and Carystus. Nicias the son of Niceratus, and two others,
								were in command.

Very early in the morning they put in between the promontory
								Chersonesus and the stream Rhetus, to that part of the coast which
								is overhung by the Solygean ridge; there in ancient times Dorian
								invaders had taken up their position and fought against their
								Aeolian enemies in Corinth, and to this day there is a village,
								called Solygea, on the hill which they occupied. From the beach
								where the crews landed this village is distant nearly a mile and a-half, the city of Corinth about seven miles, and
								the isthmus about two miles and a quarter.

The Corinthians, having had early intimation from Argos of the
								intended invasion, came in good time to the isthmus. The whole
								population, with the exception of those who dwelt to the north of
								the isthmus and five hundred troops who were employed in protecting
								Ambracia and Leucadia , was on the watch to see where the
								Athenians would land.

But, having sailed in before daylight, they were not discovered; the
								Corinthians however were soon informed by signals of their landing;
								and so, leaving half their troops at Cenchreae in case the Athenians
								should attack Crommyon, they came to the rescue with all speed.

Battus, one of the two generals who were present in the engagement,
								taking a single division of the force, went to Solygea, intending to
								protect the village, which was not fortified; Lycophron with the
								remainder of the army attacked the enemy.

The Corinthians first of all assailed the right wing of the
								Athenians, which had only just landed in front of the Chersonesus,
								and then engaged with the rest. The conflict was stubborn, and all
								hand to hand.

The Athenians, who were on the right wing, and the Carystians, who
								were on the extreme right, received the Corinthians, and with some
								difficulty drove them back. They retired behind a loose stone wall,
								and the whole place being a steep hill-side, threw the stones down
								from above; but soon they raised the paean and again came on.

Again the Athenians received them, and another hand-to-hand fight
								ensued, when a division of the Corinthians coming to the aid of
								their left wing, forced back the right wing of the Athenians and
								pursued them to the sea; but the Athenians and Carystians in their
								turn again drove them back from. the ships.

Meanwhile the rest of the two armies had been fighting steadily. On
								the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron was opposed to
								the Athenian left, the defence was most energetic; for he and his
								troops were apprehensive that the Athenians would move on the
								village of Solygea.

For a long time neither would give way, but at length the Athenians,
								having an advantage in cavalry, with which the
								Corinthians were unprovided, drove them back, and they retired to
								the summit of the ridge; where they grounded their arms and remained
								inactive, refusing to come down.

In this defeat of their right wing the Corinthians incurred the
								heaviest loss, and Lycophron their general was slain. The whole army
								was now forced back upon the high ground, where they remained in
								position; they were not pursued far, and made a leisurely retreat.

The Athenians seeing that they did not return to the attack, at once
								erected a trophy and began to spoil the enemies' dead and take up
								their own.

The other half of the Corinthians who were keeping guard at
								Cenchreae, lest the Athenians should sail against Crommyon, 'had
								their view of the battle intercepted by Mount Oneum. But when they
								saw the dust and knew what was going on, they instantly came to the
								rescue. The elder men of Corinth hearing of the defeat likewise
								hastened to the spot.

The united army then advanced against the Athenians, who fancying
								that a reinforcement had come from the neighbouring states of
								Peloponnesus, quickly retreated to their ships, taking their spoils
								and their own dead, with the exception of two whom they could not
								find;

they then embarked and sailed to the neighboring islands. Thence they
								sent a herald asking for a truce, and recovered the two dead bodies
								which were missing. The Corinthians lost two hundred and twelve men;
								the Athenians hardly so many as fifty.

On the same day the Athenians sailed from the islands to 
								Crommyon, which is in the territory of Corinth, nearly fourteen
								miles from the city, and, there anchoring, they ravaged
								the country and encamped for the night.

On the following day they sailed along the coast to Epidaurus, where
								they made a descent, and then passed onward and came to Methonè,
								which is situated between Epidaurus and Troezen. They built a wall
								across the isthmus, and so cut off the peninsula on which Methonè
								stands. There they established a garrison, which continued for some
								time to ravage the country of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. The
								fleet, when the fortification was completed, returned home.

Just about this time Eurymedon and Sophocles, who had started from
								Pylos on their voyage to Sicily with the Athenian fleet, arrived
								at Corcyra, and in concert with the popular party attacked the
								Corcyraean oligarchs, who after the revolution had crossed over into
								the island and settled in Mount Istonè. Here they had become masters
								of the country again, and were doing great mischief .
								The Athenians assaulted and took their fortress;

the garrison, who had fled in a body to a peak of the hill, came to
								terms, agreeing to give up their auxiliaries and surrender their
								arms, but stipulating that their own fate should be decided by the
								Athenian people.

Tile garrison themselves were conveyed by the generals to the island
								of Ptychia and kept there under a promise of safety until they could
								be sent to Athens; on condition however that if any of them were
								caught attempting to escape, they should all lose the benefit of the
								agreement.

Now the leaders of the Corcyraean democracy feared that when the
								captives arrived at Athens they would not be put to death;

so they devised the following trick:— They sent to the 
								island friends of the captives, whom with seeming goodwill they
								instructed to tell them that they had better escape as fast as they
								could, for the fact was that the Athenian generals were about to
								hand them over to the Corcyraean democracy; they would themselves
								provide a vessel.

The friends of the captives persuaded a few of them, and the vessel
								was provided. The prisoners were taken sailing out;
								the truce was at an end, and they were all instantly delivered up to
								the Corcyraeans.

The feeling which the Athenian generals displayed greatly contributed
								to the result; for, being compelled to proceed to Sicily themselves,
								they were well known to wish that no one else should gain the credit
								of bringing the prisoners to Athens; and
								therefore the agreement was interpreted to the letter, and the contrivers of the trick thought that
								they could execute it with impunity.

The Corcyraeans took the prisoners and shut them up in a large
								building; then, leading them out in bands of twenty at a time, they
								made them pass between two files of armed men; they were bound to
								one another and struck and pierced by the men on each side, whenever
								any one saw among them an enemy of his own; and there were men with
								whips, who accompanied them to the place of execution and quickened
								the steps of those who lingered.

In this manner they brought the prisoners out of the building, and
								slew them to the number of sixty undiscovered by the
								rest, who thought that they were taking them away to some other
								place. But soon they found out what was happening, for some one told
								them, and then they called upon the Athenians, if they wanted them
								to die, to take their lives themselves.

Out of the building they refused to stir, and threatened that into
								it, if they could help, no one should enter. The Corcyraean populace
								had not the least intention of forcing a way in by the door, but
								they got upon the roof and, making an opening, threw tiles and shot
								arrows down from above.

The prisoners sought to shelter themselves as they best could. Most
								of them at the same time put an end to their own lives; some thrust
								into their throats arrows which were shot at them, others strangled
								themselves with cords taken from beds which they found in the place,
								or with strips which they tore from their own garments.

This went on during the greater part of the night, which had closed
								upon their sufferings, until in one way or another, either by their
								own hand or by missiles hurled from above, they all perished. At
								daybreak the Corcyraeans flung the dead bodies cross-wise on waggons
								and carried them out of the city.

The women who were taken in the fortress on Mount Istonè were reduced
								to slavery. Thus the Corcyraeans in the mountain were destroyed by
								the people, and, at least while the Peloponnesian war lasted, there
								was an end of the great sedition;

for there was nothing left of the other party worth mentioning. The
								Athenians then sailed for Sicily, their original destination , and there fought in
								concert with their allies.

At the end of the summer the Athenian forces in Naupactus and some
									Acarnanians made
								an expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian town at the mouth of
								the Ambracian Gulf, which was betrayed to them. The Acarnanians
								expelled the Corinthians, and sent a colony of their own, taken from
								the whole nation, to occupy the place. So the summer ended.

During the ensuing winter Aristides the son of Archippus, one of the
								commanders of the Athenian vessels which collected tribute from the
								allies, captured, at Eion upon the Strymon, Artaphernes a Persian,
								who was on his way from the King to Sparta.

He was brought to Athens, and the Athenians had the 
								despatches which he was carrying and which were written in the
								Assyrian character translated, and read them; there were many
								matters contained in them, but the chief point was a remonstrance
								addressed to the Lacedaemonians by the King, who said that he could
								not understand what they wanted; for, although many envoys had come
								to him, no two of them agreed. If they meant to make themselves
								intelligible, he desired them to send to him another embassy with
								the Persian envoy.

Shortly afterwards the Athenians sent Artaphernes in a trireme to
								Ephesus, and with him an embassy of their own, but they found that
								Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes had recently died; for the embassy
								arrived just at that time. Whereupon they returned home.

During the same winter the Chians dismantled their new walls by order
								of the Athenians, who suspected that they
								meant to rebel, not however without obtaining from the Athenians
								such pledges and assurances as they could, that no violent change
								should be made in their condition. So the winter came to an end; and
								with it the seventh year in the Peloponnesian War of which
								Thucydides wrote the history.

Early in the ensuing summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun at
								the time of the new moon, and within the first ten days of the same month an

earthquake. 
 
							 The main body of the refugees who had escaped from Mitylenè and the
								rest of Lesbos had 
								established themselves on the continent. They hired mercenaries from
								Peloponnesus or collected them on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but
								on receiving a payment of two thousand Phocaean
									staters , they restored the town uninjured.

They then made an expedition against Antandrus and took the city,
								which was betrayed into their hands. They hoped to liberate the
								other so-called 'cities of the coast,' which had been formerly in
								the possession of the Mytilenaeans and were now held by the
									Athenians , but their principal object was Antandrus
								itself, which they intended to strengthen and make their
								head-quarters. Mount Ida was near and would furnish timber for
								shipbuilding, and by the help of a fleet and by other means they
								could easily harass Lesbos which was close at hand, and reduce the
								Aeolian towns on the continent. Such were their designs.

During the same summer the Athenians with sixty ships, two thousand
								hoplites, and a few cavalry,
								taking also certain Milesian and other allied forces, made an
								expedition against Cythera, under the command of Nicias the son of
								Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles the son
								of Tolmaeus.

Cythera is an island which lies close to Laconia off Cape Malea; it
								is inhabited by Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and a Spartan officer called
								the Judge of Cythera was sent thither every year. The Lacedaemonians
								kept there a garrison of hoplites, which was continually relieved,
								and took great care of the place.

There the merchant vessels coming from Egypt and Libya commonly put
								in; the island was a great protection to the Lacedaemonians against
								depredation by sea, on which element, though secure by land, they
								were exposed to attack, for the whole of Laconia runs out towards
								the Sicilian and Cretan seas .

The Athenian fleet appeared off Cythera, and with a 
								detachment of ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites took
								Scandea, one of the cities on the sea-shore. The rest of their army
								disembarked on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and
								moved on to the lower city of the Cytherians, which is also on the
								sea-coast;

there they found all the inhabitants encamped in force. A battle was
								fought in which the Cytherians held their ground for some little
								time, and then, betaking themselves to flight, retired to the upper
								city.

They at length surrendered to Nicias and his colleagues, placing
								themselves at the disposal of the Athenians, but stipulating that
								their lives should be spared. Nicias had already contrived to enter
								into communication with some of them, and in consequence the
								negotiations were speedier, and lighter terms were imposed upon them
								both at the time and afterwards .

Else the Athenians would have expelled them, because they were
								Lacedaemonians and their island was close to Laconia. After the
								capitulation they took into their own hands Scandea, the city near
								the harbour, and secured the island by a garrison. They then sailed
								away, made descents upon Asinè, Helos, and most of the other
								maritime towns of Laconia, and, encamping wherever they found
								convenient, ravaged the country for about seven days.

The Lacedaemonians seeing that the Athenians had got possession of
								Cythera, and anticipating similar
								descents on their own shores, nowhere opposed them with their united
								forces, but distributed a body of hoplites in garrisons through the
								country where their presence seemed to be needed. They kept strict
								watch, fearing lest some domestic revolution should break out.
								Already a great and unexpected blow had fallen upon
								them at Sphacteria; Pylos and Cythera were in the hands of the
								Athenians, and they were beset on every side by an enemy against
								whose swift attacks precaution was vain.

Contrary to their usual custom they raised a force of four hundred
								cavalry and archers. Never in their history had they shown so much
								hesitation in their military movements. They were involved in a war
								at sea, an element to which they were strange, against a power like
								the Athenians, in whose eyes to miss an opportunity was to lose a
									victory .

Fortune too was against them, and they were panic-stricken by the
								many startling reverses which had befallen them within so short a
								time. They feared lest some new calamity like that of the island
								might overtake them;

and therefore they dared not venture on an engagement, but expected
								all their undertakings to fail; they had never hitherto known
								misfortune, and now they lost all confidence in their own powers.

While the Athenians were ravaging their coasts they hardly ever
								stirred; for each garrison at the places where they
								happened to land considered in their depressed state of mind that
								they were too few to act. One of them however, which was in the
								neighbourhood of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, did offer some resistance,
								and by a sudden rush put to flight the multitude of light-armed
								troops who had been scattered, but, being encountered by the
								hoplites, they again retired with the loss of some few men and arms.
								The Athenians, raising a trophy, sailed back to Cythera.

Thence they coasted round to Epidaurus Limera and, after devastating
								some part of its territory, to Thyrea, which is situated in the
								country called Cynuria, on the border of Argolis and Laconia. The
								Lacedaemonians, who at that time held the town, had settled there
								the Aeginetan exiles , whom they wished to requite for
								services rendered to them at the time of the earthquake and the
								Helot revolt, and also because they had always been
								partisans of theirs, although subjects of the Athenians.

Before the Athenian ships had actually touched, the Aeginetans
								quitted a fort on the seashore which
								they were just building and retired to the upper city, where they
								lived, a distance of rather more than a mile.

One of the country garrisons of the Lacedaemonians which was helping
								to build the fort was entreated by the Aeginetans to enter the
								walls, but refused, thinking that to be shut up inside them would be
								too dangerous. So they ascended to the high ground, and then,
								considering the enemy to be more than a match for them, would not
								come down.

Meanwhile the Athenians landed, marched straight upon Thyrea with
								their whole army, and took it. They burnt and plundered the city,
								and carried away with them to Athens all the Aeginetans who had not
								fallen in the battle, and the Lacedaemonian governor of the place,
								Tantalus the son of Patrocles, who had been wounded and taken
								prisoner.

They also had on board a few of the inhabitants of Cythera, whose
								removal seemed to be required as a measure of precaution. These the
								Athenians determined to deposit in some of the islands; at the same
								time they allowed the other Cytherians to live in their own country,
								paying a tribute of four talents .
								They resolved to kill all the Aeginetans whom they had taken in
								satisfaction of their long-standing hatred, and to put Tantalus in
								chains along with the captives from Sphacteria.

During the same summer the people of Camarina and Gela in Sicily made
								a truce, in the first instance
								with one another only. But after a while all the other Sicilian
								states sent envoys to Gela, where they held a conference in the hope
								of effecting a reconciliation. Many opinions were
								expressed on both sides; and the representatives of the different
								cities wrangled and put in claims for the redress of their several
								grievances. At length Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a
									Syracusan, whose words chiefly
								influenced their decision , addressed the
								conference in the following speech:

'Sicilians, the city to which I belong is not the least in Sicily,
								nor am I about to speak because Syracuse suffers more than other cities
								in the war, but because I want to lay before you the policy which
								seems to me best fitted to promote the common good of the whole
								country.

You well know, and therefore I shall not rehearse to you at length,
								all the misery of war. Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and
								no one who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by
								fear. The truth is that the aggressor deems the advantage to be
								greater than the suffering; and the side which is attacked would
								sooner run any risk than suffer the smallest immediate loss.

But when such feelings on the part of either operate unseasonably,
								the time for offering counsels of peace has arrived, and such
								counsels, if we will only listen to them, will be at this moment
								invaluable to us.

Why did we go to war? Simply from a consideration of our own
								individual interests, and with a view to our interests we are now
								trying by means of discussion to obtain peace; and if, after all, we
								do not before we separate succeed in getting our respective rights,
								we shall go to war again.

But at the same time we should have the sense to see that this
								conference is not solely concerned with our private interests,
								but with those of the whole country. Sicily is in my opinion at this
								moment imperilled by the designs of the Athenians, and we must try,
								if not too late, to save her. The Athenians are a much more convincing argument of peace than any words of mine can
								be. They are the greatest power in Hellas; they come hither with a
								few ships to spy out our mistakes; though we are their natural
								enemies, they assume the honourable name of allies, and under this
								flimsy pretence turn our enmity to good account.

For when we go to war and invite their assistance (and they are fond
								of coming whether they are invited or not) we are taxing ourselves
								for our own destruction, and at the same time paving the way for the
								advance of their empire. And at some future day, when they see that
								we are exhausted, they are sure to come again with a larger
								armament, and attempt to bring all Sicily under their yoke .

'And yet if we must call in allies and involve ourselves in dangers,
								as men of sense, looking to the interest of our
								several states, we should set before us the prospect of gaining an
								increase of dominion, not of losing what we already have. We should
								consider that internal quarrels more than anything else are the ruin
								of Sicily and her cities; we Sicilians are fighting against one
								another at the very time when we are threatened by a common enemy.

Knowing this, we should be reconciled man to man, city to city, and
								make an united effort for the preservation of all Sicily. Let no one
								say to himself, The Dorians among us may be
									enemies to the Athenians, but the Chalcidians, being Ionians,
									are safe because they are their kinsmen. For the Athenians
								do not attack us because we are divided into two races, of which one
								is their enemy and the other their friend, but because they covet
								the good things of Sicily which we all share alike .

Is not their reception of the Chalcidian appeal a proof of this?

They have actually gone out of their way to grant the full privileges of their old treaty to those who up to this hour have
								never aided them as required by the terms of that treaty.

The ambition and craft of the Athenians are pardonable enough. I
								blame not those who wish to rule, but those who are willing to
								serve. The same human nature which is always ready to domineer over
								the subservient, bids us defend ourselves against the aggressor.

And if, knowing all these things, we continue to take no thought for
								the future, and have not, every one of us, made up our minds already
								that first and foremost we must all deal wisely with the danger
								which threatens all, we are grievously in error. 
							 'Now a mutual reconciliation would be the speediest way of
								deliverance from this danger;

for the Athenians do not come direct from their own country, but
								first plant themselves in that of the Sicilians who have invited
								them. Instead of finishing one war only to begin another, we should
								then quietly end our differences by peace. And those who came at our
								call and had so good a reason for doing wrong will have a still
								better reason for going away and doing nothing.

'Such is the great advantage which we obtain by sound policy as
								against the Athenians.

And why, if peace is acknowledged by
								all to be the greatest of blessings, should we not make peace among
								ourselves? Whatever good or evil is the portion of any of us, is not
								peace more likely than war to preserve the one and to alleviate the
								other? And has not peace honours and glories of her own unattended
								by the dangers of war? (But it is unnecessary to dilate on the
								blessings of peace any more than on the miseries of war.) Consider
								what I am saying, and instead of despising my words, may every man
								seek his own safety in them!

And should there be some one here present who was hoping to gain a
								permanent advantage either by right or by force, let him not take his disappointment to heart. For he knows that many a
								man before now who has sought a righteous revenge, far from
								obtaining it, has not even escaped himself; and many an one who in
								the consciousness of power has grasped at what was another's, has
								ended by losing what was his own.

The revenge of a wrong is not always successful merely because it is
								just; nor is strength most assured of victory when it is most full
								of hope. The inscrutable future is the controller of events, and,
								being the most treacherous of all things, is also the most
								beneficent; for when there is mutual fear, men think twice before
								they make aggressions upon one another.

'And now, because we know not what this hidden future may bring
								forth, and because the Athenians, who are dangerous enemies,
								are already at our gates,— having these two valid reasons for alarm,
								let us acquiesce in our disappointment, deeming that the
									obstacles to the fulfilment of our
								individual hopes are really insuperable. Let
								us send out of the country the enemies who threaten us, and make
								peace among ourselves, if possible for ever; but if not, for as long
								as we can, and let our private enmities bide their time. If you take
								my advice, rest assured that you will maintain the freedom of your
								several cities;

from which you will go forth your own masters, and recompense, like
								true men, the good or evil which is done to you. But if you will not
								believe me, and we are enslaved by others, the punishment of our
								enemies will be out of the question. Even supposing we succeed in
								obtaining vengeance to our hearts' content, we may perhaps become
								the friends of our greatest enemies, we certainly become the enemies
								of our real friends.

'As I said at first, I am the representative of a great city which is
								more likely to act on the aggressive
								than on the defensive; and yet with the prospect of these dangers
								before me I am willing to come to terms, and not to injure my
								enemies in such a way that I shall doubly injure myself. Nor am I so
								obstinate and foolish as to imagine that, because I am master of my
								own will, I can control fortune, of whom I am not master;

but I am disposed to make reasonable concessions.

And I would ask the other Sicilians to do the same of their own
								accord, and not to wait until the enemy compels them. There is no
								disgrace in kinsmen yielding to kinsmen, whether Dorians to Dorians,
								or Chalcidians to the other Ionians. Let us remember too that we are
								all neighbours, inhabitants of one island home, and called by the
								common name of Sicilians. When we see occasion we will fight among
								ourselves, and will negotiate and come to terms among ourselves.

But we shall always, if we are wise, unite as one man against the
								invader; for when a single state suffers, all are imperilled.

We will never again introduce allies from abroad, no, nor pretended
								mediators. This policy will immediately secure to Sicily two great
								blessings; she will get rid of the Athenians, and of civil war. And
								for the future we shall keep the island free and our own, and none
								will be tempted to attack us.'

Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice and
								agreed among themselves to make peace, on the
								understanding that they should all retain what they had; only
								Morgantinè was handed over to the Camarinaeans, who were to pay in
								return a fixed sum to the Syracusans.

The cities in alliance with Athens sent for the Athenian generals and
								told them that a treaty was about to be made in which they might join if they pleased. They assented; the treaty
								was concluded;

and so the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily. When the generals
								returned the Athenians punished two of them, Pythodorus and
								Sophocles, with exile, and imposed a fine on the third, Eurymedon,
								believing that they might have conquered Sicily but had been bribed
								to go away.

For in their present prosperity they were indignant at the idea of a
								reverse; they expected to accomplish everything, possible or
								impossible, with any force, great or small. The truth was that they
								were elated by the unexpected success of most of their enterprises,
								which inspired them with the liveliest hope.

During the same summer the citizens of Megara were hard pressed by
								the Athenians, who twice every year invaded the country
								with their whole army , as well as by their own exiles in
								Pegae, who had been driven out by the people in a revolution , and were continually harassing and plundering
								them. So they conferred together upon the advisability of recalling
								the exiles, lest they should expose the city to destruction from the
								attacks of two enemies at once.

The friends of the exiles became aware of the agitation and ventured
								to urge the measure more openly than hitherto.

But the popular leaders, knowing that their partisans were in great
								extremity and could not be trusted to hold out in support of them
								much longer, took alarm and entered into negotiation with the
								Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes
								the son of Alcisthenes. They thought that they would incur less
								danger by surrendering the city to them than by the restoration of
								the exiles whom they had themselves expelled. So they agreed that
								the Athenians should in the first place seize their Long Walls , which were a little less than a
								mile in length and extended from the city to their harbour Nisaea.
								They wanted to prevent the Peloponnesians interfering from Nisaea,
								of which they formed the sole garrison, being stationed there to
								secure Megara. The conspirators were then to try and place in the
								hands of the Athenians the upper city, which would be more ready to
								come over when they once had possession of the Long Walls.

Both parties had now made all necessary preparations, both in word
								and act. The Athenians 
								sailed at nightfall to Minoa, the island in front of Megara, with
								six hundred hoplites under the command of Hippocrates. They then
								took up their position not far from the Long Walls, in a pit out of
								which the bricks for the walls had been dug.

A second division of the Athenian army, consisting of lightarmed
								Plataeans and of a part of the force employed in guarding the
								frontier, under the command of Demosthenes the other general, lay in
								ambush at the temple of Ares, which is nearer still.

During the night no one knew what they were about, except the men who
								were immediately concerned. Just before daybreak the conspirators
								executed their plan. They had long ago provided that the gates
								should be open when required; for by the permission of the
								commander, who supposed them to be privateering, they had been in
								the habit of conveying a sculling-boat out of the town by night.
								This they placed upon a waggon, and carried it down to the sea
								through the trench; they then sailed out, and just before day broke
								the boat was brought back by them on the waggon and taken in at the
								gates;

their object being, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian watch
								at Minoa, as no vessel would be seen in the harbour at all. The
								waggon had just arrived at the gates, which were opened for the boat
								to enter, when the Athenians, with whom the whole affair had been
								preconcerted, seeing this movement, rushed out of the
								ambuscade, wanting to get in before the gates were shut again and
								while the waggon was still in them, and prevented them from being
								closed. At the same instant their Megarian confederates cut down the
								guards stationed at the gates.

First of all the Plataeans and the frontier guard under Demosthenes
								rushed in where the trophy now stands. No sooner were they within
								the gates than the Peloponnesians who were nearest and saw what was
								going on hastened to the rescue; but they were overpowered by the
								Plataeans, who secured the gates for the entrance of the Athenian
								hoplites as they came running up.

Then the Athenians entered, and one after another proceeded to mount
								the wall. A few Peloponnesian guards at first resisted and
								some of them were killed;

but the greater part took to flight; they were terrified at the night
								attack of the enemy, and fancied, when they saw the Megarians who
								were in the conspiracy fighting against them, that all the Megarians
								had betrayed them.

It had occurred at the same time to the Athenian herald, without
								orders, to make proclamation that any Megarian who pleased might
								join the ranks of the Athenians. When the Lacedaemonians heard the
								proclamation none of them remained any longer, but thinking that the
								Megarians were really fighting on the Athenian side they fled into
								Nisaea.

When the morning dawned and the Long Walls were already captured,
								Megara was in a tumult, and those who had negotiated with the
								Athenians and a large number of others who were in the plot insisted
								upon opening the gates and going out to battle. Now they had agreed
								that the Athenians should immediately rush in;

and they were themselves to be anointed with oil; this was the mark
								by which they were to be distinguished, that they might be spared in
								the attack. There was the less danger in opening the gates, since
								there had now arrived four thousand Athenian hoplites
								and six hundred horse, who by a previous arrangement had come from
								Eleusis during the night.

When they were anointed and had collected about the gates some one in
								the secret acquainted the other party, who instantly came upon them
								in a compact body and declared that there should be no going out;
								even when they were stronger than at present they had not ventured
								to take the field; the danger to the city was too palpable; if any
								one opposed them the battle would have to be fought first within the
								walls. They did not betray their knowledge of the plot, but assumed
								the confident tone of men who were recommending the best course. At
								the same time they kept watch about the gates; and thus the
								conspiracy was foiled.

The Athenian generals became aware that some difficulty had arisen,
								and that they could not carry the city by storm. So they 
								immediately set about the circumvallation of Nisaea, thinking that,
								if they could take it before any assistance arrived, Megara itself
								would be more likely to capitulate.

Iron and other things needful, as well as masons, were quickly
								procured from Athens. Beginning from the wall which they already
								held they intercepted the approach from Megara by a cross wall, and
								from that drew another on either side of Nisaea down to the sea. The
								army divided among them the execution of the trench and walls,
								obtaining stones and bricks from the suburbs of the town. They also
								cut down timber and fruit-trees and made palisades where they were
								needed. The houses in the suburbs were of themselves a sufficient
								fortification, and only required battlements.

All that day they continued working; on the following day, towards
								evening, the wall was nearly finished, and the terrified inhabitants
								of Nisaea having no food (for they depended for their daily supplies
								on the upper city), and imagining that Megara had gone over to the
								enemy, despairing too of any aid soon arriving from
								Peloponnesus, capitulated to the Athenians. The conditions were as
								follows:— They were to go free, every man paying a fixed ransom and
								giving up his arms; but the Athenians might deal as they pleased
								with the Lacedaemonian commander and any Lacedaemonian who was in
								the place.

Upon these terms they came out, and the Athenians, having broken down
								the Long Walls between Megara and Nisaea, took possession of Nisaea
								and prepared for further action.

But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, the Lacedaemonian,
								who was equipping an expedition intended for
								Chalcidicè, was in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth at the
								time. Hearing of the capture of the Long Walls, and fearing for the
								safety of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and of Megara itself, he
								sent to the Boeotians, desiring them to bring an army and meet him
								with all speed at Tripodiscus. The place so called is a village of
								Megara situated under Mount Geranea. Thither he also came himself,
								bringing two thousand seven hundred Corinthian, four hundred
								Phliasian, and six hundred Sicyonian hoplites, as well as the
								followers whom he had previously collected . He had hoped
								to find Nisaea still untaken; but the news of the capture reached
								him on his exit from the hills at Tripodiscus, where he did not
								arrive until night.

He immediately took with him a body of three hundred chosen men, and
								before his arrival in the country was reported reached Megara,
								undiscovered by the Athenians, who were near the sea. He professed
								that he wanted, and he really meant if he could, to attempt the
								recovery of Nisaea; but the great point was to get into Megara and
								make that safe. So he demanded admission, saying that he had hopes
								of regaining Nisaea.

The two factions in Megara were both equally afraid to receive him—
								the one lest he should introduce the
								exiles and drive them out, the other lest the people, fearing this
								very thing, should set upon them and ruin the city, which would then
								be distracted by civil war and at the same time beset by the
								Athenians. And so both parties determined to wait and see what would
								happen.

For they both expected a battle to ensue between the Athenians and
								the army which had come to the relief of the city, and when the
								victory was won the party whose friends had conquered could more
								safely join them. Brasidas, thus failing in his purpose, returned to
								the main body of his troops.

At dawn of day the Boeotians appeared. Even before they were summoned
								by Brasidas they had intended to relieve
								Megara; for the danger came home to them; and their whole force was
								already collected at Plataea. When his messenger arrived they were
								more resolved than ever, and sent forward two thousand two hundred
								heavy-armed and six hundred horse, allowing the greater number to
								return.

The entire army of Brasidas now amounted to six thousand hoplites.
								The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, and
								their light-armed troops were scattered over the plain, when the
								Boeotian cavalry came riding up, fell upon the lightarmed, and drove
								them to the shore. The attack was unexpected, for in no former
								invasion had aid come to the Megarians from any quarter.

The Athenian cavalry now rode forward and there was a long
								engagement, in which both parties claimed to have won a victory.

The Athenians drove the general of the Boeotian cavalry and a few
								other horsemen up , to the walls of Nisaea, and there slew them and took their arms. As they retained possession
								of the dead bodies, and only restored them under a flag of truce,
								they raised a trophy. Still in respect of the whole engagement
								neither side when they parted had a decided advantage. The Boeotians
								retired to their main body, and the Athenians to Nisaea.

Brasidas and his army then moved nearer to the sea and to the town of
								Megara, and there, taking up a convenient
								position and marshalling their forces, they remained without moving.
								They were expecting the Athenians to attack them, and knew that the
								Megarians were waiting to see who would be the conquerors. They were
								very well satisfied, for two reasons.

In the first place they were not the assailants, and had not gone out
								of their way to risk a battle, although they had clearly shown that
								they were ready to engage; and so they might fairly claim a victory
								without fighting. Again, the result in regard to Megara was good:
								for if they had not put in an appearance they would have had no
								chance at all, but would have been as good as beaten, and beyond a
								doubt would immediately have lost the city.

Whereas now the Athenians themselves might be unwilling to fight;
								and, if so, they would gain their object without striking a blow.
								And this turned out to be the fact; for the Megarians did in the end
								receive Brasidas.

At first the Athenians came out and drew up near the Long Walls, but
								not being attacked they likewise remained inactive. The generals on
								their side were restrained by similar reflections. They had gained
								the greater part of what they wanted; they would be offering battle
								against a superior force; and their own danger would be out of
								proportion to that of the enemy. They might be victorious and take
								Megara, but if they failed the loss would fall on the flower of
								their infantry. Whereas the Peloponnesians were naturally more willing to encounter a risk which would be divided among the
								several contingents making up the army now in the field; and each of
								these was but a part of their whole force, present and absent. Both
								armies waited for a time, and, when neither saw the other moving,
								the Athenians first of the two retired into Nisaea and the
								Peloponnesians returned to their previous position. Whereupon the
								party in Megara friendly to the exiles took courage, opened the
								gates, and received Brasidas and the generals of the other cities,
								considering that the Athenians had finally made up their minds not
								to fight, and that he was the conqueror. They then entered into
								negotiations with him; for the other faction which had conspired
								with the Athenians was now paralysed.

After this the allies dispersed to their several cities and Brasidas
								returned to Corinth, where he made preparations for his
								expedition into Chalcidicè, his original destination.

When the Athenians had also gone home, such of the Megarians as had
								been chiefly concerned with them, knowing that they were discovered,
								at once slipped away. The rest of the citizens, after conferring
								with the friends of the exiles, recalled them from Pegae , first binding them by the most solemn oaths to
								consider the interests of the state and to forget old quarrels.

But no sooner had they come into office than, taking the opportunity
								of a review and drawing up the divisions apart from one another,
								they selected about a hundred of their enemies, and of those who
								seemed to have been most deeply implicated with the Athenians, and
								compelled the people to give sentence upon them by an open vote;
								having obtained their condemnation, they put them to death. They
								then established in the city an extreme oligarchy.

And no govern. ment based on a counter revolution effected by so few
								ever lasted so long a time.

During the same summer Demodocus and Aristides, two commanders of the
								Athenian fleet which
								collected tribute from the allies, happened to be in the
								neighbourhood of the Hellespont; there were only two of them, the
								third, Lamachus, having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus. They
								saw that the Lesbian exiles were going to strengthen Antandrus as
								they had intended , and they feared that it would prove as
								troublesome an enemy to Lesbos as Anaea had been to Samos ; for the Samian
								refugees, who had settled there, aided the Peloponnesian navy by
								sending them pilots; they likewise took in fugitives from Samos and
								kept the island in a state of perpetual alarm. So the Athenian
								generals collected troops from their allies, sailed to Antandrus,
								and, defeating a force which came out against them, recovered the
								place.

Not long afterwards Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus and had
								anchored in the territory of Heraclea at the mouth of the river
								Calex, lost his ships by a sudden flood which a fall of rain in the
								upper country had brought down. He and his army returned by land
								through the country of the Bithynian Thracians who dwell on the
								Asiatic coast across the water, and arrived at Chalcedon, the
								Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

In the same summer, and immediately after the withdrawal of the
								Athenians from Megara, the
								Athenian general Demosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty ships.

A party in the cities of Boeotia, who wanted to overthrow their
								constitution and set up a democracy like that of Athens, had entered
								into communications with him and with Hippocrates, and a plan of
								operations had been concerted, chiefly under the direction of
								Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile.

Some of the democratical party undertook to betray Siphae, which is a
								seaport on the Crisaean Gulf in the Thespian territory, and certain
								Orchomenians were to deliver up to the Athenians Chaeronea, which is
								a dependency of the Boeotian, or as it was formerly called the
								Minyan, Orchomenus. A body of Orchomenian exiles had a principal
								hand in this design and were seeking to hire a Peloponnesian force.
								The town of Chaeronea is at the extremity of Boeotia near the
								territory of Phanoteus in Phocis, and some Phocians took part in the
								plot.

The Athenians meanwhile were to seize Delium, a temple of Apollo
								which is in the district of Tanagra and looks towards Euboea. In
								order to keep the Boeotians occupied with disturbances at home, and
								prevent them from marching in a body to Delium, the whole movement
								was to be made on a single day, which was fixed beforehand.

If the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, even though no
								revolution should at once break out in the states of Boeotia, they
								might hold the places which they had taken and plunder the country.
								The partisans of democracy in the several cities would have a refuge
								near at hand to which in case of failure they might retreat. Matters
								could not long remain as they were; and in time, the Athenians
								acting with the rebels, and the Boeotian forces being divided, they
								would easily settle Boeotia in their interest. Such was the nature
								of the proposed attempt.

Hippocrates himself with a force from the city was ready to march
								into Boeotia when the moment came. He had sent
								Demosthenes beforehand with the forty ships to Naupactus, intending
								him to collect an army of Acarnanians and other allies of the
								Athenians in that region and sail against Siphae, which was to be
								betrayed to them. These operations were to be carried out
								simultaneously on the day appointed.

Demosthenes on his arrival found that the confederate Acarnanians had
								already compelled 
								Oeniadae to enter the Athenian alliance. He then himself raised all
								the forces of the allies in those parts and proceeded first to make
								war upon Salynthius and the Agraeans . Having subdued
								them, he took the necessary steps for keeping his appointment at
								Siphae.

During this summer, and about the same time, Brasidas set out on his
								way to Chalcidicè with seventeen hundred hoplites. When he
								arrived at Heraclea in Trachis he despatched a messenger to
								Pharsalus, where he had friends, with a request that they would
								conduct him and his army through the country. Accordingly there came
								to meet him at Melitia, in Achaea Phthiotis, Panaerus, Dorus,
								Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus who was the proxenus of the
								Chalcidians. Under their guidance he started. Other Thessalians also
								conducted him;

in particular, Niconidas a friend of Perdiccas from Larissa. Under
								any circumstances it would not have been easy to cross Thessaly
								without an escort, and certainly for an armed force to go through a
								neighbour's country without his consent was a proceeding which
								excited jealousy among all Hellenes. Besides, the common people of
								Thessaly were always well disposed towards the Athenians. And if the
								traditions of the country had not been in favour of a close
								oligarchy, Brasidas could never have gone on;

even as it was, some of the opposite party met him on his march at
								the river Enipeus and would have stopped him, saying that he had no
								business to proceed without the consent of the whole nation.

His escort replied that they would not conduct him if the others
								objected, but that he had suddenly presented himself and they were
								doing the duty of hosts in accompaying him. Brasidas
								himself added that he came as a friend to the Thessalian land and
								people, and that he was making war upon his enemies the Athenians,
								and not upon them. He had never heard that there was any illfeeling
								between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians which prevented either of
								them from passing through the territory of the other; however, if
								they refused their consent, he would not and indeed could not go on;

but such was not the treatment which he had a right to expect from
								them. Upon this they departed, and he by the advice of his escort,
								fearing that a large force might collect and stop him, marched on at
								full speed and without a halt. On the same day on which he started
								from Melitia he arrived at Pharsalus, and encamped by the river
								Apidanus.

Thence he went on to Phacium, and thence to Perrhaebia. Here his
								Thessalian escort returned; and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects
								of the Thessalians, brought him safe to Dium in the territory of
								Perdiccas, a city of Macedonia which is situated under Mount Olympus
								on the Thessalian side.

Thus Brasidas succeeded in running through Thessaly before any
								measures were taken to stop
								him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidicè.

He and the revolted tributaries of the Athenians, alarmed at their
								recent successes, had invited the Peloponnesians. The Chalcidians
								were expecting that the first efforts of the Athenians would be
								directed against them: their cities in the neighbourhood also which
								had not revolted secretly joined in the invitation.

Perdiccas was not a declared enemy of Athens, but was afraid that the
								old differences between himself and the Athenians might revive, and
								he was especially anxious to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the
								Lyncestians.

The Lacedaemonians were the more willing to let the Chalcidians have
								an army from Peloponnesus owing to the unfortunate state of their
								affairs. For now that the Athenians were infesting Peloponnesus, and
								especially 
							 
							 Laconia, they thought that a diversion would be best effected if they
								could retaliate on them by sending troops to help their
								dissatisfied allies, who moreover were offering to maintain them,
								and had asked for assistance from Sparta with the intention of
								revolting.

They were also glad of a pretext for sending out of the way some of
								the Helots, fearing that they would take the opportunity of rising
								afforded by the occupation of Pylos.

Most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were specially intended to
								secure them against this source of danger. Once, when they were
								afraid of the number and vigour of the Helot youth, this was what they did:—
								They proclaimed that a selection would be made of those Helots who
								claimed to have rendered the best service to the Lacedaemonians in
								war, and promised them liberty. The announcement was intended to
								test them; it was thought that those among them who were foremost in
								asserting their freedom would be most high-spirited, and most likely
								to rise against their masters.

So they selected about two thousand, who were crowned with garlands
								and went in procession round the temples; they were supposed to have
								received their liberty; but not long afterwards the Spartans put
								them all out of the way, and no man knew how any one of them came by
								his end.— And so they were only too glad to send with Brasidas seven
								hundred Helots as hoplites.

The rest of his army he hired from Peloponnesus . He himself
								was even more willing to go than they were to send him.

The Chalcidians too desired to have him, for at Sparta he had always been considered a man of energy. And
								on this expedition he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians.

At the time he gave an impression of justice and
								moderation in his behaviour to the cities, which induced most of
								them to revolt, while others were betrayed into his hands. Thus the
								Lacedaemonians were able to lighten the pressure of war upon
								Peloponnesus; and when shortly afterwards they desired to negotiate,
								they had places to give in return for what they sought to recover.
								And at a later period of the war, after the Sicilian expedition, the
								honesty and ability of Brasidas which some had experienced, and of
								which others had heard the fame, mainly attracted the Athenian
								allies to the Lacedaemonians. For he was the first Spartan who had
								gone out to them, and he proved himself to be in every way a good man.

Thus he left in their minds a firm conviction that the others would
								be like him.

The Athenians, hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidicè, and
								believing that Perdiccas was the instigator of the expedition, declared
								war against the latter and kept a closer watch over their allies in
								that region.

Perdiccas, at once uniting the soldiers of Brasidas with his own
								forces, made war upon Arrhibaeus 
								the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a neighboring people
								of Macedonia; for he had a quarrel with him and wanted to subdue
								him.

But when he and Brasidas and the army arrived at the pass leading
								into Lyncus, Brasidas said that before appealing to arms he should
								like to try in person the effect of negotiations, and see if he
								could not make Arrhibaeus an ally of the Lacedaemonians.

He was partly influenced by messages which came from Arrhibaeus
								expressing his willingness to submit any matter in dispute to the
								arbitration of Brasidas: and the Chalcidian ambassadors who
								accompanied the expedition recommended him not to remove from
								Perdiccas' path all his difficulties, lest, when they
								were wanting him for their own affairs, his ardour should cool.

Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas when at Sparta had said something to
								the Lacedaemonians about his making many of the neighbouring tribes
								their allies, and on this ground Brasidas claimed to act jointly
								with Perdiccas in the matter of Arrhibaeus.

But Perdiccas answered that he had not brought Brasidas there to
								arbitrate in the quarrels of Macedonia; he had meant him to destroy
								his enemies when he pointed them out. While he, Perdiccas, was
								maintaining half the Lacedaemonian army, Brasidas had no business to
								be holding parley with Arrhibaeus.

But in spite of the opposition and resentment of Perdiccas, Brasidas
								communicated with Arrhibaeus, and was induced by his words to
								withdraw his army without invading the country. From that time
								Perdiccas thought himself ill-used, and paid only a third instead of
								half the expenses of the army.

During the same summer, immediately on his return from Lyncus, and a
								little before the vintage, Brasidas, reinforced by
								Chalcidian troops, marched against Acanthus, a colony of Andros.

The inhabitants of the city were not agreed about admitting him;
								those who in concert with the Chalcidians had invited him being
								opposed to the mass of the people. So he asked them to receive him
								alone, and hear what he had to say before they decided; and to this
								request the multitude, partly out of fear for their still ungathered
								vintage, were induced to consent. Whereupon, coming forward to the
								people (and for a Lacedaemonian he was not a bad speaker), he
								addressed them as follows:—

'Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me out at the head of
								this army to justify the declaration which we made at the beginning
								of the war— that we were going to fight against the Athenians for
								the liberties of Hellas.

If we have been long in coming, the reason is that we were
								disappointed in the result of the war nearer home; for
								we had hoped that, without involving you in danger, we might
								ourselves have made a speedy end of the Athenians. And
								therefore let no one blame us;

we have come as soon as we could, and with your help will do our best
								to overthrow them.

But how is it that you close your gates against me, and do not greet
								my arrival? We Lacedaemonians thought that we were coming to those
								who even before we came in act were our allies in spirit, and would
								joyfully receive us; having this hope we have braved the greatest
								dangers, marching for many days through a foreign country, and have
								shown the utmost zeal in your cause.

And now, for you to be of another mind and to set yourselves against
								the liberties of your own city and of all Hellas would be monstrous!

The evil is not only that you resist me yourselves, but wherever I go
								people will be less likely to join me; they will take it amiss when
								they hear that you to whom I first came, representing a powerful
								city and reputed to be men of sense, did not receive me, and I shall
								not be able to give a satisfactory explanation, but shall have to confess either that I offer a
								spurious liberty, or that I am weak and incapable of protecting you against the
								threatened attack of the Athenians.

And yet when I brought assistance to Nisaea in command of the army
								which I have led hither, the Athenians, though more numerous,
								refused to engage with me; and they are not likely now, when their
								forces must be conveyed by sea, to send an army against you equal to
								that which they had at Nisaea .

And I myself, why am I here? I come, not to injure, but to emancipate
								the Hellenes. And I have bound the government of Lacedaemon by the
								most solemn oaths to respect the independence of any
								states which I may bring over to their side. I do not want to gain
								your alliance by 
								force or fraud, but to give you ours, that we may free you from the
								Athenian yoke.

I think that you ought not to doubt my word when I offer you the most
								solemn pledges, nor should I be regarded as an inefficient champion;
								but you should confidently join me.

'If any one among you hangs back because he has a personal fear of
								anybody else, and is under the impression that I shall hand over the
								city to a party, him above all I would reassure.

For I am not come hither to be the tool of a faction; nor do I
								conceive that the liberty which I bring you is of an ambiguous
								character; I should forget the spirit of my country were I to
								enslave the many to the few, or the minority to the whole people.

Such a tyranny would be worse than the dominion of the foreigner, and
								we Lacedaemonians should receive no thanks in return for our
								trouble, but, instead of honour and reputation, only reproach. We
								should lay ourselves open to the charges which are our best weapons
								against the Athenians, and in a far more detestable form, for they
								have never been great examples of virtue.

For to men of character there is more disgrace in seeking
								aggrandisement by specious deceit than by open violence ; the violent have the justification of strength
								which fortune gives them, but a policy of intrigue is insidious and
								wicked.

'So careful are we where our highest interests are at stake. And not
								to speak of our oaths, you cannot have better assurance
								that they give whose actions, when compared with their professions,
								afford a convincing proof that it is their interest to keep their
								word.

'But if you plead that you cannot accept the proposals which I offer,
								and insist that you ought not to suffer for the rejection of them
								because you are our friends; if you are of opinion that liberty is
								perilous and should not in justice be forced upon any one, but
								gently brought to those who are able to receive it,— I shall first
								call the Gods and heroes of the country to witness that I have come
								hither for your good, and that you would not be persuaded by me: I
								shall then use force and ravage your country without any more
								scruple.

I shall deem myself justified by two overpowering arguments. In the
								first place, I must not permit the Lacedaemonians to suffer by your
								friendship, and suffer they will through the revenues which the
								Athenians will continue to derive from you if you do not join me;
								and in the second place, the Hellenes must not lose their hope of
								liberation by your fault.

On any other ground we should certainly be wrong in taking such a
								step; it is only for the sake of the general weal that we
								Lacedaemonians have any right to be forcing liberty upon those who
								would rather not have it.

For ourselves, we are far from desiring empire, but we want to
								overthrow the empire of others.

And having this end in view, we should do injustice to the majority
								if, while bringing independence to all, we tolerated opposition in
								you. Wherefore be well advised. Strive to take the lead in
								liberating Hellas, and lay up a treasure of undying fame. You will
								save your own property, and you will crown your city with glory.'

Thus spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both
								sides, partly under the
								attraction of his words, and partly because they were afraid of
								losing their vintage, determined by a majority, voting secretly, to
								revolt from Athens. They pledged Brasidas to stand by the engagement
								to which the government of Sparta had sworn before they sent him
								out, to respect the independence of all whom he brought over to the
								Lacedaemonian alliance.

They then admitted his army; and shortly afterwards
								Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, revolted also. Such were the
								events of the summer.

Meanwhile the betrayal of Boeotia into the hands of Hippocrates and
								Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, was on the eve of
								accomplishment. At the beginning of the ensuing winter Demosthenes
								and his fleet were to appear at Siphae, and Hippocrates
								simultaneously to march upon Delium. But there was a mistake about
								the day, and Demosthenes, with his Acarnanian and numerous other
								allies drawn from that neighbourhood, sailed to Siphae too soon. His
								attempt failed; for the plot was betrayed by Nicomachus a Phocian,
								of the town of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the
								Boeotians.

Whereupon there was a general levy of the Boeotians, for Hippocrates,
								who was to have been in the country and to have distracted their
								attention, had not yet arrived; and so they forestalled the
								Athenians by the occupation of Siphae and Chaeronea. When the
								conspirators in the Boeotian cities saw that there had been a
								mistake they made no movement from within.

Hippocrates had called out the whole force of Athens, metics as well
								as citizens, and all the strangers who
								were then in the city. But he did not arrive at Delium until after
								the Boeotians had quitted Siphae. He encamped and fortified Delium,
								which is a temple of Apollo.

His army dug a trench around the temple and the sacred precinct, the
								earth which they threw up out of the trench forming a rampart; along
								this rampart they drove in a double palisade, and cutting down the
								vines in the neighbourhood of the temple threw them in between. They
								made a like use of the stones and bricks of the houses near, which
								they pulled down, and by every means in their power strove to
								increase the height of the rampart. Where the temple buildings did
								not extend they erected wooden towers at convenient places; the
								cloister which had once existed had fallen down.

They began their work on the third day after their departure from
								Athens, and continued all this day and the next and the following
								day until the midday meal.

When it was nearly finished the army retired from Delium to a
								distance of a little more than a mile, intending to go home. The
								greater part of the light-armed troops proceeded on their march, but
								the hoplites piled their arms and rested. Hippocrates, who had
								remained behind, was occupied in placing the guards at their posts,
								and in superintending the completion of that part of the outworks
								which was still unfinished.

Meanwhile the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. All the forces
								from the different cities had now arrived. They saw that the Athenians
								were already marching homewards, and most of the Boeotarchs (who are
								in number eleven) disapproved of giving battle, because the enemy
								had left the Boeotian territory. For when the Athenians rested in
								their march they were just on the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas
								the son of Aeoladas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, who was
								in command at the time (the other being Arianthidas the son of
									Lysimachidas), wanted to fight , believing that the
								risk was worth encountering. So calling the soldiers to him in
								successive divisions, that they might not all leave their arms at
								once, he exhorted the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and
								to hazard battle, in the following words:—

'Men of Boeotia, no one among us generals should ever have allowed
								the thought to enter his mind that we ought not to fight with the
								Athenians, even although we may not overtake them on Boeotian soil.
								They have crossed our frontier; it is Boeotia in which they have
								built a fort, and Boeotia which they intend to lay waste. Our
								enemies they clearly are wherever we find them, and
								therefore in that country out of which they came and
								did us mischief.

But perhaps not to fight may appear to some one to be the safer
								course. Well then, let him who thinks so think again. When a man
								being in full possession of his own goes out of his way to attack
								others because he covets more, he cannot reflect too much;

but when a man is attacked by another and has to fight for his own,
								prudence does not allow of reflection. In you the temper has been
								hereditary which would repel the foreign invader, whether he be in
								another's country or in your own;

the Athenian invader above all others should be thus repelled,
								because he is your next neighbour. For among neighbours antagonism
								is ever a condition of independence, and against men like these, who
								are seeking to enslave not only near but distant countries, shall we
								not fight to the last? Look at their treatment of Euboea just over
								the strait, and of the greater part of Hellas. I would have you
								know, that whereas other men fight with their neighbours about the
								lines of a frontier, for us, if we are conquered, there will be no
								more disputing about frontiers, but one fixed boundary, including
								our whole country, for the Athenians will come in and take by force
								all that we have.

So much more dangerous are they than ordinary neighbours. And men
								who, like them, wantonly assail others, will not hesitate to attack
								him who remains quietly at home and only defends himself; but they
								are not so ready to overbear the adversary who goes out of his own
								country to meet them, and when there is an opportunity strikes
								first.

We have proved this in our own dealings with the Athenians. Once,
								owing to our internal dissensions, they took possession of our land,
								but we overcame them at Coronea, and gave Boeotia that
								complete security which has lasted to this day .

Remember the past: let the elder men among us emulate their own
								earlier deeds, and the younger who are the sons of those valiant
								fathers do their best not to tarnish the virtues of their race.
								Confident that the God whose temple they have impiously fortified
								and now occupy will be our champion, and relying on the sacrifices,
								which are favourable to us, let us advance to meet them. They may
								satisfy their greed by attacking those who do not defend themselves;
								but we will show them that from men whose generous spirit ever
								impels them to fight for the liberties of their country, and who
								will not see that of others unjustly enslaved,— from such men they
								will not part without a battle.'

With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to march
								against the Athenians, and quickly moved his army forward (for
								the day was far advanced). As soon as he approached the enemy he
								took up a position where a hill intercepted the view, and there drew
								up his army and prepared for action.

Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, heard that the Boeotians were
								advancing, and sent a message to the army bidding them get into
								position. He himself came up shortly afterwards, having left three
								hundred cavalry at Delium, in order that they might protect the
								place if assailed, and also might watch their opportunity and attack
								the Boeotians while the battle was going on. To these the Boeotians
								opposed a separate force.

When everything was ready they appeared over the crest of the hill,
								and halted in the order which they proposed to maintain in the
								engagement; they numbered about seven thousand hoplites, more than
								ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand cavalry, and five
								hundred targeteers. The Thebans and the Boeotians who
								served in their ranks occupied the right wing.

In the centre were the men of Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the
								other dwellers about the Lake Copais. On the left wing were the
								Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians; the cavalry and
								light-armed troops were placed on both wings. The Thebans were
								formed in ranks of five and twenty deep; the formation of the others
								varied.

Such was the character and array of the Boeotian forces.

All the hoplites of the Athenian army were arranged in ranks eight
								deep; in numbers they equalled the hoplites of the enemy; the
								cavalry were stationed on either wing. No regular light-armed troops
								accompanied them, for Athens had no organised force of this kind.
								Those who originally joined the expedition were many times over the
								number of their opponents; but they were to a great extent without
								proper arms, for the whole force, strangers as well as citizens, had
								been called out. Having once started homewards, there were but few
								of them forthcoming in the engagement.

When the Athenians were ranged in order of battle and on the point of
								advancing, Hippocrates the general, proceeding along the lines,
								exhorted them as follows:—

'Men of Athens, there is not much time for exhortation, but to the
								brave a few words are as good as many; I am only going to
								remind, not to admonish you .

Let no man think that because we are on foreign soil we are running
								into great danger without cause. Although in Boeotian territory we
								shall be fighting for our own. If we are victors, the
								Peloponnesians, deprived of the Boeotian cavalry, will never invade
								our land again, so that in one battle you win Boeotia
								and win at the same time for Attica a more complete freedom.

Meet them in a spirit worthy of the first city in Hellas— of that
								Athens which we are all proud to call our country; in a spirit too
								worthy of our fathers, who in times past under Myronides at
								Oenophyta overcame these very Boeotians and conquered their land.'

Thus spoke Hippocrates, and had gone over half the army, not having
								had time for more, when the
								Boeotians (to whom Pagondas just before engaging had been making a
								second short exhortation) raised the paean, and came down upon them
								from the hill. The Athenians hastened forward, and the two armies
								met at a run.

The extreme right and left of either army never engaged, for the same
								reason; they were both prevented by water-courses. But the rest
								closed, and there was a fierce struggle and pushing of shield
								against shield.

The left wing of the Boeotians as far as their centre was worsted by
								the Athenians, who pressed hard upon this part of the army,
								especially upon the Thespians. For the troops ranged at their side
								having given way they were surrounded and hemmed in; and so the
								Thespians who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand.

Some of the Athenians themselves in surrounding the enemy were thrown
								into confusion and unwittingly slew one another. On this side then
								the Boeotians were overcome, and fled to that part of the army which
								was still fighting;

but the right wing, where the Thebans were stationed, overcame the
								Athenians, and forcing them back, at first step by step, were
								following hard upon them, when Pagondas, seeing that his left wing
								was in distress, sent two squadrons of horse unperceived round the
								hill.

They suddenly appeared over the ridge; the victorious wing of the
								Athenians, fancying that another army was attacking them, was struck
								with panic;

and so at both points, partly owing to this diversion,
								and partly to the pressure of the advancing Thebans who broke their
								line, the rout of the Athenian army became general.

Some fled to the sea at Delium, others towards Oropus, others to
								Mount Parnes, or in any direction which gave hope of safety. The
								Boeotians, especially their cavalry and that of the Locrians which
								arrived when the rout had begun, pursued and slaughtered them.

Night closed upon the pursuit, and aided the mass of the fugitives in
								their escape. On the next day those of them who had reached Oropus
								and Delium, which, though defeated, they still held, were conveyed
								home by sea.

A garrison was left in the place. 
							 The Boeotians, after raising a trophy, took up their own dead, and
								despoiled those of the enemy. They then left them under the
								care of a guard, and retiring to Tanagra concerted an attack upon
								Delium.

The herald of the Athenians, as he was on his way to ask for their
								dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, declaring that he
								would get no answer until he had returned himself. He then came
								before the Athenians and delivered to them the message of the
								Boeotians, by whom they were accused of transgressing the
								universally recognized customs of Hellas.

Those who invaded the territory of others ever abstained from
								touching the temples, whereas the Athenians had fortified Delium and
								were now dwelling there, and doing all that men usually do in an
								unconsecrated place. They were even drawing, for common use, the
								water which the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to use except as
								holy water for the sacrifices.

They therefore on behalf both of the God and of themselves, invoking
								Apollo and all the divinities who had a share in the temple, bade
								the Athenians depart and carry off what belonged to them.

Upon the delivery of this message the Athenians sent to the Boeotians
								a herald of their own, who on their behalf declared
								'that they had done no wilful injury to the temple, and would not
								damage it if they could help it; they had not originally entered it
								with any injurious intent, but in order that from it they might defend
								themselves against those who were really injuring them.

According to Hellenic practice, they who were masters of the land,
								whether much or little, invariably had possession of the temples, to
								which they were bound to show the customary reverence, but
								in such ways only as were possible .

There was a time when the Boeotians themselves and most other
								nations, including all who had driven out the earlier inhabitants of
								the land which they now occupied, attacked the temples of others,
								and these had in time become their own.

So the Boeotian temples would have become theirs if they had
								succeeded in conquering more of Boeotia. So much of the country as
								they did occupy was their own, and they did not mean to leave it
								until compelled. As to meddling with the water, they could not help
								themselves;

the use of it was a necessity which they had not incurred wantonly;
								they were resisting the Boeotians who had begun by attacking their
								territory.

When men were constrained by war, or by some other great calamity,
								there was every reason to think that their offence was forgiven by
								the God himself. He who has committed an involuntary misdeed finds a
								refuge at the altar, and men are said to transgress, not when they
								presume a little in their distress, but when they do evil of their
								own free will.

The Boeotians, who demanded a sacred place as a ransom for the bodies
								of the dead, were guilty of a far greater impiety than the Athenians
								who refused to make such an unseemly exchange.

They desired the Boeotians to let them take away their dead, not
								adding the condition if they would quit
									Boeotia, for in fact they were in a spot which
								they had fairly won by arms and not in Boeotia, but simply saying,
									 if they would make a truce according to
									ancestral custom. '

The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia they might take
								what belonged to them, but must depart out of it; if
								they were in their own land they could do as they pleased. They knew
								that the territory of Oropus, in which the dead lay (for the battle
								took place on the border), was actually in the possession of Athens,
								but that the Athenians could not take them away without their
									leave, and they were unwilling as they pretended to
								make a truce respecting a piece of ground which did not belong to
									them . And to say in their reply 'that if they
								would quit Boeotian ground they might take what they asked for,'
								sounded plausible. Thereupon the Athenian herald departed, leaving
								his purpose unaccomplished.

The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin-men and slingers from the
								Malian Gulf. They had been
								joined after the battle by the Corinthians with two thousand
								hoplites, and by the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated
									Nisaea , as well as by some Megarians. They now
								marched against Delium and attacked the rampart, employing among
								other military devices an engine, with which they succeeded in
								taking the place; it was of the following description.

They sawed in two and hollowed out a great beam, which they joined
								together again very exactly, like a flute, and suspended a vessel by
								chains at the end of the beam; the iron mouth of a bellows directed
								downwards into the vessel was attached to the beam, of which a great
								part was itself overlaid with iron.

This machine they brought up from a distance on carts to
								various points of the rampart where vine stems and wood had been
								most extensively used, and when it was quite near the wall they
								applied a large bellows to their own end of the beam, and blew
								through it.

The blast, prevented from escaping, passed into the vessel which
								contained burning coals and sulphur and pitch; these made a huge
								flame, and set fire to the rampart, so that no one could remain upon
								it.

The garrison took flight, and the fort was taken. Some were slain;
								two hundred were captured; but the greater number got on board their
								ships and so reached home.

Delium was captured seventeen days after the battle. The Athenian
								herald came shortly 
								afterwards in ignorance of its fate to ask again for the dead, and
								now the Boeotians, instead of repeating their former answer, gave
								them up. In the battle the Boeotians lost somewhat less than five
								hundred;

the Athenians not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates their general;
								also a great number of light-armed troops and baggage-bearers.

Shortly after the battle of Delium, Demosthenes, on the failure of
								the attempt to betray Siphae, against which he had sailed
								with forty ships ,
								employed the Agraean and Acarnanian troops together with four
								hundred Athenian hoplites whom he had on board in a descent on the
								Sicyonian coast.

Before all the fleet had reached the shore the Sicyonians came out
								against the invaders, put to flight those who had landed, and
								pursued them to their ships, killing some, and making prisoners of
								others. They then erected a trophy, and gave back the dead under a
								flag of truce.

While the affair of Delium was going on, Sitalces the Odrysian king
								died; he had been engaged in an expetition against the
								Triballi, by whom he was defeated in battle. Seuthes the son of
									Sparadocus his nephew,
								succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of his
								Thracian dominions.

During the same winter, Brasidas and his Chalcidian allies made an
								expedition against Amphipolis upon the river Strymon,
								the Athenian colony.

The place where the city now stands is the same which Aristagoras of
								Miletus in days of old, when he was fleeing from King Darius, attempted
								to colonise; he was driven out by the Edonians . Two and
								thirty years afterwards the Athenians made another attempt; they sent a colony
								of ten thousand, made up partly of their own citizens, partly of any
								others who liked to join; but these also were attacked by the
								Thracians at Drabescus, and perished .

Twenty-nine years later the Athenians came again, under the
								leadership of Hagnon the son of Nicias, drove out the Edonians, and
								built a town on the same spot, which was formerly called 'The Nine Ways.'
								Their base of operations was Eion, a market and seaport which they
								already possessed, at the mouth of the river, about three miles from
								the site of the present town. Wanting to enclose the newly-founded
								city, which on two sides is surrounded by the river Strymon, Hagnon
								cut it off by a long wall reaching from the upper part of the river
								to the lower, and called the place Amphipolis, because it strikes
								the eye both by sea and land.

Against Amphipolis Brasidas now led his army. Starting from Arnae in
								Chalcidicè, towards evening he reached Aulon and
								Bromiscus at the point where the lake Bolbè flows into the sea;
								having there supped, he marched on during the night.
								The weather was wintry and somewhat snowy;

and so he pushed on all the quicker; he was hoping that his approach
								might be known at Amphipolis only to those who were in the secret.

There dwelt in the place settlers from Argilus, a town which was
								originally colonised from Andros; these and others aided in the
								attempt, instigated some by Perdiccas, others by the Chalcidians.

The town of Argilus is not far off, and the inhabitants were always
								suspected by the Athenians, and were always conspiring against
								Amphipolis. For some time past, ever since the arrival of Brasidas
								had given them an opportunity, they had been concerting measures
								with their countrymen inside the walls for the surrender of the
								city. They now revolted from the Athenians on that very night, and
								received him into their town, and before dawn 
								they conducted the army to the bridge over the river, which is at
								some distance from the town.

At that time no walls had been built down to the river, as they have
								since been; a small guard was posted there. Brasidas easily overcame
								the guard, owing partly to the plot within the walls, partly to the
								severity of the weather and the suddenness of his attack; he then
								crossed the bridge, and at once was master of all the possessions of
								the Amphipolitans outside the walls. For they lived scattered about
								in the country.

The passage of the river was a complete surprise to the citizens
								within the walls. Many who happened to be outside were taken.
								Others fled into the town. The Amphipolitans were in great
								consternation, for they suspected one another.

It is even said that Brasidas, if, instead of allowing his army to
								plunder, he had marched direct to the place, would probably have captured it.

But he merely occupied a position, and overran the country outside
								the walls; and then, finding that his confederates
								within failed in accomplishing their part, he took no further step.

Meanwhile the opponents of the conspirators, being superior in
								number, prevented the immediate opening of the gates, and acting
								with Eucles, the general to whose care the place had been committed
								by the Athenians, sent for help to the other general in Chalcidicè,
								Thucydides the son of Olorus, who wrote this history; he was then at
								Thasos, an island colonised from Paros, and distant from Amphipolis
								about half a day's sail.

As soon as he heard the tidings he sailed quickly to Amphipolis with
								seven ships which happened to be on the spot; he wanted to get into
								Amphipolis if possible before it could capitulate, or at any rate to
								occupy Eion.

Meanwhile Brasidas, fearing the arrival of the ships from Thasos, and
								hearing that Thucydides had the right of working gold mines in the neighboring
								district of Thrace, and was consequently one of the leading men of
								the country, did his utmost to get possession of the city before his
								arrival. He was afraid that, if Thucydides once came, the people of
								Amphipolis would no longer be disposed to surrender. For their hope
								would be that he would bring in allies from the islands or maritime
								towns or from the interior of Thrace, and relieve them.

He therefore offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any
								Amphipolitan or Athenian might either remain in the city and have
								the enjoyment of his property on terms of equality; or, if he
								preferred, might depart, taking his goods with him, within five
								days.

When the people heard the proclamation they began to waver; for very
								few of the citizens were Athenians, the greater number being a mixed multitude. Many within
								the walls were relatives of those who had been captured outside. In
								their alarm they thought the terms reasonable; the Athenian population because they were too glad to withdraw,
								reflecting how much greater their share of the danger was, and not
								expecting speedy relief; the rest of the people because they
								retained all their existing rights, and were delivered from a fate
								which seemed inevitable.

The partisans of Brasidas now proceeded to justify his proposals
								without disguise, for they saw that the mind of the whole people had
								changed, and that they no longer paid any regard to the Athenian
								general who was on the spot.

So his terms were accepted, and the city was surrendered and
								delivered up to him. On the evening of the same day Thucydides and
								his ships sailed into Eion, but not until Brasidas had taken
								possession of Amphipolis, missing Eion only by a night.

For if the ships had not come to the rescue with all speed, the place
								would have been in his hands on the next morning.

Thucydides now put Eion in a state of defence, desiring to provide
								not only against any immediate attempt of Brasidas,
								but also against future danger. He received the fugitives who had
								chosen to quit Amphipolis according to the agreement and wished to
								come into Eion.

Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of small craft down the river
								to Eion, hoping that he might take the point which runs out from the
								wall, and thereby command the entrance to the harbour; at the same
								time he made an attack by land. But in both these attempts he was
								foiled.

Whereupon he returned, and took measures for the settlement of
								Amphipolis. Myrcinus a city in the Edonian country joined him,
								Pittacus the king of the Edonians having been assassinated by the
								children of Goaxis and Brauro his wife. Soon afterwards Galepsus and
								Oesymè (both colonies from Thasos) came over to him. Perdiccas
								likewise arrived shortly after the taking of Amphipolis, and
								assisted him in settling the newly-acquired towns.

The Athenians were seriously alarmed at the loss of 
								Amphipolis; the place was very useful to them, and supplied them
								with a revenue, and with 
								timber which they imported for shipbuilding. As far as the Strymon
								the Lacedaemonians could always have found a way to the allies of
								Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to pass; but until they
								gained possession of the bridge they could proceed no further,
								because, for a long way above, the river forms a large lake, and
								below, towards Eion, there were triremes on guard. All difficulty
								seemed now to be removed, and the Athenians feared that more of
								their allies would revolt.

For Brasidas in all his actions showed himself reasonable, and
								whenever he made a speech lost no opportunity of declaring that he
								was sent to emancipate Hellas.

The cities which were subject to Athens, when they heard of the
								taking of Amphipolis and of his promises and of his gentleness, were
								more impatient than ever to rise, and privately sent embassies to
								him, asking him to come and help them, every one of them wanting to
								be first.

They thought that there was no danger, for they had under-estimated
								the Athenian power, which afterwards proved its greatness and the
								magnitude of their mistake; they judged rather by their own illusive
								wishes than by the safe rule of prudence. For such is the manner of
								men; what they like is always seen by them in the light of
								unreflecting hope, what they dislike they peremptorily set aside by
								an arbitrary conclusion.

Moreover, the Athenians had lately received a blow in Boeotia, and
								Brasidas told the allies what was likely to attract them, but
								untrue, that at Nisaea the Athenians had refused to fight with his
								unassisted forces .
								And so they grew bold, and were quite confident that no army would
								ever reach them.

Above all, they were influenced by the pleasurable
								excitement of the moment; they were now for the first time going to
								find out of what the Lacedaemonians were capable when in real
								earnest, and therefore they were willing to risk anything. The
								Athenians were aware of their disaffection, and as far as they
								could, at short notice and in winter time, sent garrisons to the
								different cities. Brasidas also despatched a message to the
								Lacedaemonians requesting them to let him have additional forces,
								and he himself began to build triremes on the Strymon.

But they would not second his efforts because their leading men were
								jealous of him, and also because they preferred to recover the
								prisoners taken in the island and bring the war to an end.

In the same winter the Megarians recovered their Long Walls which had
								been in the hands of the Athenians and razed them to the ground. 
							 After the taking of Amphipolis, Brasidas and his allies marched to
								the so-called Actè, or coastland, which runs out from the canal made by the
								Persian King and extend into the peninsula;

it ends in Athos, a high mountain projecting into the Aegean sea .

There are cities in the peninsula, of which one is Sanè, an Andrian
								colony on the edge of the canal looking towards the sea in the
								direction of Euboea; the others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi,
								Olophyxus, and Dium;

their inhabitants are a mixed multitude of barbarians, speaking Greek
								as well as their native tongue. A few indeed are Chalcidian; but the
								greater part are Pelasgians (sprung from the Tyrrhenians who once
								inhabited Lemnos and Athens), or Bisaltians, Crestonians, Edonians.

They all dwell in small cities. Most of them joined Brasidas, but
								Sane and Dium held out; whereupon he remained there for a time and
								wasted their territory.

Finding that they would not yield, he promptly made an expedition
								against Toronè in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians.
								He was invited by a few of the inhabitants, who were ready to
								deliver the city into his hands. Arriving at night, or about
								daybreak, he took up a position at the temple of the Dioscuri, which
								is distant about three furlongs from the city.

The great body of the inhabitants and the Athenian garrison never
								discovered him; but those Toronaeans who were in his interest, and
								knew that he was coming, were awaiting his approach; some few of
								them had privately gone to meet him. When his confederates found
								that he had arrived, they introduced into the city, under the
								command of Lysistratus an Olynthian, seven light-armed soldiers
								carrying daggers (for of twenty who had been originally appointed to
								that service, only seven had the courage to enter). These men
								slipped in undiscovered by way of the wall where it looks towards
								the sea. They ascended the side of the hill on the slope of which
								the city is built, and slew the sentinels posted on the summit; they
								then began to break down the postern-gate towards the promontory of
								Canastraeum.

Meanwhile Brasidas advanced a little with the rest of his army, and
								then halting, sent forward a hundred targeteers, that as soon
								as any of the gates were opened, and the signal agreed upon
								displayed, they might rush in first.

There was a delay, and they, wondering what had happened, drew by
								degrees nearer and nearer to the city. Their partisans in Toronè,
								acting with the soldiers who had already got inside, had now broken
								through the posterngate, and proceeded to cut the bar which fastened
								the gates near the market-place. They then brought round some of the
								targeteers by way of the postern-gate, and introduced them into the
								city, hoping to strike panic into the unconscious
								citizens by the sudden appearance of an armed force in their rear
								and on both sides of them at once. Their next step was to raise the
								fire-signal according to agreement; they then received the rest of
								the targeteers through the gates by the market-place.

Brasidas, when he saw the signal, gave his army the word to advance,
								and ran forward. Raising with one voice a shout which struck
								great terror into the inhabitants, they followed him.

Some of them dashed in by the gates; others found a way in at a place
								where the wall had fallen down and was being repaired, getting up by
								some planks which were placed against it, intended for drawing up
								stones.

He himself with the main body of his army ascended to the upper part
								of the city, wanting to make the capture thorough and secure; the
								rest of his soldiers overran the town.

While the capture was proceeding the Toronaeans generally, who knew
								nothing about the 
								plot, were in confusion. The conspirators and their party at once
								joined the assailants.

Of the Athenian hoplites, who to the number of fifty chanced to be
								sleeping in the Agora, a few were cut down at once, but the greater
								number, when they saw what had happened, fled, some by land, others
								to the Athenian guard-ships, of which two were on the spot, and
								reached safely the fort of Lecythus, a high point of the city which
								the Athenians had occupied and retained in their own hands; it runs
								out into the sea, and is only joined to the mainland by a narrow
								isthmus;

thither fled also such Toronaeans as were friendly to the Athenians.

It was now daylight, and the city being completely in his power,
								Brasidas made proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge
								with the Athenians, that if they liked they might come out and
								return to their homes; they would suffer no harm in the city. He
								also sent a herald to the Athenians, bidding them take what was
								their own and depart under a flag of truce out of
								Lecythus. The place, he said, belonged to the Chalcidians, and not to them.

They refused to go, but asked him to make a truce with them for a
								day, that they might take up their dead, and he granted them two
								days. During these two days he fortified the buildings which were
								near Lecythus, and the Athenians strengthened the fort itself.

He then called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and addressed them much
								in the same terms which he had used at Acanthus . He told them
								that they ought not to think badly of those citizens who had aided
								him, much less to deem them traitors; for they were not bribed and
								had not acted with any view of enslaving the city, but in the
								interest of her freedom and welfare. Those of the inhabitants who
								had not joined in the plot were not to suppose that they would fare
								worse than the rest; for he had not come thither to destroy either
								the city or any of her citizens.

In this spirit he had made the proclamation to those who had taken
								refuge with the Athenians, and he thought none the worse of them for
								being their friends; when they had a similar experience of the
								Lacedaemonians their attachment to them would be still greater, for
								they would recognize their superior honesty; they were only afraid
								of them now because they did not know them.

They must all make up their minds to be faithful allies, and expect
								henceforward to be held responsible if they offended; but in the
								past the Lacedaemonians had not been wronged by them; on the
								contrary, it was they who had been wronged by a power too great for
								them, and were to be excused if they had opposed him.

With these words he encouraged the citizens. On the expiration of the
								truce he made his intended attack upon Lecythus. The Athenians
								defended themselves from the fortress, which was weak,
								and from some houses which had battlements. For a whole day they repulsed the assault;

but on the morrow an engine was brought against them, from which the
								Lacedaemonians proposed to throw fire upon the wooden breastwork.
								Just as the army was drawing near the wall, the Athenians raised a
								wooden tower upon the top of a building at a point where the
								approach was easiest and where they thought that the enemy would be
								most likely to apply the engine. To this tower they carried up
								numerous jars and casks of water and great stones; and many men
								mounted upon it.

Suddenly the building, being too heavily weighted, fell in with a
								loud crash. This only annoyed and did not much alarm the Athenians
								who were near and saw what had happened, but the rest were
								terrified, and their fright was the greater in proportion as they
								were further off. They thought that the place had been taken at that
								spot, and fled as fast as they could to the sea where their ships
								lay.

Brasidas witnessed the accident and observed that they were
								abandoning the battlements. He at once rushed
								forward with his army, captured the fort, and put to death all whom
								he found in it.

Thus the Athenians were driven out; and in their ships of war and
								other vessels crossed over to Pallenè. There happened to be in
								Lecythus a temple of Athenè; and when Brasidas was about to storm
								the place he had made a proclamation that he who first mounted the
								wall should receive thirty minae ; but now, believing that the capture had been
								effected by some more than human power, he gave the thirty minae to
								the Goddess for the service of the temple, and then pulling down
								Lecythus and clearing the ground, he consecrated the whole place.

The rest of this winter he spent in settling the
								administration of the towns which he already held, and in concerting
								measures against the rest. At the end of the winter ended the eighth
								year of the war.

Early in the following spring the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made a
								truce for a year. The
								Athenians hoped to prevent Brasidas from gaining over any more of
								their allies for the present; the interval would give them leisure
								for preparation; and hereafter, if it was for their interest, they
								might come to a general understanding. The Lacedaemonians had truly
								divined the fears of the Athenians, and thought that, having enjoyed
								an intermission of trouble and hardship, they would be more anxious
								to make terms, restore the captives taken in the island, and
								conclude a durable peace. Their main object was to recover their men
								while the good fortune of Brasidas lasted;

when, owing to his successful career and the balance which he had
								established between the contending powers, they did not feel the
								loss of them, and yet by retaliating on equal terms with the
								remainder of their forces might have a fair prospect of victory .

So they made a truce for themselves and their allies in the following
								terms:—

'I. Concerning the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it seems
								good to us that any one who will shall
								ask counsel threat without fraud and without fear, according to his
								ancestral customs.

To this we, the Lacedaemonians and their allies here present, agree,
								and we will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians, and do our
								best to gain their assent likewise.

'II. Concerning the treasures of the God, we will take 
								measures for the detection of evil-doers, both you and we, according
								to our ancestral customs, and any one else who will, according to
								his ancestral customs, proceeding always with right and equity.

Thus it seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in respect
								of these matters. 
							 'III. It further seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies
								that, if the Athenians consent to a truce, either party shall remain
								within his own territory, retaining what he has. The Athenians at
								Coryphasium shall keep between Buphras and Tomeus. They shall remain
								at Cythera , but shall
								not communicate with the Lacedaemonian confederacy, neither we with
								them nor they with us. The Athenians who are in Nisaea and
									Minoa shall not cross the road which leads from
								the gates of the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and from
								the temple of Poseidon goes direct to the bridge leading to Minoa;
								neither shall the Megarians and their allies cross this road; the
								Athenians shall hold the island which they have taken, neither party
								communicating with the other. They shall also hold what they now
								hold near Troezen , according to the agreement concluded
								between the Athenians and Troezenians. 
							 'IV.

At sea the Lacedaemonians and their allies may sail along their own
								coasts and the coasts of the confederacy, not in ships of war, but
								in any other rowing vessel whose burden does not exceed five hundred
									talents . 
							 'V.

There shall be a safe-conduct both by sea and land for a herald, with
								envoys and any number of attendants which may be agreed upon,
								passing to and fro between Peloponnesus and Athens, to make
								arrangements about the termination of the war and about the
								arbitration of disputed points. 
							 'VI.

While the truce lasts, neither party, neither we nor you, shall
								receive deserters, either bond or free. 
							 
							 'VII.

And we will give satisfaction to you and you shall give satisfaction
								to us according to our ancestral customs, and determine disputed
								points by arbitration and not by arms.

'These things seem good to us, the Lacedaemonians, and to our allies.
								But if you deem any other condition more just or honourable, go to
								Lacedaemon and explain your views; neither the Lacedaemonians nor
								their allies will reject any just claim which you may prefer.

'And we desire you, as you desire us, to send envoys invested with
								full powers. 
							 'This truce shall be for a year.' 
							 'The Athenian people passed the following decree.

The prytanes were of the tribe Acamantis, Phaenippus was the registrar,
								Niciades was the president. Laches moved that a truce be concluded
								on the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies had
								consented; and might it be for the best interests of the Athenian
								people!

Accordingly the assembly agreed that the truce shall last for a year,
								beginning from this day, being the fourteenth day of the month
									Elaphebolion .

During the year of truce ambassadors and heralds are to go from one
								state to another and discuss proposals for the termination of the
								war.

The generals and prytanes shall proceed to hold another assembly, at
								which the people shall discuss, first of all, the question of peace,
								whatever proposal the Lacedaemonian embassy may offer about the
								termination of the war. The embassies now present shall bind
								themselves on the spot, in the presence of the assembly, to abide
								for a year by the truce just made.'

To these terms the Lacedaemonians assented, and they and their allies
								took oath to the Athenians 
								and their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius.

Those who formally ratified the truce were, on behalf of
								Lacedaemon, Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus the son of
								Periclidas, Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas; of Corinth, Aeneas
								the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus; of Sicyon,
								Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Megacles; of
								Megara, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of
								Amphidorus; of Epidaurus, Amphias the son of Eupaïdas; and on behalf
								of Athens, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, Nicias the son of
								Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmaeus.

Such were the terms of the armistice; during its continuance fresh
								negotiations for a final peace were constantly carried on.

About the time when the envoys engaged in the negotiations were
								passing to and fro, Scionè, a town of Pallenè,
								revolted from the Athenians and joined Brasidas. The Scionaeans,
								according to their own account, sprang originally from Pellenè in
								Peloponnesus, but their ancestors returning from Troy were carried
								by the storm which the Achaean fleet encountered to Scionè, where
								they took up their abode.

Brasidas, when he heard of the revolt, sailed thither by night,
								sending before him a friendly trireme, while he himself followed at
								some distance in a small boat, thinking that if he met any vessel,
								not a trireme, larger than the boat, the trireme would protect
									him , while if another trireme of equal strength
								came up, it would fall, not upon the boat, but upon the larger
								vessel, and in the meantime he would be able to save himself.

He succeeded in crossing, and having summoned a meeting of the
								Scionaeans, he repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Toronè,
								adding that their conduct was deserving of the highest praise; for
								at a time when the Athenians were holding Potidaea and the isthmus
								of Pallenè, and they, being cut off from the mainland, were as defenceless as if they had been islanders, they had
								taken the side of liberty unbidden. They were not such cowards as to
								wait until they were compelled to do what was obviously for their
								own interest; and this was a sufficient proof that they would endure
								like men any hardships, however great, if only their aspirations
								could be realized. He should reckon them the truest and most loyal
								friends of the Lacedaemonians, and pay them the highest honour.

The Scionaeans were inspirited by his words; and one and all, even
								those who had previously been
								against the movement, took courage and determined to bear cheerfully
								the burdens of the war. They received Brasidas with honour, and in
								the name of the city crowned him with a golden crown as the
								liberator of Hellas; many too, in token of their personal
								admiration, placed garlands on his head, and congratulated him, as
								if he had been a victor in the games.

For the present he left a small garrison with them and returned, but
								soon afterwards again crossed the sea with a larger army, being
								desirous, now that he had the help of the Scionaeans, to attempt
								Mendè and Potidaea; he made sure that the Athenians would follow him
								with their ships to Pallenè, which they would consider an island;
								and he wished to anticipate them. Moreover he had entered into
								negotiations with these cities, and had some hope of their being
								betrayed to him.

But before he had executed his intentions, a trireme arrived
								conveying the ambassadors who went round to
								proclaim the truce, Aristonymus from Athens, and Athenaeus from
								Lacedaemon.

His army then returned to Toronè, and the truce was formally
								announced to him. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians in Chalcidicè
								agreed to the terms.

Aristonymus the Athenian assented generally, but finding on a calculation of the days that the Scionaeans had
								revolted after the conclusion of the truce, refused to admit them.
								Brasidas insisted that they were in time, and would not surrender
								the city. Whereupon Aristonymus despatched a message to Athens.

The Athenians were ready at once to make an expedition against
								Scionè. The Lacedaemonians, however, sent an embassy to them and
								protested that such a step would be a breach of the truce. They laid
								claim to the place, relying on the testimony of Brasidas, and
								proposed to have the matter decided by arbitration.

But the Athenians, instead of risking an arbitration, wanted to send
								an expedition instantly; for they were exasperated at discovering
								that even the islanders were now daring to revolt from them, in a
								futile reliance on the Lacedaemonian power by land.

The greater right was on their side; for the truth was that the
								Scionaeans had revolted two days after the truce was made. They
								instantly carried a resolution, moved by Cleon, to destroy Scionè
								and put the citizens to the sword; and, while abstaining from
								hostilities elsewhere, they prepared to carry out their intentions.

In the meantime Mendè, a city of Pallenè and an Eretrian colony,
								revolted from them. Brasidas felt
								justified in receiving the Mendaeans, although, when they came to
								him, the peace had unmistakably been declared, because there were
								certain points in which he too charged the Athenians with violating
								the treaty.

His attitude encouraged them to take this bold step; they saw his
								zeal in the cause, which they likewise inferred from his
								unwillingness to hand over Scionè to the Athenians. Moreover the
								persons who negotiated with him were few in number, and having once
								begun, would not give up their purpose. For they feared the
								consequences of detection, and therefore compelled the multitude to
								act contrary to their own wishes.

When the Athenians heard of the revolt they were more angry than
								ever, and made preparations against both cities.

Brasidas, in expectation of their attack, conveyed away
								the wives and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans
								to Olynthus in Chalcidicè, and sent over five hundred Peloponnesian
								hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, under the sole
								command of Polydamidas, to their aid. The two cities concerted
								measures for their defence against the Athenians, who were expected
								shortly to arrive.

Brasidas and Perdiccas now joined their forces, and made a second
								expedition to Lyncus against
								Arrhibaeus. Perdiccas led his own Macedonian army and a force of
								hoplites supplied by the Hellenic inhabitants of the country.
								Brasidas, beside the Peloponnesians who remained with him, had under
								his command a body of Chalcidians from Acanthus and other cities
								which supplied as many troops as they severally could. The entire
								heavy-armed Hellenic forces numbered about three thousand; the
								Chalcidian and Macedonian cavalry nearly a thousand, and there was
								also a great multitude of barbarians.

They entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, and there finding the
								Lyncestians ready for battle, they took up a position in face of
								them.

The infantry of the two armies was stationed upon two opposite hills,
								and between them was a plain, into which the cavalry of both first
								descended and fought. Then the Lyncestian heavy-armed troops began
								to advance from the hill, and forming a junction with their cavalry,
								offered battle. Brasidas and Perdiccas now drew out their army and
								charged; the Lyncestians were put to flight and many slain; the rest
								escaped to the high ground, and there remained inactive.

The conquerors raised a trophy, and waited for two or three days
								expecting the arrival of some Illyrians whom Perdiccas had hired.
								Then Perdiccas wanted, instead of sitting idle, to push on against
								the villages of Arrhibaeus, but Brasidas was anxious about Mendè,
								and apprehensive that the Athenians might sail thither
								and do some mischief before he returned. The Illyrians had not
								appeared; and for both reasons he was more disposed to retreat than
								to advance.

But while they were disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians
								had just betrayed Perdiccas and joined Arrhibaeus, whereupon they both
								resolved to retreat; for they were afraid of the Illyrians, who are
								a nation of warriors. Owing to the dispute nothing had been
								determined respecting the time of their departure. Night came on,
								and the Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians were instantly
								seized with one of those unaccountable panics to which great armies
								are liable . They fancied that the Illyrians were
								many times their real number, and that they were close at their
								heels; so, suddenly betaking themselves to flight, they hastened
								homewards. And they compelled Perdiccas, when he understood the
								state of affairs, which at first he did not, to go away without
								seeing Brasidas, for the two armies were encamped at a considerable
								distance from one another.

At dawn Brasidas, finding that Arrhibaeus and the Illyrians were
								coming on and that the Macedonians had already decamped, resolved to
								follow them. So he formed his hoplites into a compact square, and
								placed his light-armed troops in the centre. He selected the
								youngest of his soldiers to run out upon the enemy at whatever point
								the attack might be made.

He himself proposed during the retreat to take his post in the rear
								with three hundred chosen men, meaning to stop the foremost of his
								assailants and beat them off.

Before the Illyrians came up he exhorted his soldiers, as far as the
								shortness of the time permitted, in the following words:—

' Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you may be terrified
								because you have been deserted by your companions and
								are assailed by a host of barbarians, I should think only of
								encouraging and 
								not of instructing you But now that we
								are left alone in the face of numerous enemies, I shall endeavour in
								a few words to impress upon you the main points which it concerns
								you to be informed of and to remember.

For you ought to fight like men not merely when you happen to have
								allies present, but because courage is native to you; nor should you
								fear any number of foreign troops. Remember that in the cities from
								which you come, not the many govern the few, but the few govern the
								many, and have acquired their supremacy simply by successful
								fighting. Your enemies are barbarians, and you in your inexperience
								fear them.

But you ought to know, from your late conflicts with the Macedonian
								portion of them — and any estimate which I can form, or
								account of them which I receive from others, would lead me to infer—
								that they will not prove so very formidable.

An enemy often has weak points which wear the appearance of strength;
								and these, when their nature is explained, encourage rather than
								frighten their opponents. As, on the other hand, where an army has a
								real advantage, the adversary who is the most ignorant is also the
								most foolhardy.

The Illyrians, to those who have no experience of them, do indeed at
								first sight present a threatening aspect. The spectacle of their
								numbers is terrible, their cries are intolerable, and the
								brandishing of their spears in the air has a menacing effect. But in
								action they are not the men they look, if their opponents will only
								stand their ground; for they have no regular order, and therefore
								are not ashamed of leaving any post in which they are hard pressed;
								to fly and to advance being alike honourable, no
								imputation can be thrown on their courage. When every man is his own
								master in battle he will readily find a decent excuse for saving
								himself. They clearly think that to frighten us at a safe distance
								is a better plan than to meet us hand to hand; else why do they
								shout instead of fighting?

You may easily see that all the terrors with which you have invested
								them are in reality nothing; they do but startle the sense of sight
								and hearing. If you repel their tumultuous onset, and, when
								opportunity offers, withdraw again in good order, keeping your
								ranks, you will sooner arrive at a place of safety, and will also
								learn the lesson that mobs like these, if an adversary withstand
								their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and make a
								flourish of valour, although if he yields to them they are quick
								enough to show their courage in following at his heels when there is
								no danger.'

Brasidas, having addressed his army, began to retreat. Whereupon the
								barbarians with loud noise
								and in great disorder pressed hard upon him, supposing that he was
								flying, and that they could overtake and destroy his troops.

But, wherever they attacked, the soldiers appointed for the purpose
								ran out and met them, and Brasidas himself with his chosen men
								received their charge. Thus the first onset of the barbarians met
								with a resistance which surprised them, and whenever they renewed
								the attack the Lacedaemonians received and repelled them again, and
								when they ceased, proceeded with their march. Thereupon the greater
								part of the barbarians abstained from attacking Brasidas and his
								Hellenes in the open country; but leaving a certain number to follow
								and harass them, they ran on after the fugitive Macedonians and
								killed any with whom they fell in. They then secured beforehand the
								narrow pass between two hills which led into the country of
								Arrhibaeus, knowing that this was the only path by which Brasidas
								could retreat. And as he was approaching the most 
								dangerous point of the defile they began to surround him in the hope
								of cutting him off.

Perceiving their intention, he told his three hundred to leave their
								ranks and run every man as fast as he could to the top of one of
								the hills, being the one which he thought the barbarians would be
								most likely to occupy; and before a larger number of them could come
								up and surround them, to dislodge those who were already there .

They accordingly attacked and defeated them; and so the main body of
								his army more easily reached the summit; for the barbarians, seeing
								their comrades defeated and driven from the high ground, took alarm;
								they considered too that the enemy were already on the borders of
								the country, and had got away from them, and therefore followed no
								further.

Brasidas had now gained the high ground and could march unmolested;
								on the same day he arrived at Arnissa, which is in the dominion of
								Perdiccas.

The soldiers were enraged at the hasty retreat of the Macedonians,
								and when they came upon carts of theirs drawn by oxen, or any
								baggage which had been dropped in the flight, as was natural in a
								retreat made in a panic and by night, they of themselves loosed the
								oxen and slaughtered them, and appropriated the baggage.

From that time forward Perdiccas regarded Brasidas in the light of a
								foe, and conceived a new hatred of the Peloponnesians, which was not
								a natural feeling in an enemy of the Athenians. Nevertheless,
								disregarding his own nearest interests, he took steps to make terms
								with the one and get rid of the other.

Brasidas returned from Macedonia to Toronè, and when he arrived there
								found the Athenians already in possession of Mendè. Thinking it
								now too late to cross over to Pallenè and assist Mendè and Scionè,
								he remained quiet and guarded Toronè.

While he was engaged with the Lyncestians, the Athenians, having
								completed their preparations, had sailed against Mendè and Scionè
								with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, conveying a thousand
								hoplites of their own, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian
								mercenaries, and targeteers furnished by their allies in the
								neighbourhood. They were under the command of Nicias the son of
								Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes.

Sailing from Potidaea and putting in near the temple of Poseidon they
								marched against the Mendaeans. Now they and three hundred Scionaeans
								who had come to their aid, and their Peloponnesian auxiliaries,
								seven hundred hoplites in all, with Polydamidas their commander, had
								just encamped outside the city on a steep hill.

Nicias, taking with him for the assault a hundred and twenty
								Methonaean light-armed troops, sixty select Athenian hoplites and
								all the archers, made an attempt to ascend the hill by a certain
								pathway, but he was wounded and failed to carry the position.
								Nicostratus with the remainder of his troops approaching the hill,
								which was hard of access, by another and more circuitous route was
								thrown into utter confusion, and the whole army of the Athenians
								were nearly defeated.

So on this day the Athenians, finding that the Mendaeans and their
								allies refused to give way, retreated and encamped; and when night
								came on, the Mendaeans likewise returned to the city.

On the following day the Athenians sailed round to the side of Mendè
								looking towards Scionè; they
								took the suburb, and during the whole of that day devastated the
								country. No one came out to meet them; for a division had arisen in
								the city, and on the following night the three hundred Scionaeans
								returned home.

On the next day Nicias with half his army went as far as the
								Scionaean frontier and devastated the country on his march, while
								Nicostratus with the other half sat down before the upper gates of
									 Mendè, out of which the road leads to Potidaea.

In this part of the city within the walls the Mendaeans and their
								allies chanced to have their arms deposited, and Polydamidas,
								arraying his forces in order of battle, was just exhorting the
								Mendaeans to go forth.

Some one of the popular faction answered in the heat of party that he
								would not go out, and that he did not care to fight, but no sooner
								had he uttered the words than he was seized by the Peloponnesian
								commander and roughly handled. Whereupon the people lost patience,
								caught up their arms, and made a furious rush upon the
								Peloponnesians and the opposite party who were in league with them.

They soon put them to flight, partly because the onslaught was
								sudden, and also because the gates were thrown open to the
								Athenians, which greatly terrified them.

For they thought that the attack upon them was premeditated. All the
								Peloponnesians who were not killed on the spot fled to the citadel,
								which they had previously kept in their own hands. Nicias had now
								returned and was close to the city, and the Athenians rushed into
								Mendè with their whole force. As the gates had been opened without
								any previous capitulation they plundered the town as if it had been
								stormed; and even the lives of the citizens were with difficulty
								saved by the efforts of the generals.

The Mendaeans were then told that they were to retain their former
								constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any whom they
								thought guilty of the revolt. At the same time the Athenians
								blockaded the garrison in the Acropolis by a wall extending to the
								sea on either side and established a guard. Having thus secured
								Mendè, they proceeded against Scionè.

The inhabitants of Scione and the Peloponnesian garrison had come out
								to meet them and occupied a steep hill
								in front of the city. The hill had to be taken by the Athenians
								before they could effect the circumvallation of the place.

So they made a furious attack and dislodged those who
								were stationed there ; they then
								encamped, and after raising a trophy, prepared to invest the city.

Soon afterwards, while they were engaged in the work, the
								Peloponnesian auxiliaries who were besieged in the Acropolis of
								Mendè, forcing their way out by the sea-shore, broke through the
								watch and came to Scionè by night. Most of them eluded the Athenians
								who were encamped outside, and got into the town.

While the circumvallation of Scionè was proceeding, Perdiccas, who,
								after what had oc. 
								curred in the retreat from Lyncus, hated Brasidas, sent heralds to
								the Athenian generals, and came to an understanding with them, which without loss of time he took
								measures to carry out .

It so happened that Ischagoras the Lacedaemonian Was then on the eve
								of marching with an army to reinforce Brasidas. Perdiccas was told
								by Nicias that, having now made friends with the Athenians, he
								should give them some evidence of his sincerity. He himself too no
								longer wished the Peloponnesians to find their way into his country.
								And so by his influence over the Thessalian chiefs, with whom he was
								always on good terms, he put a stop to the whole expedition; indeed,
								the Lacedaemonians did not even attempt to obtain the consent of the
								Thessalians.

Nevertheless, Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus, who had been sent
								by the Lacedaemonian government to report on the state of affairs,
								found their way to Brasidas. They brought with them, though contrary
								to law, certain young Spartans, intending to make them governors of
								the cities, instead of leaving the care of them to chance persons.
								Accordingly Brasidas appointed Clearidas the son of
								Cleonymus governor of Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas the son of Hegesander governor of
								Toronè.

During the same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the
								Thespians, charging them with Athenian tendencies. This
								was an object which they always had in view, and now they had their
								opportunity, because the flower of the Thespian army had fallen in
								the battle of Delium .

During the same summer the temple of Here near Argos was burnt down;
								Chrysis the priestess had put a light too near the sacred garlands,
								and had then gone to sleep, so that the whole place took fire and
								was consumed.

In her fear of the people she fled that very night to Phlius; and the
								Argives, as the law provided, appointed another priestess named
								Phaeinis. Chrysis had been priestess during eight years of the war
								and half of the ninth when she became an exile.

Towards the close of the summer Scionè was completely invested, and
								the Athenians, leaving a guard, retired with the rest of their army.

In the following winter the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained
								inactive, in consequence of the armistice; but the Mantineans
								and the Tegeans with their respective allies fought a battle at
								Laodicium in the territory of Orestheum; the victory was disputed.
								For the troops of both cities defeated the allies on the wing
								opposed to them, and both erected trophies, and sent spoils to
								Delphi.

The truth is that, although there was considerable slaughter on both
								sides, and the issue was still undecided when night put an end to
								the conflict, the Tegeans encamped on the field and at once erected
									 a trophy, while the Mantineans retreated to
								Bucolion and raised a rival trophy, but afterwards.

At the close of the same winter, towards the beginning of spring,
								Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached the place
								by night and planted a ladder against the walls. Thus far he
								proceeded undiscovered; for the ladder was fixed at a point which
								the sentinel who was passing on the bell had just quitted, and
								before he had returned to his post. But Brasidas had not yet mounted
								the ladder when he was detected by the garrison: whereupon he
								withdrew his army in haste without waiting for the dawn.

So the winter ended, and with it the ninth year in the Peloponnesian
								War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

WITH the return of summer the year of the truce expired, but
								hostilities were not resumed until after the Pythian games. During the armistice
								the Athenians removed the Delians from Delos; they considered
								them impure and unworthy of their sacred character by reason of a
								certain ancient offence. The island had been purified before, when
								they took up the coffins of the dead as I have already narrated ; but this purification, which seemed
								sufficient at the time, was now thought unsatisfactory because the
								inhabitants had been suffered to remain. Pharnaces gave to the
								Delians an asylum at Adramyttium in Asia, and whoever chose went and
								settled there.

When the armistice was over, Cleon, having obtained the consent of
								the people, sailed on an expedition to the
								Chalcidian cities with thirty ships conveying twelve hundred
								Athenian hoplites, three hundred Athenian horsemen, and numerous
								allies.

Touching first at Scionè (which was still blockaded), and taking from
								thence some hoplites of the besieging force, he sailed into the
								so-called Colophonian port, which was near the city of Toronè;

there learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Toronè, and
								that the garrison was too weak to resist, he marched
								with his army against the town, and sent ten ships to sail round
								into the harbour.

First he came to the new line of wall which Brasidas had raised when,
								wanting to take in the suburbs, he broke down a part of the old wall
								and made the whole city one.

But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, and the garrison under
								his command came to the defence of this
								quarter of the town, and fought against their assailants, who
								pressed them hard. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet was sailing round
								into the harbour, and Pasitelidas feared that the ships would take
								the city before he could return and defend it, and that the new
								fortifications would be captured and himself in them. So he left the
								suburb and ran back into the city.

But the enemy were too quick; the Athenians from the ships having
								taken Toronè before he arrived; while their infantry followed close
								upon him, and in a moment dashed in along with him at the breach in
								the old wall. Some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans were slain
								upon the spot, others were captured, and among them Pasitelidas the
								governor.

Brasidas was on his way to the relief of Toronè at the time, but,
								hearing that the place was taken, he stopped and returned;

he was within four miles and a half at the time of the capture. Cleon
								and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the harbour and the
								other near the new wall. The women and children were made slaves;
								the men of Toronè and any other Chalcidians, together with the
								Peloponnesians, numbering in all seven hundred, were sent to Athens.
								The Peloponnesian captives were liberated at the peace which was
								concluded shortly afterwards; the rest were recovered by the
								Olynthians in exchange for a like number of the captives held by
								them. About the same time Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian
								frontier, was betrayed to the Boeotians.

Cleon, putting a garrison into Toronè, sailed round Mount Athos,
								intending to attack Amphipolis.

While Pasitelidas is defending a suburb the Athenian flee sails into
								the harbour and the town is taken. Betrayal of Panactum.

About the same time three envoys, of whom one was Phaeax the son of
								Erasistratus, were sent by the Athenians with two
								ships to Italy and Sicily.

After the general peace and the withdrawal of the Athenl ians from
									Sicily , the Leontines had enrolled many new
								citizens, and the people contemplated a redistribution of the land.

The oligarchy, perceiving their intention, called in the Syracusans
								and drove out the people, who separated and wandered up and down the
								island. The oligarchy then made an agreement with the Syracusans;
								and, leaving their own city deserted, settled in Syracuse, and
								received the privileges of citizenship.

Not long afterwards some of them grew discontented, and, quitting
								Syracuse, seized a place called Phocaeae, which was a part of the
								town of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a fortress in the Leontine
								territory. Here they were joined by most of the common people who
								had been previously driven out, and from their strongholds they
								carried on a continual warfare against Syracuse.

It was the report of these events which induced the Athenians to send
								Phaeax to Sicily. He was to warn the Sicilians that the Syracusans
								were aiming at supremacy, and to unite the allies of Athens, and if
								possible the other cities, in a war against Syracuse.

The Athenians hoped that they might thus save the Leontine people.
								Phaeax succeeded in his mission to the Camarinaeans and
								Agrigentines, but in Gela he failed, and, convinced that he could
								not persuade the other states, went no further. Returning by land
								through the country of the Sicels, and by the way going to
								Bricinniae and encouraging the exiles, he arrived at Catana, where
								he embarked for Athens.

On his voyage, both to and from Sicily, he made proposals of
								friendship to several of the Italian cities. He also fell in with some
								Locrian settlers who had been driven out of Messenè. After the
								agreement between the Sicilian towns, a feud had broken out at
								Messenè, and one of the two parties called in the Locrians, who sent
								some of their citizens to settle there; thus Messenè was held for a
								time by the Locrians.

They were returning home after their expulsion when Phaeax fell in
								with them, but he did them no harm; for the Locrians had already
								agreed with him to enter into a treaty with the Athenians.

At the general reconciliation of the Sicilians, they alone of the
								allies had not made peace with Athens. And they would have continued
								to hold out had they not been constrained by a war with the Itoneans
								and Melaeans, who were their neighbours and colonists from their
								city. Phaeax then returned to Athens.

Cleon had now sailed round from Toronè against Amphipolis, and making
								Eion his headquarters, attacked Stagirus , a colony of the Andrians, which he failed to
								take. He succeeded, however, in storming Galepsus , a Thasian colony.

He sent an embassy to Perdiccas, desiring him to come with an army,
								according to the terms of the alliance , and another
								to Polles, the king of the Odomantian Thracians, who was to bring as
								many Thracian mercenaries as he could; he then remained quietly at
								Eion waiting for these reinforcements.

Brasidas, hearing of his movements, took up a counter-position on
								Cerdylium. This is a high ground on the right bank of the river, not
								far from Amphipolis, belonging to the Argilians. From this spot he
								commanded a view of the country round, so that Cleon was sure to be
								seen by him if,— as Brasidas fully expected,— despising the numbers of his opponents, he should go up against
								Amphipolis without waiting for his reinforcements.

At the same time he prepared for a battle, summoning to his side
								fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and the entire forces of the
								Edonians, who were targeteers and horsemen; he had already one
								thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers, in addition to the
								troops in Amphipolis.

His heavy-armed, when all mustered, amounted to nearly two thousand,
								and he had three hundred Hellenic cavalry. Of these forces about
								fifteen hundred were stationed with Brasidas on Cerdylium, and the
								remainder were drawn up in order of battle under Clearidas in
								Amphipolis.

Cleon did nothing for a time, but he was soon compelled to make the
								movement which Brasidas. expected.

For the soldiers were disgusted at their inaction, and drew
								comparisons between the generals; what skill and enterprise might be
								expected on the one side, and what ignorance and cowardice on the
								other. And they remembered how unwilling they had been to follow
								Cleon when they left Athens. He, observing their murmurs, and not
								wanting them to be depressed by too long a stay in one place, led
								his army forward.

He went to work in the same confident spirit which had already been
								successful at Pylos, and of which the success had given him a high
								opinion of his own wisdom. That any one would come out to fight with
								him he never even imagined; he said that he was only going to look
								at the place. If he waited for a larger force, this was not because
								he thought that there was any risk of his being defeated should he
								be compelled to fight, but that he might completely surround and
								storm the city.

So he stationed his army upon a steep hill above Amphipolis, whence
								he surveyed with his own eyes the lake formed by the river Strymon,
								and the lie of the country on the side towards Thrace.

He thought that he could go away without fighting whenever he
								pleased. For indeed there was no one to be seen on the walls, nor
								passing through the gates, which were all closed. He even imagined
								that he had made a mistake in coming up against the city without
								siege-engines; had he brought them he would have taken Amphipolis,
								for there was no one to prevent him.

No sooner did Brasidas see the Athenians in motion, than he himself
								descended from Cerdylium, and went
								into Amphipolis. He did not go out and draw up his forces in order
								of battle;

he feared too much the inferiority of his own troops, not in their
								numbers (which were about equal to those of the enemy) but in
								quality; for the Athenian forces were the flower of their army, and
								they were supported by the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians.

So he determined to employ a manœuvre, thinking that, if he showed
								them the real number and meagre equipment of his soldiers, he would
								be less likely to succeed than if he came upon them before there had
								been time to observe him, and when as yet they had no real grounds
								for their contempt of him.

Selecting a hundred and fifty hoplites, and handing over the rest to
								Clearidas, he resolved to make a sudden attack before the Athenians
								retired, considering that, if their reinforcements should arrive, he
								might never again have an opportunity of fighting them by
								themselves. So he called together all his troops, and wishing to
								encourage them, and explain his plan, spoke as follows:—

'Men of Peloponnesus, I need not waste words in telling you that we
								come from a land which has always been brave, and therefore
									free , and that you are Dorians , and are about to fight with Ionians whom you have
								beaten again and again.

But I must explain to you my plan of attack, lest you
								should be disheartened at the seeming disproportion of numbers,
								because we go into battle not with our
								whole force but with a handful of men.

Our enemies, if I am not mistaken, despise us; they believe that no
								one will come out against them, and so they have ascended the hill,
								where they are busy looking about them in disorder, and making but
								small account of us.

Now, he is the most successful general who discerns most
								clearly such mistakes when made by his enemies, and adapts his
								attack to the character of his own forces, not always assailing them
								openly and in regular array, but acting according to the
								circumstances of the case.

And the greatest reputation is gained by those stratagems in which a
								man deceives his enemies most completely, and does his friends most
								service.

Therefore while they are still confident and unprepared, and, if I
								read their intentions aright, are thinking of withdrawing rather
								than of maintaining their ground, while they are off their guard and
								before they have recovered their presence of mind, I and my men will
								do our best to anticipate their retreat, and will make a rush at the
								centre of the army.

Then, Clearidas, when you see me engaged, and I hope striking panic
								into them, bring up your troops, the Amphipolitans and the other
								allies, open the gates suddenly, run out, and lose no time in
								closing with them.

This is the way to terrify them; for reinforcements are always more
								formidable to an enemy than the troops with which he is already
								engaged.

Show yourself a brave man and a true Spartan, and do you, allies,
								follow manfully, remembering that readiness, obedience, and a sense
								of honour are the virtues of a soldier. To-day you have to choose
								between freedom and slavery; between the name of
								Lacedaemonian allies, which you will deserve if you are brave, and
								of servants of Athens. For even if you should be so fortunate as to
								escape bonds or death, servitude will be your lot, a servitude more
								cruel than hitherto;

and what is more, you will be an impediment to the liberation of the
								other Hellenes. Do not lose heart; think of all that is at stake;
								and I will show you that I can not only advise others, but fight
								myself.'

When Brasidas had-thus spoken, he prepared to sally forth with his
								own division, and 
								stationed the rest of his army with Clearidas at the so-called
								Thracian gate, that they might come out and support him, in
								accordance with his instructions.

He had been seen descending from Cerdylium into Amphipolis, and then offering up sacrifice at the temple of
								Athenè within the walls; for the interior of the city was visible
								from the surrounding country. While he was thus employed, a report
								was brought to Cleon, who had just gone forward to
								reconnoitre, that the whole army of the enemy could plainly be seen
								collected inside the town, and that the feet of numerous men and
								horses ready to come forth were visible under the gate.

He went to the spot and saw for himself; but, not wishing to hazard a
								regular engagement until his allies arrived, and thinking he could
								get away soon enough, he gave a general signal for retreat, at the
								same time ordering his forces to retire slowly on the left wing,
								which was the only direction possible, towards Eion.

They appeared to linger;

whereupon he caused his own right wing to face round, and so with his
								unshielded side exposed to the enemy began to lead off his army.
								Meanwhile Brasidas, seeing that the Athenians were on
								the move and that his opportunity was come, said to his companions
								and to the troops: 'These men do not mean to face us; see how their
								spears and their heads are shaking; such behaviour always shows that
								an army is going to run away.

Open me the gates there as I ordered, and let us boldly attack them
								at once.' Thereupon he went out himself by the gate leading to the
								palisade and by the first gate of the long wall which was then
								standing, and ran at full speed straight up the road, where, on the
								steepest part of the hill, a trophy now stands:

he then attacked the centre of the Athenians, who were terrified at
								his audacity and their own disorder, and put them to flight. Then
								Clearidas, as he was bidden, sallied forth by the Thracian gate with
								his division, and charged the Athenians.

The sudden attack at both points created a panic among them. Their
								left wing, which had proceeded some little way along the road
								towards Eion, broke off and instantly fled. They were already in
								full retreat, and Brasidas was going on to the right wing when he
								was wounded;

the Athenians did not observe his fall, and those about him carried
								him off the field. The right wing of the Athenians was more disposed
								to stand. Cleon indeed, who had never intended to remain, fled at
								once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer. But his
								soldiers rallied where they were on the top of the hill, and
								repulsed Clearidas two or three times.

They did not yield until the Chalcidian and Myrcinian cavalry and the
								targeteers hemmed them in and put them to flight with a shower of
								darts. And so the rout became general, and those of the Athenians
								who were not slain at once in close combat or destroyed by the
								Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, hard-pressed and wandering by
								many paths over the hills, made their way back to Eion.

Brasidas was carried safely by his followers out of the battle into
								the city. He was still alive, and knew that his army had conquered,
								but soon afterwards he died.

The rest of the army returning with Clearidas from the
								pursuit, spoiled the dead, and erected a trophy.

Brasidas was buried in the city with public honours in front of what
								is now the Agora. The whole body of the allies
								in military array followed him to the grave. The Amphipolitans
								enclosed his sepulchre, and to this day they sacrifice to him as to
								a hero, and have also instituted games and yearly offerings in his
								honour. They likewise made him their founder, and dedicated their
								colony to him, pulling down the buildings which Hagnon had erected , and
								obliterating any memorials which might have remained to future time
								of his foundation . For they considered Brasidas to
								have been their deliverer, and under the present circumstances the
								fear of Athens induced them to pay court to their Lacedaemonian
								allies. That Hagnon should retain the honours of a founder, now that
								they were enemies of the Athenians, seemed to them no longer in
								accordance with their interests, and likely to be displeasing to
								him.

They gave back to the Athenians their dead, who numbered about six
								hundred, while only seven were slain on the other side. For there
								was no regular engagement, but an unforeseen circumstance led to the
								battle;

and the Athenians were panic-stricken before it had well begun. After
								the recovery of the dead the Athenians went home by sea. Clearidas
								and his companions remained and administered the affairs of
								Amphipolis.

At the end of the summer, a little before this time, a reinforcement
								of nine hundred heavyarmed, under the
								command of the Lacedaemonian generals Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and
								Epicydidas, set out for Chalcidicè. Coming first to Heraclea in
									Trachis , they
								regulated whatever appeared to them to be amiss.

They were staying there when the battle of Amphipolis
								occurred. And so the summer came to an end.

The following winter Rhamphias and his army went as far as Pierium in
								Thessaly, but as the Thessalians would not let them
									proceed , and Brasidas, for whom these
								reinforcements were intended, was dead,' they returned home,
								thinking that the time for action had gone by. They felt that they
								were not competent to carry out the great designs of Brasidas, and
								the Athenians had now left the country defeated.

But their chief reason for not proceeding was that the
								Lacedaemonians, at the time when they left Sparta, were. inclined
								towards peace.

After the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Rhamphias from
								Thessaly, neither side undertook any military operations. Both alike
								were inclined to peace. The Athenians had been beaten at Delium, and
								shortly afterwards at Amphipolis; and so they had lost that
								confidence in their own strength which had indisposed them to treat
								at a time when temporary success seemed to make their final triumph
								certain. They were afraid too that their allies would be elated at
								their disasters, and that more of them would revolt;

they repented that after the affair at Pylos, when they might
								honourably have done so, they had not come to terms. The
								Lacedaemonians on the other hand inclined to peace because the
								course of the war had disappointed their expectations.

There was a time when they fancied that, if they only devastated
								Attica, they would crush the power of Athens within a few years ; and yet they had received a blow at Sphacteria
								such as Sparta had never experienced until then; their country was
								continually ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were
								deserting, and they were always fearing lest those who had not
								deserted, relying on the help of those who had, should
								seize their opportunity and revolt, as they had done once before.

Moreover, the truce for thirty years which they had made with Argos
								was on the point of expiring; the Argives were unwilling to renew it
								unless Cynuria were restored to them, and the Lacedaemonians deemed
								it impossible to fight against the Argives and Athenians combined.
								They suspected also that some of the Peloponnesian cities would
								secede and join the Argives, which proved to be the case.

Upon these grounds both governments thought it desirable to make
								peace. The Lacedaemonians were
								the more eager of the two, because they wanted to recover the
								prisoners taken at Sphacteria; for the Spartans among them were of
								high rank, and all alike related to themselves.

They had negotiated for their recovery immediately after they were
								taken, but the Athenians, in the hour of their prosperity, would not
								as yet agree to fair terms . After their defeat
								at Delium, the Lacedaemonians were well aware that they would now be
								more compliant, and therefore they had at once made a truce for a
								year, during which the envoys of the two states were to meet and
								advise about a lasting peace.

When Athens had received a second blow at Amphipolis, and Brasidas
								and Cleon, who had been the two greatest enemies of
								peace,— the one because the war brought him success and reputation,
								and the other because he fancied that in quiet times his rogueries
								would be more transparent and his slanders less credible,-had fallen
								in the battle, the two chief aspirants for
								political power at Athens and Sparta, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, 
								king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias the son of Niceratus the
								Athenian, who had been the most fortunate general of his day, became
								more eager than ever to make an end of the war. Nicias desired,
								whilst he was still successful and held in repute, to preserve his
								good fortune; he would have liked to rest from toil, and to give the
								people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name
								of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city.
								He thought that the way to gain his wish was to trust as little as
								possible to fortune, and to keep out of danger; and that danger
								would be best avoided by peace. Pleistoanax wanted peace, because
								his enemies were always stirring up the scruples of the
								Lacedaemonians against him, and insisting whenever misfortunes came
								that they were to be attributed to his illegal return from exile.

For they accused him and Aristocles his brother of having induced the
								priestess at Delphi, whenever Lacedaemonian envoys came to enquire
								of the oracle, constantly to repeat the same answer: 'Bring back the
								seed of the hero son of Zeus from a strange country to your own;
								else you will plough with a silver ploughshare':

until, after a banishment of nineteen years, he persuaded the
								Lacedaemonians to bring him home again with dances and sacrifices
								and such ceremonies as they observed when they first enthroned their
								kings at the foundation of Lacedaemon. He had been banished on
								account of his retreat from Attica, when he was supposed to have
								been bribed 
								While in exile at Mount Lycaeum he had occupied a house half within
								the sacred precinct of Zeus, through fear of the Lacedaemonians.

He was vexed by these accusations, and thinking that in peace, when
								there would be no mishaps, and when the Lacedaemonians would have
								recovered the captives, he would himself be less open
								to attack, whereas in war leading men must always have the misfortunes
								of the state laid at their door, he was very anxious to come to
								terms.

Negotiations were commenced during the winter. Towards spring the
								Lacedaemonians sounded a note of preparation by announcing to the
								allies that their services would be required in the erection of a
								fort; they thought that the Athenians would thereby be induced to
								listen to them. At the same time, after many conferences and many
								demands urged on both sides, an understanding was at last arrived at
								that both parties should give up what they had gained by arms. The
								Athenians, however, were to retain Nisaea, for when they demanded
								the restoration of Plataea the Thebans protested that they had
								obtained possession of the place not by force or treachery, but by
									agreement ; to which the Athenians rejoined that
								they had obtained Nisaea in the same manner . The
								Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies; and although the
								Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians were dissatisfied, the
								majority voted for peace. And so the peace was finally concluded and
								ratified by oaths and libations, the Lacedaemonians binding
								themselves to the Athenians and the Athenians to the Lacedaemonians
								in the following terms:—

'The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their respective allies make
								peace upon the following terms, to which
								they swear, each city separately:—

'I. Touching the common temples, any one who pleases may go and
								sacrifice in them and enquire at them, on behalf either of himself
								or of the state, according to the custom of his country, both by
								land and sea, without fear. 
							 'II. The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphian people shall be independent, and shall retain their
								own revenues and their own courts of justice, both for themselves
								and for their territory, according to their ancestral customs.

'III. The peace between the Athenians and their confederates and the
								Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall endure fifty years, both
								by sea and land, without fraud or hurt. 
							 'IV.

They shall not be allowed to bear arms to the hurt of one another in
								any way or manner; neither the Lacedaemonians and their allies
								against the Athenians and their allies, nor the Athenians and their
								allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and they shall
								determine any controversy which may arise between them by oaths and
								other legal means in such sort as they shall agree. 
							 'V.

The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the
								Athenians. 
							 'VI. The inhabitants of any cities which the Lacedaemonians deliver
								over to the Athenians may depart whithersoever they please, and take
								their property with them. The said cities shall be independent, but
								shall pay the tribute which was fixed in the time of Aristides.
								After the conclusion of the treaty the Athenians and their allies
								shall not be allowed to make war upon them to their hurt, so long as
								they pay the tribute. The cities are these— Argilus , Stagirus , Acanthus ,
								Scolus, Olynthus , Spartolus : these shall be
								allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians, but if
								the Athenians succeed in persuading them, having their consent, they
								may make them allies. 
							 'VII.

The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans , and Singaeans
								shall dwell in their own cities on the same terms as the Olynthians
								and Acanthians. 
							 
							 'VIII.

The Lacedaemonians and the allies shall restore Panactum 
								to the Athenians. The Athenians shall restore to the Lacedaemonians
									Coryphasium , Cythera Methonè ,
								Pteleum, and Atalantè . 
							 'IX. The Athenians shall surrender the Lacedaemonian captives whom
								they have in their public prison, or who are in the public prison of
								any place within the Athenian dominions, and they shall let go the
								Peloponnesians who are besieged in Scionè, and another allies of the
								Lacedaemonians who are in Scionè, and all whom Brasidas introduced
								into the place , and any of the allies of the
								Lacedaehnonians who are in the public prison at Athens, or in the
								public prison of any place within the Athenian dominions. The
								Lacedaemonians and their allies in like manner shall restore those
								of the Athenians and their allies who are their prisoners. 
							 'X.

Respecting Scionè , Toronè , and Sermylè, or any cities
								which are held by the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with the
								inhabitants of the said cities, or of any cities which are held by
								them, as they think fit. 
							 'XI.

The Athenians shall bind themselves by oath to the Lacedaemonians and
								their allies, city by city, and the oath shall be that which in the
								several cities of the two contracting parties is deemed the most
								binding. The oath shall be in the following form:— 'I will abide by
								this treaty and by this peace truly and sincerely.' The
								Lacedaemonians and their allies shall bind themselves by a similar
								oath to the Athenians. This oath shall be renewed by both parties
								every year;

and they shall erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, at
								Athens in the Acropolis, at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo at
								Amyclae. 
							 'XII.

If anything whatsoever be forgotten on one side or the other, either
								party may, without violation of their oaths, take
								honest counsel and alter the treaty in such manner as shall seem
								good to the two parties, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.'

The treaty begins, at Lacedaemon in the Ephorate of Pleistolas, and
								on the twenty-seventh day of the month
								Artemisium, and at Athens in the Archonship of Alcaeus, on the
								twentyfifth day of the month Elaphebolion .

The following persons took the oaths and ratified the treaty:— On
								behalf of the Lacedaemonians, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis,
								Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas,
								Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; on behalf of
								the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus,
								Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes,
								Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

This treaty was concluded at the end of winter, just at the beginning
								of spring, immediately after the city Dionysia. Ten years, with
								a difference of a few days, had passed since the invasion of Attica
								and the commencement of the war.

I would have a person reckon the actual periods of time, and not rely
								upon catalogues of the archons or other official personages whose
								names may be used in different cities to mark the dates of past
								events. For whether an event occurred in the beginning, or in the
								middle, or whatever might be the exact point, of a magistrate's term
								of office is left uncertain by such a mode of reckoning.

But if he measure by summers and winters as they are here set down,
								and count each summer and winter as a half year, he will find that
								ten summers and ten winters passed in the first part of the war.

The Lacedaemonians— for the lot having fallen upon them they had to
								make restitution first— immediately released their prisoners, and
								sending three envoys, Ischagoras, Menas, and
								Philocharidas, to Chalcidicè, commanded Clearidas to deliver up
								Amphipolis to the Athenians, and
								the other cities to accept the articles of the treaty which
								severally concerned them. But they did not approve of the terms, and
								refused.

Clearidas, who acted in the interest of the Chalcidians, would not
								give up the place, and said that it was not in his power to do so
								against their will.

Accompanied by envoys from the Chalcidian cities, he himself went
								direct to Lacedaemon, intending to defend himself in case Ischagoras
								and his colleagues should accuse him of insubordination; he also
								wanted to know whether the treaty could still be reconsidered. On
								his arrival he found that it was positively concluded, and he
								himself was sent back to Thrace by the Lacedaemonians, who commanded
								him to give up Amphipolis, or, if he could not, at any rate to
								withdraw all the Peloponnesian forces from the place. So he returned
								in haste.

The representatives of the other allies were present at Lacedaemon,
								and the Lacedaemonians 
								urged the reluctant states to accept the treaty. But they refused
								for the same reasons as before , and insisted that
								they must have more equitable conditions. Finding that they would
								not come in, the Lacedaemonians dismissed them, and proceeded on
								their own account to make an alliance with the Athenians.

They thought that the Argives, whose hostile intentions had been
								manifested by their refusal to renew the peace at the request of
								Ampelidas and Lichas, the Lacedaemonian envoys who had gone thither,
								being now unsupported by the Athenians, would thus be least
								dangerous and that the rest of Peloponnesus would be least likely to
								stir. For the Athenian alliance, to which they would otherwise have
								had recourse, would now be closed to them.

There were present at the time Athenian envoys, and after a
								negotiation the two parties took oaths, and made an alliance, of
								which the terms were as follows:—

'The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years,
								on the following conditions:— 
							 I. If any enemy invade the Lacedaemonian
								territory and harm the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall assist
								the Lacedaemonians in any way which they can, and to the utmost of
								their power; and if the enemy ravage their territory and depart, the
								offending city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and
								Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of them, and
								neither city shall cease from war before the other. These things
								shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and sincerely.

'II. If any enemy invade the Athenian territory and harm the
								Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall assist them in any way which
								they can, and to the utmost of their power; and if the enemy ravage
								their territory and depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of
								the Athenians and 
							 Lacedaemonians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of them, and
								neither city shall cease from war before the other.

These things shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and
								sincerely. 
							 'III. If the slaves rebel, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians
								with all their might and to the utmost of their power. 
							 'IV.

These provisions shall be sworn to on both sides by the same persons
								who swore to the former treaty. Every year the Lacedaemonians shall
								go to Athens at the Dionysia and renew the oath, and the Athenians
								shall go to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia and renew the oath.

Both parties shall erect pillars, one in Lacedaemon at the temple of
								Apollo in Amyclae, another at Athens in the Acropolis at the temple
								of Athenè. 
							 'V.

If the Lacedaemonians and Athenians agree that anything shall be
								added to or taken away from the treaty of alliance,
								whatever it be, this may be done without violation of their oaths.'

On behalf of the Lacedaemonians there took the oaths, Pleistoanax,
								Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes,
								Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus,
								Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. On behalf of the
								Athenians there took the oaths, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches,
								Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus,
								Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon,
								Lamachus, Demosthenes.

This alliance was made shortly after the treaty; at the same time the
								Athenians restored to the Lacedaemonians the prisoners
								taken at Sphacteria. The summer of the eleventh year then began.
								During the previous ten years the first war, of which the history
								has now been written, went on without intermission.

The treaty and the alliance which terminated the ten years' war were
								made in the Ephorate of Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and the
								Archonship of Alcaeus at Athens. Those who accepted the treaty were
								now at peace; but the Corinthians and several of the Peloponnesian
								cities did what they could to disturb the arrangement. And so before
								long a new cause of quarrel set the allies against the
								Lacedaemonians;

who also, as time went on, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians,
									because in certain particulars they would
								not execute the provisions of the treaty.

For six years and ten months the two powers abstained from invading
								each other's territories, but abroad the cessation of arms was
								intermittent, and they did each other all the harm which they could.
								At last they were absolutely compelled to break the treaty made at
								the end of the first ten years, and engaged once more in open war.

The same Thucydides of Athens continued the history, following the
								order of events, which he reckoned by summers and
								winters, up to the destruction of the Athenian empire and the taking
								of Piraeus and the Long Walls by the Lacedaemonians and their
								allies. Altogether the war lasted twenty-seven years, for if which
								the truce continued should be excluded, he is mistaken.

If he have regard to the facts of the case, he will see that the term
								'peace' can hardly be applied to a state of things in which neither
								party gave back or received all the places stipulated; moreover in
								the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and in other matters there were
								violations of the treaty on both sides; the Chalcidian allies
								maintained their attitude of hostility towards Athens, and the
								Boeotians merely observed an armistice terminable at ten days'
								notice.

So that, including the first ten years' war, the doubtful truce which
								followed, and the war which followed that, he who reckons up the
								actual periods of time will find that I have rightly given the exact
								number of years with the difference only of a few days. He will also
								find that this was the solitary instance in which those who put
								their faith in oracles were justified by the event.

For I well remember how, from the beginning to the end of the war,
								there was a common and oftenrepeated saying that it was to last
								thrice nine years.

I lived through the whole of it, being of mature years and judgment,
								and I took great pains to make out the exact truth. For twenty years
								I was banished from my country after I held the command at
								Amphipolis, and associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians
								quite as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, I was thus
								enabled to watch quietly the course of events.

I will now proceed to narrate the quarrels which after the first ten
								years broke up the treaty, and the events of the war
								which followed.

After the conclusion of the fifty years' peace and of the subsequent
								alliance, the ambassadors who had been
								invited to the conference from the other states of Peloponnesus left
								Lacedaemon.

They all went home except the Corinthians, who turned aside to Argos
								and opened communications with certain of the Argive magistrates,
								saying that the Lacedaemonians had made peace and alliance with the
								Athenians, hitherto their mortal enemies, to no good end, but for
								the enslavement of Peloponnesus, and that the Argives were bound to
								take measures for its deliverance. They ought to pass a vote that
								any independent Hellenic city which would allow a settlement of
								disputes on equal terms might enter into a defensive alliance with
								them. The negotiation should not be carried on with the assembly,
								but the Argives should appoint a few commissioners having full
								powers, lest, if any states appealed to the people and were
								rejected, their failure should become public. They added that hatred
								of the Lacedaemonians would induce many to join them.

Having offered this recommendation, the Corinthians returned home.

The Argive magistrates, after hearing these proposals, referred them
								to their colleagues and the people. The Argives passed a vote
								accordingly, and elected twelve commissioners; through these any of
								the Hellenes who pleased might make an alliance with them, except
								the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, who could only be admitted to the
								league with the sanction of the Argive people.

The Argives were the more inclined to take this course because, their
								truce with the Lacedaemonians being about to expire, they saw that
								war was imminent. Moreover they were encourage by the
								hope of becoming the leaders of Peloponnesus. For at this time the
								reputation of Lacedaemon had fallen very low; her misfortunes had
								brought her into contempt, while the resources of Argos were
								unimpaired.

For the Argives had not taken part in the war with Athens, and, being
								at peace with both parties, had reaped a harvest from them.

The first to enter the alliance offered by the Argives to any
								Hellenes who were willing to accept it were
								the Mantineans and their allies, who joined through fear of the
								Lacedaemonians. For, during the war with Athens, they had subjected
								a part of Arcadia, which they thought that the Lacedaemonians, now
								that their hands were free, would no longer allow them to retain. So
								they gladly joined Argos, reflecting that it was a great city, the
								constant enemy of Sparta, and, like their own, governed by a
								democracy.

When Mantinea seceded, a murmur ran through the other states of
								Peloponnesus that they must secede too; they imagined that the
								Mantineans had gone over to the Argives because they had better
								information than themselves, and also they were angry with the
								Lacedaemonians, chiefly on account of that clause in the treaty with
								Athens which provided that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, if
								agreed, might add to or take away from it whatever they pleased .

This clause aroused great uneasiness among the Peloponnesians, and
								made them suspect that the Lacedaemonians meant to unite with the
								Athenians in order to enslave them ; they argued that the
								power of altering the treaty ought to have been given only to the
								whole confederacy.

Entertaining these fears they generally inclined towards Argos, and
								every state was eager to follow the example of Mantinea and form an
								alliance with her.

The Lacedaemonians perceived that great excitement prevailed in
								Peloponnesus, and that 
								the Corinthians had inspired it and were themselves on the point of
								making a treaty with Argos. So they sent envoys to Corinth, desiring
								to anticipate what might happen. They laid the blame of having
								instigated the whole movement on the Corinthians, and protested
								that, if they deserted them and joined the Argives, they would be
								forsworn; indeed they were already much to blame for not accepting
								the peace made with Athens, although there was an article in their
								league which said that what the majority of the allies voted should
								be binding unless there was some impediment on the part of Gods or
								heroes.

Now the Corinthians had previously summoned those of the allies who,
								like themselves, had rejected the treaty: and, replying in their
								presence, they were unwilling to speak out and state their
								grievances, of which the chief was that the Lacedaemonians had not
								recovered for them Sollium or Anactorium .
								But they pretended that they could not betray their allies in
								Thrace, to whom, when they originally joined in the revolt of
								Potidaea, they had sworn a separate oath , and had afterwards
								renewed it.

They denied therefore that they were violating the terms of the
								league by refusing to join in the peace with the Athenians; for,
								having sworn in the name of the Gods to their allies, they would be
								violating their oaths if they betrayed them:

the treaty said 'unless there was some impediment on the part of Gods
								or heroes,' and this did appear to them to be an impediment of that
								nature. Thus far they pleaded their former oaths;

as to the Argive alliance they would take counsel with their friends,
								and do whatever was right. So the Lacedaemonians returned home. Now
								there happened to be at that time Argive envoys present at Corinth
								who urged the Corinthians to join the alliance without
								more delay, and the Corinthians told them to come to their next
								assembly.

Soon afterwards envoys from Elis likewise arrived at Corinth, who,
								first of all making an alliance with the
								Corinthians, went on to Argos, and became allies of the Argives in
								the manner prescribed. Now the Eleans had a quarrel with the
								Lacedaemonians about the town of Lepreum.

A war had arisen between the Lepreans and certain Arcadian tribes,
								and the Eleans having been called in by the Lepreans came to assist
								them, on condition of receiving half their territory. When they had
								brought the war to a successful end the Eleans allowed the
								inhabitants of Lepreum to cultivate the land themselves, paying a
								rent of a talent to Olympian Zeus.

Until the Peloponnesian war they had paid the talent, but taking
								advantage of the war they ceased to pay, and the Eleans tried to
								compel them. The Lepreans then had recourse to the Lacedaemonians,
								who undertook to arbitrate. The Eleans suspected that they would not
								have fair play at their hands; they therefore disregarded the
								arbitration and ravaged the Leprean territory.

Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians went on with the case and decided
								that Lepreum was an independent state, and that the Eleans were in
								the wrong. As their award was rejected by the Eleans, they sent a
								garrison of hoplites to Lepreum.

The Eleans, considering that the Lacedaemonians had taken into
								alliance a city which had seceded from them, appealed to the clause
								of the agreement which provided that whatever places any of the
								confederates had held previous to the war with Athens should be
								retained by them at its conclusion, and acting under a sense of
								injustice they now seceded to the Argives and, like the rest,
								entered into the alliance with them in the manner prescribed.

Immediately afterwards the Corinthians and the
								Chalcidians of Thrace joined; but the Boeotians and the Megarians
								agreed to refuse , and, jealously watched by the
								Lacedaemonians, stood aloof; for they were well aware that the
								Lacedaemonian constitution was far more congenial to their own
								oligarchical form of government than the Argive democracy.

During the same summer, and about this time, the Athenians took
								Scionè which they were
									blockading , put to death all the grown-up men,
								and enslaved the women and children; they then gave possession of
								the land to the Plataeans. They also replaced the Delians in
									Delos , moved partly by the defeats which they had
								sustained, partly by an oracle of the Delphic God.

About this time too the Phocians and Locrians went to war.

The Corinthians and Argives (who were now allies) came to Tegea,
								which they hoped to withdraw from the Lacedaemonian alliance,
								thinking that if they could secure so important a part of
								Peloponnesus they would soon have the whole of it.

The Tegeans however said that they could have no quarrel with the
								Lacedaemonians; and the Corinthians, who had hitherto been zealous
								in the cause, now began to cool, and were seriously afraid that no
								other Peloponnesian state would join them.

Nevertheless they applied to the Boeotians and begged them to become
								allies of themselves and of the Argives, and generally to act with
								them; they further requested that they would accompany them to
								Athens and procure an armistice terminable at ten days' notice,
								similar to that which the Athenians and Boeotians had made with one
								another shortly after the conclusion of the fifty years' peace. If
								the Athenians did not agree, then the Corinthians demanded of the
								Boeotians that they should renounce the armistice and for the future
								make no truce without them.

The Boeotians on receiving this request desired the Corinthians to
								say no more about alliance with the Argives. But they went together
								to Athens, where the Boeotians failed to obtain the armistice for
								the Corinthians, the Athenians replying that the original truce 
								extended to them, if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians.

The Boeotians however did not renounce their own armistice, although
								the Corinthians expostulated, and argued that such had been the
								agreement. Thus the Corinthians had only a suspension of hostilities
								with Athens, but no regular truce.

During the same summer the Lacedaemonians with their whole force,
								commanded by their king Pleistoanax the son of
								Pausanias, made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, who were
								subjects of the Mantineans . They had been
								invited by a faction among the Parrhasians; and moreover they wanted
								to demolish a fortress in the Parrhasian town of Cypsela,
								threatening the Laconian district of Sciritis, which the Mantineans
								had built and garrisoned.

The Lacedaemonians devastated the country of the Parrhasians; and the
								Mantineans, leaving the custody of their own city to a force of
								Argives, themselves garrisoned the territory of their allies. But
								being unable to save either the fort of Cypsela or the cities of
								Parrhasia, they went home again;

whereupon the Lacedaemonians, having demolished the fort and restored
								the independence of the Parrhasians, returned home likewise.

In the course of the same summer the troops serving in Thrace, which
								had gone out under 
								Brasidas and were brought home by Clearidas after the conclusion of
								peace, arrived at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians passed a vote that
								the Helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free and might
								dwell wherever they pleased. Not long afterwards, they
								settled them, together with the Neodamodes, at Lepreum, which is on
								the borders of Laconia and Elis, being now enemies of the Eleans.

Fearing lest their own citizens who had been taken in the island and
								had delivered up their arms might expect to be slighted in
								consequence of their misfortune, and, if they retained the
								privileges of citizens, would attempt revolution, they took away the
								right of citizenship from them, although some of them were holding
								office at the time. By this disqualification they were deprived of
								their eligibility to offices, and of the legal right to buy and
								sell. In time, however, their privileges were restored to them.

During this summer the Dictidians took Thyssus, a town of Mount
								Athos, which was in alliance with the Athenians.

During the whole summer intercourse continued between the Athenians
								and Peloponnesians. But almost as soon as the peace was concluded
								both Athenians and Lacedaemonians began to mistrust one another,
								because the places mentioned in the treaty were not given up.

For the Lacedaemonians, who were to make restitution first, according
								to the lot, had not surrendered Amphipolis and the other less
								important places which they held, and had not made their allies in
								Chalcidicè, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians accept the
								treaty, but only kept declaring that they would join the Athenians
								in coercing them if they continued to refuse. They even fixed a
								time, though they did not commit themselves in writing, within which
								those who would not come into the treaty were to be declared the
								enemies of both parties.

The Athenians, seeing that nothing was being really done, suspected
								the Lacedaemonians of dishonesty, and therefore they would not give
								up Pylos when the Lacedaemonians required it;

they even repented that they had restored the prisoners taken at
								Sphacteria, and resolved to keep the other places 
								until the Lacedaemonians had fulfilled their part of the contract.
								The Lacedaemonians replied that they had done what they could. They
								had delivered up the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and
								had withdrawn their soldiers from Chalcidicè; they had neglected
								nothing which lay within their power. But they could not give up
								Amphipolis, of which they were not entirely masters;

they would however try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into
								the treaty, to get back Panactum, and recover all the Athenian
								captives who were in the hands of the Boeotians.

They still continued to insist on the restoration of Pylos, or at any
								rate on the withdrawal of the Messenians and Helots, now that the
								Lacedaemonians had withdrawn their troops from Chalcidicè; the
								Athenians might, if they liked, garrison the place themselves. After
								many long conferences held during the summer, they persuaded the
								Athenians to withdraw the Messenians, Helots, and Lacedaemonian
								deserters: these the Athenians settled at Cranii in Cephallenia.

So during this summer there was peace and intercourse between Athens
								and Sparta.

Before the following winter the Ephors under whom the peace was
								concluded were succeeded 
								by others, of whom some were actually opposed to it. During the
								winter, embassies from the allied states arrived at Sparta,
								including representatives of Athens, Boeotia, and Corinth. Much was
								said with no result. As the ambassadors were departing, Cleobulus
								and Xenares, the Ephors who were most desirous of renewing the war,
								entered into a private negotiation with the Boeotians and
								Corinthians, recommending them to unite as closely as possible, and
								suggesting that the Boeotians should first enter the Argive alliance
								and then try and make the Argives, as well as themselves, allies of
								the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotians would thus escape
								the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens; for the
								Lacedaemonians would prefer the friendship and alliance of Argos to
								anything which they might lose by the enmity of Athens and the
								dissolution of the treaty. The two Ephors knew that a satisfactory
								alliance with Argos was an object which the Lacedaemonians always
								had at heart, perceiving as they did that it would enable them to
								carry on the war beyond the Peloponnesus with greater freedom.

At the same time they entreated the Boeotians to give up Panactum to
								the Lacedaemonians, in order that they might exchange it for Pylos,
								and so be in a better position for renewing the war with Athens.

The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from Xenares and
								Cleobulus and their other Lacedaemonian friends
								the instructions which they were to convey to their own governments,
								returned to their respective cities.

On their way home two Argives high in office, who had been waiting
								for them on the road, entered into communications with them, in the
								hope that the Boeotians, like the Corinthians, Eleans, and
								Mantineans, might join their alliance; if this could only be
								accomplished, and they could act together, they might easily, they
								said, go to war or make peace, either with Lacedaemon or with any
								other power.

The Boeotian envoys were pleased at the proposal, for it so happened
								that the request of the Argives coincided with the instructions of
								their Lacedaemonian friends. Whereupon the Argives, finding that
								their proposals were acceptable to the Boeotians, promised to send
								an embassy to them, and so departed.

When the Boeotians returned home they told the Boeotarchs what they
								had heard, both at Lacedaemon and from the Argives who had met them
								on their way. The Boeotarchs were glad, and their zeal was quickened
								when they discovered that the request made to them by their friends
								in Lacedaemon fell in with the projects of the
								Argives.

Soon afterwards the envoys from Argos appeared, inviting the
								Boeotians to fulfil their engagement. The Boeotarchs encouraged
								their proposals, and dismissed them; promising that they would send
								envoys of their own to negotiate the intended alliance.

In the meantime the Boeotarchs and the envoys from Corinth, Megara,
								and Chalcidicè determined that they would take an oath to
								one another, pledging themselves to assist whichever of them was at
								any time in need, and not go to war or make peace without the
								consent of all. When they had got thus far, the Megarians and
								Boeotians, who acted together in the matter , were to enter
								into an agreement with the Argives.

But before the oath was sworn, the Boeotarchs communicated their
								intentions to the Four Councils of the Boeotians, whose sanction is
								always necessary, and urged that oaths of alliance should be offered
								to any cities which were willing to join with them for mutual
								protection.

But the Boeotian Councils, fearing that they might offend the
								Lacedaemonians if they swore alliance to the Corinthians who had
								seceded from them, rejected their proposals. For the Boeotarchs did
								not tell them what had passed at Lacedaemon, and how two of the
								Ephors, Cleobulus and Xenares, and their friends had advised them
								first to become allies of Argos and Corinth, and then to make a
								further alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the
								Councils, whether informed of this or not, would be sure to ratify
								their foregone decision when it was communicated to them.

So the plan broke down, and the Corinthian and the Chalcidian envoys
								went away without effecting their purpose. The Boeotarchs, who had
								originally intended, if they succeeded, to do their best to effect
								an alliance with the Argives, gave up the idea of bringing this
								latter measure before the Councils, and did not fulfil their promise of sending envoys to Argos; but the whole
								business was neglected and deferred.

During the same winter the Olynthians made a sudden attack upon
									Mecyberna which was held by
								an Athenian garrison, and took it.

The Athenians and Lacedaemonians still continued to negotiate about
								the places which had not been restored, the Lacedaemonians hoping
								that, if the Athenians got back Panactum from the Boeotians, they
								might themselves recover Pylos. So they sent an embassy to the
								Boeotians, and begged of them to give up Panactum and the Athenian
								prisoners to themselves, that they might obtain Pylos in return for
								them.

But the Boeotians refused to give them up unless the Lacedaemonians
								made a separate alliance with them as they had done with the
								Athenians. Now the Lacedaemonians knew that, if they acceded to this
								request, they would be dealing unfairly with Athens, because there
								was a stipulation which forbade either state to make war or peace
								without the consent of the other; but they were eager to obtain
								Panactum and thereby, as they hoped, recover Pylos. At the same time
								the party who wished to break the peace with Athens were zealous on
								behalf of the Boeotians. So they made the alliance about the end of
								winter and the 
								beginning of spring. The Boeotians at once commenced the demolition
								of Panactum; and the eleventh year of the war ended.

Immediately on the commencement of spring, the Argives, observing
								that the envoys whom the Boeotians
								promised to send had not arrived, that Panactum was being
								demolished, and that a private alliance had been made between the
								Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians, began to fear that they would be
								isolated, and that the whole confederacy would go over
								to the Lacedaemonians.

For they thought that the Boeotians were demolishing Panactum by the
								desire of the Lacedaemonians, and had likewise been induced by them
								to come into the Athenian treaty; and that the Athenians were
								cognisant of the whole affair. But, if so, they could no longer form
								an alliance even with Athens, although they had hitherto imagined
								that the enmity of the two powers would secure them an alliance with
								one or the other, and that if they lost the peace with Lacedaemon,
								they might at any rate become allies of the Athenians.

So in their perplexity, fearing that they might have to fight
								Lacedaemon, Tegea, Boeotia, and Athens, all at once, the Argives,
								who at the time when they were proudly hoping to be the leaders of
								Peloponnesus had refused to make a treaty with Lacedaemon, now sent
								thither two envoys, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were likely to be well
								regarded by the Spartans. For under present circumstances it seemed
								to them that nothing better could be done than to make a treaty with
								the Lacedaemonians on any terms whatever, and keep out of war.

The envoys arrived, and began to confer with the Lacedaemonians
								respecting the conditions on which the peace should be made.

The Argives at first demanded that the old quarrel about the
								border-land of Cynuria, a district which contains the cities of
								Thyrea and Anthenè and is occupied by the Lacedaemonians, should be
								referred to the arbitration of some state or person. Of this the
								Lacedaemonians would not allow a word to be said, but they professed
								their readiness to renew the treaty on the old terms. The Argives at
								length induced them to make a fifty years' peace, on the
								understanding however that either Lacedaemon or Argos, provided that
								neither city were suffering at the time from war or plague, might
								challenge the other to fight for the disputed territory, as they had done once before when both sides claimed the
								victory; but the conquered party was not to be pursued over their
								own border.

The Lacedaemonians at first thought that this proposal was nonsense;
								however, as they were desirous of having the friendship of Argos on
								any terms, they assented, and drew up a written treaty. But they
								desired the envoys, before any of the provisions took effect, to
								return and lay the matter before the people of Argos; if they
								agreed, they were to come again at the Hyacinthia and take the
								oaths. So they departed.

While the Argives were thus engaged, the envoys of the
								Lacedaemonians— Andromedes, Phaedimus, and
								Antimenidas— who were appointed to receive Panactum and the
								prisoners from the Boeotians, and give them up to the Athenians,
								found Panactum already demolished by the Boeotians. They alleged
								that the Athenians and Boeotians in days of old had quarrelled about
								the place, and had sworn that neither of them should inhabit it, but
								both enjoy the use of it. However, Andromedes and his colleagues
								conveyed the Athenian prisoners who were in the hands of the
								Boeotians to Athens, and restored them; they further announced the
								destruction of Panactum, maintaining that they
								were restoring that too , inasmuch as no enemy
								of the Athenians could any longer dwell there. Their words raised a
								violent outcry among the Athenians; they felt that the
								Lacedaemonians were dealing unfairly with them in two respects:

first, there was the demolition of Panactum, which should have been
								delivered standing; secondly, they were informed of the separate
								alliance which the Lacedaemonians had made with the Boeotians,
								notwithstanding their promise that they would join in coercing those
								who did not accept the peace. They called to mind all their other
									 shortcomings in the fulfilment of the treaty, and
								conscious that they had been deceived, they answered the envoys
								roughly, and sent them away.

When the difference between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had gone
								thus far, the war party at Athens in their
								turn lost no time in pressing their views.

Foremost among them was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, a man who
								would have been thought young in any other city, but was influential
								by reason of his high descent: he sincerely preferred the Argive
								alliance, but at the same time he took part against the
								Lacedaemonians from temper, and because his pride was touched. For
								they had not consulted him, but had negotiated the peace through
								Nicias and Laches, despising his youth, and disregarding an ancient
								connexion with his family, who had been their proxeni; a connexion
								which his grandfather had renounced, and he, by the attention which
								he had paid to the captives from Sphacteria, had hoped to have
								renewed. Piqued at the small respect which was shown to all his
								claims, he had originally opposed the negotiations;

declaring that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, and that
								their only object in making terms was that they might by Athenian
								help crush the Argives, and afterwards attack the Athenians
								themselves when they had no friends. As soon as the rupture occurred
								he promptly despatched a private message to the Argives, bidding
								them send an embassy as quickly as they could, together with
								representatives of Mantinea and Elis, and invite the Athenians to
								enter the alliance; now was the time, and he would do his utmost to
								assist them.

The Argives received his message, and thus became aware that the
								alliance with the Boeotians had been made without the consent of the
								Athenians, and that a violent quarrel had broken out between Athens
								and Lacedaemon. So they thought no more about their 
								ambassadors who were at that very moment negotiating the peace with
								Lacedaemon, but turned their thoughts
								towards Athens. They reflected that Athens was a city which had been
								their friend of old ; like their own it was governed by
								a democracy, and would be a powerful ally to them at sea, if they
								were involved in war.

They at once sent envoys to negotiate an alliance with the Athenians;
								the Eleans and Mantineans joined in the embassy.

Thither also came in haste three envoys from Lacedaemon, who were
								thought likely to be acceptable at Athens— Philocharidas, Leon, and
									Endius . They were sent because the
								Lacedaemonians were afraid that the Athenians in their anger would
								join the Argive alliance. The envoys while they demanded the
								restoration of Pylos in return for Panactum, were to apologise for
								the alliance with the Boeotians, and to explain that it was not made
								with any view to the injury of Athens.

They delivered their message to the council, adding that they came
								with full power to 'treat about all differences. Alcibiades took
								alarm; he feared that if the envoys made a similar statement to the
								people they would win them over to their side, and that the Argive
								alliance would be rejected. Whereupon he devised the following
								trick:

he solemnly assured the Lacedaemonians that if they would not
								communicate to the people the extent of their powers, he would
								restore Pylos to them, for he would use his influence in their
								favour instead of against them, and would arrange their other
								differences.

But his real aim all the time was to alienate them from Nicias, and
								to bring about an alliance with Argos, Elis, and
								Mantinea, which he hoped to effect, if he could only discredit them
								in the assembly, and create the impression that their intentions
								were not honest, and that they never told the same tale twice. And
								he succeeded;

for when the envoys appeared before the assembly, and in answer to
								the question whether they had full powers replied 'No,' in direct
								contradiction to what they had said in the council, the patience of
								the Athenians was exhausted, and Alcibiades declaimed against the
								Lacedaemonians more violently than ever. The people were carried
								away and were ready to have in the Argives, and make an alliance
								with them and their confederates on the spot. But an earthquake
								occurred before the final vote was taken, and the assembly was
								adjourned.

The trick which had deceived the Lacedaemonians themselves completely
								deceived Nicias, 
								who could not understand the disavowal of their powers. Nevertheless
								in the assembly which met on the following day he still continued to
								maintain that the Athenians ought to prefer the friendship of
								Sparta, and not to conclude the Argive alliance until they had sent
								to the Lacedaemonians and ascertained their intentions. He urged
								them not to renew the war now, when it could be put off with honour
								to themselves and discredit to the Lacedaemonians; they were
								successful and should seek to preserve their good fortune as long as
								they could, but the Lacedaemonians were in a bad way, and would be
								only too glad to fight as soon as possible at all hazards.

And he prevailed on them to send envoys, of whom he was himself one,
								requiring the Lacedaemonians, if they were sincere in their
								intentions, to rebuild and restore Panactum, to restore Amphipolis,
								and to renounce their alliance with the Boeotians unless they came
								into the treaty, according to the stipulation which forbade the
								contracting parties to make a new alliance except by 
								mutual consent.

If we, they added, had wanted to deal unfairly, we should already
								have accepted an alliance with the Argives, whose ambassadors have
								come hither to offer it.

They entrusted the representation of these and their other grievances
								to Nicias and his colleagues, and sent them away to Sparta. These,
								on their arrival, delivered their message, which they concluded by
								declaring that, unless the Lacedaemonians renounced their alliance
								with the Boeotians in case the latter still refused to accept the
								peace, the Athenians on their part would enter into an alliance with
								the Argives and their confederates. The Lacedaemonians refused to
								give up their Boeotian alliance, Xenares the Ephor, with his friends
								and partisans, carrying this point. However they consented to ratify
								their former oaths at the request of Nicias, who was afraid that he
								would return without having settled anything, and would incur the
								blame of failure, as indeed he did, because he was held to be
								responsible for the original treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

When the Athenians learned on his return that the negotiations with
								Sparta had miscarried, they were furious; and acting under a sense
								of injustice, entered into an alliance with the Argives and their
								allies, whose ambassadors were present at the time, for Alcibiades
								had introduced them on purpose. The terms were as follows:—

'I. The Athenians and the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, on their
								own behalf and that of the allies over whom
								they severally rule, make a peace to continue for a hundred years
								both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt.

The Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies shall not make war
								against the Athenians and the allies over whom they rule, and the
								Athenians and their allies shall not make war against the Argives,
								Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, in any sort or manner. 
							 'II.

Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea shall be allied for a hundred years
								on the following conditions:— If enemies invade the
								territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans
								shall go to Athens and render the Athenians any assistance which
								they may demand of them, in the most effectual manner, and to the
								utmost of their power. And if the enemy spoil their territory and
								depart, the offending city shall be an enemy to Argos, Mantinea,
								Elis, and Athens, and suffer at the hands of all these cities; and
								it shall not be lawful for any of them to make peace with the
								offending city, unless they have the consent of all the rest.

And if enemies shall invade the territory of the Eleans or Argives or
								Mantineans, the Athenians shall go to Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, and
								render these cities any assistance which they may demand of them, in
								the most effectual manner, and to the utmost of their power. If an
								enemy spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall be
								an enemy to Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, and shall suffer at
								the hands of all these cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of
								them to make peace with the offending city, unless they have the
								consent of all the rest. 
							 ' III.

The confederates shall not allow armed men to pass through their own
								territory, or that of the allies over whom they severally rule or
								may rule, or to pass by sea, with hostile intent, unless all the
								cities have formally consented to their passage— that is to say,
								Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis. 
							 'IV.

The city which sends troops to help another shall supply them with
								provisions for thirty days, counting from the time of their arrival
								at the city which summons them; it shall also provide for them at
								their departure. But if the city which summons the troops wishes to
								employ them for a longer time, it shall give them provisions at the
								rate of three Aeginetan obols a day for heavy-armed and
								light-armed troops and for archers, and an Aeginetan drachma for
								cavalry. 
							 
							 'V.

The city which sent for the troops shall have the command when the
								war is carried on in her territory. Or, if the allied cities agree
								to send out a joint expedition, then the command shall be equally
								shared among all the cities. 
							 'VI.

The Athenians shall swear to the peace on their own behalf and on
								that of their allies; the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and their
								allies shall swear city by city. The oath shall be taken over
								full-grown victims, and shall be that oath which in the countries of
								the several contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The form
								of oath shall be as follows:— 
							 
 I will be true to the alliance, and will
									observe the agreement in all honesty and without fraud or hurt;

I will not transgress it in any way or
									manner. ' 
							 At Athens the senate and the home magistrates shall swear, and the
								prytanes shall administer the oath; at Argos the senate
								and the council of eighty and the artynae shall swear, and the
								eighty shall administer the oath; at Mantinea the demiurgi and the
								senate and the other magistrates shall swear, and the theori and the
								polemarchs shall administer the oath. At Elis the demiurgi and the
								supreme magistrates and the six hundred shall swear, and the
								demiurgi and the guardians of the law shall administer the oath.

Thirty days before the Olympian games the Athenians shall go to Elis,
								to Mantinea, and to Argos, and renew the oath. Ten days before the
								Great Panathenaea the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to
								Athens and renew the oath.

The agreement concerning the treaty and the oaths and the alliance
								shall be inscribed on a stone column in the Acropolis by the
								Athenians, by the Argives on a similar column in the temple of
								Apollo in the Agora, and by the Mantineans in the temple of Zeus in
								the Agora. They shall together erect at Olympia a brazen column at
								the coming Olympic games.

And if these cities think it desirable to make any improvement in the
								treaty, they shall add it to the provisions of it.
								Whatever the cities agree upon in common shall hold good.

Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded. Nevertheless the
								previous treaty between the Lacedaemonians and
								the Athenians was not on that account renounced by either party.

The Corinthians, although allies of the Argives, took no part in the
								new alliance; they had already refused to swear to an offensive and
								defensive alliance which the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans had
								previously made with one another. They said that they were satisfied
								with the original defensive alliance which bound them only to assist
								one another when attacked, but not to join in offensive movements.

Thus the Corinthians severed themselves from the allies, and were
								again beginning to turn their thoughts to the Lacedaemonians.

During the summer the Olympic games were celebrated, the Olympiad
								being that in which Androsthenes, an
								Arcadian, won his first victory in the pancratium. The
								Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, and so
								could neither sacrifice nor contend in the games. For they had
								refused to pay the fine which, according to Olympic law, the Eleans
								had imposed upon them, alleging that they had brought an armed force
								against the fortress of Phyrcus, and had introduced some hoplites of
								their own into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine amounted
								to two thousand minae ,
								being two minae for each
								hoplite, which is the penalty imposed by the law.

The Lacedaemonians sent envoys who argued that the sentence was
								unjust, for at the time when their troops entered Lepreum the truce
								had not been announced at Lacedaemon.

The Eleans replied that the truce (which they always
								proclaim first to themselves) had already begun with them, and that
								while they were quietly observing the truce, and expecting nothing
								less, the Lacedaemonians had treacherously attacked them.

The Lacedaemonians rejoined by asking why the Eleans proclaimed the
								truce at all at Lacedaemon if they considered them to have broken it
								already-they could not really have thought so when they made the
								proclamation; and from the moment when the announcement reached
								Lacedaemon all hostilities had ceased.

The Eleans were still positive that the Lacedaemonians were in the
								wrong, and said that they would never be persuaded of the contrary.
								But if the Lacedaemonians were willing to restore Lepreum to them,
								they offered to remit their own share of the penalty, and pay on
								their behalf that part which was due to the God.

As this proposal was rejected, the Eleans made another: the
								Lacedaemonians need not give up Lepreum if they did
								not like, but since they wanted to have access to the temple of
								Olympian Zeus, they might go up to his altar and swear before all
								the Hellenes that they would hereafter pay the fine.

But neither to this offer would the Lacedaemonians agree; they were
								therefore excluded from the temple and from the sacrifices and
								games, and sacrificed at home. The other Hellenes, with the
								exception of the people of Lepreum, sent representatives to Olympia.

The Eleans however, fearing that the Lacedaemonians would force their
								way into the temple and offer sacrifice, had a guard of young men
								under arms; there came to their aid likewise a thousand Argives, and
								a thousand Mantineans, and certain Athenian horsemen, who had been
								awaiting the celebration of the festival at Argos.

The whole assembly were in terror lest the Lacedaemonians should come
								upon them in arms, and their fears were redoubled when Lichas, the
								son of Arcesilaus, was struck by the officers. As a Lacedaemonian he
								had been excluded from the lists, but his chariot had
								been entered in the name of the Boeotian state, and was declared
								victorious. He had then come forward into the arena and placed a
								garland on the head of his charioteer, wishing to show that the
								chariot was his own. When the blows were given the anxiety became
								intense, and every one thought that something serious would happen.

But the Lacedaemonians did not stir, and the festival passed off
								quietly. 
							 The Olympic games being over, the Argives and their allies went to
								Corinth, and requested the Corinthians to join them. An embassy from
								Lacedaemon was also present. After much discussion nothing was
								concluded, for an earthquake broke up the assembly, and the envoys
								from the several states returned home. So the summer ended.

In the following winter there was a battle between the Heracleans of
								Trachis and the Oenianians, Dolopes, Malians, and certain
								Thessalians.

These were neighboring tribes hostile to the place, for it was in
								order to control them that it was originally fortified; they had
								been enemies to it from the first, and had done it all the damage in
								their power. In this battle they gained a victory over the
								Heracleans. Xenares, son of Cnidis, the Lacedaemonian governor, and
								many of the Heracleans were killed. Thus ended the winter, and with
								it the twelfth year of the war.

At the beginning of the following summer the Boeotians took
								possession of Heraclea, which after the battle was in a miserable
								plight. They dismissed Hegesippidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, for his
									misconduct , and occupied the place themselves. They
								were afraid that now, when the Lacedaemonians were embroiled in
								Peloponnesus, the Athenians would take it if they did
								not. But, for all that, the Lacedaemonians were offended.

During the same summer, Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, now one of
								the Athenian generals, acting in concert with the
								Argives and their allies, led into Peloponnesus a small Athenian
								force of hoplites and archers. He collected other troops from the
								Athenian allies in the Peloponnese, and, marching with his army
								through the country, organised the affairs of the confederacy.
								Coming to Patrae, he persuaded the citizens to build walls reaching
								down to the sea. He was intending also to erect a fort himself on
								the promontory of Rhium in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians,
								and others to whose interests the fort would have been injurious,
								came and prevented him.

In the same summer there broke out a war between the Epidaurians and
								the Argives. The occasion of the war was as follows:—
								The Epidaurians were bound to send a victim as a tribute for the
									meadows to the temple of Apollo Pythaeus over which the
								Argives had chief authority, and they had not done so. But this
								charge was a mere pretext; for in any case Alcibiades and the
								Argives had determined, if possible, to attach Epidaurus to their
								league, that they might keep the Corinthians quiet, and enable the
								Athenians to bring forces to Argos direct from Aegina instead of
								sailing round the promontory of Scyllaeum. So the Argives prepared
								to invade Epidauria, as if they wished on their own account to exact
								payment of the sacrifice.

About the same time the Lacedaemonians with their whole force, under
								the command of king Agis the son of Archidamus, likewise made an
								expedition. They marched as far as Leuctra, a place on their own
								frontier in the direction of Mount Lycaeum. No one, not even the
								cities whence the troops came, knew whither the
								expedition was going.

But at the frontier the sacrifices 
								proved unfavourable; so they returned, and sent word to their allies
								that, when the coming month was over, which was Carneus, a month
								held sacred by the Dorians, they should prepare for an expedition.

When they had retreated, the Argives, setting out on the
								twentyseventh day of the month before Carneus, and continuing the
								observance of this day during the whole time of the expedition,
								invaded and devastated the territory of Epidaurus.

The Epidaurians summoned their allies, but some of them refused to
								come, pleading the sanctity of the month; others came as far as the
								frontier of Epidauria and there stopped.

While the Argives were in Epidauria, envoys from the different cities
								met at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians conference was
								held, at which Euphamidas the Corinthian remarked that their words
								and their actions were at variance; for they were conferring about
								peace while the Argives and the Epidaurians with their allies were
								in the field against each other; first let envoys from both parties
								go and induce the armies to disband, and then they might come back
								and discuss the peace. His advice was approved;

so they went straight to the Argives and compelled them to withdraw
								from Epidauria. But, when they re-assembled, they were still unable
								to agree, and the Argives again invaded and began to ravage the
								Epidaurian territory.

Whereupon the Lacedaemonians likewise made an expedition as far as
								Caryae; but again the sacrifices at the frontier proved
								unfavourable, and they returned home.

The Argives, after devastating about one-third of Epidauria, also
								returned home. One thousand Athenian hoplites, under the command of
								Alcibiades, had come to their aid. But hearing that
								the Lacedaemonian expedition was over, and seeing that there was no
								longer any need of them, they departed. And so passed the summer.

In the following winter the Lacedaemonians, unknown to the Athenians,
								sent by sea to Epidaurus a garrison of three hundred
								under the command of Agesippidas.

The Argives came to the Athenians and complained that,
								notwithstanding the clause in the treaty which forbade the passage
								of enemies through the territory of any of the contracting
									parties , they had allowed the
								Lacedaemonians to pass by sea along the Argive coast. If they did
								not retaliate by replacing the Messenians and Helots in Pylos, and
								letting them ravage Laconia, they, the Argives, would consider
								themselves wronged.

The Athenians, by the advice of Alcibiades, inscribed at the foot of
								the column on which the treaty was recorded words
								to the effect that the Lacedaemonians had not abided by their oaths,
								and thereupon conveyed the Helots recently settled at Cranii 
								to Pylos that they might plunder the country, but they took no
								further steps.

During the winter the war between the Argives and Epidaurians
								continued; there was no regular engagement, but there were
								ambuscades and incursions in which losses were inflicted, now on one
								side, now on the other.

At the end of winter, when the spring was approaching, the Argives
								came with scaling-ladders against Epidaurus, expecting to find that
								the place was stripped of its defenders by the war, and could be
								taken by storm. But the attempt failed, and they returned. So the
								winter came to an end, and with it the thirteenth year of the war.

In-the middle of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians, seeing
								that their Epidaurian allies were in great distress, and that several
								cities of Peloponnesus had seceded from them, while
								others were disaffected, and knowing that if they did not
									quickly take measures of
								precaution the evil would spread, made war on Argos with their whole
								forces, including the Helots, under the command of Agis the son of
								Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king.

The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of the Lacedaemonians took
								part in the expedition. The rest of their allies, both from within
								and without the Peloponnesus, mustered at Phlius. Among the other
								contingents there came from Boeotia five thousand heavy-armed, and
								as many light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and attached to each
								horseman a foot-soldier; and from Corinth two thousand heavy-armed,
								while the Phliasians joined with their whole force, because the army
								was to assemble in their country.

The Argives, having had previous notice of the Lacedaemonian
								preparations, and seeing that 
								they were actually on their march to join the rest of the army at
								Phlius, now took the field themselves. The Mantineans and their
								allies and three thousand Elean hoplites came to their aid.

They advanced to the territory of Methydrium in Arcadia, where they
								fell in with the Lacedaemonians. The two armies each occupied a
								hill, and the Argives, thinking that they now had the Lacedaemonians
								alone, prepared for action. But in the night Agis removed his forces
								unknown to them and went to join the allies at Phlius.

At dawn the Argives became aware of his departure, and moved first
								towards Argos, then to the Nemean road, by which they expected the
								Lacedaemonians and their allies to descend into the plain.

But Agis, instead of taking the road by which he was expected, led
								the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians by a more difficult
								path, and so made his way down; the Corinthians, Pellenians, and
								Phliasians went by another steep pass; the Boeotians,
								Megarians, and Sicyonians he commanded to descend by the Nemean
								road, where the Argives had taken up their position, in order that,
								if the Argives should return and attack his own division of the army
								in the plain, they might be pursued and harassed by their cavalry.

Having made these dispositions, and having come down into the plain,
								he began to devastate Saminthus and the neighbourhood.

It was now daylight, and the Argives, who had become aware of his
								movements, quitted Nemea 
								and went in search of the enemy. Encountering the Phliasian and
								Corinthian forces, they killed a few of the Phliasians, and had
								rather more of their own troops killed by the Corinthians.

The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians marched as they were ordered
								towards Nemea, but found the Argives no longer there, for by this
								time they had descended from the high ground, and seeing their lands
								ravaged were drawing up their troops in order of battle.

The Lacedaemonians prepared to meet them. The Argives were now
								surrounded by their enemies; for on the side of the plain the
								Lacedaemonians and their division of the army cut them off from the
								city; from the hills above they were hemmed in by the Corinthians,
								Phliasians and Pellenians, towards Nemea by the Boeotians,
								Sicyonians, and Megarians, and in the absence of the Athenians, who
								alone of their allies had not arrived, they had no cavalry.

The main body of the Argives and their allies had no conception of
								their danger. They thought that their position was a favourable one,
								and that they had cut off the Lacedaemonians in their own country
								and close to the city of Argos.

But two of the Argives, Thrasyllus one of the five generals, and
								Alciphron the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, came to Agis when the
								armies were on the point of engaging, and urged him privately not to
								fight; the Argives were ready to offer and accept a
								fair arbitration, if the Lacedaemonians had any complaint to make of
								them; they would gladly conclude a treaty, and be at peace for the
								future.

These Argives spoke of their own motion; they had no authority from
								the people; and Agis, authority from the
								people; and Agis, likewise on his own authority, accepted their
								proposals, not conferring with his countrymen at large, but only
								with one of the Lacedaemonian magistrates who accompanied the
								expedition. He made a treaty with the Argives for four months,
								within which they were to execute their agreement, and then, without
								saying a word to any of the allies, he at once withdrew his army.

The Lacedaemonians and their allies followed Agis out of respect for
								the law, but they blamed him severely among themselves. For they
								believed that they had lost a glorious opportunity; their enemies
								had been surrounded on every side both by horse and foot;

and yet they were returning home having done nothing worthy of their
								great effort.— No finer Hellenic army had ever up to that day been
								collected; its appearance was most striking at Nemea while the host
								was still one; the Lacedaemonians were there in their full strength;
								arrayed by their side were Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians,
								Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, from each state
								chosen men— they might have been thought a match not only for the
								Argive confederacy, but for another as large.— So the army returned
								and dispersed to their homes, much out of humour with Agis.

The Argives on their part found still greater fault with those who
								had made the peace, 
								unauthorised by the people;

they too thought that such an opportunity would never recur, and that
								it was the Lacedaemonians who had escaped, for the combat would have
								taken place close to their own city, and they had numerous and brave
								allies.

And so, as they were retreating and had reached the bed of the
								Charadrus, where they hold military trials before they
								enter the city, they began to stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by
								flying to the altar, but they confiscated his property.

Soon afterwards there arrived an Athenian reinforcement of a thousand
								hoplites and three hundred horse, under the command of Laches
								and Nicostratus. The Argives, although dissatisfied with the truce,
								were reluctant to break it, so they bade them depart; and, when they
								desired to treat, they would not present them to the assembly until
								they were compelled by the importunity of their Mantinean and Elean
								allies, who had not yet left Argos.

The Athenians then, speaking by the mouth of their ambassador
								Alcibiades, told the Argives in the presence of the rest that they
								had no right to make the truce at all independently of their allies,
								and that, the Athenians having arrived at the opportune moment, they
								should fight at once.

The allies were convinced, and they all, with the exception of the
								Argives, immediately marched against Orchomenus in Arcadia; the
								Argives, though consenting, did not join them at first, but they
								came afterwards.

The united forces then sat down before Orchomenus, which they
								assailed repeatedly; they were especially anxious to get the place
								into their hands, because certain Arcadian hostages had been
								deposited there by the Lacedaemonians.

The Orchomenians, considering the weakness of their fortifications
								and the numbers of the enemy, and beginning to fear that they might
								perish before any one came to their assistance, agreed to join the
								alliance: they were to give hostages of their own to the Mantineans,
								and to deliver up those whom the Lacedaemonians had deposited with
								them.

The allied force, now in possession of Orchomenus, considered against
								what town they should next proceed; the Eleans wanted them to attack
								Lepreum, the Mantineans Tegea. The Argives and Athenians sided with
									 the Mantineans;

whereupon the Eleans, indignant that they had not voted for the
									expedition against Lepreum, returned home,
								but the remainder of the allies made preparations at Mantinea to
								attack Tegea. They were assisted by a party within the walls who
								were ready to betray the place to them.

The Lacedaemonians, when after making the four months' truce they had
								returned home, severely blamed Agis because he had
								not conquered Argos, and had lost an opportunity of which, in their
								own judgment, they had never before had the like. For it was no easy
								matter to bring together a body of allies so numerous and brave.

But when the news came that Orchomenus had fallen they were furious,
								and in a fit of passion, which was unlike their usual character,
								they had almost made up their minds to raze his house and fine him
								in the sum of a hundred thousand drachmae .

But he besought them not to punish him, promising that he would atone
								for his error by some brave action in the field; if he did not keep
								his word they might do as they pleased with him.

So they did not inflict the fine or demolish his house, but on this
								occasion they passed a law which had no precedent in their history,
								providing that ten Spartans should be appointed his counsellors , who
								were to give their consent before he could lead the army out of the
								city.

Meanwhile word was brought from their friends in Tegea that they must
								come at once, since Tegea was about to secede and had almost seceded
								already to the Argives and their allies.

Whereupon the Lacedaemonians led out their whole force,
								including the Helots, with an alacrity which they had never
									before displayed, and marched to
								Orestheum in Maenalia.

They told their Arcadian allies to assemble and follow them at once
								to Tegea. When the army had proceeded as far as Orestheum they
								dismissed the sixth part, including the elder and the younger men,
								who were to keep guard at home, and arrived at Tegea with the rest
								of their troops. Not long afterwards the Arcadian allies appeared.
								They had also sent to the Corinthians, and to the Boeotians,
								Phocians, and Locrians, whom they summoned to meet them with all
								speed at Mantinea.

But the notice given to the allies was short, and their passage was
								barred by the enemies' country, which they could not easily traverse
								unless they waited for one another and came all together. However,
								they did their best.

The Lacedaemonians, accompanied by their Arcadian allies, invaded the
								territory of Mantinea, and pitching their camp near the temple of
								Heracles, wasted the country.

When the Argives and their allies saw the enemy they took up a steep
								and hardly assailable position, and arranged themselves in
								order of battle.

The Lacedaemonians instantly charged them, and had proneeded within a
								javelin or stone's throw when one of the elder Spartans, seeing the
								strength of the ground which they were attacking, called out to Agis
								that he was trying to mend one error by another; he meant to say
								that his present mistaken forwardness was intended to repair the
								discredit of his former retreat.

And, either in consequence of this exclamation or because some new thought suddenly struck him , he withdrew his army in haste
								without actually engaging. He marched back into the district of
								Tegea, and proceeded to turn the water into the Mantinean territory.

This water is a constant source of war between the Mantineans and
								Tegeans, on account of the great harm which is done to
								one or other of them according to the direction which the stream
								takes. Agis hoped that the Argives and their allies when they heard
								of this movement would come down from the hill and try to prevent
								it; he could then fight them on level ground.

Accordingly he stayed about the water during the whole day, diverting
								the stream. Now the Argives and their confederates were at first
								amazed at the sudden retreat of their enemies when they were so
								near, and did not know what to think. But when the Lacedaemonians
								had retired and disappeared from view, and they found themselves
								standing still and not pursuing, they once more began to blame their
								own generals. Their cry was that they had already let the
								Lacedaemonians slip when they had them at a disadvantage close to
								Argos; and now they were running away and no one pursued them;

the enemy were just allowed to escape, while their own army was
								quietly betrayed. The commanders were at first bewildered by the
								outcry; but soon they quitted the hill, and advancing into the plain
								took up a position with the intention of attacking.

On the following day the Argives and their allies drew themselves up
								in the order in which they intended to fight should they
								meet with the enemy. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians returned from the
								water to their old encampment near the temple of Heracles. There
								they saw quite close to them the Argive army, which had moved on
								from the hill, and was already in order of battle.

Never within their recorded history were the Lacedaemonians more
								dismayed than at that instant; not a moment was to be 
								lost: immediately they hurried every man to his own place, the king
								Agis, according to the law, directing their several movements.

For when the king is in the field nothing is done without him; he in
								person gives general orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to
								the commanders of divisions; these again to the commanders of
								fifties, the commanders of fifties to the commanders of enomoties,
								and these to the enomoty.

In like manner any more precise instructions are passed down through
								the army, and quickly reach their destination. For almost the whole
								Lacedaemonian army are officers who have officers under them, and
								the responsibility of executing an order devolves upon many.

On this occasion the Sciritae formed the left wing, a position to
								which in the Lacedaemonian army they have a peculiar and exclusive
								right. Next to the Sciritae were placed the troops who had served in
								Chalcidice under Brasidas, and with them the Neodamodes. Next in
								order were ranged the several divisions of the Lacedaemonian army,
								and near them the Heraeans of Arcadia; next the Maenalians, and on
								the right wing the Tegeans, and a few Lacedaemonians at the extreme
								point of the line;

the cavalry were placed on both wings. This was the order of the
								Lacedaemonians. On the right wing of the enemy were placed the
								Mantineans, because the action was to be fought in their country,
								and next to them such of the Arcadians as were their allies. Then
								came the select force of a thousand Argives, whom the city had long
								trained at the public expense in military exercises; next the other
								Argives, and after them their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneatae.
								Last of all the Athenians occupied the left wing, supported by their
								own cavalry.

Such was the order and composition of the two armies:

that of the Lacedaemonians appeared to be the larger, but what the
								number was, either of the several contingents, or of the total on
								either side, I cannot pretend exactly to say, for the
								secrecy of the government did not allow the strength of the
								Lacedaemonian army to be known, and the numbers on the
								other side were thought to be exaggerated by the vanity natural to
								men when speaking of their own forces.

However, the following calculation may give some idea of the
								Lacedaemonian numbers. There were seven divisions in the field,
								besides the Sciritae who numbered six hundred; in each division
								there were four pentecosties, in every pentecosty four enomoties,
								and of each enomoty there fought in the front rank four. The depth
								of the line was not everywhere equal, but was left to the discretion
								of the generals commanding divisions; on an average it was eight
								deep. The front line consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men,
								exclusive of the Sciritae .

The two armies were now on the point of engaging, but first the
								several commanders addressed exhortations
								to their own contingents. The Mantineans were told that they were
								not only about to fight for their country, but would have to choose
								between dominion or slavery; having tried both, did they
								want to be deprived of the one, or to have any more acquaintance
								with the other? The Argives were reminded that in old times they had
								been sovereign, and more recently the equals of Sparta, in
								Peloponnesus; would they acquiesce for ever in the loss of their
								supremacy, and lose at the same time the chance of revenging
								themselves upon their hateful neighbours, who had wronged them again
								and again? The Athenians were told that it was glorious to be
								fighting side by side with a host of brave allies and to be found
								equal to the bravest. If they could conquer a Lacedaemonian army in
									 Peloponnesus, they would both extend and secure
								their dominion, and need never fear an invader again.

Such were the exhortations addressed to the Argives and to their
								allies. But the Lacedaemonians, both in their warsongs and in the
								words which a man spoke to his comrade, did but remind one another
								of what their brave spirits knew already . For they had learned that true safety was to be
								found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations
								uttered when they were going into action.

At length the two armies went forward. The Argives and their allies
								advanced to the charge with great fury and determination. The
								Lacedaemonians moved slowly and to the music of many flute-players,
								who were stationed in their ranks, and played, not as an act of
								religion, but in order that the army might march evenly and in true
								measure, and that the line might not break, as often happens in
								great armies when they go into battle.

Before they had actually closed a thought occurred to Agis. All
								armies, when engaging, are apt to
								thrust outwards their right wing; and either of the opposing forces
								tends to outflank his enemy's left with his to outflank his enemy's
								left with his own right, because every soldier individually fears
								for his exposed side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his
								comrade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in the
								better he will be protected. The first man in the front rank of the
								right wing is originally responsible for the deflection, for he
								always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own exposed side, and
								the rest of the army, from a like fear, follow his example. In this
								battle the line of the Mantineans, who were on the Argive right
								wing, extended far beyond the Sciritae:

and still further, in proportion as the army to which they belonged
								was the larger, did the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans on the
								Lacedaemonian right wing extend beyond the Athenian left.

Agis was afraid that the Lacedaemonian left wing would be surrounded,
								and, thinking that the Mantineans outflanked them too far, he
								signalled to the Sciritae and the old soldiers of Brasidas to make a
								lateral movement away from his own division of the army, and so
								cover the line of the Mantineans: to fill up the space thus left
								vacant he ordered Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two of the polemarchs,
								to bring up their two divisions from the right wing, thinking that
								he would still have more troops than he wanted there, and that he
								would thus strengthen that part of his line which was opposed to the
								Mantineans.

He had given the order at the last moment, when the charge had
								already begun, and Aristocles and Hipponoidas
								refused to make the movement. (For the cowardice which they were
								supposed to have shown on this occasion they were afterwards
								banished from Sparta.) The enemy were upon him before he was ready,
								and as the two divisions would not advance into the place left by
								the Sciritae, Agis ordered the Sciritae themselves to close up, but
								he found that it was too late, and that they also were now unable to
								fill the vacant space.

Then the Lacedaemonians showed in a remarkable manner that, although
								utterly failing in their tactics, they could win by their courage
								alone.

When they were at close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right
								put to flight the Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas. The
								Mantineans and their allies and the thousand chosen Argives dashed
								in through the gap in the Lacedaemonian ranks and completed their
								defeat; they surrounded and routed them, and so drove them to their
								waggons, where they killed some of the elder men who were appointed
								to guard them.

In this part of the field the Lacedaemonians were
								beaten, but elsewhere, and especially in the centre of the army,
								where the king Agis and the three hundred Knights, as they are
								called, who attend him, were posted, they charged the elder Argives,
								the Five Divisions as they are termed, the Cleonaeans, Orneatae, and
								those of the Athenians who were ranged with them, and put them to
								flight. Most of them never even struck a blow, but gave way at once
								on the approach of the Lacedaemonians; some were actually trodden
								under foot, being overtaken by the advancing host.

When the allies and the Argives had yielded in this quarter, they
								became severed from their comrades to the left as well as to the
								right of the line; meanwhile the extended right wing of the
								Lacedaemonians and the Tegeans threatened to surround the Athenians.
								They were in great danger; their men were being hemmed in at one
								point and were already defeated at another;

and but for their cavalry, which did them good service, they would
								have suffered more than any other part of the army.

Just then Agis, observing the distress of the Lacedaemonian left
								wing, which was opposed to the Mantineans and the thousand select
								Argives, commanded his whole forces to go and assist their own
								defeated troops. Whereupon the Athenians, when their opponents
								turned aside and began to move away from them, quietly made their
								escape, and along with them the defeated Argives. The Mantineans and
								their allies and the chosen force of Argives, seeing their army
								conquered and the Lacedaemonians bearing down upon them, gave up all
								thoughts of following up their advantage and fled.

The loss incurred by the chosen Argives was small, that of the
								Mantineans more serious. The pursuit was not fierce nor the flight
								protracted, for the Lacedaemonians fight long and refuse to move
								until they have put an enemy to flight, but, having
								once defeated him, they do not follow him far or long.

Thus, or nearly thus, went the battle, by far the greatest of
								Hellenic battles which had taken place for
								a long time, and fought by the most famous cities.

The Lacedaemonians exposed the arms of the enemies' dead, and made a
								trophy of them; they then plundered the bodies, and taking up their
								own dead carried them away to Tegea, where they were buried; the
								enemies' dead they gave back under a flag of truce.

Of the Argives, Orneatae, and Cleonaeans there fell seven hundred, of
								the Mantineans two hundred, and of the Athenians, including their
								settlers in Aegina , two hundred, and both their
								generals. As to the Lacedaemonians, their allies were not hard
								pressed and did not incur any considerable loss; how many of
								themselves fell it was hard to ascertain precisely, but their dead
								are reported to have numbered about three hundred.

Just before the battle, Pleistoanax, the other king, led out of
								Sparta a reinforcement composed of
								the elder and younger citizens ; he had proceeded as
								far as Tegea when he heard of the victory, and returned.

The Lacedaemonians sent and countermanded the reinforcements from
								Corinth and beyond the Isthmus; they then went home themselves and,
								dismissing the allies, celebrated the festival of the Carnea, for
								which this happened to be the season.

Thus, by a single action, they wiped out the charge of cowardice,
								which was due to their misfortune at Sphacteria, and of general
								stupidity and sluggishness, then current against them in Hellas.
								They were now thought to have been hardly used by
									fortune , but in character to be the same as
								ever. 
							 The very day before the battle, the Epidaurians with 
								their whole force invaded the territory of Argos, expecting to find
								it deserted;

they killed many of the men who had been left to protect the country
								when the main army took the field .

After the battle three thousand Elean hoplites came to the aid of the
								Mantineans, and a second detachment of a thousand from Athens. While
								the Lacedaemonians were still celebrating the Carnea they marched
								all together against Epidaurus, and began to surround the city with
								a wall, dividing the task among them.

The other allies did not persevere, but the Athenians soon completed
								their own portion, the fortification of the promontory on which the
								temple of Here stood. In this part of the works a garrison was left,
								to which all furnished a contingent; they then returned to their
								several cities. So the summer ended.

At the very beginning of the following winter, after the celebration
								of the Carnea, the Lacedaemonians led out an
								army as far as Tegea, whence they sent proposals of peace to the
								Argives.

There had always been some partisans of Lacedaemon in the city, who
								had wanted to put down the democracy. After the battle it was far
								easier for this party to draw the people into an alliance with
								Sparta. Their intention was to make first of all a peace, and then
								an alliance, with the Lacedaemonians, and, having done so, to set
								upon the people.

And now there arrived in Argos, Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, the
								proxenus of the Argives, offering them one of two alternatives:
								There were terms of peace, but they might also have war if they
								pleased. A warm discussion ensued, for Alcibiades happened to be in
								the place. The party which had been intriguing for the
								Lacedaemonians, and had at last ventured to come forward openly,
								persuaded the Argives to accept the terms of peace, which were as
								follows:—

'It seems good to the Lacedaemonian assembly to make an agreement
								with the Argives on the 
								following terms:— 
							 ' I. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians 
								the youths, and to the Maenalians the men whom they hold as
								hostages, and to the Lacedaemonians the men who were
								deposited in Mantinea. 
							 'II.

They shall also evacuate Epidauria, and demolish the fortifications
								which they have erected there. If the Athenians refuse to evacuate
								Epidauria, they shall be enemies to the Argives and Lacedaemonians,
								and to the. allies of the Lacedaemonians, and to the allies of the
								Argives.

'III. If the Lacedaemonians have any youths belonging to any of the
								allies in their country, they shall restore them to their several
								cities.

'IV. Concerning the sacrifice to the God, the Epidaurians shall be
								permitted to take an oath which the Argives shall formally tender to
								them.

'V. The cities in Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be all
								independent, according to their ancestral laws.

'VI. If anyone from without Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesus
								with evil intent, the Peloponnesians shall take council together and
								shall repel the enemy;

and the several states shall bear such a share in the war as may seem
								equitable to the Peloponnesians. 
							 'VII. The allies of the Lacedaemonians without Peloponnesus shall be
								in the same position as the other allies of the Lacedaemonians and
								the allies of the Argives, and they shall retain their present
								territory. 
							 'VIII.

The Argives may if they think fit show this 
								agreement to their allies and make terms with them , but if the allies raise any objection, they
								shall dismiss them to their homes.'

When the Argives had accepted these propositions in the first
								instance, the Lacedaemonian army returned home from
								Tegea. The two states now began to hold intercourse with one
								another, and not long afterwards the same party which had negotiated
								the treaty contrived that the Argives should renounce their alliance
								with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, and make a new treaty of alliance
								with Lacedaemon on the following terms:—

'It seems good to the Lacedaemonians and to the Argives to make peace
								and alliance for fifty years on the following
								conditions:— 
							 'I. They shall submit to arbitration on fair and equal terms,
								according to their ancestral customs. 
							 'II. The other cities of Peloponnesus shall participate in the peace
								and alliance, and shall be independent and their own masters,
								retaining their own territory and submitting to arbitration on fair
								and equal terms, according to their ancestral customs.

'III. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnesus shall
								share in the same terms as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the
								Argives shall be in the same position as the Argives, and shall
								retain their present territory. 
							 'IV.

If it shall be necessary to make an expedition in common against any
								place, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall consult together and
								fix the share in the war which may be equitably borne by the allies.

'V. If any of the states, either within or without Peloponnesus, have a dispute
								about a frontier, or any other matter, the difference shall be duly
								settled. But should a quarrel break out between two of the allied
								cities, they shall appeal to some state which both the cities deem
								to be impartial. 
							 'VI. Justice shall be administered to the individual citizens of each
								state according to their ancestral customs.'

Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded, and the
								Lacedaemonians and Argives 
								settled with each other any difference which they had about captures
								made in the war, or about any other matter. They now acted together,
								and passed a vote that no herald or embassy should be received from
								the Athenians, unless they evacuated the fortifications which they
								held in Peloponnesus and left the country;

they agreed also that they would not enter into alliance or make war
								except in concert. They were very energetic in all their doings, and
								jointly sent ambassadors to the Chalcidian cities in Thrace, and to
								Perdiccas whom they persuaded to join their confederacy. He did not,
								however, immediately desert the Athenians, but he was thinking of
								deserting, being influenced by the example of the Argives; for he
								was himself of Argive descent .
								The Argives and Lacedaemonians renewed the oaths formerly taken by
								the Lacedaemonians to the Chalcidians and swore new ones .

The Argives also sent envoys to the Athenians bidding them evacuate
								the fortifications which they had raised at Epidaurus. They, seeing
								that their troops formed but a small part of the garrison, sent
								Demosthenes to bring them away with him. When he came he proposed to
								hold a gymnastic contest outside the fort; upon this pretext he
								induced the rest of the garrison to go out, and then shut the gates upon them. Soon afterwards the Athenians
								renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, and themselves restored
								the fort to them.

When the Argives deserted the alliance the Mantinmeans held out for a
								time, but without the Argives
								they were helpless, and so they too came to terms with the
								Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claim to supremacy over the cities
								in Arcadia which had been subject to them .

Next the Lacedaemonians and the Argives, each providing a thousand
								men, made a joint expedition: first the Lacedaemonians went alone
								and set up a more oligarchical government at Sicyon; then they and
								the Argives uniting their forces put down the democracy at Argos,
								and established an oligarchy which was in the interest of the
								Lacedaemonians. These changes were effected at the close of winter
								towards the approach of spring, and so ended the fourteenth year of
								the war.

In the ensuing summer the Dictidians in Mount Athos revolted from the
								Athenians to the 
 
							 Chalcidians; and the Laces Chalcidians; and the Lacedaemonians resettled the affairs of Achaia upon a footing
								more favourable to their interests than hitherto.

The popular party at Argos, reconstituting themselves by degrees,
								plucked up courage, and, taking advantage of the festival of the
								Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon, attacked the oligarchy. A battle took
								place in the city: the popular party won, and either killed or
								expelled their enemies.

The oligarchy had sought help from their friends the Lacedaemonians,
								but they did not come for some time; at last they put off the
								festival and went to their aid. When they arrived at Tegea they
								heard that the oligarchs had been defeated.

They would proceed no further, but in spite of the entreaties of the
								fugitives returned home and resumed the celebration of the festival.
								Not long afterwards envoys came to them both from the party now
								established in Argos and from those who had been driven out, and in
								the presence of their allies, after hearing many pleas from both
								sides, they passed a vote condemning the victorious faction;

they then resolved to send an expedition to Argos, but delays
								occurred and time was lost. Meanwhile the democracy at Argos,
								fearing the Lacedaemonians, and again courting the Athenian alliance
								in which their hopes were centred, began building Long Walls to the
								sea, in order that if they were blockaded by land they might have
								the advantage, with Athenian help, of introducing provisions by
								water.

Certain other states in Peloponnesus were privy to this project. The
								whole Argive people, the citizens themselves, their wives, and their
								slaves, set to work upon the wall, and the Athenians sent them
								carpenters and masons from Athens. So the summer ended.

In the ensuing winter the Lacedaemonians, hearing of the progress of
								the work, made an expedition to Argos with their
								allies, all but the Corinthians; there was also a party at Argos
								itself acting in their interest. Agis the son of Archidamus, king of
								the Lacedaemonians, led the army.

The support which they expected to find at Argos was not forthcoming;
								the walls however, which were not yet finished, were captured by
								them and razed to the ground; they also seized Hysiae, a place in
								the Argive territory, and put to death all the free men whom they
								caught; they then withdrew, and returned to their several cities.

Next the Argives in their turn made an expedition into the territory
								of Phlius, which they ravaged because the Phliasians had received
								the Argive refugees, most of whom had settled there;

they then returned home. 
							 
							 During the same winter the Athenians blockaded Perdiccas in
								Macedonia, complaining of
								the league which he had made with the Argives and Lacedaemonians;
								and also that he had been false to their alliance when they had
								prepared to send an army against the Chalcidians and against
								Amphipolis under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus. The
								army was in fact disbanded chiefly owing to his withdrawal. So he
								became their enemy. Thus the winter ended, and with it the fifteenth
								year of the war.

In the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships,
								and seized any of the Argives who were still suspected to be of the
								Lacedaemonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and
								the Athenians deposited them in the subject islands near at hand.
								Athenians next made an expedition against the island of Melos with
								thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian, twelve
								hundred hoplites and three hundred archers besides twenty mounted
								archers of their own, and about fifteen hundred hoplites furnished
								by their allies in the islands.

The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit
								to Athens like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and
								took no part. But when the Athenians tried to coerce them by
								ravaging their lands, they were driven into open hostilities .

The generals, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tisias the son of
								Tisimachus, encamped with the Athenian forces on the island. But
								before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to negotiate
								with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the
								people, the Melians desired them to explain their errand to the
								magistrates and to the dominant class. They spoke as follows:—

Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, forsooth, a
								multitude should be deceived by seductive and
									unanswerable 
								arguments which they would hear set forth in a single uninterrupted
								oration (for we are perfectly aware that this is what you mean in
								bringing us before a select few), you who are sitting here may as
								well make assurance yet surer. Let us have no set speeches at all,
								but do you reply to each several statement of which you disapprove,
								and criticise it at once. Say first of all how you like this mode of
								proceeding.'

The Melian representatives answered:— 'The quiet interchange of
								explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But
								your warlike movements, which are present not only to our fears but
								to our eyes, seem to belie your words. We see that, although you may
								reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of
								the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevail and we therefore
								refuse to yield, we may expect war; if we are convinced by you,
								slavery.'

Ath. 'Nay, but if you are only going to argue
								from fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other purpose than that of
								looking your circumstances in the face and saving your city, we have
								done; but if this is your intention we will proceed.'

Mel. 'It is an excusable and natural thing that
								men in our position should neglect no argument and no view which may avail. But we
								admit that this conference has met to consider the question of our
								preservation; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner
								which you propose.'

Ath. 'Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine
									 words; we will not go out of our way to prove at
								length that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the
									Persians ; or that we attack you now because we
								are suffering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you
								if we did; nor must you expect to convince us by arguing that,
								although a colony of the Lacedaemonians, you have taken no part in
								their expeditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. But you
								and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is
								possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human
								affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal
								power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and
								the weak grant what they must.'

Mel. 'Well, then, since you set aside justice
								and invite us to speak of expediency, in our 
								judgment it is certainly expedient that you should respect a
								principle which is for the common good; that to every man when in
								peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and
								that any plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the
								point a little, should help his cause. Your interest in this
								principle is quite as great as ours, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will
								incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example
								to mankind .'

Ath. 'The fall of our empire, if it should fall,
								is not an event to which we look forward with dismay; for ruling
								states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to their vanquished
									enemies. With the Lacedaemonians, however, we are not
									 now contending; the real danger is from our many
								subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome
								their masters . But
								this is a danger which you may leave to us.

And we will now endeavour to show that we have come in the interests
								of our empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only
								seeking the preservation of your city. For we want to make you ours
								with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests of
								us both that you should not be destroyed.'

Mel. 'It may be your interest to be our masters,
								but how can it be ours to be your 
								slaves?'

Ath. 'To you the gain will be that by submission
								you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your
								preservation.'

Mel. 'But must we be your enemies? Will you not
								receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?'

Ath. 'No, your enmity is not half so mischievous
								to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an
								argument of our power, the other of our weakness.'

Mel. 'But are your subjects really unable to
								distinguish between states in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly
								your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued
								by you?'

Ath. 'Why, they do not doubt that both of them
								have a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, but they think
								that states like yours are left free because they are able to defend
								themselves, and that we do not attack them because we 
								dare not. So that your subjection will give us an increase of
								security, as well as an extension of empire. For we are masters of
								the sea, and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders too,
								must not be allowed to escape us.'

Mel. ' But do you not recognize another danger?
								For, once more, since you drive us from the plea of
									justice and press upon us your doctrine of
									expediency , we must show you what is
								for our interest, and, if it be for yours also, may hope to convince
								you:— Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals?
								When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day
								to turn against them; and if so, are you not strengthening the
								enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others who, if
								they could help, would never dream of being your enemies at all?'

Ath. 'We do not consider our really dangerous
								enemies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland who,
								secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any measures of
								precaution which they take against us, but islanders who, like you,
								happen to be under no control, and all who may be already irritated
								by the necessity of submission to our empire— these are our real
								enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring
								themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but
								foresee.'

Mel. 'Surely then, if you and your subjects will
								brave all this risk, you to preserve your empire
								and they to be quit of it, how base and cowardly would it be in us,
								who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather than be
								your slaves.'

Ath. 'Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are
								not fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without
								disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or no you shall resist
								an overwhelming force. The question is not one of honour but of
								prudence.'

Mel. 'But we know that the fortune of war is
								sometimes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers. If we yield now, all is
								over; but if we fight, there is yet a hope that we may stand
								upright.'

Ath. 'Hope is a good comforter in the hour of
								danger, and when men have something else to 
								depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her
								spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they
								see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then.
								While the knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she
								never fails .

You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do
								not you be thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are
								guilty, who, although they might still be saved if they would take
								the natural means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them,
								have recourse to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the
								like, which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them.'

Mel. 'We know only too well how hard the
								struggle must be against your power, and against fortune,
								if she does not mean to be impartial. Nevertheless we do not despair
								of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favour of
								heaven, because we are righteous and you against whom we contend are
								unrighteous; and we are satisfied that our deficiency
								in power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the
								Lacedaemonians; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we
								are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honour. And
								therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose.'

Ath. 'As for the Gods, we expect to have quite
								as much of their favour as you: for we 
								are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion
								about divine or men's desires about human things.

For of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of
								their nature wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made
								by us, and we are not the first who have acted upon it; we did but
								inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time, and we know that you
								and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do.
								So much for the Gods;

we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion
								as you. And then as to the Lacedaemonians— when you imagine that out
								of very shame they will assist you, we admire the innocence of your
								idea, but we do not envy you the folly of it.

The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly virtuous among themselves, and
								according to their national standard of morality . But, in respect of their dealings with
								others, although many things might be said, they can be described in
								few words— of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for
								identifying what is pleasant with what is honourable, and what is
								expedient with what is just. But how inconsistent is such a
								character with your present blind hope of deliverance!'

Mel. 'That is the very reason why we trust them;
								they will look to their interest, and therefore will not be willing to betray the Melians, who are their own colonists,
								lest they should be distrusted by their friends in Hellas and play
								into the hands of their enemies.'

Ath. 'But do you not see that the path of
								expediency is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice, and such dangers
								the Lacedaemonians seldom care to face?'

Mel. 'On the other hand, we think that whatever
								perils there may be, they will be ready to face them for our sakes,
								and will consider danger less dangerous where we are concerned.
									For if
								they need our aid we are close at hand, and they can better trust our
								loyal feeling because we are their kinsmen.'

Ath. 'Yes, but what encourages men who are
								invited to join in a conflict is clearly not the good-will
								of those who summon them to their side, but a decided superiority in
								real power. To this no men look more keenly than the Lacedaemonians;
								so little confidence have they in their own resources, that they
								only attack their neighbours when they have numerous allies, and
								therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to an
								island, when we are masters of the sea.'

Mel. 'But they may send their allies: the Cretan
								sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in
								overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in
								escaping.

If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find
								their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach: and then
								you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you
								have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation
								of your confederacy and of your own territory.'

Ath. 'Help may come from Lacedaemon to you as it
								has come to others, and should you ever have actual
								experience of it, then you will know that never once have the
								Athenians retired from a siege through fear of a foe elsewhere.

You told us that the safety of your city would be your first care,
								but we remark that, in this long discussion, not a word has been
								uttered by you which would give a reasonable man expectation of
								deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what
								power you have is not to be compared with that which is already
								arrayed against you. Unless after we have withdrawn you mean to
								come, as even now you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a
								great want of sense.

For surely you cannot dream of flying to that false sense of honour
								which has been the ruin of so many when danger and dishonour were
								staring them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open to the
								consequences have found the word honour 
								too much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure them on,
								until it has drawn down upon them real and irretrievable calamities;

through their own folly they have incurred a worse dishonour than
								fortune would have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you will not
								run this risk; you ought to see that there can be no disgrace in
								yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on
								reasonable terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute;
								and that you will certainly gain no honour if, having to choose
								between two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer the
								worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with
								superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of
								safety.

Reflect once more when we have withdrawn, and say to yourselves over
								and over again that you are deliberating about your one and only country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by a
								single decision.'

The Athenians left the conference: the Melians, after consulting
								among themselves, resolved to
								persevere in their refusal, and made answer as follows:— ' Men of
								Athens, our resolution is unchanged;

and we will not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city,
								founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will trust to the
								good fortune which, by the favour of the Gods, has hitherto
								preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedaemonians, and
								endeavour to save ourselves.

We are ready however to be your friends, and the enemies neither of
								you nor of the Lacedaemonians, and we ask you to leave our country
								when you have made such a peace as may appear to be in the interest
								of both parties.'

Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, as they quitted
								the conference, spoke as 
								follows:— ' Well, we must say, judging from the decision at which
								you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to
								be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as
								already realized in your fond anticipation, and that the more you
								cast yourselves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune and hope, and
								trust them, the more complete will be your ruin.'

The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the generals, when they
								found that the Melians would not
								yield, immediately commenced hostilities. They surrounded the town
								of Melos with a wall, dividing the work among the several
								contingents.

They then left troops of their own and of their allies to keep guard
								both by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of their
								army; the remainder carried on the blockade.

About the same time the Argives made an inroad into Phliasia, and
								lost nearly eighty men, who were caught in an ambuscade by the
								Phliasians and the Argive exiles. The Athenian
								garrison in Pylos took much spoil from the Lacedaemonians;

nevertheless the latter did not
								renounce the peace and go to war, but only notified by a
								proclamation that if any one of their own people had a mind to make
								reprisals on the Athenians he might.

The Corinthians next declared war upon the Athenians on some private
								grounds, but the rest of the Peloponnesians did not join them.

The Melians took that part of the Athenian wall which looked towards
								the agora by a night assault, killed a few men, and brought in as
								much corn and other necessaries as they could; they then retreated
								and remained inactive. After this the Athenians set a better watch.
								So the summer ended.

In the following winter the Lacedaemonians had intended to make an
								expedition into the Argive territory,
								but finding that the sacrifices which they offered at the frontier
								were unfavourable they
								returned home. The Argives, suspecting that the threatened invasion
								was instigated by citizens of their own, apprehended some of them;
								others however escaped.

About the same time the Melians took another part of the Athenian
								wall; for the fortifications were insufficiently guarded.

Whereupon the Athenians sent fresh troops, under the command of
								Philocrates the son of Demeas. The place was now closely invested,
								and there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So the
								Melians were induced to surrender at discretion.

The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age,
								and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonised the
								island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own.

DURING the same winter the Athenians conceived a desire of sending
								another expedition to Sicily, larger than those
								commanded by Laches and Eurymedon They hoped to conquer the island. Of its
								great size and numerous population, barbarian as well as Hellenic,
								most of them knew nothing, and they never reflected that they were
								entering on a struggle almost as arduous as the Peloponnesian War.

The voyage in a merchant-vessel round Sicily takes up nearly eight
								days, and this great island is all but a part of the mainland, being
								divided from it by a sea not much more than two miles in width.

I will now describe the original settlement of Sicily, and enumerate
								the nations which it contained. Oldest
								of all were (1) the Cyclopes and Laestrygones, who are said to have
								dwelt in a district of the island; but who they were, whence they
								came, or whither they went, I cannot tell. We must be content with
								the legends of the poets, and every one must be left to form his own
								opinion. (2)

The Sicanians appear to have succeeded these early races, although
								according to their own account they were still older; for they
								profess to have been children of the soil. But the
								fact proves to be that they were Iberians, and were driven from the
								river Sicanus in Iberia by the Ligurians. Sicily, which was
								originally called Trinacria, received from them the name Sicania.

To this day the Sicanians inhabit the western parts of the island.
								(3) After the capture of Troy, some Trojans who had escaped from the
								Achaeans came in ships to Sicily; they settled near the Sicanians,
								and took the common name of Elymi but had two separate cities, Eryx
								and Egesta. (4) These were joined by certain Phocians, who had also
								fought at Troy, and were driven by a storm first to Libya and thence
								to Sicily. (5)

The Sicels were originally inhabitants of Italy, whence they were
								driven by the Opici, and passed over into Sicily;— according to a
								probable tradition they crossed upon rafts, taking advantage of the
								wind blowing from the land, but they may have found other ways of
								effecting a passage; there are Sicels still in Italy, and the
								country itself was so called from Italus a Sicel king.

They entered Sicily with a large army, and defeating the Sicanians in
								battle, drove them back to the southern and western parts of the
								country; from them the island, formerly Sicania, took the name of
								Sicily. For nearly three hundred years after their arrival until the
								time when the Hellenes came to Sicily they occupied the most fertile
								districts, and they still inhabit the central and northern regions.
								(6) The Phoenicians at one time had settlements all round the
								island.

They fortified headlands on the sea-coast, and settled in the small
								islands adjacent, for the sake of trading with the Sicels; but when
								the Hellenes began to find their way by sea to Sicily in greater
								numbers they withdrew from the larger part of the island, and
								forming a union established themselves in Motyè, Soloeis, and
								Panormus, in the neighbourhood of the Elymi, partly trusting to
								their alliance with them, and partly because this is the point at
								which the passage from Carthage to Sicily is shortest. Such were the
								Barbarian nations who inhabited Sicily, and these were their
								settlements.

(7) The first Hellenic colonists sailed from Chalcis in Euboea under
								the leadership of Thucles, and founded Naxos; there they erected an
								altar in honour of Apollo the Founder, which is still standing
								without the city , and on this altar religious embassies sacrifice
								before they sail from Sicily. (8)

In the following year Archias, one of the Heraclidae, came from
								Corinth and founded Syracuse, first driving the Sicels out of the
								island of Ortygia; in which, though it is no longer surrounded by
								the sea, the inner city now stands; in process of time the outer
								city was included within the walls and became populous. (9)

In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse Thucles and the
								Chalcidians went forth from Naxos, and driving out the Sicels by
								force of arms, founded first Leontini, then Catana. The Catanaeans
								however chose a founder of their own, named Evarchus.

(10) About the same time Lamis came from Megara bringing a colony to
								Sicily, where he 
								occupied a place called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacyas; but he
								soon afterwards joined the settlement of the Chalcidians at
								Leontini; with them he dwelt a short time, until he was driven out;
								he then founded Thapsus, where he died. His followers quitted
								Thapsus and founded the city which is called the Hyblaean Megara;
								Hyblon, a Sicel king, had betrayed the place to them and guided them
								thither.

There they remained two hundred and forty-five years, and were then
								driven out of their town and land by Gelo the tyrant of Syracuse;
								but before they were driven out, and a hundred years after their own foundation, they sent out Pamillus and
								founded Selinus;

he had come from Megara, their own mother state, to take part in the
								new colony. (11) In the forty-fifth year after the foundation of
								Syracuse, Antiphemus of Rhodes and Entimus of Crete came with their
								followers and together built Gela. The city was named from the river
								Gela, but the spot which is now the Acropolis and was first
								fortified is called Lindii. The institutions of the new settlement
								were Dorian.

Exactly a hundred and eight years after their own foundation the
								inhabitants of Gela founded Agrigentum (Acragas), which they named
								from the river Acragas; they appointed Aristonous and Pystilus
								founders of the place, and gave to it their own institutions. (12)

Zanclè was originally colonised by pirates who came from Cymè, the
								Chalcidian city in Opicia; these were followed by a large body of
								colonists from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, who shared in the
								allotment of the soil. The first settlement was led by Perieres of
								Cymè, the second by Crataemenes of Chalcis. Zanclè was the original
								name of the place, a name given by the Sicels because the site was
								in shape like a sickle, for which the Sicel word is zanclon. These earlier settlers were afterwards driven out
								by the Samians and other Ionians, who when they fled from the
									Persians 
								found their way to Sicily .

Not long afterwards Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out these
								Samians. He then repeopled their city with a mixed multitude, and
								called the place Messenè after his native country.

Himera was colonised from Zanclè by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most
								of the settlers were Chalcidian, but the so-called Myletidae, Syracusan
								exiles who had been defeated in a civil war, took part in
								the colony. Their language was a mixture of the Chalcidian and Doric
								dialects, but their institutions were mainly Chalcidian. (13)

Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans,
								Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years
								after Acrae.

Camarina was originally founded by the Syracusans exactly a hundred
								and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse; the founders
								were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans revolted, and as a
								punishment for their revolt were violently expelled by the
								Syracusans. After a time Hippocrates the tyrant of Gela,
								receiving the territory of Camarina as the ransom
								of certain Syracusan prisoners, became the second founder of the
								place, which he colonised anew. The inhabitants 'were once more driven out
								by Gelo, who
								himself colonised the city for the third time

These were the nations, Hellenic or Barbarian, who inhabited Sicily,
								and such was the 
								inhabited Sicily, and such was the great island on which the
									Athenians were
								determined to make war. They virtuously professed that they were
								going to assist their own kinsmen and their newly-acquired
									allies , but the simple
								truth was that they aspired to the empire of Sicily.

They were principally instigated by an embassy which had come from
								Egesta and was urgent in requesting aid. The Egestaeans had gone to
								war with the neighboring city of Selinus about certain questions of
								marriage and about a disputed piece of land. The Selinuntians
								summoned the Syracusans to their assistance, and their united forces
								reduced the Egestaeans to great straits both by sea and land. The
								Egestaean envoys reminded the Athenians of the alliance which they
								had made with the
								Leontines under Laches in the former war , and begged
								them to send ships to their relief. Their chief argument was that,
								if the Syracusans were not punished for the expulsion of the
								Leontines, but were allowed to destroy the remaining allies of the
								Athenians, and to get the whole of Sicily into their own hands, they
								would one day come with a great army, Dorians assisting Dorians, who
								were their kinsmen, and colonists assisting their Peloponnesian
								founders, and would unite in over. throwing Athens herself. Such
								being the danger, the Athenians would be wise in combining with the
								allies who were still left to them in Sicily against the Syracusans,
								especially since the Egestaeans would themselves provide money
								sufficient for the war.

These arguments were constantly repeated in the ears of the Athenian
								assembly by the Egestaeans and their partisans; at length the people
								passed a vote that they would at all events send envoys to ascertain
								on the spot whether the Egestaeans really had the money which they
								professed to have in their treasury and in their temples, and to
								report on the state of the war with Selinus. So the Athenian envoys
								were despatched to Sicily.

During the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, all but
								the Corinthians, made an expedition into the Argive territory, of
								which they devastated a small part, and, having brought with them
								waggons, carried away a few loads of corn. They settled the Argive
								exiles at Orneae, where they left a small garrison, and having made
								an agreement that the inhabitants of Orneae and the Argives should
								not injure one another's land for a given time, returned home with
								the rest of their army.

Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived with thirty ships and six
								hundred hoplites. They and the people of Argos with their whole
								power went out and blockaded Orneae for a day, but at night the
								Argive exiles within the walls got away unobserved by the besiegers,
								who were encamped at some distance. On the following
								day the Argives, perceiving what had happened, razed Orneae to the
								ground and returned. Soon afterwards the Athenian fleet returned
								likewise.

The Athenians also conveyed by sea cavalry of their own, and some
								Macedonian exiles who had
								taken refuge with them, to Methonè on the borders of Macedonia, and
								ravaged the territory of Perdiccas.

Whereupon the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who
								were maintaining an armistice terminable at ten days' notice with
								the Athenians, and commanded them to assist Perdiccas, but they
								refused. So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year in the
								Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

Early in the next spring the Athenian envoys returned from Sicily.
								They were accompanied by Egestaeans who brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, being
									a month's pay for sixty vessels which they
								hoped to obtain from Athens.

The Athenians called an assembly, and when they heard both from their
								own and from the Egestaean envoys, amongst other inviting but untrue
								statements, that there was abundance of money lying ready in the
								temples and in the treasury of Egesta , they passed a vote that
								sixty ships should be sent to Sicily; Alcibiades the son of
								Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of
								Xenophanes were appointed commanders with full powers. They were to
								assist Egesta against Selinus; if this did not demand all their
								military strength they were empowered to restore the Leontines, and
								generally to further in such manner as they deemed best the Athenian
								interests in Sicily.

Five days afterwards another assembly was called to
								consider what steps should be taken for the immediate equipment of
								the expedition, and to vote any additional supplies which the
								generals might require.

Nicias, who had been appointed general against his will, thought that
								the people had come to a wrong conclusion, and that upon slight if
								specious grounds they were aspiring to the conquest of Sicily, which
								was no easy task. So, being desirous of diverting the Athenians from
								their purpose, he came forward and admonished them in the following
								terms:—

'I know that we are assembled here to discuss the preparations which
								are required for our expedition to
								Sicily, but in my judgment it is still a question whether we ought
								to go thither at all; we should not be hasty in determining a matter
								of so much importance, or allow ourselves to enter into an impolitic
								war at the instigation of foreigners.

Yet to me personally war brings honour; and I am as careless as any
								man about my own life: not that I think the worse of a citizen who
								takes a little thought about his life or his property, for I believe
								that the sense of a man's own interest will quicken his interest in
								the prosperity of the state. But I have never in my life been
								induced by the love of reputation to say a single word contrary to
								what I thought; neither will I now: I will say simply what I believe
								to be best.

If I told you to take care of what you have and not to throw away
								present advantages in order to gain an uncertain and distant good,
								my words would be powerless against a temper like yours. I would
								rather argue that this is not the time for vigorous action, and that
								your great aims will not be easily realized.

'I tell you that in going to Sicily you are leaving many enemies
								behind you, and seem to be bent on bringing new ones hither.

You are perhaps relying upon the treaty recently made, which if you
								remain quiet may retain the name of a treaty; for to a mere name the
								intrigues of certain persons both here and at
								Lacedaemon have nearly succeeded in reducing it. But if you meet with
								any serious reverse, your enemies will be upon you in a moment, for
								the agreement was originally extracted from them by the pressure of
								misfortune, and the discredit of it was on their side not on
									ours . In the treaty itself there are many
								disputed points;

and, unsatisfactory as it is, to this hour several cities, and very
								powerful cities too, persist in rejecting it. Some of these are at
								open war with us already ; others may declare
								war at ten days' notice ; and they only remain at peace because
								the Lacedaemonians are indisposed to move.

And in all probability, if they find our power divided (and such a
								division is precisely what we are striving to create), they will
								eagerly join the Sicilians, whose alliance in the war they would
								long ago have given anything to obtain.

These considerations should weigh with us. The state is far from the
								desired haven, and we should not run into danger and seek to gain a
								new empire before we have fully secured the old. The Chalcidians in
								Thrace have been rebels all these years and remain unsubdued, and
								there are other subjects of ours in various parts of the mainland
								who are uncertain in their allegiance. And we forsooth cannot lose a
								moment in avenging the wrongs of our allies the Egestaeans, while we
								still defer the punishment of our revolted subjects, whose offences
								are of long standing.

'And yet if we subdue the Chalcidian rebels we may retain our hold on
								them; but Sicily 
								is a populous and distant country, over which, even if we are
								victorious, we shall hardly be able to maintain our dominion. And
								how foolish it is to select for attack a land which no conquest can
								secure, while he who fails to conquer will not be where he was
								before!

'I should say that the Sicilian cities are not dangerous to you,—
								certainly not in their present condition, and they would be even less so
								if they were to fall under the sway of the Syracusans (and this is
								the prospect with which the Egestaeans would fain scare you).

At present individuals might cross the sea out of friendship for the
								Lacedaemonians; but if the states of Sicily were all united in one
								empire they would not be likely to make war upon another empire. For
								whatever chance they may have of overthrowing us if they unite with
								the Peloponnesians, there will be the same chance of their being
								overthrown themselves if the Peloponnesians and Athenians are ever
								united against them The Hellenes in Sicily will dread us
								most if we never come;

in a less degree if we display our strength and speedily depart; but
								if any disaster occur, they will despise us and be ready enough to
								join the enemies who are attacking us here. We all know that men
								have the greatest respect for that which is farthest off, and for
								that of which the reputation has been least tested;

and this, Athenians, you may verify by your own experience. There was
								a time when you feared the Lacedaemonians and their allies, but now
								you have got the better of them, and because your first fears have
								not been realized you despise them, and even hope to conquer Sicily.

But you ought not to be elated at the chance mishaps of your enemies;
								before you can be confident you should have gained the mastery over
								their minds .
								Remember that the Lacedaemonians are sensitive to their disgrace,
								and that their sole thought is how they may even yet find a way of
								inflicting a blow upon us which will retrieve their own character;
								the rather because they have laboured so earnestly and
								so long to win a name for valour.

If we are wise we shall not trouble ourselves about the barbarous
								Egestaeans in Sicily; the real question is how we can make ourselves
								secure against the designs of an insidious oligarchy.

'We must remember also that we have only just recovered in some
								measure from a great plague and
								a great war, and are beginning to make up our losses in men and
								money. It is our duty to expend our new resources upon ourselves at
								home, and not upon begging exiles who have an interest in successful
								lies; who find it expedient only to contribute words, and let others
								fight their battles; and who, if saved, prove ungrateful; if they
								fail, as they very likely may, only involve their friends in a
								common ruin.

'I dare say there may be some young man here who is delighted at
								holding a command, and the more so
								because he is too young for his post and he regarding only his own
								interest, may recommend you to sail; he may be one who is much
								admired for his stud of horses, and wants to make something out of
								his command which will maintain him in his extravagance. But do not
								you give him the opportunity of indulging his own magnificent tastes
								at the expense of the state. Remember that men of this stamp
								impoverish themselves and defraud the-public. An expedition to
								Sicily is a serious business, and not one which a mere youth can
								plan and carry into execution off-hand.

The youth of whom I am speaking has summoned to his side young men
								like himself, whom, not without alarm, I see sitting by him in this
								assembly, and I appeal against them to you elder citizens. If any of
								you should be placed next one of his supporters, I would not have
								him ashamed, or afraid, of being thought a coward if
								he does not vote for war. Do not, like them, entertain a
								desperate craving for things out of your reach; you know that by
								provision many successes are gained, but few or none by mere greed.
								On behalf of our country, now on the brink of the greatest danger
								which she has ever known, I entreat you to hold up your hands
								against them. Do not interfere with the boundaries which divide us
								from Sicily; I mean the Ionian gulf which parts us if we sail along
								the coast, the Sicilian sea if we sail through the open water; these
								are quite satisfactory. The Sicilians have their own country;

let them manage their own concerns. And let the Egestaeans in
								particular be informed that, having originally gone to war with the
								Selinuntians on their own account, they must make peace on their own
								account. Let us have no more allies such as ours have too often
								been, whom we are expected to assist when they are in misfortune,
								but to whom we ourselves when in need may look in vain.

'And you, Prytanis, as you wish to be a good citizen, and believe
								that the welfare of the state 
								is entrusted to you, put my proposal to the vote, and lay the
								question once more before the Athenians. If you hesitate, remember
								that in the presence of so many witnesses there can be no question
								of breaking the law, and that you will be the physician of the state
								at the critical moment. The first duty of the good magistrate is to
								do the very best which he can for his country, or, at least, to do
								her no harm which he can avoid.'

Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians who came forward
								to speak were in favour of war, and reluctant to rescind the vote
								which had been already passed, although a few took the other side.

The most enthusiastic supporter of the expedition was Alcibiades the
								son of 
							 
							 Cleinias; he was determined to oppose Nicias, who was always his
								political enemy and had just now spoken of
								him in disparaging terms; but the desire to command was even a
								stronger motive with him. He was hoping that he might be the
								conqueror of Sicily and Carthage;

and that success would repair his private fortunes, and gain him
								money as well as glory. He had a great position among the citizens
								and was devoted to horse-racing and other pleasures which outran his
								means. And in the end his wild courses went far to ruin the Athenian
								state.

For the people feared the extremes to which he carried the
								lawlessness of his personal habits, and the far-reaching purposes
								which invariably animated him in all his actions. They thought that
								he was aiming at a tyranny and set themselves against him. And
								therefore, although his talents as a military commander were
								unrivalled, they entrusted the administration of the war to others,
								because they personally objected to his private habits;

and so they speedily shipwrecked the state. He now came forward and
								spoke as follows:—

'I have a better right to command, men of Athens, than another; for
								as Nicias has attacked me, I
								must begin by praising myself; and I consider that I am worthy.
								Those doings of mine for which I am SO much cried out against are an
								honour to myself and to my ancestors, and a solid advantage to my
								country.

In consequence of the distinguished manner in which I represented the
								state at Olympia, the other Hellenes formed an idea of our power
								which even exceeded the reality, although they had
								previously imagined that we were exhausted by war. I sent into the
								lists seven chariots,— no other private man ever did the like; I was
								victor, and also won the second and fourth prize; and I ordered
								everything in a style worthy of my victory. Apart from the
								conventional honour paid to such successes, the energy which is
								shown by them creates an impression of power.

At home, again, whenever I gain distinction by providing choruses or
								by the performance of some other public duty, although the citizens
								are naturally jealous of me, to strangers these acts of munificence
								are a new argument of our strength. There is some use in the folly
								of a man who at his own cost benefits not only himself, but the
								state. And where is the injustice, if I or any one who feels his own
								superiority to another refuses to be on a level with him?

The unfortunate keep their misfortunes to themselves. We do not
								expect to be recognized by our acquaintance when we are down in the
								world; and on the same principle why should any one complain when
								treated with disdain by the more fortunate? He who would have proper
								respect shown to him should himself show it towards others.

I know that men of this lofty spirit, and all who have been in any
								way illustrious, are hated while they are alive, by their equals
								especially, and in a lesser degree by others who have to do with
								them; but that they leave behind them to after-ages a reputation
								which leads even those who are not of their family to claim kindred
								with them, and that they are the glory of their country, which
								regards them, not as aliens or as evil-doers, but as her own
								children, of whose character she is proud. These are my own
								aspirations, and this is the reason why my private life is assailed;

but let me ask you, whether in the management of public affairs any
								man surpasses me. Did I not, without involving you in any great
								danger or expense, combine the most powerful states of Peloponnesus
								against the Lacedaemonians, whom I compelled to stake at Mantinea
								all that they had upon the fortune of one day? And
								even to this hour, although they were victorious in the battle, they
								have hardly recovered courage.

'These were the achievements of my youth, and of what is supposed to
								be my monstrous folly; 
								thus did I by winning words conciliate the Peloponnesian powers, and
								my heartiness made them believe in me and follow me. And now do not
								be afraid 
								of me because I am young, but while I am in the flower of my days
								and Nicias enjoys the reputation of success, use the services of us
								both.

Having determined to sail, do not change your minds under the
								impression that Sicily is a great power. For although the Sicilian
								cities are populous, their inhabitants are a mixed multitude, and
								they readily give up old forms of government and receive new ones
								from without.

No one really feels that he has a city of his own; and so the
								individual is ill provided with arms, and the country has no regular
								means of defence. A man looks only to what he can win from the
								common stock by arts of speech or by party violence; hoping, if he
								is overthrown, at any rate to carry off his prize and enjoy it
								elsewhere.

They are a motley crew, who are never of one mind in counsel, and are
								incapable of any concert in action. Every man is for himself, and
								will readily come over to anyone who makes an attractive offer; the
								more readily if, as report says, they are in a state of internal
								discord.

They boast of their hoplites, but, as has proved to be the case in
								all Hellenic states, the number of them is grossly exaggerated.
								Hellas has been singularly mistaken about her heavy infantry; and
								even in this war it was as much as she could do to collect enough of
								them.

The obstacles then which will meet us in Sicily, judging of them from
								the information which I have received, are not great; indeed, I have
								overrated them, for there will be many barbarians who,
								through fear of the Syracusans, will join us in attacking them .

And at home there is nothing which, viewed rightly, need interfere
								with the expedition. Our forefathers had the same enemies whom we
								are now told that we are leaving behind us, and the Persian besides;
								but their strength lay in the greatness of their navy, and by that
								and that alone they gained their empire.

Never were the Peloponnesians more hopeless of success than at the
								present moment; and let them be ever so confident, they will only
								invade us by land, which they can equally do whether we go to Sicily
								or not. But on the sea they cannot hurt us, for we shall leave
								behind us a navy equal to theirs.

'What reason can we give to ourselves for hesitation? what excuse can
								we make to our allies for denying
								them aid? We have sworn to them, and have no right to argue that
								they never assisted us . In seeking their alliance we did
								not intend that they should come and help us here, but that they
								should harass our enemies in Sicily, and prevent them from coming
								hither.

Like all other imperial powers, we have acquired our dominion by our
								readiness to assist any one, whether Barbarian or Hellene, who may
								have invoked our aid. If we are all to sit and do nothing, or to
								draw distinctions of race when our help is requested, we shall add
								little to our empire, and run a great risk of losing it altogether.

For mankind do not await the attack of a superior power, they
								anticipate it. We cannot cut down an empire as we might a household;
								but having once gained our present position, we must, while keeping
								a firm hold upon some, contrive occasion against others; for if we
								are not rulers we shall be subjects. You cannot afford to regard
								inaction in the same light as others might, unless you
								impose a corresponding restriction on your practice.

Convinced then that we shall be most likely to increase our power
								here if we attack our enemies there, let us sail. We shall humble
								the pride of the Peloponnesians when they see that, scorning the
								delights of repose, we have attacked Sicily. By the help of our
								acquisitions there, we shall probably become masters of all Hellas;
								at any rate we shall injure the Syracusans, and at the same time
								benefit ourselves and our allies.

Whether we succeed and remain, or depart, in either case our navy
								will ensure our safety;

for at sea we shall be more than a match for all Sicily. Nicias must
								not divert you from your purpose by preaching indolence, and by
								trying to set the young against the old; rather in your accustomed
								order, old and young taking counsel together, after the manner of
								your fathers who raised Athens to this height of greatness, strive
								to rise yet higher. Consider that youth and age have no power unless
								united; but that the shallower and the more exact and the middle
								sort of judgment, when duly attempered, are likely to be most
								efficient. The state, if at rest, like everything else will wear
								herself out by internal friction. Every pursuit which requires skill
								will tend to decay, whereas by conflict the city will always be
								gaining fresh experience and learning to defend herself, not in
								theory, but in practice.

My opinion in short is, that a state used to activity will quickly be
								ruined by the change to inaction; and that they of all men enjoy the
								greatest security who are truest to themselves and their
								institutions even when they are not the best.'

Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the
								Egestaeans and certain Leontine 
								exiles who came forward and earnestly entreated assistance,
								reminding the Athenians of the oaths which they had sworn ,
								the people were more than ever resolved upon war.

Nicias, seeing that his old argument would no longer deter them, but
								that he might possibly change their minds if he insisted on the
								magnitude of the force which would be required, came forward again
								and spoke as follows:—

'Men of Athens, as I see that you are thoroughly determined to go to
								war, I accept the decision,
								and will advise you accordingly, trusting that the event will be
								such as we all wish.

The cities which we are about to attack are, I am informed, powerful,
								and independent of one another; they are not inhabited by slaves,
								who would gladly pass out of a harder into an easier condition of
								life; and they are very unlikely to accept our rule in exchange for
								their present liberty . As regards numbers, although
								Sicily is but one island, it contains a great many Hellenic states.

Not including Naxos and Catana (of which the inhabitants, as I hope,
								will be our allies because they are the kinsmen of the Leontines),
								there are seven other cities fully provided with means of warfare
								similar to our own, above all Selinus and Syracuse, the cities
								against which our expedition is particularly directed.

For they have numerous hoplites, archers, and javelin-men, and they
								have many triremes which their large population will enable them to
								man; besides their private wealth, they have the treasures of the
								Selinuntian temples; and the Syracusans receive a tribute which has
								been paid them from time immemorial by certain barbarian tribes.
								Moreover, they have a numerous cavalry, and grow their own corn
								instead of importing it: in the two last respects they have a great
								advantage over us.

'Against such a power more is needed than an insignificant force of
								marines; if we mean to do justice to our design, and not to be kept
								within our lines by the numbers of their cavalry, we
								must embark a multitude of infantry. For what if the Sicilians in
								terror combine against us, and
								we make no friends except the Egestaeans who can furnish us With
								horsemen capable of opposing theirs? To be driven from the island or
								to send for reinforcements, because we were wanting in forethought
								at first, would be disgraceful.

We must take a powerful armament with us from home, in the full
								knowledge that we are going to a distant land, and that the
								expedition will be of a kind
								very different from any which you have hitherto made among your
								subjects against some enemy in this part of the world, yourselves
								the allies of others. Here a friendly country is always near, and
								you can easily obtain supplies. There you will be dependent on a country 
								which is entirely strange to you, and whence during the four winter
								months hardly even a message can be sent hither.

'I say, therefore, that we must take with us a large heavy-armed
								force both of Athenians and of allies, whether
								our own subjects or any Peloponnesians whom we can persuade 
								or attract by pay to
								our service; also plenty of archers and javelin-men to act against
								the enemy's cavalry. Our naval superiority must be overwhelming,
								that we may not only be able to fight, but may have no difficulty in
								bringing in supplies. And there is the food carried from home, such
								as wheat and parched barley, which will have to be conveyed in
								merchant-vessels; we must also have bakers, drafted in a certain
								proportion from each mill, who will receive pay, but will be forced
								to serve, in order that, if we should be detained by a
								calm, the army may not want food; for it is not every city that will
								be able to receive so large a force as ours. We must make our
								preparations as complete as possible, and not be at the mercy of
								others; above all, we must take out with us as much money as we can;
								for as to the supplies of the Egestaeans which are said to be
								awaiting us, we had better assume that they are imaginary.

'Even supposing we leave Athens with a force of our own, not merely
								equal to that of the 
								enemy, but in every way superior, except indeed as regards the
								number of hoplites which they can put into the field, for in that
								respect 'equality is impossible, still it will be no easy task to
								conquer Sicily, or indeed to preserve ourselves.

You ought to consider that we are like men going to found a city in a
								land of strangers and enemies, who on the very day of their
								disembarkation must have command of the country; for if they meet
								with a disaster they will have no friends.

And this is what I fear. We shall have much need of prudence; still
								more of good fortune (and who can guarantee this to mortals?).
								Wherefore I would trust myself and the expedition as little as
								possible to accident, and would not sail until I had taken such
								precautions as will be likely to ensure our safety.

This I conceive to be the course which is the most prudent for the
								whole state, and, for us who are sent upon the expedition, a
								condition of safety. If any one thinks otherwise, to him I resign
								the command'

These were the words of Nicias. He meant either to deter the
								Athenians by bringing home to them the vastness of the
								undertaking, or to provide as far as he could for the security of
								the expedition if he were compelled to proceed.

The result disappointed him. Far from losing their enthusiasm at the
								disagreeable prospect, they were more determined than
								ever; they approved of his advice, and were confident that every
								chance of danger was now removed.

All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder
								among them convinced that they would achieve the conquest of
								Sicily,— at any rate such an armament could suffer no disaster; the
								youth were longing to see with their own eyes the marvels of a
								distant land, and were confident of a safe return; the main body of
								the troops expected to receive present pay, and to conquer a country
								which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future.

The enthusiasm of the majority was so overwhelming that, although
								some disapproved, they were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if
								they voted on the other side, and therefore held their peace.

At last an Athenian came forward and, calling upon Nicias, said that
								they would have no more excuses and delays; he must speak
								out and say what forces the people were to vote him.

He replied, with some unwillingness, that he would prefer to consider
								the matter at leisure with his colleagues, but that, as far as he
								could see at present, they ought to have at least a hundred triremes
								of their own; of these a certain number might be used as
									transports , and they must order more triremes from their
								allies. Of heavy-armed troops they would require in all, including
								Athenians and allies, not less than five thousand, and more if they
								could possibly have them; the rest of the armament must be in
								proportion, and should comprise archers to be procured both at home
								and from Crete, and slingers. These forces, and whatever else seemed
								to be required, the generals would make ready before they started.

Upon this the Athenians at once decreed that the generals should be
								empowered to act as they thought best in
								the interest of the state respecting the numbers of the army and the
									 whole management of the expedition.

Then the preparations began. Lists for service were made up at home
								and orders given to the allies. The city had newly recovered from
								the plague and from the constant pressure of war; a new population
								had grown up; there had been time for the accumulation of money
								during the peace; so that there was abundance of everything at
								command.

While they were in the midst of their preparations, the Hermae or
								square stone figures carved after the ancient Athenian fashion, and
								standing everywhere at the doorways both of temples and private
								houses, in one night had nearly all of them throughout the city
								their faces mutilated.

The offenders were not known, but great rewards were publicly offered
								for their detection, and a decree was passed that any one, whether
								citizen, stranger, or slave, might without fear of punishment
								disclose this or any other profanation of which he was cognisant.

The Athenians took the matter greatly to heart— it seemed to them
								ominous of the fate of the expedition; and they ascribed it to
								conspirators who wanted to effect a revolution and to overthrow the
								democracy.

Certain metics and servants gave information, not indeed about the
								Hermae, but about the mutilation of
								other statues which had shortly before been perpetrated by some
								young men in a drunken frolic: they also said that the mysteries
								were repeatedly profaned by the celebration of them in private
								houses, and of this impiety they accused, among others, Alcibiades.

A party who were jealous of his influence over the people, which
								interfered with the permanent establishment of their own, thinking
								that if they could get rid of him they would be supreme , took up and exaggerated the
								charges against him, clamorously insisting that both the mutilation
								of the Hermae and the profanation of the mysteries were part of a
								conspiracy against the democracy, and that he was at the bottom of
								the whole affair. In proof they alleged the excesses of his ordinary
								life, which were unbecoming in the citizen of a free state.

He, strove then and there to clear himself of the charges, and also
								offered to be tried before he
								sailed (for all was now ready), in order that, if he were guilty, he
								might be punished, and if acquitted, might retain his command. He
								adjured his countrymen to listen to no calumnies which might be
								propagated against him in his absence;

and he protested that they would be wiser in not sending a man who
								had so serious an imputation hanging over him on a command so
								important. But his enemies feared that if the trial took place at
								once he would have the support of the army;

and that the people would be lenient, and would not forget
									that he had induced the Argives and some Mantineans to
								join in the expedition. They therefore exerted themselves to
								postpone the trial. To this end they suborned fresh speakers, who
								proposed that he should sail now and not delay the expedition, but
								should return and stand his trial within a certain number of days.
								Their intention was that he should be recalled and tried when they
								had stirred up a stronger feeling against him, which they could
								better do in his absence. So it was decided that Alcibiades should
								sail.

About the middle of summer the expedition started for Sicily. Orders
								had been previously given to most of the allies,
								to the cornships, the smaller craft, and generally to the vessels in
								attendance on the armament, that they should muster at
								Corcyra, whence the whole fleet was to strike across the Ionian gulf
								to the promontory of Iapygia. Early in the morning of the day
								appointed for their departure, the Athenian forces and such of their
								allies as had already joined them went down to the Piraeus and began
								to man the ships. Almost the entire population of Athens accompanied
								them, citizens and strangers alike. The citizens came to take
								farewell, one of an acquaintance, another of a kinsman, another of a
								son, and as they passed along were full of hope and full of tears;

hope of conquering Sicily, tears because they doubted whether they
								would ever see their friends again, when they thought of the long
								voyage on which they were going away. At the last moment of parting
								the danger was nearer; and terrors which had never occurred to them
								when they were voting the expedition now entered into their souls.
								Nevertheless their spirits revived at the sight of the armament in
								all its strength and of the abundant provision which they had made.
								The strangers and the rest of the multitude came out of curiosity,
								desiring to witness an enterprise of which the greatness exceeded
								belief.

No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been sent out by any
								single Hellenic power, though in mere
								number of ships and hoplites that which sailed to Epidaurus under
								Pericles and afterwards under Hagnon to Potidaea was not inferior. For that
								expedition consisted of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and
								Lesbian triremes, conveying four thousand hoplites all Athenian
								citizens, three hundred cavalry, and a multitude of allied troops.

Still the voyage was short and the equipments were poor, whereas this
								expedition was intended to be long absent, and was thoroughly
								provided both for sea and land service, wherever its presence might
									 be required. On the fleet the greatest pains and
								expense had been lavished by the trierarchs and the state. The
								public treasury gave a drachma a day to each sailor, and furnished empty
								hulls for sixty swiftsailing vessels, and for forty transports
								carrying hoplites.

All these were manned with the best crews which could be obtained.
								The trierarchs, besides the pay given by the state, added somewhat
								more out of their own means to the wages of the upper ranks of
								rowers and of the petty
								officers . The figure-heads and other fittings provided by them were
								of the most costly description. Every one strove to the utmost that
								his own ship might excel both in beauty and swiftness. The infantry
								had been well selected and the lists carefully made up.

There was the keenest rivalry among the soldiers in the matter of
								arms and personal equipment. And while at home the Athenians were
								thus competing with one another in the performance of their several
								duties, to the rest of Hellas the expedition seemed to be a grand
								display of their power and greatness, rather than a preparation for
								war.

If any one had reckoned up the whole expenditure, both of the state
								and of individual soldiers and others, including in the first not
								only what the city had already laid out, but what was entrusted to
								the general, and in the second what either at the time or afterwards
								private persons spent upon their outfit, or the trierarchs upon
								their ships, the provision for the long voyage which every one may
								be supposed to have carried with him over and above his public pay,
								and what soldiers or traders may have taken for purposes of
								exchange, he would have found that altogether an immense sum
								amounting to many talents was withdrawn from the city.

Men were quite amazed at the boldness of the scheme and the
								magnificence of the spectacle, which were everywhere 
								spoken of, no less than at the great disproportion of the force when
								compared with that of the enemy against whom it was intended. Never
								had a greater expedition been sent to a foreign land; never was
								there an enterprise in which the hope of future success seemed to be
								better justified by actual power.

When the ships were manned and everything required for the voyage had
								been placed on board, silence was
								proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, and all with one voice
								before setting sail offered up the customary prayers; these were
								recited, not in each ship separately, but by a single herald, the
								whole fleet accompanying him. On every deck both the officers and
								the marines, mingling wine in bowls, made libations from vessels of
								gold and silver.

The multitude of citizens and other well-wishers who were looking on
								from the land joined in the prayer. The crews raised the paean and,
								when the libations were completed, put to sea. After sailing out for
								some distance in single file, the ships raced with one another as
								far as Aegina; thence they hastened onwards to Corcyra, where the
								allies who formed the rest of the army were assembling.

Meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming in to Syracuse from
								many quarters, but for a long time nobody gave credit to them. At
								length an assembly was held. Even then different opinions were
								expressed, some affirming and others denying that the expedition was
								coming. At last Hermocrates the son of Hermon, believing that he had
								certain information, came forward, and warned the Syracusans in the
								following words:—

'I dare say that, like others, I shall not be believed when I tell
								you that the expedition is really coming; and I am well aware that
								those who are either the authors or reporters of tidings which seem
								incredible not only fail to convince others, but are thought fools
								for their pains. Yet, when the city is in danger, fear
								shall not stop my mouth; for I am convinced in my own mind that I
								have better information than anybody.

The Athenians, wonder as you may, are coming against us with a great
								fleet and army; they profess to be assisting their Egestaean allies
								and to be restoring the Leontines. But the truth is that they covet
								Sicily, and especially our city. They think that, if they can
								conquer us, they will easily conquer the rest.

They will soon be here, and you must consider how with your present
								resources you can make the most successful defence. You should not
								let them take you by surprise because you despise them, or neglect
								the whole matter because you will not believe that they are coming
								at all.

But to him who is not of this unbelieving temper I say:— And do not
								you be dismayed at their audacity and power. They cannot do more
								harm to us than we can do to them; the very greatness of their
								armament may be an advantage to us; it will have a good effect on
								the other Sicilian cities, who will be alarmed, and in their terror
								will be the more ready to assist us. Then, again, if in the end we
								overpower them, or at any rate drive them away baffled, for I have
								not the slightest fear of their accomplishing their purpose, we
								shall have achieved a noble triumph.

And of this I have a good hope. Rarely have great expeditions,
								whether Hellenic or Barbarian, when sent far from home, met with
								success. They are not more numerous than the inhabitants and their
								neighbours, who all combine through fear; and if owing to scarcity
								of supplies in a foreign land they miscarry, although their ruin may
								be chiefly due to themselves, they confer glory on those whom they
								meant to overthrow.

The greatness of these very Athenians was based on the utter and
								unexpected ruin of the Persians , who were always
								supposed to have directed their expedition against
								Athens. And I think that such a destiny may very likely be reserved
								for us.

'Let us take courage then, and put ourselves into a state of defence;
								let us also send envoys to the Sicels, and, while we make
								sure of our old allies, endeavour to gain new ones. We will despatch
								envoys to the rest of Sicily, and point out that the danger is
								common to all; we will also send to the Italian cities in the hope
								that they may either join us, or at any rate refuse to receive the
								Athenians.

And I think that we should send to the Carthaginians; the idea of an
								Athenian attack is no novelty to them; they are always living in
								apprehension of it. They will probably feel that if they leave us to
								our fate, the trouble may reach themselves, and therefore they may
								be inclined in some way or other, secretly, if not openly, to assist
								us. If willing to help, of all existing states they are the best
								able; for they have abundance of gold and silver, and these make
								war, like other things, go smoothly. Let us also send to the
								Lacedaemonians and Corinthians and entreat them to come to our aid
								speedily, and at the same time to revive the war in Hellas.

I have a plan which in my judgment is the best suited to the present
								emergency, although it is the last which you in your habitual
								indolence will readily embrace .

Let me tell you what it is. If all the Sicilian Greeks, or at least
								if we and as many as will join us, taking two months' provisions,
								would put out to sea with all our available ships and prepare to
								meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia,
								thereby proving to them that before they fight for Sicily they must
								fight for the passage of the Ionian Sea, we should
								strike a panic into them. They would then reflect that at Tarentum
								(which receives us), we, the advanced guard of Sicily, are among
								friends, and go forth from a friendly country, and that the sea is a
								large place not easy to traverse with so great an armament as
								theirs. They would know that after a long voyage their ships will be
								unable to keep in line, and coming up slowly and few at a time will
								be at our mercy. On the other hand, if they lighten their vessels
								and meet us in a compact body with the swifter part of their fleet,
								they may have to use oars, and then we shall attack them when they
								are exhausted.

Or if we prefer not to fight, we can retire again to Tarentum. Having
								come over with slender supplies and prepared for a naval engagement,
								they will not know what to do on these desolate coasts. If they
								remain they will find themselves blockaded; if they attempt to sail
								onwards they will cut themselves off from the rest of their
								armament, and will be discouraged; for they will be far from certain
								whether the cities of Italy and Sicily will receive them.

In my opinion the anticipation of these difficulties will hamper them
								to such a degree, that they will never leave Corcyra. While they are
								holding consultations, and sending out spies to discover our number
								and exact position, they will find themselves driven into winter; or
								in dismay at the unexpected opposition, they may very likely break
								up the expedition; especially if, as I am informed, the most
								experienced of their generals has taken the command against his
								will, and would gladly make any considerable demonstration on our
								part an excuse for retreating. I am quite sure that rumour will
								exaggerate our strength.

The minds of men are apt to be swayed by what they hear; and they are
								most afraid of those who commence an attack, or who at any rate show
								to the aggressor betimes that he will meet with resistance; for then
								they reflect that the risk is equally divided. And so it will be
								with the Athenians.

They are now attacking us because they do not believe that we shall
								defend ourselves, and in this opinion they are
								justified by our neglect to join with the Lacedaemonians in putting
								them down. But, if they see that they were mistaken, and that we
								boldly venture , they will be more dismayed at our
								unexpected resistance than at our real power.

Take my advice; if possible, resolve on this bold step, but if not,
								adopt other measures of defence as quickly as possible. Remember
								each and all of you that the true contempt of an invader is shown by
								deeds of valour in the field, and that meanwhile the greatest
								service which you can render to the state is to act as if you were
								in the presence of danger, considering that safety depends on
								anxious preparation . The Athenians are coming; I am
								certain that they are already on the sea and will soon be here.'

Thus spoke Hermocrates. Great was the contention which his words
								aroused among the Syracusan people, some asserting that 
								the Athenians would never come, and that he was not speaking truth,
								others asking, 'And if they should come, what harm could they do to
								us nearly so great as we could do to them?' while others were quite
								contemptuous, and made a jest of the whole matter. A few only
								believed Hermocrates and realized the danger.

At last Athenagoras, the popular leader, who had at that time the
								greatest influence with the multitude, came forward and spoke as
								follows:—

'He is either a coward or a traitor who would not rejoice to hear
								that the Athenians are so mad as to come hither and deliver
								themselves into our hands. The audacity of the people who are
								spreading these alarms does not surprise me, but I do wonder at
								their folly if they cannot see that their motives are transparent.

Having private reasons for being afraid, they want to
								strike terror into the whole city that
								they may hide 
									themselves under the shadow of the
								common fear. And now, what is the meaning of these rumours? They do
								not grow of themselves; they have been got up by persons who are the
								troublers of our state.

And you, if you are wise, will not measure probabilities by their
								reports, but by what we may assume to be the intentions of shrewd
								and experienced men such as I conceive the Athenians to be. They are
								not likely to leave behind them a power such as Peloponnesus.

The war which they have already on their hands is far from settled,
								and will they go out of their way to bring upon themselves another
								as great? In my opinion they are only too glad that we are not
								attacking them, considering the number and power of our states.

'Even if the rumour of their coming should turn out to be true, I am
								sure that Sicily is more fit than Peloponnesus to
								maintain a great war. The whole island is better supplied in every
								way, and our own city is herself far more than a match for the army
								which is said to be threatening us; aye, and for another as great. I
								know that they will not bring cavalry with them, and will find none
								here, except the few horsemen which they may procure from Egesta.
								They cannot provide a force of hoplites equal to ours , for they have to cross the sea; and to come
								all this distance, if only with ships and with no troops or lading,
								would be work enough I know too that an armament which is
								directed against so great a city as ours will require 
								immense supplies .

Nay, I venture to assert that if they came hither, having at their
								command another city close upon our border as large as Syracuse, and
								could there settle and carry on war against us from thence, they
								would still be destroyed to a man; how much more when the whole
								country will be their enemy (for Sicily will unite), and when they
								must pitch their camp the moment they are out of their ships, and
								will have nothing but their wretched huts and meagre supplies, being
								prevented by our cavalry from advancing far beyond their lines?
								Indeed I hardly think that they will effect a landing at all. So far
								superior, in my judgment, are our forces to theirs.

'The Athenians, I repeat, know all that I am telling you, and do not
								mean to throw away of that.
								But some of our people are fabricating reports which neither are,
								nor are ever likely to be, true.

I know, and have always known, that by words like these, and yet more
								mischievous, if not by acts, they want to intimidate you, the
								Syracusan people and make themselves chiefs of the state. And I am
								afraid that if they persevere they will succeed at last, and that we
								shall be delivered into their hands before we have had the sense to
								take precautions or to detect and punish them.

This is the reason why our city is always in a state of unrest and
								disorganisation, fighting against herself quite as much as against
								foreign enemies, and from time to time subjected to tyrants and to
								narrow and wicked oligarchies. If the people will only support me I
								shall endeavour to prevent any such misfortunes happening in our
								day.

With you I shall use persuasion, but to these conspirators I shall
								apply force; and I shall not wait until they are detected in the act
								(for who can catch them?), but I shall punish their intentions and the mischief which they would do if they could.
								For the thoughts of our enemies must be punished before they have
								ripened into deeds. If a man does not strike first, he will be the
								first struck. As to the rest 
								of the oligarchical party, I must expose them and have an eye on
								their designs; I must also instruct them; that, I think, will be the
								way by which I can best deter them from their evil courses.

Come now, young men, and answer me a question which I have often
								asked myself. What can you want? To hold
								office already? But the law forbids. And the law was not intended to
								slight you had you been capable; it was passed because you were
								incapable. And so you would rather not be on an equality with the
								many? But when there is no real difference between men, why should
								there be a privileged class?

'I shall be told that democracy is neither a wise nor a just thing,
								and that those who have the money are most
								likely to govern well. To which I answer, first of all, that the
								people is the name of the whole, the oligarchy of a part; secondly,
								that the rich are the best guardians of the public purse, the wise
								the best counsellors, and the many, when they have heard a matter
								discussed, the best judges ;

and that each and all of these classes have in a democracy equal
								privileges. Whereas an oligarchy, while giving the people the full
								share of danger, not merely takes too much of the good things, but
								absolutely monopolises them. And this is what the powerful among you
								and the young would like to have, and what in a great city they will
								never obtain.

' O most senseless of men, for such you are indeed if you do not see
								the mischief of your own schemes; never in all my experience have I
								known such blindness among Hellenes, or such
								wickedness if you have your eyes open to what you are doing. Yet
								even now learn if you are stupid, repent if
								you are guilty; and let your aim be the welfare of the whole
								country. Remember that the good among you will have an equal or
								larger share in the government of it than the people ;

while if you want more you will most likely lose all. Away with these
								reports; we know all about them, and are determined to suppress
								them. Let the Athenians come, and Syracuse will repel her enemies in
								a manner worthy of herself; we have generals who will look to the
								matter. But if, as I believe, none of your tales are true, the state
								is not going to be deceived, and will not in a moment of panic admit
								you to power, or impose upon her own neck the yoke of slavery. She
								will take the matter into her own hands, and when she gives judgment
								will reckon words to be equally criminal with actions. She will not
								be-talked out of her liberty by you, but will do her utmost to
								preserve it; she will be on her guard, and will put you down with a
								strong hand.'

Thus spoke Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals rose, and
								suffering no one else to come forward,
								closed the discussion himself in the following words:—

'There is little wisdom in exchanging abuse or in sitting by and
								listening to it; let us rather, in view of the reported danger, see
								how the whole city and every man in it may take measures for
								resisting the invaders worthily.

Why should not the city be richly furnished with arms, horses, and
								all the pride and pomp of war; where is the harm even if they should
								not be wanted?

We, who are generals, will take in hand all these matters and examine
								into them ourselves; and we will send messengers to
								the neighboring cities in order to obtain information, and for any
								other purpose which may be necessary. Some precautions we have taken
								already, and whatever comes to our notice we will communicate to
								you.' When the general had thus spoken, the assembly dispersed.

The Athenians and their allies were by this time gathered at Corcyra.
								There the generals began by holding a final review of the ships,
								and disposed them in the order in which they were to anchor at their
								stations. The fleet was divided into three squadrons, and one of
								them assigned by lot to each of the three generals, in order to
								avoid any difficulties which might occur, if they sailed together,
								in finding water, anchorage, and provisions where they touched; they
								also thought that the presence of a general with each division would
								promote good order and discipline throughout the fleet.

They then sent before them to Italy and Sicily three ships, which had
								orders to find out what cities in those regions would receive them,
								and to meet them again on their way, that they might know before
								they put in.

At length the great armament proceeded to cross from Corcyra to
								Sicily. It consisted of a 
								hundred and thirty-four triremes in all, besides two Rhodian vessels
								of fifty oars. Of these a hundred were Athenian; sixty being swift
								vessels, and the remaining forty transports: the rest of the fleet
								was furnished by the Chians and other allies. The hoplites numbered
								in all five thousand one hundred, of whom fifteen hundred were
								Athenians taken from the roll, and seven hundred who served as
								marines were of the fourth and lowest class of Athenian citizens.
								The remainder of the hoplites were furnished by the allies, mostly
								by the subject states; but five hundred came from
								Argos, besides two hundred and fifty Mantinean and other
								mercenaries. The archers were in all four hundred and eighty, of
								whom eighty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers,
								a hundred and twenty light-armed Megarians who were exiles ;
								and one horse transport which conveyed thirty horsemen and horses.

Such were the forces with which the first expedition crossed the sea.
								For the transport of provisions thirty
								merchant-ships, which also conveyed bakers, masons, carpenters, and
								tools such as are required in sieges, were included in the armament.
								It was likewise attended by a hundred small vessels; these, as well
								as the merchant-vessels, were pressed into the service. Other
								merchant-vessels and lesser craft in great numbers followed of their
								own accord for purposes of trade. The whole fleet now struck across
								the Ionian sea from Corcyra.

They arrived at the promontory of Iapygia and at Tarentum, each ship
								taking its own course, and passed along the coast of Italy. The
								Italian cities did not admit them within their walls, or open a
								market to them, but allowed them water and anchorage; Tarentum and
								Locri refused even these. At length they reached Rhegium, the
								extreme point of Italy, where the fleet reunited.

As they were not received within the walls they encamped outside the
								city at the temple of Artemis; there they were provided by the
								inhabitants with a market, and drawing up their ships on shore they
								took a rest. They held a conference with the Rhegians, and pressed
								them, being Chalcidians themselves, to aid their Chalcidian kinsmen
								the Leontines. But the Rhegians replied that they would be neutral,
								and would only act in accordance with the decision of all the Italian Greeks.

The Athenian commanders now began to consider how they could best
								commence operations in Sicily. Meanwhile they were expecting the
								ships which had gone on and were to meet them from Egesta; for they
								wanted to know whether the Egestaeans really had the money of which
								the messengers had brought information to Athens.

From many quarters the news began to reach the Syracusans that the
								Athenian fleet was at Rhegium, and the report was
								confirmed by their spies. They now no longer doubted, but fell to
								work heart and soul. To some of the Sicel towns they sent troops, to
								others envoys; they also garrisoned the forts in the territory of
								Syracuse, and within the city itself inspected the horses' and arms,
								and saw that they were in good condition. In short, they made every
								preparation, as for a war which was rapidly approaching, and almost
								at their gates.

The three ships which had gone forward to Egesta now returned to the
								Athenians at Rhegium; they reported that of the money which
								had been promised thirty talents only were forthcoming and no more.

The spirits of the generals fell at once on receiving this their
								first discouragement. They were also disappointed at the
								unfavourable answer of the Rhegians, whom they had asked first, and
								who might naturally have been expected to join them because they
								were kinsmen of the Leontines, and had always hitherto been in the
								Athenian interest. Nicias had expected that the Egestaeans would
								fail them ;

to the two others their behaviour appeared even more incomprehensible
								than the defection of the Rhegians. The fact was that when the
								original envoys came from Athens to inspect the treasure, the
								Egestaeans had practised a trick upon them. They 
								brought them to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx, and showed them the
								offerings deposited there, consisting of bowls, flagons, censers,
								and a good deal of other plate. Most of the vessels were only of
								silver, and therefore they made a show quite out of proportion to
								their value, They also gave private entertainments to the crews of
								the trirenes:

on each of these occasions they produced, as their own,
								drinking-vessels of gold and silver not only collected in Egesta
								itself, but borrowed from the neighbouring towns, Phoenician as well
								as Hellenic. All of them exhibiting much the same vessels and making
								everywhere a great display, the sailors were amazed, and on their
								arrival at Athens told every one what heaps of wealth they had seen.

When the news spread that the Egestaeans had not got the money, great
								was the unpopularity incurred throughout the army by these men, who
								having been first imposed upon themselves had been instrumental in
								imposing upon others.

The generals now held a council of war. Nicias was of opinion that
								they should sail with the whole fleet against Selinus, which was
								their main errand: if the Egestaeans provided pay for all their
								forces, they would shape their course accordingly; if not, they
								would demand maintenance for sixty ships, the number which the
								Egestaeans had requested and remain on the spot
								until they had brought the Selinuntians to terms either by force or
								by negotiation. They would then pass along the coast before the eyes
								of the other cities and display the visible power of Athens, while
								they proved at the same time her zeal in the cause of her friends
								and allies; after this they would return home, unless a speedy way
								of relieving the Leontines or obtaining support from some of the
								other cities should unexpectedly present itself. But
								they should not throw away their own resources and imperil the
								safety of Athens.

Alcibiades urged that it would be a disgrace to have gone forth with
								so great an armament and to return without achieving
								anything. They should send envoys to every city of Sicily, with the
								exception of Selinus and Syracuse; they should also negotiate with
								the Sicels, making friends of the independent tribes, and persuading
								the rest to revolt from the Syracusans. They would thus obtain
								supplies and reinforcements. They should first appeal to the
								Messenians, whose city being on the highway of traffic was the key
								of Sicily, and possessed a harbour from which the Athenian forces
								could most conveniently watch the enemy. Finally, when they had
								brought the cities over to them and knew who would be on their side
								in the war, they should attack Selinus and Syracuse, unless the
								Selinuntians would come to terms with the Egestaeans, and the
								Syracusans would permit the restoration of the Leontines.

Lamachus was of opinion that they ought to sail direct to Syracuse,
								and fight as soon as possible under the walls of the city,
								while the inhabitants were unprepared and the consternation was at
								its height. He argued that all armies are most terrible at first;

if the appearance of them is long delayed the spirits of men revive,
								and, when they actually come, the sight of them only awakens
									contempt . If the Athenians could strike suddenly,
								while their opponents were still in fear and suspense, that would be
								the best chance of victory. Not only the sight of the armament which
								would never seem so numerous again, but the near approach of
								suffering, and above all the immediate peril of battle, would create
								.a panic among the enemy. Many of the Syracusans would
								probably be cut off in the country, not believing in the approach of
								an invader;

and while the villagers were trying to convey their property into the
								city, their own army, which would be encamped close under the walls,
								would be masters of the field and could have no lack of provisions.

In the end, the other Sicilian Greeks, instead of joining the
								Syracusan alliance, would come over to them, and would no longer
								hesitate and look about them to see which side would conquer. He was
								also of opinion that they should make Megara their naval
									station, the fleet returning thither from Syracuse and
								anchoring in the harbour The place was deserted, and was not far
								distant from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

Lamachus having thus spoken nevertheless gave his own voice for the
								proposal of Alciblades. Whereupon Alcibiades
								sailed across in his admiral's ship to Messenè and proposed an
								alliance to-the inhabitants. He failed to convince them, for they
								refused to receive the Athenians into the city, although they
								offered to open a market for them outside the walls. So he sailed
								back to Rhegium.

The generals at once manned sixty ships, selecting the crews
								indifferently out of the entire fleet, and taking the necessary
								provisions coasted along to Naxos; they left the rest of the
								armament and one of themselves at Rhegium.

The Naxians received them into their city, and they sailed on to
								Catana; but the Catanaeans, having a Syracusan party within their
								walls, denied admission to them;

so they moved to the river Terias and there encamped. On the
								following day they went on to Syracuse in long file with all their
								ships, except ten, which they had sent forward to sail into the
								Great Harbour and see whether there was any fleet
								launched. On their approaching the city a herald was to proclaim
								from the decks that the Athenians had come to restore their allies
								and kinsmen the Leontines to their homes, and that therefore any
								Leontines who were in Syracuse should regard the Athenians as their
								friends and benefactors, and join them without fear.

When the proclamation had been made, and the fleet had taken a survey
								of the city, and harbours, and of the ground which was to be the
								scene of operations, they sailed back to Catana.

The Catanaeans now held an assembly and, although they still refused
								to receive the army, they
								told the generals to come in and say what they had to say. While
								Alciblades was speaking and the people of the city had their
								attention occupied with the assembly, the soldiers broke down
								unobserved a postern gate which had been badly walled up, and
								finding their way into the town began to walk about in the
								market-place.

Those of the Catanaeans who were in the Syracusan interest, when they
								saw that the enemy had entered, took alarm and stole away. They were
								not numerous, and the other Catanaeans voted the alliance with the
								Athenians, and told them to bring up the rest of their armament from
								Rhegium.

The Athenians then sailed back to Rhegium, and with their entire
								force moved to Catana, where on their arrival they began to
								establish their camp.

But meanwhile news came from Camarina that if they would go thither
								the Camarinaeans would join them. They also heard that the
								Syracusans were manning a navy. So they sailed with their whole
								force first to Syracuse, but they found that there was no fleet in
								preparation; they then passed on to Camarina, and putting in to the
								open beach they sent a herald to the city. The citizens would not
								receive them, declaring that their oath bound them not to receive the Athenians if
								they came with more than one ship, unless they themselves sent for a
								greater number.

So they sailed away without effecting their purpose. They then
								disembarked on a part of the Syracusan territory, which they
								ravaged. But a few Syracusan horse coming up killed some of their
								light-armed troops who were straggling. They then returned to
								Catana.

There they found that the vessel Salaminia had come from Athens to
								fetch Alcibiades, who had been put upon his trial by
								the state and was ordered home to defend himself. With him were
								summoned certain of the soldiers, who were accused at the same time,
								some of profaning the mysteries, others of mutilation of the Hermae.

For after the departure of the expedition the Athenians prosecuted
								both enquiries as keenly as ever. They did not investigate the
								character of the informers, but in their suspicious mood listened to
								all manner of statements, and seized and imprisoned some of the most
								respectable citizens on the evidence of wretches; they thought it
								better to sift the matter and discover the truth; and they would not
								allow even a man of good character, against whom an accusation was
								brought, to escape without a thorough investigation, merely because
								the informer was a rogue.

For the people who had heard by tradition that the tyranny of
								Pisistratus and his sons ended in great oppression, and knew
								moreover that their power was overthrown, not by Harmodius or any
								efforts of their own, but by the Lacedaemonians were in a
								state of incessant fear and suspicion.

Now the attempt of Aristogiton and Harmodius arose out of a love
								affair, which I will narrate at length;

and the narrative will show that the Athenians themselves give quite
								an inaccurate account of their own tyrants, and of the
								incident in question, and know no more than other Hellenes 
								Pisistratus died at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, and then,
								not, as is the common opinion, Hipparchus, but
								Hippias(who was the eldest of his sons) succeeded to his power.—
								Harmodius was in the flower of youth, and Aristogiton, a citizen of the
								middle class, became his lover.

Hipparchus made an attempt to gain the affections of Harmodius, but
								he would not listen to him, and told Aristogiton. The latter was
								naturally tormented at the idea, and fearing that Hipparchus who was
								powerful would resort to violence, at once formed such a plot as a
								man in his station might for the overthrow of the tyranny.

Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt; he had no better success,
								and thereupon he determined, not indeed to take any violent step,
								but to insult Harmodius in some secret place , so that his motive could not
								be suspected.

To use violence would have been at variance with the general
								character of his rule, which was not unpopular or oppressive to the
								many; in fact no tyrants ever displayed greater merit or capacity
								than these. Although the tax on the produce of the soil which they
								exacted amounted only to five per cent., they improved and adorned
								the city, and carried on successful wars; they were also in the
								habit of sacrificing in the temples.

The city meanwhile was permitted to retain her ancient laws; but the
								family of Pisistratus took care that one of their own number should
								always be in office. Among others who thus held the annual
								archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, a son of the tyrant Hippias.
								He was named after his grandfather Pisistratus, and 
								during his term of office he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods
								in the Agora, and another altar in the temple of the Pythian Apollo.

The Athenian people afterwards added to one side of the altar in the
								Agora and so concealed the inscription upon it; but the other
								inscription on the altar of the Pythian Apollo may still be seen,
								although the letters are nearly effaced. It runs as follows:— Pisistratus the son of Hippias dedicated this
									memorial of his archonship in the sacred precinct of the Pythian
									Apollo.

That Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus and succeeded to his
								power I can positively affirm from special information which
								has been transmitted to me. But there is other evidence. Of the
								legitimate sons of Pisistratus he alone had children; this is
								indicated by the altar just mentioned, and by the column which the
								Athenians set up in the Acropolis to commemorate the oppression of
								the tyrants. For on that column no son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus
								is named, but five of Hippias who were born to him of Myrrhine the
								daughter of Callias the son of Hyperechides; now there is a
								presumption that the son who married first would be the eldest.

Moreover, his name is inscribed a on the same column immediately after his father's; this again is a
								presumption that he was his eldest son and succeeded him.

I think too that Hippias would have found a difficulty in seizing the
								tyranny if Hipparchus had been tyrant at the time of his death and
								he had tried to step into his place. As it was, owing to the
								habitual dread which he had inspired in the citizens, and the strict
								discipline which he maintained among his body-guard, he held the
								government with the most perfect security and without
								the least difficulty. Nor did he behave at all like a younger
								brother, who would not have known what to do because he had not been
								regularly used to command .

Yet Hipparchus by reason of his violent end became famous, and
								obtained in after ages the reputation of having been the tyrant.

When Hipparchus found his advances repelled by Harmodius he carried
								out his intention of insulting him. There was a
								young sister of his whom Hipparchus and his friends first invited to
								come and carry a sacred basket in a procession, and then rejected
								her, declaring that she had never been invited by them at all
								because she was unworthy.

At this Harmodius was very angry, and Aristogiton, for his sake, more
								angry still. They and the other conspirators had already laid their
								preparations, but were waiting for the festival of the great
								Panathenaea, when the citizens who took part in the procession
								assembled in arms; for to do so on any other day would have aroused
								suspicion. Harmodius and Aristogiton were to begin the attack, and
								the rest were immediately to join in, and engage with the guards.

The plot had been communicated to a few only, the better to avoid
								detection; but they hoped that, however few struck the blow, the
								crowd who would be armed, although not in the secret, would at once
								rise and assist in the recovery of their own liberties,

The day of the festival arrived, and Hippias went out of the city to
								the place called the Ceramicus,
								where he was occupied with his guards in marshalling the procession.
								HarmodiusandAristogiton, who were ready with their daggers, stepped
								forward to do the deed.

But seeing one of the conspirators in familiar conversation with Hippias, who was readily accessible to all, they
								took alarm, and imagined that they had been betrayed and were on the
								point of being seized.

Whereupon they determined to take their revenge first on the man who
								had outraged them and was the cause of their desperate attempt. So
								they rushed, just as they were, within the gates. They found
								Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as it was called, and then and there
								falling upon him with all the blind fury, one of an injured lover,
								the other of a man smarting under an insult, they smote and slew
								him.

The crowd ran together, and so Aristogiton for the present escaped
								the guards; but he was afterwards taken and not very gently handled.
								Harmodius perished on the spot.

The news was carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus; he went at once,
								not to the place, but to 
								the armed men who were to march in the procession and, being at a
								distance, were as yet ignorant of what had hapopened. Betraying
								nothing in his looks of the calamity which had befallen him, he bade
								them leave their arms and go to a certain spot which he pointed out.

They, supposing that he had something to say to them, obeyed, and
								then bidding his guards seize the arms, he at once selected those
								whom he thought guilty, and all who were found carrying daggers; for
								the custom was to march in the procession with spear and shield
								only.

Such was the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton, which began in
								the resentment of a 
								lover; the reckless attempt which followed arose out of a sudden
								fright.

To the people at large the tyranny simply became more oppressive, and
								Hippias, after his brother's death living in great fear, slew many
								of the citizens; he also began to look abroad in hope of securing an
								asylum should a revolution occur.

Himself an Athenian, he married his daughter Archedicè to a
								Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of Hippoclus the tyrant of
								Lampsacus; for he observed that the family of Hippoclus had great
								influence with King Darius. Her tomb is at Lampsacus, and bears this
								inscription:— 
							 
								 'This earth covers Archedicè the daughter of Hippias, 
								 A man who was great among the Hellenes of his day. 
								 Her father, her husband, her brothers, and her sons were tyrants, 
								 Yet was not her mind lifted up to vanity.' 
							 
							 Hippias ruled three years longer over the Athenians.

In the fourth year he was deposed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled
								Alcmaeonidae. He retired under an agreement, first to Sigeum, and
								then to Aeantides at Lampsacus. From him he went to the court of
								Darius, whence returning twenty years later with the Persian army he
								took part in the expedition to Marathon, being then an old man.

The Athenian people, recalling these and other traditions of the
								tyrants which had sunk deep into their minds, were suspicious and savage against
								the supposed profaners of the mysteries; the whole affair
								seemed to them to indicate some conspiracy aiming at oligarchy or
								tyranny.

Inflamed by these suspicions they had already imprisoned many men of
								high character. There was no sign of returning quiet, but day by day
								the movement became more furious and the number of arrests
								increased. At-last one of the prisoners, who was believed to be
								deeply implicated, was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a
								confession— whether true or false I cannot say; opinions are
								divided, and no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the
								offenders were. His companion argued that even if he were not guilty
								he ought to confess and claim a pardon ;

he would thus save his own life, and at the same time deliver Athens
								from the prevailing state of suspicion. His chance of
								escaping would be better if he confessed his guilt in the hope of a
								pardon, than if he denied it and stood his trial.

So he gave evidence both against himself and others in the matter of
								the Hermae. The Athenians were delighted at finding out what they
								supposed to be the truth; they had been in despair at the thought
								that the conspirators against the democracy would never be known,
								and they immediately liberated the informer and all whom he had not
								denounced. The accused they brought to trial, and executed such of
								them as could be found. Those who had fled they condemned to death,
								and promised a reward to any one who would kill them.

No one could say whether the sufferers were justly punished; but the
								beneficial effect on the city at the time was undeniable.

The enemies of Alcibiades, who had attacked him before he sailed,
								continued their machinations, and popular feeling was deeply
									stirred against him. The Athenians now
								thought that they knew the truth about the Hermae, and they were
								more than ever convinced that the violation of the mysteries which
								had been laid to his charge was done by him with the same purpose,
								and was a part of the conspiracy.

It so happened that while the city was in this state of excitement a
								small Lacedaemonian force proceeded as far as the Isthmus, having
								something to do in Boeotia. They were supposed to have come, not in
								the interest of the Boeotians, but by a secret understanding with
								Alcibiades; and the Athenians really believed that but for their own
								alacrity in arresting the accused persons the city would have been
								betrayed. For one whole night the people lay in arms in the temple
								of Theseus which is within the walls.

About this time too the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected
								of conspiring against the Argive democracy, and accordingly the Argive hostages who had been deposited in the
									islands were at once given up by the Athenians
								to the vengeance of the Argive people.

From every quarter suspicion had gathered around Alcibiades, and the
								Athenian people were determined to have him tried and executed; so
								they sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily bearing a summons to him and
								to others against whom information had been given.

He was ordered to follow the officers home and defend himself, but
								they were told not to arrest him; the Athenians, having regard to
								their interests in Sicily, were anxious not to cause excitement in
								their own camp or to attract the attention of the enemy, and above
								all not to lose the Mantineans and Argives, whom they knew to have
								been induced by his influence to join in the expedition .

He in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, left Sicily
								in company with the Salaminia, and sailed for Athens.

When they arrived at Thurii they followed no further, but left the
								ship and disappeared, fearing to return and stand their trial when
								the prejudice against them was so violent. The crew of the Salaminia
								searched for them, but after a time, being unable to find them, gave
								up the search and went home. Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed not
								long afterwards in a small vessel from Thurii to Peloponnesus, and
								the Athenians on his non-appearance sentenced him and his companions
								to death.

The two Athenian generals who remained in Sicily now divided the
								fleet between them by lot, and
								sailed towards Selinus and Egesta; Egestaeans would give them the
								promised money, and also to ascertain the condition of the
								Selinuntians and the nature of their quarrel with the Egestaeans.

Sailing along the north coast of Sicily, which looks towards the
								Tyrrhenian Gulf, they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in
								this part of the island. But they were not received,
								and passed on. On their voyage they took Hyccara, a city on the
								sea-shore which, although of Sicanian origin, was hostile to the
									Egestaeans .

They reduced the inhabitants to slavery, and handed the place over to
								the Egestaeans, whose cavalry had now joined them. The Athenian
								troops then marched back through the country of the Sicels until
								they arrived at Catana; the ships which conveyed the prisoners going
								round the coast to meet them.

Nicias had sailed straight from Hyccara to Egesta, where he did his
								business, and having obtained thirty talents of silver,
								rejoined the army at Catana. The Athenians on their return disposed
								of their slaves ; the sum realized by the sale was about a
								hundred and twenty talents .

They next sailed round to their Sicel allies and bade them send
								reinforcements. Then with half of their army they marched against
								Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, which they failed to take. And so
								ended the summer.

Early in the ensuing winter the Athenians made preparations for an
								attack upon Syracuse; the Syracusans likewise prepared to
								take the offensive.

For when they found that their enemies did not assail them at once,
								as in their first panic they had expected, day by day their spirits
								rose. And now the Athenians, after cruising about at the other end
								of Sicily, where they seemed to be a long way off, had gone to
								Hybla, and their attack upon it had failed. So the Syracusans
								despised them more than ever. After the manner of the populace when
								elated, they insisted that since the Athenians would not come to
								them, their generals should lead them against Catana.

Syracusan horsemen, who were always riding up to the Athenian army
								and watching their movements, would ask insultingly whether, instead
								of resettling the Leontines in their old home, they 
								were not themselves going to settle down with their good friends the
								Syracusans in a new one.

The generals were aware of the state of affairs. They determined to
								draw the whole Syracusan 
								army as far as possible out of the city, and then in their absence
								sail thither by night and take up a convenient position unmolested.
								They knew that they would fail of their purpose if they tried to disembark their men in
								the face of an enemy who was prepared to meet them, or if they
								marched openly by land and were discovered, for they had no cavalry
								of their own, and the Syracusan horse which were numerous would do
								great harm to their light-armed troops and the mass of attendants.
								Whereas if they sailed thither by night they would be enabled to
								take up a position in which the cavalry could do them no serious
								mischief.— The exact spot near the temple of Olympian Zeus which
								they afterwards occupied was indicated by Syracusan exiles who
								accompanied them.— Accordingly the generals devised the following
								plan;

they sent to Syracuse a man of whose fidelity they were assured, but
								whom the Syracusan leaders believed to be a friend of theirs. He was
								a Catanaean, and professed to come from adherents of their party
								whose names were familiar to them, and whom they knew to be still
								remaining in Catana .

He told them that the Athenians lay within the city every night away
								from the camp in which their arms were deposited, and if at dawn on
								a set day the Syracusans with their whole force would come and
								attack the troops left in the camp, their partisans in Catana would
									themselves shut the
								Athenians up in the town c and fire their ships; meanwhile the
								Syracusans might assault the palisade, and easily take the
								camp-preparations had been made , and many of the Catanaeans were in the plot; from them he
								came.

The Syracusan generals were already in high spirits, and before this
								proposal reached them had made up their minds to
								have all things in readiness for a march to Catana. So they trusted
								the man the more recklessly, and at once fixed the day on which
								'they would arrive. They then sent him back, and issued orders for
								an expedition to their whole army, including the Selinuntians and
								the rest of the allies; who had now joined them. When they were
								ready and the appointed day drew near they marched towards Catana,
								and encamped by the river Symaethus in the Leontine territory.

The Athenians, aware of the approach of the Syracusans, took all
								their own army-and Sicel or other allies on board their ships and
								smaller craft, and sailed away at nightfall to Syracuse.

At dawn they disembarked opposite the temple of Olympian Zeus,
								intending to seize a place for their camp; almost at the same moment
								the Syracusan horse who had advanced before the rest to Catana
								discovered that the whole Athenian army had put out to sea,
								whereupon they returned and told the infantry: and then all together
								hurried back to protect the city.

The march from Catana to Syracuse was long, and in the meantime the
								Athenians had quietly established themselves in an advantageous position, where they could give
								battle whenever they pleased, and the Syracusan horse were least
								likely to harass them either before or during the engagement. On one
								side they were protected by walls, and houses, and trees, and a
								marsh; on another by a line of cliffs.

They felled the trees near, and bringing them down to the sea made a
								palisade to protect their ships; on the shore of Dascon too they
								hurriedly raised a fortification of rough stones and logs at a point
								where the ground was most accessible to the enemy, and
								broke down the bridge over the river Anapus.

No one came out from the walls to hinder them in their work. The
								first to appear at all were the returning cavalry; after a while the
								whole body of infantry came up and re-formed. They at once marched
								right up to the Athenian position, but the Athenians did not come
								out to meet them; so they retired and encamped on the other side of
								the Helorine road.

On the next day the Athenians and their allies prepared to give
								battle. Their order was as 
								follows:— The Argives and Mantineans formed the right wing, the
								Athenians held the centre; on the left wing were the remaining
								allies. Half of their army which formed the van was ranged eight
								deep. The other half was drawn up likewise eight deep close to their
								sleeping-places, in a hollow oblong. The latter were told to watch
								the engagement, and to move up to the support of any part of the
								line which might be distressed. In the midst of the reserve thus
								disposed were placed the baggage-bearers.

The Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed sixteen deep; the army
								consisted of the whole Syracusan people and their allies, chiefly
								the Selinuntians, who were in the city; they had also two hundred
								horsemen from Gela, and twenty, with about fifty archers, from
								Camarina. The cavalry, numbering in all twelve hundred, were placed
								upon the right wing, and beside them the javelin-men. The Athenians
								determined to begin the attack.

Just before the battle Nicias went up and down, and addressed the
								following words to all and each of the various peoples who composed
								the army:—

'What need, soldiers, is there of a long exhortation when we are all
								here united in the same cause ? The mere sight of
								this great army is more likely to put courage into you than an
								eloquent speech and an inferior force 
 We are Argives and Mantineans, and Athenians and the
								chief of the islanders;

and must not the presence of so
								many brave allies inspire every one of us with a good hope of
								victory, especially when we reflect that our opponents are not like
								ourselves picked soldiers, but a whole city which has turned out to
								meet us? They are Sicilians too, who, although they may despise us,
								will not stand their ground against us;

for their skill is not equal to their courage. Consider again that we
								are far from home, and that there is no friendly land near but what
								you can win with your swords . The generals of the
								enemy, as I know well, are appealing to very different motives. They
								say to them, you are fighting for your own
									country, but I say to you that you are fighting in a country
								which is not your own, and from which, if you do not conquer,
								retreat will be impossible, for swarms of cavalry will follow at
								your heels.

Remember your own reputation, and charge valiantly, deeming the
								difficulties and necessities of your position to be more formidable
								than the enemy.'

Nicias having thus exhorted his men led them at once to the charge.
								The Syracusans did not expect that they would have to
								fight just at that moment, and some of them had even gone away into
								the city, which was close at hand; others came running up as fast as
								they could, and, although late, joined the main body one by one at
								the nearest point. For they showed no want of spirit or daring in
								this or any other engagement; in courage they were not a whit
								inferior to their enemies, had their skill only been adequate, but
								when it failed, they could no longer do justice to their good
								intentions. On this occasion they were compelled to
								make a hasty defence, for they felt sure that the Athenians would
								not begin the attack.

Nevertheless they took up their arms and immediately went forward to
								meet them. For a while the throwers of stones, and slingers, and
								archers skirmished in front of the two armies, driving one another
								before them after the manner of light-armed troops.

Then the soothsayers brought out the customary victims, and the
								trumpets sounded and called the infantry to the charge. The two
								armies advanced; the Syracusans to fight for their country, and
								every man for life now, and liberty hereafter; on the opposite side
								the Athenians to gain a new country, and to save the old from the
								disaster of defeat; the Argives and the independent allies eager to
								share the good things of Sicily, and, if they returned victorious,
								to see their own homes once more. The courage of the subject allies
								was chiefly inspired by a lively consciousness that their only
								chance of life was in victory; they had also a distant hope that, if
								they assisted the Athenians in overthrowing others, their own yoke
								might be lightened.

The armies met, and for a long time the issue was doubtful. During
								the battle there came on thunder
								and lightning, and a deluge of rain; these added to the terror of
								the inexperienced who were fighting for the first time, but
								experienced soldiers ascribed the storm to the time of year, and
								were much more alarmed at the stubborn resistance of the
									enemy . First the Argives drove back the left wing of
								the Syracusans;

next the Athenians the right wing which was opposed to them.
								Whereupon the rest of the army began to give way and were soon put
								to flight.

Their opponents did not pursue them far, for the Syracusan horsemen,
								who were numerous and had not shared in the defeat, interposed, and
								wherever they saw hoplites advancing from the ranks
								attacked and drove them back. The Athenians pursued in a body as far
								as they safely could, and then returned and raised a trophy.

The Syracusans rallied on the Helorine road, and did their best to
								reform after their defeat. They did not neglect to send some of
								their forces as a guard to the Olympieum, fearing lest the Athenians
								should plunder the treasures of the temple. The rest of the army
								returned to the city.

The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple at all, but
								collecting their dead, and laying them on a pyre, they passed the night
								where they were. On the following day they gave back the Syracusan
								dead under a flag of truce, and gathered from the pyre the bones of
								their own dead. There had fallen of the Syracusans and of their
								allies about two hundred and sixty; of the Athenians and their
								allies not more than fifty. The Athenians then taking with them the
								spoils of their enemies, sailed back to Catana.

Winter had now set in, and they thought that before they could do
								anything more at Syracuse they must send for horsemen from Athens,
								and collect others from their Sicilian allies; without them they
								would be at the mercy of the Syracusan cavalry. They also wanted to
								obtain both in Sicily and from Athens a supply of money, and to gain
								over some of the Sicilian cities. These would be more willing to
								listen to them after their victory. They had likewise to provide
								supplies, and to make the other requisite preparations for attacking
								Syracuse in the spring.

Accordingly they sailed away to Naxos and Catana, intending to
								winter. 
							 The Syracusans, after burying their dead, called an assembly.

Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a man of first-rate ability, of
								distinguished bravery, and also of great military experience, came
								forward and encouraged them. He told them not to be disheartened at
								the result of the battle; for their resolution had not
								been defeated ;
								but they had suffered from want of discipline.

Yet they had proved less unequal than might have been expected; and
								they should remember that they had been contending against the most
								experienced soldiers of Hellas; they were unskilled workmen, and the
								Athenians masters in their craft .

Another great source of weakness had been the number of generals
								(there were fifteen of them); the division of authority had produced
								disorganisation and disorder among the troops. If they had a few
								experienced generals, and during the winter got their hoplites into
								order, providing arms for those who had none, and so raising the
								number of their forces to the utmost, while at the same time they
								insisted on strict drill and discipline, they would have a good
								chance of victory; for they had courage already, and only wanted
								steadiness in action. 
							 Both qualities would improve together; they would learn steadiness in
								the school of danger, and their natural courage would be reinforced
								by the confidence which skill inspires.

The generals whom they elected should be few in number and should be
								entrusted with full power, the people taking a solemn oath to them
								that they would be allowed to command according to their own
								judgment. The secrets of the army would then be better kept, and
								everything would be done in a more orderly and straightforward
								manner.

The Syracusans listened to him, and voted all that he desired. They
								chose three generals and no more; Hermocrates himself, Heraclides the son of Lysimachus,
								and Sicanus the son of Execestus.

They also sent ambassadors to Corinth and to Lacedaemon 
								requesting aid as allies, and urged the Lacedaemonians to make war
								openly and decidedly against the Athenians on their behalf; thus
								they would either draw them off from Sicily, or at any rate prevent
								them from sending reinforcements to the army which was there
								already.

No sooner had the Athenians returned in the fleet to Catana than they
								sailed to Messenè, expecting
								that the city would be betrayed to them. But they were disappointed.
								For Alcibiades, when he was recalled and gave up his command,
								foreseeing that he would be an exile, communicated to the Syracusan
								party at Messenè the plot of which he was cognisant . They at once put to death the persons whom
								he indicated; and on the appearance of the Athenians the same party,
								rising and arming, prevented their admission.

The Athenians remained there about thirteen days, but the weather was
								bad, their provisions failed, and they had no success. So they went
								to Naxos, and having surrounded their camp with a palisade, proposed
								to pass the winter there. They also despatched a trireme to Athens
								for money and cavalry, which were to arrive at the beginning of
								spring.

The Syracusans employed the winter in various defensive works. Close
								to the city they built a wall, which took in the shrine of
								Apollo Temenites and extended all along that side of Syracuse which
								looks towards Epipolae; they thus enlarged the area of the city, and
								increased the difficulty of investing it in case of defeat. They
								fortified and garrisoned Megara, and also raised a fort at the
									Olympieum , besides fixing stockades at all the
								landing-places along the shore.

They knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, and so,
								marching out with their whole army to Catana, they 
								ravaged the country and burnt the huts and the camp of the
								Athenians;

they then returned home. They heard that the Athenians were sending
								an embassy to gain over the Camarinaeans on the strength of their
								former alliance, which had been made under Laches ,
								and they despatched a counter embassy of their own. They suspected
								that the Camarinaeans had not been over-zealous in sending their
								contingent to the first battle, and would not be willing to assist
								them any longer now that the Athenians had gained a victory; old
								feelings of friendship would revive, and they would be induced to
								join them.

Accordingly Hermocrates came with an embassy to Camarina, and
								Euphemus with another embassy from the Athenians. An assembly of the
								Camarinaeans was held, at which Hermocrates, hoping to raise a
								prejudice against the Athenians, spoke as follows:—

'We are not here, Camarinaeans, because we suppose that the presence
								of the Athenian army will dismay you; we are more afraid of
								their as yet unuttered words, to which you may too readily lend an
								ear if you hear them without first hearing us.

You know the pretext on which they have come to Sicily, but we can
								all guess their real intentions. If I am not mistaken they want, not
								to restore the Leontines to their city, but to drive us out of ours.
								Who can believe that they who desolate the cities of Hellas mean to
								restore those of Sicily, or that the enslavers and oppressors of the
								Chalcidians in Euboea have any feeling of kindred towards the
								colonists of these Chalcidians in Leontini? In their conquests at
								home, and in their attempt to conquer Sicily, is not the principle
								upon which they act one and the same?

The Ionians and other colonists of theirs who were their allies,
								wanting to be revenged on the Persian, freely invited
								them to be their leaders; and they accepted the invitation. But soon
								they charged them, some with desertion, and some with making war
								upon each other ; any plausible accusation which they
								could bring against any of them became an excuse for their
								overthrow.

It was not for the liberties of Hellas that Athens, or for her own
								liberty that Hellas, fought against the Persian; they fought, the
								Athenians that they might enslave Hellas to themselves instead of
								him, the rest of the Hellenes that they might get a new master, who
								may be cleverer, but certainly makes a more dishonest use of his
								wits.

'However, the character of the Athenians is known to you already, and
								we do not come here to set forth their
								enormities, which would be an easy task, but rather to accuse
								ourselves. We have had a warning in the fate of the Hellenes
								elsewhere; we know that they were reduced to slavery because they
								would not stand by one another, And when the same tricks are
								practised upon us , and we hear the old tale once more about
								the restoration of our kinsmen the
									Leontines, and the succour of our
									allies the Egestaeans, why do we not all rise as one man and
								show them that here they will find, not Ionians, nor yet
								Hellespontians, nor islanders, who must always be the slaves, if not
								of the Persian, of some other master; but Dorians and free inhabitants of Sicily, sprung from
								the independent soil of Peloponnesus?

Are we waiting till our cities are taken one by one, when we know
								that this is the only way in which we can be conquered? We see what
								their policy is: how in some cases their cunning words sow
								ill-feeling; in others they stir up war by the offer of alliance; or
								again, by some well-invented phrase specially 
								agreeable to an individual state they do it all the mischief which
								they can. And does any one suppose that, if his countryman at a
								distance perishes, the danger will not reach him, or that he who
								suffers first will have no companions in ruin?

'If any one fancies that not he, but the Syracusan, is the enemy of
								the Athenian, and asks 
								indignantly Why should I risk myself for
									you? let him consider that in fighting for my country he
								will be at the same time fighting in mine for his own . And he will fight with less danger, because I
								shall still be in existence; he will not carry on the struggle
								alone, for he will have me for an ally . Let
								him consider that the Athenian is not really seeking to chastise the
								enmity of the Syracusan, but under pretence of attacking me may be
								quite as desirous of drawing hard and fast the bonds of friendship
								with him.

And if any one from envy, or possibly from fear (for greatness is
								exposed to both), would have Syracuse suffer that we may receive a
								lesson, but survive for his own security, he is asking to have a
								thing which human power cannot compass. For a man may regulate his
								own desires, but he is not the dispenser of fortune ;

the time may come when he will find himself mistaken, and while
								mourning over his own ruin he may possibly wish that he could still
								have my prosperity to envy. But he cannot bring me back again when
								he has once abandoned me and has refused to take his share in the
								common danger, which, far from being imaginary, is only too real.
								For though in name you may be saving me, in reality you will be
								saving yourselves.

And you especially, Camarinaeans, who are 'our next neighbours, and
								on whom the danger will fall next, should have 
								anticipated all this, and not be so slack in your alliance. Instead
								of our coming to you, you should have come to us. Suppose the
								Athenians had gone to Camarina first, would you not at this moment
								be begging and praying for assistance? Then why did not you present
								yourselves at Syracuse, and say to us in our time of danger, Never yield to the enemy ? But, hitherto,
								neither you nor any of the Sicilians have shown a spirit like this.

'You may perhaps disguise your cowardice under the pretence of
								impartiality; you may balance between us and the invaders, and
								plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But that
								alliance was made on the supposition that you were invaded by an
								enemy, not against a friend; and you promised to assist the
								Athenians if they were wronged by others, not when, as now, they are
								doing wrong themselves.

Are the Rhegians who are Chalcidians so very anxious to join in the
								restoration of their Leontine kinsmen ? And yet
								how monstrous that they, suspecting the real meaning of this
								plausible claim, should display a prudence for which they can give
								no reason; and that you, who have every reason for a like prudence,
								should be eager to assist your natural enemies, and to conspire with
								them for the destruction of those who by a higher law are your still
								more natural kinsmen.

This should not be. You must make a stand against them. And do not be
								afraid of their armament. There is no danger if we hold together;
								the danger is in disunion, and they want to disunite us. Even when
								they engaged with our unaided forces , and defeated us in battle, they
								failed in their main purpose, and quickly retired.

'If then we can once unite, there is no reason for discouragement.
								But there is every reason why you, who are our allies, should meet
								us more cordially. We may be sure that help will come
								to us from Peloponnesus, and the Peloponnesians are far
								bettersoldiers than the Athenians. Let no one think that the caution which professes
								to be in league with both, and therefore gives aid to neither, is
								just to us or safe for you.

Such a policy, though it may pretend to impartiality, is really
								unjust. For if through your absence the victor overcomes and the
								vanquished falls, have you not abandoned the one to his fate, and
								allowed the other to commit a crime? How much nobler would it be to
								join your injured kinsmen, and thereby maintain the common interest
								of Sicily and save the Athenians, whom you call your friends, from
								doing wrong!

'To sum up:— We Syracusans are quite aware that there is no use in
								our dilating to you or to
								any one else on matters which you know as well as ourselves. But we
								prefer a prayer to you; and solemnly adjure you to consider, that,
								if you reject us, we, who are Dorians like yourselves, are betrayed
								by you to Ionians, our inveterate enemies, who are seeking our ruin.

If the Athenians subdue us, your decision will have gained them the
								day; but the honour will be all their own, and the authors of their
								victory will be the prize of their victory. 
							 If on the other hand we conquer, you who have brought the peril upon
								us will have to suffer the penalty.

Reflect then, and take your choice: will you have present safety and
								slavery, or the hope of delivering yourselves and us, and thereby
								escaping the dishonour of submitting to the Athenian yoke, and the
								danger of our enmity, which will not be short-lived? '

Thus spoke Hermocrates. Euphemus, the Athenian envoy, replied as
								follows:—

'We had come to renew our former alliance, but the attack made upon
								us by the Syracusan envoy renders it necessary for us
								to vindicate our title to empire .

He himself bore the strongest witness in our favour when he said that
								Dorians and Ionians are inveterate enemies. And so they are. We
								Ionians dwelling in the neighbourhood of the Peloponnesians (who are
								Dorians and more numerous than ourselves) have had to consider the
								best way of securing ourindependence.

After the Persian War we were delivered by the help of our
								newly-acquired navy from the rule and supremacy of Lacedaemon; they
								had no more right to domineer over us than we over them, except the
								right of the stronger, which at the time they possessed. We then
								assumed the leadership of the King's former subjects, which we still
								retain; if we were not to be the slaves of the Peloponnesians we
								thought that we must have the means of self-defence. And what if we
								did subjugate those kinsmen of ours whom the Syracusans say that we
								have enslaved, the Ionians and the islanders? On the strictest
								principles, where was the injustice?

For we were their mother-city, and they joined in the Persian
								invasion. They had not the courage to revolt from him and to destroy
								their homes, as we did when we left our city. But they chose slavery
								for their own portion, and would have imposed it upon us.

'We rule then, in the first place, because we deserve to rule; for we
								provided the largest navy We come hither for 
								and showed the most patriotic alacrity in
								the cause of Hellas ; while those who became our
								subjects were willing slaves to the Persian, and were doing us
								mischief. And secondly, we were anxious to gain additional strength
								against the Peloponnesians. We use no fine words:

we do not tell you that we have a right to rule on the
								ground that we alone overthrew the Barbarians , nor do we
								pretend that we fought for the liberty of our allies, and not
								equally for the general liberty and for our own . Can any man
								be blamed because he makes the natural provision for his own
									safety ? The same care of our safety has brought
								us hither, and we can see that our presence here is for your benefit
								as well as for ours.

This we will prove to you; and our proofs shall be drawn from the
								calumnies of our enemies, and from the suspicions and fears which
								most sway your minds. For we know that those who are timorous and
								mistrustful may be won for the moment by alluring words, but that
								when the time of action comes they follow their own interests.

'We have told you already that fear makes us maintain our empire at
								home; and that a 
								like fear brings us to your shores. For we desire by the help of our
								friends to secure our position in Sicily. And we have not come to
								enslave you, but to save you from being enslaved.

Let no one imagine that your welfare is no business of ours, for if
								you are preserved, and are strong enough to hold out against the
								Syracusans, they will be less likely to aid the Peloponnesians, and
								so to injure us. Thus you become at once our first concern.

And we are quite consistent in restoring the Leontines, not to be
								subjects, like their kinsmen in Euboea, but to be as strong as ever
								we can make them, that from their position on the border they may
								harass the Syracusans and do our work. In Hellas we are a match for
								our enemies single-handed;

and as to our subjection of the Chalcidians at home, which
								Hermocrates finds so inconsistent with our emancipation of the
								Chalcidians here, it is for our advantage, on the one hand, that the
								cities of Euboea should have no armed force and contribute money
								only, and, on the other hand, that the Leontines and
								our friends in Sicily should be as independent as possible.

'Now to a tyrant or to an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is
								expedient, and no man is a kinsman
								who cannot be trusted. In each case we must make friends or enemies
								according to circumstances, and here our interest requires, not that
								we should weaken our friends, but that our friends should be too
								strong for our enemies. Do not mistrust us.

In Hellas we act upon the same principle, managing our allies as our
								interest requires in their several cases. The Chians and
								Methymnaeans furnish us with ships, and are their own masters; the
								majority are less independent, and pay a tribute; others, although
								they are islanders and might be easily conquered, enjoy complete
								freedom, because they are situated conveniently for operations about
									Peloponnesus .

So that in Sicily too our policy is likely to be determined by our
								interest, and, as I was saying, by our fear of the Syracusans. For
								they desire to be your masters, but first they must unite you in a
								common suspicion of us, and then either by force, or through your
								isolation, when we have failed and retired, they will dominate
								Sicily. This is inevitable if you now join them. Your united power
								will be more than we can
								manage, and the Syracusans, when we are gone, will be too much for
								you.

He who thinks otherwise is convicted out of his own mouth. For when
								you originally invited us, the danger which we should incur if we
								allowed you to fall into the hands of the Syracusans was precisely
								what you held before our eyes, and now you ought not to distrust the
								argument which you thought good enough for us.

Nor should you suspect us because we bring hither a force larger than
								before; for we have to contend against the power of Syracuse. Much
								more to be mistrusted are they.

Without your aid we cannot even remain where we are, and if we were
								so dishonourable as to make conquests we should be unable to retain
									them , for the
								voyage is long, and it would be a hopeless task to garrison great
								cities which, though situated on an island, have the resources of a
								continent. Whereas these men are your nearest neighbours. And they
								dwell, not in a camp, but in a city far more powerful than the
								forces which we have brought to Sicily;

they are always scheming against you, and never miss a chance, as
								they have often shown, especially in their conduct towards the
								Leontines. And now they have the impudence to stir you up against
								those who resist them, and have thus far saved Sicily from passing
								under their yoke. As if you had no eyes!

Far more real than the security offered by them is that to which we
								invite you, a security which we and you gain from one another, and
								we beseech you not to throw it away. Reflect: the Syracusans are so
								numerous that with or without allies they can always find their way
								to you, but you will not often have the chance of defending yourself
								with the aid of an army like ours. And if from any suspicion you
								allow us to depart unsuccessful, or perhaps defeated, the time may
								come when you will desire to see but a fraction of that army,
								although, if it came, it would be too late to save you.

'But we would not have either you, Camarinaeans, or others moved by
								their calumnies. We have told you the whole truth about the
								suspicions which are entertained of us; we will now sum up our
								arguments, and we think that they ought to convince you.

We rule over the cities of Hellas in order to maintain our
								independence, and we emancipate the cities of Sicily that they may
								not be used against us. And we are compelled to adopt
								a policy of interference because we have many interests to guard.
								Lastly, we come now, as we came before, not uninvited, but upon
								your own invitation to assist those of your own invitation to assist
								those of you who are suffering wrong.

Do not sit in judgment upon our actions, or seek to school us into
								moderation and so divert us from our purpose (the time for good
								advice has gone by), but in as far as our busy, meddlesome spirit
								can be of service to you as well as to ourselves, take and use us,
								remembering that these qualities, so far from being injurious to all
								alike, actually benefit great numbers of the Hellenes.

For in all places— however remote from our sphere-both he who fears
								and he who intends injustice, the one because he has a lively hope
								that from us he will obtain redress, and the other because he may
								well be alarmed for the consequences if we answer to the call, must
								both alike submit, the one to learn moderation against his will, the
								other to receive at our hands a deliverance which costs him nothing.

Do not reject the common salvation which is offered to you at this
								moment, as well as to all who seek it, but following the example of
								your countrymen join with us and, instead of having always to watch
								the Syracusans, assert your equality and threaten them as they have
								long been threatening you.'

Thus spoke Euphemus. Now the Camarinaeans were swayed by opposite
								feelings; they had a good will
								to the Athenians, tempered by a suspicion that they might be
								intending to enslave Sicily, whereas the Syracusans, from their
								proximity, were always at feud with them. But they were not so much
								afraid of the Athenians as of their Syracusan neighbours, who, as they thought, might win without their
								assistance. This was the reason why they sent them the small body of
								horse which took part in the first battle; and in a like spirit they
								now determined that for the future they would give real assistance
								only to the Syracusans, but to a very moderate extent.

For the present however, that they might seem to deal equal justice
								to the Athenians, especially after their recent victory, they
								resolved to return the same answer to both.

Such were the considerations which led them to reply that, as two of
								their allies were at war with one another, they thought that under
								the circumstances the best way of observing their oaths would be to
								assist neither. So the two embassies departed.

The Syracusans proceeded with their own preparations for the war, and
								the Athenians who were encamped
								at Naxos tried by negotiation to gain over as many of the Sicels as
								they could. The dwellers in the plain who were subjects of the
								Syracusans mostly stood aloof, but the Sicel settlements in the
								interior (which had always been independent) at once, with a few
								exceptions, joined the Athenians, and brought down food to the army;

in some cases money also. Against those who were recalcitrant troops
								were despatched by the Athenians; and some of them were forced into
								submission, but others were protected by the garrisons which the
								Syracusans sent to their aid. They then transferred their station
								from Naxos to Catana and, reconstructing the camp which had been
								burnt by the Syracusans , passed the winter
								there.

In the hope of obtaining assistance they sent a trireme to Carthage
								with a proposal of friendship; likewise to Tyrrhenia, since some of
								the cities there were offering of themselves to join them in the
								war: to the various Sicel tribes and to the
								Egestaeans they issued orders that they were to send 
								as many horse as possible.

They further prepared bricks, tools, and whatever else was requisite
								for siege operations, intending, when the spring arrived, to
								prosecute the war with vigour. 
							 The envoys whom the Syracusans had sent to Corinth and
									Lacedaemon endeavoured on the voyage to persuade the
								Italian Greeks that they were equally threatened by the Athenian
								designs, and should take an interest in the war.

When they arrived at Corinth they appealed to the Corinthians for aid
								on the ground of relationship. The Corinthians, taking the lead of
								all the Hellenic states, voted that they would assist Syracuse with
								all possible energy. They sent with the Syracusan envoys ambassadors
								of their own to the Lacedaemonians, bearing a joint request that
								they would resume open hostilities at home, and unite with them in
								sending help to Sicily.

At Lacedaemon the Corinthian ambassadors met Alcibiades and his
								fellow exiles. He had sailed at once from Thurii in a trading vessel
								to Cyllene in Elis, and thence proceeded to Lacedaemon on the
								invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves, first obtaining a
								safe-conduct; for he was afraid of them after his proceedings in the
								matter of the Mantinean league .

And so it came to pass that the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and
								Alcibiades appeared simultaneously in the Lacedaemonian assembly,
								and concurred in urging the same request. The ephors and the
								magistrates were already intending to send envoys to the Syracusans
								bidding them make no terms with the Athenians, although they were
								not disposed to assist them actively. But now Alcibiades came
								forward and stimulated the energies of the Lacedaemonians in the
								following words:—

'I must endeavour first of all to remove a prejudice 
								against myself, lest through suspicion of me you should turn a deaf
								ear to considerations of public interest.

My ancestors in consequence 
								of some misunderstanding renounced the office of Lacedaemonian
								proxenus; I myself resumed it, and did you many good offices,
								especilially after your misfortune at Pylos. m My anxiety to serve
								you never ceased, but when you were making peace with Athens you
								negotiated through my enemies, thereby conferring power on them, and
								bringing dishonour upon me .

And if I then turned to the Mantineans and Argives and opposed you in
								that or in any other way, you were rightly served, and any one who
								while the wound was recent may have been unduly exasperated against
								me should now take another and a truer view. Or, again, if any one
								thought the worse of me because I was inclined to the people, let
								him acknowledge that here too there is no real ground of offence.

Any power adverse to despotism is called democracy, and my family
								have always retained the leadership of the people in their hands
								because we have been the persistent enemies of tyrants. Living too
								under a popular government, how could we avoid in a great degree
								conforming to circumstances? However, we did our best to observe
								political moderation amid the prevailing licence.

But there were demagogues, as there always have been, who led the
								people into evil ways, and it was they who drove me out . Whereas we were the leaders of the state as a
									whole , and not of a part only;

it was our view that all ought to combine in maintaining that form of
								government which had been inherited by us, and under which the city
								enjoyed the greatest freedom and glory. Of course, like all sensible
								men, we knew only too well what democracy is, and I
								better than any one, who have so good a reason for abusing it. The
								follies of democracy are universally admitted, and there is nothing
								new to be said about them. But we could not venture to change our
								form of government when an enemy like yourselves was so near to us.

'Such is the truth about the calumnies under which I labour. And now
								I will speak to you
								of the matter which you have in hand, and about which I, in so far
								as I have better information, am bound to instruct you.

We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to conquer the Sicilian
								cities; then to proceed against the Hellenes of Italy;

and lastly, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian dominions, and on
								Carthage itself. If all or most of these enterprises succeeded, we
								meant finally to attack Peloponnesus, bringing with us the whole
								Hellenic power which we had gained abroad, besides many barbarians
								whom we intended to hire— Iberians and the neighboring tribes,
								esteemed to be the most warlike barbarians that now are . Of the timber
								which Italy supplies in such abundance we meant to build numerous
								additional triremes, and with them to blockade Peloponnesus. At the
								same time making inroads by land with our infantry, we should have
								stormed some of your cities and invested others. Thus we hoped to
								crush you easily, and to rule over the Hellenic world.

For the better accomplishment of our various aims our newlyacquired
								territory would supply money and provisions enough, apart from the
								revenue which we receive in Hellas.

'You have heard the objects of our expedition from him who knows them
								best; the generals who remain will persevere and carry them out if
								they can. And now let me prove to you that if you do
								not come to the rescue Sicily will be lost.

If the Greeks would all unite they might even now, notwithstanding
								their want of military skill, resist with success; but the
								Syracusans alone, whose whole forces have been already defeated, and
								who cannot move freely at sea, will be unable to withstand the power
								which the Athenians already have on the spot.

And Syracuse once taken, the whole of Sicily is in their hands; the
								subjugation of Italy will follow; and the danger which, as I was
								saying, threatens you from that quarter, will speedily overwhelm
								you. And therefore remember every one of you that the safety, not of
								Sicily alone, but of Peloponnesus, is at stake.

No time should be lost. You must send to Sicily a force of hoplites
								who will themselves handle the oars and will take the field
								immediately on landing. A Spartan commander I conceive to be even
								more indispensable than an army; his duty will be to organise the
								troops which are already enlisted, and to press the unwilling into
								the service. Thus you will inspire confidence in your friends and
								overcome the fears of the wavering. Here too in Hellas you should
								make open war. The Syracusans, seeing that you have not forgotten
								them, will then persevere in their resistance, while the Athenians
								will have greater difficulty in reinforcing their army.

You ought also to fortify Decelea in Attica; the Athenians are always
								in particular dread of this;

to them it seems to be the only peril of which they have not faced
								the worst in the course of the war. And the way to hurt an enemy
								most surely is to inform yourself exactly about the weak points of
								which you see that he is conscious, and strike at them. For every
								man is likely to know best himself the dangers which he has most to
								fear. I will sum up briefly the chief though by no means all the
								advantages which you will gain, and the disadvantages 
								which you will inflict, by the fortification of Decelea.

The whole stock of the country will fall into your hands. The slaves
								will come over to you of their own accord; what there is besides
								will be seized by you. The Athenians will at once be deprived of the
								revenues which they obtain from the silver mines of Laurium, and of
								all the profits which they make by the land or by the law courts:
								above all, the customary tribute will cease to flow in; for their
								allies, when they see that you are now carrying on the war in
								earnest, will not mind them.

How far these plans are executed, and with how much speed and energy,
								Lacedaemonians, depends on you; for I am confident that they are
								practicable, and I am not likely to be mistaken.

'You ought not in fairness to think the worse of me because, having
								been once distinguished as a lover of my country, I now cast
								in my lot with her worst foes and attack her with all my might;

or suspect that I speak only with the eagerness of an exile. An exile
								I am indeed; I have lost an ungrateful country, but I have not lost
								the power of doing you service, if you will listen to me.

The true enemies of my country are not those who, like you, have
								injured her in open war, but those who have compelled her friends to
								become her enemies. I love Athens, not in so far as I am wronged by
								her, but in so far as I once enjoyed the privileges of a citizen.
								The country which I am attacking is no longer mine, but a lost
								country which I am seeking to regain.

He is the true patriot, not who, when unjustly exiled, abstains from
								attacking his country, but who in the warmth of his affection seeks
								to recover her without regard to the means. I desire therefore that
								you, Lacedaemonians, will use me without scruple in any service
								however difficult or dangerous, remembering that, according to the
								familiar saying, the more harm I did you as an
									enemy, the more good can I do you as a friend. For I know the secrets of the Athenians, while I could
								only guess at yours. Remember the immense importance of your present
								decision, and do not hesitate to send an expedition to Sicily and
								Attica. By despatching a fraction of your forces to co-operate in
								Sicily you may save great interests, and may overthrow the Athenian
								power once and for ever. And so henceforward you may dwell safely
								yourselves and be leaders of all Hellas, which will follow you, not
								upon compulsion, but from affection.'

Thus spoke Alcibiades: the Lacedaemonians, who had been intending to
								send an army against Athens, but
								were still hesitating and looking about them, were greatly
								strengthened in their resolution when they heard all these points
								urged by him who, as they thought, knew best.

Accordingly they now turned their thoughts to the fortification of
								Decelea, and determined to send immediate assistance to the
								Syracusans. They appointed Gylippus the son of Cleandridas commander
								of the Syracusan forces, and desired him to co-operate with the
								Syracusan and Corinthian representatives, and send aid to Sicily in
								the speediest and most effective manner which the circumstances
								admitted.

Whereupon he told the Corinthians to despatch immediately two ships
								to him at Asine, and to fit out as many more as they meant to send;
								the latter were to be ready for sea when the season arrived.

Coming to this understanding the envoys departed from Lacedaemon. 
							 About this time the trireme which the Athenian generals had
								despatched from Sicily for money and cavalry arrived at
								Athens. The Athenians, hearing their request, voted money and a
								force of cavalry for the army. So the winter ended, and with it the
								seventeenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote
								the history.

At the very beginning of the following spring the Athenians
								quitted-Catana, and sailed along the coast towards the Sicilian Megara; this
								place, as I have already mentioned , in the days of Gelo
								the tyrant was depopulated by the Syracusans, who still retain
								possession of the country.

They disembarked, and after ravaging the fields proceeded to attack a
								small Syracusan fortress , but without
								success; they then moved on some by land and some by sea to the
								river Terias, and going up the country wasted the plain and burned
								the corn. They encountered a few Syracusans, some of whom they
								killed, and setting up a trophy returned to their ships. They then
								sailed back to Catana, and having taken in provisions marched with
								their whole force against Centoripa, a Sicel town, which
								capitulated.

Thence they returned, and on their way burned the corn of the
								Inessians and the Hyblaeans.

Arriving at Catana they found that the horsemen, for whom they had
								sent, to the number of two hundred and fifty had come from Athens,
								with their equipment, but without horses, which they were expected
								to procure on the spot. Thirty mounted archers and three hundred
								talents of silver had arrived
								also.

During the same spring the Lacedaemonians led an army against Argos,
								and advanced as A far
								as Cleonae, but retired in consequence of an earthquake. The Argive
								in their turn invaded the neighboring district of Thyrea, and took a
								great deal of spoil from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no
								less than twenty-five talents .

Somewhat later the populace of Thespiae made an
								attack upon the government, but the attempt did not succeed; for the
								Thebans came to the rescue. Some of the insurgents
								were apprehended, others fled to Athens.

The Syracusans heard that the Athenians had received their cavalry,
								and that they would
								soon be upon them. They considered that, unless the Athenians gained
								possession of Epipolae (which was a steep place looking down upon
								Syracuse), the city could not easily be invested, even if they were
								defeated in battle; they therefore determined to guard the paths
								leading to the summit that the enemy might not get up by stealth.

At all other points the place was secure, as it lies high and slopes
								right down to the city, from the interior of which it can all be
								seen; the Syracusans call it Epipolae (or the plateau!, because it
								is above the level of the adjacent country.

Hermocrates and his colleagues had now entered upon their command.
								The whole people went out at break of day to the meadow skirting the
								river Anapus, and proceeded to hold a review of their forces. A
								selection was at once made of six hundred hoplites, who were
								appointed to guard Epipolae, and to run in a body to any point at
								which they were needed. They were commanded by Diomilus, an Andrian
								exile.

On the very same morning the Athenians were likewise holding a muster
								of their army. They had come from Catana with their whole
								force, and had put in unobserved near a place called Leon, which is
								dis. tant from Epipolae not quite a mile; there they disembarked
								their troops. Their ships cast anchor at Thapsus, which is a
								peninsula with a narrow isthmus, running out into the sea, and not
								far from Syracuse either by land or water.

The Athenian sailors made a stockade across the isthmus and remained
								at Thapsus, while the troops ran to Epipolae, and gained the summit
								by the way of the Euryelus before the Syracusans saw 
								them or could come up to them from the meadow where the review was
								going on.

Nevertheless Diomilus with his six hundred hurried to the spot,
								accompanied by the rest of the army, each man running as fast he
								could; but the distance from the meadow which they had to traverse
								before they could engage was not less than three miles;

consequently they were in disorder when they closed with the
								Athenians. They were defeated in the engagement which ensued on
								Epipolae, and retired into the city. Diomilus and about three
								hundred others were slain.

The Athenians erected a trophy, and gave up to the Syracusans the
								bodies of the dead under a flag of truce. On the following day they
								went down to the city itself, but as the Syracusans did not come out
								against them, they retired and built a fort upon Labdalum, at the
								edge of the cliffs of Epipolae looking towards Megara, in order that
								when they advanced either to fight or to construct lines, the place
								might serve as a depository for their baggage and their property.

Not long afterwards the Athenians were joined by three hundred
								Egestaean horsemen, and about a hundred more furnished by the Sicels, Naxians, and others. They had two
								hundred and fifty of their own, for some of whom they received
								horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans; other horses they bought.
								The whole number of their cavalry was now raised to six hundred and
								fifty.

They placed a garrison in Labdalum and went down to Syce, where they
								took up a position and immediately commenced building a wall
								round the city . The Syracusans were amazed at the celerity of the
								work. They saw that they must interfere, and made up their minds to
								go out and fight.

The two armies were already preparing to engage when the Syrawhen the Syracusan generals, seeing that their forces were
								in disorder and were forming with difficulty, led them back into the
								city, all but a detachment of the cavalry, who, remaining on the
								spot, prevented their opponents from gathering stones for the wall,
								and compelled them to keep together.

At length, advancing with one division of their hoplites and all
								their cavalry, the Athenians attacked the Syracusan horse, whom they
								put to flight, and killed some of them; they then erected a trophy.

On the following day some of the Athenians proceeded with the
								construction of that part of the circle which lay towards the
									north; others began to collect
								wood and stones and lay them along the intended course of the wall
								towards Trogilus, where the distance was shortest from the Great
								Harbour to the outer sea.

The Syracusans by the advice of their commanders, chiefly of
								Hermocrates, determined to risk no more general engagements. They
								thought it better to raise a counter-wall across the line along
								which the Athenian wall was building. If they were first they would
								intercept them. They might indeed be attacked by the Athenians while
								thus engaged, but then they could oppose them with a part of their
								army; and there would be time to run a stockade across, if not a
								wall, before any attack took place.

The Athenians on the other hand would have to leave their work, and
								employ their whole army against them. So they came out and drew a
								cross-wall, beginning at their own city, from a point below the
								circle of the Athenian wall, cutting down the olive-trees in the precinct of
								Apollo and erecting wooden towers.

As yet the Athenian ships had not sailed round from Thapsus into the
								Great Harbour; the Syracusans were still masters of their own coast,
								and the Athenians brought their necessaries from Thapsus by land.

The Athenians did not interfere with their work, for they were afraid
								of dividing and weakening their forces; and
								they were pressing forward that part of the line on which they were
								employed. So the Syracusans when they had sufficiently completed a
								part of their stockade and cross-wall, leaving one division to guard
								the work, retreated into the city with the rest of their army. The
								Athenians now destroyed their conduits, which were laid underground
								to bring drinking-water into the city. Then, choosing their time at
								noon when the Syracusan guard remained within their tents (some of
								them had even retired into the city) and when the vigilance of their
								sentinels at the stockade was relaxed, they took a body of three
								hundred chosen hoplites of their own and some light-armed troops,
								picked soldiers, to whom they had given heavy arms, and bade them
								run quickly to the cross-wall. The rest of the army proceeded in two
								divisions under the two generals, one towards the city in case the
								enemy should come to save the wall, the other to that part of the
								stockade which adjoined the postern-gate of the city.

The three hundred attacked and captured the further end of the
								stockade, from which the guards retired and fled inside the new
								outer wall which enclosed the shrine of Apollo Temenites . The pursuers pressed forward and made their
								way in after them; but they were forced out again by the Syracusans;

and some Argives and a few of the Athenians fell there. Then the
								whole army, turning back, destroyed the cross-wall, tore up the
								stockades, carried the stakes to their camp, and raised a trophy.

On the following day the Athenians, beginning at one end of the
								unfinished circle, began to bring the wall down over the cliff which on this side of
								Epipolae looks across the marsh towards the Great Harbour, intending
								to carry on the line by the shortest way to the harbour right through the level of the marsh.

Meanwhile the Syracusans also came out, and beginning from the city, proceeded to carry another
								stockade through the middle of the marsh, with a ditch at the side,
								in order to prevent the Athenians from completing their line to the
								sea.

The latter, having finished their work as far as the cliff, attacked
								the new Syracusan stockade and ditch. They ordered the ships to sail
								round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour of the Syracusans; with
								the first break of day they descended themselves from Epipolae to
								the level ground; and passing through the marsh where the soil was
								clay and firmer than the rest, over planks and gates which they laid
								down, they succeeded at sunrise in taking nearly the whole of the
								stockade and the ditch, and the remainder not long afterwards.

A battle took place in which the Athenians were victorious, and the
								Syracusans on the right wing fled to the city, those on the left
								along the river. The three hundred chosen Athenian troops pressed on
								at full speed towards the bridge, intending to stop their passage,
								but the Syracusans, fearing that they would be cut off, and having
								most of their horsemen on the spot, turned upon the three hundred,
								and putting them to flight, charged the right wing of the Athenians.

The panic now extended to the whole division at
								the extremity of the wing.

Lamachus saw what had happened, and hastened to the rescue from his
								own place on the left wing, taking with him a few archers and the
								Argive troops; but pressing forward across a certain ditch he and a
								few who had followed him were cut off from the rest, and he fell
								with five or six others. The Syracusans hastily snatched up their
								bodies, and carried them across the river out of the reach of the
								enemy. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian army
								advancing towards them they retreated.

Meanwhile the Syracusans who fled first into the city, observing the
								resistance made by the left wing, took
								courage, and coming out drew up against that part of the Athenian
								line which was opposed to them. They also sent a detachment against
								the wall of circumvallation on Epipolae, supposing that it was undefended,
								and might be taken.

They did indeed take and demolish the outwork, which was about a
								thousand feet in length; but Nicias, who happened to have been left
								there because he was ill, saved the lines themselves. He commanded the attendants of
								the camp to set fire to the engines and to the timber which had been
								left lying in front of the wall, for being without troops he knew
								that there was no other way of escape.

The expedient succeeded; and in consequence of the fire the
								Syracusans gave up the attack. The Athenian army too was now
								hastening from the plain to the surrounding wall , with the intention of
								beating off the enemy; while the ships, as they had been ordered,
								were sailing from Thapsus into the Great Harbour.

The Syracusans on the heights, seeing this combined movement, quickly
								retreated, together with the rest of the army, into the city,
								thinking that with their present force they were no longer able to
								prevent the completion of the line of wall towards the sea.

The Athenians then erected a trophy and restored the Syracusan dead
								under a flag of truce. The Syracusans
								delivered to them the bodies of Lamachus and his com panions. The
								whole Athenian forces, both naval and military, were now on the
								spot, and they proceeded to cut off the Syracusans by
								a double wall, beginning at the southern cliff of Epipolae and
								extending to the sea.

Provisions came to their army in abundance from various parts of
								Italy. Many of the Sicel tribes who had hitherto been hesitating now
								joined the Athenians, and three penteconters came from the
								Tyrrhenians.

Everything began to answer to their hopes. The Syracusans despaired
								of saving the city by arms, for no help reached them even from
								Peloponnesus. Within the walls they were talking of peace, and they
								began to enter into communications with Nicias, who, now that
								Lamachus was dead, had the sole command.

But no definite result was attained; although, as might be expected
								when men began to feel the pressure of the siege and their own
								helplessness, many proposals were made to him, and many more were
								discussed in the city. Their calamities even made them suspicious of
								one another; accordingly they deposed their generals, attributing
								the misfortunes which had befallen the city since they were
								appointed either to their ill-luck or to their treachery. In their
								room they chose Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth 
								were already at Leucas hastening to their
								relief. They were alarmed at the reports which were continually
								pouring in, all false, but all agreeing that the Athenian lines
								round Syracuse were now complete. Gylippus had no longer any hope of
								Sicily, but thought that he might save Italy; so he and Pythen the
								Corinthian sailed across the Ionian Gulf to Tarentum as fast as they
								could, taking two Laconian and two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians
								were to man ten ships of their own, two Leucadian, and three
								Ambracian, and to follow. Gylippus on his arrival at Tarentum went
								on a mission to Thurii, of which his father had formerly been a
								citizen;

he had hoped to gain over the Thurians, but failed; he 
								then continued his voyage from Tarentum along the coast of Italy. He
								was caught in the Terinaean gulf by a wind which in this region blows violently and
								steadily from the north, and was carried into the open sea. After
								experiencing a most violent storm he returned to Tarentum, where he
								drew up those of his ships which had suffered in the gale and
								refitted them.

Nicias heard of his approach, but despised the small number of his
								ships; in this respect he was like the Thurians. He thought that he
								had come on a mere privateering expedition, and for some time set no
									watch .

During the same summer, about the same time, the Lacedaemonians and
								their allies invaded Argolis and wasted most of the Argive
								territory. The Athenians assisted the Argives with thirty ships. The
								use which they made of them was a glaring violation of the treaty
								with the Lacedaemonians.

Hitherto they had only gone out on marauding expeditions from Pylos;
								when they landed, it was not upon the shores of Laconia, but upon
								other parts of the Peloponnese; and they had merely fought as the
								allies of the Argives and Mantineans. The Argives had often urged
								them just to land soldiers on Lacedaemonian ground, and to waste
								some part of Laconia, however small, without remaining, and they had
								refused. But now, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and
								Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other
								places, and wasted the country. Thereby the Athenians at last gave
								the Lacedaemonians a right to complain of them and completely
								justified measures of retaliation.

After the Athenian fleet had departed from Argos, and the
								Lacedaemonians had likewise retired, the Argives invaded Phliasia,
								and having ravaged the country and killed a few of the Phliasians,
								returned home.

GYLIPPUS and Pythen, after refitting their ships at Tarentum, coasted
								along to the Epizephyrian Locri. They now learned the truth, that
								Syracuse was not as yet completely invested, but that an army might
								still enter by way of Epipolae. So they considered whether they
								should steer their course to the left or to the right of Sicily.
								They might attempt to throw themselves into Syracuse by sea, but the
								risk would be great; or they might go first to Himera, and gathering
								a force of the Himeraeans, and of any others whom they could induce
								to join them, make their way by land.

They determined to sail to Himera, especially as the straits were
								unguarded. Nicias, when he heard that they were at Locri, although
								he had despised them at first, now sent out four Athenian ships to
								intercept them; but these had not as yet arrived at Rhegium, and
								came too late.

So they sailed through the strait and, touching by the way at Rhegium
								and Messenè, reached Himera. They persuaded the Himeraeans to make
								common cause with them, and not only to join in the expedition
								themselves, but to supply arms to all their unarmed sailors, for
								they had beached their ships at Himera.

They then sent to the Selinuntians and told them to come and meet
								them with their whole army at an appointed place. The Geloans and
								certain of the Sicels also promised to send them a small force; the
								latter with the more alacrity because Archonides, a Sicel king in
								these parts who was a powerful man and friendly to the
								Athenians, had recently died, and because Gylippus seemed to have
								come from Lacedaemon with hearty good-will.

And so, taking with him about seven hundred of his own sailors and
								marines for whom he had obtained arms, about a thousand Himeraean
								infantry, heavy and light-armed included, and a hundred Himeraean
								horsemen, some light-armed troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few
								more from Gela, and of the Sicels about a thousand in all, Gylippus
								marched towards Syracuse.

In the meantime the Corinthian ships had put to sea from Leucas and were
								coming with all speed to the
								relief of the besieged. Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders,
								who started last in a single ship, arrived at Syracuse before the
								rest of the fleet, and a little before Gylippus. He found the
								citizens on the point of holding an assembly at which the question
								of peace was to be discussed;

from this intention he dissuaded them by the encouraging announcement
								that more ships, and Gylippus the son of Cleandridas, whom the
								Lacedaemonians had sent to take the command, were on their way.

Whereupon the Syracusans were reassured, and at once went forth with
								their whole army to meet Gylippus, who, as they were informed, was
								now close at hand. He had shortly before captured the Sicel fort
								Geta on his march, and drawing up his men in readiness to fight,
								came to Epipolae, which he ascended by the Euryelus;

where the Athenians had found a way before him , Having formed
								a junction with the Syracusans, he marched against the Athenian
								lines. He arrived just at the time when the Athenians had all but
								finished their double wall , nearly a mile
								long, reaching to the Great Harbour; there remained only a small
								portion toward the sea, upon which they were still at work. Along
								the remainder of the line of wall, which extended
								towards Trogilus and the northern sea, the stones were mostly lying
								ready; a part was halffinished, a part had been completed and left.
								So near was Syracuse to destruction.

The Athenians, though at first disconcerted by the sudden advance of
								Gylippus and the 
								Syracusans, drew up their forces in order of battle. He halted as he
								approached, and sent a herald to them offering a truce if they were
								willing to quit Sicily within five days taking what belonged to
								them.

But they despised his offer, and sent away the herald without an
								answer. Whereupon both armies set themselves in order of battle.

Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in confusion, and could
								with difficulty form, led back his troops to the more open ground.
								Nicias did not follow, but lay still, close to his own wall. When
								Gylippus observed that the Athenians remained where they were, he
								led away his army to the height called Temenites; there they passed
								the night.

On the following day he stationed the greater part of his troops in
								front of the Athenian wall that the enemy might not despatch a force
								to any other point, and then sent a detachment against the fort of
								Labdalum, which was out of sight of the Athenian lines. He took the
								place, and killed every one whom he found in it.

On the same day an Athenian trireme which was keeping watch over the
								mouth of the harbour was taken by the Syracusans.

The Syracusans and their allies now began to
									build a single line of wall starting
								from the city and running upwards across Epipolae
								at an angle with the Athenian wall; this was a work which, unless it
								could be stopped by the Athenians, would make the investment of the
								city impossible.

Towards the sea the Athenian wall was now completed,
								and their forces had come up to the high ground. Gylippus, knowing
								that a part of the wall was weak, instantly went by night with his
								army to attack it.

But the Athenians, who happened to be passing the night outside the
								walls, perceived this movement and marched to oppose him; whereupon
								he at once withdrew. They then raised the weak portion of their wall
								higher; and guarded it themselves, while they posted the allies on
								the other parts of the fortification in the places severally
								assigned to them.

Nicias now determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory which runs
								out opposite the 
								city and narrows the entrance to the Great Harbour. He thought that
								this measure would facilitate the introduction of supplies . His forces would
								then be able to watch the harbour of the Syracusans from a nearer
								point, whereas they had hitherto been obliged to put out from the
								further corner of the Great Harbour whenever a Syracusan ship
								threatened to move. He was inclined to pay more attention than
								hitherto to naval operations; for since the arrival of Gylippus the
								Athenian prospects by land were not so encouraging.

Having therefore transferred his ships and a portion of his army to
								Plemmyrium, he built three forts in which the greater part of the
								Athenian stores were deposited; and the large boats as well as the
								ships of war were now anchored at this spot.

The removal was a first and main cause of the deterioration of the
								crews. For when the sailors went out to procure forage and water, of
								which there was little, and that only to be obtained from a
								distance, they were constantly cut off by the Syracusan cavalry, who
								were masters of the country, a third part of their force having been
								posted in a village at the Olympieum expressly in order
								to prevent the enemy at Plemmyrium from coming out and
								doing mischief.

About this time Nicias was informed that the rest of the Corinthian
									fleet was on the
								point of arriving, and he sent twenty ships, which were ordered to
								lie in wait for them about Locri and Rhegium and the approach to
								Sicily.

While Gylippus was building the wall across Epipolae, Gylpus, eggg employing the stones which the Athenians had
								previously laid there for their own
								use, he at the same time constantly led out and drew up in front of
								the wall the Syracusans and their allies, and the Athenians on their
								part drew up in face of them.

When he thought that the moment had arrived he offered battle; the
								two armies met and fought hand to hand between the walls. But there
								the Syracusan cavalry was useless;

the Syracusans and their allies were defeated, and received their
								dead under a flag of truce, while the Athenians raised a trophy.
								Gylippus then assembled his army and confessed that the fault was
								his own and not theirs; for by confining their ranks too much
								between the walls he had rendered useless both their cavalry and
								their javelinmen. So he would lead them out again.

And he reminded them that in material force they were equal to their
								enemies, while as for resolution they ought to be far superior. That
								they, who were Peloponnesians and Dorians ,
								should allow a mixed rabble of Ionians and islanders to remain in
								the country and not determine to master them and drive them out, was
								a thing not to be thought of.

On the first opportunity he led them out again. Nicias and the
								Athenians had determined that, whether the Syracusans would offer
								battle or not, they must not allow them to carry on their
								counter-work. For already it had almost passed the end of the
								Athenian wall, and if the work advanced any further it
								would make no difference to the Athenians whether they fought and conquered in every battle, or
								never fought at all. So they went out to meet the Syracusans.

Gylippus before engaging led his heavy-armed further outside the
								walls than on the former occasion; his cavalry and javelin-men he
								placed on the flanks of the Athenians in the open space between the
								points at which their respective lines of walls stopped.

In the course of the battle the cavalry attacked the left wing of the
								Athenians which was opposed to them, and put them to flight; the
								defeat became general, and the whole Athenian army was driven back
								by main force within their lines.

On the following night the Syracusans succeeded in carrying their
								wall past the works of the enemy. Their operations were now no
								longer molested by them, and the Athenians, whatever success they
								might gain in the field, were utterly deprived of all hope of
								investing the city.

Not long afterwards the remaining Corinthian with the Ambraciot and
								Leucadian ships sailed in, under the
								command of Erasinides the Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian
								guardships. They assisted the Syracusans in completing what remained
								of the Syracusan wall up to the Athenian wall which it crossed.

Gylippus meanwhile had gone off into Sicily to collect both naval and
								land forces, and also to bring over any cities which either were
								slack in the Syracusan cause or had stood aloof from the war.

More ambassadors, Syracusan and Corinthian, were despatched to
								Lacedaemon and Corinth, requesting that reinforcements might be sent
								across the sea in merchantships or small craft, or by any other
								available means, since the Athenians were sending for
								assistance.

The Syracusans, who were in high spirits, also manned a fleet, and
								began to practise, intending to try their hand at this new sort of
								warfare.

Nicias observing how they were employed, and seeing that the strength
								of the enemy and the helplessness of the Athenians was daily increasing, sent to
								Athens a full report of his circumstances, as he had often done
								before, but never in such detail. He now thought the situation so
								critical that, if the Athenians did not at once recall them or send
								another considerable army to their help, the expedition was lost.

Fearing lest his messengers, either from inability to speak or from
								want of intelligence , or because they desired to please the people,
								might not tell the whole truth, he wrote a letter, that the
								Athenians might receive his own opinion of their affairs unimpaired
								in the transmission, and so be better able to judge of the real
								facts of the case.

The messengers departed carrying his letter and taking verbal
								instructions. He was now careful to keep his army on the defensive,
								and to run no risks which he could avoid.

At the end of the same summer, Euetion an Athenian general, in
								concert with Perdiccas and assisted by a large force of Thracians,
								made an attack upon Amphipolis, which he failed to take. He then
								brought round triremes into the Strymon and besieged the place from
								the river, making Himeraeum his head-quarters. So the summer ended.

In the following winter the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens.
								They delivered 
								their verbal instructions, and answered any questions which were put
								to them. They also presented his letter, which the
								registrar of the city, coming forward, read to the Athenian people.
								It ran as follows:—

'Athenians, in many previous despatches I have reported to you the
								course of events up to this time, but now there is greater need than ever that you should
								inform yourselves of our situation, and come to some decision.

After we had engaged the Syracusans, against whom you sent us, in
								several battles, and conquered in most of them, and had raised the
								lines within which we are now stationed, Gylippus a Lacedaemonian
								arrived, bringing an army from Peloponnesus and from certain of the
								cities of Sicily. In the first engagement he was defeated by us, but
								on the following day we were overcome by numerous horsemen and
								javelin-men, and retired within our lines.

We have therefore desisted from our siege-works and remain idle,
								since we are overpowered by the superior numbers of the enemy, and
								indeed cannot bring our whole army into the field, for the defence
								of our wall absorbs a large part of our heavy-armed. The enemy
								meanwhile have built a single wall which crosses ours, and we cannot
								now invest them, unless a large army comes up and takes this
								crosswall.

So that we, who are supposed to be the besiegers, are really the
									besieged , at least by land; and the more so
								because we cannot go far even into the country, for we are prevented
								by their horsemen.

'Moreover they have sent ambassadors to Peloponnesus asking for
								reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily
								intending to solicit those who are at present neutral to join him,
								and to obtain from his allies fresh naval and land forces.

For they purpose, as I hear, to attack our walls by land, and at the
								same time to make an effort at sea.

And let no one be startled when I say at
									sea. Our fleet was originally in first-rate condition: the
								ships were sound and the crews were in good order, but now, as the
								enemy are well aware, the timbers of the ships, having been so long
								exposed to the sea, are soaked, and the efficiency of the crews is
								destroyed.

We have no means of drawing up our vessels and airing them, because
								the enemy's fleet is equal or even superior in numbers to our own,
								and we are always expecting an attack from them. They are clearly
								trying their strength;

they can attack us when they please, and they have far greater
								facilities for drying their ships, since they are not, like us,
								engaged in a blockade.

'Even if we had a great superiority in the number of our ships, and
								were not compelled as we are to employ them all in keeping guard, we
								could hardly have the like advantage. For our supplies have to pass
								so near the enemy's city that they are with difficulty conveyed to
								us now, and if we relax our vigilance ever so little we shall lose
								them altogether.

'It has been, and continues to be the ruin of our crews, that the
								sailors, having to forage and fetch water and wood from a distance,
								are cut off by the Syracusan horse while our servants,
								since we have been reduced to an equality with the enemy, desert us.
								Of the foreign sailors, some who were pressed into the service run
								off at once to the Sicilian cities; others, having been originally
								attracted by high pay, and fancying that they were going to trade
								and not to fight, astonished at the resistance which they encounter,
								and especially at the naval strength of the enemy, either find an
								excuse for deserting to the Syracusans, or they effect their escape
								into the country; and Sicily is a large place. Others, again, have
								persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian slaves in their room
								while they themselves are busy trading; and thus the
								precision of the service is lost.

'You to whom I am writing know that the crew of a vessel does not
								long remain at its prime,

and that the sailors who really start the ship and keep the rowing
								together are but a fraction of the whole number The most hopeless thing of all
								is that, although I am general, I am not able to put a stop to these
								disorders, for tempers like yours are not easily controlled, and
								that we cannot even fill up the crews, whereas the enemy can obtain
								recruits from many sources. Our daily waste in men and stores can
								only be replaced out of the supplies which we brought with us; and
								these we have no means of increasing, for the cities which are now
								our confederates, Naxos and Catana, are unable to maintain us.

There is only one advantage more which the Syracusans can gain over
								us: if the towns of Italy from which our provisions are derived,
								seeing in what a plight we are and that you do not come to our help,
								go over to the enemy, we shall be starved out, and they will have
								made an end of the war without striking a blow.

I could have written you tidings more cheering than these, but none
								more profitable; for you should be well-informed of our
								circumstances if you are to take the right steps. Moreover I know
								your dispositions; you like to hear pleasant things, but afterwards
								lay the fault on those who tell you them if they are falsified by
								the event; therefore I think it safer to speak the truth.

'And now, do not imagine that your soldiers and their generals have
								failed in the fulfilment of the duty which you originally imposed
								upon them. But when all Sicily is uniting against us, and the
								Syracusans are expecting another army from
								Peloponnesus, it is time that you should make up your minds. For
									the troops which we have here certainly
								cannot hold out even against our present enemies, and therefore you
								ought either to recall us or to send another army and fleet as large
								as this, and plenty of money. You should also send a general to
								succeed me, for I have a disease in the kidneys and cannot remain
								here.

I claim your indulgence; while I retained my health I often did you
								good service when in command. But do whatever you mean to do at the
								very beginning of spring, and let there be no delay. The enemy will
								obtain reinforcements in Sicily without going far, and although the
								troops from Peloponnesus will not arrive so soon, yet if you do not
								take care they will elude you; their movements will either be too
								secret for you, as they were before , or too quick.'

Such was the condition of affairs described in the letter of Nicias.
								The Athenians, after hearing it read, did not release Nicias from
								his command, but they joined with him two officers who were already
								in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, until regular colleagues could
								be elected and sent out, for they did not wish him to bear the
								burden in his sickness alone. They also resolved to send a second
								fleet and an army of Athenians taken from the muster-roll and of
								allies.

As colleagues to Nicias they elected Demosthenes the son of
								Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon was
								despatched immediately to Sicily about the winter solstice; he took
								with him ten ships conveying a hundred and twenty. talents of silver, and was to
								tell the army in Sicily that they should receive assistance and
								should not be neglected.

Demosthenes remained behind, and busied himself in
								getting ready the expedition which he was to bring out in the
								spring. He announced to the allies that troops would be
								required, collected money, and mustered ships, and hoplites at
								Athens.

The Athenians also sent twenty ships to cruise off the Peloponnesian
								coast and intercept any vessels trying to pass to Sicily from the
								Peloponnesus or Corinth.

The Sicilian envoys had now arrived at Corinth, and the
								Corinthians had heard from them that affairs were looking better in
								Sicily. Seeing how opportune had been the arrival of the ships which
								they had already despatched they were more zealous than ever. They
								prepared to convey hoplites to Sicily in merchant-vessels; the
								Lacedaemonians were to do the like from Peloponnesus.

The Corinthians also proceeded to man twenty-five ships of war,
								intending to hazard a naval engagement against the Athenian squadron
								stationed at Naupactus. They hoped that, if the attention of the
								Athenians was diverted by an opposing force, they would be unable to
								prevent their merchant-vessels from sailing.

The Lacedaemonians also prepared for their already projected invasion
								of Attica . They were kept to their purpose
								by the Syracusans and Corinthians, who, having heard of the
								reinforcements which the Athenians were sending to Sicily, hoped
								they might be stopped by the invasion, Alcibiades was always at hand
								insisting upon the importance of fortifying Decelea and of carrying
								on the war with vigour.

Above all, the Lacedaemonians were inspirited by the thought that the
								Athenians would be more easily overthrown now that they had two wars
								on hand, one against themselves, and another against the Sicilians.
								They considered also that this time they had been the first
								offenders against the treaty, whereas in the former
								war the transgression had rather been on their own side. For the
								Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace , and they themselves had refused
								arbitration when offered by the Athenians, although the former
								treaty forbade war in case an adversary was willing to submit to
									arbitration . They felt that their
								ill success was deserved, and they took seriously to heart the
								disasters which had befallen them at Pylos and elsewhere.

But now the Athenians with a fleet of thirty ships had gone forth
								from Argive territory and ravaged part of the lands of Epidaurus and
								Prasiae, besides other places ; marauding expeditions from Pylos were always going
								on; and whenever quarrels arose about disputed points in the treaty
								and the Lacedaemonians proposed arbitration, the Athenians refused
								it. Reflecting upon all this, the Lacedaemonians concluded that the
								guilt of their former transgression was now shifted to the
								Athenians, and they were full of warlike zeal.

During the winter they bade their allies provide iron, and themselves
								got tools in readiness for the fortification of Decelea. They also
								prepared, and continually urged the other Peloponnesians to prepare,
								the succours which they intended to send in merchant-vessels to the
								Syracusans. And so the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year
								in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

At the very beginning of the next spring, and earlier than ever
								before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies entered Attica under
								the command of Agis the son of Archidamus the Lacedaemonian king.
								They first devastated the plain and its neighbourhood.

They then began to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the
								cities of the confederacy. Decelea is distant about fourteen miles
								from Athens, and not much further from Boeotia. The fort was designed for the devastation of the plain and the
								richest parts of the country, and was erected on a spot within sight
								of Athens.

While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were thus
								engaged, the Peloponnesians at home were despatching the hoplites
								in the merchant-vessels to Sicily. The Lacedaemonians selected the
								best of the Helots and Neodamodes, numbering in all six hundred, and
								placed them under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan. The Boeotians
								furnished three hundred hoplites, who were commanded by two Thebans,
								Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian.

These started first and put out into the open sea from Taenarus in
								Laconia. Not long afterwards the Corinthians sent five hundred
								heavy-armed, some of them from Corinth itself, others who were
								Arcadian mercenaries; they were all placed under the command of
								Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also sent with the
								Corinthians two hundred hoplites under the command of Sargeus, a
								Sicyonian.

Meanwhile the twenty five ships which the Corinthians had manned in
								the winter lay opposite to the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus
								until the merchant-vessels conveying the heavy-armed troops had got
								safely off. So the design succeeded, and the attention of the
								Athenians was diverted from the merchantships to the triremes.

At the beginning of spring, whilst the Lacedaemonians were fortifying
								Decelea, the Athenians sent thirty ships under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus to
								cruise about Peloponnesus. He was told to touch at Argos, and there
								to summon and take on board a force of heavy-armed which the
								Argives, being allies of the Athenians, were bound to furnish.

Meanwhile they despatched under Demosthenes their intended expedition
								to Sicily: it consisted of sixty Athenian ships and
								five Chian, twelve hundred heavyarmed Athenians taken from the roll,
								and as many others as could possibly be obtained from the different
								islanders; they had also collected from their subject-allies
								supplies of all sorts for the war. Demosthenes was told first of all
								to co-operate with Charicles on the coast of Laconia.

So he sailed to Aegina, and there waited until the whole of his
								armament was assembled and until Charicles had taken on board the
								Argives.

In the same spring and about the same time Gylippus returned to
								Syracuse, bringing from each of the cities which he had
								persuaded to join him as many troops as he could obtain.

He assembled the Syracusans and told them that they should man as
								large a fleet as possible and try their fortune at sea; he hoped to
								obtain a decisive result which would justify the risk.

Hermocrates took the same view, and urged them strongly not to be
								faint-hearted at the prospect of attacking with their ships. He said
								that the Athenians had not inherited their maritime skill, and
								would not retain it for ever ; there was a time when they were
								less of a naval people than the Syracusans themselves ,
								but they had been made sailors from necessity by the Persian
								invasion. To daring men like the Athenians those who emulated their
								daring were the most formidable foes. The same reckless courage
								which had often enabled the Athenians, although inferior in power,
								to strike terror into their adversaries might now be turned against
								them by the Syracusans.

He was quite sure that if they faced the Athenian navy suddenly and
								unexpectedly, they would gain more than they would lose; the
								consternation which they would inspire would more than
								counterbalance their own inexperience and the superior skill of the
								Athenians.

He told them therefore to try what they could do at sea, and not to be timid. Thus under the influence of Gylippus,
								Hermocrates, and others, the Syracusans, now eager for the conflict,
								began to man their ships.

When the fleet was ready, Gylippus, under cover of night, led forth
								the whole land-army, intending to attack in person the
								forts on Plemmyrium. Meanwhile the triremes of the Syracusans, at a
								concerted signal, sailed forth, thirty-five from the greater harbour
								and forty-five from the lesser, where they had their arsenal. These
								latter sailed round into the Great Harbour, intending to form a
								junction with the other ships inside and make a combined attack on
								Plemmyrium, that the Athenians, assailed both by sea and land, might
								be disconcerted.

The Athenians however quickly manned sixty ships; and with
								twenty-five of them engaged the thirty-five of the Syracusans which
								were in the Great Harbour: with the remainder they encountered those
								which were sailing round from the arsenal. These two squadrons met
								at once before the mouth of the Great Harbour: the struggle was long
								and obstinate, the Syracusans striving to force an entrance, the
								Athenians to prevent them.

Meanwhile Gylippus, quite early in the morning, while the Athenians
								in Plemmyrium who had gone down to the
								water-side had their minds occupied by the sea-fight, made a sudden
								attack upon their forts. He captured the largest of them first, then
								the two lesser, their garrisons forsaking them when they saw the
								largest so easily taken.

Those who escaped from the fortress first captured, getting into a
								merchant-vessel and some boats which were moored at Plemmyrium,
								found their way to the main station of the Athenians, but with
								difficulty; for they were chased by a swift trireme, the Syracusans
								at that time having the advantage in the Great Harbour. But when the
								two lesser fortresses were taken, the Syracusans were
								already losing the day, and the fugitives got past them with greater
								ease.

For the Syracusan ships which were fighting before the mouth of the
								harbour, having forced their way through the enemy, entered in
								disorder, and falling foul of one another gave away the victory to
								the Athenians, who routed not only these, but also the others by
								whom they were at first worsted inside the harbour.

Eleven Syracusan ships were disabled; the crews in most of them were
								slain, in three, made prisoners. The Athenians themselves lost three
								ships. They now drew to land the wrecks of the Syracusan ships, and
								erecting a trophy on the little island in front of Plemmyrium
								returned to their own station.

But although the Syracusans were unsuccessful in the sea-fight, still
								they had taken the fortresses of Plemmyrium. They erected three
								trophies, one for each fort. Two out of the three forts they
								repaired and garrisoned, but one of the two which were captured last
								they demolished.

Many perished and many prisoners were made at the capture of the
								forts, and abundant spoil of different kinds was taken, for the
								Athenians had used them as a store, and much corn and goods of
								traders were deposited in them; also much property belonging to the
								trierarchs, including the sails and other fittings of forty triremes
								which fell into the enemy's hands, and three triremes which had been
								drawn up on the beach.

The loss of Plemmyrium was one of the greatest and severest blows
								which befell the Athenians. For now they could no longer even
								introduce provisions with safety, but the Syracusan ships lay
								watching to prevent them, and they had to fight for the passage . General
								discouragement and dismay prevailed throughout the army.

The Syracusans next sent out twelve ships under the command of
								Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these hastened to
								Peloponnesus conveying envoys who were to report their improved
								prospects, and to urge more strongly than ever the
								prosecution of the war in Hellas. The remaining eleven sailed to
								Italy, hearing that ships laden with supplies were on their way to
								the Athenians.

They fell in with and destroyed most of these ships, and burnt a
								quantity of ship-timber which was lying ready for the Athenians in
								the territory of Caulonia.

Then they came to Locri, and while they were at anchor there, one of
								the merchantvessels from Peloponnesus sailed in, bringing some
								Thespian hoplites . These the Syracusans took on board, and
								sailed homewards.

The Athenians watched for them near Megara with twenty ships and took
								one ship with the crew, but the rest made their escape to Syracuse. 
							 There was some skirmishing in the harbour about the palisades which
								the Syracusans had fixed in the sea in front of their old dock-houses, that their
								ships might ride at anchor in the enclosed space, where they could
								not be struck by the enemy, and would be out of harm's way.

The Athenians brought up a ship of ten thousand talents burden, which had wooden
								towers and bulwarks;

and from their boats they tied cords to the stakes and wrenched and tore them up ; or dived and
								sawed them through underneath the water. Meanwhile the Syracusans
								kept up a shower of missiles from the dock-houses, which the men in
								the ship returned. At length the Athenians succeeded in pulling up
								most of the palisade.

The stakes which were out of sight were the most dangerous of all,
								there being some which were so fixed that they did not appear above
								the water; and no vessel could safely come near. They
								were like a sunken reef, and a pilot, not seeing them, might easily
								catch his ship upon them. Even these were sawn off by men who dived
								for hire; but the Syracusans drove them in again.

Many were the contrivances employed on both sides, as was very
								natural, when two armies confronted each other at so short a
								distance.

There were continual skirmishes, and they practised all kinds of
								stratagems. 
							 The Syracusans also sent to the Siciliot cities Corinthan Ambraciot,
								and Lacedaemonian ambassadors announcing the
								taking of Plemmyrium, and explaining that in the sea-fight they had
								been defeated not so much by the superior strength of the enemy as
								through their own disorder. They were also to report their great
								hopes of success, and to ask for assistance both by land and sea.
								They were to add that the Athenians were expecting reinforcements;
								if they could succeed in destroying the army then in Sicily before
								these arrived, there would be an end of the war. Such was the course
								of events in Sicily.

Demosthenes, when the reinforcements which he was to take to Sicily
								had all been collected, 
								sailed from Aegina to Peloponnesus and joined Charicles and his
								thirty ships . He embarked the Argive hoplites, and,
								proceeding to Laconia, first devastated some part of the lands of
								Epidaurus Limera.

Next the Athenians landed in the district of Laconia opposite
								Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo. They ravaged various
								parts of the country, and fortified a sort of isthmus in the
								neighbourhood, that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert
								and find a refuge there, and that privateers might make the place, as they did Pylos, their head-quarters for marauding
								expeditions.

Demosthenes assisted in the occupation, and then sailed for Corcyra,
								intending to collect additional forces from the allies in that
								region, and to make his way with all speed to Sicily. Charicles
								waited until he had completed the fort, and then leaving a garrison
								he sailed home with his thirty ships, accompanied by the Argives.

During the same summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred
								Thracian targeteers of the Dian race, who carried dirks;
								they were to have sailed with Demosthenes to Sicily, but came too
								late, and the Athenians determined to send them back to their native
								country.

Each soldier was receiving a drachma per day; and to use them against
								Decelea would have been too expensive.

For during this summer Decelea had been fortified by the whole
								Peloponnesian army, and was henceforward regularly occupied for
								the annoyance of the country by a succession of garrisons sent from
								the allied cities, whose incursions did immense harm to the
								Athenians: the destruction of property and life which ensued did as
								much as anything to ruin the city.

Hitherto the invasions had been brief and did not prevent them from
								getting something from the soil in the interval; but now the
								Peloponnesians were continually on the spot; and sometimes they were
								reinforced by additional troops, but always the regular garrison,
								who were compelled to find their own supplies, overran and despoiled
								the country. The Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was present in person,
								and devoted his whole energies to the war. The sufferings of the
								Athenians were terrible.

For they were dispossessed of their entire territory;
								more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted , most of them
								workmen; all their sheep and cattle had perished, and now that the
								cavalry had to go out every day and make descents upon Decelea or
								keep guard all over the country, their horses were either wounded by
								the enemy, or lamed by the roughness of the ground and the incessant
								fatigue.

Provisions, which had been formerly conveyed by the shorter route
								from Euboea to Oropus 
								and thence overland through Decelea, were now carried by sea round
								the promontory of Sunium at great cost. Athens was obliged to import
								everything from abroad, and resembled a fort rather than a city.

In the daytime the citizens guarded the battlements by relays; during
								the night every man was on service except the cavalry; some at their
								places of arms, others on the wall , summer and winter alike, until they
								were quite worn out.

But worse than all was the cruel necessity of maintaining two wars at
								once; and they carried on both with a determination which no one
								would have believed unless he had actually seen it. That, blockaded
								as they were by the Peloponnesians, who had raised a fort in their
								country, they should refuse to let go Sicily, and, themselves
								besieged, persevere in the siege of Syracuse, which as a mere city
								might rank with Athens, and— whereas the Hellenes generally were
								expecting at the beginning of the war, some that they would survive
								a year, others two or perhaps three years, certainly not more, if
								the Peloponnesians invaded Attica— that in the seventeenth year from
								the first invasion, after so exhausting a struggle, the Athenians
								should have been strong enough and bold enough to go to Sicily at
								all, and to plunge into a fresh war as great as that
								in which they were already engaged— how contrary was all this to the
								expectation of mankind!

Through the vast expense thus incurred, above all through the
								mischief done by Decelea, they were now greatly impoverished. It was
								at this time that they imposed upon their allies, instead of the
								tribute, a duty of five per cent. on all
								things imported and exported by sea, thinking that this would be
								more productive.

For their expenses became heavier and heavier as the war grew in
								extent, and at the same time their sources of revenue were drying
								up. 
							 And so, being in extreme want of money, and desirous to economise,
								they at once sent away the
								Thracians who came too late for Demosthenes, ordering Diitrephes to
								convey them home, but, as they must needs sail through the Euripus,
								to employ them in any way which he could against the enemy.

He landed them at Tanagra and there made a hasty raid;

in the evening he sailed from Chalcis in Euboea across the Euripus,
								and disembarking his troops in Boeotia led them against the town of
								Mycalessus. He passed the night unperceived at the temple of Hermes,
								which is distant from Mycalessus about two miles, and at the dawn of
								day he assaulted and captured the city, which is not large. The
								inhabitants were taken off their guard; for they never imagined that
								an enemy would come and attack them at so great a distance from the
								sea. The walls were weak, and in some places had fallen down;

in others they were built low; while the citizens, in their sense of
								security, had left their gates open. The Thracians dashed into the
								town, sacked the houses and temples, and slaughtered the
								inhabitants. They spared neither old nor young, but cut down, one
								after another, all whom they met, the women and children, the very
								beasts of burden, and every living thing which they 
									saw. For the Thracians, when they dare, can be as
								bloody as the worst barbarians .

There in Mycalessus the wildest panic ensued, and destruction in
								every form was rife. They even fell upon a boys' school, the largest
								in the place, which the children had just entered, and massacred
								them every one. No calamity could be worse than this, touching as it
								did the whole city, none was ever so sudden or so terrible.

When the news reached the Thebans they hastened to the rescue. Coming
								upon the Thracians before
								they had gone far, they took away the spoil and, putting them to
								flight, pursued them to the Euripus, where the ships which had
								brought them were moored.

Of those who fell, the greater number were slain in the attempt to
								embark; for they did not know how to swim, and the men on board,
								seeing what was happening, had anchored their vessels out of
									bow-shot . In
								the retreat itself the Thracians made a very fair defence against
								the Theban cavalry which first attacked them, running out and
								closing in again, after the manner of their country; and their loss
								was trifling. But a good many who remained for the sake of plunder
								were cut off within the city and slain. The whole number who fell
								was two hundred and fifty, out of thirteen hundred.

They killed, however, some of the Thebans and others who came to the
								rescue, in all about twenty, both horsemen and hoplites.
								Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs, was slain. A large
								proportion of the Mycalessians perished. Such was the fate of
								Mycalessus; considering the size of the city, no calamity more
								deplorable occurred during the war.

Demosthenes, who after helping to build the fort on the 
								Laconian coast, had sailed away to Corcyra , on his way thither
								destroyed a merchant-vessel anchored at Phea in Elis, which was
								intended to convey some 
								of the Corinthian hoplites to Sicily. But the crew escaped, and
								sailed in another vessel.

He went on to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, where he took on board some
								hoplites, and sent to the Messenians of Naupactus for others; he
								then passed over to the mainland of Acarnania, and touched at Alyzia
								and Anactorium ,
								which were at that time occupied by the Athenians.

While he was in those regions he met Eurymedon returning from Sicily,
								whither he had been sent during the winter in charge of the money
								which had been voted to the army ;

he reported, among other things, the capture of Plemmyrium by the
								Syracusans, of which he had heard on his voyage home. Conon too, the
								governor of Naupactus, brought word that the twenty-five Corinthian
									ships 
								which were stationed on the opposite coast were still showing a
								hostile front, and clearly meant to fight. He requested the generals
								to send him reinforcements, since his own ships— eighteen in number—
								were not able to give battle against the twenty-five of the enemy.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten ships, the swiftest which they
								had, to the fleet at Naupactus, while they themselves completed the
								muster of the expedition. Eurymedon, sailing to Corcyra, ordered the
								Corcyraeans to man fifteen ships, and himself levied a number of
								hoplites. He had turned back from his homeward voyage, and was now
								holding the command, to which, in conjunction with Demosthenes, he
								had been appointed. Demosthenes meanwhile had been collecting
								slingers and javelin-men in the neighbourhood of Acarnania.

The ambassadors from Syracuse who had gone to the 
								cities of Sicily after the taking of Plemmyrium, and had persuaded
								them to join in the war, were now about to
								bring back the army which they had collected. Nicias, having
								previous information, sent word to the Sicel allies of Athens who
								commanded the road, such as the Centoripes and Alicyaei, and told
								them not to let the forces of the enemy pass, but to unite and stop
								them; there was no likelihood, he said, that they would even think
								of taking another road, since they were not allowed to go through
								the country of the Agrigentines.

So when the forces of the Sicilian towns were on their way, the
								Sicels, complying with the request of the Athenians, set an ambush
								in three divisions, and falling upon them suddenly when they were
								off their guard, destroyed about eight hundred of them, and all the
								envoys except the Corinthian; he brought the survivors, numbering
								fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

About the same time arrived a reinforcement from Camarina 
								of five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin-men, and three hundred archers. The
								Geloans also sent five ships with four hundred javelin-men and two
								hundred horsemen.

Hitherto the Sicilian cities had only watched the course of events,
								but now the whole island, with the exception of Agrigentum, which
								was neutral, united with the Syracusans against the Athenians. 
							 After their misfortune in the Sicel country, the Syracusans deferred
								their intended attack for a
								time.

The forces which Demosthenes and Eurymedon had collected from Corcyra
								and the mainland were now ready, and they passed over the Ionian Sea
								to the promontory of Iapygia. Proceeding onwards, they touched at the Iapygian islands called Choerades, and took on
								board a hundred and fifty Iapygian javelin-men of the Messapian
								tribe.

After renewing an ancient friendship with Artas, a native prince who
								had furnished the javelinmen, they went on to Metapontium in Italy.
								They persuaded the Metapontians, who were their allies, to let them
								have two triremes and three hundred javelin-men; these they took
								with them and sailed to Thurii.

At Thurii they found that the party opposed to the Athenians had just
								been driven out by a revolution.

Wishing to hold another muster and inspection of their whole army,
								and to be sure that no one was missing, they remained there for some
								time. They also did their best to gain the hearty co-operation of
								the Thurians, and to effect an offensive and defensive alliance with
								them, now that they had succeeded in expelling the anti-Athenian
								party.

About the same time the Peloponnesians in their fleet of twenty-five
								ships, which was stationed opposite the Athenian fleet at Naupactus
								to protect the passage of the merchant-vessels going to Sicily, made
								ready for action. They manned some additional ships, which raised
								their number nearly to that of the Athenians, and anchored at
								Erineus off Achaia, which is in the territory of Rhypae.

The bay, off the shore of which they were stationed, has the form of
								a crescent, and the infantry of the Corinthians and of the allies,
								which had come from the country on both sides to co-operate with the
								fleet, was disposed on the projecting promontories. The ships, which
								were under the command of Polyanthes the Corinthian, formed a close
								line between the two points.

The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with
								thirty-three ships, under the command of Diphilus.

For a while the Corinthians remained motionless; in due time the
								signal was raised and they rushed upon the Athenians 
								and engaged with them. The battle was long and obstinate.

Three Corinthian ships were destroyed. The Athenians had no ships
								absolutely sunk, but about seven of them were rendered useless; for
								they were struck full in front by the beaks of the Corinthian
								vessels, which had the projecting beams of their prows designedly
								built thicker, and their bows were stoven in.

The engagement was undecided and both sides claimed the victory; but
								the Athenians gained possession of the wrecks because the wind blew
								them towards the open sea and the Corinthians did not put out again.
								So the two fleets parted. There was no pursuit, nor were any
								prisoners taken on either side. For the Corinthians and
								Peloponnesians were fighting close to the land and thus their crews
								escaped, while on the Athenian side no ship was sunk.

As soon as the Athenians had returned to Naupactus the Corinthians
								set up a trophy, insisting that they were the victors, because they
								had disabled more of the enemy's ships than the enemy of theirs.
								They refused to acknowledge defeat on the same ground which made the
								Athenians unwilling to claim the victory. For the Corinthians
								considered themselves conquerors, if they were not severely
								defeated; but the Athenians thought that they were defeated because
								they had not gained a signal victory.

When however the Peloponnesians had sailed away and the land-army was
								dispersed, the Athenians raised another trophy in Achaia, at a
								distance of about two miles and a quarter from the Corinthian
								station at Erineus. Such was the result of the engagement.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, when the Thurians had been prevailed upon
								to help them, and 
								had furnished seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin-men,
								comhanded the ships to sail towards the territory of Crotona, and
								themselves, after holding a review of all their infantry at the
								river Sybaris, led them through the territory of Thurii.

On their arrival at the river Hylias the people of
								Crotona sent to them, and said that they could not allow the army to
								march through their country. So they directed their march down to
								the sea and passed the night at the mouth of the river, where they
								were met by their ships. On the following day they re-embarked the
								army and coasted along, touching at the cities which they passed,
								with the exception of Locri , until they came to
								the promontory of Petra near Rhegium.

The Syracusans, hearing of their approach, desired to have another
								trial of the fleet, and to use the army which
								they had collected with the express purpose of bringing on an
								engagement before Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived in Sicily.

Profiting by the experience which they had acquired in the last
								sea-fight, they devised several improvements in the construction of
								their vessels. They cut down and strengthened the prows, and also
								made the beams which proejected from them thicker; these latter they
								supported underneath with stays of timber extending from the beams
								to and through the sides of the ship a length of nine feet within
								and nine without, after the fashion in which the Corinthians had
								refitted their prows before they fought with the squadron from
								Naupactus.

For the Syracusans hoped thus to gain an advantage over the Athenian
								ships, which were not constructed to resist such improvements, but
								had their prows slender, because they were in the habit of rowing
								round an enemy and striking the side of his vessel instead of
								meeting him prow to prow. The plan would be the more effectual,
								because they were going to fight in the Great Harbour, where many
								ships would be crowded in a narrow space. They would charge full in
									 face, and presenting their own massive and solid
								beaks would stave in the hollow and weak forepart of their enemies'
									ships ;

while the Athenians, confined as they were, would not be able to
								wheel round them or break their line before striking, to which
								manœuvres they mainly trusted— the want of room would make the one
								impossible, and the Syracusans themselves would do their best to
								prevent the other.

What had hitherto been considered a defect of skill on the part of
								their pilots, the practice of striking beak to beak, would now be a
								great advantage, to which they would have constant recourse; for the
								Athenians, when forced to back water, could only retire towards the
								land, which was too near, and of which but a small part, that is to
								say, their own encampment, was open to them. The Syracusans would be
								masters of the rest of the harbour, and, if the Athenians were hard
								pressed at any point, they would all be driven together into one
								small spot, where they would run foul of one another and fall into
								confusion.

(Which proved to be the case; for nothing was more disastrous to the
								Athenians in all these seafights than the impossibility of
								retreating, as the Syracusans could, to any part of the harbour.)
								Again, while they themselves had command of the outer sea and could
								charge from it and back water into it whenever they pleased, the
								Athenians would be unable to sail into the open and turn before
									striking ; besides, Plemmyrium was hostile to them,
								and the mouth of the harbour was narrow.

Having thus adapted their plans to the degree of naval skill and
								strength which they possessed, the Syracusans, greatly encouraged by the
								result of the previous engagement, attacked the Athenians both by
								sea and land.

A little before the fleet sailed forth, Gylippus led the land-forces
								out of the city against that part of the of the city against that
								part of the Athenian wall which faced Syracuse, while
								some of the heavy-armed troops, which together with the cavalry and
								light infantry were stationed at the Olympieum, approached the lines
								of the enemy from the opposite side. Nearly at the same instant the
								ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out.

The Athenians at first thought that they were going to make an
								attempt by land only, but when they saw the ships suddenly bearing
								down upon them they were disconcerted. Some mounted the walls or
								prepared to meet their assailants in front of them; others went out
								against the numerous cavalry and javelin-men, who were hastening
								from the Olympieum and the outer side of the wall; others manned the
								ships or prepared to fight on the beach. When the crews had got on
								board they sailed out with seventy-five ships; the number of
								Syracusan ships being about eighty.

During a great part of the day the two fleets continued advancing and
								retreating and skirmishing with one another.
								Neither was able to gain any considerable advantage, only the
								Syracusans sank one or two ships of the Athenians; so they parted,
								and at the same time the infantry retired from the walls.

On the following day the Syracusans remained quiet and gave no sign
								of what they meant to do next. Seeing how close the conflict had
								been, Nicias expected another attack; he therefore compelled the
								trierarchs to repair their ships wherever they were injured, and
								anchored merchant-vessels in front of the palisades which the
								Athenians had driven into the sea so as to form a kind of dock for
								the protection of their own ships;

these he placed at a distance of about two hundred feet from one
								another, in order that any ship which was hard pressed might have a
								safe retreat and an opportunity of going out again at leisure. These
								preparations occupied the Athenians for a whole day from morning to
								night.

On the next day, in the same manner as before but at an earlier hour,
								the Syracusans attacked the Athenians both
								by sea and land.

Again the ships faced one another, and again a great part of the day
								was passed in skirmishing. At length Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus,
								a Corinthian, who was the ablest pilot in the Syracusan fleet,
								persuaded the commanders to send A message to the proper authorities
								in the city desiring them to have the market transferred as quickly
								as possible to the shore, and to compel any one who had food for
								sale to bring his whole stock thither. The sailors would thus be
								enabled to disembark and take their midday meal close to the ships;
								and so after a short interval they might, without waiting until the
								next day, renew the attack upon the Athenians when least expected.

The generals, agreeing to the proposal, sent the message, and the
								market was brought down to the shore. Suddenly the Syracusans backed
								water and rowed towards the city; then disembarking they at once
								took their meal on the spot.

The Athenians, regarding their retreat as a confession of defeat,
								disembarked at leisure, and among other matters set about preparing
								their own meal, taking for granted that there would be no more
								fighting that day.

Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again bore down upon
								them; the Athenians, in great disorder and most of them fasting,
								hurried on board, and with considerable difficulty got under weigh.

For some time the two fleets looked at one another, and did not
								engage; after a while the Athenians thought they had better not
								delay until they had fairly tired themselves out, but attack at
								once.

So, cheering on one another, they charged and fought. The Syracusans
								remained firm, and meeting the enemy prow to prow, as they had
								resolved, stove in by the strength of their beaks a
								great part of the bows of the Athenian ships. Their javelin-men on
								the decks greatly injured the enemy. Still more mischief was done by
								Syracusans who rowed about in light boats and dashed in upon the
								blades of the enemy's oars, or ran up alongside and threw darts at
								the sailors.

By such expedients as these the Syracusans, who made a great effort,
								gained the victory; and the Athenians, retreating between the
								merchant-vessels, took refuge at their own moorings.

The ships of the enemy pursued them as far as the entrance, but they
								were prevented from following further by leaden dolphins, which were
								suspended aloft from beams placed in the merchantvessels.

Two Syracusan ships, in the exultation of victory, approached too
								near and were disabled; one of them was taken with its whole crew.
								The Syracusans damaged many of the Athenian ships and sank seven;

the crews were either killed or taken prisoners. They then retired
								and raised trophies of the two sea-fights. They were now quite
								confident that they were not only equal but far superior to the
								Athenians at sea, and they hoped to gain the victory on land as
								well. So they prepared to renew the attack on both elements.

But in the midst of their preparations Demosthenes and Eurymedon
								arrived with the Athenian 
								reinforcements. They brought a fleet, including foreign ships, of
								about seventy-three sail, carrying five thousand heavy infantry of
								their own and of their allies, numerous javelin-men, slingers, and
								archers, both Hellenic and Barbarian, and abundant supplies of every
								kind. The Syracusans and their allies were in consternation.

It seemed to them as if their perils would never have an end when
								they saw, notwithstanding the fortification of
								Decelea, another army arriving nearly equal to the former, and
								Athens displaying such varied and exuberant strength; while the
								first Athenian army regained a certain degree of confidence after
								their disasters. Demosthenes at once saw how matters stood; he knew
								that there was no time to be lost, and resolved that it should not
								be with him as it had been with Nicias.

For Nicias was dreaded at his first arrival, but when, instead of at
								once laying siege to Syracuse, he passed the winter at Catana, he
								fell into contempt, and his delay gave Gylippus time to come with an
								army from Peloponnesus. Whereas if he had struck hard at first, the
								Syracusans would never even have thought of getting fresh troops;
								strong in their own self-sufficiency, they would have discovered
								their inferiority only when the city had been actually invested, and
								then, if they had been sent for reinforcements, they would have
								found them useless. Demosthenes, reflecting on all this, and aware
								that he too would never again be in a position to inspire such
								terror as on the day of his arrival, desired to take the speediest
								advantage of the panic caused by the appearance of his army.

Accordingly, seeing that the cross-wall of the Syracusans which had
								prevented the Athenians from investing them was but a single line,
								and that if he could gain the command of the way up to Epipolae and
								take the camp which was on the high ground the wall would be easily
								captured, for no one would so much as stand his ground against them,
								he resolved to make the attempt at once.

This would be the shortest way of putting an end to the war. If he
								succeeded, Syracuse would fall into his hands; if he failed, he
								meant to bring away the expedition;

he would no longer wear out the Athenian army, and weaken the state
								to no purpose. 
							 The Athenians began by ravaging the fields of the Syracusans about
								the Anapus, and regained their former superiority both by sea and
								land. At sea the Syracusans no longer opposed them; and on land they
								merely sent out parties of cavalry and javelin-men
								from the Olympieum.

Before he attacked Epipolae, Demosthenes wished to try what could be
								done with engines against the counter-wall. But the engines
								which he brought up were burnt by the enemy, who fought from the
								wall, and, after making assaults at several points, the Athenian
								forces were repulsed. He now determined to delay no longer, and
								persuaded Nicias and his colleagues to carry out the plan of
								attacking Epipolae.

To approach during the daytime and ascend the heights undetected
								appeared to be impossible; so he resolved to attack by night. He
								ordered provisions for five days, and took with him all the masons
								and carpenters in the army; also a supply of arrows and of the
								various implements which would be required for siege-works if he
								were victorious. About the first watch he, Eurymedon, and Menander
								led out the whole army and marched towards Epipolae.

Nicias was left in the Athenian fortifications. Reaching Epipolae at
								the Euryelus, where their first army had originally ascended , and advancing undiscovered by the garrison to
								the fort which the Syracusans had there erected, they took it and
								killed some of the guards.

But the greater number made good their escape and carried the news to
								the three fortified camps, one of the Syracusans, one of the other
								Sicilian Greeks, and one of the allies, which had been formed on
								Epipolae; they also gave the alarm to the six hundred who were an
								advanced guard stationed on this part of Epipolae . They hastened to meet the enemy, but Demosthenes
								and the Athenians came upon them and, in spite of a
								vigorous resistance, drove them back.

The Athenians immediately pressed forward; they were determined not
								to lose a moment or to slacken their onset until they had
								accomplished their purpose. Others captured the first part of the
								Syracusan counter-wall and, the guards taking to flight, began to
								drag off the battlements. Meanwhile the Syracusans, the allies, and
								Gylippus with his own troops, were hurrying from the outworks.

The boldness of this night attack quite amazed them. They had not
								recovered from their terror when they met the Athenians, who were at
								first too strong for them and drove them back. But now the
								conquerors, in the confidence of victory, began to fall into
								disorder as they advanced;

they wanted to force their way as quickly as they could through all
								that part of the enemy which had not yet fought, and they were
								afraid that if they relaxed their efforts the Syracusans might
								rally. The Boeotians were the first to make a stand: they attacked
								the Athenians, turned, and put them to flight.

The whole army was soon in utter confusion, and the perplexity was so
								great that from neither side could the particulars the conflict
								be exactly ascertained. In the daytime the combatants see more
								clearly; though even then only what is going on immediately around
								them, and that imperfectly— nothing of the battle as a whole. But in
								a night engagement, like this in which two great armies fought— the
								only one of the kind which occurred during the war— who could be
								certain of anything?

The moon was bright, and they saw before them, as men naturally would
								in the moonlight, the figures of one another, but were unable to
								distinguish with certainty who was friend or foe. Large bodies of
								heavy-armed troops, both Athenian and Syracusan, were moving about
								in a narrow space;

of the Athenians some were already worsted, while
								others, still unconquered, were carrying on the original movement. A
								great part of their army had not yet engaged, but either had just
								mounted the heights, or were making the ascent; and no one knew
								which way to go. For in front they were defeated already; there was
								nothing but confusion, and all distinction between the two armies
								was lost by reason of the noise.

The victorious Syracusans and their allies, who had no other means of
								communication in the darkness, cheered on their comrades with loud
								cries as they received the onset of their assailants. The Athenians
								were looking about for each other; and every one who met them,
								though he might be a friend who had turned and fled, they imagined
								to be an enemy. They kept constantly asking the watchword (for there
								was no other mode of knowing one another), and thus they not only
								caused great confusion among themselves by all asking at once, but
								revealed the word to the enemy.

The watchword of the Syracusans was not so liable to be discovered,
								because being victorious they kept together and were more easily
								recognized. So that when they were encountered by a superior number
								of the enemy they, knowing the Athenian watchword, escaped;

but the Athenians in a like case, failing to answer the challenge,
								were killed. Most disastrous of all were the mistakes caused by the
								sound of the Paean, which, the same being heard in both armies, was
								a great source of perplexity. For there were in the battle Argives,
								Corcyraeans, and other Dorian allies of the Athenians, and when they
								raised the Paean they inspired as much alarm as the enemy
								themselves;

so that in many parts of the army, when the confusion had once begun,
								not only did friends terrify friends and citizens their
								fellow-citizens whom they had encountered, but they attacked one
								another, and were with difficulty disentangled.

The greater number of those who were pursued and killed perished by
								throwing themselves from the cliffs; for the descent from Epipolae
								is by a narrow path. The fugitives who reached the
								level ground, especially those who had served in the former army and
								knew the neighbourhood, mostly escaped to the camp. But of the
								newly-arrived many missed their way, and, wandering about until
								daybreak, were then cut off by the Syracusan cavalry who were
								scouring the country.

On the following day the Syracusans erected two trophies, one on
								Epipolae at the summit of the ascent, the other at the
								spot where the Boeotians made the first stand. The Athenians
								received their dead under a flag of truce.

A considerable number of them and of their allies had fallen; there
								were however more arms taken than there were bodies of the slain;
								for those who were compelled to leap from the heights, whether they
								perished or not, had thrown away their shields.

The confidence of the Syracusans was restored by their unexpected
								success, and they sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to
								Agrigentum, then in a state of revolution, that he might win over
								the place if he could. Gylippus had gone off again by land to
								collect a new army in the other parts of Sicily, hoping after the
								victory of Epipolae to carry the Athenian fortifications by storm.

Meanwhile the Athenian generals, troubled by their recent defeat and
								the utter discouragement which prevailed in the
								army, held a council of war. They saw that their attempts all
								failed, and that the soldiers were weary of remaining. For they were
								distressed by sickness, proceeding from two causes:

the season of the year was that in which men are most liable to
								disease; and the place in which they were encamped was damp and
								unhealthy. And they felt that the situation was in every way
								hopeless. Demosthenes gave his voice against remaining;

he said that the decisive attack upon Epipolae had
								failed, and, in accordance with his original intention, he should
								vote for immediate departure while the voyage was possible, and
								while, with the help of the ships which had recently joined them,
								they had the upper hand at any rate by sea.

It was more expedient for the city that they should make war upon the
								Peloponnesians, who were raising a fort in Attica, than against the
								Syracusans, whom they could now scarcely hope to conquer; and there
								was no sense in carrying on the siege at a vast expense and with no
								result. This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

Nicias in his own mind took the same gloomy view of their affairs;
								but he did not wish openly to confess their weakness, or by a
								public vote given in a numerous assembly to let their intention
								reach the enemy's ears, and so lose the advantage of departing
								secretly whenever they might choose to go.

He had moreover still some reason to suppose that the Syracusans, of
								whose condition he was better informed than the other generals, were
								likely to be worse off than themselves if they would only persevere
								in the siege; they would be worn out by the exhaustion of their
								resources; and now the Athenians with their additional ships had
								much greater command of the sea.-There was a party in Syracuse
								itself which wanted to surrender the city to the Athenians, and they
								kept sending messages to Nicias and advising him not to depart.
								Having this information he was still wavering and considering, and
								had not made up his mind.

But in addressing the council he positively refused to withdraw the
								army; he knew, he said, that the Athenian people would not forgive
								their departure if they left without an order from home. The men
								upon whose votes their fate would depend would not, like themselves,
								have seen with their own eyes the state of affairs;
								they would only have heard the criticisms of others, and would be
								convinced by any accusations which a clever speaker might bring
									forward .

Indeed many or most of the very soldiers who were now crying out that
								their case was desperate would raise the opposite cry when they
								reached home, and would say that the generals were traitors, and had
								been bribed to depart; and therefore he, knowing the tempers of the
									Athenians, would for
								his own part rather take his chance and fall, if he must, alone by
								the hands of the enemy, than die unjustly on a dishonourable charge at the hands of
								the Athenians.

And, after all, the Syracusans were in a condition worse than their
								own; for they had to maintain mercenary troops; they were spending
								money on garrisons, and had now kept up a large navy for a whole
								year; already in great difficulties, they would soon be in greater;
								they had expended two thousand talents , and were heavily in arrear; and if by a failure
								in the pay they suffer any diminution of their present forces their
								affairs would be ruined. For they depended on mercenaries, who,
								unlike the Athenian allies, were under no compulsion to serve.

Therefore, he said, they ought to persevere in the siege, and not go
								away d disheartened by the greatness of the expense, for they were
								far richer than the enemy .

Nicias spoke thus decidedly because he knew exactly how matters stood
								in Syracuse; he was aware of their
								want of money, and of the secret existence of that party within the
								walls which wished well to the Athenians, and was continually
								sending word to him not to depart;

and the confidence in his navy, if not in his army, which now
								possessed him was greater than ever. But Demosthenes
								would not hear for an instant of persisting in the siege; if, he
								said, the army must remain and ought not to be removed without a
								vote of the assembly, then they should retire to Thapsus or Catana,
								whence they might overrun the whole country with their land-forces,
								maintaining themselves at the expense of the enemy and doing him
								great damage. They would thus fight their battles, not cooped up in
								the harbour, which gave an advantage to the enemy, but in the open
								sea, where their skill would be available and their charges and
								retreats would not be circumscribed by the narrow space which now
								hampered their movements whenever they had to put in or out.

In a word, he wholly disapproved of the Athenians continuing in their
								present position; they should with all speed break up the siege and
								be gone.

Eurymedon took the same side. Still Nicias resisted; there was delay
								and hesitation, and a suspicion that he might have some ground which
								they did not know for his unwillingness to yield. And so the
								Athenians stayed on where they were.

Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had not
								succeeded in his design upon Agrigentum; for while he was at
								Gela on his way the party indined to friendship with the Syracusans
								had been driven out. But Gylippus brought back a large army,
								together with the hoplites who had been sent in merchant-vessels
								from Peloponnesus in the spring , and had come by way of
								Libya to Selinus.

They had been driven to Libya by stress of weather, and the
								Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes and pilots. On their voyage
								they had made common cause with the Evesperitae, who were besieged
								by the Libyans. 
							 
							 After defeating the Libyans they sailed on to Neapolis, a
								Carthaginian factory which is the nearest point to Sicily, the
								passage taking two days and a night only; thence they crossed and
								came to Selinus.

On their arrival, the Syracusans immediately prepared to renew their
								attack upon the Athenians, both by land and sea. And the Athenian
								generals, seeing that their enemy had been reinforced by a new army,
								and that their own affairs, instead of improving, were daily growing
								worse in every respect, and being especially troubled by the
								sickness of their troops, repented that they had not gone before.
								Even Nicias now no longer objected, but only made the condition that
								there should be no open voting. So, maintaining such secrecy as they
								could, they gave orders for the departure of the expedition; the men
								were to prepare themselves against a given signal.

The preparations were made and they were on the point of sailing,
								when the moon, being just then at the full, was eclipsed. The mass
								of the army was greatly moved, and called upon the generals to
								remain. Nicias himself, who was too much under the influence of
								divination and such like, refused even to discuss the question of
								their removal until they had remained thrice nine days, as the
								soothsayers prescribed. This was the reason why the departure of the
								Athenians was finally delayed.

And now the Syracusans, having heard what had happened, were more
								eager than ever to prosecute the war to the
								end; they saw in the intention of the Athenians to depart a
								confession that they were no longer superior to themselves, either
								by sea or land; and they did not want them to settle down in some
								other part of Sicily where they would be more difficult to manage,
								but sought to compel them forthwith to fight at sea under the
								disadvantages of their present position.

So they manned their ships and exercised for as many days as they
								thought sufficient. When the time came they began by
								attacking the Athenian lines. A small number both of the hoplites
								and of the cavalry came out of some of the gates to meet them; they
								cut off however a portion of the hoplites, and, putting the main
								body to flight, drove them within their walls. The entrance was
								narrow, and the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few infantry.

The Syracusan army then retired. On the morrow their ships, in number
								seventy-six, sailed forth, and
								at the same time their landforces marched against the walls. The
								Athenians on their side put out with eighty-six ships; and the two
								fleets met and fought.

Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, hoping to
								surround the enemy, extended his line too far towards the land, and
								was defeated by the Syracusans, who, after overcoming the Athenian
								centre, cooped him up in the inner bay of the harbour. There he was
								slain, and the vessels which were under his command and had followed
								him were destroyed. The Syracusans now pursued and began to drive
								ashore the rest of the Athenian fleet.

Gylippus, observing the discomfiture of the enemy, who were being
								defeated and driven to land beyond their own palisade and the lines of
								their camp, hastened with a part of his army to the causeway which
								ran along the harbour, intending to kill all who landed, and to
								assist the Syracusans in capturing the ships, which could be more
								easily towed away if the shore was in the hands of their friends.

The Tyrrhenians, who guarded this part of the Athenian lines, seeing
								Gylippus and his forces advance in disorder, rushed out, and
								attacking the foremost put them to flight, and drove them into the
								marsh called Lysimelea.

But soon the Syracusans and their allies came up in greater numbers.
								The 
							 
							 Athenians in fear for their ships advanced to the support of the
								Tyrrhenians, and joined in the engagement; the Syracusans were
								overcome and pursued, and a few of their heavyarmed slain. Most of
								the Athenian ships were saved and brought back to the Athenian
								station. Still the Syracusans and their allies took eighteen, and
								killed the whole of their crews.

Then, hoping to burn the remainder of the fleet, they procured an old
								merchant-vessel, which they filled with faggots and brands; these
								they lighted, and as the wind blew right upon the enemy they let the
								ship go. The Athenians, alarmed for the safety of their fleet,
								contrived means by which they extinguished their flames, and
								succeeded in keeping the fireship at a distance. Thus the danger was
								averted.

The Syracusans now raised a trophy of their naval victory, and
								another marking their interception of the
								hoplites on the higher ground close to the wall at the place where
								they took the horses. 
							 The Athenians raised a trophy of the victory over the land-forces
								whom the Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and another of that which
								they had themselves gained with the rest of the army.

The Syracusans, who up to this time had been afraid of the
								reinforcements of Demosthenes, had now gained a brilliant success by
								sea as well as by land; the Athenians were in utter despair. Great
								was their surprise at the result, and still greater their regret
								that they had ever come.

The Sicilian were the only cities which they had ever encountered
								similar in character to their own , having the same
								democratic institutions and strong in ships, cavalry, and
								population. They were not able by holding out the prospect of a
								change of government to introduce an element of discord among them which might have gained them over , nor could
								they master them by
									a decided
								superiority of force. They had failed at almost every point, and
								were already in great straits, when the defeat at sea, which they
								could not have thought possible, reduced their fortunes to a still
								lower ebb.

The Syracusans at once sailed round the shore of the harbour without
								fear, and determined to close the mouth, that the Athenians
								might not be able, even if they wanted, to sail out by stealth.

For they were now striving, no longer to achieve their own
								deliverance, but to cut off the escape of the Athenians; they
								considered their position already far superior, as indeed it was,
								and they hoped that if they could conquer the Athenians and their
								allies by sea and land, their success would be glorious in the eyes
								of all the Hellenes, who would at once be set free, some from
								slavery, others from fear. For the Athenians, having lost so much of
								their power, would never be able to face the enemies who would rise
								up against them. And the glory of the deliverance would be ascribed
								to the Syracusans, who would be honoured by all living men and all
								future ages.

The conflict was still further ennobled by the thought that they were
								now conquering , not only the Athenians,
								but a host of their allies. And they themselves were not alone, but
								many had come to their support; they were taking the command in a
								war by the side of Corinth and Lacedaemon; they had offered their
								own city to bear the brunt of the encounter, and they had made an
								immense advance in naval power.

More nations met at Syracuse than ever gathered around any single
								city, although not so many as the whole number of
								nations enrolled in this war under the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.

I will now enumerate the various peoples who came to Sicily as
								friends or enemies, to share either in the
								conquest or in the defence of the country, and who fought before
									Syracuse , choosing
								their side, not so much from a sense of right, or from obligations
								of kinship, as from the accident of compulsion or of their own
								interest.

The Athenians themselves, who were Ionians, went of their own free
								will against the Syracusans, who were
								Dorians; they were followed by the Lemnians and Imbrians 
								and the then inhabitants of Aegina , and by the Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in
									Euboea : all these were their own colonists,
								speaking the same language with them, and retaining the same
								institutions.

Of the rest who joined in the expedition, some were subjects, others
								independent allies, some again mercenaries.

Of the subjects and tributaries, the Eretrians, Chalcidians,
								Styreans, and Carystians came from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and
								Tenians from the islands; the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from
								Ionia. Of these however the Chians were independent, and
								instead of paying tribute, provided ships. All or nearly all were
								Ionians and descendants of the Athenians, with the exception of the
								Carystians, who are Dryopes. They were subjects and constrained to
								follow, but still they were Ionians fighting against Dorians. There
								were also Aeolians, namely, the Methymnaeans , who
								furnished ships but were not tributaries, and the Tenedians and
								Aenians, who paid tribute.

These Aeolians were compelled to fight against their Aeolian
								founders, the Boeotians, who formed part of the Syracusan army. The
								Plataeans were the only Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, a natural
								result of mutual hatred. The Rhodians and Cytherians were both
								Dorians; the Cytherians, although Lacedaemonian colonists, bore arms in the
								Athenian cause against the Lacedaemonians who came with Gylippus;

and the Rhodians, though by descent Argive, were compelled to fight
								against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and against the Geloans,
								who were actually their own colony , and were taking part
								with Syracuse. Of the islanders around Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians
								and Zacynthians were independent ; still, being islanders, they followed
								under a certain degree of constraint;

for the Athenians were masters of the sea. The Corcyraeans, who were
								not only Dorians but actually Corinthians, were serving against
								Corinthians and Syracusans, although they were the colonists of the
								one and the kinsmen of the other; they followed under a decent
								appearance of compulsion, but quite readily, because they hated the
									Corinthians . The
								Messenians too, as the inhabitants of Naupactus were now called,
								including the garrison of Pylos, which was at that time held by the
								Athenians, were taken by them to the war.

A few Megarians ,
								having the misfortune to be exiles, were thus induced to fight
								against the Selinuntians, who were Megarians like themselves . 
							 The service of the remaining allies was voluntary.

The Argives , not so much because they were allies of Athens, as owing to their
								hatred of the Lacedaemonians, and the desire of each man among them to better himself at the time, followed the Athenians,
								who were Ionians, being themselves Dorians, to fight against
								Dorians. The Mantineans and other Arcadians were mercenaries
								accustomed to attack any enemy who from time to time might be
								pointed out to them, and were now ready, if they were paid, to
								regard the Arcadians, who were in the service of the
									Corinthians , as their enemies. The Cretans and
								Aetolians also served for hire; the Cretans, who had once joined
								with the Rhodians in the foundation of Gela ; came with
								reluctance; nevertheless for pay they consented to fight against
								their own colonists.

Some of the Acarnanians came to aid their Athenian allies, partly
								from motives of gain, but much more out of regard for
									Demosthenes 
								and good-will to Athens. All these dwelt on the eastern side of the
								Ionian Gulf.

Of the Hellenes in Italy, the Thurians and Metapontians, constrained
								by the necessities of a revolutionary period, joined in the
								enterprise; of the Hellenes in Sicily, the Naxians and Catanaeans.
								Of Barbarians, there were the Egestaeans, who invited the
								expedition, and the greater part of the Sicels, and, besides native
								Sicilians, certain Tyrrhenians who had a quarrel
								with the Syracusans; also Iapygians , who served for hire.
								These were the nations who followed the Athenians.

The Syracusans, on the other hand, were assisted by the Camarinaeans,
								who were their nearest neighbours, and
								by the Geloans, who dwelt next beyond them;

and then (for the Agrigentines, who came next, were neutral) by the
								still more distant Selinuntians. All these inhabited the region of
								Sicily which lies towards Libya. On the side looking towards the Tyrrhenian Gulf the Himeraeans, the only Hellenic
								people in those parts, were also their only allies.

These were the Hellenic peoples in Sicily who fought on the side of
								the Syracusans; they were Dorians and independent. As for
								Barbarians, they had only such of the Sicels as had not gone over to
								the Athenians. 
							 Of Hellenes who were not inhabitants of Sicily, the Lacedaemonians
								provided a Spartan 
								general; the Lacedaemonian forces were all Neodamodes and Helots.
								(The meaning of the word Neodamode is freedman.) The Corinthians
								were the only power which furnished both sea and land forces. Their
								Leucadian and Ambraciot kinsmen accompanied them; from Arcadia came
								mercenaries sent by Corinth; there were also Sicyonians who served
								under compulsion ;

and of the peoples beyond the Peloponnese, some Boeotians.— This
								external aid however was small compared with the numerous troops of
								all kinds which the Sicilian Greeks themselves supplied; for they
								dwelt in great cities, and had mustered many ships and horses and
								hoplites, besides a vast multitude of other troops. And again, the
								proportion furnished by the Syracusans themselves was greater than
								that of all the rest put together; their city was the largest, and
								they were in the greatest danger.

Such were the allies who were assembled on both sides. At that time
								they were all on the spot, and nothing whatever
								came afterwards to either army.

The Syracusans and the allies naturally thought that the struggle
								would be brought to a glorious end if, after having defeated the
								Athenian fleet, they took captive the whole of their great armament,
								and did not allow them to escape either by sea or land.

So they at once began to close the mouth of the Great Harbour, which
								was about a mile wide, by means of triremes,
								merchant-vessels, and small boats, placed broadside, which they
								moored there. They also made every preparation for a naval
								engagement, should the Athenians be willing to hazard another; and
								all their thoughts were on a grand scale.

The Athenians, seeing the closing of the harbour and inferring the
								intentions of the enemy, 
								proceeded to hold a council.

The generals and officers met and considered the difficulties of
								their position. The most pressing of all was the want of food. For
								they had already sent to Catana, when they intended to depart, and
								stopped the supplies for the present; and they could get no more in
								the future unless they recovered the command of the sea. They
								resolved therefore to quit their lines on the higher ground and to
								cut off by a cross-wall a space close to their ships, no greater
								than was absolutely required for their baggage and for their sick;
								after leaving a guard there they meant to put on board every other
								man, and to launch all their ships, whether fit for service or not;
								they would then fight a decisive battle, and, if they conquered, go
								to Catana; but if not, they would burn their ships, and retreat by
								land in good order, taking the nearest way to some friendly country,
								Barbarian or Hellenic.

This design they proceeded to execute, and withdrawing quietly from
								the upper walls manned their whole fleet, compelling every man of
								any age at all suitable for service to embark.

The entire number of the ships which they manned was about a hundred
								and ten. They put on board numerous archers and javelin-men,
								Acarnanians, and other foreigners, and made such preparations for
								action as their difficult situation and the nature of their
									plan allowed.

When all was nearly ready, Nicias, perceiving that his men were
								depressed by their severe defeat at sea, which was so new an
								experience to them, while at the same time the want of
								provisions made them impatient to risk a battle with the least
								possible delay, called the whole army together, and before they
								engaged exhorted them as follows:—

'Soldiers of Athens and of our allies, we have all the same interest
								in the coming struggle ; every one of us as well as of
								our enemies will now have to fight for his life and for his country,
								and if only we can win in the impending sea-fight, every one may see
								his native city and his own home once more.

But we must not be faint-hearted, nor behave as if we were mere
								novices in the art of war, who when defeated in their first battle
								are full of cowardly apprehensions and continually retain the
								impress of their disaster.

You, Athenians, have had great military experience; and you, allies,
								are always fighting at our side. Remember the sudden turns of war;
								let your hope be that fortune herself may yet come over to us; and
								prepare to retrieve your defeat in a manner worthy of the greatness
								of your own army which you see before you

'We have consulted the pilots about any improvements which seemed
								likely to avail against the crowding of ships in the narrow
								harbour, as well as against the force on the enemy's decks, which in
								previous engagements did us so much harm, and we have adopted them
								as far as we had the means.

Many archers and javelin-men will embark, and a great number of other
								troops, whom if we were going to fight in the open sea we should not
								employ because they increase the weight of the ships, and therefore
								impede our skill; but here, where we are obliged to fight a
								landbattle on ship-board , they will be
								useful.

We have thought of all the changes which are necessary
								in the construction of our ships, and in order to counteract the
								thickness of the beams on the enemy's prows, for this did us more
								mischief than anything else, we have provided iron grapnels, which
								will prevent any ship striking us from getting off if the marines
								are quick and do their duty.

For, as I tell you, we are positively driven to fight a land-battle
								on ship-board, and our best plan is neither to back water ourselves
								nor to allow the enemy to back water after we have once closed with
								him. Recollect that the shore, except so far as our land-forces
								extend, is in their hands.

'Knowing all this, you must fight to the last with all your strength,
								and not be driven ashore. When ship strikes ship, refuse to
								until you have swept the enemy's heavy-armed from their decks.

I am speaking to the hoplites rather than to the sailors; for this is
								the special duty of the men on deck. We may still reckon on the
								superiority of infantry.

The sailors I would exhort, nay I would implore them, not to be
								paralysed by their disasters; for they will find the arrangements on
								deck improved, and the numbers of the fleet increased. Some among
								you have long been deemed Athenians, though they are not; and to
								them I say, Consider how precious is that privilege, and how worthy
								to be defended. You were admired in Hellas because you spoke our
								language and adopted our manners, and you shared equally with
								ourselves in the substantial advantages of our empire, while you
								gained even more than we by the dread which you inspired in
								subject-states and in your security against wrong.

You alone have been free partners in that empire; you ought not to
								betray it now. And so, despising the Corinthians whom you have
								beaten again and again, and the Sicilians who never dared to withstand us when our fleet was in its prime, repel
								your enemies, and show that your skill even amid weakness and
								disaster is superior to the strength of another in the hour of his
								success.

'Let me appeal once more to you who are Athenians, and remind you
								that there are no more ships like
								these in the dockyards of the Piraeus, and that you have no more
								young men fit for service. In any event but victory your enemies
								here will instantly sail against Athens, while our countrymen at
								home, who are but a remnant, will be unable to defend themselves
								against the attacks of their former foes reinforced by the new
								invaders. You who are in Sicily will instantly fall into the hands
								of the Syracusans (and you know how you meant to deal with them),
								and your friends at Athens into the hands of the Lacedaemonians.

In this one struggle you have to fight for yourselves and them. Stand
								firm therefore now, if ever, and remember one and all of you who are
								embarking that you are both the fleet and army of your country, and
								that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens: for
								her sake if any man exceed another in skill or courage let him
								display them now; he will never have a better opportunity of doing
								good to himself and saving his country.'

Nicias, as soon as he had done speaking, gave orders to man the
								ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans could see clearly enough from the
								preparations which the Athenians were making that they were going to
								fight. But they had also previous notice, and had been told of the
								iron grapnels;

and they took precautions against this as against all the other
								devices of the Athenians. They covered the prows of their vessels
								with hides, extending a good way along the upper part of their
								sides, so that the grapnels might slip and find no
								hold.

When all was ready, Gylippus and the other generals exhorted their
								men in the following words:—

'That our actions so far have been glorious, and that in the coming
								conflict we shall be fighting for a
								glorious prize, most of you, Syracusans and allies, seem to be
								aware: what else would have inspired you with so much energy? But if
								any one has failed to understand our position, we will enlighten
								him.

The Athenians came hither intending to enslave first of all Sicily,
								and then, if they succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas,
								they having already the largest dominion of any Hellenic power, past
								or present. But you set mankind the example of withstanding that
								invincible navy; which you have now defeated in several engagements
								at sea, and which you will probably defeat in this.

For when men are crippled in what they assume to be their strength,
								any vestige of self-respect is more completely lost than if they had
								never believed in themselves at all. When once their pride has had a
								fall they throw away the power of resistance which they might still
								exert. And this we may assume to be the condition of the Athenians.

'Far otherwise is it with us. The natural courage, which even in the
								days of our inexperience dared to risk all, is now better
								assured, and when we have the further conviction that he is the
								strongest who has overcome the strongest, the hopes of every one are
								redoubled. And in all enterprises the highest hopes infuse the
								greatest courage.

Their imitation of our modes of fighting will be useless to them. To
								us they come naturally, and we shall readily adapt ourselves to any
								arrangements of ours which they have borrowed. But to them the
								employment of troops on deck is a novelty; they will
								be encumbered with crowds of hoplites and crowds of javelinmen,
								Acarnanians and others, who are mere awkward landsmen put into a
								ship, and will not even know how to discharge their darts when they
								are required to keep their places. Will they not make the ships
								unsteady? And their own movements will be so unnatural to them that
								they will all fall into utter confusion.

The greater number of the enemy's ships will be the reverse of an
								advantage to him, should any of you fear your inequality in that
								respect; for a large fleet confined in a small space will be
								hampered in action and far more likely to suffer from our devices.

And I would have you know what I believe on the best authority to be
								the simple truth. .Their misfortunes paralyse them, and they are
								driven to despair at finding themselves helpless. They have grown
								reckless, and have no confidence in their own plans. They will take
								their chance as best they can, and either force a way out to sea, or
								in the last resort retreat by land; for they know that they cannot
								in any case be worse off than they are.

'Against such disorder, and against hateful enemies whose good
								fortune has run away from them to us, let us advance
								with fury. We should remember in the first place that men are doing
								a most lawful act when they take vengeance upon an enemy and an
								aggressor, and that they have a right to satiate their heart's
								animosity; secondly, that this vengeance, which is proverbially the
								sweetest of all things, will soon be within our grasp.

I need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our worst enemies.
								They came against our land that they might enslave us, and if they
								had succeeded they would have inflicted the greatest sufferings on
								our men, and the worst indignities upon our wives and children, and
								would have stamped a name of dishonour upon our whole
								city.

Wherefore let no one's heart be softened towards them. Do not
								congratulate yourselves at the mere prospect of getting safely rid
								of them. Even if they conquer they can only depart. But supposing
								that we obtain, as we most likely shall, the fulness of our desires,
								in the punishment of the Athenians and in the confirmation to Sicily
								of the liberties which she now enjoys, how glorious will be our
								prize! Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which they lose little
								if they fail, and win all if they succeed.'

When Gylippus and the other Syracusan generals had, like Nicias,
								encouraged their troops, perceiving the Athenians
								to be manning their ships, they presently did the same.

Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and seeing how great and how
								near the peril was (for the ships were on the very point of rowing
								out), feeling too, as men do on the eve of a great struggle, that
								all which he had done was nothing, and that he had not said half
								enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each of them by
								his father's name, and his own name, and the name of his tribe, he
								entreated those who had made any reputation for themselves not to be
								false to it, and those whose ancestors were eminent not to tarnish
								their hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were the
								inhabitants of the freest country in the world, and how in Athens
								there was no interference with the daily life of any man . He
								spoke to them of their wives and children and their fathers' Gods,
								as men will at such a time; for then they do not care whether their
								common-place phrases seem to be out of date or not, but loudly
								reiterate the old appeals, believing that they may be of some
								service at the awful moment.

When he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as
								the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the
								land-forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he could, so
								that they might be of the greatest use in encouraging the combatants
								on board ship.

Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board the
								Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted their own station,
								and proceeded straight to the closed mouth of the harbour, intending
								to force their way to the open sea where a passage was still left.

The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with nearly the
								same number of ships as
								before. A detachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbour;
								the remainder were disposed all round it in such a manner that they
								might fall on the Athenians from every side at once, and that their
								land-forces might at the same time be able to co-operate wherever
								the ships retreated to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded
								the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing; Pythen and the Corinthians
								occupied the centre.

When the Athenians approached the closed mouth of the harbour the
								violence of their onset overpowered the ships which were stationed
								there; they then attempted to loosen the fastenings. Whereupon from
								all sides the Syracusans and their allies came bearing down upon
								them, and the conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but
								extended throughout the harbour. No previous engagement had been so
								fierce and obstinate.

Great was the eagerness with which the rowers on both sides rushed
								upon their enemies whenever the word of command was given; and keen
								was the contest between the pilots as they manœuvred one against
								another. The marines too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck
								ship, the service on deck should not fall short of the rest; every
								one in the place assigned to him was eager to be 
								foremost among his fellows.

Many vessels meeting— and never did so many fight in so small a
								space, for the two fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred—
								they were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because they
								had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the line; they
								generally fouled one another as ship dashed against ship in the
								hurry of flight or pursuit.

All the time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on deck
								poured showers of javelins and arrows and stones upon the enemy; and
								when the two closed, the marines fought hand to hand, and
								endeavoured to board.

In many places, owing to the want of room, they who had struck
								another found that they were struck themselves; often two or even
								more vessels were unavoidably entangled about one, and the pilots
								had to make plans of attack and defence, not against one adversary
								only, but against several coming from different sides. The crash of
								so many ships dashing against one another took away the wits of the
								crews, and made it impossible to hear the boatswains, whose voices
								in both fleets rose high, as they gave directions to the rowers, or
								cheered them on in the excitement of the struggle.

On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must
								force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never of returning
								in safety to their native land. To the Syracusans and their allies
								was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies,
								and of a victory by which every man would exalt the honour of his
								own city.

The commanders too, when they saw any ship backing without necessity,
								would call the captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians,
								whether they were retreating because they expected to be more at
								home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon that sea which had been their own so long ; on the Syracusan side, whether, when
								they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were only
								eager to find some means of flight, they would themselves fly from
								the fugitives.

While the naval engagement hung in the balance the two armies on
								shore had great trial and conflict of soul. The Sicilian soldier
								was animated by the hope of increasing the glory which he had
								already won, while the invader was tormented by the fear that his
								fortunes might sink lower still.

The last chance of the Athenians lay in their ships, and their
								anxiety was dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied; and it was
								not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the
								same impression of it.

Being quite close and having different points of view, they would
								some of them see their own ships victorious; their courage would
								then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the Gods not to take
								from them their hope of deliverance. But others, who saw their ships
								worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more
								utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others
								again, who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which
								was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible;
								they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and
								fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on; for at every instant
								they were all but saved or all but lost.

And while the strife hung in the balance you might hear in the
								Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or
								defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host
								in extremity of danger. Not less agonising were the feelings of
								those on board.

At length the Syracusans and their allies, after a protracted
								struggle, put the Athenians to flight, and triumphantly bearing down
								upon them, and encouraging one another with loud cries and
								exhortations, drove them to land.

Then that part of the navy which had not been taken in the deep water
								fell back in confusion to the shore, and the crews rushed out of the
								ships into the camp And the land-forces, no longer now divided in
								feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish,
								ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained
								of the wall; but the greater number began to look to themselves and
								to their own safety. Never had there been a greater panic in an
								Athenian army than at that moment.

They now suffered what they had done to others at Pylos. For at Pylos
								the Lacedaemonians, when they saw their ships destroyed, knew that
								their friends who had crossed over into the island of Sphacteria
								were lost with them . And so now the Athenians, after
								the rout of their fleet, knew that they had no hope of saving
								themselves by land unless events took some extraordinary turn.

Thus, after a fierce battle and a great destruction of ships and men
								on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies
								gained the victory. They gathered up the wrecks and bodies of the
								dead, and sailing back to the city, erected a trophy.

The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misery, never so much as thought
								of recovering their wrecks or of asking leave to collect their dead.
								Their intention was to retreat that very night.

Demosthenes came to Nicias and proposed that they should once more
								man their remaining vessels and endeavour to force the passage at
								daybreak, saying that they had more ships fit for service than the
								enemy. For the Athenian fleet still numbered sixty, but the enemy
								had less than fifty. Nicias approved of his proposal, and they would
								have manned the ships, but the sailors refused to embark;

for they were paralysed by their defeat, and had no longer any hope
								of succeeding. So the Athenians all made up their
								minds to escape by land.

Hermocrates the Syracusan suspected their intention, and dreading
								what might happen if their vast army, retreating by land and
								settling somewhere in Sicily, should choose to renew the war, he
								went to the authorities, and represented to them that they ought not
								to allow the Athenians to withdraw by night (mentioning his own
								suspicion of their intentions), but that all the Syracusans and
								their allies should go out in advance, wall up the roads, and occupy
								the passes with a guard.

They thought very much as he did, and wanted to carry out his plan,
								but doubted whether their men, who were too glad to repose after a
								great battle, and in time of festival— for there happened on that
								very day to be a sacrifice to Heracles— could be induced to obey.
								Most of them, in the exultation of victory, were drinking and
								keeping holiday, and at such a time how could they ever be expected
								to take up arms and go forth at the order of the generals? On these
								grounds the authorities decided that the thing was impossible.

Whereupon Hermocrates himself, fearing lest the Athenians should gain
								a start and quietly pass the most difficult places in the night,
								contrived the following plan: when it was growing dark he sent
								certain of his own acquaintance, accompanied by a few horsemen, to
								the Athenian camp. They rode up within earshot, and pretending to be
								friends (there were known to be men in the city who gave information
								to Nicias of what went on) called to some of the
								soldiers, and bade them tell him not to withdraw his army during the
								night, for the Syracusans were guarding the roads; he should make
								preparation at leisure and retire by day.

Having delivered their message they departed, and those
								who had heard them informed the Athenian generals.

On receiving this message, which they supposed to be genuine, they
								remained during the night. And having once given up the intention of
								starting immediately, they decided to remain during the next day,
								that the soldiers might, as well as they could, put together their
								baggage in the most convenient form, and depart, taking with them
								the bare necessaries of life, but nothing else.

Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus, going forth before them with
								their land-forces, blocked the roads in the country by which
								the Athenians were likely to pass, guarded the fords of the rivers
								and streams, and posted themselves at the best points for receiving
								and stopping them. Their sailors rowed up to the beach and dragged
								away the Athenian ships. The Athenians themselves had burnt a few of
								them, as they had intended ,
								but the rest the Syracusans towed away, unmolested and at their
								leisure, from the places where they had severally run aground, and
								conveyed them to the city.

On the third day after the sea-fight, when Nicias and Demosthenes
								thought that their preparations 
								were complete, the army began to move. They were in a dreadful
								condition;

not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole
								fleet, and instead of their expected triumph had brought the utmost
								peril upon Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights
								which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to
								every eye and mind.

The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend
								lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and
								dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived but had to be
								left were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied
								than those who were gone.

Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction;
								they would beg that they might be taken with them, and call by name
								any friend or relation whom they saw passing; they would hang upon
								their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and, when
								their limbs and strength failed them, and they dropped behind, many
								were the imprecations and cries which they uttered. So that the
								whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could
								hardly make up their minds to stir, although they were leaving an
								enemy's country, having suffered calamities too great for tears
								already, and dreading miseries yet greater in the unknown future.

There was also a general feeling of shame and self-reproach,— indeed
								they seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a
								city captured after a siege; and of a great city too. For the whole
								multitude who were marching together numbered not less than forty
								thousand. Each of them took with him anything he could carry which
								was likely to be of use. Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary
								to their practice when under arms, conveyed about their persons
								their own food, some because they had no attendants, others because
								they could not trust them; for they had long been deserting, and
								most of them had gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they
								carried sufficient;

for the supplies of the camp had failed. Their disgrace and the
								universality of the misery, although there might be some consolation
								in the very community of suffering, were nevertheless at that moment
								hard to bear, especially when they remembered from what pride and
								splendour they had fallen into their present low estate.

Never had an Hellenic army experienced such a
								reverse. They had come intending to enslave others,
								and they were going away in fear that they would be themselves
								enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns with which they had put
								to sea, they were now departing amid appeals to heaven of another
								sort. They were no longer sailors but landsmen, depending, not upon
								their fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great
								danger which still threatened them all these things appeared
								endurable.

Nicias, seeing the army disheartened at their terrible fall, went
								along the ranks and encourage and consoled them
								as well as he could. In his fervour he raised his voice as he passed
								from one to another and spoke louder and louder, desiring that the
								benefit of his words might reach as far as possible.

'Even now, Athenians and allies, we must hope: men have been
								delivered out of worse straits than these,
								and I would not have you judge yourselves too severely on account
								either of the reverses which you have sustained or of your present
								undeserved miseries.

I too am as weak as any of you; for I am quite prostrated by my
								disease, as you see. And although there was a time when I might have
								been thought equal to the best of you in the happiness of my private
								and public life, I am now in as great danger, and as much at the
								mercy of fortune, as the meanest. Yet my days have been passed in
								the performance of many a religious duty, and of many just and
								blameless action.

Therefore my hope of the future is still courageous, and our calamities
								do not appal me as they might . Who knows that they may not be
								lightened?

For our enemies have had their full share of success, and if we were
								under the jealousy of any God when our fleet started , by this time we have been punished enough.
								Others ere now have attacked their neighbours; they have done as men
								will do, and suffered what men can bear. We may therefore begin to
								hope that the Gods will be more merciful to us; for we now invite
								their pity rather than their jealousy. And look at your own
								well-armed ranks; see how many brave soldiers you are, marching in
								solid array ,
								and do not be dismayed; bear in mind that wherever you plant
								yourselves you are a city already, and that no city in Sicily will
								find it easy to resist your attack, or can dislodge you if you
								choose to settle.

Provide for the safety and good order of your own march, and remember
								every one of you that on whatever spot a man is compelled to fight,
								there if he conquer he may find a native land and a fortress.

We must press forward day and night, for our supplies are but scanty.
								The Sicels through fear of the Syracusans still adhere to us, and if
								we can only reach any part of their territory we shall be among
								friends, and you may consider yourselves secure. We have sent to
								them, and they have been told to meet us and bring food.

In a word, soldiers, let me tell you that you must be brave; there is
								no place near to which a coward can fly . And
								if you now escape your enemies, those of you who are not Athenians
								will see once more the home for which they long, while you Athenians
								will again rear aloft the fallen greatness of Athens. For men, and
								not walls or ships in which are no men, constitute a state.'

Thus exhorting his troops Nicias passed through the army, and
								wherever he saw gaps in the ranks or the men dropping out of line,
								he brought them back to their proper place. Demosthenes did the same
								for the troops under his command, and gave them
								similar exhortations.

The army marched disposed in a hollow oblong:
								the division of Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes following;
								the hoplites enclosed within their ranks the baggage-bearers and the
								rest of the host.

When they arrived at the ford of the river Anapus they found a force
								of the Syracusans and of their allies drawn up to meet them; these
								they put to flight, and getting command of the ford, proceeded on
								their march.

The Syracusans continually harassed them, the cavalry riding
								alongside, and the light-armed troops hurling darts at them. On this
								day the Athenians proceeded about four and a half miles and encamped
								at a hill. On the next day they started early, and, having advanced
								more than two miles, descended into a level plain, and encamped. The
								country was inhabited, and they were desirous of obtaining food from
								the houses, and also water which they might carry with them, as
								there was little to be had for many miles in the country which lay
								before them.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had gone forward, and at a point where the
								road ascends a steep hill called the Acraean height, and there is a
								precipitous ravine on either side, were blocking up the pass by a
								wall.

On the next day the Athenians advanced, although again impeded by the
								numbers of the enemy's cavalry who rode alongside, and of their
								javelin-men who threw darts at them. For a long time the Athenians
								maintained the struggle, but at last retired to their own
								encampment. Their supplies were now cut off, because the horsemen
								circumscribed their movements.

In the morning they started early and resumed their march. They
								pressed onwards to the hill where the way was
								barred, and found in front of them the Syracusan infantry drawn up
								to defend the wall, in deep array, for the pass was
								narrow.

Whereupon the Athenians advanced and assaulted the barrier, but the
								enemy, who were numerous and had the advantage of position, threw
								missiles upon them from the hill, which was steep;

and so, not being able to force their way, they again retired and
								rested. During the conflict, as is often the case in the fall of the
								year, there came on a storm of rain and thunder, whereby the
								Athenians were yet more disheartened, for they thought that
								everything was conspiring to their destruction .

While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans despatched a
								division of their army to raise a wall behind them across the road
								by which they had come; but the Athenians sent some of their own
								troops and frustrated their intention.

They then retired with their whole army in the direction of the plain
								and passed the night. On the following day they again advanced. The
								Syracusans now surrounded and attacked them on every side, and
								wounded many of them. If the Athenians advanced they retreated, but
								charged them when they retired, falling especially upon the
								hindermost of them, in the hope that, if they could put to flight a
								few at a time, they might strike a panic into the whole army.

In this fashion the Athenians struggled on for a long time, and
								having advanced about three-quarters of a mile rested in the plain.
								The Syracusans then left them and returned to their own encampment.

The army was now in a miserable plight, being in want of every
								necessary; and by the continual assaults of the enemy great numbers of
								the soldiers had been wounded. Nicias and Demosthenes, perceiving
								their condition, resolved during the night to light as many
								watch-fires as possible and to lead off their forces. They intended
								to take another route and march towards the sea in the
								direction opposite to that from which the Syracusans were watching
								them.

Now their whole line of march lay, not towards Catana, but towards
								the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela, and
								the cities, Hellenic or Barbarian, of that region.

So they lighted numerous fires and departed in the night. And then,
								as constantly happens in armies , especially in
								very great ones, and as might be expected when they were marching by
								night in an enemy's country, and with the enemy from whom they were
								flying not far off, there arose a panic among them, and they fell
								into confusion.

The army of Nicias, which was leading the way, kept together, and got
								on considerably in advance, but that of Demosthenes, which was the
								larger half, was severed from the other division, and marched in
								worse order.

At daybreak, however, they succeeded in reaching the sea, and
								striking into the Helorine road marched along it, intending as soon
								as they arrived at the Cacyparis to follow up the course of the
								river through the interior of the island. They were expecting that
								the Sicels for whom they had sent would meet them on this road.

When they had reached the river they found there also a guard of the
								Syracusans cutting off the passage by a wall and palisade. They
								forced their way through and, crossing the river, passed on towards
								another river which is called the Erineus, this being the direction
								in which their guides led them.

When daylight broke and the Syracusans and their allies saw that the
								Athenians had departed, most
								of them thought that Gylippus had let them go on purpose, and were
								very angry with him. They easily found the line of their retreat,
								and quickly following, came up with them about the time of the
								midday meal.

The troops of Demosthenes were last; they were marching 
								slowly and in disorder, not having recovered from the panic of the
								previous night, when they were overtaken by the Syracusans, who
								immediately fell upon them and fought. Separated as they were from
								the others, they were easily hemmed in by the Syracusan cavalry and
								driven into a narrow space.

The division of Nicias was now as much as six miles in advance, for
								he marched faster, thinking that their safety depended at such a
								time, not in remaining and fighting, if they could avoid it, but in
								retreating as quickly as they could, and resisting only when they
								were positively compelled.

Demosthenes, on the other hand, who had been more incessantly
								harassed throughout the retreat, because marching last he was first
								attacked by the enemy, now, when he saw the Syracusans pursuing him,
								instead of pressing onward, ranged his army in order of battle. Thus
								lingering he was surrounded, and he and the Athenians under his
								command were in the greatest confusion. For they were crushed into a
								walled enclosure, having a road on both sides and planted thickly
								with olive-trees, and missiles were hurled at them from all points.

The Syracusans naturally preferred this mode of attack to a regular
								engagement. For to risk themselves against desperate men would have
								been only playing into the hands of the Athenians. Moreover, every
								one was sparing of his life; their good fortune was already assured,
								and they did not want to fall in the hour of victory. Even by this
								irregular mode of fighting they thought that they could overpower
								and capture the Athenians.

And so when they had gone on all day assailing them with missiles
								from every quarter, and saw that they were
								quite worn out with their wounds and all their other sufferings,
								Gylippus and the Syracusans made a proclamation, first of all to the
								islanders, that any of them who pleased might come over to them and
								have their freedom.

But only a few cities accepted the offer. At length an
								agreement was made for the entire force under Demosthenes. Their
								arms were to be surrendered, but no one was to suffer death, either
								from violence or from imprisonment, or from want of the bare means
								of life.

So they all surrendered, being in number six thousand, and gave up
								what money they had. This they threw into the hollows of shields and
								filled four. The captives were at once taken to the city. On the
								same day Nicias and his division reached the river Erineus, which he
								crossed, and halted his army on a rising ground.

On the following day he was overtaken by the Syracusans, who told him
								that Demosthenes had surrendered, and bade him do the
								same. He, not believing them, procured a truce while he sent a
								horseman to go and see.

Upon the return of the horseman bringing assurance of the fact, he
								sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he would
								agree, on behalf of the Athenian state, to pay the expenses which
								the Syracusans had incurred in the war, on condition that they
								should let his army go; until the money was paid he would give
								Athenian citizens as hostages, a man for a talent.

Gylippus and the Syracusans would not accept these proposals, but
								attacked and surrounded this division of the army as they had the
								other, and hurled missiles at them from every side until the
								evening.

They too were grievously in want of food and necessaries.
								Nevertheless they meant to wait for the dead of the night and then
								to proceed. They were just resuming their arms, when the Syracusans
								discovered them and raised the Paean.

The Athenians, perceiving that they were detected, laid down their
								arms again, with the exception of about three hundred men who broke
								through the enemy's guard, and made their escape in the darkness as
								best they could.

When the day dawned Nicias led forward his army, and the Syracusans
								and the allies again assailed them on
								every side, hurling javelins and other missiles at them.

The Athenians hurried on to the river Assinarus. They hoped to gain a
								little relief if they forded the river, for the mass of horsemen and
								other troops overwhelmed and crushed them; and they were worn out by
								fatigue and thirst. But no sooner did they reach the water than they
								lost all order and rushed in;

every man was trying to cross first, and, the enemy pressing upon
								them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless.
								Being compelled to keep close together they fell one upon another,
								and trampled each other under foot: some at once perished, pierced
								by their own spears; others got entangled in the baggage and were
								carried down the stream.

The Syracusans stood upon the further bank of the river, which was
								steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, who were
								huddled together in the deep bed of the stream and for the most part
								were drinking greedily.

The Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered them, falling
								chiefly upon those who were in the river. Whereupon the water at
								once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and
								dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it.

At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps upon one another in
								the water and the army was utterly undone, some perishing in
								the river, and any who escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias
								surrendered to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than in the
								Syracusans. He entreated him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they
								pleased with himself, but not to go on killing the men.

So Gylippus gave the word to make prisoners. Thereupon
								the survivors, not including however a large number whom the
								soldiers concealed, were brought in alive. As for the three hundred
								who had broken through the guard in the night, the Syracusans sent
								in pursuit and seized them.

The total of the public prisoners when collected was not great; for
								many were appropriated by the soldiers, and the whole of Sicily was
								full of them, they not having capitulated like the troops under
								Demosthenes.

A large number also perished; the slaughter at the river being very
								great, quite as great as any which took place in the Sicilian war;
								and not a few had fallen in the frequent attacks which were made
								upon the Athenians during their march. Still many escaped, some at
								the time, others ran away after an interval of slavery, and all
								these found refuge at Catana.

The Syracusans and their allies collected their forces and returned
								with the spoil, and as many prisoners as they could take with them,
								into the city.

The captive Athenians and allies they deposited in the quarries,
								which they thought would be the safest place of confinement. Nicias
								and Demosthenes they put to the sword, although against the will of
								Gylippus. For Gylippus thought that to carry home with him to
								Lacedaemon the generals of the enemy, over and above all his other
								successes, would be a brilliant triumph.

One of them, Demosthenes, happened to be the greatest foe, and the
								other the greatest friend of the Lacedaemonians, both in the same
								matter of Pylos and Sphacteria. For Nicias had taken up their
									cause , and had persuaded the Athenians to make
								the peace which set at liberty the prisoners taken in the island.

The Lacedaemonians were grateful to him for the service, and this was
								the main reason why he trusted Gylippus and surrendered himself to
								him. But certain Syracusans, who had been in communication with him,
								were afraid (such was the report) that on some
								suspicion of their guilt he might be put to the torture and bring
								trouble on them in the hour of their prosperity. Others, and
								especially the Corinthians, feared that, being rich, he might by
								bribery escape and do them further mischief.

So the Syracusans gained the consent of the allies and had him
								executed. For these or the like reasons he suffered death. No one of
								the Hellenes in my time was less deserving of so miserable an end;
								for he lived in the practice of every virtue.

Those who were imprisoned in the quarries were at the beginning of
								their captivity harshly 
								treated by the Syracusans. There were great numbers of them, and
								they were crowded in a deep and narrow place. At first the sun by
								day was still scorching and suffocating, for they had no roof over
								their heads, while the autumn nights were cold, and the extremes of
								temperature engendered violent disorders.

Being cramped for room they had to do everything on the same spot.
								The corpses of those who died from their wounds, exposure to heat
								and cold, and the like, lay heaped one upon another. The smells were
								intolerable; and they were at the same time afflicted by hunger and
								thirst.During eight months they were allowed only about half a pint
								of water and a pint of food a day. Every kind of misery which could
								befall man in such a place befell them.

This was the condition of all the captives for about ten weeks. At
								length the Syracusans sold them, with the exception of the Athenians
								and of any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had sided with them in the
								war.

The whole number of the public prisoners is not accurately known, but
								they were not less than seven thousand.

Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed,
								as I think, of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was
								the greatest-the most glorious to the victors, the
								most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were utterly and at all
								points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious.

Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was
								saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home. 
							 Thus ended the Sicilian expedition.

THE news was brought to Athens, but the Athenians could not believe
								that the armament had been so completely annihilated,
								although they had the positive assurances of the very soldiers who had escaped from the scene of action. At
								last they knew the truth; and then they were furious with the
								orators who had joined in promoting the expedition — as if they had
								not voted it themselves — and with the soothsayers, and prophets,
								and all who by the influence of religion had at the time inspired
								them with the belief that they would conquer Sicily.

Whichever way they looked there was trouble; they were overwhelmed by
								their calamity, and were in fear and consternation unutterable. The
								citizens and the city were alike distressed; they had lost a host of
								cavalry and hoplites and the flower of their youth, and there were
								none to replace them . And when they saw an insufficient
								number of ships in their docks, and no crews to man them, nor money
								in the treasury, they despaired of deliverance. They had no doubt
								that their enemies in Sicily, after the great victory which they had
								already gained, would at once sail against the Piraeus. Their
								enemies in Hellas, whose resources were now doubled, would likewise
								set upon them with all their might both by sea and land, and would
								be assisted by their own revolted allies.

Still they determined, so far as their situation allowed, not to give
									 way. They would procure timber and money by
								whatever means they might, and build a navy. They would make sure of
								their allies, and above all of Euboea. Expenses in the city were to
								be economised, and they were to choose a council of the elder men,
								who should advise together, and lay before the people the measures
								which from time to time might be required.

After the manner of a democracy, they were very amenable to
								discipline while their fright lasted. They proceeded to carry out
								these resolutions. And so the summer ended.

During the following winter all Hellas was stirred by the great
								overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily.
								The states which had been neutral determined that the time had come
								when, invited or not, they could no longer stand aloof from the war;
								they must of their own accord attack the Athenians. They considered,
								one and all, that if the Sicilian expedition had succeeded, they
								would sooner or later have been attacked by them. The war would not
								last long, and they might as well share in the glory of it. The
								Lacedaemonian allies, animated by a common feeling, were more eager
								than ever to make a speedy end of their great hardships.

But none showed greater alacrity than the subjects of the Athenians,
								who were everywhere willing even beyond their power to revolt; for
								they judged by their excited feelings , and would not
								admit a possibility that the Athenians could survive another summer.

To the Lacedaemonians themselves all this was most encouraging; and
								they had in addition the prospect that their allies from Sicily
								would join them at the beginning of spring with a large force of
								ships as well as men; necessity having at last compelled them to
								become a naval power.

Everything looked hopeful, and they determined to strike promptly and
								vigorously. They considered that by the successful
								termination of the war they would be finally delivered from dangers
								such as would have surrounded them if the Athenians had become
								masters of Sicily . Athens once overthrown, they might
								assure to themselves the undisputed leadership of all Hellas.

At the beginning therefore of this winter, Agis the Lacedaemonian
								king led out a body of troops from Decelea, and collected from
								the allies contributions towards the expenses of a navy. Then
								passing to the Malian Gulf, he carried off from the Oetaeans, who
								were old enemies, the greater part of their cattle, and
								exacted money of them; from the Achaeans of Phthia, and from the
								other tribes in that region, without the leave and in spite of the
								remonstrance of the Thessalians, to whom they were subject, he
								likewise extorted money and took some hostages, whom he deposited at
								Corinth, and tried to force upon them the Lacedaemonian alliance.

The whole number of ships which the allies were to build was fixed by
								the Lacedaemonians at a hundred: twenty-five were to be built by
								themselves and twenty-five by the Boeotians, fifteen by the Phocians
								and Locrians, fifteen by the Corinthians, ten by the Arcadians,
								Pellenians, and Sicyonians, ten by the Megarians, Troezenians,
								Epidaurians, and Hermionians. Every sort of preparation was made,
								for the Lacedaemonians were determined to prosecute the war at the
								first appearance of spring.

The Athenians also carried out their intended preparations during
								this winter. They collected timber and built ships; they fortified
								Sunium for the protection of their corn-ships on the voyage round to
								Athens; also they abandoned the fort in Laconia which they had
								erected while sailing to Sicily , and cut down any
								expenses which seemed unnecessary. Above all, they
								kept strict watch over their allies, apprehending revolt.

During the same winter, while both parties were as intent upon their
								preparations as if the war were only just beginning, first
								among the Athenian subjects the Eubeans sent envoys to negotiate
								with Agis. Agis accepted their proposals, and summoned from
								Lacedaemon Alcamenes the son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus, that
								they might take the command in Euboea. They came, accompanied by
								three hundred of the Neodamodes. But while he was making ready to
								convey them across the strait, there arrived envoys from Lesbos,
								which was likewise anxious to revolt;

and as the Boeotians were in their interest, Agis was
								persuaded to defer the expedition to Euboea while he prepared to
								assist the Lesbians. He appointed Alcamenes, who had been designed
								for Euboea, their governor; and he further promised them ten ships,
								the Boeotians promising ten more. All this was done without the
								authority of the Lacedaemonian government;

for Agis, while he was with his army at Decelea, had the right to
								send troops whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact
								money. And at that particular time he might be said to have far more
								influence over the allies than the Lacedaemonians at home, for he
								had an army at his disposal, and might appear in formidable strength
								anywhere at any time. 
							 While he was supporting the Lesbians, certain Chians and Erythraeans
								(who were also ready to revolt) had recourse, not to Agis,
								but to Lacedaemon;

they were accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, whom King Darius
								the son of Artaxerxes had appointed to be military 
								governor of the provinces on the coast of Asia. Tissaphernes too was
								inviting the assistance of the Lacedaemonians, and promised to
								maintain their troops;

for the King had quite lately been demanding of him the revenues due
								from the Hellenic cities in his province, which he had been
								prevented by the Athenians from collecting, and therefore still
								owed. He thought that if he could weaken the Athenians he would be
								more likely to get his tribute; he hoped also to make the
								Lacedaemonians allies of the King, and by their help either to slay
								or take alive, in accordance with the King's orders, Amorges the
								natural son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria.

While the Chians and Tissaphernes were pursuing their common object,
								Calligitus the son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras the
								son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their own country,
								who were residing at the court of Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces,
								came to Lacedaemon. They had been commissioned by Pharnabazus to
								bring up a fleet to the Hellespont; like Tissaphernes he was
								anxious, if possible, to induce the cities in his province to revolt
								from the Athenians, that he might obtain the tribute from them; and
								he wanted the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the King to
								come from himself.

The two parties— that is to say, the envoys of Pharnabazus and those
								of Tissaphernes— were acting independently; and a vehement contest
								arose at Lacedaemon, the one party urging the Lacedaemonians to send
								a fleet and army to Ionia and Chios, the other to begin with the
								Hellespont.

They were themselves far more favourable to the proposals of the
								Chians and Tissaphernes; for Alcibiades was in their interest, and
								he was a great hereditary friend of Endius, one of the Ephors of
								that year.— Through this friendship the Lacedaemonian name of
								Alcibiades had come into his family;

for Alcibiades was the name of Endius' father .— Nevertheless the
								Lacedaemonians, before giving an answer, sent a commissioner,
								Phrynis, one of their Perioeci, to see whether the Chians had as
								many ships as they said, and whether the power of the city was equal
								to her reputation. He reported that what they had heard was true.
								Whereupon they at once made alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans
								and voted them forty ships— there being at Chios already, as the
								Chians informed them, no less than sixty.

Of the forty ships they at first intended to send out ten themselves
								under the command of Melancridas their admiral; but an earthquake
								occurred; so instead of Melancridas they appointed Chalcideus, and
								instead of the ten ships they prepared to send five only, which they
								equipped in Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nineteenth
								year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were eager to get the
								fleet sent off at once. For their proposals, like those of the
								other allies, had been made secretly, and they were afraid that the
								Athenians would detect them. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians sent to
								Corinth three Spartans, who were to give orders that the ships then
								lying at the Isthmus should be as quickly as possible dragged over
								from the Corinthian gulf to the coast on the other side. They were
								all to be despatched to Chios, including the ships which Agis had
								been equipping for Lesbos. The allied fleet then at the Isthmus
								numbered in all thirtynine.

Calligitus and Timagoras, who represented Pharnabazus, took no part
								in the expedition to Chios, nor did
								they offer to contribute towards the expenses of it the money which
								they had brought with them, amounting to twenty-five
									talents ; they thought of
								sailing later with another expedition.

Agis, when he saw that the Lacedaemonians were bent on going to Chios
								first, offered no opposition; so the allies held a conference at
								Corinth, and after some deliberation determined to sail, first of
								all to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was equipping the
								five ships in Laconia, then to proceed to Lesbos, under the command
								of Alcamenes, whom Agis had previously designed to appoint to that
								island, and finally to the Hellespont; for this last command they
								had selected Clearchus the son of Rhamphias.

They resolved to carry over the Isthmus half the ships first; these
								were to sail at once, that the attention of the Athenians might be
								distracted between those which were starting and those which were to
								follow.

They meant to sail quite openly, taking it for granted that the
								Athenians were powerless, since no navy of theirs worth speaking of
								had as yet appeared. In pursuance of their plans they conveyed
								twenty-one ships over the Isthmus.

They were in a hurry to be off, but the Corinthians were unwilling to
								join them until the conclusion of the
								Isthmian games, which were then going on. Agis was prepared to
								respect their scruples and to take the responsibility of the
								expedition on himself.

But the Corinthians would not agree to this proposal, and there was
								delay. In the meantime the Athenians began to discover the
								proceedings of the Chians, and despatched one of their generals,
								Aristocrates, to accuse them of treason. They denied the charge;
								whereupon he desired them to send back with him a few ships as a
								pledge of their fidelity to the alliance;

and they sent seven. They could not refuse his request, for the Chian
								people were ignorant of the whole matter, while the oligarchs, who
								were in the plot, did not want to break with the multitude until
								they had secured their ground. Arid the Peloponnesian
								ships had delayed so long that they had ceased to expect them.

Meanwhile the Isthmian games were celebrated. The Athenians, to whom
								they had been 
								formally notified, sent representatives to them; and now their eyes
								began to be opened to the designs of the Chians. On their return
								home they took immediate measures to prevent the enemy's ships
								getting away from Cenchreae unperceived.

When the games were over, the Peloponnesians, under the command of
								Alcamenes, with their twenty-one ships set sail for Chios; the
								Athenians, with an equal number, first sailed up to them and tried
								to draw them into the open sea. The Peloponnesians did not follow
								them far, but soon turned back to Cenchreae; the Athenians likewise
								retired, because they could not depend on the fidelity of the seven
								Chian ships which formed a part of their fleet.

So they manned some more ships, making the whole number thirty-seven,
								and when the Peloponnesians resumed their voyage along the coast
								they pursued them into Piraeum, a lonely harbour, the last in the
								Corinthian territory before you reach Epidauria. One ship was lost
								by the Peloponnesians at sea, but they got the rest together and
								came to anchor in the harbour.

Again the Athenians attacked them, not only on the water, but also
								after they had landed; there was a fierce struggle, but no regular
								engagement; most of the enemy's ships were damaged by the Athenians
								on the beach, and their commander, Alcamenes, was slain. Some
								Athenians also fell.

When the conflict was over, the conquerors left a sufficient number
								of ships to watch the enemy, and with the remainder they lay
								to under a little island not far off, where they encamped, and sent
								to Athens, requesting reinforcements.

For on the day after the battle the Corinthians had come to assist the Peloponnesian ships, and the other inhabitants of
								the country quickly followed them. Foreseeing how great would be the
								labour of keeping guard on so desolate a spot, the Peloponnesians
								knew not what to do; they even entertained the idea of burning their
								ships, but on second thoughts they determined to draw them high up
								on shore, and to keep guard over them with their landforces
								stationed near, until some good opportunity of escape should occur.
								Agis was informed of their condition, and sent Thermon, a Spartan,
								to them.

The first tidings which had reached Sparta were to the effect that
								the ships had left the Isthmus (the Ephors having told Alcamenes to
								send a horseman announcing the fact), and immediately they
								determined to send out the five ships of their own which they had
								ready, under the command of Chalcideus, who was to be accompanied by
								Alcibiades. But when they were on the point of departure, a second
								messenger reported that the other squadron had been chased into
								Piraeum; and then, disheartened by finding that they had begun the
								Ionian war with a failure, they determined to give up sending the
								ships from Laconia, and even to recall some others which had already
								sailed.

Alcibiades, seeing the state of affairs, advised Endius and the
								Ephors to persevere in the expedition. They would arrive, he said,
								before the Chians had heard of the misadventure of the ships. He
								would himself, as soon as he reached Ionia, represent to the cities
								the weakness of the Athenians and the alacrity of the
								Lacedaemonians, and they would revolt at once; for they would
								believe him sooner than any one.

To Endius he argued in private ' 
								that he would win honour if he were the instrument of effecting a
								revolt in Ionia, and of gaining the alliance of the King ; he should not
								allow such a prize to fall into the hands of Agis';— now Agis was a
								personal enemy of Alcibiades.

His opinion prevailed with Endius and the other Ephors. So he put to
								sea with the .five ships, accompanied by Chalcideus the
								Lacedaemonian, and hastened on his way.

About this time sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had remained with
								Gylippus to the end of 
								the Sicilian war were returning home. They were caught in the
								neighbourhood of Leucadia and roughly handled by twenty-seven
								Athenian vessels, under the command of Hippocles the son of
								Menippus, which were on the watch for ships coming from Sicily; but
								all except one of them escaped the Athenians and sailed into
								Corinth.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voyage seized every one whom they
								met in order that their coming
								might not be reported. They touched first at the promontory of
								Corycus on the mainland, and there releasing their prisoners they
								held a preliminary conference with certain of the Chians, who were
								in the plot, and who advised them to give no notice of their
								intention, but to sail at once to the city.

So they appeared suddenly at Chios, to the great wonder and alarm of
								the people. The oligarchs had contrived that the council should be
								sitting at the time. Chalcideus and Alcibiades made speeches and
								announced that many more ships were on their way, but said nothing
								about the blockade of Piraeum.

So Chios first, and afterwards Erythrae, revolted from Athens. They
								then sailed with three vessels to Clazomenae, which they induced to
								revolt. The Clazomenians at once crossed over to the mainland and
								fortified Polichnè, intending in case of need to retreat thither
								from the little island on which Clazomenae stands. All the revolted
								cities were occupied in raising fortifications and preparing for
								war.

The news of the revolt of Chios soon reached Athens; and the
								Athenians realized at once the magnitude of the danger which now
								surrounded them. The greatest city of all had gone over to the
								enemy, and the rest of their allies were certain to rise. In the
								extremity of their alarm they abrogated the penalties denounced
								against any one who should propose or put to the vote the employment
								of the thousand talents which throughout the war they had hitherto
								jealously reserved . They now
								passed a decree permitting their use, and resolved to man a large
								number of ships; also to send at once to Chios eight ships which had
								been keeping guard at Piraeum, and had gone away under the command
								of Strombichides the son of Diotimus in pursuit of Chalcideus, but
								not overtaking him had returned. Twelve other ships, under the
								command of Thrasycles, were to follow immediately;

these too were to be taken from the blockading force. They also
								withdrew the seven Chian ships which were assisting them in the
								blockade of Piraeum; and setting free the slaves in them, put the
								freemen in chains. Other ships were then quickly manned by them and
								sent to take the place of all those which had been subtracted from
								the blockading squadron, and they proposed to equip thirty more.
								They were full of energy, and spared no effort for the recovery of
								Chios.

Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, and
								thence, taking with him an
								additional Samian vessel, sailed to Teos and warned the inhabitants
								against revolt. But Chalcideus with twentythree ships was on his way
								from Chios to Teos, intending to attack it; he was assisted by the
								land-forces of Clazomenae and Erythrae, which followed his movements
								on the shore.

Strombichides saw him in time, and put out to sea before he arrived.
									 When fairly away from land he observed the
								superior numbers of the fleet coming from Chios, and fled towards
								Samos, pursued by the enemy.

The land-forces were not at first received by the Teians, but after
								the flight of the Athenians they admitted them. The troops waited a
								little for the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit, but as he did
								not come they proceeded without him to demolish the fort which the
								Athenians had built for the protection of Teos on the land side. A
								few barbarians under the command of Stages, a lieutenant of
								Tissaphernes, came and joined in the work of demolition.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides to
								Samos, gave heavy arms to the crews of the ships which they had
								brought from Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios.

Then, having manned their own vessels and twenty others with Chians,
								they sailed to Miletus, intending to raise a revolt.— For
								Alcibiades, who was on friendly terms with the principal Milesians,
								wanted to gain over the place before any more ships from
								Peloponnesus arrived, and, using the Chian troops and those of
								Chalcideus only, to spread revolt far and wide among the cities of
								Ionia. Thus he would gain the chief glory of the war for the Chians,
								for himself, for Chalcideus;

and, in fulfilment of his promise , for Endius, who had sent
								him out.— They were not observed during the greater part of their
								voyage, and, although narrowly escaping from Strombichides, and from
								Thrasycles who had just arrived with twelve ships from Athens and
								had joined Strombichides in the pursuit, they succeeded in raising a
								revolt in Miletus. The Athenians followed close behind them with
								nineteen ships, but the Milesians would not receive them, and they
								came to anchor at Ladè, the island opposite the town.

Immediately after the revolt of Miletus the Lacedaemonians made their
								first alliance with the King of Persia, which was
								negotiated by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus. It ran as follows:

' The Lacedaemonians and their allies make an alliance with the King
								and Tissaphernes on the following terms:— 
							 'I. All the territory and all the cities which are in possession of
								the King, or were in 
								possession of his forefathers, shall be the King's , and whatever revenue or other advantages the
								Athenians derived from these cities, the King, and the
								Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall combine to prevent them from
								receiving such revenue or advantage. 
							 '

II. The King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall carry on
								the war against the Athenians in common, and they shall not make
								peace with the Athenians unless both parties— the King on the one
								hand and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the other— agree. 
							 'III.

Whosoever revolts from the King shall be the enemy of the
								Lacedaemonians and their allies, and whosoever revolts from the
								Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be the enemy of the King in
								like manner.' 
							 Such were the terms of the alliance.

Shortly afterwards the Chians manned ten more ships and sailed to
								Anaea, wanting to hear whether the
								attempt on Miletus had succeeded, and to draw fresh cities into the
								revolt.

A message however was brought from Chalcideus, bidding them return,
								and warning them that Amorges was coming thither by land at the head
								of an army. So they sailed to the Temple of Zeus , where they caught sight of sixteen Athenian
								ships which Diomedon, following Thrasycles, was bringing from
								Athens.

They instantly fled; one ship to Ephesus, the remainder towards Teos.
								Four of them the Athenians took empty, the crews having got safe to
								land; the rest escaped to Teos.

The Athenians then sailed away to Samos. The Chians with their
								remaining ships put to sea again, and, assisted by the land-forces
								of their allies , caused first Lebedus, and afterwards
								Erae, to revolt. Both the army and the fleet then returned home.

About the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships which had been
								chased into Piraeum, and were now
								blockaded by a like number of Athenian ships, made a sally, defeated
								the Athenians, and took four ships; they then got away to Cenchreae,
								and once more prepared to sail to Chios and Ionia. At Cenchreae they
								were met by Astyochus, the admiral from Lacedaemon, to whom the
								whole of the Peloponnesian navy was about to be entrusted.

By this time the land-forces of Clazomenae and Erythrae had retired from
								Teos, and Tissaphernes, who had
								led a second army thither in person and overthrown what was left of
								the Athenian fort, had retired also. Not long after his departure,
								Diomedon arrived with ten ships, and made an agreement with the
								Teians, who promised to receive the Athenians as well as the
								Peloponnesians. He then sailed to Erae, which he attacked without
								success, and departed.

About the same time a great revolution occurred in Samos. The people,
								aided by the crews of three Athenian vessels which
								happened to be on the spot, rose against the nobles, slew in all
								about two hundred of them, and banished four hundred more; they then
								distributed their land and houses among themselves. The Athenian
								people, now assured of their fidelity, granted them independence;
								and henceforward the city was in the hands of the democracy. They
								denied to the former landed proprietors all the privileges of citizenship, not even allowing them to contract
								marriage with any family belonging to the people, nor any of the
								people with them.

The zeal of the Chians did not abate. They had already begun too go
								out with armies and raise revolts independently of the
									Peloponnesians , and they wished to draw as many cities
								as they could into their own danger. During the same summer they
								sent out a Chian fleet numbering thirteen ships. The expedition was
								directed first against Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians having originally
								instructed their officers to proceed from Chios to Lesbos, and
								thence to the Hellespont . It was placed under
								the command of Deiniadas, one of the Perioeci. Meanwhile the
								infantry of the Peloponnesians and of the neighboring allies, under
								Evalas, a Spartan, moved along the shore towards Clazomenae and
								Cymè.

The fleet sailed to Lesbos, and first induced Methymna to rebel;
								there leaving four of their ships, with the remainder they raised a
								revolt in Mytilene.

Meanwhile Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, with four ships, set
								forth, as he intended, from
								Cenchreae, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after his arrival
								a division of the Athenian fleet, numbering twenty-five ships,
								sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon; Leon had
								arrived from Athens later than Diomedon with a reinforcement of ten
								ships.

On the same day, towards evening, Astyochus put to sea, and taking
								with him one Chian ship, sailed to Lesbos, that he might render any
								assistance which he could to the Chian fleet. He came to Pyrrha, and
								on the following day to Eresus, where he heard that
								Mytilenè had been taken by the Athenians at the first blow.

The Athenian ships had sailed right into the harbour when they were
								least expected, and captured the Chian vessels;

the men on board had then landed, and defeating in a battle a
								Mytilenean force which came out to meet them, had taken possession
								of the city. Astyochus heard the news from the Eresians, and from
								the Chian ships which had been left with Eubulus at Methymna. They
								had fled when Mytilenè was taken, and had now fallen in with him;
								but only three out of the four, for one of them had been captured by
								the Athenians. Upon this, instead of going on to Mytilenè, he raised
								a revolt in Eresus, and armed the inhabitants: he then disembarked
								the heavy-armed from his ships and sent them by land to Antissa and
								Methymna under the command of Eteonicus;

and with his own and the three Chian ships coasted thither himself,
								hoping that the Methymnaeans would take courage at the sight of them
								and persevere in their revolt. But everything went against him in
								Lesbos; so he re-embarked his troops and sailed back to Chios. The
								land-forces from the ships which were intended to go to the
									Hellespont also returned to their several homes.

Not long afterwards six ships came to Chios from the allied forces of
								the Peloponnesians now collected at Cenchreae. The Athenians, when
								they had re-established their influence in Lesbos, sailed away, and
								having taken Polichnè on the mainland, which the Clazomenians were
									fortifying , brought
								them all back to their city on the island, except the authors of the
								revolt, who had escaped to Daphnus. So Clazomenae returned to the
								Athenian alliance.

During the same summer the Athenians, who were stationed with twenty
								of their ships at the island
								of Ladè and were watching the enemy in Miletus,
								made a descent upon Panormus in the Milesian
								territory. Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian general with a few followers
								came out to meet
								them, but was killed. Three days later they again sailed across and
								set up a trophy, which the Milesians pulled down, because the
								Athenian's were not really masters of the ground at the time when
								they erected it.

Leon and Diomedon, who were at Lesbos with the rest of the Athenian
								fleet, stationed their ships at the islands called Oenussae which
								lie in front of Chios, at Sidussa and Pteleum, which were forts held
								by them in the Erythraean territory, and at Lesbos itself, and
								carried on the war by sea against the Chians.

The marines whom they had on board were hoplites taken from the roll
								and compelled to serve. They made descents upon Cardamylè and
								Bolissus, and having defeated with heavy loss the Chians who came
								out to meet them, they devastated all that region. In another battle
								at Phanae they defeated them again, and in a third at Leuconium.
								Henceforward the Chians remained within their walls. The Athenians
								ravaged their country, which was well stocked, and from the Persian
								War until that time had never been touched by an invader.

No people as far as I know, except the Chians and Lacedaemonians (but
								the Chians not equally with the Lacedaemonians), have preserved
								moderation in prosperity, and in proportion as their city has gained
								in power have gained also in the stability of their administration.

In this revolt they may seem to have shown a want of prudence, yet
								they did not venture upon it until many brave allies were ready to
								share the peril with them, and until the Athenians themselves seemed
								to confess that after their calamity in Sicily the state of their
								affairs was hopelessly bad. And, if they were deceived through the
								uncertainty of human things, this error of judgment was common to many who, like them, believed that the Athenian power
								would speedily be overthrown.

But now that they were driven off the sea and saw their lands
								ravaged, some of their citizens undertook to bring back the city to
								the Athenians. The magistrates perceived their design, but instead
								of acting themselves, they sent to Erythrae for Astyochus the
								admiral. He came with four ships which he had on the spot, and they
								considered together by what means the conspiracy might be suppressed
								with the least violence, whether by taking hostages or in some other
								way.

The Lacedaemonians were thus engaged in Chios when towards the end of
								the summer there came from Athens a
								thousand Athenian hoplites and fifteen hundred Argives, of whom five
								hundred were originally light-armed, but the Athenians gave them
								heavy arms; also a thousand of the allies. They were conveyed in
								forty-eight ships, of which some were transports, under the command
								of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides.

Sailing first to Samos they crossed over to Miletus, and there took
								up a position. The Milesians with a force of eight hundred
								heavy-armed of their own, the Peloponnesians who came with
								Chalcideus, and certain foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes, who was
								there in person with his cavalry, went out and engaged the Athenians
								and their allies.

The Argives on their own wing dashed forward, and made a disorderly
								attack upon the troops opposed to them, whom they despised; they
								thought that, being Ionians, they would be sure to run away .

But they were defeated by the Milesians, and nearly three hundred of
								them perished. The Athenians first overcame the Peloponnesians, and
								then forced back the barbarians and the inferior troops. But they
								never engaged the Milesians, who, after routing the
								Argives, when they saw their other wing defeated, returned to the
								city. The Athenians, having won the day, took up a position close
								under the walls of Miletus.

In this engagement the Ionians on both sides had the advantage of the
								Dorians; for the Athenians vanquished the Peloponnesians who were
								opposed to them, and the Milesians vanquished the Argives .
								The Athenians now raised a trophy, and prepared to build a wall
								across the isthmus which separates the city from the mainland,
								thinking that, if they could reduce Miletus, the other cities would
								quickly return to their allegiance.

But meanwhile, late in the afternoon, news was brought to them that a
								fleet of fifty-five ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily was close at
								hand. Hermocrates the Syracusan had urged the Sicilians to assist in
								completing the overthrow of Athens. Twenty ships came from Syracuse,
								two from Selinus, and with them the Peloponnesian ships which had
								been in preparation . The two squadrons were entrusted to
								Theramenes, who was to conduct them to Astyochus the admiral. They
								sailed first to Leros , an island lying off Miletus.

Thence, finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed away
								to the Iasian Gulf, wanting to ascertain the fate of the town.

Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian territory,
								the point of the gulf at which the fleet had passed the night, and
								from him they received news of the battle. For he had been present,
								and had fought on the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes. And he
								recommended them, if they did not mean to ruin their cause in Ionia
								and everywhere else, to assist Miletus at once, and break up the
								blockade.

They determined to go at daybreak and relieve the place. But
								Phrynichus the Athenian general had certain information from
								Leros of their approach, and, although his colleagues wanted to
								remain and risk a battle, he refused and declared that he would
								neither himself fight, nor allow them or any one else to fight if he
								could help it.

For when they might discover the exact number of the enemy's ships
								and the proportion which their own bore to them, and, before
								engaging, make adequate preparations at their leisure, he would not
								be so foolish as to risk all through fear of disgrace.

There was no dishonour in Athenians retreating before an enemy's
								fleet when circumstances required. But there would be the deepest
								dishonour under any circumstances in a defeat; and the city would
								then not only incur disgrace, but would be in the utmost danger.
								Even if their preparations were complete and satisfactory, Athens
								after her recent disasters ought not to take the offensive, or in
								any case not without absolute necessity;

and now when they were not compelled, why should they go out of their
								way to court danger? He urged them to put on board their wounded,
								and their infantry, and all the stores which they had brought with
								them, but to leave behind the plunder obtained from the enemy's
								country, that their ships might be lighter;

they should sail back to Samos, and there uniting all their forces,
								they might go on making attacks upon Miletus when opportunity
								offered. His advice was followed.

And not on this occasion only, but quite as much afterwards, whenever
								Phrynichus had to act, he showed himself to be a man of great
									sagacity .— So the Athenians departed that very
								evening from Miletus without completing their victory, and the Argives, hurrying away from Samos in a rage after
								their disaster, went home.

At dawn the Peloponnesians sailed from Teichiussa, and on their
								arrival at Miletus found that the Athenians had left:
								after remaining one day, on the morrow they took the Chian ships
								which under the command of Chalcideus had previously been chased
								into Miletus , and resolved to go back to Teichiussa
								and fetch that part of the tackle of which they had lightened the
								ships.

There they found Tissaphernes, who had come with his infantry; he
								persuaded them to sail against Iasus, in which his enemy Amorges
								lay. So they attacked Iasus, which they took by a sudden assault;
								for it never occurred to the inhabitants that their ships were not
								Athenian. The Syracusans distinguished themselves greatly in the
								action.

The Peloponnesians took captive Amorges the natural son of
								Pissuthnes, who had rebelled, and gave him to Tissaphernes, that, if
								he liked, he might convey him to the King in obedience to the royal
									command They then plundered Iasus, and the army
								obtained a great deal of treasure; for the city had been rich from
								early times.

They did no harm to the mercenaries of Amorges, but received them
								into their own ranks; for most of them came. from Peloponnesus. The
								town, and all their prisoners, whether bond or free, were delivered
								by them into the hands of Tissaphernes, who engaged to give them a
								Daric stater for each
								man; they then returned to Miletus.

Thence they despatched by land as far s Erythrae Pedaritus the son of
								Leon, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent out to be governor of Chios;
								he was escorted by the mercenaries who had been in the service of
								Amorges. To remain on the spot, and take charge of Miletus, they
								appointed Philip. So the summer ended.

During the following winter, Tissaphernes, after he had provided for
								the security of Iasus, came to Miletus.
								There he distributed one month's pay among all the ships, at the
								rate of an Attic drachma a day per man, as his envoy had promised at
								Lacedaemon; in future he proposed to give half a drachma only until
								he had asked the King's leave, promising that if he obtained it he
								would pay the entire drachma.

On the remonstrance, however, of Hermocrates the Syracusan general
								(Theramenes, not being himself admiral, but only taking charge of
								the ships which he was to hand over to Astyochus, took no interest
								in the matter of the pay), he promised to each man a payment of
								somewhat more than three obols, reckoning the total sum paid to
								every five ships. For he offered to every five ships, up to the
								number of fifty-five ,
								three talents a month, and to any ships in excess of this number he
								agreed to give at a like rate.

During the same winter there arrived at Samos from Athens thirty-five
								ships, under the command of
								Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. Whereupon the generals
								assembled their whole fleet, including the ships engaged at
									Chios , their purpose being to make a
								distribution of their forces by lot. The principal division was to
								continue watching Miletus, while a second force of ships and
								soldiers was to be sent to Chios.

Accordingly Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty
								ships, besides transports in which they conveyed a portion of the
								thousand heavy-armed who had joined the army at Miletus , sailed away to Chios, the duty which the
								lot assigned to them. The other generals remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, and having the mastery of the sea,
								prepared to make a descent upon Miletus.

Astyochus was at Chios selecting hostages as a precaution against the
								betrayal of these island to
									Athens , but when he heard of the reinforcements
								which Theramenes had brought, and of the improved prospects of the
								allies, he desisted, and taking with him his own Peloponnesian
								ships, ten in number , and ten Chian, he put to
								sea.

Failing in an attack upon Pteleum he sailed on to Clazomenae, and
								demanded that the Athenian party should settle at Daphnus 
								on the mainland, and come over to the Peloponnesians: Tamos, one of
								the Persian lieutenants of Ionia, joined in the demand.

But the Clazomenians would not listen to him; whereupon he assaulted
								the city (which was unwalled), but being unable to take it, sailed
								away with a strong wind. He was himself carried to Phocaea and Cymè,
								and the remainder of the fleet put into the islands, Marathussa,
								Pelè, and Drymussa, which lie off Clazomenae.

There, being detained eight days by the weather, they spoiled and
								destroyed part of the property of the Clazomenians which had been
								deposited in the islands, and, taking part on board, they sailed
								away to Phocaea and Cymè, where they rejoined Astyochus.

While Astyochus was there, envoys came to him from Lesbos; the
								Lesbians were once more eager to revolt, and he was willing to
								assist them; but the Corinthians and> the other allies were
								disheartened by the previous failure. So he put to sea and sailed
								back to Chios. His ships were scattered by a storm, and reached
								Chios from various places.

Soon afterwards Pedaritus and his army having come by land
								from Miletus to Erythrae, where he crossed the
								channel, arrived in Chios. On his arrival he found at his disposal
								the sailors whom Chalcideus had taken from his five ships and left in Chios fully armed, to the number
								of five hundred.

Some of the Lesbians renewing their proposal to revolt, Astyochus
								suggested to Pedaritus and the Chians that they should go with the
								fleet to Lesbos and raise the country; they would thus increase the
								number of their allies, and, even if the attempt did not wholly
								succeed, they would injure the Athenians. But they would not listen,
								and Pedaritus refused to let him have the Chian ships.

So Astyochus took five Corinthian ships and a sixth
								from Megara, one from Hermionè, and the Lacedaemonian ships which he had
								brought with him , and set sail for Miletus in order to
								assume his command. He threatened the Chians, again and again, that
								he would certainly not help them when their time of need came.

Touching at Corycus in Erythraean he passed the night there. The
								Athenian ships from Samos were now on their way to Chios; they had
								put in at a place where they were only divided from the
								Peloponnesians by a hill, and neither fleet knew that the other was
								so near.

But that night there came a despatch from Pedaritus informing
								Astyochus that certain Erythraean prisoners had been released by the
								Athenians from Samos on condition of betraying Erythrae, and had
								gone thither with that intention. Whereupon Astyochus sailed back to
								Erythrae.

So narrowly did he escape falling into the hands of the Athenians.
								Pedaritus sailed over to meet him. They then enquired about the
								supposed traitors, and found that the whole matter was a trick which
								the men had devised in order to get away from Samos; so they
								acquitted them of the charge, and Pedaritus returned to Chios, while
								Astyochus resumed his voyage to Miletus.

In the meantime the Athenian fleet, sailing round the promontory of
								Corycus towards Arginus, lighted upon three Chian
								ships of war, to which they gave chase. A great storm came on, and
								the Chian ships with difficulty escaped into their harbour, but of
								the Athenian ships the three which were most zealous in the pursuit
								were disabled and driven ashore near the city of Chios; the crews
								were either lost or taken captive. The remainder of the fleet found
								shelter in the harbour called Phoenicus, lying under Mount Mimas,
								whence again setting sail they put in at Lesbos, and made
								preparations for building the fort which they meant to establish in
								Chios.

During the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed from the
								Peloponnese with one Laconian, one Syracusan, and
								ten Thurian ships; of these last Dorieus the son of Diagoras and two
								others were the commanders. They put in at Cnidus, which under the
								influence of Tissaphernes had already
								revolted from Athens.

The Peloponnesian authorities at Miletus, when they heard of their
								arrival, ordered one half of these ships to protect Cnidus, and the
								other half to cruise off Triopium and seize the merchant-vessels
								which put in there from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory in the
								district of Cnidus on which there is a temple of Apollo.

The Athenians, hearing of their intentions, sailed from Samos and
								captured the six ships which were keeping guard at Triopium; the
								crews escaped. They then sailed to Cnidus, and attacking the town,
								which was unwalled, all but took it.

On the following day they made a second attack, but during the night the inhabitants had improved their hasty
								defences, and some of the men who had escaped from the ships
								captured at Triopium had come into the city. So the Athenian assault
								was less destructive than on the first day; and after retiring from
								the city and devastating the country belonging to it they sailed
								back to Samos.

About the same time Astyochus arrived at Miletus and took the command
								of the fleet. He found the
								Peloponnesians still abundantly provided with all requisites. They
								had sufficient pay; the great spoils taken at Iasus were in the
								hands of the army, and the Milesians carried on the war with a will.

The Peloponnesians however considered the former treaty made between
								Tissaphernes and Chalcideus defective and disadvantageous to them;
								so before the departure of Theramenes they made new terms of
								alliance, which were as follows:—

'The Lacedaemonians and their allies make agreement with King Darius
								and the sons of the King, and with
								Tissaphernes, that there shall be alliance and friendship between
								them on the following conditions:—

"I. Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or formerly
								belonged to his father, or to his ancestors, against these neither
								the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall make war, or do them any
								hurt, nor shall the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute of
								them. Neither Darius the King nor the subjects of the King shall
								make war upon the Lacedaemonians or their allies, or do them any
								hurt. 
							 "II.

If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the
								King, or the King have need of anything from the Lacedaemonians and
								their allies, whatever they do by mutual agreement shall hold good. 
							 "III.

They shall carry on the war against the Athenians and
								their allies in common, and if they make peace, shall make peace in
								common. 
							 "IV. The King shall defray the expense of any number of troops for
								which the King has sent, so long as they remain in the King's
								country. 
							 
 V.

If any of the cities who are parties to this
									treaty go against the King's country, the rest shall interfere
									and aid the King to the utmost of their power. And if any of the
									inhabitants of the King's country or any country under the
									dominion of the King shall go against the country of the
									Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall interfere and aid
									them to the utmost of his power .'

After the conclusion of the treaty, Theramenes, having delivered over
								the fleet to Astyochus, sailed away in a small boat and was
								no more heard of.

The Athenians, who had now crossed over with their troops from Lesbos
								to Chios, and had the upper hand both by land and sea, began to
								fortify Delphinium, a place not far distant from the town of Chios,
								which had the double advantage of being strong by land and of
								possessing harbours.

The Chians meanwhile remained inactive; they had been already badly
								beaten in several battles, and their internal condition was far from
								satisfactory; for Tydeus the son of Ion and his accomplices had been
								executed by Pedaritus on a charge of complicity with Athens, and the
								city was reduced by the strong hand to a mere oligarchy. Hence they
								were in a state of mutual distrust, and could not be persuaded that
								either they or the mercenaries brought by Pedaritus
								were a match for the enemy.

They sent however to Miletus and requested the aid of Astyochus, but
								he refused. Whereupon Pedaritus sent a despatch to Lacedaemon,
								complaining of his misconduct.

So favourable to the Athenians was the course of
								affairs in Chios. The main fleet, which they had left at Samos, from
								time to time made threatening movements against the enemy at
								Miletus, but as they would never come out, the Athenians at length
								retired to Samos and there remained.

During the same winter, about the solstice, twenty-seven ships which
								Calligitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, the agents of
								Pharnabazus, had persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit out in his
									interest sailed for Ionia: they were placed under
								the command of Antisthenes, a Spartan.

The Lacedaemonians sent at the same time eleven Spartans to act as
									advisers to Astyochus, one of
								whom was Lichas the son of Arcesilaus . Besides receiving a
								general commission to assist in the direction of affairs to the best
								of their judgment, they were empowered on their arrival at Miletus
								to send on, if they saw fit, these ships, or a larger or smaller
								number, to Pharnabazus at the Hellespont under the command of
									Clearchus the son of Rhamphias, who sailed with
								them. The eleven might also, if they thought good, deprive Astyochus
								of his command and appoint Antisthenes in his place, for the
								despatch of Pedaritus had excited suspicion against him.

So the ships sailed from Malea over the open sea until they came to
								Melos. There they lighted on ten Athenian ships; of these they took
								three without their crews and burned them. But then, fearing that
								the remainder which had escaped would, as in fact they did, give
								information of their approach to the fleet at Samos, they took the
								precaution of going by a longer route. And sailing round by Crete
								they put in at Caunus in Asia.

They thought that they were now safe, and sent a messenger to the
								fleet at Miletus requesting a convoy.

Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus continued to send messengers to
								Astyochus, who continued 
								to delay. They implored him to come to their help with his whole
								fleet, saying that they were blockaded, and that he should not allow
								the chief ally of Sparta in Ionia to be cut off from the sea and
								overrun and devastated by land.

Now the Chians had more domestic slaves than any other state with the
								exception of Lacedaemon, and their offences were always more
								severely punished because of their number; so that, when the
								Athenian army appeared to be firmly settled in their fortifications,
								most of them at once deserted to the enemy . And they did
								the greatest damage, because they knew the country.

The Chians pressed upon the Lacedaemonians the necessity of coming to
								their assistance while there was still hope of interfering to some
								purpose; the fortification of Delphinium, though not yet completed,
								was in progress, and the Athenians were beginning to extend the
								lines of defence which protected their army and ships. Astyochus,
								seeing that the allies were zealous in the cause, although he had
								fully meant to carry out his threat, now determined to relieve the
								Chians.

But in the meantime he received a message from Caunus, informing him
								that the twenty-seven ships and his Lacedaemonian advisers had
								arrived. He thought that everything should give way to the
								importance of convoying so large a reinforcement which would secure
								to the Lacedaemonians greater command of the sea, and that he must
								first of all provide for the safe passage of the commissioners who
								were to report on his conduct.

So he at once gave up his intended expedition to Chios and sailed for
									 
							 
							 Caunus. As he coasted along he made a descent on the island of Cos
								Meropis. The city was unfortified and had been overthrown by an
								earthquake, the greatest which has ever happened within our memory.
								The citizens had fled into the mountains;

so he sacked the town and overran and despoiled the country, but let
								go the free inhabitants whom he found. From Cos he came by night to
								Cnidus, and was prevailed upon by the importunity of the Cnidians,
								instead of disembarking his men, to sail at once, just as he was,
								against twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus (one of the
								generals at Samos) was watching for the twenty-seven ships expected
								from Peloponnesus, being those which Astyochus was going to escort.

The Athenians at Samos had heard from Melos of their coming, and
								Charminus was cruising off the islands of Symè, Chalcè, and Rhodes,
								and on the coast of Lycia; he had by this time discovered that they
								were at Caunus.

So Astyochus sailed at once to Symè before his arrival was reported,
								in the hope that he might come upon the Athenian squadron in the
								open sea. The rain and cloudy state of the atmosphere caused
								confusion among his ships, which lost their way in the dark.

When dawn broke, the fleet was dispersed and the left wing alone was
								visible to the Athenians, while the other ships were still
								straggling off the shore of the island. Charminus and the Athenians
								put out to sea with part of their twenty ships, supposing that these
								were only the squadron from Caunus for which they were watching.

They at once attacked them, sank three of them, disabled others, and
								were gaining the victory, when to their surprise there appeared the
								larger part of the Lacedaemonian fleet threatening to surround them.

Whereupon they fled, and in their flight lost six ships, but with the
								rest gained the island of Teutlussa, and thence Halicarnassus. The
								Peloponnesians touched at Cnidus, and there uniting 
								with the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, they all sailed to Symè and
								raised a trophy; they then returned and put into port again at
								Cnidus.

As soon as the Athenians heard the result of the seafight they sailed
								from Samos to Symè with their whole fleet. They did not
								attack the Peloponnesians at Cnidus, nor the Peloponnesians them;
								but they carried away the heavy tackle of their own ships which had
								been left at Symè, and touching at Loryma, a place on the mainland,
								returned to Samos.

The Peloponnesians were now all together at Cnidus, and were making
								the repairs necessary after the battle, while the Lacedaemonian
								commissioners conferred with Tissaphernes (who was himself on the
								spot) as to any matters in his past dealings with them at which they
								were displeased, and as to the best manner of securing their common
								interests in the future conduct of the war. Lichas entered into the
								enquiry with great energy; he took exception to both the treaties;

that of Chalcideus and that of Theramenes were equally objectionable.
								For the King at that time of day to claim power over all the
								countries which his ancestors had formerly held was monstrous. If
								either treaty were carried out, the inhabitants of all the islands,
								of Thessaly, of Locris, and of all Hellas, as far as Boeotia, would
								again be reduced to slavery; instead of giving the Hellenes freedom,
								the Lacedaemonians would be imposing upon them the yoke of Persia.

So he desired them to conclude some more satisfactory treaty, for he
								would have nothing to say to these; he did not want to have the
								fleet maintained upon any such terms. Tissaphernes was indignant,
								and without settling anything went away in a rage.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians had been receiving communications from
								the chief men of Rhodes, and resolved to sail thither. They hoped to
								gain over an island which was strong alike in sailors
								and in infantry; if successful, they might henceforward
									maintain their
								navy by the help of their own allies without asking Tissaphernes for
								money.

So in the same winter they sailed from Cnidus against Rhodes, and
								first attacked Camirus with ninety-four ships. The inhabitants, who
								were in ignorance of the plot and dwelt in an unfortified city, were
								alarmed and began to fly. The Lacedaemonians re-assured them, and
								assembling the people not only of Camirus, but of Lindus and
								Ialysus, the two other cities of Rhodes, persuaded all of them to
								revolt from the Athenians.

Thus Rhodes went over to the Peloponnesians. Nearly at the same time
								the Athenians, who had heard of their intentions, brought up the
								fleet from Samos, hoping to forestall them; they appeared in the
								offing, but finding that they were just too late, sailed to Chalcè
								for the present, and thence back to Samos.

They then fought against Rhodes, making descents upon it from Chalcè,
								Cos, and Samos, while the Peloponnesians, having collected
								thirty-two talents from the
								Rhodians, drew up their ships, and did nothing for eleven weeks.

Before the Peloponnesians had removed to Rhodes affairs took a new
								turn. After the death of Chalcideus and the
								engagement at Miletus ,
								Alcibiades fell under suspicion at Sparta, and orders came fro home
								to Astyochus that he should be put to death. Agis hated him, and he
								was generally distrusted. In fear he retired to Tissaphernes, and
								soon, by working upon him, did all he could to injure the
								Peloponnesian cause. He was his constant adviser, and induced him to
								cut down the pay of the sailors from an Attic drachma
								to half a drachma , and this was only to be given at irregular
								intervals.

Tissaphernes was instructed by him to tell the Peloponnesians that
								the Athenians, with their long experience of naval affairs, gave
								half a drachma only, not from poverty, but lest their sailors should
								be demoralised by high pay, and spend their money on pleasures which
								injured their health, and thereby impaired their efficiency; the payment too was made irregularly, that the
								arrears, which they would forfeit by desertion, might be a pledge of
								their continuance in the service .

He also recommended him to bribe the trierarchs and the generals of
								the allied cities into consenting. They all yielded with the
								exception of the Syracusans: Hermocrates alone stood firm on behalf
								of the whole alliance.

When the allies who had revolted came asking for money, Alcibiades
								drove them away himself, saying on behalf of Tissaphernes that the
								Chians must have lost all sense of shame; they were the richest
								people in Hellas, and now, when they were being saved by foreign
								aid, they wanted other men, not only to risk life, but to expend
								money in their cause.

To the other cities he replied that, having paid such large sums to
								the Athenians before they revolted, they would be inexcusable if
								they were not willing to contribute as much and even more for their
								own benefit.

He represented further that Tissaphernes was now carrying on the war
								at his own expense, and must be expected to be careful. But if
								supplies should come from the King he would restore the full pay,
								and do whatever was reasonable for the cities.

Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in a hurry about
								putting an end to the war, and neither to bring up the Phoenician
								fleet which he was preparing, nor to give pay to more Hellenic
								sailors; he should not be so anxious to put the whole power both by
								sea and land into the same hands. Let the dominion
								only remain divided, and then, whichever of the two rivals was
								troublesome, the King might always use the other against him.

But if one defeated the other and became supreme on both elements,
								who would help Tissaphernes to overthrow the conqueror? He would
								have to take the field in person and fight, which he might not like,
								at great risk and expense. The danger would be easily averted at a
								fraction of the cost, and at no risk to himself, if he wore out the
								Hellenes in internal strife.

Alcibiades also said that the Athenians would be more suitable
								partners of empire, because they were less likely to encroach by
								land, and both their principles and their practice in carrying on
								the war accorded better with the King's interest. For if he helped
								them to subject the element of the sea to themselves, they would
								gladly help him in the subjugation of the Hellenes who were in his
								country, whereas the Lacedaemonians came to be their liberators. But
								a power which was at that very moment emancipating the Hellenes from
								the dominion of another Hellenic power like themselves would not be
								satisfied to leave them under the yoke of the Barbarian if they
								once succeeded in crushing the Athenians .

So he advised him first to wear them both out, and when he had
								clipped the Athenians as close as he could, then to get the
								Peloponnesians out of his country.

To this course Tissaphernes was strongly inclined, if we may judge
								from his acts. For he gave his full confidence to Alcibiades, whose
								advice he approved, and kept the Peloponnesians ill-provided, at the
								same time refusing to let them fight at sea, and
								insisting that they must wait until the Phoenician ships arrived;
								they would then fight at an advantage. In this manner he ruined
								their affairs and impaired the efficiency of their navy, which had
								once been in first-rate condition. There were many other ways in
								which he showed openly and unmistakably that he was not in earnest
								in the cause of his allies.

In giving this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, now that he had
								passed under their protection, Alcibiades said what he really
								thought to be most for their interests . But he had
								another motive; he was preparing the way for his own return from
								exile. He knew that, if he did not destroy his country altogether,
								the time would come when he would persuade his countrymen to recall
								him; and he thought that his arguments would be most effectual if he
								were seen to be on intimate terms with Tissaphernes.

And the result proved that he was right. The Athenian soldiers at
								Samos soon perceived that he had great influence with him, and he
								sent messages to the chief persons among them, whom he begged to
								remember him to all good men and true, and to let them know that he
								would be glad to return to his country and cast in his lot with
								them. He would at the same time make Tissaphernes their friend; but
								they must establish an oligarchy, and abolish the villainous
								democracy which had driven him out. Partly moved by these messages,
								but still more of their own inclination, the trierarchs and leading
								Athenians at Samos were now eager to overthrow the democracy.

The matter was stirred in the camp first of all, and introduced into
								the city afterwards. A few persons went over from Samos to
								Alcibiades, and conferred with him: to them he held out the hope
								that he would make, first of all Tissaphernes, and
								secondly the King himself, their friend, if they would put down
									democracy; the
								King would then be better able to trust them. And so the
								aristocracy, on whom the heaviest burdens are apt to fall , conceived great hopes of getting the government
								into their own hands, and overcoming their enemies.

Returning to Samos, the envoys drew all such as seemed desirable
								accomplices into a conspiracy, while the language held in public to
								the main body of the army was that the King would be their friend
								and would supply them with money if Alcibiades was restored and
								democracy given up.

Now the multitude were at first dissatisfied with the scheme, but the
								prospect of the King's pay was so grateful to them that they offered
								no opposition; and the authors of the movement, after they had
								broached the idea to the people, once more considered the proposals
								of Alcibiades among themselves and the members of their clubs. Most
								of them thought the matter safe and straightforward enough.

Phrynichus, who was still general, was of another mind. He
								maintained, and rightly, that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy
								than he did for democracy, and in seeking to change the existing
								form of government was only considering how he might be recalled and
								restored to his country at the invitation of the clubs; whereas
								their one care should be to avoid disunion. Why should the King go
								out of his way to join the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he
								would only get into trouble with the Peloponnesians, who were now as
								great a naval power, and held some of the most important cities in
								his dominion?— it would be much easier for him to make friends with
								them, who had never done him any harm.

As to the allies, to whom they had promised the blessings of
								oligarchy which they were now about to enjoy
								themselves, he would be bound that the revolted cities would not
								return to them, and that their old allies would be not a whit more
								loyal in consequence. The form of government was indifferent to them
								if they could only be free, but they did not want to be in
								subjection either to an oligarchy or to a democracy.

And as for the socalled nobility, the allies thought that they would
								be quite as troublesome as the people; they were the persons who
								suggested crimes to the popular mind; who provided the means for
								their execution; and who reaped the fruits themselves. As far as it
								rested with the oligarchy the punishment of death would be inflicted
								unscrupulously, and without trial, whereas the people brought the
								oligarchs to their senses, and were a refuge to which the oppressed
								might always have recourse.

Experience had taught the cities this lesson, and he was well aware
								of their feelings. He was therefore himself utterly dissatisfied
								with the proposals of Alcibiades, and disapproved of the whole
								affair.

But the conspirators who were present were not at all shaken in their
								opinion. They accepted the plan and prepared to send Peisander
								and other envoys to Athens, that they might manage the recall of
								Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy, and finally make
								Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians.

Phrynichus now knew that a proposal would be made for the restoration
								of Alcibiades, which the
								Athenians would certainly accept; and having opposed his return he
								feared that Alcibiades, if he were recalled, would do him a
								mischief, because he had stood in his way.

So he had recourse to the following device. He secretly sent a letter
								to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was still at Miletus,
								informing him that Alcibiades was gaining over Tissaphernes to the
								Athenians and ruining the Peloponnesian interests. He
								gave full particulars, adding that Astyochus must excuse him if he
								sought to harm an enemy even at some cost to his country .

Now Astyochus had no idea of punishing Alcibiades, who moreover no
								longer came within his reach. On the contrary, he went to him and to
								Tissaphernes at Magnesia, and, turning informer, told them of the
								letter which he had received from Samos. (He was believed to have
								sold himself to Tissaphernes, to whom he now betrayed everything;
								and this was the reason why he was so unwilling to bestir himself
								about the reduction of the pay .)

Alcibiades immediately sent a despatch denouncing to the leaders of
								the army at Samos the treason of Phrynichus, and demanding that he
								should be put to death.

Phrynichus was confounded , and
								in fact the revelation placed him in the greatest danger. However he
								sent again to Astyochus, blaming him for having violated his former
								confidence. He then proceeded to say that he was ready to give the
								Peloponnesians the opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian
								army, and he explained in detail how Samos, which was unfortified,
								might best be attacked; adding that he was in danger of his life for
								their sakes, and that he need no longer apologise if by this or any
								other means he could save himself from destruction at the hands of
								his worst enemies. Again the message was communicated by Astyochus
								to Alcibiades.

Now Phrynichus was well aware of his treachery, and he knew that
								another letter from Alcibiades giving further information was on the point
								of arriving. Before its arrival he himself warned the army that,
								Samos being unwalled and some of the ships not anchoring within the
								harbour, the enemy were going to attack the fleet; of this he had
								certain knowledge. They ought therefore to fortify the
								place as quickly as they could, and to take every precaution. As he
								was a general he could execute his proposals by his own authority.

So they set to work, and in consequence Samos, which would have been
								fortified in any case, was fortified all the sooner. Not long
								afterwards the expected letter came from Alcibiades warning the
								Athenians that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus, and that
								the enemy were going to make an attack.

But Alcibiades was not trusted; he was thought to have attributed to
								Phrynichus out of personal animosity complicity in the enemy's
								designs, with which he was himself acquainted. Thus he did him no
								harm, but rather strengthened his position by telling the same tale.

Alcibiades still continued his practices with Tissaphernes, whom he
								now sought to draw over to the
								Athenian interest. But Tissaphernes was afraid of the
								Peloponnesians, who had more ships on the spot than the Athenians.
								And yet he would have liked, if he could, to have been persuaded;
								especially when he saw the opposition which the Peloponnesians
								raised at Cnidus to the treaty of Theramenes . For his quarrel
								with them had broken out before the Peloponnesians went to Rhodes,
								where they were at present stationed ; and the words of
								Alcibiades, who had previously warned Tissaphernes that the
								Lacedaemonians were the liberators of all the cities of Hellas, were
								verified by the protest of Lichas, who declared that 'for the King
								to hold all the cities which he or his ancestors had held was a
								stipulation not to be endured.' So Alcibiades, who was playing for a
								great stake, was very assiduous in paying his court to Tissaphernes.

Meanwhile Peisander and the other envoys who had been sent from Samos
								arrived at Athens and
								made their proposals to the people. They said much in few words,
								insisting above all that if the Athenians restored Alcibiades and
								modified their democracy they might secure the alliance of the King
								and gain the victory over the Peloponnesians.

There was great opposition to any change in the democracy, and the
								enemies of Alcibiades were loud in protesting that it would be a
								dreadful thing if he were permitted to return in defiance of the
								law. The Eumolpidae and Ceryces called heaven and earth to witness
								that the city must never restore a man who had been banished for
								profaning the mysteries. Amid violent expressions of indignation
								Peisander came forward, and having up the objectors one by one he
								pointed out to them that the Peloponnesians had a fleet ready for
								action as large as their own, that they numbered more cities among
								their allies, and that they were furnished with money by
								Tissaphernes and the King; whereas the Athenians had spent
								everything:

he then asked them whether there was the least hope of saving the
								country unless the King could be won over. They all acknowledged
								that there was none. He then said to them plainly:— 
							 'But this alliance is impossible unless we are governed in a wiser
								manner, and office is confined to a smaller number: then the King
								will trust us. Do not let us be dwelling on the form of the
									constitution 
								which we may hereafter change as we please, when the very existence
								of Athens is at stake. And we must restore Alcibiades, who is the
								only man living capable of saving us.'

The people were very angry at the first suggestion of an oligarchy;
								but when Peisander proved to them that they had no other resource,
								partly in fear, and partly in hope that it might be
								hereafter changed, they gave way.

So a decree was passed that Peisander himself and ten others should
									go out and
								negotiate to the best of their judgment with Tissaphernes and
								Alcibiades.

Peisander also denounced Phrynichus, and therefore the people
								dismissed him and his colleague Scironides from their commands, and
								appointed Diomedon and Leon to be admirals in their room. Peisander
								thought that Phrynichus would stand in the way of the negotiations
								with Alcibiades, and for this reason he calumniated him, alleging
								that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges.

Then he went, one after another, to all the clubs which already
								existed in Athens for the management of trials and elections, and
								exhorted them to unite, and by concerted action put down the
								democracy. When he had completed all the necessary preparations and
								the plot was ripe, he and his colleagues proceeded on their voyage
								to Tissaphernes.

During the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had now entered upon
								their command, made a descent upon Rhodes. They found the
								Peloponnesian fleet drawn up out of their reach, but they landed,
								and defeated the Rhodians who came out to meet them. From Rhodes
								they retired to Chalcè which henceforth. they made their base of
								operations rather than Cos, because they could there better command
								any movement which might be made by the Peloponnesian fleet.

About this time Xenophantidas, a Lacedaemonian, brought word to
								Rhodes from Pedaritus, the governor of Chios, that the Athenian
								fortification was now completed , and that if the
								Peloponnesians with their whole fleet did not at once come to the
								rescue Chios would be lost. So they began to think of
								sending help.

Meanwhile Pedaritus in person with his mercenaries and the whole Chian
								army attacked the lines which protected the Athenian fleet; he took
								a part of the wall and obtained possession of certain ships which
								were drawn up on shore. But the Athenians rushed out upon them, and
								first putting to flight the Chians, soon defeated the rest of his
								forces. Pedaritus himself was slain, together with many of the
								Chians, and a great quantity of arms was taken.

The Chians were now blockaded more closely than ever both by sea and
								land, and there was a great famine in the place.
								Meanwhile Peisander and his colleagues came to Tissaphernes and
								proposed an agreement.

But Alcibiades was not as yet quite sure of Tissaphernes, who was
								more afraid of the Peloponnesians than of the Athenians, and was
								still desirous, in accordance with the lesson which he had been
								taught by Alcibiades himself, to wear them both out. So he had
								recourse to the device of making Tissaphernes ask too much, that the
								negotiations might be broken off. And I imagine that Tissaphernes
								himself equally wanted them to fail;

he was moved by his fears, while Alcibiades, seeing that his
								reluctance was insuperable, did not wish the Athenians to think that
								he was unable to persuade him— he wanted them to believe that
								Tissaphernes was already persuaded and anxious to make terms but
								could not, because they themselves would not grant enough.

And so, speaking on behalf of Tissaphernes who was himself present,
								he made such exorbitant demands that, although for a time the
								Athenians were willing to grant anything which he asked, at length
								the responsibility of breaking off the conference was thrown upon
								them. He and Tissaphernes demanded, first the cession of all Ionia to the King, then that of the neighboring
								islands; and there were some other conditions. Thus far the
								Athenians offered no opposition. But at last, fearing that his utter
								inability to fulfil his promise would be exposed, at the third
								interview he demanded permission for the King to build ships, and
								sail along his own coast wherever and with as many vessels as he
								pleased. This was too much; the Athenians now perceived that matters
								were hopeless, and that they had been duped by Alcibiades. So they
								departed in anger to Samos.

Immediately afterwards, and during the same winter, Tissaphernes came
								down to Caunus wishing to bring back the Peloponnesians to
								Miletus, and once more to make a treaty with them on such terms as
								he could get; he was willing to maintain them, for he did not want
								to become wholly their enemy, and was afraid that if their large
								fleet were at a loss for supplies they might be compelled to fight
								and be defeated, or their crews might desert; in either case the
								Athenians would gain their ends without his assistance. Above all he
								feared lest they should ravage the adjoining mainland in search of
								food.

Taking into account all these possibilities, and true to his policy,
								which was to hold the balance evenly between the two contending
								powers, he sent for the Lacedaemonians, furnished them with
								supplies, and made a third treaty with them, which ran as follows:—

'In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius the King, when
								Alexippidas was Ephor at Lacedaemon, a treaty was made in the
								plain of the Maeander between the Lacedaemonians and their allies on
								the one hand, and Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of
								Pharnaces on the other, touching the interests of the King, and of
								the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

'I. All the King's country which is in Asia shall continue to be the
								King's, and the 'King shall act as he pleases in respect of his own
								country.

'II. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the
								King's country to do hurt, and the King shall not go against the
								country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies to do hurt.

If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies go against the King's
								country and do hurt, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall
								interfere: and if any of the dwellers in the King's country shall go
								against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies and do
								hurt, the King shall interfere.

'III. Tissaphernes shall provide maintenance for the number of ships
								which the Lacedaemonians have at present, according to the
								agreement, until the King's ships arrive.

When they have arrived, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may
								either maintain their own ships, or they may receive the maintenance
								of their ships from Tissaphernes. But in this case the
								Lacedaemonians and their allies shall at the end of the war repay to
								Tissaphernes the money which they have received. 
							 '

IV. When the King's ships have arrived, the ships of the
								Lacedaemonians and of their allies and of the King shall carry on
								the war in common, as may seem best to Tissaphernes and to the
								Lacedaemonians and their allies: and if they wish to make peace with
								the Athenians both parties shall make peace on the same terms.'

Such was the treaty. Tissaphernes now prepared to bring up the
								Phoenician ships, as he had promised, and to fulfil his other
								pledges. He was anxious at all events to be seen making a beginning.

Towards the end of the winter, Oropus, which was occupied by an
								Athenian garrison, was betrayed to the Boeotians. Certain of the
								Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, both having an eye to the
								revolt of Euboea, were concerned in the enterprise. For Oropos,
								facing Eretria, while held by the Athenians could not be other than a serious annoyance, both to Eretria and to the
								whole of Euboea.

Having now possession of Oropus the Eretrians came to Rhodes, and
								invited the Peloponnesians to Euboea. They were however more
								disposed to relieve the distress of Chios, and thither they sailed
								from Rhodes with their whole fleet.

Near Triopium they described the Athenian ships in the open sea
								sailing from Chalcè: neither fleet attacked the other, but both
								arrived safely, the one at Samos, and the other at Miletus. The
								Lacedaemonians now saw that they could no longer relieve Chios
								without a battle at sea. So the winter ended, and with it the
								twentieth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote
								the history.

At the beginning of the following spring, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was
								sent at the head of a small army along the coast to the
								Hellespont. He was to effect the revolt of Abydos, a Milesian
								colony. The Chians, while Astyochus was doubting whether he could
								assist them, were compelled by the pressure of the blockade to fight
								at sea.

While he was still at Rhodes they had obtained from Miletus, after
								the death of Pedaritus, a new governor, Leon, a Spartan, who had
								come out as a marine with Antisthenes ; he brought with him
								twelve ships, five Thurian, four Syracusan, one from Anaea, one
								Milesian, and one which was Leon's own;

they had been employed in guarding Miletus. The Chians made a sally
								with their whole force, and seized a strong position; their ships at
								the same time, to the number of thirty-six, sailed out and fought
								with the thirty-two of the Athenians. The engagement was severe; the
								Chians and their allies had rather the advantage, but
								evening had come on; so they retired to the city.

Soon afterwards Dercyllidas arrived at the Hellespont from Miletus;
								Abydos, and two days later
								Lampsacus, revolted to him and Pharnabazus. Strombichides, having
								intelligence, hastened thither from Chios with twenty-four Athenian
								ships, of which some were transports conveying hoplites.

Defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, he took
								Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the first onset. He made
								plunder of the slaves and property which he found there, and,
								reinstating the free inhabitants, went on to Abydos. But the people
								of Abydos would not yield, and though he attempted to take the place
								by assault, he failed;

so he crossed over to Sestos, a city of the Chersonese opposite
								Abydos, which the Persians had formerly held. There he placed a
								garrison to keep watch over the entire Hellespont.

Meanwhile the Chians gained more command of the sea, and Astyochus
								and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, hearing of the naval
								engagement and of the withdrawal of Strombichides and his ships,
								took courage.

Sailing to Chios with two ships, Astyochus fetched away the
									fleet which was there, and with his united forces made
								a demonstration against Samos. But the Athenian crews, who were in a
								state of mutual distrust, did not go out to meet him; so he sailed
								back to Miletus.

For about this time, or rather sooner, the democracy at Athens had
								been subverted. Peisander and his fellow envoys,
								on their return to Samos after their visit to Tissaphernes, had
								strengthened their interest in the army, and had even 
								persuaded the chief men of Samos to join them in setting up an
									oligarchy, although they had
								lately risen against their own countrymen in order to put down oligarchy .

At the same time conferring among themselves, the Athenian leaders at
								Samos came to the conclusion that since Alcibiades would not join
								they had better leave him alone; for indeed he was not the sort of
								person who was suited to an oligarchy. But they determined, as they
								were already compromised, to proceed by themselves, and to take
								measures for carrying the movement through; they meant also to
								persevere in the war, and were willing enough to contribute money or
								anything else which might be wanted out of their own houses, since
								they would now be toiling, not for others, but for themselves .

Having thus encouraged one another in their purpose they sent
								Peisander and one half of the envoys back to
								Athens. They were to carry out the scheme at home, and had
								directions to set up an oligarchy in the subject-cities at which
								they touched on their voyage. The other half were despatched
								different ways other subject-cities.

Diotrephes, who was then at Chios, was sent to assume the command in
								Chalcidicè and on the coast of Thrace, to which he had been
								previously appointed. On arriving at Thasos he put down the
								democracy.

But within about two months of his departure the Thasians began to
								fortify their city; they did not want to have an aristocracy
								dependent on Athens when they were daily expecting to obtain their
								liberty from Lacedaemon.

For there were Thasian exiles who had been driven out by the
								Athenians dwelling in Peloponnesus, and they, with the assistance of
								their friends at home, were exerting themselves vigorously to obtain
								ships and effect the revolt of Thasos. The recent
								change was exactly what they desired; for the government had been
								reformed without danger to themselves, and the democracy, who would
								have opposed them, had been overthrown.

Thus the result in the case of Thasos, and also, as I imagine, of
								many other states, was the opposite of what the oligarchical
								conspirators had intended. For the subject-cities, having secured a
								moderate form of government, and having no fear of being called to
								account for their proceedings, aimed at absolute freedom; they
								scorned the sham independence proffered to them by the Athenians.

Peisander and his colleagues pursued their voyage and, as they had
								agreed, put down the democracies 
								in the different states. From some places they obtained the
								assistance of heavy-armed troops, which they took with them to
									Athens .

There they found the revolution more than half accomplished by the
								oligarchical clubs. Some of the younger citizens had conspired and
								secretly assassinated one Androcles, one of the chief leaders of the
								people, who had been foremost in procuring the banishment of
									Alcibiades . Their motives were twofold: they killed
								him because he was a demagogue; but more because they hoped to
								gratify Alcibiades, whom they were still expecting to return, and to
								make Tissaphernes their friend. A few others who were inconvenient
								to them they made away with in a like secret manner.

Meanwhile they declared in their public programme that no one ought
								to receive pay who was not on military service; and that not more
								than five thousand should have a share in the government; those,
								namely, who were best able to serve the state in person and with
								their money.

These were only pretences intended to look well in the eyes of the
								people; for the authors of the revolution fully meant to retain
								the new government in their own hands. The popular assembly and the
								council of five hundred were still convoked; but nothing was brought
								before them of which the conspirators had not approved; the speakers
								were of their party and the things to be said had been all arranged
								by them beforehand.

No one any longer raised his voice against them; for the citizens
								were afraid when they saw the strength of the conspiracy, and if any
								one did utter a word, he was put out of the way in some convenient
								manner. No search was made for the assassins; and though there might
								be suspicion, no one was brought to trial;

the people were so depressed and afraid to move that he who escaped
								violence thought himself fortunate, even though he had never said a
								word. Their minds were cowed by the supposed number of the
								conspirators, which they greatly exaggerated, having no means of
								discovering the truth, since the size of the city prevented them
								from knowing one another.

For the same reason a man 
								could not conspire and retaliate , because he was unable to express his sorrow or
								indignation to another; he could not make a confidant of a stranger,
								and he would not trust his acquaintance.

The members of the popular party all approached one another with
								suspicion; every one was supposed to have a hand in what was going
								on. Some were concerned whom no one would ever have thought likely
								to turn oligarchs; their adhesion created the worst mistrust among
								the multitude, and by making it impossible for them to rely upon one
								another, greatly contributed to the security of the few.

Such was the state of affairs when Peisander and his colleagues
								arrived at Athens. They 
								immediately set to work and prepared to strike the final blow.
								First, they called an assembly and proposed the election of ten
								commissioners, who should be empowered to frame for the city the
								best constitution which they could devise; this was to be laid
								before the people on a fixed day.

When the day arrived they summoned an assembly to meet in the temple of Poseidon at Colonus without the walls, and
								distant rather more than a mile. But the commissioners only moved
								that any Athenian should be allowed to propose whatever resolution
								he pleased— nothing more; threatening at the same time with severe
								penalties anybody who indicted the proposer for unconstitutional
								action, or otherwise offered injury to him. The whole scheme now
								came to light.

A motion was made to abolish all the existing magistracies and the
								payment of magistrates, and to choose a presiding board of five;
								these five were to choose a hundred, and each of the hundred was to
								co-opt three others. The Four Hundred thus selected were to meet in
								the council-chamber; they were to have absolute authority, and might
								govern as they deemed best; the Five Thousand were to be summoned by
								them whenever they chose.

The mover of this proposal, and to outward appearance the most active
								partisan of the revolution, was-Peisander, but the real author and
								maturer of the whole scheme, who had been longest interested in it,
								was Antiphon, a man inferior in virtue to none of his
								contemporaries, and possessed of remarkable powers of thought and
								gifts of speech. He did not like to come forward in the assembly, or
								in any other public arena. To the multitude, who were
								suspicious of his great abilities, he was an object of dislike; but there was no man
								who could do more for any who consulted him, whether their business
								lay in the courts of justice or in the assembly.

And when the government of the Four Hundred was overthrown and became
								exposed to the of the people, and he being accused of taking part in
								the plot had to speak in his own case, his defence was undoubtedly
								the best ever made by ally man tried on a capital charge down to my
								time.

Phrynichus also showed extraordinary zeal in the interests of the
								oligarchy. He was afraid of Alcibiades, whom he knew to be cognisant
								of the intrigue which when at Samos he had carried on with
									Astyochus , and he
								thought that no oligarchy would ever be likely to restore him.
								Having once set his hand to the work he was deemed by the others to
								be the man upon whom they could best depend in the hour of danger.

Another chief leader of the revolutionary party was Theramenes the
								son of Hagnon, a good speaker and a sagacious man. No wonder then
								that, in the hands of all these able men, the attempt, however
								arduous, succeeded. For an easy thing it certainly was not, about
								one hundred years after the fall of the tyrants, to destroy the
								liberties of the Athenians, who not only were a free, but during
								more than one half of this time had been an imperial people.

The assembly passed all these measures without a dissentient voice,
								and was then dissolved. And now the Four Hundred were
								introduced into the council-chamber. The manner was as follows:— The
								whole population were always on service, either
								manning the walls or drawn up at their places of arms, for the enemy
								were at Decelea .

On the day of the assembly those who were not in the conspiracy were
								allowed to go home as usual, while the conspirators were quietly
								told to remain, not actually by their arms, but at a short distance;
								if anybody opposed what was doing they were to arm and interfere.

There were also on the spot some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred
								Carystians, and some of the Athenian colonists from Aegina , who received similar
								instructions; they had all been told to bring with them from their
								homes their own arms for this especial purpose .

Having disposed their forces the Four Hundred arrived, every one with
								a dagger concealed about his person, and with them a bodyguard of a
								hundred and twenty Hellenic youths whose services they used for any
								act of violence which they had in hand. They broke in upon the
								council of five hundred as they sat in the councilchamber, and told
								them to take their pay and begone. They had brought with them the
								pay of the senators for the remainder of their yearly term of
								office, which they handed to them as they went out.

In this manner the council retired without offering any remonstrance;
								and the rest of the citizens kept perfectly quiet and
								made no counter-movement. The Four Hundred then installed themselves
								in the council-chamber; for the present they elected by lot Prytanes
								of their own number, and did all that was customary in the way of
								prayers and sacrifices to the Gods at their entrance into office.
								Soon however they wholly changed the democratic system; and although
								they did not recall the exiles, because Alcibiades was one of them,
								they governed the city with a high hand.

Some few whom they thought would be better out of the way were put to
								death by them, others imprisoned, others again exiled.
								They also sent heralds to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, who was at
								Decelea, saying that they desired to conclude a peace with him; and
								that they expected him to be more ready to treat with them than with
								the perfidious democracy.

But he, thinking that the city must be in an unsettled state and that
								the people would not so quickly yield up
								their ancient liberty, thinking too that the appearance of a great
								Lacedaemonian army would increase their excitement, and far from
								convinced that civil strife was not at that very moment raging among
								them, gave unfavourable answers to the envoys of the Four Hundred.
								He sent to Peloponnesus for large reinforcements, and then, with the
								garrison at Decelea and the newly arrived troops, came down in
								person to the very walls of Athens. He expected that the Athenians,
								distracted by civil strife, would be quite at his mercy; there would
								be such a panic created by the presence of enemies both within and
								without the walls, that he might even succeed in taking the city at
								the first onset;

for the Long Walls would be deserted, and he could not fail of
								capturing them. But when he drew near there was no sign of the
								slightest disorder within; the Athenians, sending out their cavalry
								and a force of heavy and light-armed troops and archers, struck down
								a few of his soldiers who had ventured too far, and retained
								possession of some arms and dead bodies;

whereupon, having found out his mistake, he withdrew to Decelea.
								There he and the garrison remained at their posts; but he ordered
								the newly arrived troops, after they had continued a few days in
								Attica, to return home. The Four Hundred resumed negotiations, and
								Agis was now more ready to listen to them. At his suggestion they
								sent envoys to Lacedaemon in the hope of coming to terms.

They also sent ten commissioners to Samos, who were to pacify the
								army, and to explain that the oligarchy was not
								established with any design of injuring Athens or her citizens, but
								for the preservation of the whole state. The promoters of the
								change, they said, were five thousand, not four hundred; but never
								hitherto, owing to the pressure of war and of business abroad, had
								so many as five thousand assembled to deliberate even on the most
								important questions.

They instructed them to say anything else which would have a good
								effect, and sent them on their mission as soon as they themselves
								were installed in the government. For they were afraid, and not
								without reason as the event showed, that the Athenian sailors would
								be impatient of the oligarchical system, and that disaffection would
								begin at Samos and end in their own overthrow.

At the very time when the Four Hundred were establishing themselves
								at Athens, a reaction had
								set in against the oligarchical movement at Samos.

Some Samians of the popular party, which had originally risen up
								against the nobles, had changed sides again when Peisander came to
								the island and,
								persuaded by him and his Athenian accomplices at Samos, had formed a
								body of three hundred conspirators and prepared to attack the rest
								of the popular party who had previously been their comrades.

There was a certain Hyperbolus, an Athenian of no character, who, not
								for any fear of his power and influence, but for his villany, and
								because the city was ashamed of him, had been ostracised. This man
								was assassinated by them, and they were abetted in the act by
								Charminus, one of the generals, and by certain of the 
								Athenians at Samos, to whom they pledged their faith.

They also joined these Athenians in other deeds of violence, and were
								eager to fall upon the popular party. But the people, discovering
								their intention, gave information to the generals Leon and Diomedon,
								who were impatient of the attempted oligarchy because they were
								respected by the multitude, to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, one of
								whom was a trierarch and the other a private soldier, and to others
								who were thought to be the steadiest opponents of the oligarchical
								movement. They entreated them not to allow the Samian people to be
								destroyed, and the island of Samos, without which the Athenian
								empire would never have lasted until then, to be estranged.

Thereupon the generals went to the soldiers one by one, and begged
								them to interfere, addressing themselves especially to the Parali,
								or crew of the ship Paralus, all freeborn Athenians, who were at any
								time ready to attack oligarchy, real or imaginary. Leon and
								Diomedon, whenever they sailed to any other place, left some ships
								for the protection of the Samians.

And so, when the three hundred began the attack, all the crews,
								especially the Parali, hastened to the rescue, and the popular party
								gained the victory. Of the three hundred they slew about thirty, and
								the three most guilty were banished; the rest they forgave, and
								henceforward all lived together under a democracy.

Chaereas the son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had been active in
								the movement, was, quickly despatched in the ship
								Paralus by the Samians and the army to Athens, there to report the
								defeat of the Samian oligarchy, for as yet they did not know that
								the government was in the hands of the Four Hundred.

No sooner had he arrived than the Four Hundred imprisoned two or
								three of the Parali, and taking away their ship transferred the rest
								of the crew to a troop-ship which was ordered to keep guard about
								Euboea.

Chaereas, seeing promptly how matters stood, had
								contrived to steal away and get back to Samos, where he told the
								soldiers with much aggravation the news from Athens, how they were
								punishing everybody with stripes, and how no one might speak a word
								against the government; he declared that their wives and children
								were being outraged, and that the oligarchy were going to take the
								relations of all the men serving at Samos who were not of their
								faction and shut them up, intending, if the fleet did not submit, to
								put them to death. And he added a great many other falsehoods.

When the army heard his report they instantly rushed upon the chief
								authors of the recent oligarchy who were present, and their
								confederates, and tried to stone them. But they were deterred by the
								warnings of the moderate party, who begged them not to ruin
								everything by violence while the enemy were lying close to them,
								prow threatening prow.

Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, who were the chief
								leaders of the reaction, now thought that the time had come for the
								open proclamation of democracy among the Athenians at Samos, and
								they bound the soldiers, more especially those of the oligarchical
								party, by the most solemn oaths to maintain a democracy and be of
								one mind, to prosecute vigorously the war with Peloponnesus, to be
								enemies to the Four Hundred, and to hold no parley with them by
								heralds.

All the Samians who were of full age took the same oath, and the
								Athenian soldiers determined to make common cause with the Samians
								in their troubles and dangers, and invited them to share their
								fortunes. They considered that neither the Samians nor themselves
								had any place of refuge to which they could turn, but that, Whether
								the Four Hundred or their enemies at Miletus gained the day, they
								were doomed.

There was now an obstinate struggle; the one party determined to
								force democracy upon the city, the other to force oligarchy
								upon the fleet.

The soldiers proceeded to summon an assembly, at which they deposed
								their former generals, and any trierarchs whom they suspected, and
								chose others. Among the new generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus
								naturally found a place. One after another the men rose and
								encouraged their comrades by various arguments.

'We ought not to despond,' they said, 'because the city has revolted
								from us, for they are few and we are many; they have lost us and not
								we them, and our resources are far greater.

Having the whole navy with us we can compel the subject-states to pay
								us tribute as well as if we sailed forth from the Piraeus; Samos is
								our own— no weak city, but one which in the Samian war all but
								wrested from Athens the dominion of the sea; and the position which
								we hold against our Peloponnesian enemies is as strong as
								heretofore. And again, with the help of the fleet we are better able
								to obtain supplies than the Athenians at home. Indeed the only
								reason why the citizens have so long retained the command of the
								Piraeus is that we who are stationed at Samos are the advanced guard
								of the Piraeus itself.

And now if they will not agree to give us back the constitution, it
								will come to this-that we shall be better able to drive them off the
								sea than they us. The help which the city gives us against our
								enemies is poor and worthless;

and we have lost nothing in losing them. They have no longer any
								money to send' (the soldiers were supplying themselves). 'They
								cannot aid us by good counsel; and yet for what other reason do
								states exercise authority over armies? But in this respect too they
								are useless. They have gone altogether astray, and overthrown the constitution of their country, which we maintain
								and will endeavour to make the oligarchy maintain likewise. Our
								advisers in the camp then are at least as good as theirs in the
								city.

Alcibiades, if we procure his recall and pardon, will be delighted to
								obtain for us the alliance of the King. And above all, if these
								hopes fail entirely, yet, while we have our great navy, there are
								many places of refuge open to us in which we shall find city and
								lands.'

Having met and encouraged one another by these and similar appeals,
								they displayed a corresponding energy in their preparations for war. And the
								ten commissioners whom the Four Hundred had sent out to Samos,
								hearing when they reached Delos how matters stood, went no further.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Miletus had likewise
								troubles among themselves. The sailors
								complained loudly to one another that their cause was ruined by
								Astyochus and Tissaphernes. 'Astyochus,' they said, 'refused to
								fight before , while we were
								strong and the Athenian navy weak, and will not fight now when they
								are reported to be in a state of anarchy, and their fleet is not as
								yet united. We are kept waiting for Tissaphernes and the Phoenician
								ships, which are a mere pretence and nothing more, and we shall soon
								be utterly exhausted. Tissaphernes never brings up the promised
								reinforcement, and he destroys our navy by his scanty and irregular
								payments: the time has come when we must fight.' The Syracusans were
								especially vehement in the matter.

Astyochus and the allies became aware of the outcry, and had resolved
								in council to fight a decisive battle. This resolution was confirmed
								when they heard of the confusion at Samos. So they put to sea with
								all their ships, in number a hundred and twelve, and ordering the
									 Milesians to march along the coast towards Mycalè,
								sailed thither themselves.

But the 
								Athenians with their fleet of eighty-two ships, which had come out
								of Samos and were just then moored at Glaucè on the promontory of
								Mycalè, a point of the mainland not far off, saw the Peloponnesians
								bearing down upon them, and returned, thinking that with their
								inferior numbers they were not justified in risking their all.

Besides, having previous information from Miletus that the
								Peloponnesians were anxious to fight, they had sent a messenger to
								Strombichides at the Hellespont, and were waiting for him to come to
								their aid with the ships from Chios which had gone to Abydos .

So they retreated to Samos, and the Peloponnesians sailed for Mycalè
								and there established themselves, together with the land-forces of
								Miletus and of the neighboring cities.

On the following day they were on the point of attacking Samos, when
								news came that Strombichides had arrived with the fleet from the
								Hellespont;

whereupon the Peloponnesians immediately retired towards Miletus, and
								the Athenians themselves, thus reinforced, sailed against Miletus
								with a hundred and eight ships. They had hoped to fight a decisive
								battle, but no one came out to meet them, and they returned to
								Samos.

The Peloponnesians had not gone out because they thought that even with their united
								force they could not risk a battle . But not knowing how to maintain so large a
								fleet, especially since Tissaphernes never paid them properly, they
								at once while the summer lasted sent Clearchus the son of Rhamphias
								with forty ships to Pharnabazus, this being the commission which he
								had originally received from Peloponnesus .

Pharnabazus had been inviting them to come, and promised to maintain
								them;

the Byzantians likewise had been sending envoys to them
								proposing to revolt. The Peloponnesian squadron put out into the
								open sea that they might not be seen on their voyage by the
								Athenians. They were caught in a storm; Clearchus and most of his
								ships found refuge at Delos, and thence returned to Miletus. He
								himself proceeded later by land to the Hellespont and assumed his
								command. But ten ships under Helixus of Megara arrived safely, and
								effected the revolt of Byzantium.

The Athenians at Samos, receiving information of these movements,
								sent a naval force to guard the Hellespont; and off Byzantium a
								small engagement was fought by eight ships against eight.

Ever since Thrasybulus restored the democracy at Samos he had
								strongly insisted that 
								Alcibiades should be recalled; the other Athenian leaders were of
								the same mind, and at last the consent of the army was obtained at
								an assembly which voted his return and full pardon. Thrasybulus then
								sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, convinced
								that there was no help for the Athenians unless by his means
								Tissaphernes could be drawn away from the Peloponnesians.

An assembly was called, at which Alcibiades lamented the cruel and
								unjust fate which had banished him; he then spoke at length of their
								political prospects; and bright indeed were the hopes of future
								victory with which he inspired them, while he magnified to excess
								his present influence over Tissaphernes. He meant thereby first to
								frighten the oligarchy at home, and effect the
								dissolution of their clubs; and secondly, to exalt himself in the
								eyes of the army at Samos and fortify their resolution; thirdly, to
								widen the breach between Tissaphernes and the enemy, and blast the
								hopes of the Lacedaemonians. Having these objects in view,
								Alcibiades carried his fulsome assurances to the utmost.

Tissaphernes, he said, had promised him that if he could only trust
								the Athenians they should not want for food while he had anything to
								give, no not if he were driven at last to turn his own bed into
								money; that he would bring up the Phoenician ships (which were
								already at Aspendus) to assist the Athenians instead of the
								Peloponnesians; but that he could not trust the Athenians unless
								Alcibiades were restored and became surety for them.

Hearing all this, and a great deal more, the Athenians immediately
								appointed him a colleague of their other
								generals, and placed everything in his hands; no man among them
								would have given up for all the world the hope of deliverance and of
								vengeance on the Four Hundred which was now aroused in them; so
								excited were they that under the influence of his words they
								despised the Peloponnesians, and were ready to sail at once for the
								Piraeus.

But in spite of the eagerness of the multitude he absolutely forbade
								them to go thither and leave behind them enemies nearer at hand.
								Having been elected general, he said, he would make the conduct of
								the war his first care, and go at once to Tissaphernes.

And he went straight from the assembly, in order that he might be
								thought to do nothing without Tissaphernes; at the same time he
								wished to be honoured in the eyes of Tissaphernes himself, and to
								show him that he had now been chosen general, and that a time had
								come when he could do him a good or a bad turn. Thus Alcibiades
								frightened the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with
								the Athenians.

The Peloponnesians at Miletus, who had already conceived a mistrust
								of Tissaphernes, 
								when they heard of the restoration of Alcibiades were still more
								exasperated against him.

About the time of the advance in force of the Athenians on Miletus,
								Tissaphernes, observing that the Peloponnesians would not put out to
								sea and fight with them, had become much more remiss in paying the
								fleet; and previously to this a dislike of him, arising out of his
								connexion with Alcibiades, had gained ground.

He was now more hated than ever. As before, the soldiers began to
								gather in knots and to express discontent; and not only the
								soldiers, but some men of position complained that they had never
								yet received their full pay, and that the sum given was too small,
								while even this was irregularly paid; if nobody would fight, or go
								where food could be got, the men would desert. All these grievances
								they laid to the charge of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for
								his own gain.

While these thoughts were passing in their minds the behaviour of
								Astyochus gave occasion to an outbreak.

The Syracusan and Thurian sailors were for the most part free men,
								and therefore bolder than the rest in assailing him with demands for
								pay. Astyochus answered them roughly and threatened them; he even
								raised his stick against Dorieus of Thurii who was pleading the
								cause of his own sailors.

When the men saw the action they, sailor-like, lost all control of
								themselves, and rushed upon him, intending to stone him; but he,
								perceiving what was coming, ran to an altar, where taking refuge he
								escaped unhurt, and they were parted.

The Milesians, who were likewise discontented, captured by a sudden
								assault a fort which had been built in Miletus by Tissaphernes, and
								drove out the garrison which he had placed there. Of 
								this proceeding the allies approved, especially the Syracusans;

Lichas, however, was displeased, and said that the Milesians and the
								inhabitants of the King's country should submit to the necessary
								humiliation, and manage to keep on good terms with Tissaphernes
								until the war was well over. His conduct on this and on other
								occasions excited a strong feeling against him among the Milesians;
								and afterwards, when he fell sick and died, they would not let him
								be buried where his Lacedaemonian comrades would have laid him.

While the Lacedaemonians were quarrelling in this manner with
								Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon;
								he had been appointed to succeed Astyochus, who surrendered to him
								the command of the fleet and sailed home.

Tissaphernes sent with him an envoy, one of his own attendants, a
								Carian named Gaulites, who spoke both Greek and Persian . He was instructed to complain of the
								destruction of the fort by the Milesians, and also to defend
								Tissaphernes against their charges. For he knew that Milesian envoys
								were going to Sparta chiefly to accuse him, and Hermocrates with
								them, who would explain how he, aided by Alcibiades, was playing a
								double game and ruining the Peloponnesian cause.

Now Tissaphernes owed Hermocrates a grudge ever since they quarrelled
								about the payment of the sailors . And when afterwards
								he had been exiled from Syracuse, and other generals, Potamis,
								Myscon, and Demarchus, came to take the command of the Syracusan
								ships at Miletus , Tissaphernes attacked him with still greater
								violence in his exile, declaring among other things that Hermocrates
								had asked him for money and had been refused, and that this was the reason of the enmity which he conceived against him.

And so Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates sailed away to
								Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had by this time returned from Tissaphernes
								to Samos.

The envoys whom the Four Hundred had sent to pacify the army and give
								explanations left Delos and came to Samos after
								the return of Alcibiades, and an assembly was held at which they
								endeavoured to speak.

At first the soldiers would not listen to them, but shouted 'Death to
								the subverters of the democracy.'

When quiet had been with difficulty restored, the envoys told them
								that the change was not meant for the destruction but for the
								preservation of the state, and that there was no intention of
								betraying Athens to the enemy, which might have been effected by the
								new government already if they had pleased during the recent
								invasion. They declared that all the Five Thousand were in turn to
								have a share in the administration ; and that the
								families of the sailors were not being outraged, as Chaereas
								slanderously reported, or in any way molested;

they were living quietly in their several homes. They defended
								themselves at length, but the more they said, the more furious and
								unwilling to listen grew the multitude. Various proposals were made;
								above all they wanted to sail to the Piraeus. Then Alcibiades
								appears to have done as eminent a
								service to the state as any man ever did. For if the Athenians at
								Samos in their excitement had been allowed to sail against their
								fellow-citizens, the enemy would instantly have obtained possession
								of Ionia and the Hellespont.

This he prevented, and at that moment no one else could have
								restrained the multitude: but he did restrain them, and with sharp
								words protected the envoys against the fury of
								individuals in the crowd.

He then dismissed them himself with the reply that he had nothing to
								say against the rule of the Five Thousand, but that the Four Hundred
								must be got rid of, and the old council of Five Hundred restored.

If they had reduced the expenditure in order that the soldiers on
								service might be better off for supplies, he highly approved. For
								the rest he entreated them to stand firm, and not give way to the
								enemy; if the city was preserved, there was good hope that they
								might be reconciled amongst themselves, but if once anything
								happened either to the army at Samos or to their fellow-citizens at
								home, there would be no one left to be reconciled with.

There were also present envoys from Argos, who proffered their aid
								'to the Athenian people at Samos.'

Alcibiades complimented them, and requested them to come with their
								forces when they were summoned; he then dismissed them. These
								Argives came with the Parali who had been ordered by the Four
								Hundred to cruise off Euboea in a troop-ship ; they were
								afterwards employed in conveying to Lacedaemon certain envoys sent
								by the Four Hundred, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. But when
								they were near Argos on their voyage the crews seized the envoys,
								and, as they were among the chief authors of the revolution,
								delivered them over to the Argives; while they, instead of returning
								to Athens, went from Argos to Samos, and brought with them in their
								trireme the Argive ambassadors.

During the same summer, and just at the time when the Peloponnesians
								were most offended with Tissaphernes on various grounds, and above
								all on account of the restoration of Alcibiades, which finally
								proved him to be a partisan of the Athenians, he, as if he were
								wanting to clear himself of these suspicions, prepared to go to Aspendus and fetch the Phoenician ships; and he
								desired Lichas to go with him. He also said that he would
								assign the charge of the army to his lieutenant Tamos, who would
								provide for them during his absence.

Why he went to Aspendus, and having gone there never brought the
								ships, is a question not easy to answer, and which has been answered
								in various ways.

For the Phoenician fleet of a hundred and forty-seven ships came as
								far as Aspendus— there is no doubt about this; but why they never
								came further is matter of conjecture. Some think that, in going to
								Aspendus, Tissaphernes was still pursuing his policy of wearing out
								the Peloponnesians; at any rate Tamos, who was in charge, supplied
								them no better, but rather worse. Others are of opinion that he
								brought up the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus in order to make money
								by selling the crews their discharge; for he certainly had no idea
								of using them in actual service. Others think that he was influenced
								by the outcry against him which had reached Lacedaemon; and that he
								wanted to create an impression of his honesty: 'Now at any rate he
								has gone to fetch the ships, and they are really manned.'

I believe beyond all question that he wanted to wear out and to
								neutralise the Hellenic forces; his object was to damage them both
								while he was losing time in going to Aspendus, and to paralyse their
								action, and not strengthen either of them by his alliance. For if he
								had chosen to finish the war, finished it might have been once for
								all, as any one may see: he would have brought up the ships, and
								would in all probability have given the victory to the
								Lacedaemonians, who lay opposite to the Athenians and were fully a
								match for them already.

The excuse which he gave for not bringing them is the most conclusive
								evidence against him; he said that there was not as many collected
								as the King had commanded. But if so, the King would 
								have been all the better pleased, for his money would have been
								saved and Tissaphernes would have accomplished the same result at
								less expense.

Whatever may have been his intention, Tissaphernes came to Aspendus
								and conferred with the Phoenicians, and the Peloponnesians at his
								request sent Philip, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to fetch the
								ships.

Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes was going to Aspendus,
								sailed thitherward himself with thirteen ships, promising the army
								at Samos that he would not fail to do them a great service. He would
								either bring the Phoenician ships to the Athenians, or, at any rate,
								make sure that they did not join the Peloponnesians. He had probably
								known all along the real mind of Tissaphernes, and that he never
								meant to bring them at all. He wanted further to injure him as much
								as possible in the opinion of the Peloponnesians when they observed
								how friendly Tissaphernes was towards himself and the Athenians;
								their distrust would compel him to change sides. So he set sail and
								went on his voyage eastward, making directly for Phaselis and
								Caunus.

The commissioners sent by the Four Hundred returned from Samos to
								Athens and reported the words of
								Alcibiades— how he bade them stand firm and not give way to the
								enemy, and what great hopes he entertained of reconciling the army
								to the city, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians. The greater
								number of the oligarchs, who were already dissatisfied, and would
								have gladly got out of the whole affair if they safely could, were
								now much encouraged. They began to come together and to criticise
								the conduct of affairs.

Their leaders were some of the oligarchical generals and actually in
								office at the time, for example, Theramenes the son of Hagnon and
									 
							 
							 Aristocrates the son of Scellius. They had been among the chief
								authors of the revolution, 
								but now, fearing, as they urged, the army at Samos, and being in
								good earnest afraid of Alcibiades, fearing also lest their
								colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon , might, unauthorised by the majority, betray
								the city, they did not indeed openly profess 
								that they meant to get rid of extreme oligarchy, but they maintained
								that the Five Thousand should be established in reality and not in
								name, and the constitution made more equal.

This was the political phrase of which they availed themselves, but
								the truth was that most of them were given up to private ambition of
								that sort which is more fatal than anything to an oligarchy
								succeeding a democracy. For the instant an oligarchy is established
								the promoters of it disdain mere equality, and everybody thinks that
								he ought to be far above everybody else. Whereas in a democracy,
								when an election is made, a man is less disappointed at a failure
								because he has not been competing with his equals.

The influence which most sensibly affected them were the great power
								of Alcibiades at Samos, and an impression that the oligarchy was not
								likely to be permanent. Accordingly every one was struggling hard to
								be the first champion of the people himself.

The leading men among the Four Hundred most violently opposed to the
								restoration of democracy were Phrynichus, who had been general at
								Samos, and had there come into antagonism with Alcibiades ,
								Aristarchus, a man who had always been the most thorough-going enemy
								of the people, Peisander, and Antiphon. These and the other leaders,
								both at the first establishment of the oligarchy , and again later when the army at Samos declared
								for the democracy , sent envoys of their
								own number to Lacedaemon, and were always anxious to make peace;
								meanwhile they continued the fortification which they had begun to build at
								Eetionea. They were confirmed in their purposes after the return of
								their own ambassadors from Samos; for they saw that not only the
								people, but even those who had appeared steadfast adherents of their
								own party, were now changing their minds.

So, fearing what might happen both at Athens and Samos, they sent
								Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others, in great haste, authorising
								them to make peace with Lacedaemon upon anything like tolerable
								terms; at the same time they proceeded more diligently than ever
								with the fortification of Eetionea.

The design was (so Theramenes and his party averred) not to bar the
								Piraeus against the fleet at Samos should they sail thither with
								hostile intentions, but rather to admit the enemy with his sea and
								land forces whenever they pleased. This Eetionea is the mole of the
								Piraeus and forms one side of the entrance;

the new fortification was to be so connected with the previously
								existing wall, which looked towards the land, that a handful of men
								stationed between the two walls might command the approach from the
								sea. For the old wall looking towards the land, and the new inner
								wall in process of construction facing the water, ended at the same
								point in one of the two forts which protected the narrow mouth of
								the harbour. A cross-wall was added, taking in the largest
								storehouse in the Piraeus and the nearest to the new fortification,
								which it joined;

this the authorities held themselves, and commanded every one to
								deposit their corn there, not only what came in by sea but what they
								had on the spot, and to take from thence all that they wanted to
								sell.

For some time Theramenes had been circulating whispers of their
								designs, and when the envoys returned from
								Lacedaemon without having effected anything in the nature of a
								treaty for the Athenian people, he declared that this fort was
								likely to prove the ruin of Athens.

Now the Euboeans had requested the Peloponnesians to send them a
									fleet , and just at this time two and forty
								ships, including Italian vessels from Tarentum and Locri and a few
								from Sicily, were stationed at Las in Laconia, and were making ready
								to sail to Euboea under the command of Agesandridas the son of
								Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes insisted that these ships were
								intended, not for Euboea, but for the party who were fortifying
								Eetionea, and that, if the people were not on the alert, they would
								be undone before they knew where they were.

The charge was not a mere calumny, but had some foundation in the
								disposition of the ruling party. For what would have best pleased
								them would have been, retaining the oligarchy in any case, to have
								preserved the Athenian empire over the allies; failing this, to keep
								merely their ships and walls, and to be independent; if this too
								proved impracticable, at any rate they would not see democracy
								restored, and themselves fall the first victims, but would rather
								bring in the enemy and come to terms with them, not caring if
								thereby the city lost walls and ships and everything else, provided
								that they could save their own lives.

So they worked diligently at the fort, which had entrances and
								postern-gates and every facility for introducing the enemy, and did
								their best to finish the building in time.

As yet the murmurs of discontent had been secret and confined to a
								few; when suddenly Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to
								Lacedaemon, in a full market-place, having just quitted the
								council-chamber, was struck by an assassin, one of the force
								employed in guarding the frontier, and fell dead. The
								man who dealt the blow escaped; his accomplice, an Argive, was
									seized and put to the torture by order of the Four
								Hundred, but did not disclose any name or say who had instigated the
								deed. All he would confess was that a number of persons used to
								assemble at the house of the commander of the frontier guard, and in
								other houses. No further measures followed; and so Theramenes and
								Aristocrates, and the other citizens, whether members of the Four
								Hundred or not, who were of the same mind, were emboldened to take
								decided steps.

For the Peloponnesians had already sailed round from Las, and having
								overrun Aegina had cast anchor at Epidaurus; and Theramenes insisted
								that if they had been on their way to Euboea they would never have
								gone up the Saronic gulf to Aegina and then returned and anchored at
								Epidaurus, but that some one had invited them for the purposes which
								he had always alleged; it was impossible therefore to be any longer
								indifferent.

After many insinuations and inflammatory harangues, the people began
								to take active measures. The hoplites who were at work on the
								fortification of Eetionea in the Piraeus, among whom was
								Aristocrates with his own tribe, which, as taxiarch, he commanded,
								seized Alexicles, an oligarchical general who had been most
								concerned with the clubs, and shut him up in a house. Others joined
								in the act, including one Hermon, who commanded the Peripoli
								stationed at Munychia;

above all, the rank and file of the hoplites heartily approved. The
								Four Hundred, who were assembled in the councilhouse when the news
								was brought to them, were ready in a moment to take up arms, except
								Theramenes and his associates, who disapproved of their proceedings;

to these they began to use threats. Theramenes
								protested, and offered to go with them at once and rescue Alexicles.
								So, taking one of the generals who was of his own faction, he went
								down to the Piraeus. Aristarchus and certain young knights came also
								to the scene of action.

Great and bewildering was the tumult, for in the city the people
								fancied that the Piraeus was in the hands of the insurgents, and
								that their prisoner had been killed, and the inhabitants of the
								Piraeus that they were on the point of being attacked from the city.
								The elder men with difficulty restrained the citizens, who were
								running up and down and flying to arms.

Thucydides of Pharsalus, the proxenus of Athens in that city,
								happening to be on the spot, kept throwing himself in every man's
								way and loudly entreating the people, when the enemy was lying in
								wait so near, not to destroy their country. At length they were
								pacified, and refrained from laying hands on one another.

Theramenes, who was himself a general, came to the Piraeus, and in an
								angry voice pretended to rate the soldiers, while Aristarchus and
								the party opposed to the people were furious. No effect was produced
								on the mass of the hoplites, who were for going to work at once.

They began asking Theramenes if he thought that the fort was being
								built to any good end, and whether it would not be better
								demolished. He answered that, if they thought so, he thought so too.
								And immediately the hoplites and a crowd of men from the Piraeus got
								on the walls and began to pull them down. The cry addressed to the
								people was,' Whoever wishes the Five Thousand to rule and not the
								Four Hundred, let him come and help us.'

For they still veiled their real minds under the name of the Five
								Thousand, and did not venture to say outright 'Whoever wishes the
								people to rule': they feared that the Five Thousand might actually
								exist, and that a man speaking in ignorance to his neighbour might
								get into trouble. The Four Hundred therefore did not wish the Five
								Thousand either to exist or to be known not to exist, thinking that
								to give so many a share in the government would be
								downright democracy, while at the same time the mystery tended to
								make the people afraid of one another.

The next day the Four Hundred, although much disturbed, met in the
									council-chamber. 
								Meanwhile the hoplites in the Piraeus let go Alexicles whom they had
								seized, and having demolished the fort went to the theatre of
								Dionysus near Munychia; there piling arms they held an assembly, and
								resolved to march at once to the city, which they accordingly did,
								and again piled arms in the temple of the Dioscuri. Presently
								deputies appeared sent by the Four Hundred.

These conversed with them singly, and tried to persuade the more
								reasonable part of them to keep quiet and restrain their comrades,
								promising that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand,
								and that out of these the Four Hundred should be in turn elected in
								such a manner as the Five Thousand might think fit. In the meantime
								they begged them not to ruin everything, or to drive the city upon
								the enemy.

The discussion became general on both sides, and at length the whole
								body of soldiers grew calmer, and turned their thoughts to the
								danger which threatened the commonwealth. They finally agreed that
								an assembly should be held on a fixed day in the theatre of Dionysus
								to deliberate on the restore. ation of harmony.

When the day arrived and the assembly was on the point of meeting in
								the theatre of Dionysus,
								news came that Agesandridas and his forty-two ships had crossed over
								from Megara, and were sailing along the coast of Salamis. Every man
								of the popular party thought that this was what they had been so
								often told by Theramenes and his friends, and that the ships were
								sailing to the fort, happily now demolished.

Nor is it impossible that Agesandridas may have been hovering about
								Epidaurus and the neighbourhood by agreement; but it is equally
								likely that he lingered there of his own accord, with an eye to the
								agitation which prevailed at Athens, hoping to be on the spot at the
								critical moment.

Instantly upon the arrival of the news the whole city rushed down to
								the Piraeus, thinking that a
								conflict with their enemies more serious than their domestic
									strife was now awaiting
								them, not at a distance, but at the very mouth of the harbour. Some
								embarked in the ships which were lying ready; others launched fresh
								ships; others manned the walls and prepared to defend the entrance
								of the Piraeus.

The Peloponnesian squadron, however, sailed onward, doubled the
								promontory of Sunium, and then, after putting in
								between Thoricus and Prasiae, finally proneeded to Oropus.

The Athenians in their haste were compelled to employ crews not yet
								trained to work together, the city was in a state of revolution, and
								the matter was vital and urgent; Euboea was all in all to them now
								that they were shut out from Attica . They
								despatched a fleet under the command of Thymochares to Eretria;

these ships, added to those which were at Euboea before, made up
								thirty-six. No sooner had they arrived than they were constrained to
								fight; for Agesandridas, after his men had taken their midday meal,
								brought out his own ships from Oropus, which is distant by sea about
								seven miles from the city of Eretria, and bore down upon them.

The Athenians at once began to man their ships,
								fancying that their crews were close at hand; but it had been so
								contrived that they were getting their provisions from houses at the
								end of the town, and not in the market, for the Eretrians
								intentionally sold nothing there that the men might lose time in
								embarking; the enemy would then come upon them before they were
								ready, and they would be compelled to put out as best they could.

A signal was also raised at Eretria telling the fleet at Oropus when
								to attack. The Athenians putting out in this hurried manner, and
								fighting off the harbour of Eretria, nevertheless resisted for a
								little while, but before long they fled and were pursued to the
								shore.

Those of them who took refuge in the city of Eretria, relying on the
								friendship of the inhabitants, fared worst, for they were butchered
								by them; but such as gained the fortified position which the
								Athenians held in the Eretrian territory escaped, and also the crews
								of the vessels which reached Chalcis.

The Peloponnesians, who had taken twenty-two Athenian ships and had
								killed or made prisoners of the men, erected a trophy. Not long
								afterwards they induced all Euboea to revolt, except Oreus of which
								the Athenians still maintained possession. They then set in order
								the affairs of the island.

When the news of the battle and of the defection of Euboea was
								brought to Athens, the Athenians were
								panic-stricken. Nothing which had happened before, not even the ruin
								of the Sicilian expedition, however overwhelming at the time, had so
								terrified them. The army at Samos was in insurrection;

they had no ships in reserve or crews to man them; there was
								revolution at home— civil war might break out at any moment: and by
								this new and terrible misfortune they had lost, not only their
								ships, but what was worse, Euboea, on which they were more dependent
								for supplies than on Attica itself. Had they not reason to despair?

But what touched them nearest, and most agitated their
								minds, was the fear lest their enemies, emboldened by victory,
								should at once attack the Piraeus, in which no ships were left;
								indeed they fancied that they were all but there. And had the
								Peloponnesians been a little more enterprising they could easily
								have executed such a plan.

Either they might have cruised near, and would then have aggravated
								the divisions in the city; or by remaining and carrying on a
								blockade they might have compelled the fleet in Ionia, although
								hostile to the oligarchy, to come and assist their kindred and their
								native city; and then the Hellespont, Ionia, all the islands between
								Ionia and Euboea, in a word, the whole Athenian empire, would have
								fallen into their hands. But on this as on so many other occasions
								the Lacedaemonians proved themselves to be the most convenient
								enemies whom the Athenians could possibly have had.

For the two peoples were of very different tempers; the one quick,
								the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous ; and
								the Lacedaemonian character was of great service to the Athenians,
								the more so because the empire for which they were fighting was
								maritime. And this view is confirmed by the defeat of the Athenians
								at Syracuse; for the Syracusans, who were most like them fought best against
								them.

When the news came the Athenians in their extremity still contrived
								to man twenty ships, and immediately summoned an assembly (the
								first of many) in the place called the Pnyx, where they had always
								been in the habit of meeting; at which assembly they deposed the
								Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be in the hands
								of the Five Thousand; this number was to include all who could
								furnish themselves with arms.

No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on
								pain of falling under a curse. In the numerous other assemblies
								which were afterwards held they appointed Nomothetae, and by a
								series of decrees established a constitution. This government during
								its early days was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within
								my memory. Oligarchy and Democracy were duly attempered. And thus
								after the miserable state into which she had fallen, the city was
								again able to raise her head.

The people also passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and others from
								exile, and sending to him and to the army in Samos exhorted them to
								act vigorously.

When this new revolution began, Peisander, Alexicles, and the other
								leaders of the oligarchy stole away to Decelea; all except
								Aristarchus, who, being one of the generals at the time, gathered
								round him hastily a few archers of the most barbarous sort and made
								his way to Oenoè.

This was an Athenian fort on the borders of Boeotia which the
									Corinthians , having
								called the Boeotians to their aid, were now besieging on their own
								account, in order to revenge an overthrow inflicted by the garrison
								of Oenoè upon a party of them who were going home from Decelea.

Aristarchus entered into communication with the besiegers, and
								deceived the garrison by telling them that the Athenian government
								had come to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and that by one of the
								conditions of the peace they were required to give up-the place to
								the Boeotians. They, trusting him, whom they knew to be a general,
								and being in entire ignorance of what had happened because they were
								closely invested, capitulated and came out.

Thus Oenoè was taken and occupied by the Boeotians; and the
								oligarchical revolution at Athens came to an end.

During this summer and about the same time Mindarus transferred the
								fleet of the Peloponnesians to the Hellespont, They had been waiting
								at Miletus. But none of the commissioners whom Tissaphernes on going
								to Aspendus appointed to supply the fleet gave them anything; and
								neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had as yet
								made their appearance; Philip, who had been sent with Tissaphernes,
								and Hippocrates, a Spartan then in Phaselis, had informed the
								admiral Mindarus that the ships would never come, and that
								Tissaphernes was thoroughly dishonest in his dealings with them. All
								this time Pharnabazus was inviting them and was eager to secure the
								assistance of the fleet; he wanted, like Tissaphernes, to raise a
								revolt, whereby he hoped to profit, among the cities in his own
								dominion which still remained faithful to Athens. So at length
								Mindarus, in good order and giving the signal suddenly, lest he
								should be discovered by the Athenians at Samos, put to sea from
								Miletus with seventy-three ships, and set sail for the Hellespont,
								whither in this same summer a Peloponnesian force had already gone
								in sixteen ships, and had overrun a portion of the Chersonese. But
								meeting with a storm Mindarus was driven into Icarus, and being
								detained there five or six days by stress of weather, he put in at
								Chios.

When Thrasyllus at Samos heard that he had started from Miletus he
								sailed away in all haste with fifty-five ships, fearing
								that the enemy might get into the Hellespont before him.

Observing that Mindarus was at Chios, and thinking that he could keep
								him there, he placed scouts at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite,
								that he might be informed if the ships made any attempt to sail
								away. He himself coasted along the island to Methymna and ordered a supply of barley-meal and other provisions,
								intending, if he were long detained, to make Lesbos his
								head-quarters while attacking Chios. He wanted also to sail against
								the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had revolted, and, if possible, to
								destroy the place.

Now certain of the chief citizens of Methymna who had been driven
								into exile had conveyed to the island about fifty hoplites,
								partisans of theirs, from Cymè, besides others whom they hired on
								the mainland, to the number of three hundred in all. They were
								commanded by Anaxander, a Theban, who was chosen leader because the
								Lesbians were of Theban descent . They first of all
								attacked Methymna. In this attempt they were foiled by the timely
								arrival of the Athenian garrison from Mytilenè, and being a second
								time repulsed outside the walls, had marched over the mountains and
								induced Eresus to revolt.

Thither Thrasyllus sailed, having determined to attack them with all
								his ships. He found that Thrasybulus had already reached the place,
								having started from Samos with five ships as soon as he heard that
								the exiles had landed. But he had come too late to prevent the
								revolt, and was lying off Eresus.

There Thrasyllus was also joined by two ships which were on their way
								home from the Hellespont, and by a squadron from Methymna. The whole
								fleet now consisted of sixty-seven ships, from the crews of which
								the generals formed an army, and prepared by the help of engines and
								by every possible means to take Eresus.

Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, having spent
								two days in provisioning, and having received from the
								Chians three Chian tesseracosts for each man, on the third
								day sailed hastily from Chios, not going through the
								open sea ,
								lest they should fall in with the ships blockading Eresus, but
								making directly for the mainland and keeping Lesbos on the left.

They touched at the harbour of the island Carteria, which belongs to
								Phocaea, and there taking their midday meal, sailed past the Cymaean
								territory, and supped at Argennusae on the mainland over against
								Mytilenè.

They sailed away some time before dawn, and at Harmatus, which is
								opposite Methymna on the mainland, they again took their midday
								meal; they quickly passed by the promontory of Lectum, Larissa,
								Hamaxitus, and the neighboring towns, and finally arrived at
								Rhoeteum in the Hellespont before midnight. Some of the ships also
								put into Sigeum and other places in the neighbourhood.

The Athenians, who lay with eighteen ships at Sestos , knew from the beacons which their scouts kindled, and from the sudden blaze of
								many watch-fires which appeared in the enemy's country, that the
								Peloponnesians were on the point of sailing into the strait. That
								very night, getting close under the Chersonese, they moved towards
								Elaeus, in the hope of reaching the open sea before the enemy's
								ships arrived.

They passed unseen the sixteen Peloponnesian ships 
								which were at Abydos, and had been told by their now approaching friends to keep a sharp
								look-out if the Athenians tried to get away. At dawn of day they
								sighted the fleet of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase; most of
								them escaped in the direction of' Imbros and Lemnos, but the four
								which were hindermost were caught off Elaeus.

One which ran ashore near the temple of Protesilaus the
								Peloponnesians took, together with the crew; two others without the
								crews; a fourth they burnt on the shore of Imbros; the crew escaped.

For the rest of that day they blockaded Elaeus with the ships from
								Abydos which had now joined
								them; the united fleet numbering eighty-six; but as the town would
								not yield they sailed away to Abydos.

The Athenians, whose scouts had failed them, and who had never
								imagined that the enemy's fleet could pass them undetected, were
								quietly besieging Eresus; but on finding out their mistake they
								instantly set sail and followed the enemy to the Hellespont.

They fell in with and took two Peloponnesian ships, which during the
								pursuit had ventured too far into the open sea. On the following day
								they came to Elaeus, where they remained at anchor, and the ships
								which had taken refuge at Imbros joined them; the next five days
								were spent in making preparations for the impending engagement.

After this they fought, and the manner of the battle was as follows.
								The Athenians began to 
								sail in column close along the shore towards Sestos, when the
								Peloponnesians, observing them, likewise put to sea from Abydos.

Perceiving that a battle was imminent, the Athenians, numbering
								seventy-six ships, extended their line along the Chersonese from
								Idacus to Arrhiani, and the Peloponnesians, numbering eighty-eight
								ships, from Abydos to Dardanus. The Syracusans held the right wing
								of the Peloponnesians;

the other wing, on which were the swiftest ships, was led by Mindarus
								himself. Thrasyllus commanded the left wing of the Athenians, and
								Thrasybulus the right; the other generals had their several posts.

The Peloponnesians were eager to begin the engagement, intending, as
								their left wing extended beyond the right of the Athenians, to
								prevent them, if possible, from sailing out of the straits again, and also to thrust their centre back on the
								land which was near. The Athenians, seeing their intention, advanced
								from the land the wing on which the enemy wanted to cut them off,
								and succeeded in getting beyond them.

But their left wing by this time had passed the promontory of
								Cynossema, and the result was that the centre of their line was
								thinned and weakened— all the more since their numbers were inferior
								and the sharp projection of the shore about Cynossema hindered those
								who were on one side from seeing what was taking place on the other.

So the Peloponnesians, falling upon the centre of the Athenian fleet,
								forced their enemies' ships back on the beach, and having
								gained a decisive advantage, disembarked to follow up their victory.

Neither Thrasybulus on the right wing, who was pressed hard by
								superior numbers, nor Thrasyllus on the left, was able to assist
								them. The promontory of Cynossema hindered the left wing from seeing
								the action, and the ships of the Syracusans and others, equal in
								number to their own, kept them fully engaged. But at last, while the
								victorious Peloponnesians were incautiously pursuing, some one ship,
								some another, a part of their line began to fall into disorder.

Thrasybulus remarked their confusion, and at once left off extending
								his wing; then turning upon the ships which were opposed to him, he
								repulsed and put them to flight; he next faced the conquering and now scattered ships
								of the Peloponnesian centre, struck at them, and threw them into
								such a panic that hardly any of them resisted. The Syracusans too
								had by this time given way to Thrasyllus, and were still more
								inclined to fly when they saw the others flying.

After the rout the Peloponnesians effected their escape, most of them
								to the river Midius first, 
								and then to Abydos. Not many ships were taken by the Athenians; for
								the Hellespont, being narrow, afforded a retreat to the enemy within
								a short distance. Nevertheless nothing could have been more
								opportune for them than this victory at sea;

for some time past they had feared the Peloponnesian navy on account
								of their disaster in Sicily, as well as of the various smaller
								defeats which they had sustained . But now they ceased to depreciate
								themselves or to think much of their enemies' seamanship.

They had taken eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian,
								two Boeotian, and of the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and
								Pellenians one each. Their own loss amounted to fifteen ships.

They raised a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema, and then
								collecting the wrecks, and giving up to the enemy his dead under a
								flag of truce, sent a trireme carrying intelligence of the victory
								to Athens.

On the arrival of the ship and the news of a success so incredible
								after the calamities which had befallen them in Euboea and during
								the revolution, the Athenians were greatly encouraged. They thought
								that their affairs were no longer hopeless, and that if they were
								energetic they might still win.

The Athenians at Sestos promptly repaired their ships, and on the
								fourth day were proceeding against Cyzicus, which had revolted, when,
								seeing the eight Peloponnesian ships from Byzantium
								anchored at Harpagium and Priapus, they bore down upon them, and
								defeating the land-forces which were acting with them, took the
								ships. They then went and recovered Cyzicus, which was unwalled, and
								exacted a contribution from the inhabitants.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and
								recovered as many of their own captured vessels as were still
								seaworthy; the rest had been burnt by the Elaeusians. They then sent
								Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring up the ships which were
								there.

About the same time Alcibiades sailed back with his thirteen
									ships from Caunus and Phaselis to samons, announcing
								that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet from coming to the
								assistance of the enemy, and that he had made Tissaphernes a greater
								friend of the Athenians than ever. He then manned nine additional
								ships, and exacted large sums of money from the Halicarnassians.

He also fortified Cos , where he left a governor, and
								towards the autumn returned to Samos. 
							 When Tissaphernes heard that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from
								Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke up his camp at Aspendus
								and marched away towards Ionia.

Now after the arrival of the Peloponnesians at the Hellespont, the
								Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had procured from them at Abydos a
								force of infantry, which they led through Mount Ida and introduced
								into their city.

They were oppressed by Arsaces the Persian, a lieutenant of
								Tissaphernes. This Arsaces, when the Athenians, wishing to purify
								Delos, expelled the inhabitants and they settled in Adramyttium ,
								professing to have a quarrel which he did not wish to declare
								openly, asked their best soldiers to form an army for him. He then
								led them out of the town as friends and allies, and, taking
								advantage of their midday meal, surrounded them with his own troops,
								and shot them down.

This deed alarmed the Antandrians, who thought that
								they might meet-with some similar violence at his hands; and as he
								was imposing upon them burdens which were too heavy for them, they
								expelled his garrison from their citadel.

Tissaphernes, who was already offended at the expulsion of his
								garrison from Miletus , and from Cnidus , where the
								same thing had happened, perceived that this new injury was the work
								of the Peloponnesians. He felt that they were now his determined
								enemies, and was apprehensive of some further injury. He was also
								disgusted at discovering that Pharnabazus had induced the
								Peloponnesians to join him, and was likely in less time and at less
								expense to be more successful in the war with the Athenians than
								himself. He therefore determined to go to the Hellespont, and
								complain of their conduct in the affair of Antandrus, offering at
								the same time the most plausible defence which he could concerning
								the non-arrival of the Phoenician fleet and their other grievances.
								He first went to Ephesus, and there offered sacrifice to Artemis. .
								. .

[With the end of the winter which follows this summer the
								twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian War is completed.]