Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the
								Athenians as they warred against each other, beginning to write as
								soon as the war was on foot, with expectation it should prove a
								great one and most worthy the relation of all that had been before
								it; 
							 conjecturing so much both from this, that they flourished on both
								sides in all manner of provision, and also because he saw the rest
								of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then
								presently and some intending so to do.

For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened
								among the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians and, as
								a man may say, to most nations.

For the actions that preceded this and those again that are yet more
								ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by
								any means clearly be discovered, yet for any argument that, looking
								into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not
								think they have been very great, either for matter of war or
								otherwise.

For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas was not of old
								constantly inhabited; 
							 but that at first there were often removals, everyone easily leaving
								the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater
								number.

For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse, but with fear,
								neither by sea nor land, and every man so husbanded the ground as
								but barely to live upon it without any stock of riches and planted
								nothing (because it was uncertain when another should invade them
								and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls), but
								made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary
								sustenance as might serve them from day to day, they made little
								difficulty to change their habitations. 
							 And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for
								greatness of cities or other provision.

But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes
								of inhabitants, as that which is now called Thessalia, and Boeotia,
								and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia, and of the
								rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile.

For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular
								men both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home, and
								withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers.

From hence it is that Attica, from great antiquity for the sterility
								of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the
								same people.

And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said that
								Greece, by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other
								parts received the like augmentation. 
							 For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the
								most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves
								to Athens; 
							 where receiving the freedom of the city, they long since so increased
								the same in number of people, as, Attica being incapable of them
								itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.

And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little
								demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. 
							 For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by
								Greece in common;

nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of
								Hellas; 
							 nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any
								such name at all. 
							 But Pelasgicum (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts,
								by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. 
							 But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis and called in for
								their aid into other cities, these cities, because of their
								conversing with them, began more particularly to be called
								Hellenes; 
							 and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them
								all. 
							 This is conjectured principally out of Homer.

For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not
								anywhere that name in general, nor indeed to any but those that with
								Achilles came out of Phthiotis and were the first so called; 
							 but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. 
							 Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; 
							 because the Grecians, as it seemeth unto me, were not yet
								distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable
								unto them.

The Grecians then, neither as they had that name in particular by
								mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever
								before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence,
								enter into any action with their forces joined. 
							 And to that expedition they came together by the means of navigation,
								which the most part of Greece had now received.

For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have
								built a navy. 
							 And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea, and both commanded
								the isles called Cyclades and also was the first that sent colonies
								into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting
								his own sons there for governors; 
							 and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the
								better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.

For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent
								lived near unto the sea or else inhabited the islands after once
								they began to cross over one to another in ships, became thieves and
								went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to
								enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak, and
								falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly inhabited, rifled
								them and made this the best means of their living, being a matter at
								that time nowhere in disgrace but rather carrying with it something
								of glory.

This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom,
								so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. 
							 The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce
								men questioning of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether
								they be thieves or not, as a thing neither scorned by such as were
								asked nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know.

They also robbed one another within the mainland. 
							 And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called Ozolae, the Acarnanians, and those of the
								continent in that quarter, unto this day. 
							 Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people
								of that continent from their old trade of thieving.

For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed because
								their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe, and accustomed
								themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their
								armour.

And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same
								manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest.

Amongst whom the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour
								and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. 
							 And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years laid away
								upon the same delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen
								coats and golden grasshoppers, which they were wont to bind up in
								the locks of their hair. 
							 From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity,
								remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians.

But the moderate kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of
								these times, was first taken up by the Lacedaemonians, amongst whom
								also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their
								bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the
								commons.

The same were also the first that when they were to contend in the
								Olympic games stripped themselves naked and anointed their bodies
								with ointment; 
							 whereas in ancient times the champions did also in the Olympic games
								use breeches, nor is it many years since this custom ceased. 
							 Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those
								of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling,
								and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the
								exercise.

It may likewise by many other things be demonstrated that the old
								Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the
								barbarians of the present age.

As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase
								of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of
								riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore, and have
								taken up isthmi [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea]
								both for merchandise and for the better strength against
								confiners. 
							 But the old cities, men having been in those times for the most part
								infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as
								in the continent. 
							 For others also that dwelt on the seaside, though not seamen, yet
								they molested one another with robberies. 
							 And even to these times those people are planted up high in the
								country.

But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders,
								namely, the Carians and the Phoenicians. 
							 For by them were the greatest part of the islands inhabited, a
								testimony whereof is this. 
							 The Athenians when in this present war they hallowed the isle of
								Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead found that more
								than half of them were Carians, known so to be both by the armour
								buried with them and also by their manner of burial at this day.

And when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more
								free. 
							 For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands and in the most of
								them planted colonies of his own.

By which means they who inhabited the sea-coasts, becoming more
								addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings, of whom
								some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. 
							 For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with
								the mighty; 
							 and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into
								subjection.

And so it came to pass that rising to power they proceeded afterward
								to the war against Troy.

And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon got together that fleet, not so
								much for that he had with him the suitors of Helen bound thereto by
								oath to Tindareus as for this, that he exceeded the rest in
								power.

For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty
								of the acts of the Peloponnesians say that first Pelops, by the
								abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men
								in want, obtained such power amongst them, as, though he were a
								stranger, yet the country was called after his name; 
							 and that this power was also increased by his posterity. 
							 For Eurystheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleidae, Atreus, that
								was his uncle by the mother, and was then abiding with him as an
								exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus,
								and to whom Eurystheus, when he undertook the expedition, had
								committed Mycenae and the government thereof, for that he was his
								kinsman; 
							 when as Eurystheus came not back (the Mycenians being willing to it
								for fear of the Heracleidae, and because he was an able man and made
								much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenae, and of
								whatsoever else was under Eurystheus, for himself;

and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the
								Perseides. 
							 To which greatness Agamemnon succeeding, and also far excelling the
								rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and
								assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour as by fear.

For it is clear that he himself both conferred most ships to that
								action and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. 
							 And this is likewise declared by Homer (if any think his testimony
								sufficient), who, at the delivery of the scepter unto him, calleth
								him, 
 of many isles and of all Argos
										king. 
 Now he could not, living in the continent,
								have been lord of the islands, other than such as were adjacent
								which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. 
							 And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages
								before it.

Now seeing Mycenae was but a small city, or if any other of that age
								seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak
								an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have
								said and fame reported it to be.

For if the city of Lacedaemon were now desolate and nothing of it
								left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would
								breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in
								comparison of the fame. 
							 For although of five parts of Peloponnesus it possess two and hath
								the leading of the rest and also of many confederates without, yet
								the city being not close built and the temples and other edifices
								not costly, and because it is but scatteringly inhabited after the
								ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the
								report. 
							 Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture by
								the sight of their city that their power were double to what it
								is. 
							 We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that
								went to Troy] nor have in regard so much the external show of a city
								as the power;

but we are to think that that expedition was indeed greater than
								those that went before it but yet inferior to those of the present
								age, if in this also we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a
								poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. 
							 And yet even thus it cometh short.

For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels, those that
								were of Boeotians carrying one hundred and twenty men apiece, and
								those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I
								suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; 
							 and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest he maketh in his
								catalogue no mention at all, but declareth that they who were in the
								vessels of Philoctetes served both as mariners and soldiers; 
							 for he writes that they who were at the oar were all of them
								archers. 
							 And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along
								except kings and such as were in chief authority; 
							 especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms
								without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion.

So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their
								shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as
								sent jointly from all Greece were not very many.

And the cause hereof was not so much want of men as of wealth. 
							 For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater
								than they hoped might both follow the war and also maintain
								itself. 
							 When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight
								(which is manifest, for else they could not have fortified their
								camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not
								there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook
								themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus and part to
								fetch in booties; 
							 whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years
								resistance, as being ever a match for so many as remained at the
								siege.

Whereas, if they had gone furnished with store of provision and with
								all their forces, eased of booty-haling and tillage, since they were
								masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. 
							 But they strove not with their whole power but only with such a
								portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be
								present; 
							 when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both
								in less time and with less labour. 
							 But through want of money not only they were weak matters, all that
								preceded this enterprise, but also this, which is of greater name
								than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and
								report which, by means of the poets, now goeth of it.

For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their
								shifting and transplantations; 
							 insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power.

For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little
								innovation; 
							 and in most of the cities there arose seditions, and those which were
								driven out built cities for themselves in other places.

For those that are now called Boeotians in the sixtieth year after
								the taking of Troy expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated
								themselves in that country which, now Boeotia, was then called
								Cadmeis. 
							 (But there was in the same country a certain portion of that nation
								before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy.)
								And in the eightieth year the Dorians together with the Heracleidae
								seized on Peloponnesus.

And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest and,
								shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. 
							 And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands, and the
								Peloponnesians most of Italy and Sicily and also certain parts of
								the rest of Greece. 
							 But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

But when the power of Greece was now improved, and the desire of
								money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities
								there were erected tyrannies (for before that time kingdoms with
								honours limited were hereditary); 
							 and the Grecians built navies and became more seriously addicted to
								the affairs of the sea.

The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form
								of shipping into the nearest to that which is now in use, and at
								Corinth are reported to have been made the first galleys of all
								Greece.

Now it is well known that Aminocles, the shipwright of Corinth, built
								four ships at Samos; 
							 and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end of this
								present war are at the most but three hundred years.

And the most ancient naval battle that we know of was fought between
								the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans, and from that battle to the
								same time are but two hundred and sixty years.

For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic
								(because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus,
								trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to
								another but through the Corinthians' territory), and was also
								wealthy in money, as appears by the poets, who have surnamed this
								town the rich. 
							 And after the Grecians had commerce also by sea, then likewise having
								furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates
								and, affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased
								their city in revenue of money.

After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus, first king of the
								Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy, and
								making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part
								of the sea that lieth on their own coast. 
							 Also Polycrates, who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had
								a strong navy wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; 
							 and amongst the rest having won Rhenea, he consecrated the same to
								Apollo of Delos. 
							 The Phocaeans likewise, when they were building the city of
								Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians in a fight at sea.

These were the greatest navies extant. 
							 And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy,
								consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with
								vessels of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of
								former times.

And it was but a little before the Medan war and death of Darius,
								successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of
								Sicily and the Corcyraeans had of galleys any number. 
							 For these last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece
								before the invasion of the Medes.

And the people of Aegina and the Athenians had but small ones, and
								the most of them consisting but of fifty oars apiece; 
							 and that so lately as but from the time that the Athenians making war
								on Aegina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the
								persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that
								war. 
							 And these also not all had decks.

Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. 
							 Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by
								them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over
								other people. 
							 For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient
								land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the
								islands.

But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by,
								there was none at all; 
							 and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. 
							 For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any
								nation far from home, because the lesser cities neither brought in
								their forces to the great ones as subjects nor concurred as equals
								in any common enterprise; 
							 but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to
								hand.

For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians was it
								wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with
								either party.

As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also
								the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and
								the Persian kingdom after the defeat of Croesus made war upon all
								that lieth from the river Halys to the seaside and so subdued all
								the cities which they possessed in the continent; 
							 and Darius afterward, when he had overcome the Phoenician fleet, did
								the like unto them in the islands.

And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who
								forecasted only for themselves how with as much safety as was
								possible to look to their own persons and their own families, they
								resided for the most part in the cities and did no action worthy of
								memory, unless it were against their neighbours. 
							 For as for the tyrants of Sicily, they were already arrived at
								greater power. 
							 Thus was Greece for a long time hindered, that neither jointly it
								could do anything remarkable nor the cities singly be adventurous.

But after that the tyrants, both of Athens and of the rest of Greece
								where tyrannies were, were the most and last of them, excepting
								those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedaemonians (for Lacedaemon,
								after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited the same,
								though it hath been longer troubled with seditions than any other
								city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and
								been also always free from tyrants; 
							 for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something
								more that the Lacedaemonians have used one and the same government,
								and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs
								in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in
								Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes
								against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon. 
							 And in the tenth year again after that came the barbarian with the
								great fleet into Greece to subdue it.

And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians
								that league in that war was given to the Lacedaemonians, as to the
								most potent state. 
							 And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed
								their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship-board
								and became seamen. 
							 When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the
								Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had
								in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into
								leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the
								Lacedaemonians, these two cities appearing to be the mightiest, for
								this had the power by land and the other by sea.

But this confederation lasted but awhile; 
							 for afterwards the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, being at
								variance, warred each on other together with their several
								confederates. 
							 And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had
								recourse presently to one of these. 
							 In so much that from the war of the Medes to this present war being
								continually [exercised] sometimes in peace sometimes in war, either
								one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived
								at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also
								expert because their practice was with danger.

The Lacedaemonians governed not their confederates so as to make them
								tributaries but only drew them by fair means to embrace the
								oligarchy convenient to their own policy. 
							 But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the
								galleys of all those that stood out (except the Chians and
								Lesbians), reigned over them and ordained every of them to pay a
								certain tribute of money. 
							 By which means their own particular provision was greater in the
								beginning of this war than when, in their flourishing time the
								league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was
								at the most.

Such then I find to have been the state of things past, hard to be
								believed, though one produce proof for every particular thereof. 
							 For men receive the report of things, though of their own country if
								done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another,
								without examination.

For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the
								tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and know not that
								Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus,
								and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; 
							 and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their
								accomplices had that day and at that instant discovered unto Hippias
								somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man
								forewarned; 
							 and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they
								should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the
								temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the
								Panathenaical show.

And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not
								yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other
								Grecians, as that the kings of Lacedaemon, in giving their
								suffrages, had not single but double votes, and that Pitanate was a
								band of soldiers so called there, whereas there was never any
								such. 
							 So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and
								embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.

Now he that by the arguments here adduced shall frame a judgment of
								the things past and not believe rather that they were such as the
								poets have sung or prose-writers have composed, more delightfully to
								the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be
								disproved and by length of time turned for the most part into the
								nature of fables without credit, but shall think them here searched
								out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too,
								considering their antiquity: he, I say, shall not err.

And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be
								greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before
								it, yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same,
								it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before
								mentioned.

What particular persons have spoken when they were about to enter
								into the war or when they were in it were hard for me to remember
								exactly, whether they were speeches which I have heard myself or
								have received at the second hand. 
							 But as any man seemed to me that knew what was nearest to the sum of
								the truth of all that had been uttered to speak most agreeably to
								the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here.

But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to
								write all that I heard from all authors nor such as I myself did but
								think to be true, but only those whereat I was myself present and
								those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry.

And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty,
								because such as were present at every action spake not all after the
								same manner, but as they were affected to the parts or as they could
								remember.

To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no
								fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. 
							 But he that desires to look into the truth of things done and which
								(according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at
								least their like, he shall find enough herein to make him think it
								profitable. 
							 And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession than to be
								rehearsed for a prize.

The greatest action before this was that against the Medes; 
							 and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon
								decided. 
							 But as for this war, it both lasted long and the harm it did to
								Greece was such as the like in the like space had never been seen
								before.

For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made
								desolate, what by the barbarians and what by the Greeks warring on
								one another (and some cities there were that when they were taken
								changed their inhabitants), nor so much banishing and slaughter,
								some by the war some by sedition, as was in this.

And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of,
								but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as
								earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world and most
								violent withal; 
							 eclipses of the sun oftener than is reported of any former time; 
							 great droughts in some places, and thereby famine; 
							 and that which did none of the least hurt but destroyed also its
								part, the plague.

All these evils entered together with this war, which began from the
								time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league which
								immediately after the conquest of Euboea had been concluded between
								them for thirty years.

The causes why they brake the same and their quarrels I have
								therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what
								ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise.

And the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the
								growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedaemonians into
								fear necessitated the war. 
							 But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced were
								these.

Epidamnus is a city situated on the right hand to such as enter into
								the Ionian Gulf. 
							 Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of
								Illyris.

This was planted by the Corcyraeans; 
							 but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of
								Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and,
								according to an ancient custom, called to this charge out of the
								metropolitan city.

Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians and
								others of the Doric nation. 
							 In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and
								populous;

and having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by
								a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians
								brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power.

But that which was the last accident before this war was that the
								nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined
								with the barbarians and both by land and sea robbed those that
								remained within.

The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent
								their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying
								the Corcyraeans not to see them perish but to reconcile unto them
								those whom they had driven forth and to put an end to the barbarian
								war.

And this they entreated in the form of suppliants, sitting down in
								the temple of Juno. 
							 But the Corcyraeans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away
								again without effect.

The Epidamnians, now despairing of relief from the Corcyraeans and at
								a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi
								enquired at the oracle whether it were not best to deliver up their
								city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders and make
								trial what aid they should obtain from thence.

And when the oracle had answered that they should deliver it and take
								the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth and
								according to the advice of the oracle gave their city to them, and
								declared how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what
								answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help and that
								they would not stand by beholding their destruction.

And the Corinthians undertook their defence not only for the equity
								of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the
								Corcyraeans' colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyraeans, who
								being their colony yet contemned them and allowed them not their due
								honour in public meetings nor in the distribution of the sacrifice
								began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies;

but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of
								money and strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in
								contempt. 
							 Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in
								shipping, and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phaeaces
								who flourished in glory of naval affairs, which was also the cause
								why they the rather provided themselves of a navy. 
							 And they were indeed not without power that way; 
							 for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty
								galleys.

The Corinthians therefore, having all these criminations against
								them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to
								whosoever would to go and dwell there but also sent thither a
								garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens.

Which succours, for fear the Corcyraeans should have hindered their
								passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia.

The Corcyraeans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison
								were gone to Epidamnus and that the colony was delivered to the
								Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same, and sailing presently
								thither with twenty-five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet,
								in an insolent manner commanded them both to recall those whom they
								had banished (for these banished men of Epidamnus had been now at
								Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors and
								claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyraeans to restore them) and
								to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the
								Corinthians.

But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. 
							 Whereupon the Corcyraeans with forty galleys, together with the
								banished men (whom they pretended to reduce) and with the Illyrians,
								whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them,

and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation that such of the
								Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or
								otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. 
							 But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they
								enclosed the city in on every side.

The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was
								besieged, presently made ready their army, and at the same time
								caused a proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a
								colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like
								privileges with those that were there before, and that such as
								desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go
								along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty
								Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind.

And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their
								silver. 
							 Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in
								their passage by the Corcyraeans, to aid them with some galleys, who
								accordingly furnished out eight; 
							 the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. 
							 They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them
								five; 
							 the citizens of Hermione, one; 
							 the Troezenians, two; 
							 the Leucadians, ten; 
							 the Ambraciots, eight. 
							 Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money; 
							 of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. 
							 And of the Corinthians themselves there were ready thirty galleys and
								three thousand men of arms.

The Corcyraeans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in
								company of the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and of the
								Sicyonians whom they took with them and required the Corinthians to
								recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to
								Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to
								do;

or if they had anything to allege, they were content to have the
								cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should
								both agree on; 
							 and they then should hold the colony to whom the same should be
								adjudged. 
							 They said also that they were content to refer their cause to the
								oracle at Delphi, that war they would make none;

but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them,
								be forced in their own defence to seek out better friends than those
								whom they already had.

To this the Corinthians answered that if they would put off with
								their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they
								would then consult of the matter; 
							 for before they could not honestly do it because whilst they should
								be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery
								of a siege.

The Corcyraeans replied to this that if they would call back those
								men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as
								the Corinthians had required them; 
							 or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay
								where they were and to suspend the war till the cause should be
								decided.

The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since
								their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having
								defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy-five galleys
								and two thousand men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the
								Corcyraeans.

Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas,
								Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of
								Timanthes; 
							 and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas
								the son of Isarchus.

After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium
								(which is a temple of Apollo and ground consecrated unto him) in the
								mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyraeans sent a herald to them
								at Actium to forbid their coming on, and in the meantime manned out
								their fleet, and, having repaired and made fit for service their old
								galleys and furnished the rest with things necessary, shipped their
								munition and went aboard.

The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer
								not inclining to peace but having their galleys already manned and
								furnished to the number of eighty sail (for forty attended always
								the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea and, arranging themselves,
								came to a battle in which the Corcyraeans were clearly victors;

and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen
								galleys. 
							 And the same day it happened likewise that they that besieged
								Epidamnus had the same rendered unto them, with conditions, that the
								strangers therein found should be ransomed and the Corinthians kept
								in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.

The battle being ended, the Corcyraeans, after they had set up their
								trophy in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other
								prisoners but kept the Corinthians still in bonds.

After this, when the Corinthians with their vanquished fleet were
								gone home to Corinth, the Corcyraeans, masters now of the whole sea
								in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas, a
								Corinthian colony, and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal
								of the Eleans, and burnt it because they had both with money and
								shipping given aid to the Corinthians.

And they were masters of those seas and infested the confederates of
								Corinth for the most part of that year, till such time as in the
								beginning of the summer following the Corinthians sent a fleet and
								soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas
								and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in
								Thesprotis; 
							 and the Corcyraeans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay
								over against them in Leucimna.

But neither part stirred against the other; 
							 but after they had lain quietly opposite all the summer, they retired
								in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.

All this year, as well before as after the battle, the Corinthians,
								being vexed at the war with the Corcyraeans, applied themselves to
								the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the
								strongest they were able to make, and to procure mariners out of
								Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece.

The Corcyraeans, having intelligence of their preparations, began to
								fear and (because they had never been in league with any Grecian
								city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the
								Athenians or Lacedaemonians) thought it best now to send to Athens
								to see if they could procure any aid from thence.

This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their
								ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to
								that of the Corcyraeans might hinder them from carrying the war as
								they desired.

And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each
								other; 
							 and the Corcyraeans spake to this effect:

"Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the
								aid of their neighbours (as now do we), and cannot pretend by any
								great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go
								any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek
								conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to
								those that are to grant it; 
							 and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same; 
							 and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit
								be rejected.

And the Corcyraeans, being fully persuaded that they can make all
								this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither,
								desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates.

Now so it is that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect
								of our suit to you and also for the present unprofitable to our own
								estate.

For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league
								with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others but also
								left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the
								Corinthians. 
							 And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with
								others into league because we would not at the discretion of others
								enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and
								imprudence.

Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in the late
								battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater
								preparation out of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, and seeing
								with our own single power we are not able to go through, and since
								also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all
								Greece, it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of
								whomsoever else we can; 
							 and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our
								former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not
								from malice but error of judgment.

"Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence on our
								part of need will on your part be honourable for many reasons. 
							 First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have
								suffered and not to such as have committed the injustice. 
							 And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at
								stake their whole fortune, you shall so place your benefit as to
								have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible.

Besides this, the greatest navy but your own is ours. 
							 Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies,
								can befall you than that that power which you would have prized
								above any money or other requital should come voluntarily and
								without all danger or cost present itself to your hands, bringing
								with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you
								defend, and strength to yourselves. 
							 All which have not happened at once to many. 
							 And few there be of those that sue for league that come not rather to
								receive strength and reputation than to confer it.

If any here think that the war wherein we may do you service will not
								at all be, he is in an error and seeth not how the Lacedaemonians,
								through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; 
							 and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you,
								making way for their enterprise, assault us now in the way to the
								invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of
								their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand either to
								weaken us or to strengthen their own estate.

It must therefore be your part, we offering and you accepting the
								league, to begin with them and to anticipate plotting rather than to
								counterplot against them.

"If they object injustice in that you receive their colony,
								henceforth let them learn that all colonies so long as they receive
								no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; 
							 but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; 
							 for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to
								be their equals.

That they have done us the injury is manifest; 
							 for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching
								Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than
								judgment.

Now let that which they have done unto us, who are their kindred,
								serve you for some argument not to be seduced by their demands and
								made their instruments before you be aware. 
							 For he lives most secure that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him
								by his enemies to repent of.

"As for the articles between you and the Lacedaemonians, they are not
								broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league
								with neither party.

For there it is said that whosoever is confederate of neither party
								may have access lawfully to either.

And sure it were very unreasonable that the Corinthians should have
								the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the
								league, and out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out
								of places in your dominion, and we be denied both the league now
								propounded and also all other help from whencesoever. 
							 And if they impute it to you as a fault that you grant our request,
								we shall take it for a greater that you grant it not.

For therein you shall reject us that are invaded and be none of your
								enemies; 
							 and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not
								only not oppose but also suffer to raise unlawful forces in your
								dominions. 
							 Whereas you ought in truth either not to suffer them to take up
								mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also in such
								manner as you shall think good yourselves, but especially by taking
								us into your league and so aiding us.

Many commodities, as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but
								this for the greatest: that whereas they are your enemies (which is
								manifest enough) and not weak ones but able to hurt those that stand
								up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial,
								league; 
							 and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. 
							 Nay, rather your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let
								none at all have shipping but yourselves, or at least, if that
								cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished
								therewith.

If any man now think thus that what we have
									spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the
									league were thereby broken, let that man consider that his fear
									joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his
									confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength,
									will so much the less be feared. 
								 Let him also remember that he is now in consultation no less
									concerning Athens than Corcyra, wherein he forecasteth none of
									the best (considering the present state of affairs) that makes a
									question whether against a war at hand and only not already on
									foot he should join unto it or not that city which with most
									important advantages or disadvantages will be friend or
									enemy.

For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily
									that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from
									thence and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus thither, and is
									also for divers other uses most commodious.

And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be
									abandoned or not by this. 
								 For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours,
									and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one
									by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to
									fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyraeans and the
									Peloponnesians; 
								 whereas by making league with us, you shall, with your fleet
									augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians
								alone.

Thus spake the Corcyraeans, and after them the Corinthians, thus:

"The Corcyraeans in their oration having made mention not only of
								your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and
								unjustly warred on, it is also necessary for us first to answer
								concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the
								rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow that ours
								are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon
								reason reject the needy estate of those others.

Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with
								other cities that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is
								that they took up that custom not from any virtue but mere
								wickedness, as being unwilling to have any confederate for a witness
								of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them.

Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself,
								giveth them this point, that when they do any man a wrong, they
								themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by
								consent. 
							 For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as
								by necessity are driven into their harbour.

And in this consisteth their goodly pretext for not admitting
								confederates, not because they would not be content to accompany
								others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; 
							 that where they were too strong, they might oppress; 
							 and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit
								might be shared from them; 
							 and that they might escape the shame when they took anything.

But if they had been honest men (as they themselves say they are), by
								how much the less they are obnoxious to accusation, so much the more
								means they have, by giving and taking what is due, to make their
								honesty appear.

"But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. 
							 For being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt, but now
								they also make war upon us and say they were not sent out to be
								injured by us.

But we say again that we did not send them forth to be scorned by
								them but to have the leading of them and to be regarded by them as
								is fit.

For our other colonies both honour and love us much:

which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions,
								that these have no just cause to be offended alone, and that without
								some manifest wrong we should not have had colour to war against
								them.

But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to
								have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in
								us to have insulted over their modesty. 
							 But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other
								things and also in this; 
							 that Epidamnus being ours which whilst it was vexed with wars they
								never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized
								by them, and so holden.

"They say now that before they took it, they offered to put the cause
								to trial of judgment. 
							 But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment as
								hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for,
								but rather he that before the trial will admit equality in the
								matter itself as well as in the pleading.

Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a
								judicial trial before they had besieged the city but after, when
								they saw we meant not to put it up. 
							 And now hither they be come, not content to have been faulty in that
								business themselves but to get in you, into their confederacy? no,
								but into their conspiracy, and to receive them in this name that
								they are enemies to us.

But they should have come to you then when they were most in safety,
								not now when we have the wrong and they the danger, and when you
								that never partaked of their power must impart unto them of your
								aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal
								share from us of the blame. 
							 They should communicate their power before hand that mean to make
								common the issue of the same, and they that share not in the crimes
								ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.

"Thus it appears that we come for our parts with arguments of equity
								and right, whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else
								but violence and rapine. 
							 And now we shall show you likewise that you cannot receive them in
								point of justice.

For although it be in the articles that the cities written with
								neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please,
								yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of either, but
								only for those that, having revolted from neither part, want
								protection and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those
								(if they be wise) that receive them.

For you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these but to us, instead
								of confederates, enemies. 
							 For if you go with them, it follows they must defend themselves not
								without you.

You should do most uprightly to stand out of both our ways; 
							 and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyraeans (for
								between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but
								with the Corcyraeans you never had so much as a truce) and not to
								constitute a new law of receiving one another's rebels.

For neither did we give our votes against you when the Samians
								revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion,
								but plainly alleged that it was reason that everyone should have
								liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates.

And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be
								seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; 
							 and you shall set up a law not so much against us as against
								yourselves.

"These are the points of justice we had to show you conformable to
								the law of the Grecians. 
							 And now we come to matter of advice and claim of favour, which (being
								not so much your enemies as to hurt you nor such friends as to
								surcharge you), we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted
								us by way of requital.

For when you had want of long barks against the Aeginetae a little
								before the Medan war, you had twenty lent to you by the
								Corinthians; 
							 which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians when by us
								it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both
								of your victory against the Aeginetae and of the punishment of the
								Samians.

And these things were done for you in a season when men, going to
								fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but of
								victory. 
							 For even a man's domestic affairs are ordered the worse through
								eagerness of present contention.

"Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of
								them from the elder, be you pleased to defend us now in the like
								manner. 
							 And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there
								be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found
								in the contrary.

For utility followeth those actions most wherein we do the least
								wrong; 
							 besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyraeans
								frighting you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure and
								not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the
								Corinthians; 
							 but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former
								jealousies concerning the Megareans.

For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to
								cancel an accusation of much greater moment.

Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy
								which now shall be at your service by this league. 
							 For to do no injury to our equals is a firmer power than that
								addition of strength which, puffed up with present shows, men are to
								acquire with danger.

And since we be come to this, which once before
									we said at Lacedaemon, that everyone ought to proceed as he
									shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that
									liberty now of you; 
								 and that you that have been helped by our votes will not hurt us
									now by yours, but render like for like;

remembering that now is that occasion wherein he that aideth us
									is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest
									enemy; 
								 and that you will not receive these Corcyraeans into league
									against our wills nor defend them in their injuries.

These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit and
									also advise the best for the good of your own affairs.

This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

Both sides having been heard and the Athenian people twice assembled,
								in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the
								Corinthians than of the Corcyraeans. 
							 But in the latter they changed their minds, not so as to make a
								league with the Corcyraeans both offensive and defensive, that the
								friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other (for then,
								if the Corcyraeans should have required them to go against Corinth,
								the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians), but made it only
								defensive, that if anyone should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of
								their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one
								another.

For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the
								Peloponnesians and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had
								so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians, but
								rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against
								another; 
							 that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians,
								and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their
								hands.

And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy
								and Sicily.

With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyraeans into
								league, and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten galleys not
								long after to their aid.

The commanders of them were Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus
								the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles,

and had order not to fight with the Corinthians unless they invaded
								Corcyra or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs,
								which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. 
							 This they forbad, because they would not break the peace concluded
								with the Peloponnesians. 
							 So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.

The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one
								hundred and fifty sail; 
							 of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of
								the Ambraciots twenty-seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of
								their own.

The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several
								cities for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in, and
								over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles with four
								others.

After they were all come together upon the coast of the continent
								over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas and came to Chimerium
								in the country of Thesprotis.

In this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the
								city of Ephyra in that part of Thesprotis which is called
								Elaeatis; 
							 and near into it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into
								that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron from
								which it taketh the name. 
							 Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from
								Cestrine, betwixt which two rivers ariseth this promontory of
								Chimerium.

To this part of the continent came the Corinthians and encamped.

The Corcyraeans understanding that they made against them, having
								ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades,
								Aesimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands
								called Sybota; 
							 and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them.

But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with
								them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid
								them.

The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many
								barbarians, which in those quarters have been evermore their
								friends.

The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three
								days' provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with
								purpose to fight,

and about break of day, as they were sailing, described the galleys
								of the Corcyraeans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming
								on to fight with the Corinthians.

As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into
								order of battle. 
							 In the right wing of the Corcyraeans were placed the galleys of
								Athens, and the rest being their own were divided into three
								commands under the three commanders, one under one.

This was the order of the Corcyraeans. 
							 The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of
								Ambracia; 
							 in the middle, other their confederates in order; 
							 and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyraeans they
								were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in
								the left.

The standard being on either side lift up, they joined battle, having
								on both parts both many men of arms and many archers and slingers,
								but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed.

The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought, near unto the
								manner of a fight at land.

For after they had once run their galleys up close aboard one of
								another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten
								asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men
								of arms who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained
								altogether without motion. 
							 Passages through each other they made none but fought it out with
								courage and strength rather than with skill.

Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and
								disorder, in which the Athenian galleys being always, where the
								Corcyraeans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but
								yet began no assault because their commanders stood in awe of the
								prohibition of the Athenian people.

The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress, for
								the Corcyraeans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs
								and chased them dispersed to the continent; 
							 and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned
								tents, and took away their baggage.

So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were
								vanquished, and the Corcyraeans had the victory. 
							 But in the left wing where the Corinthians were themselves they were
								far superior because the Corcyraeans had twenty galleys of their
								number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent
								in the chase of the enemy.

And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyraeans were in distress,
								now aided them manifestly, whereas before, they had abstained from
								making assault upon any. 
							 But when once they fled outright and that the Corinthians lay sore
								upon them, then everyone fell to the business without making
								difference any longer; 
							 and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one
								another, Corinthians and Athenians.

The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, stayed not to fasten the
								hulls of the galleys they had sunk unto their own galleys that so
								they might tow them after, but made after the men, rowing up and
								down, to kill rather than to take alive, and through ignorance (not
								knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some
								of their own friends.

For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space
								at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily
								discern who were of the victors and who of the vanquished party. 
							 For this was the greatest naval battle for number of ships that ever
								had been before of Grecians against Grecians.

When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they
								returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead,
								which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota
								where also lay the land forces of the barbarians that were come to
								aid them. 
							 This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. 
							 When they had done, they reunited themselves and made again to the
								Corcyraeans.

And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea
								remaining of the former battle together with those of Athens, put
								forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon
								their territory.

By this time the day was far spent, and the song which they used to
								sing when they came to charge was ended, when suddenly the
								Corinthians began to row astern, for they had descried twenty
								Athenian galleys sent from Athens to second the former ten for fear
								lest the Corcyraeans (as it also fell out) should be overcome and
								those ten galleys of theirs be too few to defend them.

When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting
								that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by
								little and little they fell off.

But the Corcyraeans (because the course of these galleys was unto
								them more out of sight) described them not but wondered why the
								Corinthians rowed astern, till at last some that saw them said they
								were enemies, and then retired also the Corcyraeans.

For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about
								the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves.

And thus were they parted, and the battle ended in night. 
							 The Corcyraeans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys
								under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus and Andocides the
								son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcasses
								and wrecks, soon after they were described arrived at the camp of
								the Corcyraeans in Leucimna.

The Corcyraeans at first (being night) were afraid they had been
								enemies, but knew them afterwards; 
							 so they anchored there.

The next day both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra
								as were fit for service went to the haven in Sybota, where the
								Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight.

But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged
								themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own
								accord to begin the battle, both for that they saw the supply of
								fresh galleys from Athens and for many difficulties that happened to
								them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard and also
								for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet
								repaired, but took thought rather how to go home for fear lest the
								Athenians, having the peace already broken in that they had fought
								against each other, should not suffer them to depart.



They therefore thought good to send afore unto the Athenians certain
								men without privilege of heralds for to sound them and to say in
								this manner:

Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the
										war and violate the articles; 
									 for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand
										in our way and bear arms against us; 
									 if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against
										Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve the
										peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us
										as enemies. 
 Thus said they;

and the Corcyraeans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out
								immediately to take and kill them.

But the Athenians made answer thus: 
 Men of
										Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the
										peace; 
									 but we bring aid to these our confederates, the
										Corcyraeans; 
									 if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you
										not, but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it,
										we will not suffer you.

When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made
								ready to go home and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. 
							 And the Corcyraeans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the
								dead which, carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose
								the night before, came driving to their hands, and, as if they had
								had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. 
							 The victory was thus challenged on both sides upon these grounds.

The Corinthians did set up a trophy because in the battle they had
								the better all day, having gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies
								than the other and taken no less than a thousand prisoners and sunk
								about seventy of the enemies' galleys. 
							 And the Corcyraeans set up a trophy because they had sunk thirty
								galleys of the Corinthians and had, after the arrival of the
								Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by
								reason of the wind; 
							 and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the
								Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them; 
							 and lastly, for that when they went to Sybota, the Corinthians came
								not out to encounter them. 
							 Thus each side claimed victory.

The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town
								seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit (this town
								was common to them and to the Corcyraeans), and having put into it
								Corinthians only, departed and went home. 
							 Of the Corcyraeans, eight hundred that were servants they sold, and
								kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much
								favour that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra
								into the power of the Corinthians, the greatest part of these being
								principal men of the city.

And thus was Corcyra delivered of the war of Corinth, and the
								Athenian galleys went from them. 
							 This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the
								Athenians: namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyraeans
								in a battle by sea against the Corinthians with whom they were
								comprised in the same articles of peace.

Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose
								between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians to induce the war.

For whilst the Corinthians studied to be revenged, the Athenians, who
								had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidaea, a
								city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene, a colony of the Corinthians
								but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that
								part of the wall of their city that stood towards Pallene, and to
								give them hostages, and also to send away and no more receive the
								Epidemiurgi (magistrates so called) which were sent unto them year
								by year from Corinth, fearing lest through the persuasion of
								Perdiccas and of the Corinthians they should revolt and draw to
								revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace.

These things against the Potidaeans, the Athenians had precontrived
								presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra.

For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; 
							 and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now
								warred upon them.

And the cause why he did so was that when his brother Philip and
								Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league
								with them.

And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedaemon to negotiate
								the Peloponnesian war and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians
								the better to procure the revolt of Potidaea.

And likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace and with the
								Bottiaeans to revolt with them; 
							 for if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with
								the help of them he thought his war would be the easier.

Which the Athenians perceiving and intending to prevent the revolt of
								these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet (for they
								were now sending thirty galleys with a thousand men of arms under
								the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others,
								into the territories of Perdiccas) both to receive hostages of the
								Potidaeans and to demolish their walls, and also to have an eye to
								the neighboring cities that they revolted not.

The Potidaeans having sent ambassadors to Athens to try if they could
								persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them, by
								other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of
								Corinth to Lacedaemon, dealt with the Lacedaemonians at the same
								time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. 
							 When after long solicitation at Athens and no good done, the fleet
								was sent away against them no less than against Macedonia, and when
								the magistrates of Lacedaemon had promised them if the Athenians
								went to Potidaea, to invade Attica, then at last they revolted, and
								together with them the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, all mutually
								sworn in the same conspiracy.

For Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull
								down their maritime towns and to go up and dwell at Olynthus and
								that one city to make strong, and unto those that removed gave part
								of his own and part of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake
								Bolbe, to live on so long as the war against the Athenians should
								continue. 
							 So when they had demolished their cities and were gone up higher into
								the country, they prepared themselves to the war.

The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidaea and
								the other cities already revolted.

And the commanders of the fleet, conceiving it to be impossible, with
								their present forces, to make war both against Perdiccas and the
								towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had
								been at first sent out, and there staying, joined with Philip and
								the brothers of Derdas that had invaded the country from above.

In the meantime after Potidaea was revolted, and whilst the Athenian
								fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what
								might become of the city and making the danger their own, sent unto
								it, both of their own city and of other Peloponnesians which they
								hired, to the number of sixteen hundred men of arms and four hundred
								light armed.

The charge of these was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus, for
								whose sake most of the volunteers of Corinth went the voyage: for he
								had been ever a great favourer of the Potidaeans.

And they arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidaea forty days.

The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought
								to the Athenian people, who, hearing withal of the forces sent unto
								them under Aristeus, sent forth against the places revolted two
								thousand men of arms and forty galleys under the conduct of Callias,
								the son of Calliades.

These, coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand,
								who by this time had taken Therme and were now besieging the city of
								Pydna;

and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. 
							 But shortly after they took composition and, having made a necessary
								league with Perdiccas (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidaea, and
								the arrival there of Aristeus), departed from Macedonia.

Thence coming to Berrhoea, they attempted to take it; 
							 but when they could not do it, they turned back and marched towards
								Potidaea by land. 
							 They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides
								many of their confederates, and of Macedonians that had served with
								Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen.

And their galleys, seventy in number, sailing by them along the
								coast, by moderate journeys came in three days to Gigonus and there
								encamped.

The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation
								of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near
								unto Olynthus and had the market kept for them without the city.

And the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to
								Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas; 
							 for he fell off again presently from the Athenians and, having left
								Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidaeans.

The purpose of Aristeus was to have the body of the army with himself
								within the isthmus and therewith to attend the coming on of the
								Athenians, and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates
								without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdiccas,
								to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were passed by, to come
								on their backs and to inclose the enemy betwixt them.

But Callias the Athenian general, and the rest that were in
								commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen
								and some few of their confederates to Olynthus to stop those within
								from making any sally from the town, and then dislodging marched on
								towards Potidaea.

When they were come on as far as the isthmus and saw the enemy make
								ready to fight, they also did the like;

and not long after they joined battle. 
							 That wing wherein was Aristeus himself with the chosen men of the
								Corinthians and others put to flight that part of their enemies that
								stood opposite unto them and followed execution a great way. 
							 But the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and Peloponnesians were by
								the Athenians defeated and fled into the city.

And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution, was in doubt what
								way to take, to Olynthus or to Potidaea. 
							 In the end he resolved of the shortest way, and with his soldiers
								about him ran as hard as he was able into Potidaea, and with much
								ado got in at the pier through the sea, cruelly shot at and with the
								loss of a few but the safety of the greatest part of his
								company.

As soon as the battle began, they that should have seconded the
								Potidaeans from Olynthus (for it is at most but sixty furlongs off,
								and in sight) advanced a little way to have aided them; 
							 and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of
								battle to keep them back. 
							 But the Athenians having quickly gotten the victory, and the
								standards being taken down, they retired again, they of Olynthus
								into that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the
								Athenians. 
							 So that neither side had their cavalry at the battle.

After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy and gave truce to the
								Potidaeans for the taking up of the bodies of their dead. 
							 Of the Potidaeans and their friends there died somewhat less than
								three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and
								fifty, with Callias one of their commanders.

Presently upon this the Athenians raised a wall before the city on
								the part toward the isthmus which they kept with a garrison, but the
								part to Pallene-ward they left unwalled. 
							 For they thought themselves too small a number both to keep a guard
								in the isthmus and withal to go over and fortify in Pallene, fearing
								lest the Potidaeans and their confederates should assault them when
								divided.

When the people of Athens understood that Potidaea was unwalled on
								the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither sixteen
								hundred men of arms under the conduct of Phormio the son of Asopius,
								who arriving in Pallene left his galleys at Aphytis, and marching
								easily to Potidaea wasted the territory as he passed through. 
							 And when none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before
								the city on that part also that looketh towards Pallene.

Thus was Potidaea on both sides strongly besieged, and also from the
								sea by the Athenian galleys that came up and rode before it.

Aristeus, seeing the city enclosed on every side and without hope of
								safety save what might come from Peloponnesus or some other
								unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the
								opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea that the provision might the
								longer hold out for the rest, and of them that should remain within
								offered himself to be one.

But when his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their
								business and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by
								sea unseen of the Athenian guard, and staying amongst the
								Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war, laid an ambush before
								Sermylius and slew many of that city and solicited the sending of
								aid from Peloponnesus. 
							 And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidaea, having with him his
								sixteen hundred men of arms, wasted the territory of the Chalcideans
								and Bottiaeans, and some small towns he took in.

These were the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the
								Athenians. 
							 The Corinthians quarrelled the Athenians for besieging Potidaea and
								in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus. 
							 The Athenians quarrelled the Peloponnesians for causing their
								confederate and tributary city to revolt, and for that they had come
								thither and openly fought against them in the behalf of
								Potidaea. 
							 Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth as yet, and they yet
								abstained from arms; 
							 for this was but a particular action of the Corinthians.

But when Potidaea was once besieged, both for their men's sakes that
								were within and also for fear to lose the place they could no longer
								hold. 
							 But out of hand they procured of their confederates to go to
								Lacedaemon; 
							 and thither also they went themselves with clamours and accusations
								against the Athenians that they had broken the league and wronged
								the Peloponnesians.

The Aeginetae, though not openly by ambassadors for fear of the
								Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any,
								alleging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according
								to their own laws, as by the articles they ought to have been.

So the Lacedaemonians having called together the confederates, and
								whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the
								Athenians, in the ordinary council of their own state commanded them
								to speak.

Then presented everyone his accusation; 
							 and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other their great
								differences, laid open this especially, that contrary to the
								articles they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens.

Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the
								Lacedaemonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in and said as
								followeth.

"Men of Lacedaemon, your own fidelity both in matter of estate and
								conversation maketh you the less apt to believe us when we accuse
								others of the contrary. 
							 And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity, but you have less
								experience in the affairs of foreign states.

For although we have oftentimes foretold you that the Athenians would
								do us a mischief, yet from time to time when we told it you, you
								never would take information of it but have suspected rather that
								what we spake hath proceeded from our own private differences. 
							 And you have therefore called hither these confederates not before we
								had suffered but now when the evil is already upon us. 
							 Before whom our speech must be so much the longer by how much our
								objections are the greater in that we have both by the Athenians
								been injured and by you neglected.

If the Athenians lurking in some obscure place had done these wrongs
								unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same
								before you as to men that knew it not. 
							 But now what cause have we to use long discourse when you see already
								that some are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving
								the like against others, and especially against our confederates,
								and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long
								since prepared for it?

For else they would never have taken Corcyra and holden it from us by
								force, nor have besieged Potidaea, whereof the one was most
								commodious for any action against Thrace, and the other had brought
								unto the Peloponnesians a most fair navy.

"And of all this you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered
								them upon the end of the Persian war to fortify their city and again
								afterwards to raise their long walls, whereby you have hitherto
								deprived of their liberty not only the states by them already
								subdued but also your own confederates. 
							 For not he that bringeth into slavery, but he that being able to
								hinder it neglects the same is most truly said to do it, especially
								if they assume the honour to be esteemed the deliverers of Greece
								[as you do].

And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet
								with any certain resolution what to do. 
							 For the question should not have been put whether or not we have
								received injury, but rather in what manner we are to repair it. 
							 For they that do the wrong, having consulted upon it beforehand, use
								no delay at all but come upon them whom they mean to oppress whilst
								they be yet irresolute.

And we know not only that the Athenians have incroached upon their
								neighbours but also by what ways they have done it. 
							 And as long as they think they carry it closely through your
								blindness, they are the less bold;

but when they shall perceive that you see, and will not see, they
								will then press us strongly indeed. 
							 For, Lacedaemonians, you are the only men of all Greece that sitting
								still defend others, not with your forces but with promises;

and you are also the only men that love to pull down the power of the
								enemy, not when it beginneth but when it is doubled. 
							 You have indeed a report to be sure, but yet it is more in fame that
								than in fact. 
							 For we ourselves know that the Persian came against Peloponnesus from
								the utmost parts of the earth before you encountered him as became
								your state. 
							 And also now you connive at the Athenians who are not as the Medes,
								far off, but hard at hand, choosing rather to defend yourselves from
								their invasion than to invade them, and by having to do with them
								when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of
								fortune. 
							 And yet we know that the barbarian's own error, and in our war
								against the Athenians their own oversights more than your
								assistance, was the thing that gave us victory. 
							 For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of some that,
								relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other
								means.

Yet let not any man think that we speak this out of malice but only
								by way of expostulation: for expostulation is with friends that err,
								but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.

"Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate his
								neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it, especially on so great
								quarrels as these whereof you neither seem to have any feeling nor
								to consider what manner of men and how different from you in every
								kind the Athenians be that you are to contend withal.

For they love innovation and are swift to devise and also to execute
								what they resolve on. 
							 But you on the contrary are only apt to save your own, not devise
								anything new, nor scarce to attain what is necessary.

They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous above their
								own reason, and in danger hope still the best. 
							 Whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, and you distrust
								even what your judgment assures, and being in a danger never think
								to be delivered. 
							 They are stirrers, you studies; 
							 they love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any.

For they make account by being abroad to add to their estate; 
							 you, if you should go forth against the state of another, would think
								to impair your own.

They, when they overcome their enemies, advance the farthest and,
								when they are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least;

and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the
								commonwealth as if they were none of their own; 
							 but their minds, when they would serve the state, are right their
								own.

Unless they take in hand what they have once advised on, they account
								so much lost of their own. 
							 And when they take it in hand, if they obtain anything, they think
								lightly of it in respect of what they look to win by their
								prosecution. 
							 If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary for the
								present and enter presently into other hopes.

For they alone both have and hope for at once whatsoever they
								conceive through their celerity in execution of what they once
								resolve on. 
							 And in this manner they labour and toil all the days of their
								lives. 
							 What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy for continual getting
								of more; 
							 nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter
								profitable;

nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than laborious
								business. 
							 So that, in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest
								themselves nor suffer others is to say the truth.

Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedaemon, that
									this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, yet you
									still delay time, not knowing that those only are they to whom
									it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit still who,
									though they use not their power to do injustice, yet bewray a
									mind unlikely to swallow injuries, but placing equity belike in
									this, that you neither do any harm to others nor receive it in
									defending of yourselves.

But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states
									about you were of the same condition. 
								 But, as we have before declared, your customs are in respect of
									theirs antiquated;

and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will
									prevail. 
								 True it is that for a city living for the most part in peace,
									unchanged customs are the best; 
								 but for such as be constrained to undergo many matters, many
									devices will be needful. 
								 Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much
									experience, are more new to you than yours are to them.

Here, therefore, give a period to your slackness and by a speedy
									invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidaea and
									the rest, lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred to
									their cruelest enemies, and lest we and others be driven through
									despair to seek out some other league.

Which to do were no injustice neither against the Gods, judges of
									men's oaths, nor against men, the hearers of them. 
								 For not they break the league who being abandoned have recourse
									to others, but they that yield not their assistance to whom they
									have sworn it. 
								 But if you mean to follow the business seriously, we will
									stay;

for else we should do irreligiously, neither should we find any
									other more conformable to our manners than yourselves.

Therefore, deliberate well of these points, and take such a
									course that Peloponnesus may not by your leading fall into worse
									estate than it was left unto you by your progenitors.

Thus spake the Corinthians. 
							 The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing at Lacedaemon
								upon their business, when they heard of this oration thought fit to
								present themselves before the Lacedaemonians, not to make apology
								for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to show in
								general that it was not fit for them in this case to take any sudden
								resolution but farther time to consider. 
							 Also they desired to lay open the power of their city, to the elder
								sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already, and to the
								younger, for an information of what they knew not, supposing that
								when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness rather
								than to war.

And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedaemonians
								saying that they also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in
								the assembly, who willed them to come in. 
							 And the Athenians went into the assembly and spake to this effect:

"Though our embassage was not to this end, that we should argue
								against our confederates, but about such other affairs as the city
								was pleased to employ us in; 
							 yet having heard of the great exclamation against us, we came into
								the court not to make answer to the criminations of the cities (for
								to plead before you here were not to plead before the judges either
								of them or us) but to the end you may not be drawn away to take the
								worse resolution at the persuasion of the confederates in matters of
								so great importance, and withal, touching the sum of the oration
								made against us, to inform you that what we possess we have it
								justly, and that our city deserveth reputation.

But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by
								hearsay than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate
								them? 
							 But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know
								as well as we, those, though it be tedious to hear them ever
								objected, we must of necessity recite. 
							 For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of
								which, as you had your parts in the substance, so must we have ours
								(if that be any benefit) in the commemoration.

And we shall make recital of them not by way of deprecation but of
								protestation and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill
								advice, you have to enter the list withal.

We therefore say that we not only first and alone hazarded battle
								against the barbarian in the fields of Marathon, but also
								afterwards, when he came again, being unable to resist him by land,
								embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave
								him battle amongst the rest by sea at Salamis, which was the cause
								that kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus and laying it waste
								city after city; 
							 for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other
								mutual succour.

And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself, who, when his
								fleet was overcome and that he had no more such forces, went away in
								haste with the greatest part of his army.

"Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was
								embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same the three things
								of most advantage, namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most
								prudent commander, and the most lively courage. 
							 For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than
								two-thirds; 
							 and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the
								battle was fought in the strait whereby he clearly saved the whole
								business and whom, though a stranger, you yourselves have honoured
								for it more than any man that came unto you.

And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other in this,
								that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of
								the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we
								were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods,
								and even in that estate not to betray the common cause of the
								confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put
								ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them, and that
								without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in
								the like manner.

So that we may say that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you
								than we received it from you. 
							 You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited and to
								the end you might still keep them so, and when you were afraid not
								of our danger but your own. 
							 Whereas we, coming from a city no more being, and putting ourselves
								into danger for a city hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in
								part and ourselves.

But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to
								have our territories wasted, or afterwards, as men lost, durst not
								have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with
								him by sea because your fleet had been too small; 
							 but his affairs had succeeded as he would himself.

"Therefore, men of Lacedaemon, we deserve not so great envy of the
								Grecians, for our courage at that time and for our prudence and for
								the dominion we hold, as we now undergo.

Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the
								confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the
								war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the
								command of their own accord.

So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is
								out of the nature of the thing itself, as chiefly for fear, next for
								honour, and lastly for profit.

For when we had the envy of many and had reconquered some that had
								already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had
								been but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe
								course laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger. 
							 For the revolts from us would all have been made to you.

Now it is no fault for men in danger to order their affairs to the
								best.

"For you also, men of Lacedaemon, have command over the cities of
								Peloponnesus and order them to your best advantage. 
							 And had you, when the time was, by staying it out, been envied in
								your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to
								the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule
								imperiously or to have fallen into danger.

So that, though overcome by three of the greatest things, honour,
								fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us
								and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be
								wondered at nor beside the manner of men. 
							 Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a
								thing fixed for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. 
							 Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy
								of the same; 
							 and of you also so esteemed till having computed the commodity, you
								now fall to allegation of equity, a thing which no man that had the
								occasion to achieve anything by strength ever so far preferred as to
								divert him from his profit.

Those men are worthy of commendation who following the natural
								inclination of man in desiring rule over others are juster than for
								their own power they need.

And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make
								appear our own moderation; 
							 and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt rather
								than commendation.

"For though in pleas of covenants with our confederates when, in our
								own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and
								us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then
								nevertheless been reputed contentious.

None of them considering that others, who in other places have
								dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we,
								yet are never upbraided for it.

For they that have the power to compel need not at all to go to
								law. 
							 And yet these men having been used to converse with us upon equal
								terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not,
								either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not
								thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little
								they forego than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken
								their goods by violence. 
							 For in this kind also they themselves cannot deny but the weaker must
								give way to the stronger.

And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice than for
								violence. 
							 For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine, and the other,
								because from one stronger, but necessity.

Therefore, when they suffered worse things under the Medes' dominion,
								they bore it, but think ours to be rigorous. 
							 And good reason, for to men in subjection the present is ever the
								worst estate.

Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves,
								you would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for
								fear of us if you should do again as you did for awhile when you
								were their commanders against the Medes. 
							 For not only your own institutions are different from those of
								others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he
								neither useth those of yours nor yet those of the rest of Greece.

Deliberate therefore of this a great while as
									of a matter of great importance, and do not upon the opinions
									and criminations of others procure your own trouble. 
								 Consider before you enter how unexpected the chances of war
									be.

For a long war for the most part endeth in calamity from which we
									are equally far off, and whether part it will light on is to be
									tried with uncertainty.

And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to
									action, the which ought to come behind; 
								 and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning.

But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find
									that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our
									elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths, but
									according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by
									judgment; 
								 or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness that if you
									begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same
									way that you shall walk in before us.

Thus spake the Athenians. 
							 After the Lacedaemonians had heard both the complaints of the
								confederates against the Athenians and the Athenians' answer, they
								put them everyone out of the court and consulted of the business
								among themselves.

And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this, that the
								Athenians had done unjustly and ought speedily to be warred on. 
							 But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate,
								spake as followeth.

"Men of Lacedaemon, both I myself have the experience of many wars,
								and I see you of the same age with me to have the like, insomuch as
								you cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do,
								nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe.

And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of
								will find it to be no small one.

For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states
								we have equal strength and can quickly be upon them, yet against men
								whose territory is remote and are also expert seamen and with all
								other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and
								public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part
								of Greece besides, and that have many confederates paying them
								tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the
								war? 
							 And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such
								haste to it? 
							 On our navy?

But therein we are too weak; 
							 and if we will provide and prepare against them, it will require
								time. 
							 On our money? 
							 But therein also we are more too weak; 
							 for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily
								contribute.

"But it may be some rely on this, that we exceed them in arms and
								multitude of soldiers so that we may waste their territories with
								incursions.

But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they
								are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of.

Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them
								with shipping because the most of them are islanders.

What a war then will this of ours be? 
							 For unless we have the better of them in shipping or take from them
								their revenue whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most
								hurt to ourselves.

And in this case to let fall the war again will be no honour for us
								when we are chiefly thought to have begun it.

As for the hope that if we waste their country, the war will soon be
								at an end, let that never lift us up; 
							 for I fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. 
							 For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to
								their earth, nor as men without experience to be astonished at the
								war.

"And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our
								confederates to be wronged and not apprehend the Athenians in their
								plots against them, but only not yet to take up arms but to send and
								expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of
								sufferance; 
							 and in the meantime to make our provision and make friends both of
								Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power
								either in shipping or money (nor are they to be blamed that being
								laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not
								Grecians only but also barbarians for their safety), and withal to
								set forth our own.

If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; 
							 if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better
								appointed, we may war upon them if we will.

And when they see our preparation and hear words that import no less,
								they will perhaps relent the sooner, especially having their grounds
								unhurt and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet
								spoiled.

For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and
								so much the more by how much the better husbanded. 
							 The which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may, lest making
								them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn.

For if, unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confederates
								we waste their territory, consider if in so doing we do not make the
								war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians and also more
								difficult.

For though accusations, as well against cities as private men, may be
								cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some taken up by all, the
								success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be letten
								fall again.

"Now let no man think it cowardice that being many cities, we go not
								presently and invade that one city.

For of confederates that bring them in money, they have more than
								we; 
							 and war is not so much war of arms as war of money by means whereof
								arms are useful, especially when it is a war of land men against sea
								men.

And therefore let us first provide ourselves of money and not first
								raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. 
							 For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad,
								have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them.

"As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith we are reproached
								by the confederates, be never ashamed of it; 
							 for the more haste you make to the war, you will be the longer before
								you end it for that you go to it unprovided.

Besides, our city hath been ever free and well thought of, and this
								which they object is rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon
								judgment. 
							 For by that it is that we alone are neither arrogant upon good
								success nor shrink so much as others in adversity. 
							 Nor are we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the
								delight thereof moved to undergo danger more than we think fit
								ourselves; 
							 nor when they sharpen us with reprehension doth the smart thereof a
								jot the more prevail upon us.

And this modesty of ours maketh us both good soldiers and good
								counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begetteth modesty, and
								valour is most sensible of shame; 
							 good counsellors in this, that we are brought up more simply than to
								disesteem the laws and by severity more modestly than to disobey
								them, and also in that we do not, like men exceeding wise in things
								needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy and
								in effect not assault him accordingly, but do think our neighbour's
								cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be
								discerned by a speech;

and do therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy
								as against men well advised. 
							 For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them but
								upon the safe foresight of ourselves. 
							 Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man,
								but him only to be the best, that hath been brought up amongst the
								most difficulties.

Let us not therefore cast aside the
									institutions of our ancestors which we have so long retained to
									our profit; 
								 nor let us of many men's lives, of much money, of many cities,
									and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day,
									but at leisure, the which we have better commodity than any
									other to do, by reason of our power.

Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidaea; 
								 send about that wherein the confederates say they are
									injured; 
								 and the rather because they be content to refer the cause to
									judgment, and one that offereth himself to judgment may not
									lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury before the judgment be
									given. 
								 And prepare withal for the war. 
								 So shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and
									the most formidable to the enemy.

Thus spake Archidamus. 
							 But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all and
								spake to the Lacedaemonians in this manner:

For my part, I understand not the many words
									used by the Athenians; 
								 for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they
									have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury
									to our confederates and to Peloponnesus. 
								 And if they carried themselves well against the Medes, when time
									was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double punishment,
									because they are not good as they were and because they are evil
									as they were not.

Now are we the same we were and mean not (if we be wise) either
									to connive at the wrongs done to our confederates or defer to
									repair them, for the harm they suffer is not deferred.

Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; 
								 and we have good confederates not to be betrayed to the Athenians
									nor to be defended with words (for they are not hurt in words),
									but to be aided with all our power and with speed.

Let no man tell me that after we have once received the injury we
									ought to deliberate. 
								 No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in
									consultation.

Wherefore, men of Lacedaemon, decree the war, as becometh the
									dignity of Sparta; 
								 and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our
									confederates, but in the name of the Gods proceed against the
									doers of injustice.

Having thus spoken, being himself Ephor, he put it to the question in
								the assembly of the Lacedaemonians;

and saying afterwards that he could not discern whether was the
								greater cry (for they used there to give their votes viva voce and not with balls) and desiring that it might
								be evident that their minds were inclined most to the war, he put it
								unto them again and said, 
 to whomsoever of
										you it seemeth that the peace is broken and that the
										Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go
										yonder, 
 and withal he showed them a certain place,
									 
 and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise,
										let him go to the other side.

So they arose and the room was divided, wherein far the greater
								number were those that held the peace to be broken.

Then calling in the confederates they told them that for their own
								parts their sentence was that the Athenians had done them wrong; 
							 but yet they desired to have all their confederates called together,
								and then to put it to the question again that if they would, the war
								might be decreed by common consent.

This done, their confederates went home; 
							 and so did also afterwards the Athenians when they had dispatched the
								business they came about.

This decree of the assembly that the peace was broken was made in the
								fourteenth year of those thirty years for which a peace had been
								formerly concluded after the actions past in Euboea.

The Lacedaemonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that
								war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates as
								for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. 
							 For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into
								their hands.

Now the manner how the Athenians came to the administration of those
								affairs by which they so raised themselves was this.

After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and
								such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale were there also utterly
								overthrown, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, then commander
								of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus
								went home. 
							 But the Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the
								Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from the king, stayed
								behind and besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes; 
							 and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it
								abandoned by the barbarians. 
							 And after this they set sail from the Hellespont, everyone to his own
								city.

And the body of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear
								of the barbarians, went home also and fetched thither their wives
								and children and such goods as they had from the places where they
								had been put out to keep, and went about the reparation of their
								city and walls. 
							 For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall,
								and likewise a few houses (though the most were down) which the
								principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.

The Lacedaemonians, hearing what they went about, sent thither their
								ambassadors—partly because they would themselves have been glad that
								neither the Athenians nor any other had had walls, but principally
								as incited thereto by their confederates who feared not only the
								greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their
								courage showed against the Persians—and entreated them not to build
								their walls but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls
								of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing,
								not discovering their meaning and the jealousy they had of the
								Athenians but pretending this:

that if the barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to
								make the seat of his war, as he did of Thebes, and that Peloponnesus
								was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire and from whence to
								withstand the war.

But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the
								Lacedaemonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with
								this answer, that they would presently send ambassadors about the
								business they spake of to Lacedaemon. 
							 Now Themistocles willed them to send himself to Lacedaemon for one,
								and that as speedily as they could; 
							 but such as were chosen ambassadors with him not to send away
								presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to
								fight upon them from a sufficient height; 
							 and that all the men in the city, in the meantime, both they and
								their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice
								that might advance the work but pulling all down whatsoever, should
								help to raise it.

When he had thus instructed them, adding that he would himself do the
								rest at Lacedaemon, he took his journey.

And when he came to Lacedaemon, he went not to the state, but
								delaying the time excused himself, and when any of those that were
								in office asked him why he did not present himself to the state,
								answered, 
 that he stayed for his
										fellow-ambassadors who, upon some business that fell out,
										were left behind, but he expected them very shortly and
										wondered they were not come already.

Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles for the love they bore
								him; 
							 but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up
								and that it was come to good height already, they could not then
								choose but believe it.

Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports,
								but rather to send thither some of their own, such as were honest
								men, and, having informed themselves, would relate the truth, which
								they also did.

And Themistocles sendeth privily to the Athenians about the same men
								to take order for their stay with as little appearance of it as they
								could and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were
								returned (for by this time were arrived those that were joined with
								him, namely, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son
								of Lysimachus, and brought him word that the wall was of a
								sufficient height);

for he feared lest the Lacedaemonians, when they knew the truth,
								would refuse to let them go. 
							 The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors according as it
								was written to them to do. 
							 Themistocles, coming now to his audience before the Lacedaemonians,
								said plainly, 
 that the city of Athens was
										already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of
										those within, and that if it shall please the Lacedaemonians
										upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto them, they were
										to send thenceforward as to men that understood what
										conduced both to their own and also to the common good of
										all Greece.

For when they thought it best to quit their city and put
									themselves into their galleys, 
 
							 he said, 
							 
 they were bold to do it without asking the
									advice of them;

and in common counsel the advice of the Athenians was as good as the
								advice of them. 
							 And now at this time their opinion is that it will be best, both for
								themselves in particular and for all the confederates in common,
								that their city should be walled.

For that in strength unequal men cannot alike and equally advise
									for the common benefit of Greece. 
								 Therefore, 
 
							 said he, 
							 
 either must all the confederate cities be
									unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by
								us.

The Lacedaemonians when they heard him, though they made no show of
								being angry with the Athenians (for they had not sent their
								ambassadors to forbid them but, by way of advice, to admonish them
								not to build the wall; 
							 besides, they bare them affection then for their courage shown
								against the Medes), yet they were inwardly offended because they
								missed of their will. 
							 And the ambassadors returned home of either side without complaint.

Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls, the structure itself
								making manifest the haste used in the building.

For the foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts, and those in
								some places unwrought and as they were brought to the place. 
							 Many pillars also taken from sepulchres and polished stones were
								piled together among the rest. 
							 For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and
								therefore hastening they took alike whatsoever came next to
								hand.

Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Piraeus,
								for it was begun in the year that himself was archon of Athens, as
								conceiving the place both beautiful, in that it had three natural
								havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the
								enlargement of their power.

For he was indeed the first man that dared tell them that they ought
								to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently
								helped them in the obtaining it.

By his counsel also it was that they built the wall of that breadth
								about Piraeus which is now to be seen. 
							 For two carts carrying stones met and passed upon it one by
								another. 
							 And yet within it there was neither rubbish nor mortar [to fill it
								up], but it was made all of great stones cut square and bound
								together with iron and lead. 
							 But for height it was raised but to the half, at the most, of what he
								had intended.

For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the
								height and breadth, and that a few and the less serviceable men
								might have sufficed to defend it and the rest have served in the
								navy.

For principally he was addicted to the sea because, as I think, he
								had observed that the forces of the king had easier access to invade
								them by sea than by land, and thought that Piraeus was more
								profitable than the city above. 
							 And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians that, in case they were
								oppressed by land, they should go down thither and with their
								galleys make resistance against what enemy soever.

Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other
								kinds, immediately upon the departure of the Persians.

In the meantime was Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, sent from
								Lacedaemon commander of the Grecians with twenty galleys out of
								Peloponnesus, with which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a
								multitude of other confederates, and making war on Cyprus subdued
								the greatest part of the same;

and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium,
								which they besieged and won.

But Pausanias, being now grown insolent, both the rest of the
								Grecians and especially the Ionians who had newly recovered their
								liberty from the king, offended with him, came to the Athenians and
								requested them for consanguinity's sake to become their leaders and
								to protect them from the violence of Pausanias.

The Athenians, accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the
								defence of these and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs
								there in such sort as it should seem best to themselves.

In the meantime the Lacedaemonians sent for Pausanias home to examine
								him of such things as they had heard against him. 
							 For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Grecians that
								came from thence;

and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny than a command
								in war. 
							 And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the
								confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to
								him had turned to the Athenians.

When he came to Lacedaemon, though he were censured for some wrongs
								done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquit,
								especially of Medising, the which seemed to be the most evident of
								all.

Him therefore they sent general no more, but Dorcis, and some others
								with him, with no great army, whose command the confederates
								refused;

and they, finding that, went their ways likewise. 
							 And after that the Lacedaemonians sent no more, because they feared
								lest such as went out would prove the worse for the state, as they
								had seen by Pausanias, and also because they desired to be rid of
								the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders
								and at that time their friends.

When the Athenians had thus gotten the command by the confederates'
								own accord for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down
								an order which cities should contribute money for this war against
								the barbarians, and which galleys. 
							 For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered by laying
								waste the territories of the king.

And then first came up amongst the Athenians the office of treasurers
								of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute, for so they called
								this money contributed. 
							 And the first tribute that was taxed came to four hundred and sixty
								talents. 
							 The treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were kept there in the
								temple.

Now using their authority at first in such manner as that the
								confederates lived under their own laws and were admitted to common
								council, by [the] war and administration of the common affairs of
								Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the barbarians,
								what against their own innovating confederates, and what against
								such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall
								in, they effected those great matters following.

Which also I have therefore written both because this place hath been
								pretermitted by all that have written before me (for they have
								either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians
								or that invasion only, of which number is Hellanicus, who hath also
								touched them in his Attic history, but briefly and without exact
								mention of the times), and also because they carry with them a
								demonstration of how the Athenian empire grew up.

And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took
								Eion upon the river Strymon from the Medes by siege and carried away
								the inhabitants captives.

Then the isle Scyros, in the Aegean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes,
								the inhabitants whereof they also carried away captives and planted
								therein a colony of their own.

Likewise they made war on the Carystians alone without the rest of
								the Euboeans, and those also after a time came in by
								composition.

After this they warred on the revolted Naxians and brought them in by
								siege. 
							 And this was the first confederate city which contrary to the
								ordinance they deprived of their free estate; 
							 though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did the
								like by the rest.

Amongst other causes of revolts the principal was their failing to
								bring in their tribute and galleys and their refusing (when they did
								so) to follow the wars. 
							 For the Athenians exacted strictly and were grievous to them by
								imposing a necessity of toil which they were neither accustomed nor
								willing to undergo.

They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they
								had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms, and could easily
								bring back to their subjection such as should revolt.

And of this the confederates themselves were the causes. 
							 For through this refusal to accompany the army the most of them, to
								the end they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their
								galleys with money, as much as it came to, by which means the navy
								of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates,
								and themselves unprovided and without means to make war in case they
								should revolt.

After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates
								fought against the Medes, both by land and by water, upon the river
								of Eurymedon in Pamphilia; 
							 and in one and the same day the Athenians had victory in both and
								took or sunk all the Phoenician fleet to the number of two hundred
								galleys.

After this again happened the revolt of Thasos upon a difference
								about the places of trade and about the mines they possessed in the
								opposite parts of Thrace. 
							 And the Athenians, going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in
								a battle at sea and landed in the island.

But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of
								their confederates' people unto the river of Strymon for a colony to
								be planted in a place called then the Nine-ways, now Amphipolis,
								they won the said Nine-ways, which was held by the Eidonians; 
							 but advancing farther towards the heart of the country of Thrace,
								they were defeated at Drabescus, a city of the Eidonians, by the
								whole power of the Thracians that were enemies to this new-built
								town of the Nine-ways.

The Thasians in the meantime, being overcome in divers battles and
								besieged, sought aid of the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to
								divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica,

which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do and also had
								done it, but by an earthquake that then happened, they were
								hindered. 
							 In which earthquake their Helots, and of neighboring towns the
								Thuriatae and Aethaeans, revolted and seized on Ithome. 
							 Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians
								brought into servitude in former times, whereby also it came to pass
								that they were called all Messenians.

Against these had the Lacedaemonians now a war at Ithome. 
							 The Thasians in the third year of the siege rendered themselves to
								the Athenians upon condition to raze their walls, to deliver up
								their galleys, to pay both the money behind and for the future as
								much as they were wont, and to quit both the mines and the
								continent.

The Lacedaemonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long,
								amongst other their confederates sent for aid to the Athenians, who
								also came with no small forces under the command of Cimon.

They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural
								assaults, the long continuance of the siege seeming to require men
								of ability in that kind, whereby they might perhaps have gotten the
								place by force.

And upon this journey grew the first manifest dissension between the
								Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. 
							 For the Lacedaemonians, when they could not take the place by
								assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the
								Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race, might, at
								the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration if they
								stayed, dismissed them alone of all the confederates, not
								discovering their jealousy but alleging that they had no farther
								need of their service.

But the Athenians, perceiving that they were not sent away upon good
								cause but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter, and
								conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedaemonians'
								hands, as soon as they were gone left the league which they had made
								with the Lacedaemonians against the Persian and became confederates
								with their enemies the Argives; 
							 and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath and made the
								same league with the Thessalians.

Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth
								year of the siege rendered the place to the Lacedaemonians upon
								condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus and that they
								should no more return, and whosoever should be taken returning to be
								the slave of him that should take him.

For the Lacedaemonians had before been warned by a certain answer of
								the Pythian oracle to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes.

So they came forth, they and their wives and their children. 
							 And the Athenians, for hatred they bore to the Lacedaemonians,
								received them and put them into Naupactus; 
							 which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolae.

The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedaemonians and came to the
								league of the Athenians because they were holden down by the
								Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. 
							 Whereupon Megara and Pegae were put into the hands of the Athenians,
								who built for the Megareans the long walls from the city to Nisaea
								and maintained them with a garrison of their own. 
							 And from hence it was chiefly that the vehement hatred grew of the
								Corinthians against the Athenians.

Moreover Inarus, the son of Psammetticus, an African, king of the
								Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Mareia above Pharus,
								caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against the king
								Artaxerxes;

and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought
								in the Athenians to assist him, who chancing to be then warring on
								Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their
								confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. 
							 And going from the sea up the river of Nilus after they had made
								themselves masters of the river and of two parts of the city of
								Memphis, assaulted the third part called the White Wall. 
							 Within were of the Medes and Persians, such as had escaped, and of
								the Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest.

The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias and landing their
								soldiers fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and
								the Corinthians had the victory. 
							 After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the
								Peloponnesians at Cecryphaleia, and the Athenians had the
								victory.

After this again, the war being on foot of the Athenians against the
								Aeginetae, a great battle was fought between them by sea upon the
								coast of Aegina, the confederates of both sides being at the same,
								in which the Athenians had the victory, and having taken seventy
								galleys landed their army and besieged the city under the conduct of
								Leocrates the son of Stroebus.

After this, the Peloponnesians, desiring to aid the Aeginetae, sent
								over into Aegina itself three hundred men of arms of the same that
								had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians and with other
								forces seized on the top of Geraneia. 
							 And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence into
								the territory of Megara, supposing that the Athenians, having much
								of their army absent in Aegina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid
								the Megareans or, if they did, would be forced to rise from before
								Aegina.

But the Athenians stirred not from Aegina; 
							 but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the
								conduct of Myronides went to Megara;

and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted asunder
								again with an opinion on both sides not to have had the worse in the
								action.

And the Athenians, who notwithstanding had rather the better, when
								the Corinthians were gone away erected a trophy. 
							 But the Corinthians, having been reviled at their return by the
								ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared
								and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been
								theirs. 
							 Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara with a huge shout both
								slew those that were setting up the trophy and, charging the rest,
								got the victory.

The Corinthians, being overcome, went their way; 
							 but a good part of them, being hard followed and missing their way,
								lighted into the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with
								a great ditch had no passage through.

Which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them at the place by which
								they entered with their men of arms and, encompassing the ground
								with their light armed soldiers, killed those that were entered with
								stones. 
							 This was a great loss to the Corinthians, but the rest of their army
								got home again.

About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls
								from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called
								Phaleron, the other to Piraeus.

The Phoceans also making war upon Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineus, towns
								that belonged to the Dorians of whom the Lacedaemonians are
								descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedaemonians, under
								the conduct of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus in the place of
								Pleistoanactes son of king Pausanias who was yet in his minority,
								sent unto the aid of the Dorians fifteen hundred men of arms of
								their own, and of their confederates ten thousand.

And when they had forced the Phoceans upon composition to surrender
								the town they had taken, they went their ways again. 
							 Now if they would go home by sea through the Crisaean Gulf, the
								Athenians going about with their fleet would be ready to stop
								them; 
							 and to pass over Geraneia they thought unsafe because the Athenians
								had in their hands Megara and Pegae. 
							 For Geraneia was not only a difficult passage of itself but was also
								always guarded by the Athenians.

They thought good, therefore, to stay amongst the Boeotians and to
								consider which way they might most safely go through. 
							 Whilst they were there, there wanted not some Athenians that privily
								solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people
								out of government and to have demolished the long walls then
								building.

But the Athenians, with the whole power of their city and a thousand
								Argives and other confederates as they could be gotten together, in
								all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them;

for there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the
								democracy.

There also came to the Athenians certain horsemen out of Thessaly,
								which in the battle turned to the Lacedaemonians.

They fought at Tanagra of Boeotia, and the Lacedaemonians had the
								victory; 
							 but the slaughter was great on both sides.

Then the Lacedaemonians, entering into the territories of Megara and
								cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the way of
								Geraneia and the Isthmus.

Upon the twoand-sixtieth day after this battle the Athenians, under
								the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Boeotians and
								overthrew them at Oenophyta and brought the territories of Boeotia
								and Phocis under their obedience, and withal razed the walls of
								Tanagra and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus a hundred
								hostages, and finished also at the same time their long walls at
								home.

After this, Aegina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions:
								that they should have their walls pulled down and should deliver up
								their galleys and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come.

Also the Athenians made a voyage about Peloponnesus wherein they
								burnt the arsenal of the Lacedaemonians' navy, took Chalcis, a city
								of the Corinthians, and landing their forces in Sicyonia overcame in
								the fight those that made head against them.

All this while the Athenians stayed still in Egypt and saw much
								variety of war. 
							 First the Athenians were masters of Egypt;

and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus, a Persian, with money to
								Lacedaemon to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by
								that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt.

But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose,
								Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia.

And then was Megabazus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt
								with great forces, and coming in by land overthrew the Egyptians and
								their confederates in a battle, drave the Grecians out of Memphis,
								and finally inclosed them in the isle of Prosopis. 
							 There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having
								drained the channel and turned the water another way, he made their
								galleys lie aground and the island for the most part continent, and
								so came over and won the island with land soldiers.

Thus was the army of the Grecians lost after six years' war; 
							 and few of many passing through Africa saved themselves in Cyrene,
								but the most perished.

So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king except only Amyrtaeus
								that reigned in the fens. 
							 For him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and
								the people of the fens of all the Egyptians the most warlike.

But Inarus, king of the Africans and author of all this stir in
								Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified.

The Athenians moreover had sent fifty galleys more into Egypt for a
								supply of those that were there already, which putting in at
								Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus, knew nothing of what had
								happened to the rest, and being assaulted from the land by the army
								and from the sea by the Phoenician fleet, lost the greatest part of
								their galleys and escaped home again with the lesser part. 
							 Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their
								confederates into Egypt.

Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven
								out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. 
							 And the Athenians, taking with them the Boeotians and Phoceans, their
								confederates, made war against Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, and
								were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army
								(for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling) but could
								not win the city nor yet perform anything else of what they came for
								but came back again without effect and brought Orestes with
								them.

Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the galleys
								that lay at Pegae (for Pegae was in the hands of the Athenians)
								under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into
								Sicyonia and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made
								head, and then presently took up forces in Achaia, and putting over
								made war on Oenias, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged.

Nevertheless they took it not but returned home.

Three years after this, was a truce made between the Peloponnesians
								and Athenians for five years.

And the Athenians gave over the Grecian war and with two hundred
								galleys, part their own and part confederates, under the conduct of
								Cimon made war on Cyprus.

Of these there went sixty sail into Egypt, sent for by Amyrtaeus that
								reigned in the fens; 
							 and the rest lay at the siege of Citium.

But Cimon there dying and a famine arising in the army, they left
								Citium and when they had passed Salamis in Cyprus, fought at once
								both by sea and land against the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and
								Cilicians and, having gotten victory in both, returned home, and
								with them the rest of their fleet, now come back from Egypt.

After this, the Lacedaemonians took in hand the war called the holy
								war and, having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession
								thereof to the Delphians. 
							 But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedaemonians were gone, came
								with their army and, regaining it, delivered the possession to the
								Phoceans.

Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Boeotia being seized of
								Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and certain other places of Boeotia, the
								Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a
								thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates
								as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of
								Tolmaeus.

And when they had taken Chaeroneia, they carried away the inhabitants
								captives and, leaving a garrison in the city, departed. 
							 In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with
								the Locrians of Opus and the Euboean outlaws and others of the same
								faction, set upon them at Coroneia;

and overcoming the Athenians in battle, some they slew and some they
								took alive.

Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Boeotia and made peace with
								condition to have their prisoners released. 
							 So the outlaws and the rest returned, and lived again under their own
								laws.

Not long after revolted Euboea from the Athenians; 
							 and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian
								army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted
								and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that
								the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as
								fled into Nisaea. 
							 Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the
								Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. 
							 Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Euboea;

and the Lacedaemonians afterward brake into Attica and wasted the
								country about Eleusine and Thriasium under the conduct of
								Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and came no
								farther on, but so went away.

After which the Athenians passed again into Euboea and totally
								subdued it: the Hestiaeans they put quite out, taking their
								territory into their own hands, but ordered the rest of Euboea
								according to composition made.

Being returned from Euboea, within awhile after they made a peace
								with the Lacedaemonians and their confederates for thirty years and
								rendered Nisaea, Achaia, Pegae, and Troezene (for these places the
								Athenians held of theirs) to the Peloponnesians.

In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians
								and Milesians concerning Priene; 
							 and the Milesians, being put to the worse, came to Athens and
								exclaimed against the Samians. 
							 Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the
								Milesians out of desire to alter the form of government.

Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys
								and set up the democracy there and took of the Samians fifty boys
								and as many men for hostages, which, when they had put into Lemnos
								and set a guard upon them, they came home.

But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular
								government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with
								the mightiest of them in Samos and with Pissuthnes the son of
								Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven
								hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening
								and first set upon the popular faction and brought most of them into
								their power;

and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted and
								delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there into
								the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against
								Miletus. 
							 With these also revolted the Byzantines.

The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty
								galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use (for some of them went
								into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phoenicians and some to fetch
								in succours from Chios and Lesbos), but with the forty-four that
								remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought with
								seventy galleys of the Samians (whereof twenty were such as served
								for the transport of soldiers) as they were coming altogether from
								Miletus; 
							 and the Athenians had the victory.

After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from
								Chios and Lesbos twenty-five. 
							 With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in
								battle and besieged the city, which they inclosed with a triple
								wall, and shut it up by sea with their galleys.

But Pericles, taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made
								haste towards Caunus and Caria upon intelligence of the coming
								against them of the Phoenician fleet. 
							 For Stesagoras with five galleys was already gone out of Samos and
								others out of other places to meet the Phoenicians.

In the meantime, the Samians, coming suddenly forth with their fleet
								and falling upon the harbour of the Athenians which was unfortified,
								sunk the galleys that kept watch before it and overcame the rest in
								fight, insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast
								for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they
								pleased.

But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. 
							 And after this there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail,
								with Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormio; 
							 and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; 
							 and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more.

And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea,
								yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege
								they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their
								walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the
								money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. 
							 And the Byzantines also yielded with condition to remain subject to
								them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.

Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of
								the Corcyraeans and the Potidaeans and whatsoever other intervenient
								pretext of this war.

These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the
								barbarians came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at
								most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of
								this present war. 
							 In which time the Athenians both assured their government over the
								confederates and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. 
							 This the Lacedaemonians saw and opposed not, save now and then a
								little, but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without
								necessity and also for that they were hindered sometimes with
								domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against
								them; 
							 till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced
								manifestly indeed and that they had done injury to their
								confederates, they could forbear no longer, but thought it necessary
								to go in hand with the war with all diligence and to pull down, if
								they could, the Athenian greatness. 
							 For which purpose it was by the Lacedaemonians themselves decreed
								that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done
								unjustly;

and also having sent to Delphi and enquired of Apollo whether they
								should have the better in the war or not, they received, as it is
								reported, this answer: 
 That if they warred
										with their whole power, they should have victory and that
										himself would be on their side, both called and
										uncalled.

Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to
								put it to the question amongst them, 
 whether they should make war or not. 
 And the
								ambassadors of the several confederates coming in and the council
								set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them
								accusing the Athenians of injury and desiring the war, as also the
								Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities everyone severally
								to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea should be lost
								before help came, being then present spake last of all to this
								effect:

"Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians, they
								having both decreed the war themselves and also assembled us to do
								the same. 
							 For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as
								they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering
								their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the
								rest of the common business.

And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the
								Athenians need not be taught to beware of them, yet it were good for
								those that dwell up in the land, and not as we in places of traffic
								on the sea side, to know that unless they defend those below, they
								shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea
								the commodities of the seasons and again more hardly receive the
								benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; 
							 and also not to mistake what is now spoken, as if it concerned them
								not, but to make account that if they neglect those that dwell by
								the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves;

and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us, and
								therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. 
							 For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet unless they
								have wrong, yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive
								injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to
								come again to composition, and neither to swell with the good
								success of war nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the
								ease of peace.

For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly
								lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. 
							 And he that in war is made proud by success observeth not that his
								pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence.

For though many things ill advised come to good effect against
								enemies worse advised, yet more, thought well advised, have fallen
								but badly out against well advised enemies. 
							 For no man comes to execute a thing with the same confidence he
								premeditates it. 
							 For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we
								fail through fear.

"As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us
								and upon other sufficient allegations; 
							 and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also
								in due time lay it down.

And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory:
								first, because we exceed them in number;

and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all
								of one fashion. 
							 And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians,
								we shall provide it both out of everyone's particular wealth and
								with the money at Delphi and Olympia. 
							 For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their
								foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. 
							 For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than
								domestic; 
							 whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting
								more in the persons of men than in money.

And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability
								they are totally vanquished. 
							 And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves
								to naval affairs. 
							 And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall
								surely overmatch them in courage. 
							 For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by
								teaching; 
							 but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto
								by industry.

And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must be all our
								parts to contribute. 
							 For else it were a hard case that the confederates of the Athenians
								should not stick to contribute to their own servitude, and we should
								refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for
								our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from
								us and even with that do us mischief.

"We have also many other ways of war, as the revolt of their
								confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their
								revenue; 
							 the building of forts in their territory; 
							 and many other things which one cannot now foresee. 
							 For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of
								our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the
								occasion. 
							 Wherein he that complies with it with most temper standeth the
								firmest, and he that is most passionate oftenest miscarries.

Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our
								territory with an equal adversary; 
							 we must undergo them. 
							 But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city
								after another too strong for us. 
							 Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly and every nation and city
								set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without
								labour. 
							 And know that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it)
								brings with it no less than manifest servitude, which but to mention
								as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very
								dishonourable to Peloponnesus.

For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit,
								or else that we endure it out of fear and so appear degenerate from
								our ancestors. 
							 For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored, whereas we
								for our part assure not so much as our own but, claiming the
								reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a
								tyrant city to be established amongst us.

Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults,
								foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. 
							 For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath
								done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it
								hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of
								foolishness.

"But to what end should we object matters past more than is necessary
								to the business in hand? 
							 We must now by helping the present labour for the future, for it is
								peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. 
							 And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must
								not therefore change the custom; 
							 for there is no reason that what was gotten in want should be lost by
								wealth. 
							 But we should confidently go in hand with the war as for many other
								causes so also for this, that both the God hath by his oracle
								advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself, and also for
								that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit, are
								ready to take our parts.

Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch
								as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them; 
							 but you fight rather in defence of the same. 
							 For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the
								first invader.

So that seeing it will be every way good to
									make the war, and since in common we persuade the same, and
									seeing also that both to the cities and to private men it will
									be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the
									defence of the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged (which
									was wont to be contrary) by lonians, nor the recovery of the
									liberty of the rest of the Grecians. 
								 For it is a case that admitteth not delay when they are some of
									them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we
									met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo
									the like.

But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity and that this
									is the best advice; 
								 and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the
									present danger but coveting the long peace proceeding from
									it. 
								 For though by war growth the confirmation of peace, yet for love
									of ease to refuse the war doth not likewise avoid the
									danger.

But making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece is set up
									alike over all and reigneth over some already and the rest in
									intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war and not
									only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves but also
									deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of
								servitude. 
 
							 Thus said the Corinthians.

The Lacedaemonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all,
								brought the balls to all the confederates present in order, from the
								greatest state to the least; 
							 and the greatest part gave their votes for the war.

Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to
								go in hand with it presently because they were unprovided and every
								state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves of
								what was necessary, yet there passed not fully a year in this
								preparation before Attica was invaded and the war openly on foot.

In the meantime they sent ambassadors to the Athenians with certain
								criminations to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they
								might have all the pretext that could be for raising of the war.

And first the Lacedaemonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians,
								required them to banish such as were under curse of the goddess
								Minerva for pollution of sanctuary. 
							 Which pollution was thus.

There had been one Cylon an Athenian, a man that had been victor in
								the Olympian exercises, of much nobility and power amongst those of
								old time, and that had married the daughter of Theagenes, a
								Megarean, in those days tyrant of Megara.

To this Cylon asking counsel at Delphi the God answered that on the
								greatest festival day he should seize the citadel of Athens.

He therefore, having gotten forces of Theagenes and persuaded his
								friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the
								Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus with intention to take upon him the
								tyranny, esteeming the feast of Jupiter to be the greatest and to
								touch withal on his particular in that he had been victor in the
								Olympian exercises.

But whether the feast spoken of were meant to be the greatest in
								Attica or in some other place, neither did he himself consider nor
								the oracle make manifest. 
							 For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is called
								the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius and is celebrated without
								the city, wherein in the confluence of the whole people many men
								offered sacrifices not of living creatures but such as was the
								fashion of the natives of the place.

But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to
								the enterprise.

And when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces
								out of the fields and lying before the citadel besieged it. 
							 But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege,
								went most of them away, and left both the guard of the citadel and
								the whole business to the nine archontes with absolute authority to
								order the same as to them it should seem good.

For at that time, most of the affairs of the commonweal were
								administered by those nine archontes.

Now those that were besieged with Cylon were for want of both victual
								and water in very evil estate, and therefore Cylon and a brother of
								his fled privily out;

but the rest, when they were pressed and some of them dead with
								famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar that is in the
								citadel. 
							 And the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the
								place, raising them upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to
								the sword. 
							 Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at
								the altars of the severe goddesses as they were going away. 
							 And from this the Athenians, both themselves and their posterity,
								were called accursed and sacrilegious persons.

Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse; 
							 and Cleomenes, a Lacedaemonian, together with the Athenians in a
								sedition, banished them afterwards again, and not only so but
								disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were
								dead. 
							 Nevertheless there returned of them afterwards again, and there are
								of their race in the city unto this day.

This pollution, therefore, the Lacedaemonians required them to purge
								their city of, principally, forsooth, as taking part with the gods,
								but knowing withal that Pericles the son of Xantippus was by the
								mother's side one of that race. 
							 For they thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the
								more easily be brought to yield to their desire.

Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished as to
								bring him into the envy of the city, as if the misfortune of him
								were in part the cause of the war.

For being the most powerful of his time and having the sway of the
								state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedaemonians, not
								suffering the Athenians to give them the least way but inciting them
								to the war.

Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedaemonians to banish
								such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Taenarus. 
							 For the Lacedaemonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants
								in the temple of Neptune at Taenarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew
								them: for which cause they themselves think it was that the great
								earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta.

Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of
								sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalcioeca, which was thus.

After that Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was recalled by the Spartans
								from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called in question by
								them was absolved though he was no more sent abroad by the state,
								yet he went again into Hellespont in a galley of Hermione as a
								private man, without leave of the Lacedaemonians, to the Grecian
								war, as he gave out, but in truth to negotiate with the king, as he
								had before begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece.

Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning
								of the whole business, was at first from this.

When after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium when he was
								there the first time (which, being holden by the Medes, there were
								taken in it some near to the king and of his kindred), unknown to
								the rest of the confederates he sent unto the king those near ones
								of his which he had taken and gave out they were run away.

This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he
								had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. 
							 Also he sent letters unto him which Gongylus carried wherein, as was
								afterwards known, was thus written:

Pausanias, General of the Spartans, being
										desirous to do thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these
										men whom he hath by arms taken prisoners. 
									 And I have a purpose, if the same seem also good unto thee,
										to take thy daughter in marriage and to bring Sparta and the
										rest of Greece into thy subjection. 
									 These things I account myself able to bring to pass if I may
										communicate my counsels with thee. 
									 If, therefore, any of these things do like thee, send some
										trusty man to the seaside by whose mediation we may confer
										together.

These were the contents of the writing. 
							 Xerxes, being pleased with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son
								of Pharnaces to the seaside with commandment to take the government
								of the province of Dascylis and to dismiss Megabates, that was
								governor there before, and withal gives him a letter to Pausanias,
								which he commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzantium
								and to show him the seal and well and faithfully to perform
								whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to
								do.

Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was
								commanded, sent over the letter;

wherein was written this answer: 
 Thus saith
										king Xerxes to Pausanias: For the men which thou hast saved
										and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy benefit is
										laid up in our house indelibly registered forever; 
									 and I like also of what thou hast propounded. 
									 And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the
										performance of what thou hast promised unto me. 
									 Neither be thou hindered by the expense of gold and silver or
										multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful
										to have them come. 
									 But with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent unto thee, do
										boldly both mine and thine own business as shall be most fit
										for the dignity and honour of us both.

Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was before in
								great authority for his conduct at Plataea, became now many degrees
								more elevated and endured no more to live after the accustomed
								manner of his country but went apparelled at Byzantium after the
								fashion of Persia, and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of
								Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian
								manner. 
							 Nor was he able to conceal his purpose, but in trifles made apparent
								beforehand the greater matters he had conceived of the future.

He became moreover difficult of access, and would be in such choleric
								passions toward all men indifferently that no man might endure to
								approach him, which was also none of the least causes why the
								confederates turned from him to the Athenians.

When the Lacedaemonians heard of it, they called him home the first
								time. 
							 And when being gone out the second time without their command in a
								galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same
								practices and, after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the
								Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated
								himself at Colonae in the country of Troy practicing still with the
								barbarians and making his abode there for no good purpose, then the
								ephori forebore no longer but sent unto him a public officer with
								the scytale commanding him not to depart from the officer and, in
								case he refused, denounced war against him.

But he, desiring as much as he could to decline suspicion and
								believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of
								his accusations, returned unto Sparta the second time. 
							 And first he was by the ephori committed to ward (for the ephori have
								power to do this to their king); 
							 but afterwards, procuring his enlargement, he came forth and
								exhibited himself to justice against such as had anything to allege
								against him.

And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither
								his enemies nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the
								punishment of a man both of the race of their kings and at that
								present in great authority (for Plistarchus the son of Leonidas
								being king and as yet in minority, Pausanias, who was his
								cousin-german, had the tuition of him yet), by his licentious
								behaviour and affectation of the barbarian customs, he gave much
								cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the
								present state.

They considered also that he differed in manner of life from the
								discipline established: amongst other things by this, that upon the
								tripode at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated as the best of
								the spoil of the Medes, he had caused to be inscribed of himself in
								particular this elegiac verse: 
							 
 
									 Pausanias, Greek General, 
									 Having the Medes defeated, 
									 To Phoebus in record thereof 
									 This gift hath consecrated.

But the Lacedaemonians then presently defaced that inscription of the
								tripode and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined
								in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so. 
							 This therefore was numbered amongst the offences of Pausanias and was
								thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather for the
								condition he was now in.

They had information farther that he had in hand some practice with
								the Helots. 
							 And so he had, for he promised them not only manumission but also
								freedom of the city if they would rise with him and co-operate in
								the whole business.

But neither thus upon some impeachment of the Helots would they
								proceed against him but kept the custom which they have in their own
								cases not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan
								without unquestionable proof. 
							 Till at length (as it is reported) purposing to send over to
								Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was bewrayed unto them by
								a man of Argilus, in time past his minion and most faithful to him,
								who, being terrified with the cogitation that not any of those which
								had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the
								seal of Pausanias (to the end that if his jealousy were false or
								that he should need to alter anything in the letter, it might not be
								discovered) and opened the letter, wherein (as he had suspected the
								addition of some such clause) he found himself also written down to
								be murdered.

The ephori, when these letters were by him shown unto them, though
								they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet
								desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias his own mouth,
								the man being upon design gone to Taenarus into sanctuary and having
								there built him a little room with a partition in which he hid the
								ephori, and Pausanias coming to him and asking the cause of his
								taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. 
							 For the man both expostulated with him for what he had written about
								him and from point to point discovered all the practice, saying that
								though he had never boasted unto him these and these services
								concerning the king, he must yet have the honour as well as many
								other of his servants to be slain. 
							 And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things and also bade
								the man not to be troubled at what was past and gave him assurance
								to leave sanctuary, intreating him to go on in his journey with all
								speed and not to frustrate the business in hand.

Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time
								went their way, and knowing now the certain truth intended to
								apprehend him in the city. 
							 It is said that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he
								perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him
								what they came for; 
							 and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter
								for good will, he ran into the close of the temple of Pallas
								Chalcioeca and got in before they overtook him (now the temple
								itself was hard by) and, entering into a house belonging to the
								temple to avoid the injury of the open air, there stayed.

They that pursued him could not then overtake him; 
							 but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house and,
								watching a time when he was within, beset the house and mured him up
								and, leaving a guard there, famished him.

When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him,
								as he was, out of the house, yet breathing; 
							 and being out he died immediately.

After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Caeada where
								they use to cast in malefactors; 
							 yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place
								thereabouts. 
							 But the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedaemonians afterward both
								to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died (so that he
								lies now in the entry of the temple, as is evident by the
								inscription of the pillar) and also (as having been a pollution of
								the sanctuary) to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalcioeca for
								that one. 
							 Whereupon they set up two brazen statues and dedicated the same unto
								her for Pausanias.

Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of
								sanctuary, required the Lacedaemonians to banish out of their city
								such as were touched with the same.

At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lacedaemonians
								by their ambassadors to the Athenians accused Themistocles, for that
								he also had Medised together with Pausanias, having discovered it by
								proofs against Pausanias, and desired that the same punishment might
								be likewise inflicted upon him.

Whereunto consenting (for he was at this time in banishment by
								ostracism; 
							 and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and
								fro in other places of Peloponnesus), they sent certain men in
								company of the Lacedaemonians who were willing to pursue him with
								command to bring him in wheresoever they could find him.

But Themistocles, having had notice of it beforehand, flieth out of
								Peloponnesus into Corcyra to the people of which city he had
								formerly been beneficial. 
							 But the Corcyraeans, alleging that they durst not keep him there for
								fear of displeasing both the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians,
								convey him into the opposite continent;

and being pursued by the men thereto appointed asking continually
								which way he went, he was compelled at a strait to turn in to
								Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy.

The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his
								wife, and by her was instructed to take their son with him and sit
								down at the altar of the house.

When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him
								and desired him that though he had opposed him in some suit in
								Athens, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight,
								saying that being now the weaker, he must needs suffer under the
								stronger, whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms; 
							 and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of
								life, whereas, if he delivered him up (telling him withal for what
								and by whom he was followed), he deprived him of all means of saving
								his life. 
							 Admetus having heard him bade him arise together with his son whom he
								held as he sat, which is the most submissive supplication that is.

Not long after came the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians; 
							 and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not
								but sent him away by land to Pydna upon the other sea (a city
								belonging to Alexander) because his purpose was to go to the king,
								where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked and was carried by
								foul weather upon the fleet of the Athenians that besieged
								Naxos.

Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown) who he
								was and for what he fled, and said that unless he would save him, he
								meant to say that he had hired him to carry him away for money; 
							 and that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go
								out of the ship till the weather served to be gone; 
							 to which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him
								according to his merit. 
							 The master did so; 
							 and having lain a day and a night at sea upon the fleet of the
								Athenians, he arrived afterward at Ephesus.

And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money (for he
								received there both what was sent him from his friends at Athens and
								also what he had put out at Argos), he took his journey upwards in
								company of a certain Persian of the low countries and sent letters
								to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, newly come to the
								kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose:

I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who,
										of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy
										father that invaded me, have done your house the maniest
										damages; 
									 yet the benefits I did him were more after once I with
										safety, he with danger, was to make retreat. 
									 And both a good turn is already due unto me, 
 (writing
								here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians' departure out of
								Salamis and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge falsely
								unto himself) 
 and at this time to do thee
										many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by
										the Grecians for thy friendship's sake. 
									 But I desire to have a year's respite that I may declare unto
										thee the cause of my coming myself.

The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be and
								commanded him to do as he had said. 
							 In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the
								language and fashions of the place.

And a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king more
								than ever had been any Grecian before, both for his former dignity
								and the hope of Greece which he promised to bring into his
								subjection, but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom.

For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the
								strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy
								admiration different from other men. 
							 For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before
								or after, he was both of extemporary matters upon short deliberation
								the best discerner and also of what for the most part would be their
								issue the best conjecturer. 
							 What he was perfect in he was able also to explicate, and what he was
								unpractised in he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. 
							 Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case
								that was doubtful. 
							 And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of
								his wit and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to
								tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden.

But falling sick he ended his life; 
							 some say he died voluntarily by poison because he thought himself
								unable to perform what he had promised to the king.

His monument is in Magnesia in Asia, in the market place; 
							 for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed
								upon him Magnesia which yielded him fifty talents by the year for
								his bread, and Lampsacus for his wine (for this city was in those
								days thought to have store of wine), and the city of Myus for his
								meat.

His bones are said by his kindred to have been brought home by his
								own appointment and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians, for
								it was not lawful to bury one there that had fled for treason. 
							 These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and Themistocles
								the Athenian, the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.

And this is that which the Lacedaemonians did command, and were
								commanded, in their first embassage touching the banishment of such
								as were under the curse. 

							 After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens commanding them to
								levy the siege from before Potidaea and to suffer Aegina to be free,
								but principally and most plainly telling them that the war should
								not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the
								Megareans, by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica
								and all ports within the Athenian dominion.

But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their
								commands nor in the abrogation of that act, but recriminated the
								Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds
								and for receiving of their slaves that revolted.

But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedaemon were
								arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake
								nothing of that which formerly they were wont but only this, that 
 the Lacedaemonians desire that there
										should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the
										Grecians to be governed by their own laws, 
 the
								Athenians called an assembly and, propounding their opinions amongst
								themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give
								them an answer once for all.

And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some
								for the war and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought
								not to stand in their way to peace but to be abrogated. 
							 And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of
								all Athens and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his
								advice in such manner as followeth:

"Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion not to give
								way to the Peloponnesians (notwithstanding I know that men have not
								the same passions in the war itself which they have when they are
								incited to it but change their opinions with the events), but also I
								see that I must now advise the same things or very near to what I
								have before delivered. 
							 And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place that if we
								miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed
								by common consent, or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own
								wisdom only. 
							 For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the
								purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty, which is also the
								cause that when anything happeneth contrary to our expectation, we
								use to lay the fault on fortune.

That the Lacedaemonians, both formerly and especially now, take
								counsel how to do us mischief is a thing manifest. 
							 For whereas it is said [in the articles] that in our mutual
								controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in
								the meantime either side hold what they possess, they never yet
								sought any such trial themselves nor will accept of the same offered
								by us. 
							 They will clear themselves of their accusations by war rather than by
								words, and come hither no more now to expostulate but to
								command.

For they command us to arise from before Potidaea and to restore the
								Aeginetae to the liberty of their own laws and to abrogate the act
								concerning the Megareans.

And they that come last command us to restore all the Grecians to
								their liberty. 
							 Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle by
								not abrogating the act concerning Megara (yet this by them is
								pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay),
								nor retain a scruple in your minds as if a small matter moved you to
								the war.

For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your
								resolution. 
							 Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a
								greater matter as men that for fear will obey them likewise in
								that. 
							 But by a stiff denial you shall teach them plainly to come to you
								hereafter on terms of more equality.

"Resolve therefore from this occasion either to yield them obedience
								before you receive damage, or if we must have war (which for my part
								I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way
								nor keep what we possess in fear. 
							 For a great and a little claim imposed by equals upon their
								neighbours before judgment by way of command hath one and the same
								virtue, to make subject.

As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not
								like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now
								understand.

The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour without money
								either in particular or in common stock. 
							 Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience, for
								that the wars which they have had one against another have been but
								short through poverty.

And such men can neither man their fleets nor yet send out their
								armies by land very often, because they must be far from their own
								wealth and yet by that be maintained and be besides barred the use
								of the sea.

It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support
								the wars; 
							 and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars
								with their bodies than with their money. 
							 For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but
								their money they think is sure to be spent, especially if the war
								(as it is likely) should last.

So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one
								battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to
								maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another
								kind, they are not able; 
							 inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily
								perform nothing upon the occasion; 
							 and having equality of vote and being of several races, everyone will
								press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully
								executed.

For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy and others to have
								their estates least wasted. 
							 And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of
								their time to debate the common business and the greater to dispatch
								their own private affairs. 
							 And everyone supposeth that his own neglect of the common estate can
								do little hurt and that it will be the care of somebody else to look
								to that for his own good, not observing how by these thoughts of
								everyone in several the common business is jointly ruined.

"But their greatest hindrance of all will be their want of money,
								which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay,
								which the occasions of war will not endure.

As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not
								worthy fear.

For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of
								peace to fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an
								enemy, and we no less fortified against them.

And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and
								by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory,
								yet would not that be enough both to besiege us and also to hinder
								us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with
								our fleet, which is the thing wherein our strength lies.

For we have more experience in land service by use of the sea than
								they have in sea service by use of the land.

Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily.

For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian
								war, yet have not attained it fully. 
							 How then should husbandmen not seamen, whom also we will not suffer
								to apply themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so
								great fleets, perform any matter of value?

Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might
								adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of
								men; 
							 but awed by many they will not stir that way, and not applying
								themselves to it will be yet more unskillful and thereby more
								cowardly.

For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not
								to be attended at idle times and on the by, but requiring rather
								that while it is a-learning, nothing else should be done on the by.

"But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi and
								therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers
								employed in our fleet, this indeed, if, going aboard both ourselves
								and those that dwell among us, we could not match them, were a
								dangerous matter. 
							 But now we can both do this and (which is the principal thing) we
								have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship
								both more and better of our own citizens than are in all the rest of
								Greece.

Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial would be found
								content to fly his own country and, withal upon less hope of
								victory, for a few days' increase of wages take part with the other
								side.

"In this manner, or like to this, seems to me to stand the case of
								the Peloponnesians; 
							 whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and
								has many great advantages besides.

If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by
								sea. 
							 And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus and they all Attica, yet
								shall theirs be the greater loss. 
							 For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of
								that we shall destroy; 
							 whereas for us there is other land both in the islands and
								continent.

For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. 
							 Consider but this. 
							 If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more
								inexpugnable? 
							 We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination,
								lay aside the care of fields and villages, and not for the loss of
								them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in
								number than ourselves. 
							 For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as
								many more; 
							 and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates,
								which are our strength; 
							 for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. 
							 Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses but of men's bodies; 
							 for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. 
							 And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and
								destroy them yourselves and show the Peloponnesians that you will
								never the sooner obey them for such things as these.

There be many other things that give hope of
									victory in case you do not, whilst you are in this war, strive
									to enlarge your dominion and undergo other voluntary dangers
									(for I am afraid of our own errors more than of their
									designs);

but they shall be spoken of at another time in prosecution of the
									war itself. 
								 For the present, let us send away these men with this answer:
									'that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and
									ports if the Lacedaemonians will also make no banishment of us
									nor of our confederates as of strangers,' for neither our act
									concerning Megara nor their banishment of strangers is forbidden
									in the articles, 'also, that we will let the Grecian cities be
									free if they were so when the peace was made; 
								 and if the Lacedaemonians will also give leave unto their
									confederates to use their freedom not as shall serve the turn of
									the Lacedaemonians, but as they themselves shall every one think
									good; 
								 also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles and
									will not begin the war but be revenged on those that shall.' 
								 For this is both just and for the dignity of the city to
									answer.

Nevertheless you must know that of necessity war there will
									be; 
								 and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall
									have our enemies, and that out of the greatest dangers, whether
									to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours.

For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less
									beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather
									than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the
									barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. 
								 Of whom we ought not now to come short but rather to revenge us
									by all means upon our enemies, and do our best to deliver the
									state unimpaired by us to posterity.

Thus spake Pericles. 
							 The Athenians, liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have
								them, answering the Lacedaemonians according to his direction, both
								in particulars as he had spoken and generally, 
 that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to
										answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of
										arbitrament. 
 So the ambassadors went home, and after
								these there came no more.

These were the quarrels and differences on either side before the
								war, which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus
								and Corcyra. 
							 Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to
								each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. 
							 For the things that had passed were but the confusion of the articles
								and matter of the war to follow.

The war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians beginneth now
								from the time they had no longer commerce one with another without a
								herald, and that having once begun it they warred without
								intermission. 
							 And it is written in order by summers and winters according as from
								time to time the several matters came to pass.

The peace, which after the winning of Euboea was concluded for thirty
								years, lasted fourteen years. 
							 But in the fifteenth year, being the forty-eighth of the priesthood
								of Chrysis in Argos, Aenesias being then ephor at Sparta and
								Pythadorus, archon of Athens, having then two months of his
								government to come, in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea
								and in the beginning of the spring, three hundred and odd Thebans
								led by Pythangelus the son of Phyleides and Diemporus the son of
								Onetoridas, Boeotian rulers, about the first watch of the night
								entered with their arms into Plataea, a city of Boeotia and
								confederate of the Athenians.

They were brought in and the gates opened unto them by Naucleides and
								his accomplices, men of Plataea that for their own private ambition
								intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies
								and the putting of the whole city under the subjection of the
								Thebans.

This they negotiated with one Eurymachus the son of Leontiadas, one
								of the most potent men of Thebes. 
							 For the Thebans, foreseeing the war, desired to preoccupy Plataea,
								which was always at variance with them, whilst there was yet peace
								and the war not openly on foot. 
							 By which means they more easily entered undiscovered, there being no
								order taken before for a watch.

And making a stand in their arms in the market place, they did not,
								as they that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently
								to the business and enter the houses of their adversaries, but
								resolved rather to make favourable proclamation and to induce the
								city to composition and friendship. 
							 And the herald proclaimed, 
 that if any man,
										according to the ancient custom of all the Boeotians, would
										enter into the same league of war with them, he should come
										and bring his arms to theirs, 
 supposing the city by
								this means would easily be drawn to their side.

The Plataeans, when they perceived that the Thebans were already
								entered and had surprised the city, through fear and opinion that
								more were entered than indeed were (for they could not see them in
								the night), came to composition and accepting the condition rested
								quiet, and the rather, for that they had yet done no man harm.

But whilst that these things were treating, they observed that the
								Thebans were not many and thought that if they should set upon them,
								they might easily have the victory. 
							 For the Plataean commons were not willing to have revolted from the
								Athenians.

Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter, and they united
								themselves by digging through the common walls between house and
								house that they might not be discovered as they passed the
								streets. 
							 They also placed carts in the streets without the cattle that drew
								them to serve them instead of a wall, and every other thing they put
								in readiness as they severally seemed necessary for the present
								enterprise.

When all things according to their means were ready, they marched
								from their houses towards the enemies, taking their time whilst it
								was yet night and a little before the break of day because they
								would not have to charge them when they should be emboldened by the
								light and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified
								and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. 
							 So they forthwith set upon them and came quickly up to hand strokes.

And the Thebans, seeing this and finding they were deceived, cast
								themselves into a round figure and beat them back in that part where
								the assault was made;

and twice or thrice they repulsed them. 
							 But at last, when both the Plataeans themselves charged them with a
								great clamour, and their wives also and families shouted and
								screeched from the houses and withal threw stones and tiles amongst
								them, the night having been also very wet, they were afraid and
								turned their backs and fled here and there about the city, ignorant
								for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out by which
								they should have been saved (for this accident fell out upon the
								change of the moon) and pursued by such as were well acquainted with
								the ways to keep them in;

insomuch as the greatest part of them perished. 
							 The gate by which they entered, and which only was left open, a
								certain Plataean shut up again with the head of a javelin, which he
								thrust into the staple instead of a bolt, so that this way also
								their passage was stopped.

As they were chased up and down the city, some climbed the walls and
								cast themselves out and for the most part died. 
							 Some came to a deserted gate of the city and with a hatchet given
								them by a woman cut the staple and got forth unseen; 
							 but these were not many, for the thing was soon discovered.

Others again were slain dispersed in several parts of the city. 
							 But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast themselves
								before into a ring, happened into a great edifice adjoining to the
								wall, the doors whereof, being open, they thought had been the gates
								of the city and that there had been a direct way through to the
								other side.

The Plataeans, seeing them now pent up, consulted whether they should
								burn them as they were by firing the house or else resolve of some
								other punishment.

At length both these and all the rest of the Thebans that were
								straggling in the city agreed to yield themselves and their arms to
								the Plataeans at discretion.

And this success had they that entered into Plataea.

But the rest of the Thebans that should with their whole power have
								been there before day for fear the surprise should not succeed with
								those that were in, came so late with their aid that they heard the
								news of what was done by the way.

Now Plataea is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the
								slower for the rain which had fallen the same night. 
							 For the river Asopus was swollen so high that it was not easily
								passable.

So that what by the foulness of the way and what by the difficulty of
								passing the river, they arrived not till their men were already some
								slain and some taken prisoners.

When the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait for
								such of the Plataeans as were without (for there were abroad in the
								villages both men and household stuff, as was not unlikely, the evil
								happening unexpectedly and in time of peace), desiring, if they
								could take any prisoners, to keep them for exchange for those of
								theirs within, which (if any were so) were saved alive.

This was the Thebans' purpose. 
							 But the Plataeans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that
								some such thing would be done and fearing their case without, sent a
								herald unto the Thebans whom they commanded to say that what they
								had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of
								peace, was done wickedly, and to forbid them to do any injury to
								those without, and that otherwise they would kill all those men of
								theirs that they had alive, which, if they would withdraw their
								forces out of their territory, they would again restore unto
								them.

Thus the Thebans say, and that the Plataeans did swear it. 
							 But the Plataeans confess not that they promised to deliver them
								presently but upon treaty if they should agree, and deny that they
								swore it.

Upon this the Thebans went out of their territory; 
							 and the Plataeans, when they had speedily taken in whatsoever they
								had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. 
							 They that were taken were one hundred and eighty; 
							 and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had practised, was one.

When they had done, they sent a messenger to Athens and gave truce to
								the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead, and ordered the
								city as was thought convenient for the present occasion.

The news of what was done coming straightway to Athens, they
								instantly laid hands on all the Boeotians then in Attica and sent an
								officer to Plataea to forbid their farther proceeding with their
								Theban prisoners till such time as they also should have advised of
								the matter; 
							 for they were not yet advertised of their putting to death.

For the first messenger was sent away when the Thebans first entered
								the town; 
							 and the second, when they were overcome and taken prisoners; 
							 but of what followed after they knew nothing. 
							 So that the Athenians, when they sent, knew not what was done; 
							 and the officer arriving found that the men were already slain.

After this, the Athenians sending an army to Plataea, victualled it
								and left a garrison in it, and took thence both the women and
								children and also such men as were unserviceable for the war.

This action falling out at Plataea and the peace now clearly
								dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; 
							 so also did the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, intending on
								either part to send ambassadors to the king and to other barbarians,
								wheresoever they had hope of succours, and contracting leagues with
								such cities as were not under their own command.

The Lacedaemonians besides those galleys which they had in Italy and
								Sicily, of the cities that took part with them there, were ordered
								to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities,
								so many more as the whole number might amount to five hundred sail
								and to provide a sum of money assessed, and in other things not to
								stir farther but to receive the Athenians coming but with one galley
								at once till such time as the same should be ready.

The Athenians, on the other side, surveyed their present confederates
								and sent ambassadors to those places that lay about Peloponnesus, as
								Corcyra, Cephalonia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus, knowing that as long
								as these were their friends, they might with the more security make
								war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus.

Neither side conceived small matters but put their whole strength to
								the war, and not without reason. 
							 For all men in the beginnings of enterprises are the most eager. 
							 Besides, there were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in
								Athens, who for want of experience not unwillingly undertook the
								war. 
							 And not only the rest of Greece stood at gaze to behold the two
								principal states in combat,

but many prophecies were told and many sung by the priests of the
								oracles both in the cities about to war and in others.

There was also a little before this an earthquake in Delos, which in
								the memory of the Grecians never shook before, and was interpreted
								for and seemed to be a sign of what was to come afterwards to
								pass. 
							 And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was all sure
								to be inquired after.

But men's affections for the most part went with the Lacedaemonians,
								and the rather, for that they gave out they would recover the
								Grecians' liberty. 
							 And every man, both private and public person, endeavoured as much as
								in them lay both in word and deed to assist them and thought the
								business so much hindered as himself was not present at it.

In such passion were most men against the Athenians, some for desire
								to be delivered from under their government and others for fear of
								falling into it. 
							 And these were the preparations and affections brought unto the war.

But the confederates of either party, which they had when they began
								it, were these.

The Lacedaemonians had all Peloponnesus within the isthmus except the
								Argives and Achaeans (for these were in amity with both, save that
								the Pellenians at first, only of all Achaia, took their part; 
							 but afterwards all the rest did so likewise); 
							 and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians,
								Phoceans, Ambraciotes, Leucadians, and Anactorians. 
							 Of which the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleians,
								Ambraciotes, and Leucadians found shipping;

the Boeotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, horsemen; 
							 and the rest of the cities, footmen. 
							 And these were the confederates of the Lacedaemonians. 
							 The Athenian confederates were these:

the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of
								the Acarnanians, Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and other cities their
								tributaries among those nations; 
							 also that part of Caria which is on the seacoast and the Dorians
								adjoining to them; 
							 Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace; 
							 all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east and all the
								rest of the Cyclades except Melos and Thera.

Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans found galleys; 
							 the rest, footmen and money.

These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both
								sides.

The Lacedaemonians, after the business of Plataea, sent messengers
								presently up and down Peloponnesus and to their confederates without
								to have in readiness their forces and such things as should be
								necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of
								Attica.

And when they were all ready, they came to the rendezvous in the
								isthmus at a day appointed, two-thirds of the forces of every
								city.

When the whole army was gotten together, Archidamus, king of the
								Lacedaemonians, general of the expedition, called together the
								commanders of the several cities and such as were in authority and
								most worthy to be present and spake unto them as followeth:

Men of Peloponnesus and confederates, not only
									our fathers have had many wars, both within and without
									Peloponnesus, but we ourselves also, such as are anything in
									years, have been sufficiently acquainted therewith; 
								 yet did we never before set forth with so great a preparation as
									at this present. 
								 And now, not only we are a numerous and puissant army that
									invade, but the state also is puissant that is invaded by
									us.

We have reason therefore to show ourselves neither worse than our
									fathers nor short of the opinion conceived of ourselves. 
								 For all Greece is up at this commotion observing us, and through
									their hatred to the Athenians do wish that we may accomplish
									whatsoever we intend.

And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army
									and to have much assurance that they will not come out against
									us to battle, yet we ought not for this to march the less
									carefully prepared but of every city, as well the captain as the
									soldier, to expect always some danger or other in that part
									wherein he himself is placed.

For the accidents of war are uncertain, and for the most part the
									onset begins from the lesser number and upon passion. 
								 And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, hath beaten back
									the greater with the more ease; 
								 for that through contempt they have gone unprepared.

And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to
									have bold hearts yet for action, they ought to make their
									preparations as if they were afraid. 
								 For that will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy
									and more safety in fighting with him.

But we invade not now a city that cannot defend itself but a city
									every way well appointed. 
								 So that we must by all means expect to be fought withal, though
									not now because we be not yet there, yet hereafter, when they
									shall see us in their country wasting and destroying their
									possessions.

For all men, when in their own sight and on a sudden they receive
									any extraordinary hurt, fall presently into choler; 
								 and the less they consider, with the more stomach they
									assault.

And this is likely to hold in the Athenians somewhat more than in
									the others, for they think themselves worthy to have the command
									of others and to invade and waste the territories of their
									neighbours rather than to see their neighbours waste theirs.

Wherefore, as being to war against a great city and to procure
									both to your ancestors and yourselves a great fame, either good
									or bad as shall be the event, follow your leaders in such sort
									as above all things you esteem of order and watchfulness. 
								 For there is nothing in the world more comely nor more safe than
									when many men are seen to observe one and the same
								order.

Archidamus, having thus spoken and dismissed the council, first sent
								Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to Athens to try
								if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would yet in
								some degree remit of their obstinacy.

But the Athenians neither received him into their city nor presented
								him to the state; 
							 for the opinion of Pericles had already taken place, not to receive
								from the Lacedaemonians neither herald nor ambassador as long as
								their army was abroad. 
							 Therefore they sent him back without audience with commandment to be
								out of their borders the selfsame day, and that hereafter if they
								would anything with them, they should return everyone to his home
								and send their ambassadors from thence.

They sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the
								country to the end that no man should confer with him, who, when he
								came to the limits and was to be dismissed, uttered these words, 
 This day is the beginning of much evil
										unto the Grecians, 
 and so departed.

When he returned to the camp, Archidamus, perceiving that they would
								not relent, dislodged and marched on with his army into their
								territory.

The Boeotians with their appointed part and with horsemen aided the
								Peloponnesians, but with the rest of their forces went and wasted
								the territory of Plataea.

Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the isthmus, and
								when they were on their march before they brake into Attica,
								Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others was general of
								the Athenians, when he saw they were about to break in, suspecting
								that Archidamus, either of private courtesy or by command of the
								Lacedaemonians to bring him into jealousy (as they had before for
								his sake commanded the excommunication), might oftentimes leave his
								lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, 
 that though Archidamus had been his guest,
										it was for no ill to the state; 
									 and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his lands and
										houses as well as the rest, that then he gave them to the
										commonwealth, 
 and therefore desired 
 that for this he might not be
										suspected. 
 Also he advised them concerning the
								business in hand the same things he had done before, 
 that they should make preparations for the
										war and receive their goods into the city;

that they should not go out to battle but come into the city
										and guard it; 
									 that they should also furnish out their navy, wherein
										consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their
										confederates, 
 telling them, 
 how that in the money that came from these lay their
										strength, and that the victory in war consisted wholly in
										counsel and store of money.

Farther he bade them be confident, 
 in that
										there was yearly coming into the state from the confederates
										for tribute, besides other revenue, six hundred talents, and
										remaining yet then in the citadel six thousand talents of
										silver coin, 
 (for the greatest sum there had been
								was ten thousand talents wanting three hundred, out of which was
								taken that which had been expended upon the gate-houses of the
								citadel and upon other buildings and for the charges of
								Potidaea)

besides the uncoined gold and silver of
										private and public offerings, and all the dedicated vessels
										belonging to the shows and games, and the spoils of the
										Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to
										no less than five hundred talents.

He added farther that 
 much money might be
										had out of other temples without the city which they might
										use; 
									 and if they were barred the use of all these, they might yet
										use the ornaments of gold about the goddess
								herself 
 ; 
							 and said that 
 the image had about it the
										weight of forty talents of most pure gold and which might
										all be taken off; 
									 but having made use of it for their safety, 
 he said,
									 
 they were to make restitution of the
										like quantity again. 
 Thus he encouraged them
								touching matter of money.

Men of arms, 
 he said, 
 they had thirteen thousand besides the
										sixteen thousand that were employed for the guard of the
										city and upon the walls. 
 For so many at the first
								kept watch at the coming in of the enemy, young and old together and
								strangers that dwelt amongst them as many as could bear arms.

For the length of the Phalerian wall to that part of the
								circumference of the wall of the city where it joined was thirtyfive
								furlongs, and that part of the circumference which was guarded (for
								some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the
								long wall and the Phalerian) was forty-three furlongs. 
							 And the length of the long walls down to Piraeus (of which there was
								a watch only on the outmost) was forty furlongs. 
							 And the whole compass of Piraeus together with Munychia was sixty
								furlongs, whereof that part that was watched was but half.

He said farther, 
 they had of horsemen,
										accounting archers on horseback, twelve hundred; 
									 and sixteen hundred archers;

and of galleys fit for the sea, three hundred. 
 All
								this and no less had the Athenians when the invasion of the
								Peloponnesians was first in hand and when the war began. 
							 These and other words spake Pericles, as he used to do, for
								demonstration that they were likely to outlast this war.

When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words and
								fetched into the city their wives and children and the furniture of
								their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses
								themselves. 
							 Their sheep and oxen they sent over into Euboea and into the islands
								over against them.

Nevertheless this removal, in respect they had most of them been
								accustomed to the country life, grieved them very much.

This custom was from great antiquity more familiar with the Athenians
								than any other of the rest of Greece. 
							 For in the time of Cecrops and the first kings down to Theseus the
								inhabitants of Attica had their several boroughs and therein their
								common halls and their governors, and, unless they were in fear of
								some danger, went not to the king for advice; 
							 but every city administered their own affairs and deliberated by
								themselves.

And some of them had also their particular wars, as the Eleusinians
								who joined with Eumolpus against Erectheus. 
							 But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who besides his wisdom was
								also a man of very great power, he not only set good order in the
								country in other respects but also dissolved the councils and
								magistracies of the rest of the towns; 
							 and assigning them all one hall and one council-house, brought them
								all to cohabit in the city that now is; 
							 and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use this one
								for their city, which (now when they all paid their duties to it)
								grew great and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity.

And from that time to this day, the Athenians keep a holiday at the
								public charge to the goddess and call it Synoecia.

That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of
								the citadel, was before this time the city. 
							 An argument whereof is this: that the temples of the gods are all set
								either in the citadel itself or, if without, yet in that quarter, as
								that of Jupiter Olympius and of Apollo Pythius and of Tellus and of
								Bacchus in Limnae (in honour of whom the old Bacchanals were
								celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Athesterion, according as
								the Ionians who are derived from Athens do still observe them),
								besides other ancient temples situated in the same part.

Moreover, they served themselves with water for the best uses of the
								fountain which, now the Nine-pipes, built so by the tyrants, was
								formerly, when the springs were open, called Callirhoe, and was
								near. 
							 And from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites they
								ordain the use of the same water to this day.

And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the
								Athenians still called the city.

The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by laws of
								their own country towns and, after they were brought into one, were
								nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well of the
								ancient time as since till the Persian war, to live in the country
								with their whole families; 
							 and also especially for that since the Persian war they had already
								repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove.

It pressed them likewise and was heavily taken besides their houses
								to leave the things that pertained to their religion (which, since
								their old form of government, were become patrial) and to change
								their manner of life and to be no better than banished every man his
								city.

After they came into Athens, there was habitation for a few and place
								of retire with some friends or kindred. 
							 But the greatest part seated themselves in the empty places of the
								city and in temples and in all the chapels of the heroes, saving in
								such as were in the citadel and the Eleusinium and other places
								strongly shut up. 
							 The Pelasgicum also under the citadel, though it were a thing
								accursed to dwell in it and forbidden by the end of a verse in a
								Pythian oracle in these words, 
 Best is the
										Pelasgicum empty, 
 was nevertheless for the present
								necessity inhabited.

And in my opinion, this prophecy now fell out contrary to what was
								looked for. 
							 For the unlawful dwelling there caused not the calamities that befell
								the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there, which
								war the oracle, not naming, foretold only that it should one day be
								inhabited unfortunately.

Many also furnished the turrets of the walls and whatsoever other
								place they could any of them get. 
							 For when they were come in, the city had not place for them all; 
							 but afterwards they had the long walls divided amongst them and
								inhabited there and in most parts of Piraeus.

Withal they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying
								their confederates and making ready a hundred galleys to send about
								Peloponnesus.

Thus were the Athenians preparing.

The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward came first to Oenoe,
								a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in, and
								encamping before it, prepared with engines and by other means to
								assault the wall.

For Oenoe, lying on the confines between Attica and Boeotia, was
								walled about; 
							 and the Athenians kept a garrison in it for defence of the country
								when at any time there should be war.

For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it, and also
								spent much time about it otherwise. 

							 And Archidamus for this was not a little taxed as thought to have
								been both slow in gathering together the forces for the war and also
								to have favoured the Athenians in that he encouraged not the army to
								a forwardness in it. 
							 And afterwards likewise his stay in the isthmus and his slowness in
								the whole journey was laid to his charge, but especially his delay
								at Oenoe.

For in this time the Athenians retired into the city: whereas it was
								thought that the Peloponnesians, marching speedily, might but for
								this delay have taken them all without.

So passionate was the army of Archidamus for his stay before
								Oenoe. 
							 But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet
								unhurt, would relent and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause
								(as it is reported) he held his hand.

But after, when they had assaulted Oenoe and tried all means but
								could not take it, and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them,
								then at length arising from thence—about eighty days after that
								which happened to the Thebans that entered Plataea, the summer and
								corn being now at the highest—they fell into Attica, led by
								Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to wasting of the
								country, first about Eleusis and then in the plain of Thriasia, and
								put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at the brooks called
								Rheiti. 
							 After this, leaving the Aegaleon on the right hand, they passed
								through Cecropia till they came unto Acharnas, which is the greatest
								town in all Attica of those that are called Demoi, and pitching
								there, both fortified their camp and stayed a great while wasting
								the country thereabout.

Archidamus was said to have stayed so long at Acharnas with his army
								in battle array and not to have come down all the time of his
								invasion into the champaign with this intention.

He hoped that the Athenians, flourishing in number of young men and
								better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps
								have come forth against him and not endured to see their fields cut
								down and wasted;

and, therefore, seeing they met him not in Thriasia, he thought good
								to try if they would come out against him lying now at Acharnas.

Besides, the place seemed unto him commodious for the army to lie
								in; 
							 and it was thought also that the Acharnans, being a great piece of
								the city (for they were three thousand men of arms), would not have
								suffered the spoiling of their lands, but rather have urged the rest
								to go out and fight. 
							 And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might
								hereafter more boldly both waste the champaign country and come down
								even to the walls of the city. 
							 For the Acharnans, after they should have lost their own, would not
								be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men; 
							 but there would be the thoughts of sedition in one towards another in
								the city.

These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnas.

The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and
								the fields of Thrius and as long as they had any hope it would come
								on no farther, remembering that also Pleistoanax the son of
								Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, when fourteen years before this war
								he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as
								Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again and came no farther (for which
								he was also banished Sparta as thought to have gone back for money),
								they stirred not. 
							 But when they saw the army now at Acharnas but sixty furlongs from
								the city, then they thought it no longer to be endured;

and when their fields were wasted (as it was likely) in their sight,
								which the younger sort had never seen before nor the elder but in
								the Persian war, it was taken for a horrible matter and thought fit
								by all, especially by the youth, to go out and not endure it any
								longer.

And holding councils apart one from another, they were at much
								contention, some to make a sally and some to hinder it. 
							 And the priests of the oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds,
								everyone made the interpretation according to the sway of his own
								affection. 
							 But the Acharnians, conceiving themselves to be no small part of the
								Athenians, were they that, whilst their own lands were wasting, most
								of all urged their going out. 
							 Insomuch as the city was every way in tumult and in choler against
								Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished
								them, but reviled him for that being their general he refused to
								lead them into the field, and imputing unto him the cause of all
								their evil.

But Pericles, seeing them in passion for their present loss and ill
								advised and being confident he was in the right touching not
								sallying, assembled them not nor called any council for fear lest
								being together they might upon passion rather than judgment commit
								some error, but looked to the guarding of the city and as much as he
								could to keep it in quiet.

Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen to keep the scouts of
								the army from entering upon and doing hurt to the fields near the
								city. 
							 And there happened at Phrygii a small skirmish between one troop of
								horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the
								horsemen of the Boeotians. 
							 Wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse till such
								time as the Boeotians were aided by the coming in of their men of
								arms; 
							 and then they were put to flight and a few of the Athenians and
								Thessalians slain, whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off
								the same day without leave of the enemy.

And the Peloponnesians the next day erected a trophy. 
							 This aid of the Thessalians was upon an ancient league with the
								Athenians and consisted of Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Parasians,
								Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, Pheraeans. 
							 The leaders of the Larissaeans were Polymedes and Aristonus, men of
								contrary factions in their city; 
							 of the Pharsalians, Meno; 
							 and of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders.

The Peloponnesians, seeing the Athenians would not come out to fight,
								dislodging from Acharnas wasted certain other villages between the
								hills Parnethus and Brelissus.

Whilst these were in Attica, the Athenians sent the hundred galleys
								which they had provided, and in them one thousand men of arms and
								four hundred archers, about Peloponnesus, the commanders whereof
								were Charcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteus the son of Epicles, and
								Socrates the son of Antigenes, who thus furnished weighed anchor and
								went their way.

The Peloponnesians, when they had stayed in Attica as long as their
								provision lasted, went home through Boeotia, not the way they came
								in, but passing by Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice, which
								is of the tillage of the Oropians, subjects to the people of
								Athens. 
							 And when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded and
								went every man to his own city.

When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both by sea and
								land, such as were to continue to the end of the war, and made a
								decree to take out a thousand talents of the money in the citadel
								and set it by so as it might not be spent, but the charges of the
								war be borne out of other money, and made it capital for any man to
								move or give his vote for the stirring of this money for any other
								use, but only if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade
								the city for necessity of that defence.

Together with this money they likewise set apart one hundred galleys,
								and those to be every year the best and captains to be appointed
								over them, which were to be employed for no other use than the money
								was and for the same danger if need should require.

The Athenians that were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus
								and with them the Corcyraeans with the aid of fifty sail more and
								certain others of the confederates thereabout amongst other places
								which they infested in their course landed at Methone, a town of
								Laconia, and assaulted it as being but weak and few men within.

But it chanced that Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a
								garrison in those parts, and hearing of it, succoured those of the
								town with one hundred men of arms. 
							 Wherewith running through the Athenian army, dispersed in the fields,
								directly towards the town, he put himself into Methone; 
							 and with the loss of few of his men in the passage he saved the
								place, and for this adventure was the first that was praised at
								Sparta in this war.

The Athenians putting off from thence sailed along the coast and put
								in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days in wasting the
								country and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the
								Lower Elis together with other Eleians thereabouts that came forth
								to defend it.

But the wind arising and their galleys being tossed by the weather in
								a harbourless place, the most of them embarked and sailed about the
								promontory called Icthys into the haven of Pheia. 
							 But the Messenians and certain others that could not get aboard went
								by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it.

And when they had done, the galleys that now were come about took
								them in and, leaving Pheia, put forth to sea again. 
							 By which time a great army of Eleians was come to succour it, but the
								Athenians were now gone away and wasting some other territory.

About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about
								Locris, which were to serve also for a watch about Euboea.

Of these Cleopompus the son of Clinias had the conduct and, landing
								his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of the sea
								coast and won the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages, and
								overcame in fight at Alope the Locrians that came out to aid it.

The same summer, the Athenians put the Aeginetae, man, woman, and
								child, out of Aegina, laying to their charge that they were the
								principal cause of the present war. 
							 And it was also thought the safer course to hold Aegina, being
								adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; 
							 and not long after they sent inhabitants into the same.

When the Aeginetae were thus banished, the Lacedaemonians gave them
								Thyrea to dwell in and the occupation of the lands belonging unto it
								to live on, both upon hatred to the Athenians, and for the benefits
								received at the hands of the Aeginetae in the time of the earthquake
								and insurrection of the Helotes. 
							 This territory of Thyrea is in the border between Argolica and
								Laconica, and reacheth to the seaside. 
							 So some of them were placed there, and the rest dispersed into other
								parts of Greece.

Also the same summer, on the first day of the month according to the
								moon (at which time it seems only possible), in the afternoon
								happened an eclipse of the sun. 
							 The which, after it had appeared in the form of a crescent and withal
								some stars had been discerned, came afterwards again to the former
								brightness.

The same summer also, the Athenians made Nymphodorus the son of
								Pythos, of the city of Abdera (whose sister was married to Sitalces
								and that was of great power with him), their host, though before
								they took him for an enemy, and sent for him to Athens, hoping by
								his means to bring Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, into
								their league.

This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the
								kingdom of the Odrysians above the power of the rest of Thrace.

For much of Thrace consisteth of free states. 
							 And Tereus that took to wife out of Athens Procne the daughter of
								Pandion was no kin to this Teres nor of the same part of Thrace. 
							 But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia in the country now called
								Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. 
							 And the fact of the women concerning Itys was done there; 
							 and by the poets, where they mention the nightingale, that bird is
								also called Daulias. 
							 And it is more likely that Pandion matched his daughter to this man,
								for vicinity and mutual succour, than with the other that was so
								many days' journey off as Odrysae. 
							 And Teres (which is also another name) was the first that seized on
								the kingdom of Odrysae.

Now Sitalces, this man's son, the Athenians got into their league
								that they might have the towns lying on Thrace and Perdiccas to be
								of their party.

Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them
								and Sitalces and caused Sadocus the son of Sitalces to be made free
								of Athens and also undertook to end the war in Thrace. 
							 For he would persuade Sitalces to send unto the Athenians a Thracian
								army of horsemen and targeteers.

He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured of
								him the restitution of Therme. 
							 And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war
								against the Chalcideans.

Thus were Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas
								the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, made confederates with the
								Athenians.

The Athenians, being yet with their hundred galleys about
								Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians,
								and put the Palaerenses only, of all the Acarnanians, into the
								possession both of the town and territory. 
							 Having also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Euarchus, they
								drave him thence and joined the place to their league.

From thence they sailed to Cephalonia and subdued it without battle
								(this Cephalonia is an island lying over against Acarnania and
								Leucas and hath in it these four cities, the Pallenses, Cranii,
								Samaei, and Pronaei) and not long after returned with their fleet to
								Athens.

About the end of the autumn of this summer the Athenians, both
								themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, with the whole
								power of the city, under the conduct of Pericles the son Xantippus,
								invaded the territory of Megara. 
							 And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys
								about Peloponnesus, in their return, being now at Aegina, hearing
								that the whole power of the city was gone into Megaris, went and
								joined them.

And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together
								in one place before, the city being now in her strength and the
								plague not yet amongst them. 
							 For the Athenians themselves were no less than ten thousand men of
								arms, besides the three thousand at Potidaea; 
							 and the strangers that dwelt amongst them and accompanied them in
								this invasion were no fewer than three thousand men of arms more,
								besides other great numbers of lightarmed soldiers.

And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went
								back to Athens. 
							 And afterwards, year after year during this war the Athenians often
								invaded Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen and sometimes with
								their whole army, until such time as they had won Nisaea.

Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalante, an island
								lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then, for a garrison
								against thieves, which passing over from Opus and other parts of
								Locris might annoy Euboea. 
							 These were the things done this summer after the retreat of the
								Peloponnesians out of Attica.

The winter following, Euarchus of Acarnania, desirous to return to
								Astacus, prevaileth with the Corinthians to go thither with forty
								galleys and fifteen hundred men of arms to re-establish him, to
								which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same
								purpose. 
							 The commanders of this army were Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus,
								Timoxenes the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of
								Chrysis.

When they had re-established him, they endeavoured to draw to their
								party some other places on the seacoast of Acarnania; 
							 but missing their purpose, they set sail homeward.

As they passed by the coast of Cephalonia, they disbarked in the
								territory of the Cranii where, under colour of composition, they
								were deceived and lost some part of their forces. 
							 For the assault made upon them by the Cranii being unexpected, they
								got off with much ado and went home.

The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom,
								solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war in this
								manner.

Having set up a tent, they put into it the bones of the dead three
								days before the funeral; 
							 and everyone bringeth whatsoever he thinks good to his own.

When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress
								coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which
								are the bones of the men of every tribe by themselves. 
							 There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over for such as
								appear not nor were found amongst the rest when they were taken
								up.

The funeral is accompanied by any that will, whether citizen or
								stranger; 
							 and the women of their kindred are also by at the burial lamenting
								and mourning.

Then they put them into a public monument which standeth in the
								fairest suburbs of the city, in which place they have ever interred
								all that died in the wars except those that were slain in the field
								of Marathon, who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary,
								were therefore buried thereright.

And when the earth is thrown over them, someone thought to exceed the
								rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, maketh an oration
								wherein he giveth them such praises as are fit; 
							 which done, the company depart. 
							 And this is the form of that burial;

and for the whole time of the war, whensoever there was occasion,
								they observed the same.

For these first the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles the
								son of Xantippus, who, when the time served, going out of the place
								of burial into a high pulpit to be heard the farther off by the
								multitude about him, spake unto them in this manner:

"Though most that have spoken formerly in this place have commended
								the man that added this oration to the law as honourable for those
								that die in the wars, yet to me it seemeth sufficient that they who
								have showed their valour by action should also by an action have
								their honour, as now you see they have, in this their sepulture
								performed by the state, and not to have the virtue of many hazarded
								on one to be believed as that one shall make a good or bad
								oration.

For to speak of men in a just measure, is a hard matter; 
							 and though one do so, yet he shall hardly get the truth firmly
								believed. 
							 The favourable hearer and he that knows what was done will perhaps
								think what is spoken short of what he would have it and what it
								was; 
							 and he that is ignorant will find somewhat on the other side which he
								will think too much extolled, especially if he hear aught above the
								pitch of his own nature. 
							 For to hear another man praised finds patience so long only as each
								man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he
								hears. 
							 And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy
								thinks it false.

But since our ancestors have so thought good, I also, following the
								same ordinance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and
								opinions of everyone of you as far forth as I can.

"I will begin at our ancestors; 
							 being a thing both just and honest that to them first be given the
								honour of remembrance in this kind. 
							 For they, having been always the inhabitants of this region, by their
								valour have delivered the same to succession of posterity hitherto
								in the state of liberty.

For which they deserve commendation, but our fathers deserve yet
								more; 
							 for that besides what descended on them, not without great labour of
								their own they have purchased this our present dominion and
								delivered the same over to us that now are.

Which in a great part also we ourselves that are yet in the strength
								of our age here present have enlarged and so furnished the city with
								everything, both for peace and war, as it is now all-sufficient in
								itself.

The actions of war whereby all this was attained and the deeds of
								arms both of ourselves and our fathers in valiant opposition to the
								barbarians or Grecians in their wars against us, amongst you that
								are well acquainted with the sum, to avoid prolixity I will pass
								over. 
							 But by what institutions we arrived at this, by what form of
								government and by what means we have advanced the state to this
								greatness, when I shall have laid open this, I shall then descend to
								these men's praises. 
							 For I think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand and
								profitable to the whole company, both of citizens and strangers, to
								hear related.

"We have a form of government not fetched by imitation from the laws
								of our neighboring states (nay, we are rather a pattern to others,
								than they to us) which, because in the administration it hath
								respect not to a few but to the multitude, is called a
								democracy. 
							 Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law
								for their private controversies, yet in conferring of dignities one
								man is preferred before another to public charge, and that according
								to the reputation not of his house but of his virtue, and is not put
								back through poverty for the obscurity of his person as long as he
								can do good service to the commonwealth.

And we live not only free in the administration of the state but also
								one with another void of jealousy touching each other's daily course
								of life, not offended at any man for following his own humour, nor
								casting on any man censorious looks, which though they be no
								punishment, yet they grieve.

So that conversing one with another for the private without offence,
								we stand chiefly in fear to transgress against the public and are
								obedient always to those that govern and to the laws, and
								principally to such laws as are written for protection against
								injury, and such unwritten as bring undeniable shame to the
								transgressors.

"We have also found out many ways to give our minds recreation from
								labour by public institution of games and sacrifices for all the
								days of the year with a decent pomp and furniture of the same by
								private men, by the daily delight whereof we expel sadness.

We have this farther by the greatness of our city that all things
								from all parts of the earth are imported hither, whereby we no less
								familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations than our own.

"Then in the studies of war we excel our enemies in this. 
							 We leave our city open to all men; 
							 nor was it ever seen that by banishing of strangers we denied them
								the learning or sight of any of those things which, if not hidden,
								an enemy might reap advantage by, not relying on secret preparation
								and deceit but upon our own courage in the action. 
							 They, in their discipline, hunt after valour presently from their
								youth with laborious exercise, and yet we that live remissly
								undertake as great dangers as they. 
							 For example, the Lacedaemonians invade not our dominion by themselves
								alone but with the aid of all the rest.

But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground
								against such as in their own ground fight in defence of their own
								substance, yet for the most part we get the victory.

Never enemy yet fell into the hands of our whole forces at once both
								because we apply ourselves much to navigation and by land also send
								many of our men into divers countries abroad. 
							 But when, fighting with a part of it, they chance to get the better,
								they boast they have beaten the whole; 
							 and when they get the worse, they say they are beaten by the
								whole.

And yet when, from ease rather than studious labour and upon natural
								rather than doctrinal valour, we come to undertake any danger, we
								have this odds by it that we shall not faint beforehand with the
								meditation of future trouble, and in the action we shall appear no
								less confident than they that are ever toiling, procuring admiration
								to our city as well in this as in divers other things.

For we also give ourselves to bravery, and yet with thrift; 
							 and to philosophy, and yet without mollification of the mind. 
							 And we use riches rather for opportunities of action than for verbal
								ostentation, and hold it not a shame to confess poverty but not to
								have avoided it.

Moreover there is in the same men a care both of their own and the
								public affairs and a sufficient knowledge of state matters even in
								those that labour with their hands. 
							 For we only think one that is utterly ignorant therein to be a man
								not that meddles with nothing but that is good for nothing. 
							 We likewise weigh what we undertake and apprehend it perfectly in our
								minds, not accounting words for a hindrance of action but that it is
								rather a hindrance to action to come to it without instruction of
								words before.

For also in this we excel others, daring to undertake as much as any
								and yet examining what we undertake; 
							 whereas with other men ignorance makes them dare, and consideration
								dastards. 
							 And they are most rightly reputed valiant who, though they perfectly
								apprehend both what is dangerous and what is easy, are never the
								more thereby diverted from adventuring. 
							 Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of bounty.

For we purchase our friends not by receiving but by bestowing
								benefits. 
							 And he that bestoweth a good turn is ever the most constant friend
								because he will not lose the thanks due unto him from him whom he
								bestowed it on. 
							 Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit is dull and flat,
								as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour but for a
								debt.

So that we only do good to others not upon computation of profit but
								freeness of trust.

"In sum it may be said both that the city is in general a school of
								the Grecians, and that the men here have everyone in particular his
								person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with grace
								and decency.

And that this is not now rather a bravery of words upon the occasion
								than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions
								we have obtained, maketh evident.

For it is the only power now found greater in proof than fame, and
								the only power, that neither grieveth the invader when he miscarries
								with the quality of those he was hurt by, nor giveth cause to the
								subjected states to murmur as being in subjection to men
								unworthy.

For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration for a
								power not without testimony but made evident by great arguments, and
								which needeth not either a Homer to praise it or any other such
								whose poems may indeed for the present bring delight, but the truth
								will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of the actions. 
							 For we have opened unto us by our courage all seas and lands and set
								up eternal monuments on all sides both of the evil we have done to
								our enemies and the good we have done to our friends.

"Such is the city for which these men, thinking it no reason to lose
								it, valiantly fighting have died. 
							 And it is fit that every man of you that be left should be like
								minded to undergo any travail for the same.

"And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city in general
								as well to show you that the stakes between us and them, whose city
								is not such, are not equal as also to make known by effects the
								worth of these men I am to speak of, the greatest part of their
								praises being therein already delivered.

For what I have spoken of the city hath by these, and such as these,
								been achieved. 
							 Neither would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent in
								many other of the Grecians as they do in these, the present
								revolution of these men's lives seeming unto me an argument of their
								virtues, noted in the first act thereof and in the last
								confirmed.

For even such of them as were worse than the rest do nevertheless
								deserve that for their valour shown in the wars for defence of their
								country they should be preferred before the rest. 
							 For having by their good actions abolished the memory of their evil,
								they have profited the state thereby more than they have hurt it by
								their private behaviour.

Yet there was none of these that preferring the further fruition of
								his wealth was thereby grown cowardly, or that for hope to overcome
								his poverty at length and to attain to riches did for that cause
								withdraw himself from the danger. 
							 For their principal desire was not wealth but revenge on their
								enemies, which esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they
								made account through it both to accomplish their revenge and to
								purchase wealth withal; 
							 putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their hope, but
								for that which was before their eyes relying upon themselves in the
								action, and therein choosing rather to fight and die than to
								shrink-and be saved, they fled from shame, but with their bodies
								they stood out the battle; 
							 and so in a moment whilst fortune inclineth neither way, left their
								lives not in fear but in opinion of victory.

"Such were these men, worthy of their country. 
							 And for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune, but you
								ought not to be less venturously minded against the enemy, not
								weighing the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying may
								recount to you that know as well as he the many commodities that
								arise by fighting valiantly against your enemies, but contemplating
								the power of the city in the actions of the same from day to day
								performed and thereby becoming enamoured of it. 
							 And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider
								then that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that
								knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when
								they were in fight, and by such men as, though they failed of their
								attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue but
								made unto it a most honourable contribution.

For having everyone given his body to the commonwealth, they receive
								in place thereof an undecaying commendation and a most remarkable
								sepulchre not wherein they are buried so much as wherein their glory
								is laid up upon all occasions both of speech and action to be
								remembered forever.

For to famous men all the earth is a sepulchre; 
							 and their virtues shall be testified not only by the inscription in
								stone at home but by an unwritten record of the mind, which more
								than of any monument will remain with everyone forever.

In imitation therefore of these men and placing happiness in liberty
								and liberty in valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of
								war.

For the miserable and desperate men are not they that have the most
								reason to be prodigal of their lives, but rather such men as, if
								they live, may expect a change of fortune and whose losses are
								greatest if they miscarry in aught.

For to a man of any spirit death, which is without sense, arriving
								whilst he is in vigour and common hope, is nothing so bitter as
								after a tender life to be brought into misery.

"Wherefore I will not so much bewail as comfort you, the parents,
								that are present, of these men. 
							 For you know that whilst they lived, they were obnoxious to manifold
								calamities. 
							 Whereas whilst you are in grief, they only are happy that die
								honourably as these have done, and to whom it hath been granted not
								only to live in prosperity but to die in it.

Though it be a hard matter to dissuade you from sorrow for the loss
								of that which the happiness of others, wherein you also when time
								was rejoiced yourselves, shall so often bring into your remembrance
								(for sorrow is not for the want of a good never tasted but for the
								privation of a good we have been used to);

yet such of you as are of the age to have children may bear the loss
								of these in the hope of more. 
							 For the later children will both draw on with some the oblivion of
								those that are slain and also doubly conduce to the good of the city
								by population and strength. 
							 For it is not likely that they should equally give good counsel to
								the state that have not children to be equally exposed to danger in
								it.

As for you that are past having of children, you are to put the
								former and greater part of your life to the account of your
								gain; 
							 and supposing the remainder of it will be but short, you shall have
								the glory of these for a consolation of the same. 
							 For the love of honour never growth old, nor doth that unprofitable
								part of our life take delight (as some have said) in gathering of
								wealth so much as it doth in being honoured.

"As for you that are the children or brethren of these men, I see you
								shall have a difficult task of emulation. 
							 For every man useth to praise the dead, so that with odds of virtue
								you will hardly get an equal reputation but still be thought a
								little short. 
							 For men envy their competitors in glory while they live, but to stand
								out of their way is a thing honoured with an affection free from
								opposition.

And since I must say somewhat also of feminine virtue for you that
								are now widows, I shall express it in this short admonition. 
							 It will be much for your honour not to recede from your sex and to
								give as little occasion of rumour amongst the men, whether of good
								or evil, as you can.

Thus also have I, according to the prescript
										of the law, delivered in word what was expedient; 
									 and those that are here interred have in fact been already
										honoured; 
									 and further, their children shall be maintained till they be
										at man's estate at the charge of the city, which hath
										therein propounded both to these and them that live a
										profitable garland in their matches of valour. 
									 For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the
										worthiest men.

So now having lamented everyone his own, you may be
									gone.

Such was the funeral made this winter, which ending, ended the first
								year of this war.

In the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their
								confederates, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded
								Attica under the conduct of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamas, king
								of Lacedaemon, and after they had encamped themselves, wasted the
								country about them.

They had not been many days in Attica when the plague first began
								amongst the Athenians, said also to have seized formerly on divers
								other parts, as about Lemnos and elsewhere; 
							 but so great a plague and mortality of men was never remembered to
								have happened in any place before.

For at first neither were the physicians able to cure it through
								ignorance of what it was but died fastest themselves, as being the
								men that most approached the sick, nor any other art of man availed
								whatsoever. 
							 All supplications to the gods and enquiries of oracles and whatsoever
								other means they used of that kind proved all unprofitable; 
							 insomuch as subdued with the greatness of the evil, they gave them
								all over.

It began, by report, first in that part of Ethiopia that lieth upon
								Egypt, and thence fell down into Egypt and Africa and into the
								greatest part of the territories of the king.

It invaded Athens on a sudden and touched first upon those that dwelt
								in Piraeus, insomuch as they reported that the Peloponnesians had
								cast poison into their wells (for springs there were not any in that
								place). 
							 But afterwards it came up into the high city, and then they died a
								great deal faster.

Now let every man, physician or other, concerning the ground of this
								sickness, whence it sprung, and what causes he thinks able to
								produce so great an alteration, speak according to his own
								knowledge. 
							 For my own part, I will deliver but the manner of it and lay open
								only such things as one may take his mark by to discover the same if
								it come again, having been both sick of it myself and seen others
								sick of the same.

This year, by confession of all men, was of all other, for other
								diseases, most free and healthful. 
							 If any man were sick before, his disease turned to this;

if not, yet suddenly, without any apparent cause preceding and being
								in perfect health, they were taken first with an extreme ache in
								their heads, redness and inflammation of the eyes; 
							 and then inwardly, their throats and tongues grew presently bloody
								and their breath noisome and unsavoury.

Upon this followed a sneezing and hoarseness, and not long after the
								pain, together with a mighty cough, came down into the breast. 
							 And when once it was settled in the stomach, it caused vomit; 
							 and with great torment came up all manner of bilious purgation that
								physicians ever named.

Most of them had also the hickyexe which brought with it a strong
								convulsion, and in some ceased quickly but in others was long before
								it gave over.

Their bodies outwardly to the touch were neither very hot nor pale
								but reddish, livid, and beflowered with little pimples and whelks,
								but so burned inwardly as not to endure any the lightest clothes or
								linen garment to be upon them nor anything but mere nakedness, but
								rather most willingly to have cast themselves into the cold
								water. 
							 And many of them that were not looked to, possessed with insatiate
								thirst, ran unto the wells, and to drink much or little was
								indifferent, being still from ease and power to sleep as far as
								ever.

As long as the disease was at its height, their bodies wasted not but
								resisted the torment beyond all expectation; 
							 insomuch as the most of them either died of their inward burning in
								nine or seven days whilst they had yet strength, or, if they escaped
								that, then the disease falling down into their bellies and causing
								there great exulcerations and immoderate looseness, they died many
								of them afterwards through weakness. 
							 For the disease, which took first the head, began above and came down
								and passed through the whole body;

and he that overcame the worst of it was yet marked with the loss of
								his extreme parts;

for breaking out both at their privy members and at their fingers and
								toes, many with the loss of these escaped; 
							 there were also some that lost their eyes. 
							 And many that presently upon their recovery were taken with such an
								oblivion of all things whatsoever, as they neither knew themselves
								nor their acquaintance.

For this was a kind of sickness which far surmounted all expression
								of words and both exceeded human nature in the cruelty wherewith it
								handled each one and appeared also otherwise to be none of those
								diseases that are bred amongst us, and that especially by this. 
							 For all, both birds and beasts, that use to feed on human flesh,
								though many men lay abroad unburied, either came not at them or
								tasting perished.

An argument whereof as touching the birds is the manifest defect of
								such fowl, which were not then seen, neither about the carcases or
								anywhere else. 
							 But by the dogs, because they are familiar with men, this effect was
								seen much clearer.

So that this disease (to pass over many strange particulars of the
								accidents that some had differently from others) was in general such
								as I have shown, and for other usual sicknesses at that time no man
								was troubled with any. 
							 Now they died some for want of attendance and some again with all the
								care and physic that could be used.

Nor was there any to say certain medicine that applied must have
								helped them; 
							 for if it did good to one, it did harm to another.

Nor any difference of body, for strength or weakness, that was able
								to resist it; 
							 but it carried all away, what physic soever was administered.

But the greatest misery of all was the dejection of mind in such as
								found themselves beginning to be sick (for they grew presently
								desperate and gave themselves over without making any resistance),
								as also their dying thus like sheep, infected by mutual visitation,
								for the greatest mortality proceeded that way. 
							 For if men forebore to visit them for fear, then they died
								forlorn;

whereby many families became empty for want of such as should take
								care of them. 
							 If they forbore not, then they died themselves, and principally the
								honestest men. 
							 For out of shame they would not spare themselves but went in unto
								their friends, especially after it was come to this pass that even
								their domestics, wearied with the lamentations of them that died and
								overcome with the greatness of the calamity, were no longer moved
								therewith.

But those that were recovered had much compassion both on them that
								died and on them that lay sick, as having both known the misery
								themselves and now no more subject to the danger. 
							 For this disease never took any man the second time so as to be
								mortal. 
							 And these men were both by others counted happy, and they also
								themselves, through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light
								hope never to die of any other sickness hereafter.

Besides the present affliction, the reception of the country people
								and of their substance into the city oppressed both them and much
								more the people themselves that so came in.

For having no houses but dwelling at that time of the year in
								stifling booths, the mortality was now without all form; 
							 and dying men lay tumbling one upon another in the streets, and men
								halfdead about every conduit through desire of water. 
							 The temples also where they dwelt in tents were all full of the dead
								that died within them.

For oppressed with the violence of the calamity and not knowing what
								to do, men grew careless both of holy and profane things alike.

And the laws which they formerly used touching funerals were all now
								broken, every one burying where he could find room. 
							 And many for want of things necessary, after so many deaths before,
								were forced to become impudent in the funerals of their friends. 
							 For when one had made a funeral pile, another getting before him
								would throw on his dead and give it fire. 
							 And when one was in burning, another would come and, having cast
								thereon him whom he carried, go his way again.

And the great licentiousness, which also in other kinds was used in
								the city, began at first from this disease. 
							 For that which a man before would dissemble and not acknowledge to be
								done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely, seeing before his
								eyes such quick revolution, of the rich dying and men worth nothing
								inheriting their estates.

Insomuch as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods even for
								their pleasure, as men that thought they held their lives but by the
								day.

As for pains, no man was forward in any action of honour to take any
								because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not
								before they achieved it. 
							 But what any man knew to be delightful and to be profitable to
								pleasure, that was made both profitable and honourable.

Neither the fear of the gods nor laws of men awed any man, not the
								former because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship
								from seeing that alike they all perished, nor the latter because no
								man expected that lives would last till he received punishment of
								his crimes by judgment. 
							 But they thought there was now over their heads some far greater
								judgment decreed against them before which fell, they thought to
								enjoy some little part of their lives.

Such was the misery into which the Athenians being fallen were much
								oppressed, having not only their men killed by the disease within
								but the enemy also laying waste their fields and villages
								without.

In this sickness also (as it was not unlikely they would) they called
								to mind this verse said also of the elder sort to have been uttered
								of old:

A Doric war shall fall, 
								 
 
 And a great plague withal. 
 
 
							 Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it was not loimos [plague], that was by the ancients
								mentioned in that verse, but limos 
								[famine]. 
							 But upon the present occasion the word loimos 
								deservedly obtained. 
							 For as men suffered, so they made the verse to say. 
							 And I think if after this there shall ever come another Doric war and
								with it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly.

There was also reported by such as knew a certain answer given by the
								oracle to the Lacedaemonians when they inquired whether they should
								make this war or not:

that if they warred with all their power, they 
								 should have the victory, and that the God himself
									would take 
								 their parts. And thereupon they thought the
								present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy. 
							 The Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica but the sickness
								presently began, and never came into Peloponnesus, to speak of, but
								reigned principally in Athens and in such other places afterwards as
								were most populous. 
							 And thus much of this disease.

After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champaign country, they fell
								upon the territory called Paralos as far as to the mountain Laurius
								where the Athenians had silver mines, and first wasted that part of
								it which looketh towards Peloponnesus and then that also which lieth
								toward Andros and Euboea.

And Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind
								he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not to go
								out against them to battle.

Whilst they were yet in the plain and before they entered into the
								maritime country, he furnished a hundred galleys to go about
								Peloponnesus and, as soon as they were ready, put to sea.

In these galleys he had four thousand men of arms, and in vessels
								then purposely first made to carry horses, three hundred
								horsemen.

The Chians and Lesbians joined likewise with him with fifty
								galleys. 
							 This fleet of the Athenians, when it set forth, left the
								Peloponnesians still in Paralia;

and coming before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, they wasted much
								of the country thereabout and assaulting the city had a hope to take
								it, though it succeeded not.

Leaving Epidaurus, they wasted the territories about of Troezene,
								Halias, and Hermione, places all on the seacoast of
								Peloponnesus.

Putting off from hence, they came to Prasiae, a small maritime city
								of Laconia, and both wasted the territory about it and took and
								razed the town itself. 
							 And having done this, came home and found the Peloponnesians not now
								in Attica but gone back.

All the while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the
								Athenians and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the sickness,
								both in the army and city, destroyed many, insomuch as it was said
								that the Peloponnesians, fearing the sickness (which they knew to be
								in the city both by fugitives and by seeing the Athenians burying
								their dead), went the sooner away out of the country.

And yet they stayed there longer in this invasion than they had done
								anytime before and wasted even the whole territory, for they
								continued in Attica almost forty days.

The same summer Agnon the son of Nicias and Cleopompus the son of
								Clinias, who were joint commanders with Pericles with that army
								which he had employed before, went presently and made war upon the
								Chalcideans of Thrace and against Potidaea which was yet
								besieged.

Arriving, they presently applied engines and tried all means possible
								to take it, but neither the taking of the city nor anything else
								succeeded worthy so great preparation. 
							 For the sickness coming amongst them afflicted them mightily indeed
								and even devoured the army. 
							 And the Athenian soldiers which were there before and in health
								catched the sickness from those that came with Agnon. 
							 As for Phormio and his sixteen hundred, they were not now amongst the
								Chalcideans.

And Agnon therefore came back with his fleet, having of four thousand
								men in less than forty days lost one thousand and fifty of the
								plague. 
							 But the soldiers that were there before stayed upon the place and
								continued the siege of Potidaea.

After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians the Athenians, having
								their fields now the second time wasted and both the sickness and
								war falling upon them at once, changed their minds and accused
								Pericles, as if by his means they had been brought into these
								calamities, and desired earnestly to compound with the
								Lacedaemonians, to whom also they sent certain ambassadors, but they
								returned without effect.

And being then at their wits' end, they kept a stir at Pericles.

And he, seeing them vexed with their present calamity and doing all
								those things which he had before expected, called an assembly (for
								he was yet general) with intention to put them again into heart and,
								assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a more calm and
								less dismayed temper. 
							 And standing forth, he spake unto them in this manner:

"Your anger towards me cometh not unlooked for, for the cause of it I
								know. 
							 And I have called this assembly, therefore, to remember you and
								reprehend you for those things wherein you have either been angry
								with me or given way to your adversity without reason.

For I am of this opinion, that the public prosperity of the city is
								better for private men than if the private men themselves were in
								prosperity and the public wealth in decay.

For a private man, though in good estate, if his country come to
								ruin, must of necessity be ruined with it; 
							 whereas he that miscarrieth in a flourishing commonwealth shall much
								more easily be preserved.

Since then the commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private
								men, and everyone cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth,
								why should not everyone strive to defend it and not, as you now,
								astonished with domestic misfortune, forsake the common safety and
								fall a-censuring both me that counselled the war and yourselves that
								decreed the same as well as I?

And it is I you are angry withal, one, as I think myself, inferior to
								none either in knowing what is requisite or in expressing what I
								know, and a lover of my country and superior to money.

For he that hath good thoughts and cannot clearly express them were
								as good to have thought nothing at all. 
							 He that can do both and is ill affected to his country will likewise
								not give it faithful counsel. 
							 And he that will do that too yet if he be superable by money will for
								that alone set all the rest to sale.

Now if you followed my advice in making this war, as esteeming these
								virtues to be in me somewhat above the rest, there is sure no reason
								that I should now be accused of doing you wrong.

"For though to such as have it in their own election (being otherwise
								in good estate), it were madness to make choice of war; 
							 yet when we must of necessity either give way, and so without more
								ado be subject to our neighbours, or else save ourselves from it by
								danger, he is more to be condemned that declineth the danger than he
								that standeth to it.

For mine own part I am the man I was and of the mind I was; 
							 but you are changed, won to the war when you were entire but
								repenting it upon the damage and condemning my counsel in the
								weakness of your own judgment. 
							 The reason of this is because you feel already everyone in particular
								that which afflicts you, but the evidence of the profit to accrue to
								the city in general you see not yet.

And your minds, dejected with the great and sudden alteration, cannot
								constantly maintain what you have before resolved. 
							 For that which is sudden and unexpected and contrary to what one hath
								deliberated enslaveth the spirit, which by this disease principally,
								in the neck of the other incommodities, is now come to pass in
								you.

But you that are born in a great city and with education suitable,
								how great soever the affliction be, ought not to shrink at it and
								eclipse your reputation (for men do no less condemn those that
								through cowardice lose the glory they have than hate those that
								through impudence arrogate the glory they have not) but to set aside
								the grief of your private losses and lay your hands to the common
								safety.

"As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be long and we in
								the end never the nearer to victory, though that may suffice which I
								have demonstrated at other times touching your causeless suspicion
								that way, yet this I will tell you, moreover, touching the greatness
								of your means for dominion, which neither you yourselves seem ever
								to have thought on nor I touched in my former orations, nor would I
								also have spoken it now but that I see your minds dejected more than
								there is cause for.

That though you take your dominion to extend only to your
								confederates, I affirm that of the two parts of the world of
								manifest use, the land and the sea, you are of one of them entire
								masters, both of as much of it as you make use of and also of as
								much more as you shall think fit yourselves. 
							 Neither is there any king or nation whatsoever of those that now are
								that can impeach your navigation with the fleet and strength you now
								go.

So that you must not put the use of houses and lands wherein now you
								think yourselves deprived of a mighty matter into the balance with
								such a power as this nor take the loss of these things heavily in
								respect of it, but rather set little by them as but a light ornament
								and embellishment of wealth, and think that our liberty as long as
								we hold fast that will easily recover unto us these things
								again; 
							 whereas subjected once to others, even that which we possess besides
								will be diminished. 
							 Show not yourselves both ways inferior to your ancestors, who not
								only held this (gotten by their own labours not left them) but have
								also preserved and delivered the same unto us (for it is more
								dishonour to lose what one possesseth than to miscarry in the
								acquisition of it), and encounter the enemy not only with
								magnanimity but also with disdain.

For a coward may have a high mind upon a prosperous ignorance; 
							 but he that is confident upon judgment to be superior to his enemy
								doth also disdain him, which is now our case.

And courage in equal fortune is the safer for our disdain of the
								enemy where a man knows what he doth; 
							 for he trusteth less to hope, which is of force only in
								uncertainties, and more to judgment upon certainties, wherein there
								is a more sure foresight.

"You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the city hath gotten
								for her dominion in which you all triumph, and either not decline
								the pains or not also pursue the honour. 
							 And you must not think the question is now of your liberty and
								servitude only. 
							 Besides the loss of your rule over others, you must stand the danger
								you have contracted by offence given in the administration of
								it.

Nor can you now give it over (if any fearing at this present that
								that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention of not
								to meddle hereafter), for already your government is in the nature
								of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up and unsafe to
								lay down.

And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it or lived
								in a free city by themselves, would quickly overthrow it. 
							 For the quiet life can never be preserved if it be not ranged with
								the active life, nor is it a life conducible to a city that reigneth
								but to a subject city that it may safely serve.

Be not therefore seduced by this sort of men
									nor angry with me, together with whom yourselves did decree this
									war, because the enemy invading you hath done what was likely he
									would if you obeyed him not. 
								 And as for the sickness, the only thing that exceeded the
									imagination of all men, it was unlooked for; 
								 and I know you hate me somewhat the more for that, but unjustly,
									unless when anything falleth out above your expectation
									fortunate, you will also dedicate unto me that.

Evils that come from heaven you must bear necessarily, and such
									as proceed from your enemies, valiantly; 
								 for so it hath been the custom of this city to do heretofore,
									which custom let it not be your part to reverse.

Knowing that this city hath a great name amongst all people for
									not yielding to adversity and for the mighty power it yet hath
									after the expense of so many lives and so much labour in the
									war, the memory whereof, though we should now at length miscarry
									(for all things are made with this law, to decay again), will
									remain with posterity forever. 
								 How that being Grecians, most of the Grecians were our
									subjects; 
								 that we have abided the greatest wars against them, both
									universally and singly, and have inhabited the greatest and
									wealthiest city.

Now this he with the quiet life will condemn, the active man will
									emulate, and they that have not attained to the like will
									envy.

But to be hated and to displease is a thing that happeneth for
									the time to whosoever he be that hath the command of others; 
								 and he does well, that undergoeth hatred for matters of great
									consequence. 
								 For the hatred lasteth not and is recompensed both with a present
									splendour and an immortal glory hereafter.

Seeing then you foresee both what is honourable for the
										future and not dishonourable for the present procure both
										the one and the other by your courage now. 
									 Send no more heralds to the Lacedaemonians, nor let them know
										the evil present does anyway afflict you; 
									 for they whose minds least feel and whose actions most oppose
										a calamity both among states and private persons are the
										best.

In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the
								Athenians towards himself and withal to withdraw their thoughts from
								the present affliction.

But they, though for the state in general they were won and sent to
								the Lacedaemonians no more but rather inclined to the war, yet they
								were everyone in particular grieved for their several losses: the
								poor because entering the war with little, they lost that
								little; 
							 and the rich because they had lost fair possessions, together with
								goodly houses and costly furniture in them, in the country; 
							 but the greatest matter of all was that they had war instead of
								peace.

And altogether, they deposed not their anger till they had first
								fined him in a sum of money.

Nevertheless, not long after (as is the fashion of the multitude)
								they made him general again and committed the whole state to his
								administration. 
							 For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled, and for the
								need of the commonwealth they prized him more than any other
								whatsoever.

For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace, he
								governed the same with moderation and was a faithful watchman of
								it; 
							 and in his time it was at the greatest.

And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he therein also
								foresaw what it could do. 
							 He lived after the war began two years and six months.

And his foresight in the war was best known after his death. 
							 For he told them that if they would be quiet and look to their navy,
								and during this war seek no further dominion nor hazard the city
								itself, they should then have the upper hand. 
							 But they did contrary in all, and in such other things besides as
								seemed not to concern the war managed the state, according to their
								private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves
								and their confederates. 
							 What succeeded well the honour and profit of it came most to private
								men, and what miscarried was to the city's detriment in the war.

The reason whereof was this: that being a man of great power both for
								his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most
								incorrupt, he freely controlled the multitude and was not so much
								led by them as he led them. 
							 Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour
								them in his speeches but out of his authority durst anger them with
								contradiction.

Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he
								would with his orations put them into a fear; 
							 and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise
								erect their spirits and embolden them.

It was in name a state democratical, but in fact a government of the
								principal man. 
							 But they that came after, being more equal amongst themselves and
								affecting everyone to be the chief, applied themselves to the people
								and let go the care of the commonwealth.

From whence amongst many other errors, as was likely in a great and
								dominant city, proceeded also the voyage into Sicily, which was not
								so much upon mistaking those whom they went against as for want of
								knowledge in the senders of what was necessary for those that went
								the voyage. 
							 For through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway
								with the people they both abated the vigour of the army and then
								also first troubled the state at home with division.

Being overthrown in Sicily and having lost, besides other ammunition,
								the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in
								sedition, yet they held out three years both against their first
								enemies and the Sicilians with them and against most of their
								revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus the
								king's son, who took part with and sent money to the Peloponnesians
								to maintain their fleet and never shrunk till they had overthrown
								themselves with private dissensions.

So much was in Pericles above other men at that time that he could
								foresee by what means the city might easily have outlasted the
								Peloponnesians in this war.

The Lacedaemonians and their confederates made war the same summer
								with one hundred galleys against Zacynthus, an island lying over
								against Elis. 
							 The inhabitants whereof were a colony of Achaeans of Peloponnesus but
								confederates of the people of Athens.

There went in this fleet a thousand men of arms and Cnemus a Spartan
								for admiral, who, landing, wasted the greatest part of the
								territory. 
							 But they of the island not yielding, they put off again and went
								home.

In the end of the same summer, Aristeus of Corinth and Aneristus,
								Nicolaus, Stratodemus, and Timagorus of Tegea, ambassadors of the
								Lacedaemonians, and Pollis of Argos, a private man, as they were
								travelling into Asia to the king to get money of him and to draw him
								into their league, took Thrace in their way and came unto Sitalces
								the son of Teres with a desire to get him also, if they could, to
								forsake the league with Athens and to send his forces to Potidaea,
								which the Athenian army now besieged, and not to aid the Athenians
								any longer, and withal to get leave to pass through his country to
								the other side of the Hellespont to go, as they intended, to
								Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, who would convoy them to the
								king.

But the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus the son of Callimachus and
								Ameiniades the son of Philemon, then resident with Sitalces,
								persuaded Sadocus the son of Sitalces, who was now a citizen of
								Athens, to put them into their hands that they might not go to the
								king and do hurt to the city whereof he himself was now a
								member.

Whereunto condescending, as they journeyed through Thrace to take
								ship to cross the Hellespont, he apprehended them before they got to
								the ship by such others as he sent along with Learchus and
								Ameiniades with command to deliver them into their hands.

And they, when they had them, sent them away to Athens. 
							 When they came thither, the Athenians, fearing Aristeus, lest
								escaping he should do them further mischief (for he was manifestly
								the author of all the business of Potidaea and about Thrace), the
								same day put them all to death, unjudged and desirous to have
								spoken, and threw them into the pits, thinking it but just to take
								revenge of the Lacedaemonians that began it and had slain and thrown
								into pits the merchants of the Athenians and their confederates whom
								they took sailing in merchant ships about the coast of
								Peloponnesus. 
							 For in the beginning of the war, the Lacedaemonians slew as enemies
								whomsoever they took at sea, whether confederates of the Athenians
								or neutral, all alike.

About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciotes, both they
								themselves and divers barbarian nations by them raised, made war
								against Argos of Amphilochia and against the rest of that
								territory.

The quarrel between them and the Argives arose first from hence.

This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia was planted by Amphilochus the
								son of Amphiaraus after the Trojan war, who, at his return,
								misliking the then state of Argos, built this city in the Gulf of
								Ambracia and called it Argos after the name of his own country.

And it was the greatest city and had the most wealthy inhabitants of
								all Amphilochia.

But many generations after, being fallen into misery, they
								communicated their city with the Ambraciotes, bordering upon
								Amphilochia; 
							 and then they first learned the Greek language now used from the
								Ambraciotes that lived among them.

For the rest of the Amphilochians were barbarians.

Now the Ambraciotes in process of time drave out the Argives and held
								the city by themselves. 
							 Whereupon the Amphilochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians,
								and both together called in the Athenians who sent thirty galleys to
								their aid and Phormio for general. 
							 Phormio, being arrived, took Argos by assault and, making slaves of
								the Ambraciotes, put the town into the joint possessions of the
								Amphilochians and Acarnanians.

And this was the beginning of the league between the Athenians and
								Acarnanians.

The Ambraciotes therefore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from
								this their captivity, came in with an army partly of their own and
								partly raised amongst the Chaonians and other neighboring barbarians
								now in this war. 
							 And coming to Argos, were masters of the field; 
							 but when they could not take the city by assault, they returned and
								disbanding went every nation to his own. 
							 These were the acts of the summer.

In the beginning of the winter the Athenians sent twenty galleys
								about Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio, who, coming to lie
								at Naupactus, guarded the passage that none might go in or out from
								Corinth and the Crisaean gulf. 
							 And other six galleys under the conduct of Melesander they sent into
								Caria and Lycia, as well to gather tribute in those parts as also to
								hinder the Peloponnesian pirates lying on those coasts from
								molesting the navigation of such merchant ships as they expected to
								come to them from Phaselis, Phoenicia, and that part of the
								continent.

But Melesander, landing in Lycia with such forces of the Athenians
								and their confederates as he had aboard, was overcome in battle and
								slain with the loss of a part of his army.

The same winter, the Potidaeans, unable any longer to endure the
								siege, seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians could not
								make them rise and seeing their victual failed and that they were
								forced, amongst divers other things done by them for necessity of
								food, to eat one another, propounded at length to Xenophon the son
								of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleidas, and Phanomachus
								the son of Callimachus, the Athenian commanders that lay before the
								city, to give the same into their hands.

And they, seeing both that the army was already afflicted by lying in
								that cold place and that the state had already spent two thousand
								talents upon the siege, accepted of it. 
							 The conditions agreed on were these:

to depart, they and their wives and children
										and their auxiliary soldiers, every man with one suit of
										clothes and every woman with two, and to take with them
										everyone a certain sum of money for his charges by the
										way. 
 Hereupon a truce was granted them to
								depart;

and they went, some to the Chalcideans and others to other places as
								they could get to. 
							 But the people of Athens called the commanders in question for
								compounding without them, conceiving that they might have gotten the
								city to discretion, and sent afterwards a colony to Potidaea of
								their own citizens. 
							 These were the things done in this winter. 
							 And so ended the second year of this war, written by Thucydides.

The next summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates came not
								into Attica but turned their arms against Plataea, led by Archidamus
								the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, who, having
								pitched his camp, was about to waste the territory thereof. 
							 But the Plataeans sent ambassadors presently unto him with words to
								this effect:

Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, you do
										neither justly nor worthy yourselves and ancestors in making
										war upon Plataea. 
									 For Pausanias of Lacedaemon, the son of Cleombrotus, having,
										together with such Grecians as were content to undergo the
										danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory,
										delivered all Greece from the slavery of the Persians, when
										he offered sacrifice in the market-place of Plataea to
										Jupiter the deliverer, called together all the confederates
										and granted to the Plataeans this privilege: 
									 that their city and territory should be
										free; 
									 
 that none should make any unjust war against
											them nor go about to subject them; 
 
									 
 and if any did, the confederates then present
											should to their utmost ability revenge their
											quarrel .

These privileges your fathers granted us for our valour and zeal
									in those dangers. 
								 But now do you the clean contrary; 
								 for you join with our greatest enemies, the Thebans, to bring us
									into subjection.

Therefore calling to witness the gods then sworn by and the gods
									both of your and our country, we require you that you do no
									damage to the territory of Plataea nor violate those oaths, but
									that you suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was
									allowed us by Pausanias.

The Plataeans having thus said, Archidamus replied and said thus: 
 Men of Plataea, if you would do as ye say,
										you say what is just. 
									 For as Pausanias hath granted to you, so also be you free and
										help to set free the rest, who, having been partakers of the
										same dangers then and being comprised in the same oath with
										yourselves, are now brought into subjection by the
										Athenians. 
									 And this so great preparation and war is only for the
										deliverance of them and others, of which if you will
										especially participate, keep your oaths; 
									 at least (as we have also advised you formerly) be quiet and
										enjoy your own in neutrality, receiving both sides in the
										way of friendship, neither side in the way of
									faction. 
 Thus said Archidamus.

And the ambassadors of Plataea, when they had heard him, returned to
								the city, and having communicated his answer to the people, brought
								word again to Archidamus: 
 that what he had
										advised was impossible for them to perform without leave of
										the Athenians in whose keeping were their wives and
										children; 
									 and that they feared also for the whole city lest when the
										Lacedaemonians were gone, the Athenians should come and take
										the custody of it out of their hands; 
									 or that the Thebans, comprehended in the oath of receiving
										both sides, should again attempt to surprise it. 
 But
								Archidamus, to encourage them, made this answer:

Deliver you unto us Lacedaemonians your city
										and your houses, show us the bounds of your territory, give
										us your trees by tale, and whatsoever else can be
										numbered; 
									 and depart yourselves whither you shall think good as long as
										the war lasteth: and when it shall be ended, we will deliver
										it all unto you again. 
									 In the meantime we will keep them as deposited and will
										cultivate your ground and pay you rent for it, as much as
										shall suffice for your maintenance.

Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city and, having
								consulted with the people, made answer 
 that
										they would first acquaint the Athenians with it, and if they
										would consent, they would then accept the conditions; 
									 till then, they desired a suspension of arms and not to have
										their territory wasted. 
 Upon this he granted them so
								many days truce, as was requisite for their return, and for so long
								forebore to waste their territory.

When the Plataean ambassadors were arrived at Athens and had advised
								on the matter with the Athenians, they returned to the city with
								this answer:

The Athenians say thus: that neither in
										former times, since we were their confederates, did they
										ever abandon us to the injuries of any, nor will they now
										neglect us but give us their utmost assistance. 
									 And they conjure us by the oath of our fathers not to make
										any alienation touching the league.

When the ambassadors had made this report, the Plataeans resolved in
								their councils not to betray the Athenians but rather to endure, if
								it must be, the wasting of their territory before their eyes and to
								suffer whatsoever misery could befall them, and no more to go forth
								but from the walls to make this answer:

that it was impossible for them to do as the
										Lacedaemonians had required. 
 When they had answered
								so, Archidamus, the king, first made a protestation to the gods and
								heros of the country, saying thus: 
 All ye
										Gods and Heros, protectors of Plataeis, be witnesses that we
										neither invade this territory (wherein our fathers after
										their vows unto you overcame the Medes, and which you made
										propitious for the Grecians to fight in) unjustly now in the
										beginning because they have first broken the league they had
										sworn, nor what we shall further do will be any injury
										because, though we have offered many and reasonable
										conditions, they have yet been all refused; 
									 assent ye also to the punishment of the beginners of injury
										and to the revenge of those that bear lawful arms.

Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready his army for
								the war. 

							 And first having felled trees, he therewith made a palisade about the
								town that none might go out. 
							 That done, he raised a mount against the wall, hoping with so great
								an army all at work at once, to have quickly taken it.

And having cut down wood in the hill Cithaeron, they built a frame of
								timber and wattled it about on either side to serve instead of walls
								to keep the earth from falling too much away and cast into it stones
								and earth and whatsoever else would serve to fill it up.

Seventy days and nights continually they poured on, dividing the work
								between them for rest in such manner as some might be carrying,
								whilst others took their sleep and food. 
							 And they were urged to labour by the Lacedaemonians that commanded
								the mercenaries of the several cities and had the charge of the
								work.

The Plataeans, seeing the mount to rise, made the frame of a wall
								with wood which, having placed on the wall of the city in the place
								where the mount touched, they built it within full of bricks taken
								from the adjoining houses for that purpose demolished, the timber
								serving to bind them together that the building might not be
								weakened by the height.

The same was also covered with hides and quilts both to keep the
								timber from shot of wildfire and those that wrought from danger.

So that the height of the wall was great on one side, and the mount
								went up as fast on the other. 
							 The Plataeans used also this device: they brake a hole in their own
								wall where the mount joined and drew the earth from it into the
								city.

But the Peloponnesians, when they found it out, took clay and
								therewith daubing hurdles of reeds cast the same into the chink,
								which mouldering not, as did the earth, they could not draw it
								away.

The Plataeans, excluded here, gave over that plot, and digging a
								secret mine, which they carried under the mount from within the city
								by conjecture, fetched away the earth again and were a long time
								undiscovered; 
							 so that still casting on, the mount grew still less, the earth being
								drawn away below and settling over the part where it was voided.

The Plataeans, nevertheless, fearing that they should not be able
								even thus to hold out, being few against many, devised this
								further. 
							 They gave over working at the high wall against the mount and,
								beginning at both ends of it where the wall was low, built another
								wall in form of a crescent, inward to the city; 
							 that if the great wall were taken, this might resist and put the
								enemy to make another mount, and by coming further in to be at
								double pains and withal more encompassable with shot.

The Peloponnesians, together with the rising of their mount, brought
								to the city their engines of battery. 
							 One of which, by the help of the mount, they applied to the high
								wall, wherewith they much shook it and put the Plataeans into great
								fear. 
							 And others to other parts of the wall, which the Plataeans partly
								turned aside by casting ropes about them and partly with great
								beams, which, being hung in long iron chains by either end upon two
								other great beams jetting over and inclining from above the wall
								like two horns, they drew up to them athwart; 
							 and where the engine was about to light, slacking the chains and
								letting their hands go, they let fall with violence to break the
								beak of it.

After this the Peloponnesians, seeing their engines availed not and
								thinking it hard to take the city by any present violence, prepared
								themselves to besiege it. 
							 But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no great
								city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn it;

for there was no way they did not think on to have gained it without
								expense and long siege.

Having therefore brought faggots, they cast them from the mount into
								the space between it and their new wall, which by so many hands was
								quickly filled, and then into as much of the rest of the city as at
								that distance they could reach and, throwing amongst them fire,
								together with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood and raised such
								a flame, as the like was never seen before made by the hand of
								man.

For as for the woods in the mountains, the trees have indeed taken
								fire; 
							 but it hath been by mutual attrition and have flamed out of their own
								accord.

But this fire was a great one, and the Plataeans that had escaped
								other mischiefs wanted little of being consumed by this. 
							 For near the wall they could not get by a great way; 
							 and if the wind had been with it (as the enemy hoped it might), they
								could never have escaped.

It is also reported that there fell much rain then with great thunder
								and that the flame was extinguished and the danger ceased by that.

The Peloponnesians, when they failed likewise of this, retaining a
								part of their army and dismissing the rest, enclosed the city about
								with a wall, dividing the circumference thereof to the charge of the
								several cities. 
							 There was a ditch both within and without it out of which they made
								their bricks;

and after it was finished, which was about the rising of Arcturus,
								they left a guard for one half of the wall (for the other was
								guarded by the Boeotians) and departed with the rest of their army
								and were dissolved according to their cities.

The Plataeans had before this sent their wives and children and all
								their unserviceable men to Athens. 
							 The rest were besieged, being in number of the Plataeans themselves
								four hundred, of Athenians eighty, and a hundred and ten women to
								dress their meat.

These were all when the siege was first laid and not one more,
								neither free nor bond, in the city. 
							 In this manner was the city besieged.

The same summer at the same time that this journey was made against
								Plataea, the Athenians with two thousand men of arms of their own
								city and two hundred horsemen made war upon the Chalcideans of
								Thrace and the Bottiaeans, when the corn was at the highest, under
								the conduct of Xenophon the son of Euripides and two others.

These coming before Spartolus in Bottiaea destroyed the corn and
								expected that the town should have been rendered by the practice of
								some within. 
							 But such as would not have it so having sent for aid to Olynthus
								before, there came into the city for safeguard thereof a supply both
								of men of arms and other soldiers from thence.

And these issuing forth of Spartolus, the Athenians put themselves
								into order of battle under the town itself. 
							 The men of arms of the Chalcideans and certain auxiliaries with them
								were overcome by the Athenians and retired within Spartolus.

And the horsemen of the Chalcideans and their light-armed soldiers
								overcame the horsemen and light-armed of the Athenians, but they had
								some few targeteers besides of the territory called Crusis. 
							 When the battle was now begun, came a supply of other targeteers from
								Olynthus.

Which the light-armed soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened
								both by this addition of strength and also as having had the better
								before, with the Chalcidean horse and this new supply charged the
								Athenians afresh. 
							 The Athenians hereupon retired to two companies they had left with
								the carriages.

And as oft as the Athenians charged, the Chalcideans retired; 
							 and when the Athenians retired, the Chalcideans charged them with
								their shot. 
							 Especially the Chalcidean horsemen rode up and, charging them where
								they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme affright to turn
								their backs and chased them a great way.

The Athenians fled to Potidaea and, having afterwards fetched away
								the bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder of
								their army to Athens. 
							 Four hundred and thirty men they lost and their chief commanders all
								three. 
							 And the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, when they had set up a trophy and
								taken up their dead bodies, disbanded and went everyone to his city.

Not long after this, the same summer, the Ambraciotes and Chaonians,
								desiring to subdue all Acarnania and to make it revolt from the
								Athenians, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to make ready a fleet out of
								the confederate cities and to send a thousand men of arms into
								Acarnania, saying that if they aided them both with a fleet and a
								land army at once, the Acarnanians of the seacoast being thereby
								disabled to assist the rest, having easily gained Acarnania they
								might be masters afterward both of Zacynthus and Cephalonia and the
								Athenians hereafter less able to make their voyages about
								Peloponnesus, and that there was a hope beside to take
								Naupactus.

The Peloponnesians assenting sent thither Cnemus, who was yet
								admiral, with his men of arms in a few galleys immediately, and
								withal sent word to the cities about, as soon as their galleys were
								ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas.

Now the Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the
								Ambraciotes, as being their own colony. 
							 And the galleys which were to go from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that
								part of the coast were now making ready;

and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciotes were
								arrived before and stayed at Leucas for their coming. 
							 Cnemus and his thousand men of arms, when they had crossed the sea
								undescried of Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian galleys
								that kept watch at Naupactus, presently prepared for the war by
								land.

He had in his army of Grecians, the Ambraciotes, Leucadians,
								Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with
								him; 
							 and of barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king but were
								led by Photius and Nicanor, which two being of the families eligible
								had now the annual government. 
							 With the Chaonians came also the Thesprctians, they also without a
								king.

The Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector of
								Tharups their king, who was yet in minority. 
							 The Parauaeans were led by their king Oroedus; 
							 and under Oroedus served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their
								king, a thousand Orestians.

Also Perdiccas sent thither, unknown to the Athenians, a thousand
								Macedonians;

but these last were not yet arrived. 
							 With this army began Cnemus to march without staying for the fleet
								from Corinth. 
							 And passing through Argeia, they destroyed Limnaea, a town
								unwalled. 
							 From thence they marched towards Stratus, the greatest city of
								Acarnania, conceiving that if they could take this first, the rest
								would come easily in.

The Acarnanians seeing a great army by land was entered their country
								already and expecting the enemy also by sea, joined not to succour
								Stratus but guarded everyone his own and sent for aid to
								Phormio. 
							 But he answered them that since there was a fleet to be set forth
								from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus without a guard.

The Peloponnesians and their confederates, with their army divided
								into three, marched on towards the city of the Stratians to the end
								that, being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley, they
								might presently assault the walls.

So they went on, the Chaonians and other barbarians in the middle,
								the Leucadians and Anactorians and such others as were with these on
								the right hand, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes
								on the left, each army at great distance and sometimes out of sight
								of one another.

The Grecians in their march kept their order and went warily on till
								they had gotten a convenient place to encamp in. 
							 But the Chaonians, confident of themselves and by the inhabitants of
								that continent accounted most warlike, had not the patience to take
								in any ground for a camp but carried furiously on together with the
								rest of the barbarians, thought to have taken the town by their
								clamour and to have the action ascribed only to themselves.

But they of Stratus, aware of this whilst they were yet in their way
								and imagining if they could overcome these thus divided from the
								other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less forward
								to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city and, when
								the enemies approached, fell upon them both from the city and from
								the ambushes at once and, putting them into affright, slew many of
								the Chaonians upon the place;

and the rest of the barbarians, seeing these to shrink, stayed no
								longer but fled outright.

Neither of the Grecian armies had knowledge of this skirmish because
								they were gone so far before to choose (as they then thought) a
								commodious place to pitch in.

But when the barbarians came back upon them running, they received
								them and joining both camps together stirred no more for that
								day. 
							 And the Stratians assaulted them not, for want of the aid of the rest
								of the Acarnanians, but used their slings against them and troubled
								them much that way (for without their men of arms there was no
								stirring for them); 
							 and in this kind the Acarnanians are held excellent.

When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army to the river Anapus, from
								Stratus eighty furlongs, and fetched off the dead bodies upon truce
								the next day. 
							 And whereas the city Oeniadae was come in of itself, he made his
								retreat thither before the Acarnanians should assemble with their
								succours; 
							 and from thence went everyone home. 
							 And the Stratians set up a trophy of the skirmish against the
								barbarians.

In the meantime the fleet of Corinth and the other confederates that
								was to set out from the Crisaean gulf and to join with Cnemus to
								hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the upper came not at all
								but were compelled to fight with Phormio and those twenty Athenian
								galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, about the same time that the
								skirmish was at Stratus.

For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on them till they
								were out of the strait, intending to set upon them in the open
								sea.

And the Corinthians and their confederates went not as to fight by
								sea but furnished rather for the land service in Acarnania and never
								thought that the Athenians with their twenty galleys durst fight
								with theirs that were sevenand-forty. 
							 Nevertheless, when they saw that the Athenians as themselves sailed
								by one shore kept over against them on the other, and that now when
								they went off from Patrae in Achaia to go over to Acarnania in the
								opposite continent, the Athenians came towards them from Chalcis and
								the river Evenus and also knew that they had come to anchor there
								the night before, they found they were then to fight of necessity
								directly against the mouth of the strait.

The commanders of the fleet were such as the cities that set it forth
								had severally appointed, but of the Corinthians, these: Machon,
								Isocrates, and Agatharchidas.

The Peloponnesians ordered their fleet in such manner as they made
								thereof a circle as great as, without leaving the spaces so wide as
								for the Athenians to pass through, they were possibly able with the
								stems of their galleys outward and sterns inward, and into the midst
								thereof received such small vessels as came with them and also five
								of their swiftest galleys, the which were at narrow passages to come
								forth in whatsoever part the enemy should charge.

But the Athenians with their galleys ordered one after one in file
								went round them and shrunk them up together by wiping them ever as
								they past and putting them in expectation of present fight. 
							 But Phormio had before forbidden them to fight till he himself had
								given them the signal.

For he hoped that this order of theirs would not last long, as in an
								army on land, but that the galleys would fall foul of one another
								and be troubled also with the smaller vessels in the midst. 
							 And if the wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation
								whereof he so went round them, and which usually blew there every
								morning, he made account they would then instantly be
								disordered. 
							 As for giving the onset, because his galleys were more agile than the
								galleys of the enemy, he thought it was in his own election and
								would be most opportune on that occasion.

When this wind was up and the galleys of the Peloponnesians, being
								already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways troubled,
								by the wind and withal by their own lesser vessels that encumbered
								them, and when one galley fell foul of another and the mariners
								laboured to set them clear with their poles and, through the noise
								they made keeping off and reviling each other, heard nothing neither
								of their charge nor of the galleys' direction, and through want of
								skill unable to keep up their oars in a troubled sea, rendered the
								galley untractable to him that sat at the helm, then and with this
								opportunity he gave the signal. 
							 And the Athenians, charging, drowned first one of the admiral galleys
								and divers others after it in the several parts they assaulted and
								brought them to that pass at length that not one applying himself to
								the fight they fled all towards Patrae and Dyme, cities of
								Achaia.

The Athenians, after they had chased them and taken twelve galleys
								and slain most of the men that were in them, fell off and went to
								Molycreium; 
							 and when they had there set up a trophy and consecrated one galley to
								Neptune, they returned with the rest to Naupactus.

The Peloponnesians with the remainder of their fleet went presently
								along the coast of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleians; 
							 and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from
								Leucas and with him those galleys that were there and with which
								this other fleet should have been joined.

After this the Lacedaemonians sent unto Cnemus to the fleet
								Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to be of his council with
								command to prepare for another better fight and not to suffer a few
								galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea.

For they thought this accident (especially being their first proof by
								sea) very much against reason, and that it was not so much a defect
								of the fleet as of their courage, never comparing the long practice
								of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. 
							 And therefore they sent these men thither in passion.

Who, being arrived with Cnemus, intimated to the cities about to
								provide their galleys and caused those they had before to be
								repaired.

Phormio likewise sent to Athens to make known both the enemy's
								preparation and his own former victory and withal to will them to
								send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready
								because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. 
							 Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys but commanded him that had the
								charge of them to go first into Crete.

For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyna, the public host of the Athenians,
								had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia, telling them they
								might take it in, being now their enemy, which he did to gratify the
								Polichnitae that bordered upon the Cydonians.

Therefore with these galleys he sailed into Crete and together with
								the Polichnitae wasted the territory of the Cydonians, where also,
								by reason of the winds and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted
								not a little of his time.

In the meantime, whilst these Athenians were wind-bound in Crete, the
								Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene in order of battle sailed along
								the coast of Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land
								forces come to aid them.

Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium Molycricum and anchored
								without it with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former
								battle.

Now this Rhium was of the Athenians' side, and the other Rhium in
								Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most
								but seven furlongs of sea; 
							 and these two make the mouth of the Crisaean gulf.

The Peloponnesians therefore came to an anchor at Rhium of Achaia
								with seventy-seven galleys, not far from Panormus where they left
								their land forces.

After they saw the Athenians and had lain six or seven days one
								against the other meditating and providing for the battle, the
								Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide
								sea for fear of what they had suffered by it before, nor the other
								to enter the strait because to fight within they thought to be the
								enemy's advantage.

At last Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the
								Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily before a new supply
								should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together and, seeing
								the most of them to be fearful through their former defeat and not
								forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this
								effect:

Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid
										of the battle at hand for the success of the battle past,
										his fear is without ground.

For you know we were inferior to them then in preparation and set
									not forth as to a fight at sea but rather to an expedition by
									land. 
								 Fortune likewise crossed us in many things, and somewhat we
									miscarried by unskilfulness.

So as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice, nor is it
									just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force but have
									somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be
									dejected for the calamity of the event; 
								 but we must think that though fortune may fail men, yet the
									courage of a valiant man can never fail, and not that we may
									justify cowardice in anything by pretending want of skill, and
									yet be truly valiant.

And yet you are not so much short of their skill as you exceed
									them in valour. 
								 And though this knowledge of theirs, which you so much fear,
									joined with courage will not be without a memory also to put
									what they know in execution; 
								 yet without courage no art in the world is of any force in the
									time of danger. 
								 For fear confoundeth the memory, and skill without courage
									availeth nothing.

To their odds therefore of skill oppose your odds of valour, and
									to the fear caused by your overthrow oppose your being then
									unprovided.

You have further now a greater fleet and to fight on your own
									shore with your aids at hand of men of arms; 
								 and, for the most part, the greatest number and best provided get
									the victory.

So that we can neither see any one cause in particular why we
									should miscarry; 
								 and whatsoever were our wants in the former battle, supplied in
									this will now turn to our instruction.

With courage therefore, both masters and mariners, follow every
									man in his order, not forsaking the place assigned him.

And for us, we shall order the battle as well as the former
										commanders and leave no excuse to any man of his
										cowardice. 
									 And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign
										punishment; 
									 and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their
										merit.

Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. 
							 And Phormio, he likewise doubting that his soldiers were but
								fainthearted and observing they had consultations apart and were
								afraid of the multitude of the enemy's galleys, thought good, having
								called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the
								present occasion.

For though he had always before told them and predisposed their minds
								to an opinion that there was no number of galleys so great which
								setting upon them they ought not to undertake, and [also] most of
								the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves that
								being Athenians they ought not to decline any number of galleys
								whatsoever of the Peloponnesians, yet when he saw that the sight of
								the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive their
								courage and, having assembled the Athenians, said thus:



Soldiers, having observed your fear of the
										enemy's number, I have called you together, not enduring to
										see you terrified with things that are not terrible.

For first, they have prepared this great number and odds of
									galleys for that they were overcome before and because they are
									even in their own opinions too weak for us. 
								 And next, their present boldness proceeds only from their
									knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof (as if to be
									valiant were peculiar unto them) they are now come up, wherein
									having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in
									service by sea.

But in reason the odds must be ours in this as well as it is
									theirs in the other kind. 
								 For in courage they exceed us not; 
								 and as touching the advantage of either side, we may better be
									bold now than they.

And the Lacedaemonians, who are the leaders of the confederates,
									bring them to fight for the greatest part (in respect of the
									opinion they have of us) against their wills. 
								 For else they would never have undertaken a new battle after they
									were once so clearly overthrown.

Fear not therefore any great boldness on their part. 
								 But the fear which they have of you is far both greater and more
									certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but
									also for this, that they would never believe you would go about
									to resist unless you had some notable thing to put in practice
									upon them.

For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they
									invade chiefly upon confidence of their strength; 
								 but they that are much the fewer must have some great and sure
									design when they dare fight unconstrained.

Wherewith these men now amazed fear us more for our unlikely
									preparation than they would if it were more proportionable. 
								 Besides, many great armies have been overcome by the lesser
									through unskilfulness and some also by timorousness, both which
									we ourselves are free from.

As for the battle, I will not willingly fight it in the gulf nor
									go in thither, seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness and
									art against many without art, straitness of room is
									disadvantage. 
								 For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit
									unless he have sight of the enemy afar off, or if he be himself
									over-pressed, again get clear. 
								 Nor is there any getting through them or turning to and fro at
									one's pleasure, which are all the works of such galleys as have
									their advantage in agility; 
								 but the sea fight would of necessity be the same with a battle by
									land wherein the greater number must have the better.

But of this I shall myself take the best care I am able. 
								 In the meantime, keep you your order well in the galleys, and
									every man receive his charge readily; 
								 and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us. 
								 In the fight have in great estimation order and silence as things
									of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight
									by sea; 
								 and charge these your enemies according to the worth of your
									former acts.

You are to fight for a great wager, either to destroy the hope of
									the Peloponnesian navies or to bring the fear of the sea nearer
									home to the Athenians.

Again, let me tell you, you have beaten them once
										already; 
									 and men once overcome will not come again to the danger so
										well resolved as before.

Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. 
							 The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would not enter the
								gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills,
								weighed anchor and betime in the morning, having arranged their
								galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along their own coast
								within the gulf, leading the way in the same order as they had lain
								at anchor, with their right wing.

In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys to the
								end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for
								safeguard of the town sail along his own coast likewise within the
								strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of
								theirs and avoid the impression but be inclosed by their galleys on
								both sides.

Phormio, fearing (as they expected) what might become of the town now
								without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will
								and in extreme haste went aboard and sailed along the shore with the
								land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him.

The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley
								after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore
								(which they most desired), upon one sign given turned suddenly
								everyone as fast as he could upon the Athenians, hoping to have
								intercepted them every galley.

But of those the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing and the turn
								made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea. 
							 The rest they intercepted and, driving them to the shore, sunk
								them. 
							 The men, as many as swam not out, they slew;

and the galleys some they tied to their own and towed them away
								empty, and one with the men and all in her they had already
								taken. 
							 But the Messenian succours on land, entering the sea with their arms,
								got aboard of some of them and fighting from the decks recovered
								them again after they were already towing away.

And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory and overcame the
								galleys of the Athenians. 
							 Now the twenty galleys that were their right wing gave chase to those
								eleven Athenian galleys which had avoided them when they turned and
								were gotten into the open sea. 
							 These flying toward Naupactus arrived there before the enemies, all
								save one, and when they came under the temple of Apollo, turned
								their beakheads and put themselves in readiness for defence in case
								the enemy should follow them to the land.

But the Peloponnesians, as they came after, were paeanising as if
								they had already had the victory; 
							 and one galley which was of Leucas, being far before the rest, gave
								chase to one Athenian galley that was behind the rest of the
								Athenians.

Now it chanced that there lay out into the sea a certain ship at
								anchor to which the Athenian galley first coming fetched a compass
								about her and came back full butt against the Leucadian galley that
								gave her chase and sunk her.

Upon this unexpected and unlikely accident they began to fear; 
							 and having also followed the chase, as being victors, disorderly,
								some of them let down their oars into the water and hindered the way
								of their galleys (a matter of very ill consequence, seeing the enemy
								was so near) and stayed for more company; 
							 and some of them, through ignorance of the coast, ran upon the
								shelves.

The Athenians seeing this took heart again and together with one
								clamour set upon them who resisted not long, because of their
								present errors committed and their disarray, but turned and fled to
								Panormus from whence at first they set forth.

The Athenians followed and took from them six galleys that were
								hindmost and recovered their own which the Peloponnesians had sunk
								by the shore and tied astern of theirs. 
							 Of the men some they slew and some also they took alive.

In the Leucadian galley that was sunk near the ship was Timocrates, a
								Lacedaemonian, who, when the galley was lost, ran himself through
								with his sword; 
							 and his body drave into the haven of Naupactus.

The Athenians, falling off, erected a trophy in the place from whence
								they set forth to this victory and took up their dead and the wreck,
								as much as was on their own shore, and gave truce to the enemy to do
								the like.

The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as if they also had had the
								victory, in respect of the flight of those galleys which they sunk
								by the shore; 
							 and the galley which they had taken they consecrated to Neptune in
								Rhium of Achaia, hard by their trophy.

After this, fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they
								sailed by night into the Crisaean gulf and to Corinth, all but the
								Leucadians.

And those Athenians with twenty galleys out of Crete, that should
								have been with Phormio before the battle, not long after the going
								away of the galleys of Peloponnesus arrived at Naupactus. 
							 And the summer ended.

But before the fleet, gone into the Crisaean gulf and to Corinth, was
								dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the commanders of the
								Peloponnesians in the beginning of winter instructed by the
								Megareans thought good to make an attempt upon Peiraeus, the haven
								of the Athenians. 
							 Now it was without guard or bar, and that upon very good cause,
								considering how much they exceeded others in the power of their
								navy.

And it was resolved that every mariner with his oar, his cushion, and
								one thong for his oar to turn in should take his way by land from
								Corinth to the other sea that lieth to Athens and, going with all
								speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisaea, the arsenal of
								the Megareans, which then were there, and sail presently into
								Peiraeus.

For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before
								it, nor was there any imagination that the enemies would on such a
								sudden come upon them; 
							 for they durst not have attempted it openly, though with leisure; 
							 nor if they had had any such intention, could it but have been
								discovered.

As soon as it was resolved on, they set presently forward and,
								arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisaea and set sail,
								not now towards Peiraeus, as they intended, fearing the danger (and
								a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them), but toward a
								promontory of Salamis lying out towards Megara. 
							 Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay
								three galleys that kept watch to hinder the importation and
								exportation of anything to or from the Megareans. 
							 This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away after
								them and, being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also
								other parts of the island.

By this time the fires signifying the coming of enemies were lifted
								up towards Athens and affrighted them more than anything that had
								happened in all this war. 
							 For they in the city thought the enemies had been already in
								Peiraeus, and they in Peiraeus thought the city of the Salaminians
								had been already taken and that the enemy would instantly come into
								Peiraeus, which, had they not been afraid nor been hindered by the
								wind, they might also easily have done.

But the Athenians, as soon as it was day, came with the whole
								strength of the city into Peiraeus and launched their galleys and
								embarking in haste and tumult set sail toward Salamis, leaving for
								the guard of Peiraeus an army of foot.

The Peloponnesians upon notice of these succours, having now overrun
								most of Salamis and taken many prisoners and much other booty
								besides the three galleys from the fort of Budorus, went back in all
								haste to Nisaea. 
							 And somewhat they feared the more for that their galleys had lain
								long in the water and were subject to leaking. 
							 And when they came to Megara, they went thence to Corinth again by
								land.

The Athenians likewise, when they found not the enemy at Salamis,
								went home and from that time forward looked better to Peiraeus both
								for the shutting of the ports and for their diligence otherwise.

About the same time in the beginning of the same winter, Sitalces an
								Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas
								the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and upon the Chalcideans
								bordering on Thrace upon two promises, one of which he required to
								be performed to him, and the other he was to perform himself.

For Perdiccas had promised somewhat unto him for reconciling him to
								the Athenians, who had formerly oppressed him with war, and for not
								restoring his brother Philip to the kingdom, that was his enemy,
								which he never paid him. 
							 And Sitalces himself had covenanted with the Athenians when he made
								league with them that he would end the war which they had against
								the Chalcideans of Thrace.

For these causes therefore he made this expedition and took with him
								both Amyntas the son of Philip (with purpose to make him king of
								Macedonia) and also the Athenian ambassadors then with him for that
								business and Agnon the Athenian commander. 
							 For the Athenians ought also to have joined with him against the
								Chalcideans both with a fleet and with as great land forces as they
								could provide.

Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he levied first those
								Thracians that inhabit on this side the mountains Haemus and
								Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the shore of
								the Euxine Sea and the Hellespont. 
							 Then beyond Haemus he levied the Getes and all the nations between
								Ister and the Euxine Sea. 
							 The Getes and the people of those parts are borderers upon the
								Scythians and furnished as the Scythians are, all archers on
								horseback.

He also drew forth many of those Scythians that inhabit the mountains
								and are free states, all swordsmen, and are called Dii, the greatest
								part of which are on the mountain Rhodope; 
							 whereof some he hired, and some went as voluntaries.

He levied also the Agrianes and Laeaeans and all other the nations of
								Paeonia in his own dominion. 
							 These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extending to the
								Graaeans and Laeaeans, nations of Paeonia, and to the river Strymon,
								which, rising out of the mountain Scomius, passeth through the
								territories of the Graaeans and Laeaeans, who make the bounds of his
								kingdom toward Paeonia and are subject only to their own laws.

But on the part that lieth to the Triballians, who are also a free
								people, the Treres make the bound of his dominion, and the
								Tilataeans. 
							 These dwell on the north side of the mountain Scomius and reach
								westward as far as to the river Oscius, which cometh out of the same
								hill Nestus and Hebrus doth; 
							 a great and desert hill adjoining to Rhodope.

The dimensions of the dominion of the Odrysians by the seaside is
								from the city of the Abderites to the mouth of Ister in the Euxine
								Sea; 
							 and is, the nearest way, four days' and as many nights' sail for a
								round ship, with a continual fore wind. 
							 By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city Abdera to the
								mouth of Ister eleven days' journey for an expedite footman.

Thus it lay in respect of the sea. 
							 Now for the continent: from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and to the
								river Strymon (for it reacheth this way farthest into the main land)
								it is for the like footman thirteen days' journey.

The tribute they received from all the barbarian nations and from the
								cities of Greece, in the reign of Seuthes (who reigned after
								Sitalces and made the most of it), was in gold and silver, by
								estimation, four hundred talents by year. 
							 And presents of gold and silver came to as much more, besides
								vestures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture presented not
								only to him but also to all the men of authority and Odrysian
								nobility about him.

For they had a custom, which also was general to all Thrace contrary
								to that of the kingdom of Persia, to receive rather than to
								give; 
							 and it was there a greater shame to be asked and deny than to ask and
								go without. 
							 Nevertheless they held this custom long by reason of their power, for
								without gifts there was nothing to be gotten done amongst them. 
							 So that this kingdom arrived thereby to great power.

For of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian Gulf and
								the Euxine Sea, it was, for revenue of money and other wealth, the
								mightiest; 
							 though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the
								same be far short of the Scythians.

For there is no nation, not to say of Europe but neither of Asia,
								that are comparable to this, or that as long as they agree, are
								able, one nation to one, to stand against the Scythians. 
							 And yet in matter of counsel and wisdom in the present occasions of
								life, they are not like to other men.

Sitalces therefore, king of this great country, prepared his army
								and, when all was ready, set forward and marched towards Macedonia:
								first, through his own dominion; 
							 then, over Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the
								Paeonians, over which he marched the same way himself had formerly
								made with timber when he made war against the Paeonians. 
							 Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrysians, they had
								on their right hand the Paeonians and on the left the Sintians and
								Medes;

and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus in Paeonia.

His army, as he marched, diminished not any way, except by sickness,
								but increased by the accession of many free nations of Thrace that
								came in uncalled in hope of booty. 
							 Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no less than
								a hundred and fifty thousand men, whereof the most were foot, the
								horse being a third part or thereabouts.

And of the horse, the greatest part were the Odrysians themselves and
								the next most, the Getes. 
							 And of the foot, those swordsmen, a free nation that came down to him
								out of the mountain Rhodope, were the most warlike. 
							 The rest of the promiscuous multitude were formidable only for their
								number.

Being all together at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from the
								hill's side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Perdiccas.

For there are in Macedonia the Lyncestians and the Elimeiotae and
								other highland nations, who, though they be confederates and in
								subjection to the other, yet have their several kingdoms by
								themselves.

But of that part of the now Macedonia which lieth toward the sea,
								Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas, and his ancestors the
								Temenidae, who came out of Argos, were the first possessors and
								reigned in the same, having first driven out of Pieria the Pierians,
								which afterwards seated themselves in Phagres and other towns beyond
								Strymon at the foot of Pangaeum (from which cause that country is
								called the Gulf of Pieria to this day which lieth at the foot of
								Pangaeum and bendeth toward the sea), and out of that which is
								called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, that now border upon the
								Chalcideans.

They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of Paeonia near unto
								the river Axius reaching from above down to Pella and to the
								sea. 
							 Beyond Axius they possess the country called Mygdonia as far as to
								Strymon, from whence they have driven out the Edonians.

Furthermore, they drave the Eordians out of the territory now called
								Eordia (of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of
								them yet about Physca) and the Almopians out of Almopia.

The same Macedonians subdued also other nations and hold them yet, as
								Anthemus, Crestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great part of the
								Macedonians themselves. 
							 But the whole is called Macedonia and was the kingdom of Perdiccas
								the son of Alexander when Sitalces came to invade it.

The Macedonians, unable to stand in the field against so huge an
								army, retired all within their strongholds and walled towns, as many
								as the country afforded,

which were not many then, but were built afterwards by Archelaus the
								son of Perdiccas when he came to the kingdom, who then also laid out
								the highways straight and took order both for matter of war, as
								horses and arms and for other provision, better than all the other
								eight kings that were before him. 
							 The Thracian army, arising from Doberus, invaded that territory first
								which had been the principality of Philip and took Eidomene by
								force;

but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other towns he had yielded to him
								for the love of Amyntas the son of Philip, who was then in the
								army. 
							 They also assaulted Europus but could not take it. 
							 Then they went on further into Macedonia on the part that lies on the
								right hand of Pella and Cyrrhus;

but within these into Bottiaea and Pieria they entered not but wasted
								Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. 
							 Now the Macedonians had never any intention to make head against them
								with their foot;

but sending out their horsemen, which they had procured from their
								allies of the higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Thracian army in
								such places where, few against many, they thought they might do it
								with most convenience. 
							 And where they charged, none was able to resist them, being both good
								horsemen and well armed with breastplates; 
							 but enclosed by the multitude of the enemies, they fought against
								manifest odds of number so that in the end they gave it over,
								esteeming themselves too weak to hazard battle against so many.

After this Sitalces gave way to a conference with Perdiccas touching
								the motives of this war. 
							 And forasmuch as the Athenians were not arrived with their fleet (for
								they thought not that Sitalces would have made the journey, but had
								sent ambassadors to him with presents), he sent a part of his army
								against the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, wherewith, having compelled
								them within their walled towns, he wasted and destroyed their
								territory.

Whilst he stayed in these parts, the Thessalians southward, and the
								Magnetians, and the rest of the nations subject to the Thessalians,
								and all the Grecians as far as to Thermopylae were afraid he would
								have turned his forces upon them and stood upon their guard.

And northward, those Thracians that inhabit the champaign country
								beyond Strymon, namely the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and
								Dersaeans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same.

He gave occasion also to a rumour that he meant to lead his army
								against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians, as
								called in by them to that purpose by virtue of their league.

But whilst he stayed, he wasted the Chalcidean, Bottiaean, and
								Macedonian territories; 
							 and when he could not effect what he came for and his army both
								wanted victual and was afflicted with the coldness of the season,
								Seuthes the son of Spardocus, his cousin-german and of greatest
								authority next himself, persuaded him to make haste away. 
							 Now Perdiccas had dealt secretly with Seuthes and promised him his
								sister in marriage and money with her;

and Sitalces at the persuasion of him after the stay of full thirty
								days, whereof he spent eight in Chalcidea, retired with his army
								with all speed into his own kingdom. 
							 And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Stratonica in
								marriage, as he had promised. 
							 This was the issue of this expedition of Sitalces.

The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was dissolved,
								the Athenians that were at Naupactus under the conduct of Phormio
								sailed along the coast to Astacus and, disbarking, marched into the
								inner parts of Acarnania. 
							 He had in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with him
								in his galleys and four hundred more Messenians. 
							 With these he put out of Stratus, Coronta, and other places all those
								whose fidelity he thought doubtful. 
							 And when he had restored Cynes the son of Theolytus to Coronta, they
								returned again to their galleys.

For they thought they should not be able to make war against the
								Oeniades (who only of all Acarnania are the Athenians' enemies) in
								respect of the winter. 
							 For the river Achelöus, springing out of the mountain Pindus and
								running through Dolopia, and through the territories of the Agraeans
								and the Amphilochians, and through most part of the champaign of
								Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and falling into
								the sea by the city of the Oeniades, which also it moateth about
								with fens, by the abundance of water maketh it hard lying there for
								an army in time of winter.

Also most of the islands Echinades lie just over against Oenia, hard
								by the mouth of Achelöus. 
							 And the river, being a great one, continually heapeth together the
								gravel, insomuch that some of those islands are become continent
								already; 
							 and the like in short time is expected by the rest.

For not only the stream of the river is swift, broad, and turbidous,
								but also the islands themselves stand thick, and, because the gravel
								cannot pass, are joined one to another, lying in and out, not in a
								direct line nor so much as to give the water his course directly
								forward into the sea. 
							 These islands are all desert and but small ones.

It is reported that Apollo by his oracle did assign this place for an
								habitation to Alcmaeon the son of Amphiareus, at such time as he
								wandered up and down for the killing of his mother, telling him 
 that he should never be free from the
										terrors that haunted him till he had found out and seated
										himself in such a land as when he slew his mother, the sun
										had never seen nor was then land because all other lands
										were polluted by him. 
 Hereupon being at a nonplus,
								as they say, with much ado he observed this ground congested by the
								river Achelöus and thought there was enough cast up to serve his
								turn already since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after
								which it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer.

Therefore, seating himself in the places about the Oeniades, he
								reigned there and named the country after the name of his son
								Acarnas. 
							 Thus goes the report, as we have heard it concerning Alcmaeon.

But Phormio and the Athenians, leaving Acarnania and returning to
								Naupactus, in the very beginning of the spring came back to Athens
								and brought with them such galleys as they had taken and the freemen
								they had taken prisoners in their fights at sea, who were again set
								at liberty by exchange of man for man.

So ended that winter, and the third year of the war written by
								Thucydides.

The summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, at
								the time when corn was at the highest, entered with their army into
								Attica under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king
								of the Lacedaemonians, and there set them down and wasted the
								territory about.

And the Athenian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy
								where they thought fit and kept back the multitude of light-armed
								soldiers from going out before the men of arms and infesting the
								places near the city.

And when they had stayed as long as their victual lasted, they
								returned and were dissolved according to their cities.

After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos immediately, all
								but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians, which though they would
								have done before the war and the Lacedaemonians would not then
								receive them, yet even now they were forced to revolt sooner than
								they had intended to do.

For they stayed to have first straitened the mouth of their haven
								with dams of earth, to have finished their walls and their galleys
								then in building, and to have gotten in all that was to come out of
								Pontus, as archers, and victual, and whatsoever else they had sent
								for.

But the Tenedians, with whom they were at odds, and the Methymnaeans,
								and of the Mytilenaeans themselves certain particular men upon
								faction, being hosts to the Athenians, made known unto them that the
								Lesbians were forced to go all into Mytilene; 
							 that by the help of the Lacedaemonians and their kindred, the
								Boeotians, they hastened all manner of provision necessary for a
								revolt; 
							 and that unless it were presently prevented, all Lesbos would be
								lost.

The Athenians, afflicted with the disease, and with the war now on
								foot and at the hottest, thought it a dangerous matter that Lesbos,
								which had a navy and was of strength entire, should thus be added to
								the rest of their enemies, and at first received not the
								accusations, holding them therefore the rather feigned because they
								would not have them true. 
							 But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mytilene and could not
								persuade them to dissolve themselves and undo their preparation,
								they then feared the worst and would have prevented them,

and to that purpose suddenly sent out the forty galleys made ready
								for Peloponnesus with Cleippedes and two other commanders.

For they had been advertised that there was a holiday of Apollo
								Maloeis to be kept without the city and that to the celebration
								thereof the Mytilenaeans were accustomed to come all out of the
								town; 
							 and they hoped, making haste, to take them there unawares. 
							 And if the attempt succeeded, it was well; 
							 if not, they might command the Mytilenaeans to deliver up their
								galleys and to demolish their walls; 
							 or they might make war against them if they refused.

So these galleys went their way. 
							 And ten galleys of Mytilene which then chanced to be at Athens, by
								virtue of their league to aid them, the Athenians stayed and cast
								into prison the men that were in them.

In the meantime a certain man went from Athens into Euboea by sea and
								then by land to Geraestus and, finding there a ship ready to put
								off, having the wind favourable, arrived in Mytilene three days
								after he set forth from Athens and gave them notice of the coming of
								the fleet. 
							 Hereupon they not only went not out to Maloeis, as was expected, but
								also stopped the gaps of their walls and ports where they were left
								unfinished and placed guards to defend them.

When the Athenians not long after arrived and saw this, the
								commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mytilenaeans what they had
								in charge, which not hearkened unto, they presently fell to the
								war.

The Mytilenaeans, unprovided and compelled to a war on such a sudden,
								put out some few galleys before the haven to fight; 
							 but being driven in again by the galleys of Athens, they called to
								the Athenian commanders to parley, desiring, if they could upon
								reasonable conditions, to get the galleys for the present sent
								away.

And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions, he also fearing
								they should be too weak to make war against the whole island.

When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mytilenaeans amongst others
								sent to Athens one of those that had given intelligence there of
								their design, and had repented him after of the same, to try if they
								could persuade them to withdraw their fleet from them as not
								intending any innovation.

Withal they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedaemon,
								undiscovered of the fleet of the Athenians which was riding at
								anchor in Malea to the north of the city, being without any
								confidence of their success at Athens.

And these men, after an ill voyage through the wide sea, arriving at
								Lacedaemon, negotiated the sending of aid from thence.

But when their ambassadors were come back from Athens without effect,
								the Mytilenaeans and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne (for
								these, together with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and some few other
								their confederates, aided the Athenians), prepared themselves for
								the war. 
							 And the Mytilenaeans with the whole strength of the city made a sally
								upon the Athenian camp and came to a battle;

wherein, though the Mytilenaeans had not the worse, yet they lay not
								that night without the walls nor durst trust to their strength but
								retiring into the town, lay quiet there, expecting to try their
								fortune with the accession of such forces as (if any came) they were
								to have from Peloponnesus. 
							 For there were now come into the city one Meleas a Laconian and
								Hermiondas a Theban, who, having been sent out before the revolt but
								unable to arrive before the coming of the Athenian fleet, secretly
								after the end of the battle entered the haven in a galley and
								persuaded them to send another galley along with them with other
								ambassadors to Sparta, which they did.

But the Athenians, much confirmed by this the Mytilenaeans'
								cessation, called in their confederates (who, because they saw no
								assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner in than was
								thought they would have done) and, riding at anchor to the south of
								the city, fortified two camps, on either side one, and brought their
								galleys before both the ports and so quite excluded the Mytilenaeans
								from the use of the sea.

As for the land, the Athenians held so much only as lay near their
								camps, which was not much; 
							 and the Mytilenaeans and other Lesbians, that were now come to aid
								them, were masters of the rest. 
							 For Malea served the Athenians for a station only for their galleys
								and to keep their market in. 
							 And thus proceeded the war before Mytilene.

About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians sent likewise
								thirty galleys into Peloponnesus under the conduct of Asopius the
								son of Phormio. 
							 For the Acarnanians had desired them to send some son or kinsman of
								Phormio for general into those parts.

These, as they sailed by, wasted the maritime country of Laconia;

and then sending back the greatest part of his fleet to Athens,
								Asopius himself with twelve galleys went on to Naupactus. 
							 And afterwards, having raised the whole power of Acarnania, he made
								war upon the Oeniades and both entered with his galleys into the
								river of Achelöus and with his land forces wasted the territory.

But when the Oeniades would not yield, he disbanded his land forces
								and sailed with his galleys to Leucas and landed his soldiers on the
								territory of Neritum, but in going off was by those of the country
								that came out to defend it and by some few of the garrison soldiers
								there both himself and part of his company slain.

And having upon truce received from the Leucadians their dead bodies,
								they went their ways.

Now the ambassadors of the Mytilenaeans that went out in the first
								galley, having been referred by the Lacedaemonians to the general
								meeting of the Grecians at Olympia to the end they might determine
								of them together with the rest of the confederates, went to Olympia
								accordingly. 
							 It was that Olympiad wherein Dorieus of Rhodes was the second time
								victor.

And when after the solemnity they were set in council, the
								ambassadors spake unto them in this manner:

"Men of Lacedaemon and confederates, we know the received custom of
								the Grecians. 
							 For they that take into league such as revolt in the wars and
								relinquish a former league, though they like them as long as they
								have profit by them, yet accounting them but traitors to their
								former friends, they esteem the worse of them in their judgment.

And to say the truth, this judgment is not without good reason when
								they that revolt and they from whom the revolt is made are mutually
								like minded and affected, and equal in provision and strength, and
								no just cause of their revolt given. 
							 But now between us and the Athenians it is not so.

Nor let any man think the worse of us for that having been honoured
								by them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of danger.

"For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek to come
								into league with you, shall be to make good the justice and honesty
								of our revolt. 
							 For we know there can be neither firm friendship between man and man
								nor any communion between city and city to any purpose whatsoever
								without a mutual opinion of each other's honesty, and also a
								similitude of customs otherwise; 
							 for in the difference of minds is grounded the diversity of
								actions.

"As for our league with the Athenians, it was first made when you
								gave over the Medan war, and they remained to prosecute the relics
								of that business.

Yet we entered not such a league as to be their helpers in bringing
								the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians but to set free the
								Grecians from the servitude of the Medes.

And as long as they led us as equals, we followed them with much
								zeal: but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes
								and led us to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then
								but be afraid.

And the confederates, through the multitude of distinct counsels
								unable to unite themselves for resistance, fell all but ourselves
								and the Chians into their subjection. 
							 And we, having still our own laws and being in name a free state,
								followed them to the wars;

but so, as by the examples of their former actions, we held them not
								any longer for faithful leaders. 
							 For it was not probable when they had subdued those whom together
								with us they took into league but that, when they should be able,
								they would do the like also by the rest.

"It is true that if we were now in liberty all, we might be the
								better assured that they would forbear to innovate; 
							 but since they have under them the greatest part already, in all
								likelihood they will take it ill to deal on equal terms with us
								alone and, the rest yielding, to let us only stand up as their
								equals. 
							 Especially when by how much they are become stronger by the
								subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are we become
								desolate.

But the equality of mutual fear is the only band of faith in
								leagues.

For he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the
								odds of strength, will abstain from coming on. 
							 Now the reason why they have left us yet free is no other but that
								they may have a fair colour to lay upon their domination over the
								rest and because it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us
								in by policy than by force.

For therein they made use of us for an argument that having equal
								vote with them we would never have followed them to the wars if
								those against whom they led us had not done the injury:

and thereby also they brought the stronger against the weaker and,
								reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker by
								removing the rest. 
							 Whereas if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both
								their own strength and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued
								them so easily.

Likewise our navy kept them in some fear, lest united and added to
								yours or to any other, it might have created them some danger.

Partly also we escaped by our observance toward their commons and
								most eminent men from time to time.

But yet we still thought we could not do so long, considering the
								examples they have showed us in the rest, if this war should not
								have fallen out.

"What friendship then or assurance of liberty was this when we
								received each other with alienated affections: when whilst they had
								wars, they for fear courted us; 
							 and when they had peace, we for fear courted them: and whereas in
								others good will assureth loyalty, in us it was the effect of
								fear? 
							 So it was more for fear than love that we remained their
								confederates; 
							 and whomsoever security should first embolden, he was first likely by
								one means or other to break the league.

Now if any man think we did unjustly to revolt upon the expectation
								of evil intended without staying to be certain whether they would do
								it or not, he weigheth not the matter aright.

For if we were as able to contrive evil against them and again to
								defer it, as they can against us, being thus equal, what needed us
								to be at their discretion? 
							 But seeing it is in their hands to invade at pleasure, it ought to be
								in ours to anticipate.

"Upon these pretensions, therefore, and causes, men of Lacedaemon and
								confederates, we have revolted, the which are both clear enough for
								the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty
								enough to affright, and compel us to take some course for our own
								safety, which we would have done before, when before the war we sent
								ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not because you would
								not then admit us into your league. 
							 And now when the Boeotians invited us to it, we presently obeyed. 
							 Wherein we thought we made a double revolt, one from the Grecians, in
								ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians and helping to set
								them free, and another from the Athenians, in breaking first and not
								staying to be destroyed by them hereafter.

But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit and before we
								were provided for it. 
							 For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to
								admit us into the league and send us the speedier aid, thereby the
								better at once both to defend those you ought to defend and to annoy
								your enemies.

Whereof there was never better opportunity than at present.

For the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great
								expenses consumed and their navy divided, part upon your own coasts
								and part upon ours, it is not likely they should have many galleys
								to spare in case you again this summer invade them both by sea and
								land, but that they should either be unable to resist the invasion
								of your fleet or be forced to come off from both our coasts.

And let not any man conceive that you shall herein at your own danger
								defend the territory of another. 
							 For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. 
							 For the war will not be, as a man would think, in Attica but there
								from whence cometh the profit to Attica.

This profit is the revenue they have from the confederates, which, if
								they subdue us, will still be greater. 
							 For neither will any other revolt; 
							 and all that is ours will accrue unto them, and we shall be worse
								handled besides than those that were under them before.

But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a
								city that hath a great navy, the thing you most stand in need of,
								and also easily overthrow the Athenians by subduction of their
								confederates because everyone will then be more confident to come
								in, and you shall avoid the imputation of not assisting such as
								revolt unto you. 
							 And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your
								strength in this war will be much the more confirmed.

In reverence therefore of the hopes which
										the Grecians have reposed in you and of the presence of
										Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here we are in a manner
										suppliants to you, receive the Mytilenaeans into league and
										aid us. 
									 And do not cast us off, who (though, as to the exposing of
										our persons, the danger be our own) shall bring a common
										profit to all Greece if we prosper and a more common
										detriment to all the Grecians if, through your
										inflexibleness, we miscarry.

Be you therefore men such as the Grecians esteem you and our
										fears require you to be.

In this manner spake the Mytilenaeans. 
							 And the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, when they had heard
								and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league with the
								Lesbians but also again to make an invasion into Attica. 
							 And to that purpose the Lacedaemonians appointed their confederates
								there present to make as much speed as they could with two parts of
								their forces into the isthmus; 
							 and they themselves being first there prepared engines in the isthmus
								for the drawing up of galleys, with intention to carry the navy from
								Corinth to the other sea that lieth towards Athens, and to set upon
								them both by sea and land.

And these things diligently did they. 
							 But the rest of the confederates assembled but slowly, being busied
								in the gathering in of their fruits and weary of warfare.

The Athenians, perceiving all this preparation to be made upon an
								opinion of their weakness and desirous to let them see they were
								deceived as being able, without stirring the fleet at Lesbos, easily
								to master the fleet that should come against them out of
								Peloponnesus, manned out a hundred galleys and embarked therein
								generally, both citizens (except those of the degree of
								Pentacosiomedimni and Horsemen) and also strangers that dwelt
								amongst them, and sailing to the isthmus made a show of their
								strength and landed their soldiers in such parts of Peloponnesus as
								they thought fit.

When the Lacedaemonians saw things so contrary to their expectation,
								they thought it false which was spoken by the Lesbian ambassadors,
								and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their confederates were
								not arrived and that news was brought of the wasting of the
								territory near their city by the thirty galleys formerly sent about
								Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went home again,

and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, and intimated to
								the cities rateably to furnish forty galleys, and appointed Alcidas,
								who was to go thither with them, for admiral.

And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians gone, went
								likewise home with their hundred galleys.

About the time that this fleet was out, they had surely the most
								galleys (besides the beauty of them) together in action in these
								employment; 
							 yet in the beginning of the war they had both as good and more in
								number.

For a hundred attended the guard of Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; 
							 and another hundred were about Peloponnesus, besides those that were
								at Potidaea and other places, so that in one summer they had in all
								two hundred and fifty sail.

And this, together with Potidaea, was it that most exhausted their
								treasure.

For the men of arms that besieged the city had each of them two
								drachmes a day, one for himself and another for his man, and were
								three thousand in number that were sent thither at first and
								remained to the end of the siege, besides sixteen hundred more that
								went with Phormio and came away before the town was won. 
							 And the galleys had all the same pay. 
							 In this manner was their money consumed and so many galleys employed,
								the most indeed that ever they had manned at once.

About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were in the isthmus, the
								Mytilenaeans marched by land, both they and their auxiliaries,
								against Methymne in hope to have had it betrayed unto them and,
								having assaulted the city, when it succeeded not the way they looked
								for, they went thence to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus; 
							 and after they had settled the affairs of those places and made
								strong their walls returned speedily home.

When these were gone, the Methymnaeans likewise made war upon
								Antissa; 
							 but beaten by the Antisaeans and some auxiliaries that were with
								them, they made haste again to Methymne with the loss of many of
								their soldiers.

But the Athenians being advertised hereof and understanding that the
								Mytilenaeans were masters of the land and that their own soldiers
								there were not enough to keep them in, sent thither, about the
								beginning of autumn, Paches, the son of Epicurus, with a thousand
								men of arms of their own city,

who, supplying the place of rowers themselves, arrived at Mytilene
								and ingirt it with a single wall, save that in some places, stronger
								by nature than the rest, they only built turrets and placed guards
								in them.

So that the city was every way strongly besieged, both by sea and
								land, and the winter began.

The Athenians, standing in need of money for the siege, both
								contributed themselves and sent thither two hundred talents of this
								their first contribution, and also dispatched Lysicles and four
								others with twelve galleys to levy money amongst the
								confederates.

But Lysicles, after he had been to and fro and gathered money in
								divers places, as he was going up from Myus through the plains of
								Maeander in Caria as far as to the hill Sandius, was set upon there
								by the Carians and Anaeitans and himself with a great part of his
								soldiers slain.

The same winter the Plataeans (for they were besieged by the
								Peloponnesians and Boeotians), pressed now with want of victual and
								hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other means of safety
								appearing, took counsel, both they and the Athenians that were
								besieged with them, at first all to go out and, if they could, to
								pass over the wall of the enemy by force. 
							 The authors of this attempt, were Theaenetus the son of Tolmidas, a
								soothsayer, and Eupompidas the son of Daimachus, one of their
								commanders.

But half of them afterwards, by one means or other, for the greatness
								of the danger shrunk from it again; 
							 but two hundred and twenty or thereabouts voluntarily persisted to go
								out in this manner.

They made them ladders fit for the height of the enemy's wall; 
							 the wall they measured by the lays of bricks on the part toward the
								town where it was not plastered over; 
							 and divers men at once numbered the lays of bricks, whereof, though
								some missed, yet the greatest part took the reckoning just,
								especially numbering them so often and at no great distance but
								where they might easily see the part to which their ladders were to
								be applied, and so by guess of the thickness of one brick took the
								measure of their ladders.



As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built. 
							 It consisted of a double circle, one towards Plataea and another
								outward in case of an assault from Athens. 
							 These two walls were distant one from the other about sixteen
								foot;

and that sixteen foot of space which was betwixt them was disposed
								and built into cabins for the watchmen, which was so joined and
								continued one to another that the whole appeared to be one thick
								wall with battlements on either side.

At every ten battlements stood a great tower of a just breadth to
								comprehend both walls and reach from the outmost to the inmost front
								of the whole, so that there was no passage by the side of a tower
								but through the midst of it.

And such nights as there happened any storm of rain, they used to
								quit the battlements of the wall and to watch under the towers, as
								being not far asunder and covered beside overhead. 
							 Such was the form of the wall wherein the Peloponnesians kept their
								watch.

The Plataeans, after they were ready and had attended a tempestuous
								night, and withal moonless, went out of the city and were conducted
								by the same men that were the authors of the attempt. 
							 And first they passed the ditch that was about the town and then came
								up close to the wall of the enemy, who, because it was dark, could
								not see them coming; 
							 and the noise they made as they went could not be heard for the
								blustering of the wind.

And they came on besides at a good distance one from the other, that
								they might not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms, and were
								but lightly armed and not shod but on the left foot for the more
								steadiness in the wet.

They came thus to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower
								and tower, knowing that there was now no watch kept there. 
							 And first came they that carried the ladders and placed them to the
								wall: then twelve lightly armed, only with a dagger and a
								breastplate, went up, led by Ammeas the son of Coroebus, who was the
								first that mounted; 
							 and they that followed him went up into either tower six. 
							 To these succeeded others lightly armed that carried the darts for
								whom they that came after carried targets at their backs that they
								might be the more expedite to get up, which targets they were to
								deliver to them when they came to the enemy.

At length, when most of them were ascended, they were heard by the
								watchmen that were in the towers.

For one of the Plataeans taking hold of the battlements threw down a
								tile which made a noise in the fall. 
							 And presently there was an alarm, and the army ran to the wall. 
							 For in the dark and stormy night they knew not what the danger was,
								and the Plataeans that were left in the city came forth withal and
								assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side to
								that where their men went over.

So that though they were all in a tumult in their several places, yet
								not any of them that watched durst stir to the aid of the rest nor
								were able to conjecture what had happened.

But those three hundred that were appointed to assist the watch upon
								all occasions of need went without the wall and made towards the
								place of the clamour.

They also held up the fires, by which they used to make known the
								approach of enemies, towards Thebes. 
							 But then the Plataeans likewise held out many other fires from the
								wall of the city, which for that purpose they had before prepared,
								to render the fires of the enemy insignificant, and that the
								Thebans, apprehending the matter otherwise than it was, might
								forbear to send help till their men were over and had recovered some
								place of safety.

In the meantime those Plataeans, which having scaled the wall first
								and slain the watch were now masters of both the towers, not only
								guarded the passages by standing themselves in the entries but also,
								applying ladders from the wall to the towers and conveying many men
								to the top, kept the enemies off with shot both from above and
								below. 
							 In the mean space, the greatest number of them having reared to the
								wall many ladders at once and beaten down the battlements passed
								quite over between the towers.

And ever as any of them got to the other side, they stood still upon
								the brink of the ditch without and with arrows and darts kept off
								those that came by the outside of the wall to hinder their
								passage.

And when the rest were over, then last of all, and with much ado,
								came they also down to the ditch which were in the two towers. 
							 And by this time the three hundred that were to assist the watch came
								and set upon them and had lights with them,

by which means the Plataeans that were on the further brink of the
								ditch discerned them the better from out of the dark and aimed their
								arrows and darts at their most disarmed parts; 
							 for standing in the dark, the lights of the enemy made the Plataeans
								the less discernible, insomuch as these last passed the ditch,
								though with difficulty and force.

For the water in it was frozen over, though not so hard as to bear,
								but watery, and such as when the wind is at east rather than at
								north. 
							 And the snow which fell that night, together with so great a wind as
								that was, had very much increased the water, which they waded
								through with scarce their heads above. 
							 But yet the greatness of the storm was the principal means of their
								escape.

From the ditch the Plataeans in troop took the way towards Thebes,
								leaving on the left hand the temple of Juno built by Androcrates,
								both for that they supposed they would least suspect the way that
								led to their enemies, and also because they saw the Peloponnesians
								with their lights pursue that way, which by Mount Cithaeron and the
								Oak-heads led to Athens.

The Plataeans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs, forsook the
								Theban way and turned into that which led towards the mountain to
								Erythrae and Hysiae and, having gotten the hills, escaped through to
								Athens, being two hundred and twelve persons of a greater
								number. 
							 For some of them returned into the city before the rest went over,
								and one of their archers was taken upon the ditch without. 
							 And so the Peloponnesians gave over the pursuit and returned to their
								places.

But the Plataeans that were within the city, knowing nothing of the
								event and those that turned back having told them that not a man
								escaped, as soon as it was day sent a herald to entreat a truce for
								the taking up of their dead bodies; 
							 but when they knew the truth, they gave it over. 
							 And thus these men of Plataea passed through the fortification of
								their enemies and were saved.

About the end of the same winter Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, was sent
								in a galley to Mytilene and, coming first to Pyrrha and thence going
								to Mytilene by land, entered the city by the dry channel of a
								certain torrent, which had a passage through the wall of the
								Athenians, undiscovered. 
							 And he told the magistrates that Attica should again be invaded and
								that the forty galleys which were to aid them were coming, and that
								himself was sent afore both to let them know it and withal to give
								order in the rest of their affairs.

Hereupon the Mytilenaeans grew confident and hearkened less to
								composition with the Athenians. 
							 And the winter ended, and the fourth year of this war written by
								Thucydides.

In the beginning of the summer after they had sent Alcidas away with
								the forty-two galleys, whereof he was admiral, unto Mytilene, both
								they and their confederates invaded Attica to the end that the
								Athenians, troubled on both sides, might the less send supply
								against the fleet now gone to Mytilene.

In this expedition Cleomenes was general instead of Pausanias, the
								son of Pleistoanax, who being king was yet in minority; 
							 and Cleomenes was his uncle by the father.

And they now cut down both what they had before wasted and began to
								grow again, and also whatsoever else they had before pretermitted:
								and this was the sharpest invasion of all but the second.

For whilst they stayed to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos, which
								by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they went abroad
								and destroyed most part of the country. 
							 But when nothing succeeded according to their hopes and seeing their
								corn failed, they retired again and were dissolved according to
								their cities.

The Mytilenaeans, in the meantime, seeing the fleet came not from
								Peloponnesus but delayed the time and their victuals failed, were
								constrained to make their composition with the Athenians upon this
								occasion.

Salaethus, when he also expected these galleys no longer, armed the
								commons of the city, who were before unarmed, with intention to have
								made a sally upon the Athenians.

But they, as soon as they had gotten arms, no longer obeyed the
								magistrates but, holding assemblies by themselves, required the rich
								men either to bring their corn to light and divide it amongst them
								all, or else, they said, they would make their composition by
								delivering up the city to the Athenians.

Those that managed the state perceiving this and unable to hinder it,
								knowing also their own danger in case they were excluded out of the
								composition, they all jointly agreed to yield the city to Paches and
								his army with these conditions: 
 to be
										proceeded withal at the pleasure of the people of Athens and
										to receive the army into the city; 
									 and that the Mytilenaeans should send ambassadors to Athens
										about their own business; 
									 and that Paches, till their return, should neither put in
										bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mytilenaean. 
 
								This was the effect of that composition.

But such of the Mytilenaeans as had principally practised with the
								Lacedaemonians, being afraid of themselves, when the army was
								entered the city durst not trust to the conditions agreed on but
								took sanctuary at the altars. 
							 But Paches, having raised them upon promise to do them no injury,
								sent them to Tenedos to be in custody there till the people of
								Athens should have resolved what to do.

After this he sent some galleys to Antissa and took in that town and
								ordered the affairs of his army as he thought convenient.

In the meantime those forty galleys of Peloponnesus which should have
								made all possible haste trifled away the time about Peloponnesus
								and, making small speed in the rest of their navigation, arrived at
								Delos unknown to the Athenians at Athens. 
							 From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconus, they got first
								intelligence of the loss of Mytilene. 
							 But to know the truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus in
								Erythraea.

It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mytilene that they
								arrived at Embatus where, understanding the certainty, they went to
								council about what they were to do upon the present occasion; 
							 and Teutiaplus, an Eleian, delivered his opinion to this effect:

Alcidas, and the rest that have command of
										the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my
										opinion, to go to Mytilene as we are before advice be given
										of our arrival.

For in all probability we shall find the city, in respect they
									have but lately won it, very weakly guarded and to the sea
									(where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong) not
									guarded at all. 
								 It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in
									one house and some in another, carelessly as victors.

Therefore if we fall upon them suddenly and by night, I think,
									with the help of those within, if any be left there that will
									take our part, we may be able to possess ourselves of the
									city.

And we shall never fear the danger if we but think this: that
										all stratagems of war whatsoever are no more but such
										occasions as this, which, if a commander avoid in himself
										and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for
										the most part have good success.

Thus said he, but prevailed not with Alcidas. 
							 And some others, fugitives of lonia and those Lesbians that were with
								him in the fleet, gave him counsel that, seeing he feared the danger
								of this, he should seize some city of Ionia or Cume in Aeolia, that
								having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence
								force Ionia to revolt, whereof there was hope because the Ionians
								would not be unwilling to see him there; 
							 and if they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great
								revenue and withal put them to maintain a fleet against them, it
								would be a great exhausting of their treasure. 
							 They said besides that they thought they should be able to get
								Pissuthnes to join with them in the war.

But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this
								opinion that since they were come too late to Mytilene, they were
								best to return speedily into Peloponnesus.

Whereupon putting off from Embatus, he sailed by the shore to
								Myonnesus of the Teians and there slew most of the prisoners he had
								taken by the way.

After this he put in at Ephesus; 
							 and thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anaea and
								told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at
								liberty to kill such as had not lift up their hands against him nor
								were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians but confederates to the
								Athenians by constraint, and that, unless he gave over that course,
								he would make few of the enemies his friends but many now friends to
								become his enemies.

Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors he set the Chians and
								some others, all that he had left alive, at liberty. 
							 For when men saw their fleet, they never fled from it but came unto
								them as to Athenians, little imagining that the Athenians being
								masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst have put over to Ionia.

From Ephesus Alcidas went away in haste, indeed fled; 
							 for he had been described by the Salaminia and the Paralus (which by
								chance were then in their course for Athens) whilst he lay at anchor
								about Claros and, fearing to be chased, kept the wide sea, meaning
								by his good will to touch no land till he came into
								Peloponnesus.

But the news of them came to Paches from divers places, especially
								from Erythraea. 
							 For the cities of Ionia being unwalled were afraid extremely lest the
								Peloponnesians, sailing by without intention to stay, should have
								pillaged them as they passed. 
							 But the Salaminia and the Paralus, having seen him at Claros, brought
								the news themselves. 
							 And Paches thereupon made great haste after and followed him as far
								as Latmos the island.

But when he saw he could not reach him, he came back again and
								thought he had a good turn, seeing he could not overtake those
								galleys upon the wide sea that the same were not compelled, by being
								taken in some place near land, to fortify themselves and so to give
								him occasion with guards and galleys to attend them.

As he came by in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of the
								Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and inhabited after
								the town above, through their own sedition, was taken by Itamanes
								and the barbarians. 
							 (This town was taken at the time when Attica was the second time
								invaded by the Peloponnesians.)

They then that came down and dwelt in Notium, falling again into
								sedition, the one part having procured some forces, Arcadians and
								barbarians, of Pissuthnes, kept them in a part of the town which
								they had severed from the rest with a wall; 
							 and there, with such of the Colophonians of the high town as being of
								the Medan faction entered with them, they governed the city at their
								pleasure;

and the other part, which went out from these and were the fugitives,
								brought in Paches. 
							 He, when he had called out Hippias, captain of the Arcadians that
								were within the said wall, with promise, if they should not agree,
								to set him safe and sound within the wall again, and Hippias was
								thereupon come to him, committed him to custody, but without bonds,
								and withal, assaulting the wall on a sudden when they expected not,
								took it and slew as many of the Arcadians and barbarians as were
								within; 
							 and when he had done, brought Hippias in again, according as he had
								promised, but, after he had him there, laid hold on him and caused
								him to be shot to death and restored Notium to the Colophonians,
								excluding only such as had medized.

Afterwards the Athenians sent governors to Notium of their own and,
								having gathered together the Colophonians out of all cities
								whatsoever, seated them there under the law of the Athenians.

Paches, when he came back to Mytilene, took in Pyrrha and Eressus
								and, having found Salaethus the Lacedaemonian hidden in Mytilene,
								apprehended him and sent him, together with those men he had put in
								custody at Tenedos and whomsoever else he thought author of the
								revolt, to Athens.

He likewise sent away the greatest part of his army and with the rest
								stayed and settled the state of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos as
								he thought convenient.

These men, and Salaethus with them, being arrived at Athens, the
								Athenians slew Salaethus presently, though he made them many offers,
								and amongst other to get the army of the Peloponnesians to rise from
								before Plataea, for it was yet besieged.

But upon the rest they went to council and in their passion decreed
								to put them to death, not only those men there present but also all
								the men of Mytilene that were of age, and to make slaves of the
								women and children, laying to their charge the revolt itself in that
								they revolted not being in subjection as others were; 
							 and withal the Peloponnesian fleet, which durst enter into Ionia to
								their aid, had not a little aggravated that commotion. 
							 For by that it seemed that the revolt was not made without much
								premeditation.

They therefore sent a galley to inform Paches of their decree with
								command to put the Mytilenaeans presently to death.

But the next day they felt a kind of repentance in themselves and
								began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was that not the
								authors only but the whole city should be destroyed.

Which when the ambassadors of the Mytilenaeans that were there
								present and such Athenians as favoured them understood, they wrought
								with those that bare office to bring the matter again into debate,
								wherein they easily prevailed, forasmuch as to them also it was well
								known that the most of the city were desirous to have means to
								consult of the same anew.

The assembly being presently met, among the opinions of divers others
								Cleon also, the son of Cleaenetus, who in the former assembly had
								won to have them killed, being of all the citizens most violent and
								with the people at that time far the most powerful, stood forth and
								said in this manner:

"I have often on other occasions thought a democracy incapable of
								dominion over others, but most of all now for this your repentance
								concerning the Mytilenaeans.

For through your own mutual security and openness, you imagine the
								same also in your confederates and consider not that when at their
								persuasion you commit an error or relent upon compassion, you are
								softened thus to the danger of the commonwealth not to the winning
								of the affections of your confederates; 
							 nor do you consider that your government is a tyranny and those that
								be subject to it are against their wills so and are plotting
								continually against you, and obey you not for any good turn, which
								to your own detriment you shall do them, but only for that you
								exceed them in strength, and for no good will.

But the worst mischief of all is this, that nothing we decree shall
								stand firm and that we will not know that a city with the worse
								laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws when they be
								not binding, and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty is more
								profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance, and that the
								more ignorant sort of men do, for the most part, better regulate a
								commonwealth than they that are wiser.

For these love to appear wiser than the laws and in all public
								debatings to carry the victory as the worthiest things wherein to
								show their wisdom, from whence most commonly proceeds the ruin of
								the states they live in. 
							 Whereas the other sort, mistrusting their own wits, are content to be
								esteemed not so wise as the laws and not able to carp at what is
								well spoken by another, and so, making themselves equal judges
								rather than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part
								well.

We therefore should do the like and not be carried away with combats
								of eloquence and wit to give such counsel to your multitude as in
								our own judgments we think not good.

"For my own part, I am of the opinion I was before; 
							 and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of the
								Mytilenaeans in question again and thereby caused delay, which is
								the advantage only of them that do the injury. 
							 For the sufferer by this means comes upon the doer with his anger
								dulled; 
							 whereas revenge, the opposite of injury, is then greatest when it
								follows presently. 
							 I do wonder also what he is that shall stand up now to contradict me
								and shall think to prove that the injuries done us by the
								Mytilenaeans are good for us or that our calamities are any damage
								to our confederates.

For certainly he must either trust in his eloquence to make you
								believe that that which was decreed was not decreed or, moved with
								lucre, must with some elaborate speech endeavour to seduce you. 
							 Now of such matches [of eloquence] as these, the city giveth the
								prizes to others;

but the danger that hence proceedeth, she herself sustaineth.

And of all this you yourselves are the cause, by the evil institution
								of these matches, in that you use to be spectators of words and
								hearers of actions, beholding future actions in the words of them
								that speak well as possible to come to pass and actions already past
								in the orations of such as make the most of them, and that with such
								assurance, as if what you saw with your eyes were not more certain
								than what you hear related.

You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new
								strain but backward to follow any tried advice, slaves to strange
								things, contemners of things usual. 
							 You would everyone chiefly give the best advice;

but if you cannot, then you will contradict those that do. 
							 You would not be thought to come after with your opinion but rather,
								if anything be acutely spoken, to applaud it first and to appear
								ready apprehenders of what is spoken even before it be out, but slow
								to preconceive the sequel of the same. 
							 You would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our life is
								conversant in;

and yet you sufficiently understand not that that is before your
								eyes. 
							 And to speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you are
								rather like unto spectators sitting to hear the contentions of
								sophisters than to men that deliberate of the state of a
								commonwealth.

"To put you out of this humour, I say unto you that the Mytilenaeans
								have done us more injury than ever did any one city.

For those that have revolted through the over-hard pressure of our
								government or that have been compelled to it by the enemy, I pardon
								them. 
							 But they that were islanders and had their city walled so as they
								needed not fear our enemies but only by sea, in which case also they
								were armed for them with sufficient provision of galleys, and they
								that were permitted to have their own laws and whom we principally
								honoured, and yet have done thus, what have they done but conspired
								against us and rather warred upon us than revolted from us (for a
								revolt is only of such as suffer violence) and joined with our
								bitterest enemies to destroy us? 
							 This is far worse than if they had warred against us for increasing
								of their own power.

But these men would neither take example by their neighbour's
								calamity, who are, all that revolted, already subdued by us; 
							 nor could their own present felicity make them afraid of changing it
								into misery, but being bold against future events and aiming at
								matters above their strength though below their desires, have taken
								arms against us and preferred force before justice. 
							 For no sooner they thought they might get the victory but
								immediately, though without injury done them, they rose against
								us. 
							 But with cities that come to great and unexpected prosperity, it is
								usual to turn insolent;

whereas most commonly that prosperity which is attained according to
								the course of reason is more firm than that which cometh unhoped
								for; 
							 and such cities, as one may say, do more easily keep off an adverse,
								than maintain a happy, fortune.

Indeed we should not formerly have done any honour more to the
								Mytilenaeans than to the rest of our confederates, for then they had
								never come to this degree of insolence. 
							 For it is natural to men to contemn those that observe them and to
								have in admiration such as will not give them way.

Now therefore let them be punished according to their wicked dealing,
								and let not the fault be laid upon a few and the people be
								absolved. 
							 For they have all alike taken arms against us; 
							 and the commons, if they had been constrained to it, might have fled
								hither and have recovered their city afterwards again. 
							 But they, esteeming it the safer adventure to join with the few, are
								alike with them culpable of the revolt.

Have also in consideration your confederates; 
							 and if you inflict the same punishment on them that revolt upon
								compulsion of the enemy that you do on them that revolt of their own
								accord, who, think you, will not revolt, though on light pretence,
								seeing that speeding they win their liberty and failing their case
								is not incurable?

Besides, that against every city we must be at a new hazard, both of
								our persons and fortunes. 
							 Wherein with the best success we recover but an exhausted city and
								lose that wherein our strength lieth, the revenue of it; 
							 but miscarrying, we add these enemies to our former and must spend
								that time in warring against our own confederates, which we needed
								to employ against the enemies we have already.

We must not therefore give our confederates
										hope of pardon, either impetrable by words or purchasable by
										money, as if their errors were but such as are commonly
										incident to humanity. 
									 For these did us not an injury unwillingly but wittingly
										conspired against us;

whereas it ought to be involuntary whatsoever is pardonable. 
								 Therefore both then at first, and now again, I maintain that you
									ought not to alter your former decree nor to offend in any of
									these three most disadvantageous things to empire, pity, delight
									in plausible speeches, and lenity.

As for pity, it is just to show it on them that are like us and
									will have pity again but not upon such as not only would not
									have had pity upon us but must also of necessity have been our
									enemies forever hereafter. 
								 And for the rhetoricians that delight you with their orations,
									let them play their prizes in matters of less weight and not in
									such wherein the city for a little pleasure must suffer a great
									damage, but they for their well speaking must well have. 
								 Lastly for lenity, it is to be used towards those that will be
									our friends hereafter rather than towards such as being suffered
									to live will still be as they are, not a jot the less our
									enemies.

In sum I say only this, that if you follow my advice, you shall
									do that which is both just in respect of the Mytilenaeans and
									profitable for yourselves; 
								 whereas if you decree otherwise, you do not gratify them but
									condemn yourselves. 
								 For if these have justly revolted, you must unjustly have had
									dominion over them. 
								 Nay though your dominion be against reason, yet if you resolve to
									hold it, you must also, as a matter conducing thereunto, against
									reason punish them; 
								 or else you must give your dominion over, that you may be good
									without danger.

But if you consider what was likely they would have done to you
									if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them worthy the same
									punishment nor be less sensible, you that have escaped, than
									they that have conspired, especially they having done the injury
									first.

For such as do an injury without precedent cause persecute most,
									and even to the death, him they have done it to, as jealous of
									the danger his remaining enemy may create him; 
								 for he that is wronged without cause and escapeth will commonly
									be more cruel than if it were against any enemy on equal
									quarrel.

Let us not therefore betray ourselves, but in contemplation of
									what you were near suffering and how you once prized above all
									things else to have them in your power, requite them now
									accordingly. 
								 Be not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forget
									the danger that hung over our own heads so lately. 
								 Give not only unto these their deserved punishment but also unto
									the rest of our confederates a clear example that death is their
									sentence whensoever they shall rebel. 
								 Which when they know, you shall the less often have occasion to
									neglect your enemies and fight against your own
									confederates.

To this purpose spake Cleon. 
							 After him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who also in the former
								assembly opposed most the putting of the Mytilenaeans to death,
								stood forth and spake as followeth.

"I will neither blame those who have propounded the business of the
								Mytilenaeans to be again debated nor commend those that find fault
								with often consulting in affairs of great importance. 
							 But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as
								these two, haste and anger, whereof the one is ever accompanied with
								madness and the other with want of judgment.

And whosoever maintaineth that words are not instructors to deeds,
								either he is not wise or doth it upon some private interest of his
								own. 
							 Not wise, if he think that future and not apparent things may be
								demonstrated otherwise than by words; 
							 interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter and knowing that a bad
								cause will not bear a good speech, he go about to deter his opposers
								and hearers by a good calumniation. 
							 But they of all others are most intolerable that when men give public
								advice will accuse them also of bribery.

For if they charged a man with no more but ignorance when he had
								spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion of a fool. 
							 But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place, he
								is still suspected; 
							 and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool but
								also void of honesty.

The commonwealth gets no good by such courses for through fear hereof
								it will want counsellors. 
							 And the state would do their business for the most part well if this
								kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking, for
								they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors.

For a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that
								contradict him but rather to make good his counsel upon liberty of
								speech. 
							 And a wise state ought not either to add unto, or, on the other side,
								to derogate from, the honour of him that giveth good advice, nor yet
								punish, nay, nor disgrace, the man whose counsel they receive
								not.

And then, neither would he that lighteth on good advice deliver
								anything against his own conscience, out of ambition of further
								honour and to please the auditory, nor he that doth not, covet
								thereupon by gratifying the people some way or other that he also
								may endear them.

"But we do here the contrary; 
							 and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give
								the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy for this
								uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the
								commonwealth.

And our custom is to hold good counsel given suddenly no less suspect
								then bad, by which means as he that gives the most dangerous counsel
								must get the same received by fraud, so also he that gives the most
								sound advice is forced by lying to get himself believed.

So that the commonwealth is it alone which, by reason of these
								suspicious imaginations, no man can possibly benefit by the plain
								and open way without artifice. 
							 For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he
								shall presently be suspected of some secret gain unto himself in
								particular.

We, therefore, that in the most important affairs and amidst these
								jealousies do give our advice have need to foresee further than you
								that look not far, and the rather because we stand accountable for
								our counsel, and you are to render no account of your hearing
								it.

For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be
								the more moderate judges. 
							 But now, according to the passion that takes you when at any time
								your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that
								gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own that were in
								fault as well as his.

"For my own part, I stood not forth with any purpose of contradiction
								in the business of the Mytilenaeans nor to accuse any man. 
							 For we contend not now, if we be wise, about the injury done by them
								but about the wisest counsel for ourselves.

For how great soever be their fault, yet I would never advise to have
								them put to death unless it be for our profit, [nor yet would I
								pardon them,] though they were pardonable, unless it be good for the
								commonwealth.

And in my opinion, our deliberation now is of the future rather than
								of the present. 
							 And whereas Cleon contendeth that it will be profitable for the
								future to put them to death in that it will keep the rest from
								rebelling, I, contending likewise for the future, affirm the
								contrary.

And I desire you not to reject the profit of my advice for the fair
								pretexts of his, which agreeing more with your present anger against
								the Mytilenaeans may quickly perhaps win your consent. 
							 We plead not judicially with the Mytilenaeans so as to need arguments
								of equity, but we consult of them which way we may serve ourselves
								of them to our most advantage hereafter.

"I say, therefore, that death hath been in states ordained for a
								punishment of many offences, and those not so great but far less
								than this. 
							 Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves; 
							 nor did any man ever yet enter into a practice which he knew he could
								not go through with.

And a city when it revolteth, supposeth itself to be better
								furnished, either of themselves or by their confederates, than it
								is, or else it would never take the enterprise in hand.

They have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; 
							 nor is there any law that can prevent it. 
							 For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting them
								still, in hope to be less annoyed by malefactors. 
							 And it is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old even
								upon the most heinous crimes; 
							 but that in tract of time, men continuing to transgress, they were
								extended afterwards to the taking away of life;

and yet they still transgress. 
							 And therefore, either some greater terror than death must be devised,
								or death will not be enough for coercion. 
							 For poverty will always add boldness to necessity; 
							 and wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. 
							 And the other [middle] fortunes, they also through human passion,
								according as they are severally subject to some insuperable one or
								other, impel men to danger.

But hope and desire work this effect in all estates. 
							 And this as the leader, that as the companion; 
							 this contriving the enterprise, that suggesting the success are the
								cause of most crimes that are committed, and being least discerned,
								are more mischievous than evils seen.

Besides these two, fortune also puts men forward as much as anything
								else. 
							 For presenting herself sometimes unlooked for, she provoketh some to
								adventure, though not provided as they ought for the purpose, and
								especially cities because they venture for the greatest matters, as
								liberty and dominion over others; 
							 and amongst a generality, everyone, though without reason, somewhat
								the more magnifies himself in particular.

In a word, it is a thing impossible and of great simplicity to
								believe when human nature is earnestly bent to do a thing that by
								force of law or any other danger it can be diverted.

"We must not, therefore, relying on the security of capital
								punishment, decree the worst against them nor make them desperate,
								as if there were no place to repent and, as soon as they can, to
								cancel their offence. 
							 For observe:

if a city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would now
								compound whilst it were able both to pay us our charges for the
								present and our tribute for the time to come. 
							 But the way that Cleon prescribeth, what city, think you, would not
								provide itself better than this did and endure the siege to the very
								last if to compound late and soon be all one?

And how can it be but detriment to us to be at charge of long sieges
								through their obstinacy and, when we have taken a city to find it
								exhausted and to lose the revenue of it for the future? 
							 And this revenue is the only strength we have against our
								enemies.

We are not then to be exact judges in the punition of offenders but
								to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may have our
								confederate cities, such as they may be able to pay us tribute; 
							 and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws but by the
								providence of our own actions.

But we to the contrary, when we recover a city which, having been
								free and held under our obedience by force hath revolted justly,
								think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon
								them.

Whereas we ought rather not mightily to punish a free city revolted
								but mightily to look to it before it revolt and to prevent the
								intention of it, but when we have overcome them, to lay the fault
								upon as few as we can.

"Consider also, if you follow the advice of Cleon, how much you shall
								offend likewise in this other point.

For in all your cities the commonalty are now your friends and either
								revolt not with the few, or, if they be compelled to it by force,
								they presently turn enemies to them that caused the revolt; 
							 whereby when you go to war, you have the commons of the adverse city
								on your side.

But if you shall destroy the commonalty of the Mytilenaeans, which
								did neither partake of the revolt and as soon as they were armed
								presently delivered the city into your hands, you shall first do
								unjustly to kill such as have done you service, and you shall effect
								a work besides which the great men do everywhere most desire. 
							 For when they have made a city to revolt, they shall have the people
								presently on their side, you having foreshown them by the example
								that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same
								punishment.

Whereas indeed, though they were guilty, yet we ought to dissemble
								it, to the end that the only party now our friend may not become our
								enemy.

And for the assuring of our dominion, I think it far more profitable
								voluntarily to put up an injury than justly to destroy such as we
								should not. 
							 And that same both justice and profit of revenge, alleged by Cleon,
								can never possibly be found together in the same thing.

You, therefore, upon knowledge that this is
										the best course, not upon compassion or lenity (for neither
										would I have you won by that) but upon consideration of what
										hath been advised, be ruled by me, and proceed to judgment
										at your own leisure against those whom Paches hath sent
										hither as guilty, and suffer the rest to enjoy their
										city.

For that will be both good for the future and also of present
									terror to the enemy. 
								 For he that consulteth wisely is a sorer enemy than he that
									assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly.

Thus spake Diodotus. 
							 After these two opinions were delivered, the one most opposite to the
								other, the Athenians were at contention which they should
								decree; 
							 and at the holding up of hands they were both sides almost equal, but
								yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed.

Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another galley, lest not
								arriving before the former they should find the city already
								destroyed. 
							 The first galley set forth before the second a day and a night.

But the Mytilenaean ambassadors having furnished this latter with
								wine and barley cakes and promised them great rewards if they
								overtook the other galley, they rowed diligently, at one and the
								same time both plying their oars and taking their refection of the
								said barley cakes steeped in wine and oil; 
							 and by turns part of them slept, and the other part rowed.

It happened also that there blew no wind against them; 
							 and the former galley making no great haste, as going on so sad an
								errand, whereas the former proceeded in the manner before mentioned,
								arrived indeed first, but only so much as Paches had read the
								sentence and prepared to execute what they had decreed. 
							 But presently after came in the other galley and saved the city from
								being destroyed. 
							 So near were the Mytilenaeans to the danger.

But those whom Paches had sent home as most culpable of the revolt,
								the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death, being in number
								somewhat above a thousand. 
							 They also razed the walls of Mytilene and took from them all their
								galleys.

After which they imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute; 
							 but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnaeans) into
								three thousand parts, three hundred of those parts [of the choicest
								land] they consecrated to the gods.And for the rest, they sent men
								by lot out of their own city to possess it of whom the Lesbians, at
								the rent of two minae of silver yearly upon a lot, had the land
								again to be husbanded by themselves.

The Athenians took in all such towns also as the Mytilenaeans were
								masters of in the continent, which were afterwards made subjects to
								the people of Athens. 
							 Thus ended the business touching Lesbos.

The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos the Athenians, under
								the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made war on Minoa, an
								island adjacent to Megara. 
							 For the Megareans had built a tower in it and served themselves of
								the island for a place of garrison.

But Nicias desired that the Athenians might keep their watch upon
								Megara in that island as being nearer and no more at Budorum and
								Salamis, to the end that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence
								with their galleys undescried nor send out pirates as they had
								formerly done, and to prohibit the importation of all things to the
								Megareans by sea.

Wherefore, when he had first taken two towers that stood out from
								Nisaea, with engines applied from the sea, and so made a free
								entrance for his galleys between the island and the firm land, he
								took it in with a wall also from the continent in that part where it
								might receive aid by a bridge over the marshes; 
							 for it was not far distant from the main land.

And, that being in few days finished, he built a fort in the island
								itself and, leaving there a garrison, carried the rest of his army
								back.

It happened also about the same time of this summer, that the
								Plataeans, having spent their victual and being unable longer to
								hold out, yielded their city in this manner to the
								Peloponnesians.

The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but they within were unable
								to fight. 
							 Whereupon the Lacedaemonian commander, perceiving their weakness,
								would not take the place by force (for he had command to that
								purpose from Lacedaemon, to the end that if they should ever make
								peace with the Athenians with conditions of mutual restitution of
								such cities as on either side had been taken by war, Plataea, as
								having come in of its own accord, might not be thereby recoverable)
								but sent a herald to them who demanded whether or no they would give
								up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lacedaemonians and
								take them for their judges with power to punish the offenders, but
								none without form of justice.

So said the herald, and they (for they were now at the weakest)
								delivered up the city accordingly. 
							 So the Peloponnesians gave the Plataeans food for certain days till
								the judges, which were five, should arrive from Lacedaemon.

And when they were come, no accusation was exhibited; 
							 but calling them man by man, they asked of everyone only this
								question: whether they had done to the Lacedaemonians and their
								confederates in this war any good service.

But the Plataeans, having sued to make their answer more at large and
								having appointed Astymachus the son of Asopolaus and Lacon the son
								of Aeimnestus (who had been heretofore the host of the
								Lacedaemonians) for their speakers, said as followeth:

"Men of Lacedaemon, relying upon you we yielded up our city, not
								expecting to undergo this but some more legal manner of
								proceeding; 
							 and we agreed not to stand to the judgment of others (as now we do)
								but of yourselves only, conceiving we should so obtain the better
								justice. 
							 But now we fear we have been deceived in both.

For we have reason to suspect both that the trial is capital, and
								you, the judges, partial, gathering so much both from that, that
								there hath not been presented any accusation to which we might
								answer, and also from this, that the interrogatory is short and
								such, as if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against
								ourselves and be easily convinced if we lie.

But since we are on all hands in a strait, we are forced (and it
								seems our safest way) to try what we can obtain by pleading. 
							 For, for men in our case the speech not spoken may give occasion to
								some to think, that spoken it had preserved us. 
							 But besides other inconveniences, the means also of persuasion go ill
								on our side.

For if we had not known one another, we might have helped ourselves
								by producing testimony in things you knew not. 
							 Whereas now, all that we shall say will be before men that know
								already what it is. 
							 And we fear not that you mean, because you know us inferior in virtue
								to yourselves, to make that a crime, but lest you bring us to a
								judgment already judged to gratify somebody else.

"Nevertheless, we will produce our reasons of equity against the
								quarrel of the Thebans and withal make mention of our services done
								both to you and to the rest of Greece, and make trial if by any
								means we can persuade you.

As to that short interrogatory, whether we have any way done good in
								this present war to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, or
								not, if you ask us as enemies, we say that, if we have done them no
								good, we have also done them no wrong;

if you ask us as friends, then we say that they rather have done us
								the injury in that they made war upon us. 
							 But in the time of the peace and in the war against the Medes we
								behaved ourselves well;

for the one we brake not first, and in the other we were the only
								Boeotians that joined with you for the delivery of Greece. 
							 For though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by sea at
								Artemisium; 
							 and in the battle fought in this our own territory, we were with
								you; 
							 and whatsoever dangers the Grecians in those times underwent, we were
								partakers of all, even beyond our strength.

And unto you, Lacedaemonians, in particular, when Sparta was in
								greatest affright after the earthquake, upon the rebellion of the
								Helotes and seizing of Ithome, we sent the third part of our power
								to assist you, which you have no reason to forget.

"Such then we showed ourselves in those ancient and most important
								affairs. 
							 It is true, we have been your enemies since; 
							 but for that you are to blame yourselves. 
							 For when oppressed by the Thebans we sought league of you, you
								rejected us and bade us go to the Athenians that were nearer hand,
								yourselves being far off.

Nevertheless, you neither have in this war nor were to have suffered
								at our hands anything that misbecame us.

And if we denied to revolt from the Athenians when you bade us, we
								did you no injury in it. 
							 For they both aided us against the Thebans when you shrunk from us,
								and it was now no more any honesty to betray them, especially having
								been well used by them, and we ourselves having sought their league
								and being made denizens also of their city.

Nay, we ought rather to have followed them in all their commands with
								alacrity. 
							 When you or the Athenians have the leading of the confederates, if
								evil be done, not they that follow are culpable but you that lead to
								the evil.

"The Thebans have done us many other injuries; 
							 but this last, which is the cause of what we now suffer, you
								yourselves know what it was.

For we avenged us but justly of those that in time of peace, and upon
								the day of our novilunial sacrifice, had surprised our city; 
							 and by the law of all nations it is lawful to repel an assailing
								enemy, and therefore there is no reason you should punish us now for
								them.

For if you shall measure justice by your and their present benefit in
								the war, it will manifestly appear that you are not judges of the
								truth but respecters only of your profit.

And yet if the Thebans seem profitable to you now, we and the rest of
								the Grecians were more profitable to you then when you were in
								greater danger. 
							 For though the Thebans are now on your side when you invade
								others; 
							 yet at that time when the barbarian came in to impose servitude on
								all, they were on his.

It is but justice that with our present offence (if we have committed
								any) you compare our forwardness then which you will find both
								greater than our fault and augmented also by the circumstance of
								such a season when it was rare to find any Grecian that durst oppose
								his valour to Xerxes' power, and when they were most commended not
								that with safety helped to further his invasion but that adventured
								to do what was most honest, though with danger.

But we being of that number and honoured for it amongst the first are
								afraid lest the same shall be now a cause of our destruction, as
								having chosen rather to follow the Athenians justly than you
								profitably.

But you should ever have the same opinion in the same case and think
								this only to be profitable that doing what is useful for the present
								occasion, you reserve withal a constant acknowledgment of the virtue
								of your good confederates.

"Consider also that you are an example of honest dealing to the most
								of the Grecians. 
							 Now if you shall decree otherwise than is just (for this judgment of
								yours is conspicuous, you that be praised against us that be not
								blamed), take heed that they do not dislike that good men should
								undergo an unjust sentence, though at the hands of better men, or
								that the spoil of us that have done the Grecians service should be
								dedicated in their temples.

For it will be thought a horrible matter that Plataea should be
								destroyed by Lacedaemonians and that you, whereas your fathers in
								honour of our valour inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at
								Delphi, should now blot it out of all Greece to gratify the
								Thebans.

For we have proceeded to such a degree of calamity that if the Medes
								had prevailed, we must have perished then; 
							 and now the Thebans have overcome us again in you, who were before
								our greatest friends, and have put us to two great hazards, one
								before of famishing if we yielded not, and another now of a capital
								sentence.

And we Plataeans, who even beyond our strength have been zealous in
								the defence of the Grecians, are now abandoned and left unrelieved
								by them all.

"But we beseech you for those gods' sakes, in whose names once we
								made mutual league, and for our valour's sake shown in the behalf of
								the Grecians, to be moved towards us and, if at the persuasion of
								the Thebans you have determined aught against us, to change your
								minds and reciprocally to require at the hands of the Thebans this
								courtesy, that whom you ought to spare, they would be contented not
								to kill and so receive an honest benefit in recompense of a wicked
								one, and not to bestow pleasure upon others and receive wickedness
								upon yourselves in exchange.

For though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done, yet to
								make the infamy of it cease will be work enough.

For being none of your enemies but well-willers and such as have
								entered into the war upon constraint, you cannot put us to death
								with justice.

Therefore, if you will judge uncorruptly, you ought to secure our
								persons and to remember that you received us by our own voluntary
								submission and with hands upheld (and it is the law among Grecians
								not to put such to death), besides that we have from time to time
								been beneficial to you. 
							 For look upon the sepulchres of your fathers whom, slain by the Medes
								and buried in this territory of ours, we have yearly honoured at the
								public charge both with vestments and other rites; 
							 and of such things as our land hath produced, we have offered unto
								them the first fruits of it all, as friends in an amicable land and
								confederates use to do to those that have formerly been their
								fellows in arms.

But now by a wrong sentence you shall do the contrary of this. 
							 For consider this. 
							 Pausanias, as he thought, interred these men in amicable ground and
								amongst their friends. 
							 But you, if you slay us, and of Plataeis make Thebais, what do you
								but leave your fathers and kindred, deprived of the honours they now
								have, in an hostile territory and amongst the very men that slew
								them? 
							 And moreover, put into servitude that soil whereon the Grecians were
								put into liberty? 
							 And make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they prevailed
								against the Medes? 
							 And destroy the patrial sacrifices which were instituted by the
								builders and founders of the same?

These things are not for your glory, men of
									Lacedaemon, nor to violate the common institutions of Greece and
									wrong your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you
									service for the hatred of another when you have received no
									injury from us yourselves, but to spare our lives, to relent, to
									have a moderate compassion in contemplation not only of the
									greatness of the punishment but also of who we are that must
									suffer and of the uncertainty where calamity may light, and that
									undeservedly.

Which we, as becometh us and our need compelleth us to do, cry
									aloud unto the common gods of Greece to persuade you unto
									producing the oath sworn by your fathers to put you in mind; 
								 and also we become here sanctuary men at the sepulchres of your
									fathers, crying out upon the dead not to suffer themselves to be
									in the power of the Thebans nor to let their greatest friends be
									betrayed into the hands of their greatest enemies, remembering
									them of that day upon which, though we have done glorious acts
									in their company, yet we are in danger at this day of most
									miserable suffering.

But to make an end of speaking (which is as necessary so most
									bitter to men in our case because the hazard of our lives cometh
									so soon after), for a conclusion we say that it was not to the
									Thebans that we rendered our city (for we would rather have died
									of famine, the most base perdition of all other), but we came
									out on trust in you. 
								 And it is but justice that if we cannot persuade you, you should
									set us again in the estate we were in and let us undergo the
									danger at our own election.

Also we require you, men of Lacedaemon, not only not to deliver
									us Plataeans, who have been most zealous in the service of the
									Grecians especially being sanctuary men, out of your own hands
									and your own trust into the hands of our most mortal enemies the
									Thebans but also to be our saviours and not to destroy us
									utterly, you that set at liberty all other Grecians.

Thus spake the Plataeans. 
							 But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedaemonians might relent at
								their oration, stood forth and said that since the Plataeans had had
								the liberty of a longer speech (which they thought they should not)
								than for answer to the question was necessary, they also desired to
								speak, and being commanded to say on, spake to this effect:

"If these men had answered briefly to the question and not both
								turned against us with an accusation and also out of the purpose and
								wherein they were not charged made much apology and commendation of
								themselves in things unquestioned, we had never asked leave to
								speak. 
							 But as it is, we are to the one point to answer and to confute the
								other, that neither the fault of us nor their own reputation may do
								them good, but your sentence may be guided by hearing of the truth
								of both.

The quarrel between us and them arose at first from this, that when
								we had built Plataea last of all the cities of Boeotia, together
								with some other places which, having driven out the promiscuous
								nations, we had then in our dominion, they would not (as was
								ordained at first) allow us to be their leaders; 
							 but being the only men of all the Boeotians that transgressed the
								common ordinance of the country when they should have been compelled
								to their duty, they turned unto the Athenians and together with them
								did us many evils, for which they likewise suffered as many from us.

"But when the barbarian invaded Greece, then, say they, that they of
								all the Boeotians only also Medized not. 
							 And this is the thing wherein they both glory most themselves and
								most detract from us.

Now we confess they Medized not because also the Athenians did
								not. 
							 Nevertheless, when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the
								Grecians, in the same kind then of all the Boeotians they only
								Atticized.

But take now into your consideration withal what form of government
								we were in both the one and the other when we did this. 
							 For then had we our city governed neither by an oligarchy with laws
								common to all nor by a democracy; 
							 but the state was managed by a few with authority absolute, than
								which there is nothing more contrary to laws and moderation nor more
								approaching unto tyranny.

And these few, hoping yet further, if the Medes prevailed, to
								increase their own power, kept the people under and furthered the
								coming in of the barbarian. 
							 And so did the whole city, but it was not then master of itself nor
								doth it deserve to be upbraided with what it did when they had no
								laws [but were at the will of others].

But when the Medes were gone and our city had laws, consider now,
								when the Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece and this territory
								of ours with the rest wherein through sedition they had gotten many
								places already, whether by giving them battle at Coroneia and
								defeating them, we delivered not Boeotia from servitude then, and do
								not also now with much zeal assist you in the asserting of the rest,
								and find not more horses and more provision of war than any of the
								confederates besides. 
							 And so much be spoken by way of apology to our Medizing.

"And we will endeavour to prove now that the Grecians have been
								rather wronged by you and that you are more worthy of all manner of
								punishment. 
							 You became, you say, confederates and denizens of Athens for to be
								righted against us.

Against us then only the Athenians should have come with you and not
								you with them have gone to the invasion of the rest, especially when
								if the Athenians would have led you whither you would not, you had
								the league of the Lacedaemonians made with you against the Medes,
								which you so often object, to have resorted unto, which was
								sufficient not only to have protected you from us but, which is the
								main matter, to have secured you to take what course you had
								pleased. 
							 But voluntarily and without constraint you rather chose to follow the
								Athenians.

And you say it had been a dishonest thing to have betrayed your
								benefactors. 
							 But it is more dishonest and more unjust by far to betray the
								Grecians universally, to whom you have sworn, than to betray the
								Athenians alone, especially when these go about to deliver Greece
								from subjection and the other to subdue it.

Besides, the requital you make the Athenians is not proportionable
								nor free from dishonesty. 
							 For you, as you say yourselves, brought in the Athenians to right you
								against injuries; 
							 and you co-operate with them in injuring others. 
							 And howsoever, it is not so dishonest to leave a benefit unrequited
								as to make such a requital, as though justly due cannot be justly
								done.

"But you have made it apparent that even then it was not for the
								Grecians' sake that you alone of all the Boeotians Medized not but
								because the Athenians did not;

yet now you that would do as the Athenians did, and contrary to what
								the Grecians did, claim favour of these for what you did for the
								others' sake. 
							 But there is no reason for that; 
							 but as you have chosen the Athenians, so let them help you in this
								trial.

And produce not the oath of the former league as if that should save
								you now. 
							 For you have relinquished it and, contrary to the same, have rather
								helped the Athenians to subdue the Aeginetae and others than
								hindered them from it. 
							 And this you not only did voluntarily and having laws the same you
								have now, and none forcing you to it as there did us, but also
								rejected our last invitation, a little before the shutting up of
								your city, to quietness and neutrality.

Who can therefore more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in general
								than you that pretend honesty to their ruin? 
							 And those acts wherein formerly, as you say, you have been beneficial
								to the Grecians, you have now made apparent to be none of yours and
								made true proof of what your own nature inclines you to.

For with Athenians you have walked in the way of injustice. 
							 And thus much we have laid open touching our involuntary Medizing and
								your voluntary Atticizing.

"And for this last injury you charge us with, namely, the unlawful
								invading of your city in time of peace and of your new-moon
								sacrifice, we do not think, no not in this action, that we have
								offended so much as you yourselves.

For though we had done unjustly if we had assaulted your city or
								wasted your territory as enemies of our own accord; 
							 yet when the prime men of your own city, both for wealth and
								nobility, willing to discharge you of foreign league and conform you
								to the common institutions of all Boeotia, did of their own accord
								call us in, wherein lieth the injury then? 
							 For they that lead transgress rather than they that follow.

But as we conceive, neither they nor we have transgressed at all. 
							 But being citizens as well as you and having more to hazard, they
								opened their own gates and took us into the city as friends not as
								enemies with intention to keep the ill-affected from being worse and
								to do right to the good, taking upon them to be moderators of your
								councils and not to deprive the city of your persons but to reduce
								you into one body with the rest of your kindred, and not to engage
								you in hostility with any but to settle you in peace with all.

"And for an argument that we did not this as enemies, we did harm to
								no man but proclaimed that if any man were willing to have the city
								governed after the common form of all Boeotia, he should come to
								us.

And you came willingly at first and were quiet. 
							 But afterwards, when you knew we were but few, though we might seem
								to have done somewhat more than was fit to do without the consent of
								your multitude, you did not by us as we did by you, first innovate
								nothing in fact and then with words persuade us to go forth again,
								but contrary to the composition assaulted us. 
							 And for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much; 
							 for they suffered by a kind of law. 
							 But to kill those that held up their hands for mercy, whom taken
								alive you afterwards had promised to spare, was not this a horrible
								cruelty?

You committed in this business three crimes, one in the neck of
								another; 
							 first, the breach of the composition; 
							 then, the death that followed of our men; 
							 and thirdly, the falsifying of your promise to save them if we did no
								hurt to anything of yours in the fields. 
							 And yet you say that we are the transgressors and that you for your
								parts deserve not to undergo a judgment. 
							 But it is otherwise. 
							 And if these men judge aright, you shall be punished now for all your
								crimes at once.

We have herein, men of Lacedaemon, been thus
									large both for your sakes and ours: for yours, to let you see
									that if you condemn them, it will be no injustice; 
								 for ours, that the equity of our revenge may the better
									appear.

Be not moved with the recital of their virtues of old, if any
									they had, which, though they ought to help the wronged, should
									double the punishment of such as commit wickedness because their
									offence doth not become them. 
								 Nor let them fare ever the better for their lamentation or your
									compassion when they cry out upon your fathers' sepulchres and
									their own want of friends.

For we on the other side affirm that the youth of our city
									suffered harder measure from them; 
								 and their fathers, partly slain at Coroneia in bringing Boeotia
									to your confederation and partly alive and now old and deprived
									of their children, make far juster supplication to you for
									revenge. 
								 And pity belongeth to such as suffer undeservedly;

but, on the contrary, when men are worthily punished, as these
									are, it is to be rejoiced at. 
								 And for their present want of friends they may thank
									themselves. 
								 For of their own accord they rejected the better
									confederates.

And the law hath been broken by them, without precedent wrong
									from us, in that they condemned our men spitefully rather than
									judicially, in which point we shall now come short of requiting
									them; 
								 for they shall suffer legally and not, as they say they do, with
									hands upheld from battle but as men that have put themselves
									upon trial by consent.

Maintain therefore, ye Lacedaemonians, the law of the Grecians
									against these men that have transgressed it, and give unto us
									that have suffered contrary to the law the just recompense of
									our alacrity in your service. 
								 And let not the words of these give us a repulse from you; 
								 but set up an example to the Grecians by presenting [unto these
									men] a trial not of words but of facts, which, if they be good,
									a short narration of them will serve the turn; 
								 if ill, compt orations do but veil them.

But if such as have the authority, as you have now, would collect
									the matter to a head and, according as any man should make
									answer thereunto, so proceed to sentence, men would be less in
									the search of fair speeches wherewith to excuse the foulness of
									their actions.

Thus spake the Thebans. 
							 And the Lacedaemonian judges, conceiving their interrogatory to stand
								well, namely, whether they had received any benefit by them or not
								in this present war, for they had indeed intreated them both at
								other times, according to the ancient league of Pausanias after the
								Medan war, to stand neutral, and also a little before the siege the
								Plataeans had rejected their proposition of being common friends to
								both sides according to the same league, taking themselves, in
								respect of these their just offers, to be now discharged of the
								league and to have received evil at their hands, caused them one by
								one to be brought forth and, having asked them again the same
								question, whether they had any way benefited the Lacedaemonians and
								their confederates in this present war or not, as they answered not
								led them aside and slew them, not exempting any.

Of the Plataeans themselves they slew no less than two hundred; 
							 of the Athenians who were besieged with them, twenty-five.

The women they made slaves; 
							 and the Thebans assigned the city for a year, or thereabouts, for a
								habitation to such Megareans as in sedition had been driven from
								their own and to all those Plataeans which, living, were of the
								Theban faction. 
							 But afterwards, pulling it all down to the very foundation, they
								built a hospital in the place near the temple of Juno of two hundred
								foot diameter with chambers on every side in circle both above and
								below, using therein the roofs and doors of the Plataeans'
								buildings. 
							 And of the rest of the stuff that was in the city wall, as brass and
								iron, they made bedsteads and dedicated them to Juno, to whom also
								they built a stone chapel of a hundred foot over.

The land they confiscated and set it to farm afterwards for ten years
								to the Thebans. 
							 So far were the Lacedaemonians alienated from the Plataeans,
								especially, or rather altogether, for the Thebans' sake, whom they
								thought useful to them in the war now on foot.

So ended the business at Plataea in the fourscore and thirteenth year
								after their league made with the Athenians.

The forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which having been sent to aid the
								Lesbians fled, as hath been related, through the wide sea chased by
								the Athenians and tossed by storms on the coast of Crete, came
								thence dispersed into Peloponnesus and found thirteen galleys,
								Leucadians and Ambraciotes, in the haven of Cyllene with Brasidas
								the son of Tellis come hither to be of council with Alcidas.

For the Lacedaemonians, seeing they failed of Lesbos, determined with
								their fleet augmented to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition
								(there being but twelve Athenian galleys about Naupactus), to the
								end they might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should
								come from Athens. 
							 So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves in that.

The sedition in Corcyra began upon the coming home of those captives
								which were taken in the battles by sea at Epidamnus and released
								afterwards by the Corinthians at the ransom, as was voiced, of
								eighty talents for which they had given security to their hosts, but
								in fact for that they had persuaded the Corinthians that they would
								put Corcyra into their power.

These men going from man to man solicited the city to revolt from the
								Athenians. 
							 And two galleys being now come in, one of Athens, another of Corinth,
								with ambassadors from both those states, the Corcyraeans upon
								audience of them both decreed to hold the Athenians for their
								confederates on articles agreed on but withal to remain friends to
								the Peloponnesians as they had formerly been.

There was one Peithias, voluntary host of the Athenians and that had
								been principal magistrate of the people.

Him these men called into judgment and laid to his charge a practice
								to bring the city into the servitude of the Athenians. 
							 He again, being acquit, called in question five of the wealthiest of
								the same men saying they had cut certain stakes in the ground
								belonging to the temples both of Jupiter and of Alcinus, upon every
								of which there lay a penalty of a state.

And the cause going against them, they took sanctuary in the temples
								to the end, the sum being great, they might pay it by portions [as
								they should be taxed].

But Peithias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law
								should proceed. 
							 These five being by the law excluded the senate and understanding
								that Peithias, as long as he was a senator, would cause the people
								to hold for friends and foes the same that were so to the Athenians,
								conspired with the rest and, armed with daggers, suddenly brake into
								the senate-house and slew both Peithias and others, as well private
								men as senators, to the number of about sixty persons; 
							 only a few of those of Peithias his faction escaped in the Athenian
								galley that lay yet in the harbour.

When they had done this and called the Corcyraeans to an assembly,
								they told them that what they had done was for the best and that
								they should not be now in bondage to the Athenians; 
							 and for the future they advised them to be in quiet and to receive
								neither party with more than one galley at once and to take them for
								enemies if they were more. 
							 And when they had spoken, forced them to decree it accordingly.

They also presently sent ambassadors to Athens both to show that it
								was fit for them to do what they had done and also to dissuade such
								Corcyraeans as were fled thither of the other faction from doing
								anything to their prejudice for fear the matter should fall into a
								relapse.

When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors
								themselves as seditious persons and also all those Corcyraeans whom
								they had there prevailed with and sent them to custody in
								Aegina.

In the meantime, upon the coming in of a galley of Corinth with
								ambassadors from Lacedaemon, those that managed the state assailed
								the commons, and overcame them in fight.

And night coming on, the commons fled into the citadel and the higher
								parts of the city where they rallied themselves and encamped and
								made themselves masters of the haven called the Hillaique haven. 
							 But the nobility seized on the market place (where also the most of
								them dwelt) and on the haven on the side toward the continent.

The next day they skirmished a little with shot, and both parts sent
								abroad into the villages to solicit the slaves with promise of
								liberty to take their parts. 
							 And the greatest part of the slaves took part with the commons, and
								the other side had an aid of eight hundred men from the continent.

The next day but one they fought again; 
							 and the people had the victory, having the odds both in strength of
								places and in number of men. 
							 And the women also manfully assisted them, throwing tiles from the
								houses and enduring the tumult even beyond the condition of their
								sex.

The few began to fly about twilight and fearing lest the people
								should even with their shout take the arsenal and so come on and put
								them to the sword, to stop their passage set fire on the houses in
								circle about the market place and upon others near it. 
							 Much goods of merchants was hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the
								wind had risen and carried the flame that way, had been in danger to
								have been destroyed.

When the people had gotten the victory, the Corinthian galley stole
								away; 
							 and most of the auxiliaries got over privily into the continent.

The next day Nicostratus, the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian
								commander, came in with twelve galleys and five hundred Messenian
								men of arms from Naupactus; 
							 and both negotiated a reconciliation and induced them (to the end
								they might agree) to condemn ten of the principal authors of the
								sedition (who presently fled) and to let the rest alone, with
								articles both between themselves and with the Athenians to esteem
								friends and enemies the same the Athenians did.

When he had done this, he would have been gone; 
							 but the people persuaded him before he went to leave behind him five
								of his galleys, the better to keep their adversaries from stirring,
								and to take as many of theirs, which they would man with Corcyraeans
								and send with him.

To this he agreed; 
							 and they made a list of those that should embark, consisting
								altogether of their enemies. 
							 But these, fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary in the temple
								of Castor and Pollux.

But Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them and spake to them to put
								them into courage. 
							 But when he could not prevail, the people, arming themselves on
								pretence that their diffidence to go along with Nicostratus
								proceeded from some evil intention, took away their arms out of
								their houses and would also have killed some of them such as they
								chanced on if Nicostratus had not hindered them.

Others also when they saw this took sanctuary in the temple of Juno,
								and they were in all above four hundred. 
							 But the people fearing some innovation got them by persuasion to rise
								and, conveying them into the island that lieth over against the
								temple of Juno, sent them their necessaries thither.

The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth day after
								the putting over of these men into the island arrived the
								Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where since their voyage of Ionia
								they had lain at anchor, to the number of three and fifty sail. 
							 Alcidas had the command of these as before, and Brasidas came with
								him as a counsellor. 
							 And having first put in at Sybota, a haven of the continent, they
								came on the next morning by break of day toward Corcyra.

The Corcyraeans, being in great tumult and fear both of the seditious
								within and of the invasion without, made ready threescore galleys,
								and still as any of them were manned sent them out against the
								enemy; 
							 whereas the Athenians had advised them to give leave to them to go
								forth first and then the Corcyraeans to follow after with the whole
								fleet together.

When their galleys came forth thus thin, two of them presently turned
								to the enemy; 
							 and in others they that were aboard were together by the ears amongst
								themselves, and nothing was done in due order.

The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, opposed themselves to the
								Corcyraeans with twenty galleys only; 
							 the rest they set in array against the twelve galleys of Athens,
								whereof the Salaminia and the Paralus were two.

The Corcyraeans having come disorderly up, and by few at once, were
								on their part in much distress; 
							 but the Athenians, fearing the enemy's number and doubting to be
								environed, would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood
								thick nor would set upon the galleys that were placed in the midst
								but charged one end of them and drowned one of their galleys.

And when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their fleet into a
								circular figure, they then went about and about it endeavouring to
								put them into disorder. 
							 Which they that were fighting against the Corcyraeans perceiving and
								fearing such another chance as befell them formerly at Naupactus,
								went to their aid and, uniting themselves, came upon the Athenians
								all together.

But they retiring rowed astern, intending that the Corcyraeans should
								take that time to escape in, they themselves in the meantime going
								as leisurely back as was possible and keeping the enemy still
								ahead.

Such was this battle, and it ended about sunset.

The Corcyraeans, fearing lest the enemy in pursuit of their victory
								should have come directly against the city or take aboard the men
								which they had put over into the island or do them some other
								mischief, fetched back the men into the temple of Juno again and
								guarded the city.

But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, yet durst not
								invade the city but, having taken thirteen of the Corcyraean
								galleys, went back into the continent from whence they had set
								forth.

The next day they came not unto the city no more than before,
								although it was in great tumult and affright and though also
								Brasidas (as it is reported) advised Alcidas to it but had not equal
								authority, but only landed soldiers at the promontory of Leucimna
								and wasted their territory.

In the meantime the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely lest those
								galleys should come against the city, not only conferred with those
								in sanctuary and with the rest about how the city might be preserved
								but also induced some of them to go aboard. 
							 For notwithstanding the sedition they manned thirty galleys in
								expectation that the fleet of the enemy should have entered.

But the Peloponnesians, having been wasting of their fields till it
								was about noon, went their ways again. 
							 Within night the Corcyraeans had notice by fires of threescore
								Athenian galleys coming toward them from Leucas, which the
								Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition and of the fleet to go
								to Corcyra under Alcidas, had sent to aid them under the conduct of
								Eurymedon the son of Thucles.

The Peloponnesians therefore, as soon as night came, sailed speedily
								home, keeping still the shore and causing their galleys to be
								carried over at the isthmus of Leucas that they might not come in
								sight as they went about.

But the people of Corcyra, hearing of the Attic galleys coming in and
								the going off of the Peloponnesians, brought into the city those
								Messenians which before were without and appointing the galleys
								which they had furnished to come about into the Hillaique haven,
								whilst accordingly they went about, slew all the contrary faction
								they could lay hands on, and also afterwards threw overboard out of
								the same galleys all those they had before persuaded to embark, and
								so went thence. 
							 And coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those that
								had taken sanctuary to refer themselves to a legal trial, all which
								they condemned to die.

But the most of the sanctuary men, that is, all those that were not
								induced to stand to trial by law, when they saw what was done,
								killed one another there right in the temple; 
							 some hanged themselves on trees; 
							 everyone as he had means made himself away.

And for seven days together that Eurymedon stayed there with his
								sixty galleys, the Corcyraeans did nothing but kill such of their
								city as they took to be their enemies, laying to their charge a
								practice to have everted the popular government. 
							 Amongst whom some were slain upon private hatred and some by their
								debtors for the money which they had lent them. 
							 All forms of death were then seen;

and (as in such cases it usually falls out) whatsoever had happened
								at any time happened also then, and more. 
							 For the father slew his son; 
							 men were dragged out of the temples and then slain hard by; 
							 and some immured in the temple of Bacchus died within it. 
							 So cruel was this sedition and seemed so the more because it was of
								these the first.

For afterwards all Greece, as a man may say, was in commotion; 
							 and quarrels arose everywhere between the patrons of the commons,
								that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few, that desired to
								bring in the Lacedaemonians. 
							 Now in time of peace they could have had no pretence nor would have
								been so forward to call them in; 
							 but being war and confederates to be had for either party, both to
								hurt their enemies and strengthen themselves, such as desired
								alteration easily got them to come in.

And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this
								sedition, which though they have been before and shall be ever as
								long as human nature is the same, yet they are more calm and of
								different kinds according to the several conjunctures. 
							 For in peace and prosperity as well cities as private men are better
								minded because they be not plunged into necessity of doing anything
								against their will. 
							 But war, taking away the affluence of daily necessaries, is a most
								violent master and conformeth most men's passions to the present
								occasion. 
							 The cities therefore being now in sedition and those that fell into
								it later having heard what had been done in the former, they far
								exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the art of
								assailing and for the strangeness of their revenges.

The received value of names imposed for signification of things was
								changed into arbitrary. 
							 For inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness; 
							 provident deliberation, a handsome fear; 
							 modesty, the cloak of cowardice; 
							 to be wise in everything, to be lazy in everything.

A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. 
							 To re-advise for the better security was held for a fair pretext of
								tergiversation. 
							 He that was fierce was always trusty, and he that contraried such a
								one was suspected. 
							 He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; 
							 but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous man than
								he.

But he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the
								other was said to be a dissolver of society and one that stood in
								fear of his adversary. 
							 In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act
								or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it was
								commended. 
							 To be kin to another was not to be so near as to be of his society
								because these were ready to undertake anything and not to dispute
								it.

For these societies were not made upon prescribed laws of profit but
								for rapine, contrary to the laws established. 
							 And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by
								divine law as by the communication of guilt. 
							 And what was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an
								eye to their actions to see whether they were too strong for them or
								not, and not ingenuously.

To be revenged was in more request than never to have received
								injury. 
							 And for oaths (when any were) of reconcilement, being administered in
								the present for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no
								power; 
							 but upon opportunity, he that first durst thought his revenge sweeter
								by the trust than if he had taken the open way. 
							 For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course but,
								having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves
								withal a mastery in point of wit. 
							 And dishonest men for the most part are sooner called able than
								simple men honest, and men are ashamed of this title but take a
								pride in the other. 

							 The cause of all this is desire of rule out of avarice and ambition,
								and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding.

For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the
								other faction, preferring under decent titles, one, the polit- 
								 ical equality of the multitude, the other, the moderate aristoc- 
								 racy, though in words they seemed to be
								servants of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of
								their contention; 
							 and striving by whatsoever means to overcome both ventured on most
								horrible outrages and prosecuted their revenges still fartheir
								without any regard of justice or the public good, but limiting them,
								each faction, by their own appetite, and stood ready, whether by
								unjust sentence or with their own hands, when they should get power,
								to satisfy their present spite. 
							 So that neither side made account to have anything the sooner done
								for religion [of an oath], but he was most commended that could pass
								a business against the hair with a fair oration. 
							 The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both factions, partly
								because they would not side with them and partly for envy that they
								should so escape.

Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind throughout all Greece by
								the occasion of their sedition. 
							 Sincerity (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed
								down; 
							 and it was far the best course to stand diffidently against each
								other with their thoughts in battle array, which no speech was so
								powerful nor oath terrible enough to disband.

And being all of them the more they considered the more desperate of
								assurance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief than were
								able to rely on any man's faith.

And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best
								success; 
							 for both their own defect and the subtlety of their adversaries
								putting them into a great fear to be overcome in words, or at least
								in preinsidiation, by their enemies' great craft, they therefore
								went roundly to work with them with deeds.

Whereas the other, not caring though they were perceived and thinking
								they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were
								thereby unprovided and so the more easily slain.

In Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed
								first; 
							 and so were all other, which either such men as have been governed
								with pride rather than modesty by those on whom they take revenge
								were like to commit in taking it; 
							 or which such men as stand upon their delivery from long poverty out
								of covetousness, chiefly to have their neighbours' goods would
								contrary to justice give their voices to; 
							 or which men, not for covetousness but assailing each other on equal
								terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger would cruelly
								and inexorably execute.

And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the
								city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil,
								gotten now above the law, showed itself with delight to be too weak
								for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all
								superiority. 
							 Else they would never have preferred revenge before innocence nor
								lucre (whensoever the envy of it was without power to do them hurt)
								before justice.

And for the laws common to all men in such cases (which, as long as
								they be in force, give hope to all that suffer injury), men desire
								not to leave them standing against the need a man in danger may have
								of them but by their revenges on others to be beforehand in
								subverting them.

Such were the passions of the Corcyraeans, first of all other
								Grecians, towards one another in the city; 
							 and Eurymedon and the Athenians departed with their galleys.

Afterwards, such of the Corcyraeans as had fled (for there escaped
								about five hundred of them), having seized on the forts in the
								continent, impatronized themselves of their own territory on the
								other side and from thence came over and robbed the islanders and
								did them much hurt; 
							 and there grew a great famine in the city.

They likewise sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth concerning
								their reduction; 
							 and when they could get nothing done, having gotten boats and some
								auxiliary soldiers, they passed, awhile after, to the number of
								about six hundred into the island. 
							 Where, when they had set fire on their boats that they might trust to
								nothing but to make themselves masters of the field, they went up
								into the hill Istone and, having there fortified themselves with a
								wall, infested those within and were masters of the territory.

In the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty galleys into
								Sicily under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus and
								Charoeadas the son of Euphiletus, for the Syracusians and the
								Leontines were now warring against each other.

The confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric cities except
								the Camarinaeans, which also in the beginning of this war were
								reckoned in the league of the Lacedaemonians but had not yet aided
								them in the war. 
							 The confederates of the Leontines were the Chalcidique cities
								together with Camarina. 
							 And in Italy the Locrians were with the Syracusians; 
							 but the Rhegians, according to their consanguinity, took part with
								the Leontines.

Now the confederates of the Leontines, in respect of their ancient
								alliance with the Athenians as also for that they were Ionians,
								obtained of the Athenians to send them galleys, for that the
								Leontines were deprived by the Syracusians of the use both of the
								land and sea.

And so the people of Athens sent aid unto them, pretending
								propinquity but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn
								from thence into Peloponnesus and also to test the possibility of
								taking the states of Sicily into their own hands.

These arriving at Rhegium in Italy joined with the confederates and
								began the war. 
							 And so ended this summer.

The next winter, the sickness fell upon the Athenians again (having
								indeed never totally left the city, though there was some
								intermission) and continued above a year after;

but the former lasted two years, insomuch as nothing afflicted the
								Athenians or impaired their strength more than it.

For the number that died of it of men of arms enrolled were no less
								than four thousand four hundred; 
							 and horsemen, three hundred; 
							 of the other multitude, innumerable.

There happened also at the same time many earthquakes both in Athens
								and Euboea and also amongst the Boeotians, and in Boeotia chiefly at
								Orchomenus.

The Athenians and Rhegians that were now in Sicily made war the same
								winter on the islands called the islands of Aeolus with thirty
								galleys. 
							 For in summer it was impossible to war upon them for the shallowness
								of the water.

These islands are inhabited by the Liparaeans who are a colony of the
								Cnidians and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called
								Lipara; 
							 and thence they go forth and husband the rest which are Didyme,
								Strongyle, and Hiera.

The inhabitants of those places have an opinion that in Hiera Vulcan
								exerciseth the craft of a smith. 
							 For it is seen to send forth abundance of fire in the daytime and of
								smoke in the night. 
							 These islands are adjacent to the territory of the Siculi and
								Messanians but were confederates of the Syracusians.

When the Athenians had wasted their fields and saw they would not
								come in, they put off again and went to Rhegium. 
							 And so ended this winter and the fifth year of this war written by
								Thucydides.

The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came as far
								as the isthmus under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus,
								intending to have invaded Attica; 
							 but by reason of the many earthquakes that then happened, they turned
								back, and the invasion proceeded not.

About the same time (Euboea being then troubled with earthquakes),
								the sea came in at Orobiae on the part which then was land and,
								being impetuous withal, overflowed most part of the city, whereof
								part it covered and part it washed down and made lower in the return
								so that it is now sea which before was land. 
							 And the people, as many as could not prevent it by running up into
								the higher ground, perished.

Another inundation like unto this happened in the isle of Atalanta,
								on the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of
								the Athenians' fort there; 
							 and of two galleys that lay on dry land, it brake one in pieces.

Also there happened at Peparethus a certain rising of the water, but
								it brake not in; 
							 and a part of the wall, the town-house, and some few houses besides
								were overthrown by the earthquakes.

The cause of such inundation, for my part, I take to be this: that
								the earthquake, where it was very great, did there send off the
								sea; 
							 and the sea returning on a sudden, caused the water to come on with
								greater violence. 
							 And it seemeth unto me that without an earthquake such an accident
								could never happen.

The same summer divers others, as they had several occasions, made
								war in Sicily; 
							 so also did the Sicilians amongst themselves and the Athenians with
								their confederates. 
							 But I will make mention only of such most memorable things as were
								done either by the confederates there with the Athenians or against
								the Athenians by the enemy.

Charoeades the Athenian general being slain by the Syracusians,
								Laches, who was now sole commander of the fleet, together with the
								confederates made war on Mylae, a town belonging to Messana. 
							 There were in Mylae two companies of Messanians in garrison, the
								which also laid a certain ambush for those that came up from the
								fleet.

But the Athenians and their confederates both put to flight those
								that were in ambush with the slaughter of the most of them and also,
								assaulting their fortification, forced them on composition both to
								render the citadel and to go along with them against Messana.

After this, upon the approach of the Athenians and their
								confederates, the Messanians compounded likewise and gave them
								hostages and such other security as was requisite.

The same summer the Athenians sent thirty galleys about Peloponnesus
								under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alkisthenes and Proclus
								the son of Theodorus and sixty galleys more with two thousand men of
								arms, commanded by Nicias the son of Niceratus, into Melos.

For the Athenians, in respect that the Melians were islanders and yet
								would neither be their subjects nor of their league, intended to
								subdue them.

But when upon the wasting of their fields they still stood out, they
								departed from Melos and sailed to Oropus in the opposite
								continent. 
							 Being there arrived within night, the men of arms left the galleys
								and marched presently by land to Tanagra in Boeotia.

To which place, upon a sign given, the Athenians that were in the
								city of Athens came also forth with their whole forces, led by
								Hipponnicus the son of Callias and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, and
								joined with them and, pitching their camp, spent the day in wasting
								the territory of Tanagra and lay there the night following.

The next day, they defeated in battle such of the Tanagrians as came
								out against them and also certain succours sent them from
								Thebes; 
							 and when they had taken up the arms of those that were slain and
								erected a trophy, they returned back, the one part to Athens, the
								other to their fleet.

And Nicias with his sixty galleys, having first sailed along the
								coast of Locris and wasted it, came home likewise.

About the same time the Peloponnesians erected the colony of
								Heracleia in Trachinia with this intention. 
							 The Melians in the whole contain these three parts:

Paralians, Hierans, and Trachinians. 
							 Of these the Trachinians, being afflicted with war from the Oetaeans
								their borderers, thought at first to have joined themselves to the
								Athenians; 
							 but fearing that they would not be faithful to them, they sent to
								Lacedaemon, choosing for their ambassador Tisamenus.

And the Dorians, who are the mother nation to the Lacedaemonians,
								sent their ambassadors likewise with him with the same requests; 
							 for they also were infested with war from the same Oetaeans.

Upon audience of these ambassadors the Lacedaemonians concluded to
								send out a colony, both intending the reparation of the injuries
								done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians and conceiving withal
								that the town would stand very commodiously for their war with the
								Athenians, inasmuch as they might thereby have a navy ready, where
								the passage was but short, against Euboea; 
							 and it would much further their conveyance of soldiers into
								Thrace. 
							 And they had their mind wholly bent to the building of the place. 

							 First, therefore, they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi.

And the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent inhabitants
								thither, both of their own people and of the neighbours about them,
								and gave leave also to any that would to go thither out of the rest
								of Greece, save only to the Ionians, Achaeans, and some few other
								nations. 
							 The conductors of the colony were three Lacedaemonians, Leon,
								Alcidas, and Damagon.

Who, taking it in hand, built the city which is now called Heracleia
								from the very foundation, being distant from Thermopylae forty
								furlongs and from the sea twenty. 
							 Also they made houses for galleys to lie under, beginning close to
								Thermopylae against the very strait, to the end to have them the
								more defensible.

The Athenians, when this city was peopled, were at first afraid and
								thought it to be set up especially against Euboea; 
							 because from thence to Cenaeum, a promontory of Euboea, the passage
								is but short. 
							 But it fell out afterwards otherwise than they imagined; 
							 for they had no great harm by it, the reason whereof was this.

That the Thessalians, who had the towns of those parts in their power
								and upon whose ground it was built, afflicted these new planters
								with a continual war till they had worn them out, though they were
								many indeed in the beginning. 
							 For being the foundation of the Lacedaemonians, everyone went thither
								boldly, conceiving the city to be an assured one. 
							 And chiefly the governors themselves, sent hither from Lacedaemon,
								undid the business and dispeopled the city by fighting most men
								away, for that they governed severely and sometimes also unjustly,
								by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed against them.

The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians stayed in
								Melos, those other Athenians that were in the thirty galleys about
								Peloponnesus slew first certain garrison soldiers in Ellomenus, a
								place of Leucadia, by ambush. 
							 But afterwards with a greater fleet and with the whole power of the
								Acarnanians, who followed the army, all (but the Oeniades) that
								could bear arms, and with the Zacynthians and Cephalonians and
								fifteen galleys of the Corcyraeans, made war against the city itself
								of Leucas.

The Leucadians, though they saw their territory wasted by them both
								without the isthmus and within where the city of Leucas standeth and
								the temple of Apollo, yet they durst not stir because the number of
								the enemy was so great. 
							 And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to
								wall them up, conceiving that they might easily be expugned by a
								siege and desiring to be rid of a city their continual enemy.

But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians
								that, seeing so great an army was together, it would be honourable
								for him to invade the Aetolians, principally as being enemies to
								Naupactus; 
							 and that if these were subdued, the rest of the continent thereabouts
								would easily be added to the Athenian dominion.

For they alleged that though the nation of the Aetolians were great
								and warlike, yet their habitation was in villages unwalled and those
								at great distances, and were but light-armed and might, therefore,
								with no great difficulty be all subdued before they could unite
								themselves for defense.

And they advised him to take in hand first the Apodotians, next the
								Ophionians, and after them the Eurytanians (which are the greatest
								part of Aetolia, of a most strange language, and that are reported
								to eat raw flesh); 
							 for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow.

But he, induced by the Messenians whom he favoured, but especially
								because he thought without the forces of the people of Athens with
								the confederates only of the continent and with the Aetolians to
								invade Boeotia by land, going first through the Locri Ozolae and so
								to Cytinium of Doris, having Parnassus on the right hand till the
								descent thereof into the territory of the Phoceans, which people,
								for the friendship they ever bore to the Athenians, would, he
								thought, be willing to follow his army, and if not, might be
								forced; 
							 and upon the Phoceans bordereth Boeotia; 
							 putting off therefore with his whole army, against the minds of the
								Acarnanians, from Leucas, he sailed unto Solium by the shore.

And there, having communicated his conceit with the Acarnanians, when
								they would not approve of it because of his refusal to besiege
								Leucas, he himself with the rest of his army, Cephalonians,
								Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenians, the soldiers of his own
								fleet (for the fifteen galleys of Corcyra were now gone away),
								warred on the Aetolians, having Oeneon, a city of Locris, for the
								seat of his war.

Now these Locrians called Ozolae were confederates of the Athenians
								and were to meet them with their whole power in the heart of the
								country. 
							 For being confiners on the Aetolians and using the same manner of
								arming, it was thought it would be a matter of great utility in the
								war to have them in their army for that they knew their manner of
								fight and were acquainted with the country.

Having lain the night with his whole army in the temple of Jupiter
								Nemeius (wherein the poet Hesiodus is reported by them that dwell
								thereabout to have died, foretold by an oracle that he should die in
								Nemea), in the morning betimes he dislodged and marched into
								Aetolia.

The first day he took Potidania; 
							 the second day, Crocyleium; 
							 the third, Teichium. 
							 There he stayed and sent the booty he had gotten to Eupalium in
								Locris. 
							 For he purposed, when he had subdued the rest, to invade the
								Ophionians afterwards (if they submitted not) in his return to
								Naupactus.

But the Aetolians knew of this preparation when it was first resolved
								on. 
							 And afterwards, when the army was entered, they were united into a
								mighty army to make head, insomuch as that the farthest off of the
								Ophionians that reach out to the Melian Gulf, the Bomians and
								Callians, came in with their aids.

The Messenians gave the same advice to Demosthenes that they had done
								before and, alleging that the conquest of the Aetolians would be but
								easy, willed him to march with all speed against them, village after
								village, and not to stay till they were all united and in order of
								battle against him but to attempt always the place which was next to
								hand.

He, persuaded by them and confident of his fortune because nothing
								had crossed him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians that
								should have come in with their aids (for his greatest want was of
								darters light-armed), marched to Aegitium, which approaching he won
								by force, the men having fled secretly out and encamped themselves
								on the hills above it; 
							 for it stood in a mountainous place and about eighty furlongs from
								the sea.

But the Aetolians (for by this time they were come with their forces
								to Aegitium) charged the Athenians and their confederates and,
								running down upon them, some one way and some another, from the
								hills, plied them with their darts. 
							 And when the army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired; 
							 and when it retired, they assaulted. 
							 So that the fight for a good while was nothing but alternate chase
								and retreat, and the Athenians had the worst in both.

Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows and were able to
								use them (for the Aetolians, by reason they were not armed, were put
								back still with the shot), they held out. 
							 But when upon the death of their captain the archers were dispersed
								and the rest were also wearied, having a long time continued the
								said labour of pursuing and retiring, and the Aetolians continually
								afflicting them with their darts, they were forced at length to fly
								and, lighting into hollows without issue and into places they were
								not acquainted withal, were destroyed. 
							 For Chromon a Messenian, who was their guide for the ways, was
								slain.

And the Aetolians, pursuing them still with darts, slew many of them
								quickly whilst they fled, being swift of foot and without
								armour. 
							 But the most of them missing their way and entering into a wood which
								had no passage through, the Aetolians set it on fire and burnt it
								about them.

All kinds of shifts to fly and all kinds of destruction were that day
								in the army of the Athenians. 
							 Such as remained with much ado got to the sea and to Oeneon, a city
								of Locris, from whence they first set forth.

There died very many of the confederates and a hundred and twenty men
								of arms of the Athenians; 
							 that was their number, and all of them able men; 
							 these men of the very best died in this war. 
							 Procles also was there slain, one of the generals.

When they had received the bodies of their dead from the Aetolians
								under truce and were gotten again to Naupactus, they returned with
								the fleet to Athens. 
							 But they left Demosthenes about Naupactus and those parts because he
								was afraid of the Athenian people for the loss that had happened.

About the same time the Athenians that were on the coast of Sicily
								sailed unto Locris and, landing, overcame such as made head and took
								in Peripolium, situated on the river Halex.

The same summer, the Aetolians, having sent their ambassadors,
								Tolophus, an Ophionian, Boryades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an
								Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedaemon, persuaded them to send an army
								against Naupactus for that it harboured the Athenians against
								them.

And the Lacedaemonians, towards the end of autumn, sent them three
								thousand men of arms of their confederates of which five hundred
								were of Heracleia, the new-built city of Trachinia. 
							 The general of the army was Eurylochus, a Spartan, with whom Macarius
								and Menedaeus went also along, Spartans likewise.

When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to
								the Locrians of Ozolae both because their way lay through them to
								Naupactus, and also because he desired to make them revolt from the
								Athenians.

Of all the Locrians the Amphissians co-operated with him most, as
								standing most in fear for the enmity of the Phoceans. 
							 And they first giving hostages induced others who likewise were
								afraid of the coming in of the army to do the like: the Myoneans
								first, being their neighbours, for this way is Locris of most
								difficult access; 
							 then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians,
								Hessians, and the Oeantheans. 
							 All these went with them to the war. 
							 The Olpaeans gave them hostages but followed not the army. 
							 But the Hyaeans would give them no hostages till they had taken a
								village of theirs called Polis.

When everything was ready and he had sent the hostages away to
								Cytinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards Naupactus
								through the territory of the Locrians. 
							 And as he marched, he took Oeneon, a town of theirs, and Eupalium
								because they refused to yield unto him.

When they were come into the territory of Naupactus, the Aetolians
								being there already to join with them, they wasted the fields about
								and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified. 
							 Then they went to Molycreium, a colony of the Corinthians but subject
								to the people of Athens, and took that.

Now Demosthenes, the Athenian (for ever since the Aetolian business
								he abode about Naupactus), having been pre-advertised of this army
								and being afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acarnanians and
								with much ado, because of his departure from before Leucas,
								persuaded them to relieve Naupactus;

and they sent along with him in his galleys a thousand men of
								arms. 
							 Which entering were the preservation of the city;

for there was danger, the walls being of a great compass and the
								defendants few, that else they should not have been able to make
								them good. 
							 Eurylochus and those that were with him, when they perceived that
								those forces were entered and that it was impossible to take the
								city by assault, departed thence not into Peloponnesus but to
								Aeolis, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron and other places
								thereabouts, and also to Proschion in Aetolia.

For the Ambraciotes coming to them persuaded them to undertake,
								together with themselves, the enterprise against Argos and the rest
								of Amphilochia, and Acarnania, saying withal that if they could
								overcome these, the rest of that continent would enter into the
								league of the Lacedaemonians.

Whereunto Eurylochus assented and, dismissing the Aetolians, lay
								quiet in those parts with his army till such time as the Ambraciotes
								being come with their forces before Argos he should have need to aid
								them. 
							 And so this summer ended.

The Athenians that were in Sicily in the beginning of winter,
								together with the Grecians of their league and as many of the Siculi
								as having obeyed the Syracusans by force, or being their
								confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly against Nessa,
								a town of Sicily, the citadel whereof was in the hands of the
								Syracusans. 
							 And they assaulted the same;

but when they could not win it, they retired. 
							 In the retreat, the Syracusans that were in the citadel sallied out
								upon the confederates that retired later than the Athenians, and
								charging, put a part of the army to flight and killed not a few.

After this, Laches and the Athenians landed some time at Locris and
								overcame in battle by the river Caicinus about three hundred
								Locrians, who with Proxenus, the son of Capaton, came out to make
								resistance; 
							 and when they had stripped them of their arms, departed.

The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos, by the
								admonition indeed of a certain oracle. 
							 For Pisistratus also, the tyrant, hallowed the same before; 
							 not all, but only so much as was within the prospect of the
								temple. 
							 But now they hallowed it all over in this manner.

They took away all sepulchres whatsoever of such as had died there
								before, and for the future made an edict that none should be
								suffered to die nor any woman to bring forth child in the
								island; 
							 but [when they were near the time, either of the one or the other]
								they should be carried over into Rheneia. 
							 This Rheneia is so little a way distant from Delos that Polycrates,
								the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea and had the
								dominion of the other islands, when he won Rheneia dedicated the
								same to Apollo of Delos, tying it unto Delos with a chain.

And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians instituted the
								keeping, every fifth year, of the Delian games. 

							 There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos, both of
								Ionians and of the islanders round about. 
							 For they then came to see the games, with their wives and children,
								as the Ionians do now the games at Ephesus.

There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise and of music; 
							 and the cities did severally set forth dances. 
							 Which things to have been so, is principally declared by Homer in
								these verses of his hymn to Apollo: 
							 
								 But thou, Apollo, takest most delight 
 In Delos. There
									assemble in thy sight 
 The long-coat Ions, with their
									children dear 
 And venerable bedfellows; and there
									 
 In matches set of buffets, song, and dance, 
 Both
									show thee pastime and thy name advance.

That there were also matches of music and that men resorted thither
								to contend therein he again maketh manifest in these verses of the
								same hymn. 
							 For after he hath spoken of the Delian dance of the women, he endeth
								their praise with these verses, wherein also he maketh mention of
								himself: 
							 
								 But well: let Phoebus and Diana be 
 Propitious; and
									farewell you, each one. 
 But yet remember me when I am
									gone: 
 And if of earthly men you chance to see 
 Any
									toil'd pilgrim, that shall ask you, Who, 
 O damsels, is
									the man that living here 
 Was sweet'st in song, and that
									most had your ear? 
 Then all, with a joint murmur,
									thereunto

Make answer thus: A man deprived of seeing;
									 
 In the isle of sandy Chios is his being. 
 
							 So much hath Homer witnessed touching the great meeting and solemnity
								celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. 
							 And the islanders and the Athenians, since that time, have continued
								still to send dancers along with their sacrificers; 
							 but the games and things of that kind were worn out, as is likely, by
								adversity till now that the Athenians restored the games and added
								the horse race, which was not before.

The same winter the Ambraciotes, according to their promise made to
								Eurylochus when they retained his army, made war upon Argos in
								Amphilochia with three thousand men of arms, and invading Argeia,
								they took Olpae, a strong fort on a hill by the sea-side, which the
								Acarnanians had fortified and used for the place of their common
								meetings for matters of justice, and is distant from the city of
								Argos, which stands also on the sea-side, about twenty-five
								furlongs.

The Acarnanians, with part of their forces, came to relieve
								Argos; 
							 and with the rest they encamped in that part of Amphilochia which is
								called Crenae to watch the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus
								that they might not pass through to the Ambraciotes without their
								knowledge;

and sent to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the
								expedition against the Aetolians, to come to them and be their
								general. 
							 They sent also to the twenty Athenian galleys that chanced to be then
								on the coast of Peloponnesus under the conduct of Aristoteles, the
								son of Timocrates, and Hierophon, the son of Antimnestus.

In like manner the Ambraciotes that were at Olpae sent a messenger to
								the city of Ambracia, willing them to come to their aid with their
								whole power, as fearing that those with Eurylochus would not be able
								to pass by the Acarnanians, and so they should be either forced to
								fight alone or else have an unsafe retreat.

But the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, as soon as they
								understood that the Ambraciotes were come to Olpae, dislodging from
								Proschion went with all speed to assist them; 
							 and passing over the river Achelöus, marched through Acarnania,
								which, by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now
								disfurnished. 
							 On their right hand they had the city of Stratus and that
								garrison; 
							 on the left, the rest of Acarnania.

Having passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through
								Phytia, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon; 
							 then through Limnaea; 
							 then they went into the territory of the Agraeans, which are out of
								Acarnania, and their friends:

and getting to the hill Thiamus, which is a desert hill, they marched
								over it and came down into Argeia when it was now night; 
							 and passing between the city of the Argives and the Arcarnanians that
								kept watch at [the] Wells, came unseen and joined with the
								Ambraciotes at Olpae.

When they were all together, they sat down about break of day at a
								place called Metropolis and there encamped. 
							 And the Athenians not long after with their twenty galleys arrived in
								the Ambracian gulf to the aid of the Argives, to whom also came
								Demosthenes with two hundred Messenian men of arms and threescore
								Athenian archers.

The galleys lay at sea before the hill upon which the fort of Olpae
								standeth. 
							 But the Acarnanians, and those few Amphilochians (for the greatest
								part of them the Ambraciotes kept back by force) that were come
								already together at Argos, prepared themselves to give the enemy
								battle, and chose Demosthenes, with their own commanders, for
								general of the whole league. 
							 He, when he had brought them up near unto Olpae, there encamped.

There was between them a great hollow. 
							 And for five days together they stirred not; 
							 but the sixth day both sides put themselves into array for the
								battle. 
							 The army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the other,
								for indeed it was much greater; 
							 but Demosthenes, fearing to be encompassed, placed an ambush in a
								certain hollow way and fit for such a purpose, of armed and unarmed
								soldiers, in all to the number of four hundred; 
							 which, in that part where the number of the enemies overreached,
								should in the heat of the battle rise out of ambush and charge them
								on their backs.

When the battles were in order on either side, they came to
								blows. 
							 Demosthenes, with the Messenians and those few Athenians that were
								there, stood in the right wing; 
							 and the Acarnanians (as they could one after another be put in order)
								and those Amphilochian darters which were present, made up the
								other. 
							 The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes were ranged promiscuously, except
								only the Mantineans, who stood together most of them in the left
								wing, but not in the utmost part of it; 
							 for Eurylochus and those that were with him made the extremity of the
								left wing, against Demosthenes and the Messenians.

When they were in fight, and that the Peloponnesians with that wing
								overreached and had encircled the right wing of their enemies, those
								Acarnanians that lay in ambush, coming in at their backs, charged
								them and put them to flight in such sort as they endured not the
								first brunt, and besides, caused the greatest part of the army
								through affright to run away. 
							 For when they saw that part of it defeated which was with Eurylochus,
								which was the best of their army, they were a great deal the more
								afraid. 
							 And the Messenians that were in that part of the army with
								Demosthenes, pursuing them, dispatched the greatest part of the
								execution.

But the Ambraciotes that were in the right wing, on that part had the
								victory, and chased the enemy unto the city of Argos.

But in their retreat, when they saw that the greatest part of the
								army was vanquished, the rest of the Acarnanians setting upon them,
								they had much ado to recover Olpae in safety. 
							 And many of them were slain, whilst they ran into it out of array and
								in disorder, save only the Mantineans, for these made a more orderly
								retreat than any part of the army. 
							 And so this battle ended, having lasted till the evening.

The next day, Menedaius (Eurylochus and Macarius being now slain),
								taking the command upon him and not finding how, if he stayed, he
								should be able to sustain a siege, wherein he should both be shut up
								by land and also with those Attic galleys by sea, or if he should
								depart, how he might do it safely, had speech with Demosthenes and
								the Acarnanian captains, both about a truce for his departure and
								for the receiving of the bodies of the slain.

And they delivered unto them their dead, and having erected a trophy
								took up their own dead, which were about three hundred. 
							 But for their departure they would make no truce openly [nor] to
								all; 
							 but secretly Demosthenes with his Acarnanian fellow-commanders made a
								truce with the Mantineans, and with Menedaius and the rest of the
								Peloponnesian captains and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily
								as they could, with purpose to disguard the Ambraciotes and
								multitude of mercenary strangers, and withal to use this as a means
								to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred with the Grecians of those
								parts as men that had treacherously advanced their particular
								interest.

Accordingly they took up their dead, and buried them as fast as they
								could; 
							 and such as had leave consulted secretly touching how to be gone.

Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that the
								Ambraciotes from the city of Ambracia, according to the message sent
								to them before from Olpae [which was that they should bring their
								whole power through Amphilochia to their aid], were already on their
								march (ignorant of what had passed here) to join with those at
								Olpae.

And hereupon he sent a part of his army presently forth to beset the
								ways with ambushment and to pre-occupy all places of strength, and
								prepared withal to encounter with the rest of his army.

In the meantime, the Mantineans and such as had part in the truce,
								going out on pretence to gather potherbs and firewood, stole away by
								small numbers, and as they went, did indeed gather such things as
								they pretended to go forth for;

but when they were gotten far from Olpae, they went faster away. 
							 But the Ambraciotes and others that came forth in the same manner,
								but in greater troops, seeing the others go quite away, were eager
								to be gone likewise, and ran outright, as desiring to overtake those
								that were gone before.

The Acarnanians at first thought they had gone all without a truce
								alike and pursued the Peloponnesians and threw darts at their own
								captains for forbidding them and for saying that they went away
								under truce, as thinking themselves betrayed.

But at last they let go the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew
								the Ambraciotes only. 
							 And there was much contention and ignorance of which was an
								Ambraciote and which a Peloponnesian. 
							 So they slew about two hundred of them, and the rest escaped into
								Agrais, a bordering territory, where Salynthius, king of the
								Agraeans and their friend, received them.

The Ambraciotes out of the city of Ambracia were come as far as
								Idomene. 
							 Idomene are two high hills, to the greater whereof came first
								undiscovered that night they whom Demosthenes had sent afore from
								the camp and seized it; 
							 but the Ambraciotes got first to the lesser and there encamped the
								same night.

Demosthenes, after supper, in the twilight, marched forward with the
								rest of the army, one half whereof himself took with him for the
								assault of the camp, and the other half he sent about through the
								mountains of Amphilochia.

And the next morning before day, he invaded the Ambraciotes whilst
								they were yet in their lodgings and knew not what was the matter,
								but thought rather that they had been some of their own company.

For Demosthenes had placed the Messenians on purpose in the foremost
								ranks, and commanded them to speak unto them as they went in the
								Doric dialect and to make the sentinels secure, especially seeing
								their faces could not be discerned, for it was yet night.

Wherefore they put the army of the Ambraciotes to flight at the first
								onset and slew many upon the place;

the rest fled as fast as they could towards the mountains. 
							 But the ways being beset and the Amphilochians being well acquainted
								with their own territory and armed but lightly against men in armour
								unacquainted and utterly ignorant which way to take, they lit into
								hollow ways and to the places forelaid with ambushes and
								perished.

And having been put to all manner of shifts for their lives, some
								fled towards the sea; 
							 and when they saw the galleys of Athens sailing by the shore (this
								accident concurring with their defeat), swam to them, and chose
								rather in their present fear to be killed of those in the galleys
								than by the barbarians and their most mortal enemies the
								Amphilochians.

The Ambraciotes with this loss came home, a few of many, in safety to
								their city. 
							 And the Acarnanians, having taken the spoil of the dead and erected
								their trophies, returned unto Argos.

The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciotes which fled
								from Olpae into Agrais to demand leave to carry away the bodies of
								those dead which were slain after the first battle, when without
								truce they went away together with the Mantineans and with those
								that had truce.

But when the herald saw the armours of those Ambraciotes that came
								from the city, he wondered at the number, for he knew nothing of
								this last blow but thought they had been armours of those with
								them.

Then one asked him what he wondered at and how many he thought were
								slain; 
							 for he that asked him the question thought, on the other side, that
								he had been a herald sent from those at Idomene. 
							 And he answered, about two hundred. 

							 Then he that asked replied and said: 
 Then
										these are not the armours of them, but of above a
										thousand.

Then, 
 said he again, 
 they belong not to them that were in
										battle with us. 
 The other answered: 
 Yes, if you fought yesterday in
										Idomene. 
 
							 
							 
 But we fought not yesterday at all, but the
									other day in our retreat. 
 

							 
 But we yet fought yesterday with those
									Ambraciotes that came from the city to aid the rest.

When the herald heard that and knew that the aid from the city was
								defeated, he burst out into Aimees, and astonished with the
								greatness of the present loss, forthwith went his way without his
								errand and required the dead bodies no farther.

For this loss was greater than, in the like number of days, happened
								to any one city of Greece in all this war. 
							 I have not written the number of the slain because it was said to be
								such as is incredible for the quantity of the city. 
							 But this I know: that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, as
								Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would have
								subdued Ambracia, they might have done it even with the shout of
								their voices. 
							 But they feared now that if the Athenians possessed it, they would
								prove more troublesome neighbours unto them than the other.

After this, having bestowed the third part of the spoils upon the
								Athenians, they distributed the other two parts according to the
								cities. 
							 The Athenians' part was lost by sea. 
							 For those three hundred complete armours which are dedicated in the
								temples in Attica, were picked out for Demosthenes [himself], and he
								brought them away with him. 
							 His return was withal the safer for this action, after his defeat in
								Aetolia. 
							 And the Athenians that were in the twenty galleys returned to
								Naupactus.

The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, when the Athenians and Demosthenes
								were gone, granted truce at the city of the Oeniades to those
								Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians that were fled to Salynthius and the
								Agraeans to retire, the Oeniades being gone over to Salynthius and
								the Agraeans likewise.

And for the future, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a league
								with the Ambraciotes for a hundred years, upon these conditions: 
 That neither the Ambraciotes with the
										Acarnanians should make war against the Peloponnesians, nor
										the Acarnanians with the Ambraciotes against the
										Athenians; 
									 that they should give mutual aid to one another's
										country; 
									 that the Ambraciotes should restore whatsoever towns or
										bordering fields they held of the Amphilochians; 
									 and that they should at no time aid Anactorium, which was in
										hostility with the Acarnanians. 
 And upon this
								composition the war ended.

After this, the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred
								men of arms of their own city to Ambracia under the conduct of
								Xenocleides, the son of Euthycles, who, with much difficulty passing
								through Epirus, at length arrived. 
							 Thus passed the business in Ambracia.

The same winter the Athenians that were in Sicily invaded Himeraea by
								sea, aided by the Sicilians that invaded the skirts of the same by
								land. 
							 They sailed also to the islands of Aeolus. 
							 Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus, the son
								of Isolochus, [with certain galleys], come to receive charge of the
								fleet commanded by Laches.

For the Sicilian confederates had sent to Athens and persuaded the
								people to assist them with a greater fleet.

For though the Syracusans were masters by land, yet seeing they
								hindered them but with few galleys from the liberty of the sea, they
								made preparation, and were gathering together a fleet with intention
								to resist them.

And the Athenians furnished out forty galleys to send into Sicily,
								conceiving that the war there would the sooner be at an end and
								desiring withal to train their men in naval exercise.

Therefore Pythodorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away
								with a few of those galleys, and intended to send Sophocles, the son
								of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles, with the greatest
								number afterwards.

But Pythodorus, having now the command of Laches' fleet, sailed in
								the end of winter unto a certain garrison of the Locrians which
								Laches had formerly taken, and overthrown in a battle there by the
								Locrians, retired.

The same spring, there issued a great stream of fire out of the
								mountain Aetna, as it had also done in former times, and burned part
								of the territory of the Catanaeans, that dwell at the foot of Aetna,
								which is the highest mountain of all Sicily.

From the last time that the fire brake out before to this time, it is
								said to be fifty years. 
							 And it hath now broken out thrice in all since Sicily was inhabited
								by the Grecians.

These were the things that came to pass this winter. 
							 And so ended the sixth year of this war written by Thucydides.

The spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys
								of Syracuse and as many of Locris went to Messana in Sicily, called
								in by the citizens themselves, and took it; 
							 and Messana revolted from the Athenians.

This was done by the practice chiefly of the Syracusans, that saw the
								place to be commodious for invasion of Sicily, and feared lest the
								Athenians, some time or other hereafter making it the seat of their
								war, might come with greater forces into Sicily and invade them from
								thence; 
							 but partly also of the Locrians, as being in hostility with the
								Rhegians and desirous to make war upon them on both sides.

The Locrians had now also entered the lands of the Rhegians with
								their whole power, both because they would hinder them from
								assisting the Messanians and because they were solicited thereunto
								by the banished men of Rhegium that were with them. 
							 For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition and were unable for the
								present to give them battle, for which cause they the rather also
								now invaded them.

And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their
								land-forces; 
							 but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messana, and more were
								setting forth, to lie in the same harbour, to make the war on that
								side.

About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full
								growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct
								of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, invaded
								Attica, and there lay and wasted the country about.

And the Athenians sent forty galleys into Sicily, the same which they
								had provided before for that purpose, and with them the other two
								generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. 
							 For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in
								Sicily before.

To these they gave commandment also to take order, as they went by,
								for the state of those Corcyraeans that were in the city and were
								pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain; 
							 and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take
								part with those in the mountain, who, because there was a great
								famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of that
								state.

To Demosthenes also, who ever since his return out of Acarnania had
								lived privately, they gave authority, at his own request, to make
								use of the same galleys, if he thought good so to do, about
								Peloponnesus.

As they sailed by the coast of Laconia and had intelligence that the
								Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles
								hasted to Corcyra; 
							 but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they
								had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their
								voyage. 
							 But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a
								tempest that then arose by chance.

And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place,
								alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing
								how there was great store of timber and stone and that the place
								itself was naturally strong and desert, both it and a great deal of
								the country about. 
							 For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs in the territory
								that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the
								Lacedaemonians Coryphasion.

But they answered him that there were many desert promontories in
								Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in
								taking them in. 
							 But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this
								place and other places, because there was here a haven, and the
								Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same
								language the Lacedaemonians did, would both be able to annoy them
								much by excursions thence and be also faithful guardians of the
								place.

When he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor with the
								soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains
								of companies, he gave it over, till at last, the weather not serving
								to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle a desire,
								occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own
								accord.

And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron
								tools to hew stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good
								and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. 
							 And for mortar, where it was needed, for want of vessels they carried
								it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward so as it
								might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from
								falling, making all possible haste to prevent the Lacedaemonians and
								to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour
								it.

For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature and needed no
								fortifying at all.

The Lacedaemonians were [that day] celebrating a certain holiday, and
								when they heard the news did set lightly by it, conceiving that
								whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find
								them either already gone or easily take the place by force.

Somewhat also they were retarded by reason that their army was in
								Attica. 
							 The Athenians, having in six days finished the wall to the land and
								in the places where was most need, left Demosthenes with five
								galleys to defend it and with the rest hastened on in their course
								for Corcyra and Sicily.

The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were advertised of
								the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home; 
							 for the Lacedaemonians and Agis, their king, took this accident of
								Pylus to concern their own particular. 
							 And the invasion was withal so early, corn being yet green, that the
								most of them were scanted with victual. 
							 The army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder
								than for the season.

So as for many reasons it fell out that they returned sooner now than
								at other times they had done, and this invasion was the shortest,
								for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.

About the same time, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having drawn a
								few Athenians together out of the garrisons and a number of the
								confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace, a
								colony of the Mendaeans, that was their enemy, by treason, but was
								presently again driven out by the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans that
								came to succour it, and lost many of his soldiers.

When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city
								of Sparta and of other the neighboring towns went presently to the
								aid of Pylus; 
							 but [the rest of] the Lacedaemonians came slowlier on, as being newly
								come from the former expedition.

Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus to
								require their assistance with all speed at Pylus, and also to their
								threescore galleys that were at Corcyra, which, transported over the
								isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys
								lying at Zacynthus. 
							 And by this time their army of foot was also there.

Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus,
								Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian
								fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste, to tell them that they must come
								presently to him for as much as the place was in danger to be
								lost.

And according as Demosthenes' message imported, so the fleet made
								haste. 
							 The Lacedaemonians in the meantime prepared themselves to assault the
								fort both by sea and land, hoping easily to win it, being a thing
								built in haste and not many men within it.

And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from
								Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to
								bar up the entries of the harbour.

For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to
								the place, maketh the haven safe and the entries straight, one of
								them, nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting
								passage for no more but two galleys in front; 
							 and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent,
								for not above eight or nine. 
							 The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden, in bigness,
								about fifteen furlongs over. 
							 Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the
								beak-heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven.

And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men
								into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over
								men of arms into the same and placed others likewise along the shore
								of the continent.

For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the
								island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. 
							 For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the
								sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth
								to the aid of their fellows; 
							 and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or
								other danger, win the place, seeing there was no provision of
								victual within it and that the enemy took it but on short
								preparation.

Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms
								out of every band by lot. 
							 Some also had been sent over before by turns; 
							 but they which went over now last and were left there, were four
								hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. 
							 And their captain was Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedaemonians bent to assault him both
								from their galleys and with their army by land, prepared also to
								defend the place. 
							 And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, to the
								land, he placed them athwart the fort and armed the mariners that
								belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the
								greatest part made of osiers. 
							 For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves of
								arms. 
							 Those they had they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars and a
								light-horseman of the Messenians, which came by chance. 
							 And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made
								use of amongst the rest.

The greatest part therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on
								the parts of the wall toward the land which were of most strength
								and commanded them to make good the place against the land-forces if
								they assaulted it. 
							 And he himself, with sixty men of arms chosen out of the whole number
								and a few archers, came forth from the fort to the sea-side in that
								part where he most expected their landing, which part was of
								troublesome access and stony and lay to the wide sea. 
							 But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought they would
								be drawn to adventure for that. 
							 For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been
								mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place [to the
								seaward] the less strong;

and if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no
								other account but the place would be lost.

Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in
								order his men of arms and encouraged them with words to this effect:

You that participate with me in the present
										danger, let not any of you in this extremity go about to
										seem wise and reckon every peril that now besetteth us, but
										let him rather come up to the enemy with little
										circumspection and much hope and look for his safety by
										that. 
									 For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit
										not debate, but a speedy hazard.

And [yet] if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages with
									fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most
									things are with us.

For I make account, the difficulty of their landing makes for us,
									which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us; 
								 but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there
									is none to impeach them they will land well enough. 
								 For whilst they are in their galleys, they are most easy to be
									fought withal; 
								 and in their disbarking, being but on equal terms, their number
									is not greatly to be feared;

for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few for want
									of room to fight in. 
								 And for an army to have odds by land is another matter than when
									they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so
									many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. 
								 So that I think their great difficulties do but set them even
									with our small number.

And for you, that be Athenians and by experience of disbarking
									against others know that if a man stand it out and do not fear
									of the sowsing of a wave or the menacing approach of a galley
									give back of himself, he can never be put back by violence; I
									expect that you should keep your ground and by fighting it out
									upon the very edge of the water preserve both yourselves and the
									fort.

Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes the Athenians took better heart
								and went down and arranged themselves close by the sea.

And the Lacedaemonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their
								army by land and with their fleet, consisting of three-and-forty
								galleys, in which was admiral Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles,
								a Spartan. 
							 And he made his approach where Demosthenes had before expected
								him.

So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by
								land. 
							 The Peloponnesians, dividing their galleys into small numbers because
								they could not come near with many at once and resting between,
								assailed them by turns, using all possible valour and mutual
								encouragement to put the Athenians back and gain the fort. 
							 Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas.

For having the command of a galley and seeing other captains of
								galleys and steersmen (the place being hard of access), when there
								appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid and
								tender of breaking their galleys, he would cry out unto them,
								saying, 
 They did not well for sparing of
										wood to let the enemy fortify in their country. 
 And
								[to the Lacedaemonians] he gave advice to force landing with the
								breaking of their galleys and prayed the confederates that in
								requital of many benefits they would not stick to bestow their
								galleys at this time upon the Lacedaemonians and, running them
								ashore, to use any means whatsoever to land and to get into their
								hands both the men [in the isle] and the fort.

Thus he urged others; 
							 and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her
								ashore, he came to the ladders, but attempting to get down was by
								the Athenians put back, and after he had received many wounds,
								swooned; 
							 and falling upon the ledges of the galley, his buckler tumbled over
								into the sea. 
							 Which brought to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in
								the trophy which they set up for this assault.

Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come aland; 
							 but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budging,
								they could not do it.

So that at this time fortune came so much about, that the Athenians
								fought from the land, Laconique land, against the Lacedaemonians in
								galleys; 
							 and the Lacedaemonians from their galleys fought against the
								Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. 
							 For at that time there was an opinion far spread, that these were
								rather landmen and expert in a battle of foot, and that in maritime
								and naval actions the other excelled.

This day then and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults and
								after that gave over. 
							 And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine for timber
								wherewith to make engines, hoping with engines to take that part of
								the wall that looketh into the haven, which, though it were higher,
								yet the landing to it was easier.

In the meantime arrive the forty Athenian galleys from Zacynthus; 
							 for there were joined with them certain galleys of the garrison of
								Naupactus and four of Chios.

And when they saw both the continent and the island full of men of
								arms and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come
								forth, not knowing where to cast anchor they sailed for the present
								to the isle Prote, being near and desert, and there lay for that
								night. 
							 The next day, after they had put themselves in order, they put to sea
								again with purpose to offer them battle if the other would come
								forth into the wide sea against them; 
							 if not, to enter the haven upon them.

But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them nor had stopped
								up the entries of the haven, as they had before determined, but
								lying still on the shore manned out their galleys and prepared to
								fight, if any entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one.

The Athenians, understanding this, came in violently upon them at
								both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedaemonian galleys,
								which were already set out and opposed them, they charged and put to
								flight; 
							 and in following the chase, which was but short, they brake many of
								them and took five, whereof one with all her men in her; 
							 and they fell in also with them that fled to the shore. 
							 And the galleys which were but in manning out were torn and rent
								before they could put off from the land. 
							 Others they tied to their own galleys and towed them away empty.

Which the Lacedaemonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the
								loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island,
								came in with their aid [from the land], and entering armed into the
								sea took hold of the galleys with their hands to have pulled them
								back again, every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse
								wherein himself was not present.

So there arose a great affray about the galleys, and such as was
								contrary to the manner of them both. 
							 For the Lacedaemonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one
								may say) nothing else but make a sea-fight from the land; 
							 and the Athenians, who had the victory and desired to extend their
								present fortune to the utmost, made a land-fight from their
								galleys.

But at length, having wearied and wounded each other, they fell
								asunder; 
							 and the Lacedaemonians recovered all their galleys, save only those
								which were taken at the first onset.

When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians
								erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed
								the wreck, and immediately went round the island with their galleys,
								keeping watch upon it as having intercepted the men within it. 
							 The Peloponnesians, in the meantime, that were in the continent and
								were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts
								of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylus.

As soon as the news of what had passed was related at Sparta, they
								thought fit, in respect the loss was great, to send the magistrates
								down to the camp to determine, upon view of the state of their
								present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done.

These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men
								and were not willing to put them to the danger either of suffering
								by famine or of being forced by multitude, concluded amongst
								themselves to take truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as
								concerned the particulars of Pylus, if they also would be content,
								and to send ambassadors to Athens about agreement, and to endeavour
								to fetch off their men as soon as they could.

The Athenian commanders accepting the proposition, the truce was made
								in this manner: 
							 That the Lacedaemonians should deliver up not only those galleys
								wherein they fought but also bring to Pylus and put into the
								Athenians' hands whatsoever vessels of the long form of building
								were anywhere else in Laconia; 
							 that they should not make any assault upon the fort, neither by sea
								nor land.— 
							 That the Athenians should permit the Lacedaemonians that were in the
								continent to send over to those in the island a portion of ground
								corn agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic choenickes of meal
								and two cotyles of wine and a piece of flesh, and to every of their
								servants half that quantity;

that they should send this the Athenians looking on, and not send
								over any vessel by stealth.—That the Athenians should nevertheless
								continue guarding of the island, provided that they landed not in
								it, and should not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor
								sea.—That if either side transgressed in any part thereof, the truce
								was then immediately to be void, otherwise to hold good till the
								return of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors from Athens.—That the
								Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens and back.—That
								at their return the truce should end, and the Athenians should
								restore them their galleys in as good estate as they had received
								them.

Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the
								Athenians, to the number of about three score; 
							 and the ambassadors were sent away, who, arriving at Athens, said as
								followeth:

"Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us hither concerning our
								men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to such a course,
								as being most profitable for you, may, in this misfortune, be the
								most honourable for us that our present condition is capable of.

We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with our custom,
								being the fashion with us, where few words suffice there indeed not
								to use many; 
							 but yet to use more when the occasion requireth that by words we
								should make plain that which is to be done in actions of
								importance.

But the words we shall use we pray you to receive not with the mind
								of an enemy nor as if we went about to instruct you as men ignorant,
								but for a remembrance to you of what you know that you may
								deliberate wisely therein.

It is now in your power to assure your present good fortune with
								reputation, holding what you have, with the addition of honour and
								glory besides, and to avoid that which befalleth men upon
								extraordinary success, who through hope aspire to greater fortune
								because the fortune they have already came unhoped for.

Whereas they that have felt many changes of both fortunes ought
								indeed to be most suspicious of the good. 
							 So ought your city, and ours especially, upon experience in all
								reason to be.

"Know it, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us, who, being
								of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that
								which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give.

And yet we are not brought to this through weakness nor through
								insolence upon addition of strength, but because it succeeded not
								with the power we had as we thought it should, which may as well
								happen to any other as to ourselves.

So that you have no reason to conceive that for your power and
								purchases fortune also must be therefore always yours.

Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of
								things doubtful do most wisely also address themselves towards
								adversity and not think that war will so far follow and no further
								as one shall please more or less to take it in hand, but rather so
								far as fortune shall lead it. 
							 Such men also, seldom miscarrying because they be not puffed up with
								the confidence of success, choose then principally to give over when
								they are in their better fortune.

And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us, and
								not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry (as many ways
								you may), to have it thought hereafter that all your present
								successes were but mere fortune; 
							 whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without danger to leave
								a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

"The Lacedaemonians call you to a peace and end of the war, giving
								you peace and alliance and much other friendship and mutual
								familiarity, requiring for the same [only] those their men that are
								in the island, though also we think it better for both sides not to
								try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of
								safety offered they escape by force, or being expugned by siege
								should be more in your power than they be.

For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled
								not when one that having beaten his enemy and gotten much the better
								in the war brings him through necessity to take an oath and to make
								peace on unequal terms, but when having it in his power lawfully so
								to do if he please, he overcome him likewise in goodness, and,
								contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate
								conditions.

For in this case, his enemy being obliged not to seek revenge as one
								that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame,
								be the more inclined to the conditions agreed on.

And, naturally, to those that relent of their own accord men give way
								reciprocally with content; 
							 but against the arrogant they will hazard all, even when in their own
								judgments they be too weak.

But for us both, if ever it were good to
										agree, it is surely so at this present and before any
										irreparable accident be interposed. 
									 Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear
										you a particular eternal hatred, and you be deprived of the
										commodities we now offer you.

Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst
									you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not
									suffered dishonour and but indifferent loss. 
								 And we shall not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also
									give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the
									Grecians, who will acknowledge it rather from you than us. 
								 For they make war not knowing whether side begun; 
								 but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your own
									hands, the thanks will be yours.

And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedaemonians your
									sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it and are therein
									not forced but gratified.

Wherein consider how many commodities are like to ensue. 
								 For if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being
									inferior to us, will honour us in the highest degree.

Thus spake the Lacedaemonians, thinking that in times past the
								Athenians had coveted peace and been hindered of it by them, and
								that being now offered, they would gladly accept of it.

But they, having these men intercepted in the island, thought they
								might compound at pleasure and aspired to greater matters. 
							 To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon, the son of
								Cleaenetus, a popular man at that time and of greatest sway with the
								multitude.

He persuaded them to give this answer: 
 That
										they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and
										come themselves to Athens; 
									 and when they should be there, if the Lacedaemonians would
										make restitution of Nisaea and Pegae and Troezen and
										Achaia 
 —the which they had not won in war but had
								received by former treaty when the Athenians, being in distress and
								at that time in more need of peace than now, [yielded them up into
								their hands]— 
 then they should have their
										men again, and peace should be made for as long as they both
										should think good.

To this answer they replied nothing, but desired that commissioners
								might be chosen to treat with them, who, by alternate speaking and
								hearing, might quietly make such an agreement as they could persuade
								each other unto.

But then Cleon came mightily upon them saying he knew before that
								they had no honest purpose and that the same was now manifest in
								that they refused to speak before the people but sought to sit in
								consultation only with a few, and willed them, if they had aught to
								say that was real, to speak it before them all.

But the Lacedaemonians finding that, although they had a mind to make
								peace with them upon this occasion of adversity, yet it would not be
								fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest speaking and not
								obtaining they should incur calumny with their confederates; 
							 and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued
								for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without effect.

Upon their return, presently the truce at Pylus was at an end; 
							 and the Lacedaemonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution
								of their galleys. 
							 But the Athenians, laying to their charge an assault made upon the
								fort, contrary to the articles, and other matters of no great
								importance, refused to render them, standing upon this, that it was
								said that the accord should be void upon whatsoever the least
								transgression of the same. 
							 But the Lacedaemonians, denying it and protesting this detention of
								their galleys for an injury, went their ways and betook themselves
								to the war.

So the war at Pylus was on both sides renewed with all their
								power; 
							 the Athenians went every day about the island with two galleys, one
								going one way, another another way, and lay at anchor about it every
								night with their whole fleet, except on that part which lieth to the
								open sea; 
							 and that only when it was windy. 
							 (From Athens also there came a supply of thirty galleys more, to
								guard the island, so that they were in the whole threescore and
								ten.) And the Lacedaemonians made assaults upon the fort, and
								watched every opportunity that should present itself to save their
								men in the island.

Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in
								Sicily, adding to those galleys that lay in garrison at Messana the
								rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made war out of
								Messana,

instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the
								Rhegians, whose territory they had also invaded with their whole
								forces by land;

and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present and hearing
								that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in
								the siege of the island, desired to try with them a battle by
								sea.

For if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying
								before Rhegium, both with their land-forces on the field side and
								with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their hands and
								thereby strengthen their affairs. 
							 For Rhegium, a promontory of Italy, and Messana in Sicily lying near
								together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying at anchor
								there against them and make themselves masters of the strait.

This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana where Sicily is
								nearest to the continent, and is that which is called Charybdis,
								where Ulysses is said to have passed through. 
							 Which, for that it is very narrow, and because the sea falleth in
								there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is rough,
								hath therefore not without good cause been esteemed dangerous.

In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with
								somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter
								end of the day to come to a sea-fight, having been drawn forth about
								the passage of a certain boat to undertake sixteen galleys of Athens
								and eight of Rhegium, and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off
								with the loss of one galley and went speedily each [side] to their
								own camp at Messana and Rhegium;

and the night overtook them in the action.

After this the Locrians departed out of the territory of the
								Rhegians, and the fleet of the Syracusians and their confederates
								came together to an anchor at Peloris and had their land-forces by
								them.

But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them and, finding their
								galleys empty of men, fell in amongst them; 
							 and by means of a grapnel cast into one of their galleys they lost
								that galley, but the men swam out.

Upon this the Syracusians went aboard, and whilst they were towed
								along the shore towards Messana the Athenians came up to them
								again; 
							 and the Syracusians, opening themselves, charged first and sunk
								another of their galleys.

So the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messana, having had the
								better in their passage by the shore and in the sea-fight, which
								were both together in such manner as is declared.

The Athenians, upon news that Camarina should by Archias and his
								complices be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. 
							 In the meantime the Messanians, with their whole power by land and
								also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidique city and their
								borderer.

The first day, having forced the Naxians to retire within their
								walls, they spoiled their fields; 
							 the next day they sent their fleet about into the river Acesine,
								which spoiled the country [as it went up the river], and with their
								land-forces assaulted the city.

In the meantime many of the Siculi, mountaineers, came down to their
								assistance against the Messanians, which when they of Naxos
								perceived, they took heart and, encouraging themselves with an
								opinion that the Leontines and all the rest of the Grecians their
								confederates had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the
								city and charged upon the Messanians and put them to flight with the
								slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers, and the rest hardly
								escaping home.

For the barbarians fell upon them and slew the most part of them in
								the highways. 
							 And the galleys that lay at Messana not long after divided themselves
								and went to their several homes. 
							 Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the
								Athenians, marched presently against Messana, as being now weakened,
								and assaulted it, the Athenians with their fleet by the haven and
								the land-forces at the wall to the field.

But the Messanians and certain Locrians with Demoteles, who after
								this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing forth and falling
								suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines' army to
								flight and slew many. 
							 But the Athenians, seeing that, disbarked and relieved them and,
								coming upon the Messanians now in disorder, chased them again into
								the city.

Then they erected a trophy and put over to Rhegium. 
							 After this, the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another without
								the Athenians.

All this while the Athenians at Pylus besieged the Lacedaemonians in
								the island; 
							 and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still
								upon the place.

This keeping of watch was exceedingly painful to the Athenians in
								respect of the want they had both of corn and water, for there was
								no well but one and that was in the fort itself of Pylus and no
								great one. 
							 And the greatest number turned up the gravel and drank such water as
								they were like to find there.

They were also scanted of room for their camp, and their galleys not
								having place to ride in, they were forced by turns some to stay
								ashore and others to take their victual and lie off at anchor.

But their greatest discouragement was the time which they had stayed
								there longer than they had thought to have done, for they thought to
								have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island and
								having nothing to drink but salt water.

The cause hereof were the Lacedaemonians, who had proclaimed that any
								man that would should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and all other
								esculents necessary for a siege into the island, appointing for the
								same a great reward of silver; 
							 and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him
								liberty. 
							 Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual, but especially the
								Helotes, who, putting off from all parts of Peloponnesus,
								wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island
								that lay to the wide sea.

But they had a care above all to take such a time as to be brought in
								with the wind.

For when it blew from the sea, they could escape the watch of the
								galleys easily; 
							 for they could not then lie round about the island at anchor. 
							 And the Helotes were nothing tender in putting ashore, for they ran
								their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money; 
							 and the men of arms also watched at all the landing places of the
								island. 
							 But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm were
								intercepted.

There were also such as could dive, that swam over into the island
								through the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles filled
								with poppy tempered with honey, and pounded linseed; 
							 whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards
								watched.

So that on either part they used all possible art, one side to send
								over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.

The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how
								it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the
								island, knew not what they should do to it and feared lest winter
								should overtake them in their siege, fearing not only that to
								provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert
								place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also that they should
								be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it
								were summer; 
							 and again, that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there
								would be no place to lie anchor in against them, but that the watch
								there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape or in
								some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that brought
								them meat.

But that which they feared most was that the Lacedaemonians seemed to
								have some assurance of them already, because they sent no more to
								negotiate about them.

And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. 
							 But Cleon, knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the
								agreement, said that they who brought the news reported not the
								truth. 
							 Whereupon, they that came thence advising them, if they would not
								believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes
								were chosen by the Athenians to view it.

But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said whom he
								before calumniated or, saying the contrary, be proved a liar, he
								advised the Athenians, seeing them inclined of themselves to send
								thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it
								was not fit to send to view the place nor to lose their opportunity
								by delay;

but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a
								voyage against those men; 
							 and glanced at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, then general, upon
								malice and with language of reproach, saying it was easy, if the
								leaders were men, to go and take them there in the island; 
							 and that himself, if he had the command, would do it.

But Nicias, seeing the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against
								Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter he did not
								presently put it in practice, and seeing also he had upbraided him,
								willed him to take what strength he would that they could give him
								and undertake it.

Cleon, supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words,
								was ready to accept it; 
							 but when he knew he would give him the authority in good earnest,
								then he shrunk back and said that not he but Nicias was general,
								being now indeed afraid and hoping that he durst not have given over
								the office to him.

But then Nicias again bade him do it and gave over his command [to
								him] for so much as concerned Pylus and called the Athenians to
								witness it. 
							 They (as is the fashion of the multitude), the more Cleon declined
								the voyage and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the
								more to resign his power to him and cried out upon Cleon to go.

Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage himself of his word, he
								undertook the voyage, and stood forth saying that he feared not the
								Lacedaemonians and that he would not carry any man with him out of
								the city but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present
								and those targettiers that were come to them from Aenus and four
								hundred archers out of other places; 
							 and with these, he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylus
								already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the
								Lacedaemonians alive or kill them upon the place.

This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and was
								heard with great content of the wiser sort. 
							 For of two benefits, the one must needs fall out: either to be rid of
								Cleon (which was their greatest hope) or, if they were deceived in
								that, then to get those Lacedaemonians into their hands.

Now when he had dispatched with the assembly and the Athenians had by
								their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself
								Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus, and presently put to
								sea.

He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion because he heard that
								he also of himself had a purpose to set his soldiers aland in the
								isle. 
							 For the army, having suffered much by the straitness of the place and
								being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to
								put the matter to the hazard of a battle;

confirmed therein the more for that the island had been burnt. 
							 For having been for the most part wood and (by reason it had lain
								ever desert) without path, they were before [the more] afraid and
								thought it the advantage of the enemy; 
							 for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army
								that should offer to come aland. 
							 For their errors being in the wood and their preparation could not so
								well have been discerned, whereas all the faults of their own army
								should have been in sight, so that the enemy might have set upon
								them suddenly in what part soever they had pleased, because the
								onset had been in their own election.

Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the
								Lacedaemonians at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of
								the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and
								unskilful. 
							 Besides, their own army being great it might receive an overthrow
								before they could know of it, because they could not see where it
								was needful to relieve one another.

These things came into his head especially from the loss he received
								in Aetolia; 
							 which in part also happened by occasion of the woods.

But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at
								the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before
								them, and one of them having set fire on the wood, [it burnt on by
								little and little], and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it
								was burnt before they were aware.

By this accident, Demosthenes, the better discerning that the
								Lacedaemonians were more than he had imagined, having before, by
								victual sent unto them, thought them not so many, did now prepare
								himself for the enterprise as a matter deserving the Athenians'
								utmost care and as having better commodity of landing in the island
								than before he had, and both sent for the forces of such
								confederates as were near and put in readiness every other needful
								thing.

And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming,
								came himself also, with those forces which he had required, unto
								Pylus. 

							 When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in
								the continent to know if they would command those in the island to
								deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with
								easy imprisonment till some agreement were made touching the main
								war.

Which when they refused, the Athenians for one day held their
								hands; 
							 but the next day, having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men
								of arms, they put off in the night and landed a little before day on
								both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to
								the number of about eight hundred men of arms, and marched upon high
								speed towards the foremost watch of the island.

For thus the Lacedaemonians lay quartered. 
							 In this foremost watch were about thirty men of arms; 
							 the middest and evenest part of the island and about the water was
								kept by Epitadas, their captain, with the greatest part of the whole
								number; 
							 and another part of them, which were not many, kept the last guard
								towards Pylus, which place to the seaward was on a cliff and least
								assailable by land. 
							 For there was also a certain fort which was old and made of chosen
								[not of hewn] stones, which they thought would stand them in stead
								in case of violent retreat. 
							 Thus they were quartered.

Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, which
								they so ran to, in their cabins and as they were taking arms. 
							 For they knew not of their landing but thought those galleys had come
								thither to anchor in the night according to custom, as they had been
								wont to do.

As soon as it was morning, the rest of the army also landed, out of
								somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he
								had, being all [that rowed] except only the Thalamii: eight hundred
								archers, targetiers as many, all the Messenians that came to aid
								them, and as many of them besides as held any place about Pylus,
								except only the garrison of the fort itself.

Demosthenes then, disposing his army by two hundred and more in a
								company, and in some less, [at certain distances], seized on all the
								higher grounds to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every
								side, might the less know what to do or against what part to set
								themselves in battle and be subject to the shot of the multitude
								from every part; 
							 and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be
								charged behind;

and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks,
								be charged at once both behind and before. 
							 And which way soever they marched, the light-armed and such as were
								meanliest provided of arms followed them at the back with arrows,
								darts, stones, and slings, who have courage enough afar off, and
								could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the
								enemies when they should retire. 
							 With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first and
								afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action.

Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those
								in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain and
								that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array and went
								towards the men of arms of the Athenians with intent to charge
								them; 
							 for these were opposed to them in front, and the light-armed soldiers
								on their flanks and at their backs.

But they could neither come to join with them nor any way make use of
								their skill. 
							 For both the lightarmed soldiers kept them off with shot from either
								side, and the men of arms advanced not. 
							 Where the light-armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven
								back; 
							 but returning, they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and
								that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the ground
								being uneasy and rough by having been formerly desert, so that the
								Lacedaemonians in their armour could not follow them.

Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another afar
								off. 
							 But when the Lacedaemonians were no longer able to run out after them
								where they charged, these lightarmed soldiers, seeing them less
								earnest in chasing them and taking courage chiefly from their sight,
								as being many times their number, and having also been used to them
								so much as not to think them now so dangerous as they had done, for
								that they had not received so much hurt at their hands as their
								subdued minds, because they were to fight against the
								Lacedaemonians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned
								them; 
							 and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones,
								arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand.

Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed
								to such kind of fight; 
							 and withal a great dust of the woods lately burnt mounted into the
								air, so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with
								the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see
								before them.

Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedaemonians' side, for their
								jacks now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown
								stuck broken in them, so as they could not handle themselves, as
								neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them for
								the greater noise of the enemy, but danger being on all sides, were
								hopeless to save themselves upon any side by fighting.

In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not
								shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order to the
								last guard of the island and to the watch that was there.

When they once gave ground, then were the lightarmed soldiers much
								more confident than before and pressed upon them with a mighty
								noise; 
							 and as many of the Lacedaemonians as they could intercept in their
								retreat they slew; 
							 but the most of them recovered the fort and together with the watch
								of the same put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that
								were subject to assault.

The Athenians following could not now encompass and hem them in, for
								the strong situation of the place, but, assaulting them in the face,
								sought only how to put them from the wall.

And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either
								side tired with the fight and with thirst and with the sun, one
								endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the other to keep
								their ground. 
							 And the Lacedaemonians defended themselves easilier now than before
								because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks.

When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians
								said unto Cleon and Demosthenes that they spent their labour there
								in vain and that if they would deliver unto him a part of the
								archers and light-armed soldiers to get up by such a way as he
								himself should find out and come behind upon their backs, he thought
								the entrance might be forced.

And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place
								out of sight to the Lacedaemonians that he might not be discovered
								making his approach under the cliffs of the island where they were
								continual in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof,
								they kept no watch, and with much labour and hardly unseen, came
								behind them, and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both
								terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not and
								much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they
								expected.

And the Lacedaemonians, being now charged with their shot both before
								and behind, were in the same case (to compare small matters with
								great) that they were in at Thermopylae. 
							 For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a
								narrow path; 
							 and these now, being charged on both sides, could make good the place
								no longer, but fighting few against many and being weak withal for
								want of food, were at last forced to give ground; 
							 and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the
								entrances.

But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more they gave back the
								faster they would be killed by their army, stayed the fight and held
								in the soldiers, with desire to carry them alive to Athens in case
								their spirits were so much broken and their courage abated by this
								misery as upon proclamation made they would be content to deliver up
								their arms.

So they proclaimed that they should deliver up their arms and
								themselves to the Athenians to be disposed of as to them should seem
								good.

Upon hearing hereof the most of them threw down their bucklers and
								shook their hands above their heads, signifying their acceptation of
								what was proclaimed. 
							 Whereupon a truce was made and they came to treat, Cleon and
								Demosthenes of one side, and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the
								other side. 
							 For of them that had command there, Epitadas, who was the first, was
								slain; 
							 and Hippagretes, who was chosen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead,
								though yet alive; 
							 and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law in
								case the others should miscarry.

Styphon and those that were with him said they would send over to the
								Lacedaemonians in the continent to know what they there would advise
								them to.

But the Athenians, letting none go thence, called for heralds out of
								the continent; 
							 and the question having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the
								Lacedaemonians that came over from the continent brought them this
								answer: 
 The Lacedaemonians bid you take
										advice touching yourselves such as you shall think good,
										provided you do nothing dishonourably. 
 Whereupon,
								having consulted, they yielded up themselves and their arms.

And the Athenians attended them that day and the night following with
								a watch; 
							 but the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island,
								they prepared to be gone and committed the prisoners to the custody
								of the captains of the galleys. 
							 And the Lacedaemonians sent over a herald and took up the bodies of
								their dead.

The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island was
								thus: There went over into the island in all four hundred and twenty
								men of arms; 
							 of these were sent away alive three hundred wanting eight; 
							 and the rest slain. 
							 Of those that lived, there were of the city itself of Sparta one
								hundred and twenty. 
							 Of the Athenians there died not many, for it was no standing fight.

The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the
								fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy-two
								days, of which for twenty days victual was allowed to be carried to
								them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away
								that went about the peace;

in the rest, they were fed by such only as put in thither by
								stealth; 
							 and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. 
							 For their captain Epitadas had distributed it more sparingly than he
								needed to have done.

So the Athenians and the Peloponnesians departed from Pylus, and went
								home both of them with their armies. 
							 And the promise of Cleon, as senseless as is was, took effect; 
							 for within twenty days he brought home the men as he had undertaken.

Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most
								contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. 
							 For they expected that the Lacedaemonians should never, neither by
								famine nor whatsoever other necessity, have been constrained to
								deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands,
								fighting as long as they had been able, and would not believe that
								those that yielded were like to those that were slain.

And when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the
								prisoners, by way of insulting, if they which were slain were
								valiant men, he answered that a spindle (meaning an arrow) deserved
								to be valued at a high rate if it could know what was a good man,
								signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced
								to light on.

After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should
								be kept in bonds till there should be made some agreement; 
							 and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory,
								then to bring them forth and kill them.

They took order also [in the same assembly] for the settling of the
								garrison at Pylus. 
							 And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of
								their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native
								country (for Pylus is in that country which belonged once to the
								Messenians), infested Laconia with robberies and did them much other
								mischief, as being of the same language.

The Lacedaemonians, not having in times past been acquainted with
								robberies and such war as that, and because their Helotes ran over
								to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country,
								took the matter much to heart; 
							 and though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet they
								sent ambassadors and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the
								fort of Pylus and of their men.

But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; 
							 and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, yet were always
								sent away without effect. 
							 These were the proceedings at Pylus.

Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians, with eighty
								galleys, two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred
								horse in boats built for transportation of horses, made war upon the
								territory of Corinth. 
							 There went also with them Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, of
								their confederates. 
							 The general of the whole army was Nicias, the son of Niceratus, with
								two others in commission with him.

Betimes in a morning they put in at a place between Chersonesus and
								Rheitus on that shore above which standeth the hill Solygeius,
								whereon the Dorians in old time sat down to make war on the
								Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Aeolians, and
								upon which there standeth now a village, called also Solygeia. 
							 From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant
								twenty furlongs, and the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus
								twenty.

The Corinthians, having long before from Argos had intelligence that
								an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all of them
								with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without
								the isthmus and five hundred garrison soldiers absent in Ambracia
								and Leucadia; 
							 all the rest of military age came forth to attend the Athenians where
								they should put in.

But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen and that
								advertisement thereof was given them by signs put up into the air,
								they left the one half of their forces in Cenchreia lest the
								Athenians should go against Crommyon: and with the other half made
								haste to meet them.

Battus, one of their commanders (for there were two of them present
								at the battle), with one squadron went toward the village of
								Solygeia, being an open one, to defend it; 
							 and Lycophron with the rest charged the enemy.

And first they gave the onset on the right wing of the Athenians,
								which was but newly landed before Chersonesus; 
							 and afterwards they charged likewise the rest of the army. 
							 The battle was hot and at hand-strokes.

And the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for of these
								consisted their utmost files) sustained the charge of the
								Corinthians; 
							 and with much ado drave them back. 
							 But as they retired they came up (for the place was all rising
								ground) to a dry wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground,
								threw down stones at them; 
							 and after having sung the Paean, came again close to them, whom when
								the Athenians abode, the battle was again at hand-strokes.

But a certain band of Corinthians that came in to the aid of their
								own left wing put the right wing of the Athenians to flight and
								chased them to the sea-side; 
							 but then from their galleys they turned head again, both the
								Athenians and the Carystians.

The other part of their army continued fighting on both sides,
								especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron fought
								against the left wing of the Athenians; 
							 for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygeia.

So they held each other to it a long time, neither side giving
								ground. 
							 But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen, which did them
								great service, seeing the other had none) the Corinthians were put
								to flight and retired to the hill, where they laid down their arms
								and descended no more, but there rested.

In this retreat, the greatest part of their right wing was slain, and
								amongst others Lycophron, one of the generals. 
							 But the rest of the army being in this manner neither much urged, nor
								retiring in much haste, when they could do no other, made their
								retreat up the hill and there sat down.

The Athenians, seeing them come no more down to battle, rifled the
								dead bodies of the enemy and took up their own and presently erected
								a trophy on the place.

That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchreia to watch the
								Athenians, that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle
								for the hill Oneius; 
							 but when they saw the dust and so knew what was in hand, they went
								presently to their aid. 
							 So did also the old men of Corinth from the city when they understood
								how the matter had succeeded.

The Athenians, when all these were coming upon them together,
								imagining them to have been the succours of the neighboring cities
								of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys, carrying with
								them the booty and the bodies of their dead, all save two, which,
								not finding, they left.

Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands on the other side, and
								from thence sent a herald and fetched away those two dead bodies
								which they left behind. 
							 There were slain in this battle Corinthians, two hundred and twelve,
								and Athenians, somewhat under fifty.

The Athenians, putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to
								Crommyon in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a
								hundred and twenty furlongs; 
							 where anchoring, they wasted the fields and stayed all that
								night.

The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of
								Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion from their
								galleys, and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Troezen,
								and there took in the isthmus of Chersonesus with a wall, and placed
								a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the
								territories of Troezen, Halias, and Epidaurus. 
							 And when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their
								fleet.

About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and
								Sophocles, after their departure from Pylus with the Athenian fleet
								towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city,
								and made war upon those Corcyraeans which lay encamped upon the hill
								Istone, and which after the sedition had come over, and both made
								themselves masters of the field and much annoyed the city, and
								having assaulted their fortification, took it.

But the men all in one troop escaped to a certain high ground and
								thence made their composition, which was this: that they should
								deliver up the strangers that aided them; 
							 and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should stand to
								the judgment of the people of Athens.

Hereupon the generals granted them truce and transported them to the
								island of Ptychia to be there in custody till the Athenians should
								send for them; 
							 with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running
								away, then the truce to be broken for them all.

But the patrons of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians
								would not kill them when they came thither, devise against them this
								plot.

To some few of those in the island they secretly send their friends
								and instruct them to say, as if forsooth it were for good will, that
								it was their best course with all speed to get away; 
							 and withal, to offer to provide them of a boat; 
							 for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to
								the Corcyraean people.

When they were persuaded to do so and that a boat was treacherously
								prepared, as they rowed away they were taken; 
							 and the truce being now broken, were all given up into the hands of
								the Corcyraeans.

It did much further this plot, that to make the pretext seem more
								serious and the agents in it less fearful, the Athenian generals
								gave out that they were nothing pleased that the men should be
								carried home by others, whilst they themselves were to go into
								Sicily, and the honour of it be ascribed to those that should convoy
								them.

The Corcyraeans, having received them into their hands, imprisoned
								them in a certain edifice, from whence afterwards they took them out
								by twenty at a time and made them pass through a lane of men of
								arms, bound together and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on
								either side, according as any one espied his enemy. 
							 And to hasten the pace of those that went slowliest on, others were
								set to follow them with whips.

They had taken out of the room in this manner and slain to the number
								of threescore before they that remained knew it, who thought they
								were but removed and carried to some other place. 
							 But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they
								then cried out to the Athenians and said that if they would
								themselves kill them they should do it, and refused any more to go
								out of the room;

nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to
								come in. 
							 But neither had the Corcyraeans any purpose to force entrance by the
								door; 
							 but getting up to the top of the house, uncovered the roof and threw
								tiles and shot arrows at them.

They in prison defended themselves as well as they could, but many
								also slew themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting
								them into their throats, and strangled themselves with the cords of
								certain beds that were in the room and with ropes made of their own
								garments rent in pieces. 
							 And having continued most part of the night (for night overtook them
								in the action) partly strangling themselves by all such means as
								they found, and partly shot at from above, they [all] perished.

When day came, the Corcyraeans laid them one across another in carts
								and carried them out of the city.

And of their wives, as many as were taken in the fortification, they
								made bondwomen. 
							 In this manner were the Corcyraeans that kept the hill brought to
								destruction by the commons. 
							 And thus ended this far-spread sedition for so much as concerned this
								present war; 
							 for of other seditions there remained nothing worth the relation.

And the Athenians being arrived in Sicily, whither they were at first
								bound, prosecuted the war there together with the rest of their
								confederates of those parts.

In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Naupactus went
								forth with an army and took the city of Anactorium, belonging to the
								Corinthians and lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, by
								treason. 
							 And when they had put forth the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it
								with a colony sent thither from all parts of their own nation. 
							 And so this summer ended.

The next winter, Aristides, the son of Archippus, one of the
								commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to gather
								tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes, a Persian,
								in the town of Eion upon the river Strymon, going from the king to
								Lacedaemon.

When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters
								out of the Assyrian language into Greek and read them; 
							 wherein, amongst many other things that were written to the
								Lacedaemonians, the principal was this: that he knew not what they
								meant, for many ambassadors came, but they spake not the same
								thing; 
							 if therefore they had any thing to say certain, they should send
								somebody to him with this Persian.

But Artaphernes they send afterwards away in a galley, with
								ambassadors of their own, to Ephesus. 
							 And there encountering the news that king Artaxerxes, the son of
								Xerxes, was lately dead (for about that time he died), they returned
								home.

The same winter also, the Chians demolished their new wall by command
								of the Athenians, upon suspicion that they intended some innovation,
								notwithstanding they had given the Athenians their faith and the
								best security they could to the intent they should let them be as
								they were. 
							 Thus ended this winter, and the seventh year of this war written by
								Thucydides.

The next summer, in the very beginning, at a change in the moon the
								sun was eclipsed in part; 
							 and in the beginning of the same month happened an earthquake.

At this time the Mytilenaean and other Lesbian outlaws, most of them
								residing in the continent, with mercenary forces out of Peloponnesus
								and some which they levied where they were, seize on Rhoeteium, and
								for two thousand Phocaean states render it again without doing them
								other harm.

After this they came with their forces to Antander and took that city
								also by treason. 
							 They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called
								Actaeae, which were in the occupation formerly of the Mytilenaeans,
								but subject to the Athenians; 
							 but above all the rest Antander, which when they had once gotten (for
								there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of
								timber, and Mount Ida was above their heads), they might issue from
								thence with other their preparation and infest Lesbos, which was
								near, and bring into their power the Aeolic towns in the
								continent. 
							 And this were those men preparing.

The Athenians the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men
								of arms, and a few horsemen, taking with them also the Milesians and
								some other of their confederates, made war upon Cythera, under the
								conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, the son of
								Diotrephes, and Autocles, the son of Tolmaeus.

This Cythera is an island upon the coast of Laconia, over against
								Malea. 
							 The inhabitants be Lacedaemonians, of the same that dwell about
								them. 
							 And every year there goeth over unto them from Sparta a magistrate
								called Cyther- 
								 odikes. They likewise sent over men of arms
								from time to time to lie in the garrison there, and took much care
								of the place.

For it was the place where their ships used to put in from Egypt and
								Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by thieves from
								the sea, being that way only subject to that mischief. 
							 For the island lieth wholly out into the Sicilian and Cretic seas.

The Athenians, arriving with their army, with ten of their galleys
								and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians, took a town lying to
								the sea, called Scandeia; 
							 and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the
								island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the
								Cythereans, lying likewise to the sea.

The Cythereans they found standing all in arms prepared for them. 
							 And after the battle began, the Cythereans for a little while made
								resistance, but soon after turned their backs and fled into the
								higher part of the city, and afterwards compounded with Nicias and
								his fellow-commanders that the Athenians should determine of them
								whatsoever they thought good but death.

Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cythereans before,
								which was also a cause that those things which concerned the accord
								both now and afterwards were both the sooner and with the more
								favour dispatched. 
							 For the Athenians did but remove the Cythereans, and that also
								because they were Lacedaemonians, and because the island lay in that
								manner upon the coast of Laconia.

After this composition, having as they went by received Scandeia, a
								town lying upon the haven, and put a guard upon the Cythereans, they
								sailed to Asine and most of the towns upon the sea-side. 
							 And going sometimes aland, and staying where they saw cause, wasted
								the country for about seven days together.

The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera and
								expected withal that they would come to land in the same manner in
								their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to
								resist them; 
							 but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their
								territory to guard it wheresoever there was need; 
							 and were otherwise also exceedingly watchful, fearing lest some
								innovation should happen in the state, as having received a very
								great and unexpected loss in the island, and the Athenians having
								gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with
								a busy and unavoidable war.

In so much that contrary to their custom they ordained four hundred
								horsemen, and some archers. 
							 And if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now,
								because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war,
								and against Athenians, who thought they lost whatsoever they not
								attempted.

Withal, their so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so
								contrary to their own expectation, exceedingly affrighted them.

And fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they had
								received in the island, they durst the less to hazard battle, and
								thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because
								their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them
								nothing.

As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country
								and disbarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most
								part stirred not, both as knowing themselves singly to be too small
								a number, and as being in that manner dejected. 
							 Yet one garrison fought about Cortyta and Aphrodisia and frighted in
								the straggling rabble of light-armed soldiers; 
							 but when the men of arms had received them, it retired again with the
								loss of a few, whom they also rifled of their arms; 
							 and the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again and
								went to Cythera.

From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera, and having
								wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea, which is of the
								territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the middle border
								between Argeia and Laconia. 
							 The Lacedaemonians, possessing this city, gave the same for an
								habitation to the Aeginetae, after they were driven out of Aegina,
								both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of
								the earthquake and of the insurrection of the Helotes, and also for
								that, being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone
								ever the same way with the Lacedaemonians.

When the Athenians were coming towards them, the Aeginetae left the
								wall which they happened to be then building toward the sea-side and
								retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which was not
								above ten furlongs from the sea.

There was also with them one of those garrisons which the
								Lacedaemonians had distributed into the several parts of the
								country; 
							 and these, though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would
								not now enter with them into the town, though the Aeginetae
								entreated them, apprehending danger in being cooped up within the
								walls; 
							 and therefore retiring into the highest ground, lay still there, as
								finding themselves too weak to give them battle.

In the meantime the Athenians came in, and marching up presently with
								their whole army, won Thyrea, and burnt it, and destroyed whatsoever
								was in it. 
							 The Aeginetae, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried
								prisoners to Athens, amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of
								Patroclus, captain of such Lacedaemonians as were amongst them, was
								wounded and taken alive.

They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom for
								safety's sake they thought good to remove into some other place. 
							 These therefore, the Athenians decreed, should be placed in the
								islands; 
							 and that the rest of the Cythereans at the tribute of four talents
								should inhabit their own territory; 
							 that the Aeginetae, as many as they had taken (out of former
								inveterate hatred), should be put to death; 
							 and that Tantalus should be put in bonds amongst those Lacedaemonians
								that were taken in the island.

In Sicily the same summer was concluded a cessation of arms, first
								between the Camarinaeans and the Geloans; 
							 but afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling by their
								ambassadors out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst
								themselves for making of a peace. 
							 Wherein, after many opinions delivered by men disagreeing and
								requiring satisfaction, every one as he thought himself prejudiced,
								Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusian, who also prevailed
								with them the most, spake unto the assembly to this effect:

"Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city nor of the most
								afflicted with war that am now to speak and to deliver the opinion
								which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all
								Sicily.

Touching war, how calamitous a thing it is, to what end should a man,
								particularising the evils thereof, make a long speech before men
								that already know it? 
							 For neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to enter
								into war, nor the fear of them divert any man from it, when he
								thinks it will turn to his advantage. 
							 But rather it so falls out that the one thinks the gain greater than
								the danger; 
							 and the other prefers danger before present loss.

But lest they should both the one and the other do it unseasonably,
								exhortations unto peace are profitable, and will be very much worth
								to us if we will follow them at this present.

For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure their own,
								both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour
								now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. 
							 Which if it succeed not so well that we may depart satisfied every
								man with reason, we will be at wars again.

"Nevertheless you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought
								not to be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but
								how to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at
								least in my opinion) by the Athenians. 
							 And you ought to think, that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders
								of the peace than any words of mine; 
							 who, having of all the Grecians the greatest power, lie here with a
								few galleys to observe our errors, and by a lawful title of
								alliance, handsomely to accommodate their natural hostility to their
								best advantage.

For if we enter into a war and call in these men, who are apt enough
								to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at our
								own charges and withal cut out for them the dominion here, it is
								likely, when they shall see us spent, they will sometime hereafter
								come upon us with a greater fleet and attempt to bring all these
								states into their subjection.

"Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates and
								undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours
								than for the impairing of what we already have; 
							 and to believe that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition, and
								that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the
								Athenians as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition
								within itself.

In contemplation whereof, we ought, man with man and city with city,
								to return again into amity; 
							 and with one consent to endeavour the safety of all Sicily: and not
								to have this conceit, that though the Dorians be the Athenians'
								enemies, yet the Chalcideans are safe, as being of the race of the
								Ionians.

For they invade not these divided races upon hatred of a side, but
								upon a covetous desire of those necessaries which we enjoy in
								common. 
							 And this they have proved themselves in their coming hither to aid
								the Chalcideans.

For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from
								the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more forward to
								help them than by the league they were bound unto.

Indeed, the Athenians, that covet and meditate these things, are to
								be pardoned. 
							 I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most
								willing to be subject; 
							 for it is the nature of man everywhere to command such as give way
								and to be shy of such as assail.

We are to blame that know this and do not provide accordingly and
								make it our first care of all to take good order against the common
								fear.

Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst
								ourselves (for the Athenians come not amongst us out of their own
								country, but from theirs here that have called them in); 
							 and so, not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace
								without trouble; 
							 and those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence
								to injure us, so shall they with fair reason be dismissed by us
								without their errand.

"And thus much for the profit that will be found by advising wisely
								concerning the Athenians.

But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why
								should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? 
							 Or do you think, perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be
								pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove
								the latter or preserve the former, to both; 
							 or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or
								whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? 
							 Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice,
								but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own
								safety.

Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design
								of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he
								fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his
								hope, knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such
								as had done them injury, and others trusting, by some strength they
								have had, to take away another's right, have, the first sort,
								instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of
								winning from others, left behind them what they had of their
								own.

For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an
								injury hath been done it should therefore prosper; 
							 nor is strength therefore sure because hopeful. 
							 It is the instability of fortune that is most predominant in things
								to come, which, though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet
								appears to be the most profitable. 
							 For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other
								with the greater providence.

"Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the
								uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present,
								and taking these for hindrances sufficient to have made us come
								short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us send away
								our enemies that hover over us and make an eternal peace amongst
								overselves, or if not that, then a truce at least for as long as may
								be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. 
							 In sum, let us know this:

that following my counsel, we shall every of us have our cities
								free; 
							 whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate
								according to their merit such as do us good or harm; 
							 whereas rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our
								contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, [if
								it be], we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies
								and enemies to such as we ought not.

For my part, as I said in the beginning, I
									bring to this the greatest city, and which is rather an
									assailant than assailed; 
								 and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an
									agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies as to hurt ourselves
									more. 
								 Nor yet through foolish spite will I look to be followed as
									absolute in my will and master of fortune, which I cannot
									command; 
								 but I will also give way where it is reason.

And so I look the rest should do as well as I; 
								 and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy.

For it is no dishonour to be overcome kinsmen of kinsmen, one
									Dorian of another Dorian, and one Chalcidean of another of his
									own race, or in sum, any one by another of us, being neighbours
									and cohabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and
									all called by one name, Sicilians. 
								 Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again by
									common conferences make peace by our own selves.

But when foreigners invade us, we shall, if wise, unite all of us
									to encounter them, inasmuch as being weakened singly, we are in
									danger universally.

As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor
									arbitrators. 
								 For so shall Sicily attain these two benefits, to be rid of the
									Athenians and of domestic war for the present, and to be
									inhabited by ourselves with liberty and less insidiated by
									others for the time to come.

Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his advice and
								agreed amongst themselves that the war should cease, every one
								retaining what they then presently enjoyed; 
							 and that the Camarinaeans should have Morgantina, paying for the same
								unto the Syracusians a certain sum of money then assessed.

They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the
								Athenians unto them as were in authority, told them that they also
								were willing to compound and be comprehended in the same peace. 
							 And the Athenians approving it, they did so;

and hereupon the Athenians departed out of Sicily. 
							 The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two,
								namely Pythodorus and Sophocles, and laid a fine upon the third,
								which was Eurymedon, as men that might have subdued the estates of
								Sicily, but had been bribed to return.

So great was their fortune at that time that they thought nothing
								could cross them, but that they might have achieved both easy and
								hard enterprises with great and slender forces alike. 
							 The cause whereof was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their
								designs, subministering strength unto their hope.

The same summer the Megareans in the city of Megara, pinched both by
								the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their
								whole forces every year twice, and by their own outlaws from Pegae,
								who in a sedition driven out by the commons grievously afflicted
								them with robberies, began to talk one to another how it was fit to
								call them home again and not to let their city by both these means
								to be ruined.

The friends of those without, perceiving the rumour, they also, more
								openly now than before, required to have it brought to council.

But the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the commons,
								by reason of the miseries they were in, should not be able to carry
								it against the other side, made an offer to Hippocrates, the son of
								Ariphon, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanders of the
								Athenian army, to deliver them the city, as esteeming that course
								less dangerous for themselves than the reduction of those whom they
								had before driven out. 
							 And they agreed that first the Athenians should possess themselves of
								the long-walls (these were about eight furlongs in length, and
								reached from the city to Nisaea their haven), thereby to cut off the
								aid of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, in which (the better to assure
								Megara to their side) there lay no other soldiers in garrison but
								they; 
							 and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the
								city above, which would the more easily succeed if that were
								effected first.

The Athenians therefore, after all was done and said on both sides
								and everything ready, sailed away by night to Minoa, an island of
								the Megareans, with six hundred men of arms led by Hippocrates, and
								sat down in a certain pit, out of which bricks had been made for the
								walls, and which was not far off.

But they that were with the other commander, Demosthenes, light-armed
								Plataeans and others called peripoli, lay in ambush at the temple of
								Mars, not so far off as the former.

And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as
								had peculiar care to know the passages of this same night. 
							 When it was almost day, the Megarean traitors did thus: They had been
								accustomed long, as men that went out for booty with leave of the
								magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices the opening
								of the gates, to carry out a little boat, such as wherein the
								watermen used an oar in either hand, and to convey it by night down
								the ditch to the sea-side in a cart, and in a cart to bring it back
								again and set it within the gates, to the end that the Athenians
								which lay in Minoa might not know where to watch for them, no boat
								being to be seen in the haven.

At this time was that cart at the gates, which were opened according
								to custom as for the boat. 
							 And the Athenians seeing it (for so it was agreed on), arose from
								their ambush and ran with all speed to get in before the gates
								should be shut again, and to be there whilst the cart was yet in the
								gates and kept them open.

And first those Plataeans and peripoli that were with Demosthenes ran
								in, in that same place where the trophy is now extant, and fighting
								presently within the gates (for those Peloponnesians that were
								nearest heard the stir), the Plataeans overcame those that resisted
								and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were
								coming after.

After this the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up every one
								to the wall.

And a few of the Peloponnesians that were of the garrison, made head
								at first and fought and were some of them slain; 
							 but the most of them took their heels, fearing in the night both the
								enemy that charged them and also the traitors of the Megareans that
								fought against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general
								had betrayed them.

It chanced also that the Athenian herald of his own discretion made
								proclamation that if any Megarean would take part with the
								Athenians, he should come and lay down his arms. 
							 When the Peloponnesians heard this, they stayed no longer, but
								seriously believing that they jointly warred upon them, fled into
								Nisaea.

As soon as it was day, the walls being now taken and the Megareans
								being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the
								Athenians, and with them the rest, as many as were conscious, said
								it was fit to have the gates opened and to go out and give the enemy
								battle.

Now it was agreed on between them that when the gates were open, the
								Athenians should rush in, and that themselves would be easily known
								from the rest, to the end they might have no harm done them, for
								that they would besmear themselves with some ointment. 
							 And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety, for
								the four thousand men of arms of Athens and six hundred horsemen,
								which according to the appointment were to come to them, having
								marched all night, were already arrived.

When they had besmeared themselves and were now about the gates, one
								of those who were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest that
								were not. 
							 These joining their strength came all together to the gates, denying
								that it was fit to go out to fight, for that neither in former times
								when they were stronger than now, durst they do so, or to put the
								city into so manifest danger, and said, that if they would not be
								satisfied, the battle should be thereright. 
							 Yet they discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as
								having given good advice, meant to maintain it. 
							 And they stayed at the gates, insomuch as the traitors could not
								perform what they intended.

The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened and
								that they could not take the city by assault, fell to enclosing of
								Nisaea with a wall, which if they could take before aid came, they
								thought Megara would the sooner yield. 
							 Iron was quickly brought unto them from Athens, and masons, and
								whatsoever else was necessary.

And beginning at the wall they had won, when they had built cross
								over to the other side, from thence both ways they drew it on to the
								sea on either side Nisaea; 
							 and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as
								the ditch, they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the
								suburbs, and having felled trees and timber, they supplied what was
								defective with a strong palisade. 
							 The houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on
								battlements, served them for a fortification. 
							 All that day they wrought;

the next day about evening they had within very little finished. 
							 But then they that were in Nisaea, seeing themselves to want victual
								(for they had none but what came day by day from the city above),
								and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come to
								relieve them, conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies,
								compounded with the Athenians on these terms: to be dismissed every
								one at a certain ransom in money; 
							 to deliver up their arms; 
							 and the Lacedaemonians, both the captain and whosoever of them else
								was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians. 
							 Having thus agreed, they went out.

And the Athenians, when they had broken off the long walls from the
								city of Megara and taken in Nisaea, prepared for what was further to
								be done.

Brasidas, the son of Tellus, a Lacedaemonian, happened at this time
								to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing of an army to go into
								Thrace. 
							 And when he heard of the taking of the long walls, fearing what might
								become of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and lest Megara should be
								won, sent unto the Boeotians, willing them to meet him speedily with
								their forces at Tripodiscus, a village of Megaris so called at the
								foot of the hill Geraneia; 
							 and he marched presently himself with two thousand seven hundred men
								of arms of Corinth, four hundred of Phlius, six hundred of Sicyon,
								and those of his own all that he had yet levied, thinking to have
								found Nisaea yet untaken.

When he heard the contrary (for he set forth towards Tripodiscus in
								the night), with three hundred men chosen out of the whole army,
								before news should arrive of his coming, he came unseen of the
								Athenians that lay by the sea-side to the city of Megara, pretending
								in word, and intending also in good earnest if he could have done
								it, to attempt upon Nisaea, but desiring to get into Megara to
								confirm it; 
							 and required to be let in, for that he was, he said, in hope to
								recover Nisaea.

But the Megarean factions, being afraid, one, lest he should bring in
								the outlaws and cast out them, the other, lest the commons out of
								this very fear should assault them, whereby the city, being at
								battle within itself and the Athenians lying in wait so near, would
								be lost, received him not, but resolved on both sides to sit still
								and attend the success.

For both the one faction and the other expected that the Athenians
								and these that came to succour the city would join battle; 
							 and then they might with more safety, such as were the favoured side,
								turn unto them that had the victory. 
							 And Brasidas, not prevailing, went back to the rest of the army.

Betimes in the morning arrived the Boeotians, having also intended to
								come to the aid of Megara before Brasidas sent, as esteeming the
								danger to concern themselves, and were then with their whole forces
								come forward as far as Plataea. 
							 But when they had received also this message, they were a great deal
								the more encouraged and sent two thousand two hundred men of arms
								and two hundred horse to Brasidas, but went back with the greater
								part of their army.

The whole army being now together of no less than six thousand men of
								arms, and the Athenian men of arms lying indeed in good order about
								Nisaea and the sea-side, but the light-armed straggling in the
								plains, the Boeotian horsemen came unexpectedly upon the light-armed
								soldiers, and drove them towards the sea; 
							 for in all this time till now, there had come no aid at all to the
								Megareans from any place.

But when the Athenian horse went likewise out to encounter them, they
								fought, and there was a battle between the horsemen of either side
								that held long, wherein both sides claimed the victory.

For the Athenians slew the general of the Boeotian horse and some few
								others and rifled them, having themselves been first chased by them
								to Nisaea; 
							 and having these dead bodies in their power they restored them upon
								truce and erected a trophy. 
							 Nevertheless, in respect of the whole action, neither side went off
								with assurance; 
							 but parting asunder, the Boeotians went to the army, and the
								Athenians to Nisaea.

After this, Brasidas with his army came down nearer to the sea and to
								the city of Megara, and having seized on a place of advantage, set
								his army in battle array and stood still. 
							 For they thought the Athenians would be assailants, and knew the
								Megareans stood observing whether side should have the victory, and
								that it must needs fall out well for them both ways;

first, because they should not be the assailant and voluntarily begin
								the battle and danger, since having showed themselves ready to
								fight, the victory must also justly be attributed to them without
								their labour;

and next, it must fall out well in respect of the Megareans, for if
								they should not have come in sight, the matter had not been any
								longer in the power of fortune, but they had without all doubt been
								presently deprived of the city as men conquered; 
							 whereas now, if haply the Athenians declined battle likewise, they
								should obtain what they came for without stroke stricken; 
							 which also indeed came to pass.

For the Megareans—when the Athenians went out and ordered their army
								without the long walls, but yet, because the enemy charged not,
								stood also still, their commanders likewise considering, that if
								they should begin the battle against a number greater than their
								own, after the greatest part of their enterprise was already
								achieved, the danger would be unequal; 
							 for if they should overcome, they could win but Megara, and if they
								were vanquished, must lose the best part of their men of arms; 
							 whereas the enemy, who out of the whole power and number that was
								present in the field did adventure but every one a part, would in
								all likelihood put it to the hazard; 
							 and so for a while affronted each other, and, neither doing any
								thing, withdrew again, the Athenians first into Nisaea, and
								afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place from whence they had set
								forth—then, I say, the Megareans, such as were the friends of the
								outlaws, taking heart because they saw the Athenians were unwilling
								to fight, set open the gates to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest
								of the captains of the several cities; 
							 and when they were in (those that had practised with the Athenians
								being all the while in a great fear), they went to council.

Afterwards Brasidas, having dismissed his confederates to their
								several cities, went himself to Corinth in pursuit of his former
								purpose to levy an army for Thrace.

Now the Megareans that were in the city (when the Athenians also were
								gone home), all that had chief hand in the practice with the
								Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slipt away; 
							 but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends of the
								outlaws, recalled them from Pegae, upon great oaths administered
								unto them no more to remember former quarrels, but to give the city
								their best advice.

These, when they came into office, took a view of the arms, and
								disposing bands of soldiers in divers quarters of the city, picked
								out of their enemies and of those that seemed most to have
								co-operated in the treason with the Athenians, about a hundred
								persons; 
							 and having constrained the people to give their sentence upon them
								openly, when they were condemned slew them, and established in the
								city the estate almost of an oligarchy.

And this change of government, made by a few upon sedition, did
								nevertheless continue for a long time after.

The same summer, when Antandros was to be furnished by the
								Mytilenaeans as they intended, Demodicus and Aristides, captains of
								certain galleys set forth by the Athenians to fetch in tribute,
								being then about Hellespont (for Lamachus that was the third in that
								commission, was gone with ten galleys into Pontus), having notice of
								the preparation made in that place, and thinking it would be
								dangerous to have it happen there as it had done in Anaea over
								against Samos, in which the Samian outlaws having settled
								themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in matters of the sea by
								sending them steersmen, and both bred trouble within the city and
								entertained such as fled out of it, levied an army amongst the
								confederates, and marched to it; 
							 and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antandros against
								them, recovered the place again.

And not long after, Lamachus that was gone into Pontus, as he lay at
								anchor in the river Calex in the territory of Heracleia, much rain
								having fallen above in the country and the stream of a land flood
								coming suddenly down, lost all his galleys and came himself and his
								army through the territory of the Bithynians (who are Thracians
								dwelling in Asia on the other side) to Chalcedon, a colony of the
								Megareans in the mouth of Pontus Euxinus, by land.

The same summer likewise Demosthenes, general of the Athenians, with
								forty galleys, presently after his departure out of Megaris, sailed
								to Naupactus.

For certain men in the cities thereabouts, desiring to change the
								form of the Boeotian government and to turn it into a democracy
								according to the government of Athens, practised with him and
								Hippocrates to betray unto him the estates of Boeotia, induced
								thereunto principally by Ptoeodorus, a Theban outlaw; 
							 and they ordered the design thus:

Some had undertaken to deliver up Siphae (Siphae is a city of the
								territory of Thespiae, standing upon the seaside in the Crissaean
								gulf); 
							 and Chaeroneia, which was a town that paid duties to Orchomenus
								(called heretofore Orchomenus in Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in
								Boeotia), some others of Orchomenus were to surrender into their
								hands. 
							 And the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this and were
								hiring soldiers to that end out of Peloponnesus. 
							 This Chaeroneia is the utmost town of Boeotia towards Phanotis in the
								country of Phocis; 
							 and some Phoceans also dwelt in it.

[On the other side], the Athenians were to seize on Delium, a place
								consecrated to Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, on the part
								toward Euboea. 
							 All this ought to have been done together upon a day appointed, to
								the end that the Boeotians might not oppose them with their forces
								united, but might be troubled every one to defend his own.

And if the attempt succeeded, and that they once fortified Delium,
								they easily hoped, though no change followed in the state of the
								Boeotians for the present, yet being possessed of those places, and
								by that means continually fetching in prey out of the country,
								because there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that
								it could not stand long at a stay; 
							 but that the Athenians joining with such of them as rebelled, and the
								Boeotians not having their forces united, they might in time order
								the state to their own liking. 
							 Thus was the plot laid.

And Hippocrates himself, with the forces of the city, was ready when
								time should serve to march; 
							 but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to the
								end that he should levy an army of Acarnanians and other their
								confederates in these quarters, and sail to Siphae to receive it by
								treason. 
							 And a day was set down betwixt them on which these things should have
								been done together.

Demosthenes, when he arrived and found the Oeniades by compulsion of
								the rest of Acarnania entered into the Athenian confederation and
								had himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made war first
								upon Salynthius and the Agraeans, and having taken in other places
								thereabouts, stood ready, when the time should require, to go to
								Siphae.

About the same time of this summer, Brasidas, marching towards the
								cities upon Thrace with seventeen hundred men of arms, when he came
								to Heracleia in Trachinia, sent a messenger before him to his
								friends at Pharsalus, requiring them to be guides unto him and to
								his army. 
							 And when there were come unto him Panaerus and Dorus and
								Hippolochidas and Torylaus and Strophacus, who was the public host
								of the Chalcideans, all which met him at Melitia, a town of Achaia,
								he marched on.

There were other of the Thessalians also that convoyed him; 
							 and from Larissa he was convoyed by Niconidas, a friend of
								Perdiccas. 
							 For it had been hard to pass Thessaly without a guide howsoever, but
								especially with an army. 
							 And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave is a thing
								that all Grecians alike are jealous of. 
							 Besides, that the people of Thessaly had ever borne good affection to
								the Athenians.

Insomuch, as if by custom the government of that country had not been
								lordly rather than a commonwealth, he could never have gone on. 
							 For also now as he marched forward, there met him at the river
								Enipeus others, of a contrary mind to the former, that forbade him
								and told him that he did unjustly to go on without the common
								consent of all.

But those that convoyed him answered that they would not bring him
								through against their wills, but that coming to them on a sudden,
								they conducted him as friends. 
							 And Brasidas himself said he came thither a friend both to the
								country and to them; 
							 and that he bore arms, not against them, but against the Athenians
								their enemies; 
							 and that he never knew of any enmity between the Thessalians and
								Lacedaemonians whereby they might not use one another's ground;

and that even now he would not go on without their consent; 
							 for neither could he, but [only] entreated them not to stop him. 
							 When they heard this, they went their ways. 
							 And he, by the advice of his guides, before any greater number should
								unite to hinder him, marched on with all possible speed, staying
								nowhere by the way. 
							 And the same day he set forth from Melitia he reached Pharsalus and
								encamped by the river Apidanus;

from thence he went to Phacium; 
							 from thence into Peraebia. 
							 The Peraebians, though subject to the Thessalians, set him at Dion in
								the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Macedonians situate
								at the foot of Olympus on the side towards Thessaly.

In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly before any there could
								put in readiness to stop him and came into the territory of the
								Chalcideans and to Perdiccas.

For Perdiccas and the Chalcideans, all that had revolted from the
								Athenians, when they saw the affairs of the Athenians prosper, had
								drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear; 
							 the Chalcideans, because they thought the Athenians would make war on
								them first, as having been also incited thereto by those cities
								amongst them that had not revolted; 
							 and Perdiccas, not that he was their open enemy, but because he
								feared the Athenians for ancient quarrels, but principally because
								he desired to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncesteans.

And the ill success which the Lacedaemonians in these times had was a
								cause that they obtained an army from them the more easily.

For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their particular territory
								Laconia most of all, they thought the best way to divert them was to
								send an army to the confederates of the Athenians, so to vex them
								again. 
							 And the rather because Perdiccas and the Chalcideans were content to
								maintain the army, having called it thither to help the Chalcideans
								in their revolt.

And because also they desired a pretence to send away part of their
								Helotes, for fear they should take the opportunity of the present
								state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in Pylus, to
								innovate.

For they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of
								their Helotes, for the Lacedaemonians had ever many ordinances
								concerning how to look to themselves against the Helotes. 
							 They caused proclamation to be made that as many of them as claimed
								the estimation to have done the Lacedaemonians best service in their
								wars should be made free; 
							 feeling them in this manner and conceiving that, as they should every
								one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they
								would soonest also rebel against them.

And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with
								crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to
								receive their liberty, they not long after made them away; 
							 and no man knew how they perished. 
							 And now at this time, with all their hearts, they sent away seven
								hundred men of arms more of the same men along with Brasidas.

The rest of the army were mercenaries, hired by Brasidas out of
								Peloponnesus. 
							 [But] Brasidas himself the Lacedaemonians sent out, chiefly because
								it was his own desire;

notwithstanding the Chalcideans also longed to have him, as one
								esteemed also in Sparta every way an active man. 
							 And when he was out, he did the Lacedaemonians very great
								service.

For by showing himself at that present just and moderate towards the
								cities, he caused the most of them to revolt; 
							 and some of them he also took by treason. 
							 Whereby it came to pass that if the Lacedaemonians pleased to come to
								composition (as also they did), they might have towns to render and
								receive reciprocally. 
							 And also long after, after the Sicilian war, the virtue and wisdom
								which Brasidas showed now, to some known by experience, by others
								believed upon from report, was the principal cause that made the
								Athenian confederates affect the Lacedaemonians.

For being the first that went out, and esteemed in all points for a
								worthy man, he left behind him an assured hope that the rest also
								were like him.

Being now come into Thrace, the Athenians upon notice thereof
								declared Perdiccas an enemy, as imputing to him this expedition, and
								reinforced the garrisons in the parts thereabouts.

Perdiccas with Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces,
								marched presently against Arrhibaeus, the son of Bromerus, king of
								the Lyncesteans, a people of Macedonia, confining on Perdiccas his
								dominion, both for a quarrel they had against him and also as
								desiring to subdue him.

When he came with his army, and Brasidas with him, to the place where
								they were to have fallen in, Brasidas told him that he desired,
								before he made war, to draw Arrhibaeus by parley, if he could, to a
								league with the Lacedaemonians.

For Arrhibaeus had also made some proffer by a herald to commit the
								matter to Brasidas' arbitrement. 
							 And the Chalcidean ambassadors, being present, gave him likewise
								advice not to thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas, to
								the end they might have him more prompt in their own affairs.

Besides, the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedaemon,
								had spoken there as if they had meant to bring [as] many of the
								places about him [as they could] into the Lacedaemonian league. 
							 So that Brasidas favoured Arrhibaeus for the public good of their own
								state.

But Perdiccas said that he brought not Brasidas thither to be a judge
								of his controversies, but to destroy those enemies which he should
								show him; 
							 and that it will be an injury, seeing he pays the half of his army,
								for Brasidas to parley with Arrhibaeus.

Nevertheless Brasidas, whether Perdiccas would or not, and though it
								made a quarrel, had conference with Arrhibaeus, by whom also he was
								induced to withdraw his army. 
							 But from that time forward Perdiccas, instead of half, paid but a
								third part of his army, as conceiving himself to have been injured.

The same summer, a little before the vintage, Brasidas, having joined
								to his own the forces of the Chalcideans, marched to Acanthus, a
								colony of the Andrians.

And there arose sedition about receiving him between such as had
								joined with the Chalcideans in calling him thither and the common
								people. 
							 Nevertheless, for fear of their fruits, which were not yet gotten in,
								the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter alone, and then,
								after he had said his mind, to advise what to do amongst
								themselves. 
							 And presenting himself before the multitude (for he was not
								uneloquent, though a Lacedaemonian), he spake to this effect:

"Men of Acanthus, the reason why the Lacedaemonians have sent me and
								this army abroad is to make good what we gave out in the beginning
								for the cause of our war against the Athenians, which was that we
								meant to make a war for the liberties of Greece.

But if we be come late, as deceived by the war there in the opinion
								we had that we ourselves should soon have pulled the Athenians down
								without any danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame
								us.

For we are come as soon as occasion served, and with your help will
								do our best to bring them under.

But I wonder why you shut me forth of your gates, and why I was not
								welcome. 
							 For we Lacedaemonians have undergone this great danger of passing
								many days' journey through the territory of strangers, and showed
								all possible zeal, because we imagined that we went to such
								confederates as before we came had us present in their hearts and
								were desirous of our coming.

And therefore it were hard that you should now be otherwise minded
								and withstand your own and the rest of the Grecians' liberty,

not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because others whom
								I go to will be the less willing to come in, making difficulty
								because you to whom I came first, having a flourishing city and
								being esteemed wise, have refused us. 
							 For which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must be
								thought either to pretend to set up liberty unjustly, or to come
								weak and without power to maintain you against the Athenians.

And yet against this same army I now have, when I went to encounter
								the Athenians at Nisaea, though more in number they durst not hazard
								battle. 
							 Nor is it likely that the Athenians will send forth so great a number
								against you as they had in their fleet there at Nisaea.

"I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians; 
							 and I have the Lacedaemonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths
								that whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at least
								by me, shall still enjoy their own laws; 
							 and that we shall not hold you as confederates to us brought in
								either by force or fraud, but on the contrary, be confederates to
								you that are kept in servitude by the Athenians.

And therefore I claim not only that you be not jealous of me
								(especially having given you so good assurance), or think me unable
								to defend you, but also that you declare yourselves boldly with
								me.

And if any man be unwilling so to do through fear of some particular
								man, apprehending that I would put the city into the hands of a few,
								let him cast away that fear;

for I came not to side, nor do I think I should bring you an assured
								liberty, if neglecting the ancient use here I should enthral either
								the multitude to the few, or the few to the multitude.

For to be governed so were worse than the domination of a
								foreigner; 
							 and there would result from it to us Lacedaemonians not thanks for
								our labours, but instead of honour and glory, an imputation of those
								crimes for which we make war amongst the Athenians, and which would
								be more odious in us than in them that never pretended the
								virtue.

For it is more dishonourable, at least to men in dignity, to amplify
								their estate by specious fraud than by open violence. 
							 For the latter assaileth with a certain right of power given us by
								fortune, but the other with the treachery of a wicked conscience.

But besides the oath which they have sworn
									already, the greatest further assurance you can have is this:
									that our actions weighed with our words, you must needs believe
									that it is to our profit to do as I have told you.

But if after these promises of mine you shall say you cannot, and
									yet, forasmuch as your affection is with us, will claim impunity
									for rejecting us, or shall say that this liberty I offer you
									seems to be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done
									to offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon
									any, then will I call to witness the gods and heroes of this
									place that my counsel which you refuse was for your good, and
									will endeavour, by wasting of your territory, to compel you to
									it.

Nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong, but have reason for
									it for two necessities: one, of the Lacedaemonians, lest whilst
									they have your affections and not your society, they should
									receive hurt from your contributions of money to the
									Athenians; 
								 another, of the Grecians, lest they should be hindered of their
									liberty by your example.

For otherwise indeed we could not justly do it; 
								 nor ought we Lacedaemonians to set any at liberty against their
									wills if it were not for some common good. 
								 We covet not dominion [over you];

but seeing we haste to make others lay down the same, we should
									do injury to the greater part, if bringing liberty to the other
									states in general we should tolerate you to cross us.

Deliberate well of these things; 
								 strive to be the beginners of liberty in Greece, to get
									yourselves eternal glory, to preserve every man his private
									estate from damage, and to invest the whole city with a most
									honourable title.

Thus spake Brasidas. 
							 The Acanthians, after much said on either side, partly for that which
								Brasidas had effectually spoken and partly for fear of their fruits
								abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from the Athenians,
								having given their votes in secret. 
							 And when they had made him take the same oath which the Lacedaemonian
								magistrates took when they sent him out, namely, that what
								confederates soever he should join to the Lacedaemonians should
								enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the city.

And not long after revolted Stageirus, another colony of the
								Andrians. 
							 And these were the acts of this summer.

In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Boeotian cities
								should have been delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals
								of the Athenians, and Demosthenes should have gone to Siphae, and
								Hippocrates to Delium; 
							 having mistaken the days on which they should have both set forward,
								Demosthenes went to Siphae first, and having with him the Acarnans
								and many confederates of those parts in his fleet, [yet] lost his
								labour. 
							 For the treason was detected by one Nicomachus, a Phocean of the town
								of Phanotis, who told it unto the Lacedaemonians, and they again
								unto the Boeotians.

Whereby the Boeotians, concurring universally to relieve those places
								(for Hippocrates was not yet gone to trouble them in their own
								several territories), preoccupied both Siphae and Chaeroneia. 
							 And the conspirators, knowing the error, attempted in those cities no
								further.

But Hippocrates, having raised the whole power of the city of Athens,
								both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them and all strangers
								that were then there, arrived afterwards at Delium when the
								Boeotians were now returned from Siphae; 
							 and there stayed and took, in Delium, a temple of Apollo, with a
								wall, in this manner:

Round about the temple and the whole consecrated ground they drew a
								ditch; 
							 and out of the ditch, instead of a wall they cast up the earth; 
							 and having driven down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the
								matter of the vineyard about the temple, which to that purpose they
								cut down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined
								buildings; 
							 and by all means heightened the fortification, and in such places as
								would give leave, erected turrets of wood upon the same.

There was no edifice of the temple standing, for the cloister that
								had been was fallen down. 
							 They began the work the third day after they set forth from Athens
								and wrought all the same day and all the fourth and the fifth day
								till dinner.

And then being most part of it finished, the camp came back from
								Delium about ten furlongs homewards. 
							 And the lightarmed soldiers went most of them presently away; 
							 but the men of arms laid down their arms there and rested. 
							 Hippocrates stayed yet behind and took order about the garrison and
								about the finishing of the remainder of the fortification.

The Boeotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra; 
							 and when all the forces were come in that from every city were
								expected, and when they understood that the Athenians drew
								homewards, though the rest of the Boeotian commanders, which were
								eleven, approved not giving battle, because they were not now in
								Boeotia (for the Athenians, when they laid down their arms, were in
								the confines of Oropia); 
							 yet Pagondas, the son of Aioladas, being the Boeotian commander for
								Thebes, whose turn it was to have the leading of the army, was,
								together with Arianthidas, the son of Lysimachidas, of opinion to
								fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune of a
								battle; 
							 wherefore calling them unto him every company by itself, that they
								might not be all at once from their arms, he exhorted the Boeotians
								to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, speaking in
								this manner:

Men of Boeotia, it ought never to have so much
									as entered into the thought of any of us the commanders that,
									because we find not the Athenians now in Boeotia, it should
									therefore be unfit to give them battle. 
								 For they out of a bordering country have entered Boeotia and
									fortified in it with intent to waste it, and are indeed enemies
									in whatsoever ground we find them, or whencesoever they come
									doing the acts of hostility.

But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him henceforth be of
									another opinion. 
								 For providence, in them that are invaded, endureth not such
									deliberation concerning their own as may be used by them who,
									retaining their own, out of desire to enlarge, voluntarily
									invade the estate of another.

And it is the custom of this country of yours, when a foreign
									enemy comes against you, to fight with him both on your own and
									on your neighbour's ground alike; 
								 but much more you ought to do it against the Athenians when they
									be borderers.

For liberty with all men is nothing else but to be a match for
									the cities that are their neighbours. 
								 With these, then, that attempt the subjugation not only of their
									neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not try
									the utmost of our fortune? 
								 We have for example the estate that the Euboeans over against us,
									and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece, do live in
									under them. 
								 And you must know that though others fight with their neighbours
									about the bounds of their territories, we, if we be vanquished,
									shall have but one bound amongst us all, so that we shall no
									more quarrel about limits.

For if they enter, they will take all our several states into
									their own possession by force. 
								 So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians than
									of other people. 
								 And such as upon confidence in their strength invade their
									neighbours, as the Athenians now do, use to be bold in warring
									on those that sit still, defending themselves only in their own
									territories; 
								 whereas they be less urgent to those that are ready to meet them
									without their own limits, or [also] to begin the war when
									opportunity serveth.

We have experience hereof in these same men. 
								 For after we had overcome them at Coroneia, at what time through
									our own sedition they held our country in subjection, we
									established a great security in Boeotia, which lasted till this
									present.

Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our
									former acts there, and the younger sort, who are the children of
									those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue
									of their houses; 
								 but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple fortified
									they unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, the sacrifices we
									offered him appearing fair, to march against them, and let them
									see that though they may gain what they covet when they invade
									such as will not fight, yet men that have the generosity to hold
									their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state of
									another unjustly, will never let them go away
								unfoughten.

Pagondas with this exhortation persuaded the Boeotians to march
								against the Athenians, and making them rise led them speedily on,
								for it was drawing towards night. 
							 And when he was near to their army, in a place from whence by the
								interposition of a hill they saw not each other, making a stand he
								put his army into order and prepared to give battle.

When it was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the
								Boeotians were marching after them, he sends presently to the army,
								commanding them to be put in array. 
							 And not long after he came himself, having left some three hundred
								horse about Delium, both for a guard to the place if it should be
								assaulted, and withal to watch an opportunity to come upon the
								Boeotians when they were in fight.

But for these, the Boeotians appointed some forces purposely to
								attend them. 
							 And when all was as it should be, they showed themselves from the top
								of the hill, where they sat down with their arms in the same order
								they were to fight in, being about seven thousand men of arms, of
								light-armed soldiers above ten thousand, a thousand horsemen, and
								five hundred targetiers.

Their right wing consisting of the Thebans, and their partakers; 
							 in the middle battle were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and
								the rest that dwell about the lake; 
							 in the left were the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians. 
							 The horsemen and light-armed soldiers were placed on either wing. 
							 The Thebans were ordered by twentyfive in file; 
							 but the rest, every one as it fell out.

This was the preparation and order of the Boeotians.

The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the enemy, were
								ordered by eight in file throughout; 
							 their horse they placed on either wing. 
							 But for light-armed soldiers, armed as was fit, there were none; 
							 nor was there any in the city. 
							 Those that went out followed the camp for the most part without arms,
								as being a general expedition both of citizens and strangers; 
							 and after they once began to make homeward, there stayed few
								behind.

When they were now in their order and ready to join battle,
								Hippocrates, the general, came into the army of the Athenians and
								encouraged them, speaking to this effect:

Men of Athens, my exhortation shall be short,
									but with valiant men it hath as much force as a longer, and is
									for a remembrance rather than a command.

Let no man think, because it is in the territory of another, that
									we therefore precipitate ourselves into a great danger that did
									not concern us. 
								 For in the territory of these men, you fight for your own. 
								 If we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our
									territories again, for want of the Boeotian horsemen. 
								 So that in one battle you shall both gain this territory and free
									your own.

Therefore march on against the enemy, every one as becometh the
									dignity both of his natural city, which he glorieth to be chief
									of all Greece, and of his ancestors, who having overcome these
									men at Oenophyta under the conduct of Myronides, were in times
									past masters of all Boeotia.

Whiles Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and had gone with it
								over half the army, but [could proceed] no further, the Boeotians
								(for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhortation and had there
								sung the Paean) came down upon them from the hill. 
							 And the Athenians likewise went forward to meet them, [so fast that]
								they met together running.

The utmost parts of both the armies never came to join, hindered both
								by one and the same cause; 
							 for certain currents of water kept them asunder.

But the rest made sharp battle, standing close, and striving to put
								by each others' bucklers. 
							 The left wing of the Boeotians, to the very middle of the army, were
								overthrown by the Athenians, who in this part had to deal, amongst
								others, principally with the Thespians. 
							 For whilst they that were placed within the same wing gave back and
								were circled in by the Athenians in a narrow compass, those
								Thespians that were slain were hewed down in the very fight.

Some also of the Athenians themselves, troubled with inclosing them,
								through ignorance slew one another. 
							 So that the Boeotians were overcome in this part and fled to the
								other part where they were yet in fight.

But the right wing, wherein the Thebans stood, had the better of the
								Athenians, and by little and little forced them to give ground and
								followed upon them from the very first.

It happened also that Pagondas, while the left wing of his army was
								in distress, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill,
								whereby that wing of the Athenians which was victorious,
								apprehending upon their sudden appearing that they had been a fresh
								army, was put into affright;

and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this
								accident and by the Thebans that continually won ground and brake
								their ranks, betook themselves to flight. 
							 Some fled toward Delium and the sea, and some towards Oropus;

others toward the mountain Parnethus, and others other ways, as to
								each appeared hope of safety. 
							 The Boeotians, especially their horse and those Locrians that came in
								after the enemy was already defeated, followed killing them. 
							 But night surprising them, the multitude of them that fled was the
								easier saved.

The next day those that were gotten to Oropus and Delium went thence
								by sea to Athens, having left a garrison in Delium, which place,
								notwithstanding this defeat, they yet retained.

The Boeotians, when they had erected their trophy, taken away their
								own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and left a guard upon the
								place, returned back to Tanagra and there entered into consultation
								for an assault to be made on Delium.

In the meantime, a herald sent from the Athenians to require the
								bodies met with a herald by the way sent by the Boeotians, which
								turned him back by telling him he could get nothing done till
								himself was returned from the Athenians. 
							 This herald, when he came before the Athenians, delivered unto them
								what the Boeotians had given him in charge, namely, that they had
								done unjustly to transgress the universal law of the Grecians, being
								a constitution received by them all;

that the invader of another's country should abstain from all holy
								places in the same; 
							 that the Athenians had fortified Delium and dwelt in it, and done
								whatsoever else men use to do in places profane, and had drawn that
								water to the common use, which was unlawful for themselves to have
								touched, save only to wash their hands for the sacrifice;

that therefore the Boeotians, both in the behalf of the god and of
								themselves, invoking Apollo and all the interested spirits, did warn
								them to be gone and to remove their stuff out of the temple.

After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their
								own to the Boeotians, denying that either they had done any wrong to
								the holy place already or would willingly do any hurt to it
								hereafter; 
							 for neither did they at first enter into it to such intent, but to
								requite the greater injuries which had been done unto them;

as for the law which the Grecians have, it is no other but that they
								which have the dominion of any territory, great or small, have ever
								the temples also, and besides the accustomed rites, may superinduce
								what other they can:

for also the Boeotians, and most men else, all that having driven out
								another nation possess their territory, did at first invade the
								temples of others and make them their own;

that therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they
								would keep it, and for the part they were now in, they were in it
								with a good will and would not out of it, as being their own; 
							 that for the water, they meddled with it upon necessity;

which was not to be ascribed to insolence, but to this, that fighting
								against the Boeotians that had invaded their territory first, they
								were forced to use it;

for whatsoever is forced by war or danger hath in reason a kind of
								pardon even with the god himself; 
							 for the altars, in cases of involuntary offences, are a refuge, and
								they are said to violate laws that are evil without constraint, not
								they that are a little bold upon occasion of distress;

that the Boeotians themselves, who require restitution of the holy
								places for a redemption of the dead, are more irreligious by far
								than they, who, rather than let their temples go, are content to go
								without that which were fit for them to receive;

and they bade him say plainly that they would not depart out of the
								Boeotian territory, for that they were not now in it, but in a
								territory which they had made their own by the sword; 
							 and nevertheless, required truce, according to the ordinances of the
								country, for the fetching away of the dead.

To this the Boeotians answered that if the dead were in Boeotia, they
								should quit the ground and take with them whatsoever was theirs; 
							 but if the dead were in their own territory, the Athenians themselves
								knew best what to do. 
							 For they thought that though Oropia, wherein the dead lay (for the
								battle was fought in the border between Attica and Boeotia), by
								subjection belonged to the Athenians, yet they could not fetch them
								off by force; 
							 and for truce that the Athenians might come safely on Athenian
								ground, they would give none, but conceived it was a handsome answer
								to say that if they would quit the ground, they should obtain
								whatsoever they required. 
							 Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way without effect.

The Boeotians presently sent for darters and slingers from [the towns
								on] the Melian gulf; 
							 and with these, and with two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and
								with the Peloponnesian garrison that was put out of Nisaea, and with
								the Megareans, all which arrived after the battle, they marched
								forthwith to Delium and assaulted the wall. 
							 And when they had attempted the same many other ways, at length they
								brought to it an engine, wherewith they also took it, made in this
								manner:

Having slit in two a great mast, they made hollow both the sides, and
								curiously set them together again in the form of a pipe. 
							 At the end of it in chains they hung a cauldron; 
							 and into the cauldron from the end of the mast they conveyed a snout
								of iron, having with iron also armed a great part of the rest of the
								wood.

They carried it to the wall, being far off, in carts, to that part
								where it was most made up with the matter of the vineyard and with
								wood.

And when it was to, they applied a pair of great bellows to the end
								next themselves, and blew. 
							 The blast, passing narrowly through into the cauldron, in which were
								coals of fire, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding great
								flame, and set the wall on fire, so that no man being able to stand
								any longer on it, but abandoning the same and betaking themselves to
								flight, the wall was by that means taken.

Of the defendants, some were slain and two hundred taken
								prisoners; 
							 the rest of the number recovered their galleys and got home.

Delium thus taken on the seventeenth day after the battle, and the
								herald, which not long after was sent again about the fetching away
								of the dead, not knowing it, the Boeotians let him have them, and
								answered no more as they had formerly done.

In the battle there died Boeotians few less than five hundred; 
							 the Athenians few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates the
								general; 
							 but of light-armed soldiers and such as carried the provisions of the
								army, a great number.

Not long after this battle, Demosthenes, that had been with his army
								at Siphae, seeing the treason succeeded not, having aboard his
								galleys his army of Acarnanians and Agraeans and four hundred men of
								arms of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. 
							 But before all his galleys came to shore, the Sicyonians, who went
								out to defend their territory, put to flight such as were already
								landed and chased them back to their galleys, having also slain some
								and taken some alive.

And when they had erected a trophy, they gave truce to the Athenians
								for the fetching away of their dead.

About the time that these things passed at Delium, died Sitalces,
								king of the Odrysians, overcome in battle in an expedition against
								the Triballians. 
							 And Seuthes, the son of Spardocus, his brother's son, succeeded him
								in the kingdom, both of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace as
								much as was before subject to Sitalces.

The same winter, Brasidas with the confederates in Thrace made war
								upon Amphipolis, a colony of the Athenians, situated on the river
								Strymon.

The place whereon the city now standeth, Aristagoras of Miletus had
								formerly attempted to inhabit when he fled from king Darius, but was
								beaten away by the Edonians. 
							 Two-and-thirty years after this, the Athenians assayed the same, and
								sent thither ten thousand of their own city, and of others as many
								as would go; 
							 and these were destroyed all by the Thracians at Drabescus.

In the twenty-ninth year after, conducted by Agnon, the son of
								Nicias, the Athenians came again, and having driven out the
								Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the
								Nine-ways. 
							 His army lay then at Eion, a town of traffic by the seaside subject
								to the Athenians, at the mouth of the river Strymon, five-andtwenty
								furlongs from the city. 
							 Agnon named this city Amphipolis because it was surrounded by the
								river Strymon, that runs on either side it. 
							 When he had taken it in with a long wall from river to river, he put
								inhabitants into the place, being conspicuous round about both to
								the sea and land.

Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, dislodging from
								Arnae in Chalcidea. 
							 Being about twilight come as far as Aulon and Bromiscus, where the
								lake Bolbe entereth into the sea, he caused his army to sup, and
								then marched forward by night.

The weather was foul, and a little it snowed, which also made him to
								march the rather, as desiring that none of Amphipolis, but only the
								traitors, should be aware of his coming.

For there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city (now
								Argilus is a colony of the Andrians), and others, that contrived
								this, induced thereunto some by Perdiccas and some by the
								Chalcideans.

But above all the Argilians, being of a city near unto it, and ever
								suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies to the place, as soon
								as opportunity was offered and Brasidas arrived (who had also long
								before dealt underhand with as many of them as dwelt in Amphipolis
								to betray it), both received him into their own city, and revolting
								from the Athenians, brought the army forward the same night as far
								as to the bridge of the river.

The town stood not close to the river, nor was there a fort at the
								bridge then as there is now; 
							 but they kept it only with a small guard of soldiers. 
							 Having easily forced this guard, both in respect of the treason and
								of the weather, and of his own unexpected approach, he passed the
								bridge and was presently master of whatsoever the Amphipolitans had
								that dwelt without.

Having thus suddenly passed the bridge, and many of those without
								being slain, and some fled into the city, the Amphipolitans were in
								very great confusion at it; 
							 and the rather because they were jealous one of another.

And it is said that if Brasidas had not sent out his army to take
								booty, but had marched presently to the city, he had in all
								likelihood taken it then. 
							 But so it was that he pitched there and fell upon those without;

and seeing nothing succeeded by those within, lay still upon the
								place.

But the contrary faction to the traitors being superior in number,
								whereby the gates were not opened presently, both they and Eucles
								the general, who was then there for the Athenians to keep the town,
								sent unto the other general, Thucydides, the son of Olorus, the
								writer of this history, who had charge in Thrace, and was now about
								Thasos (which is an island and a colony of the Parians, distant from
								Amphipolis about half a day's sail), requiring him to come and
								relieve them.

When he heard the news, he went thitherwards in all haste with seven
								galleys, which chanced to be with him at that time. 
							 His purpose principally was to prevent the yielding up of
								Amphipolis; 
							 but if he should fail of that, then to possess himself of Eion
								[before Brasidas' coming].

Brasidas, in the meantime, fearing the aid of the galleys to come
								from Thasos, and having also been informed that Thucydides possessed
								mines of gold in the parts of Thrace thereabouts, and was thereby of
								ability amongst the principal men of the continent, hasted by all
								means to get Amphipolis before he should arrive, lest otherwise at
								his coming the commons of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy
								confederates both from the sea-side and in Thrace, and relieve them,
								should thereupon refuse to yield.

And to that end offered them a moderate composition, causing to be
								proclaimed that whosoever, Amphipolitan or Athenian, would, might
								continue to dwell there and enjoy his own, with equal and like form
								of government; 
							 and that he that would not, should have five days' respite to be gone
								and carry away his goods.

When the commons heard this, their minds were turned; 
							 and the rather, because the Athenians amongst them were but few, and
								the most were a promiscuous multitude; 
							 and the kinsmen of those that were taken without flocked together
								within. 
							 And in respect of their fear, they all thought the proclamation
								reasonable; 
							 the Athenians thought it so because they were willing to go out, as
								apprehending their own danger to be greater than that of the rest,
								and withal, not expecting aid in haste; 
							 and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both delivered of the
								danger, and withal to retain their city with the equal form of
								government.

Insomuch that they which conspired with Brasidas now openly justified
								the offer to be reasonable; 
							 and seeing the minds of the commons were now turned and that they
								gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian general, they
								compounded, and upon the conditions proclaimed received him.

Thus did these men deliver up the city. 
							 Thucydides with his galleys arrived in the evening of the same day at
								Eion.

Brasidas had already gotten Amphipolis, and wanted but a night of
								taking Eion also; 
							 for if these galleys had not come speedily to relieve it, by next
								morning it had been had.

After this Thucydides assured Eion, so as it should be safe both for
								the present, though Brasidas should assault it, and for the
								future; 
							 and took into it such as, according to the proclamation made, came
								down from Amphipolis.

Brasidas with many boats came suddenly down the river to Eion and
								attempted to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the
								wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the
								river; 
							 he assayed also the same at the same time by land, and was in both
								beaten off; 
							 but Amphipolis he furnished with all things necessary.

Then revolted to him Myrcinus, a city of the Edonians, Pittacus, the
								king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Goaxis and by
								Braures his own wife. 
							 And not long after Gapselus also, and Oesyme, colonies of the
								Thasians. 
							 Perdiccas also, after the taking of these places, came to him and
								helped him in assuring of the same.

After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great
								fear, especially for that it was a city that yielded them much
								profit, both in timber which is sent them for the building of
								galleys and in revenue of money, and because also, though the
								Lacedaemonians had a passage open to come against their
								confederates, the Thessalians convoying them, as far as to Strymon,
								yet if they had not gotten that bridge, the river being upwards
								nothing but a vast fen, and towards Eion well guarded with their
								galleys, they could have gone no further; 
							 which now they thought they might easily do, and therefore feared
								lest their confederates should revolt.

For Brasidas both showed himself otherwise very moderate, and also
								gave out in speech that he was sent forth to recover the liberty of
								Greece.

And the cities which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the
								taking of Amphipolis, and what assurance he brought with him, and of
								his gentleness besides, were extremely desirous of innovation, and
								sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who
								should first revolt.

For they thought they might do it boldly, falsely estimating the
								power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards it appeared, and
								making a judgment of it according to [blind] wilfulness rather than
								safe forecast; 
							 it being the fashion of men, what they wish to be true to admit even
								upon an ungrounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral
								kind of arguing to reject.

Withal, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the
								Boeotians, and because Brasidas had said (not as was the truth, but
								as served best to allure them) that when he was at Nisaea the
								Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew
								confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against
								them.

But the greatest cause of all was that for the delight they took at
								this time to innovate, and for that they were to make trial of the
								Lacedaemonians, not till now angry, they were content by any means
								to put it to the hazard. 
							 Which being perceived, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into
								those cities, as many as the shortness of the time and the season of
								winter would permit. 
							 And Brasidas sent unto Lacedaemon to demand greater forces, and in
								the meantime prepared to build galleys on the river Strymon.

But the Lacedaemonians, partly through envy of the principal men, and
								partly because they more affected the redemption of their men taken
								in the island and the ending of the war, refused to furnish him.

The same winter the Megareans, having recovered their long walls
								holden by the Athenians, razed them to the very ground. 

							 Brasidas, after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the
								confederates, marched with his army into the territory called
								Acte.

This Acte is that prominent territory which is disjoined from the
								continent by a ditch made by the king; 
							 and Athos, a high mountain in the same, determineth at the Aegean
								sea.

Of the cities it hath, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by the
								side of the said ditch on the part which looketh to the sea towards
								Euboea;

the rest are Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dion, and are
								inhabited by promiscuous barbarians of two languages. 
							 Some few there are also of the Chalcidean nation; 
							 but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene nations that once
								inhabited Athens and Lemnos, and of the Bisaltic and Chrestonic
								nations, and Edonians, and dwell in small cities.

The most of which yielded to Brasidas; 
							 but Sane and Dion held out, for which cause he stayed with his army
								and wasted their territories.

But seeing they would not hearken unto him, he led his army presently
								against Torone of Chalcidea, held by the Athenians. 
							 He was called in by the few, who were ready withal to deliver him the
								city; 
							 and arriving there a little before break of day, he sat down with his
								army at the temple of Castor and Pollux, distant about three
								furlongs from the city.

So that to the rest of the city and to the Athenian garrison in it,
								his coming was unperceived. 
							 But the traitors, knowing he was to come (some few of them being also
								privily gone to him), attended his approach; 
							 and when they perceived he was come, they took in unto them seven men
								armed only with daggers (for of twenty appointed at first to that
								service, seven only had the courage to go in; 
							 and were led by Lysistratus of Olynthus); 
							 which, getting over the wall towards the main sea unseen, went up
								(for the town standeth on a hill's side) to the watch that kept the
								upper end of the town, and having slain the watchmen brake open the
								postern gate towards Canastraea.

Brasidas this while with the rest of his army lay still, and then
								coming a little forward, sent a hundred targetiers before, who, when
								the gates should be opened and sign agreed on be set up, should run
								in first.

These men, expecting long and wondering at the matter, by little and
								little were at length come up close to the city. 
							 Those Toronaeans within, which helped the men that entered to perform
								the enterprise, when the postern gate was broken open, and the gate
								leading to the market-place opened likewise by cutting asunder the
								bar, went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to
								the end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew
								not the matter, both behind and on either side; 
							 and then they put up the sign appointed, which was fire, and received
								the rest of the targetiers by the gate that leadeth to the
								market-place.

Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise, and with a huge
								cry of all at once, to the great terror of those within, entered
								into the city running.

Some went directly in by the gate, and some by certain squared
								timber-trees, which lay at the wall (which having been lately down
								was now again in building) for the drawing up of stone.

Brasidas, therefore, with the greatest number, betook himself to the
								highest places of the city to make sure the winning of it by
								possessing the places of advantage. 
							 But the rest of the rabble ran dispersed here and there without
								difference.

When the town was taken, the most of the Toronaeans were much
								troubled, because they were not acquainted with the matter; 
							 but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with it, joined
								themselves presently with those that entered.

The Athenians (of which there were about fifty men of arms asleep in
								the market-place), when they knew what had happened, fled all,
								except some few that were slain upon the place, some by land, some
								by water in two galleys that kept watch there, and saved themselves
								in Lecythus, which was a fort which they themselves held, cut off
								from the rest of the city to the seaward in a narrow isthmus.

And thither also fled all such Toronaeans as were affected to them.

Being now day, and the city strongly possessed, Brasidas caused a
								proclamation to be made that those Toronaeans which were fled with
								the Athenians might come back, as many as would, to their own and
								inhabit there in security. 
							 To the Athenians he sent a herald, bidding them depart out of
								Lecythus under truce with all that they had, as a place that
								belonged to the Chalcideans.

The Athenians denied to quit the place, but the truce they desired
								for one day for the taking up of their dead. 
							 And Brasidas granted it for two, in which two days he fortified the
								buildings near; 
							 and so also did the Athenians theirs.

He also called an assembly of the Toronaeans and spake unto them as
								he had done before to the Acanthians, adding that there was no just
								cause why either they that had practised to put the city into his
								hands should be the worse thought of or accounted traitors for it,
								seeing that they did it with no intent to bring the city into
								servitude, nor were hired thereunto with money, but for the benefit
								and liberty of the city; 
							 or that they which were not made acquainted with it should think that
								themselves were not to reap as much good by it as the others;

for he came not to destroy either city or man, but had therefore made
								that proclamation touching those that fled with the Athenians
								because he thought them never the worse for that friendship, and
								made account when they had made trial of the Lacedaemonians, they
								would show as much good will also unto them, or rather more,
								inasmuch as they would behave themselves with more equity; 
							 and that their present fear was only upon want of trial.

Withal he wished them to prepare themselves to be true confederates
								for the future, and from henceforward, to look to have their faults
								imputed; 
							 for, for what was past, he thought they had not done any wrong, but
								suffered it rather from other men that were too strong for them, and
								therefore were to be pardoned if they had in aught been against him.

When he had thus said and put them again into heart, the truce being
								expired, he made divers assaults upon Lecythus. 
							 The Athenians fought against them from the wall, though a bad one,
								and from the houses such as had battlements, and for the first day
								kept them off.

But the next day, when the enemies were to bring to the wall a great
								engine, out of which they intended to cast fire upon their wooden
								fences, and that the army was now coming up to the place where they
								thought they might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to
								be assaulted, the Athenians, having upon the top of the building
								erected a turret of wood, and carried up many buckets of water, and
								many men being also gone up into it, the building overcharged with
								weight fell suddenly to the ground, and that with so huge a noise
								that though those which were near and saw it were grieved more than
								afraid, yet such as stood further off, especially the furthest of
								all, supposing the place to be in that part already taken, fled as
								fast as they could towards the sea and went aboard their
								galleys.



Brasidas, when he perceived the battlements to be abandoned and saw
								what had happened, came on with his army and presently got the fort
								and slew all that he found within it.

But the rest of the Athenians, which before abandoned the place, with
								their boats and galleys put themselves into Pallene. 

							 There was in Lecythus a temple of Minerva. 
							 And when Brasidas was about to give the assault, he had made
								proclamation that whosoever first scaled the wall should have thirty
								minae of silver for a reward. 
							 Brasidas now, conceiving that the place was won by means not human,
								gave those thirty minae to the goddess to the use of the temple. 
							 And then pulling down Lecythus, he built it anew and consecrated unto
								her the whole place.

The rest of this winter he spent in assuring the places he had
								already gotten and in contriving the conquest of more. 
							 Which winter ending, ended the eighth year of this war.

The Lacedaemonians and Athenians, in the spring of the summer
								following, made a cessation of arms presently for a year, having
								reputed with themselves, the Athenians, that Brasidas should by this
								means cause no more of their cities to revolt, but that by this
								leisure they might prepare to secure them; 
							 and that if this suspension liked them, they might afterwards make
								some agreement for a longer time; 
							 the Lacedaemonians, that the Athenians fearing what they feared,
								would, upon the taste of this intermission of their miseries and
								weary life, be the willinger to compound, and with the restitution
								of their men to conclude a peace for a longer time.

For they would fain have recovered their men while Brasidas' good
								fortune continued; 
							 and whilst, if they could not recover them, they might yet (Brasidas
								prospering and setting them equal with the Athenians) try it out
								upon even terms and get the victory.

Whereupon a suspension of arms was concluded, comprehending both
								themselves and their confederates, in these words:

"Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius, it seemeth good
								unto us that whosoever will may without fraud and without fear ask
								counsel threat, according to the laws of his country.

The same also seemeth good to the Lacedaemonians and their
								confederates here present; 
							 and they promise moreover to send ambassadors to the Boeotians and
								Phoceans, and do their best to persuade them to the same.

That concerning the treasure belonging to the god, we shall take care
								to find out those that have offended therein, both we and you,
								proceeding with right and equity, according to the laws of our
								several states;

and that whosoever else will may do the same every one according to
								the law of his own country. 

							 "If the Athenians will accord that each side shall keep within their
								own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the Lacedaemonians and
								the rest of the confederates touching the same think good thus: 
							 "That the Lacedaemonians in Coryphasium stay within the mountains of
								Buphras and Tomeus, and the Athenians in Cythera without joining
								together in any league, either we with them or they with us. 
							 That those in Nisaea and Minoa pass not the highway, which from the
								gate of Megara near the temple of Nisus leadeth to the temple of
								Neptune, and so straightforward to the bridge that lies over into
								Minoa; 
							 that the Megareans pass not the same highway, nor into the island
								which the Athenians have taken, neither having commerce with
								other. 
							 That the Megareans keep what they now possess in Troezen and what
								they had before by agreement with the Athenians, and have free
								navigation, both upon the coasts of their own territories and their
								confederates.

"That the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall pass the seas
								not in a long ship, but in any other boat rowed with oars of burden
								not exceeding five hundred talents.

"That the heralds and ambassadors that shall pass between both sides
								for the ending of the war or for trials of judgment may go and come
								without impeachment, with as many followers as they shall think
								good, both by sea and land.

"That during this time of truce, neither we nor you receive one
								another's fugitives, free nor bond.

"That you to us and we to you shall afford law according to the use
								of our several states, to the end our controversies may be decided
								judicially without war.

"This is thought good by the Lacedaemonians and their
								confederates. 
							 But if you shall conceive any other articles more fair or of more
								equity than these, then shall you go and declare the same at
								Lacedaemon. 
							 For neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor their confederates refuse
								anything that you shall make appear to be just.

But let those that go, go with full authority, even as you do now
								require it of us.—That this truce shall be for a year.

The people decreed it. 
								 Acamantis was president of the assembly. 
								 Phaenippus the scribe. 
								 Niciades overseer, and Laches pronounced these words: 'With good
									fortune to the people of Athens, a suspension of arms is
									concluded, according as the Lacedaemonians and their
									confederates have agreed.'

And they consented before the people that the suspension should
									continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the
									fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion,

in which time the ambassadors and heralds, going from one side
									to the other, should treat about a final end of the wars; 
								 and that the commanders of the army

and the presidents of the city calling an assembly, the
									Athenians should hold a council, touching the manner of
									embassage for ending of the war first; 
								 and the ambassadors there present should now immediately swear
									this truce for a year.

The same articles the Lacedaemonians propounded and the confederates
								agreed unto with the Athenians and their confederates in Lacedaemon
								on the twelfth day of the month Gerastion.

The men that agreed upon these articles, and sacrificed, were these,
								viz.: Of the Lacedaemonians, Taurus, the son of Echetimidas,
								Athenaeus, the son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, the son of
								Eryxidaidas; 
							 of the Corinthians, Aeneas, the son of Ocytes, and Euphamidas, the
								son of Aristonymus; 
							 of the Sicyonians, Damotimos, the son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, the
								son of Megacles; 
							 of the Megareans, Nicasus, the son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, the
								son of Amphidorus; 
							 of the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaidas;

of the Athenians, the generals [themselves], Nicostratus, the son of
								Diotrephes, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Autocles the son of
								Tolmaeus. 
							 This was the truce; 
							 and during the same they were continually in treaty about a longer
								peace.

About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro, Scione, a
								city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. 
							 The Scionaeans say that they be Pallenians descended of those of
								Peloponnesus, and that their ancestors, passing the seas from Troy,
								were driven in by a tempest, which tossed the Achaeans up and down,
								and planted themselves in the place they now dwell in.

Brasidas, upon their revolt, went over into Scione by night; 
							 and though he had a galley with him that went before, yet he himself
								followed aloof in a light-horseman. 
							 His reason was this: that if his light-horseman should be assaulted
								by some greater vessel, the galley would defend it; 
							 but if he met with a galley equal to his own, he made account that
								such a one would not assault his boat, but rather the galley,
								whereby he might in the meantime go through in safety.

When he was over and had called the Scionaeans to assemble, he spake
								unto them as he had done before to them of Acanthus and Torone,
								adding that they of all the rest were most worthy to be commended,
								inasmuch as Pallene, being cut off in the isthmus by the Athenians
								that possess Potidaea, and being no other than islanders, did yet of
								their own accord come forth to meet their liberty, and stayed not
								through cowardliness till they must of necessity have been compelled
								to their own manifest good; 
							 which was an argument that they would valiantly undergo any other
								great matter to have their state ordered to their minds; 
							 and that he would verily hold them for most faithful friends to the
								Lacedaemonians, and also otherwise do them honour.

The Scionaens were erected with these words of his; 
							 and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what
								was done as those that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to
								undergo the war; 
							 and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably and crowned him with
								a crown of gold, in the name of the city, as the deliverer of
								Greece. 
							 And private persons honoured him with garlands and came to him as
								they use to do to a champion that hath won a prize.

But he leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back, and
								not long after carried over a greater army, with design by the help
								of those of Scione to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidaea. 
							 For he thought the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to
								an island, and desired to prevent them. 
							 Withal, he had in hand a practice with some within to have those
								cities betrayed. 
							 So he attended, ready to undertake that enterprise.

But in the meantime came unto him in a galley Aristonymus for the
								Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians, that carried about
								the news of the truce. 
							 Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone:

and these men related unto Brasidas the articles of the
								agreement. 
							 The confederates of the Lacedaemonians in Thrace approved of what was
								done; 
							 and Aristonymus had in all other things satisfaction.

But for the Scionaeans, whose revolt by computation of the days he
								had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they
								were comprehended therein. 
							 Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, and that the city
								revolted before the truce, and refused to render it. 
							 But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter,
								the Athenians were ready presently to have sent an army against
								Scione.

The Lacedaemonians in the meantime sent ambassadors to the Athenians
								to tell them that they could not send an army against it without
								breach of the truce, and, upon Brasidas' word, challenged the city
								to belong unto them, offering themselves to the decision of law.

But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to judgment, but
								meant with all the speed they could make to send an army against it,
								being angry at the heart that it should come to this pass, that even
								islanders durst revolt and trust to the unprofitable help of the
								strength of the Lacedaemonians by land.

Besides, touching [the time of] the revolt, the Athenians had more
								truth on their side than themselves alleged; 
							 for the revolt of the Scionaeans was after the truce two days. 
							 Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree to take them by
								force and to put them all to the sword. 
							 And, forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only
								for that.

In the meantime revolted also Mende in Pallene, a colony of the
								Eretrians. 
							 These also Brasidas received into protection, holding it for no
								wrong, because they came in openly in time of truce; 
							 and somewhat there was also which he charged the Athenians with,
								about breach of the truce.

For which cause the Mendaeans had also been the bolder, as sure of
								the intention of Brasidas, which they might guess at by Scione,
								inasmuch as he could not be gotten to deliver it. 
							 Withal, the few were they which had practised the revolt, who, being
								once about it, would by no means give it over, but, fearing lest
								they should be discovered, forced the multitude contrary to their
								own inclination to the same.

The Athenians being hereof presently advertised, and much more angry
								now than before, made preparation to war upon both;

and Brasidas expecting that they would send a fleet against them,
								received the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans into
								Olynthus in Chalcidea, and sent over thither five hundred
								Peloponnesian men of arms and three hundred Chalcidean targetiers,
								and for commander of them all Polydamidas. 
							 And those that were left in Scione and Mende joined in the
								administration of their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian
								fleet immediately with them.

In the meantime Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into
								Lyncus against Arrhibaeus the second time. 
							 Perdiccas led with him the power of the Macedonians, his subjects,
								and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. 
							 Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him
								the Chalcideans, Acanthians, and the rest, according to the forces
								they could severally make. 
							 The whole number of the Grecian men of arms were about three
								thousand. 
							 The horsemen, both Macedonians and Chalcideans, somewhat less than a
								thousand; 
							 but the other rabble of barbarians was great.

Being entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, and finding the
								Lyncesteans encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to
								their camp.

And the foot of each side being lodged upon a hill, and a plain lying
								betwixt them both, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a
								skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both. 
							 But afterwards, the men of arms of the Lyncesteans coming down to aid
								their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and
								Perdiccas drew down their army likewise, and charging, put the
								Lyncesteans to flight; 
							 many of which being slain, the rest retired to the hill-top and lay
								still.

After this they erected a trophy and stayed two or three days,
								expecting the Illyrians who were coming to Perdiccas upon hire; 
							 and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have gone on against the villages
								of Arrhibaeus one after another, and to have sitten still there no
								longer. 
							 But Brasidas, having his thoughts on Mende, lest if the Athenians
								came thither before his return it should receive some blow, seeing
								withal that the Illyrians came not, had no liking to do so, but
								rather to retire.

Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had
								betrayed Perdiccas and joined themselves with Arrhibaeus. 
							 So that now it was thought good to retire by them both, for fear of
								these who were a warlike people; 
							 but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded, by
								reason of their variance. 
							 The next night, the Macedonians and multitude of barbarians (as it is
								usual with great armies to be terrified upon causes unknown) being
								suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number
								than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present
								flight and went home. 
							 And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he
								knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas (their camps being far
								asunder), to be gone also.

Brasidas betimes in the morning, when he understood that the
								Macedonians were gone away without him, and that the Illyrians and
								Arrhibaeans were coming upon him, putting his men of arms into a
								square form and receiving the multitude of his light-armed into the
								middle, intended to retire likewise. 
							 The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to run out upon the
								enemy when they charged the army anywhere [with shot];

and he himself, with three hundred chosen men marching in the rear,
								intended, as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy,
								fighting if they came close up.

But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his soldiers, as the
								shortness of time gave him leave, with words to this effect:

Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in
									respect you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians and that the
									barbarians which come upon you are many, that you were afraid, I
									should not [at this time] instruct you and encourage you as I
									do. 
								 But now, against this desertion of your companions and the
									multitude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short
									instruction and hortative to give you encouragement to the
									full.

For to be good soldiers is unto you natural, not by the presence
									of any confederates, but by your own valour; 
								 and not to fear others for the number, seeing you are not come
									from a city where the many bear rule over the few, but the few
									over the many; 
								 and have gotten this for power by no other means than by
									overcoming in fight.

And as to these barbarians, whom through ignorance you fear, you
									may take notice, both by the former battles fought by us against
									them before, in favour of the Macedonians, and also by what I
									myself conjecture and have heard by others, that they have no
									great danger in them.

For when any enemy whatsoever maketh show of strength, being
									indeed weak, the truth once known doth rather serve to embolden
									the other side; 
								 whereas, against such as have valour indeed, a man will be the
									boldest when he knoweth the least. 
								 These men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make
									terrible offers;

for the sight of their number is fearful, the greatness of their
									cry intolerable, and the vain shaking of their weapons on high
									is not without signification of menacing. 
								 But they are not answerable to this when with such as stand them
									they come to blows. 
								 For fighting without order they will quit their place without
									shame if they be once pressed; 
								 and seeing it is with them honourable alike to fight or run away,
									their valours are never called in question; 
								 and a battle wherein every one may do as he lists, affords them a
									more handsome excuse to save themselves. 
								 But they trust rather in their standing out of danger and
									terrifying us afar off than in coming to hands with us; 
								 for else they would rather have taken that course than this.

And you see manifestly that all that was before terrible in them
									is in effect little, and serves only to urge you to be going
									with their show and noise. 
								 Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and again withdraw
									yourselves still, as you shall have leisure, in your order and
									places, you shall not only come the sooner to a place of safety,
									but shall learn also against hereafter that such a rabble as
									this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make
									a flourish of valour with threats from afar before the
									battle; 
								 but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem
									courageous where they may do it safely.

When Brasidas had made his exhortation, he led away his army. 
							 And the barbarians, seeing it, pressed after them with great cries
								and tumult, as supposing he fled.

But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them [did
								so, and] met them which way soever they came on, and that Brasidas
								himself, with his chosen band, sustained them where they charged
								close and endured the first brunt beyond their expectation, and
								seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged, the other
								received them and fought, and when they ceased the other retired,
								then at length the greatest part of the barbarians forbore the
								Grecians that with Brasidas were in the open field, and leaving a
								part to follow them with shot, the rest ran with all speed after the
								Macedonians which were fled, of whom as many as they overtook they
								slew; 
							 and withal prepossessed the passage, which is a narrow one between
								two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing
								that there was no other passage by which Brasidas could get
								away. 
							 And when he was come to the very strait, they were going about him to
								have cut him off.

He, when he saw this, commanded the three hundred that were with him
								to run every man as fast as he could to one of the tops, which of
								them they could easliest get up to, and try if they could drive down
								those barbarians that were now going up to the same, before any
								greater number was above to hem them in.

These accordingly fought with and overcame those barbarians upon the
								hill, and thereby the rest of the army marched the more easily to
								the top. 
							 For this beating of them from the vantage of the hill made the
								barbarians also afraid, so that they followed them no further,
								conceiving withal that they were now at the confines and already
								escaped through.

Brasidas, having now gotten the hills and marching with more safety,
								came first the same day to Arnissa, of the dominion of
								Perdiccas.

And the soldiers of themselves, being angry with the Macedonians for
								leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of oxen or fardles fallen from
								any man (as was likely to happen in a retreat made in fear and in
								the night) they lighted on by the way, the oxen they cut in pieces
								and took the fardles to themselves.

And from this time did Perdiccas first esteem Brasidas as his enemy,
								and afterwards hated the Peloponnesians, not with ordinary hatred
								for the Athenians' sake, but being utterly fallen out with him about
								his own particular interest, sought means as soon as he could to
								compound with these and be disleagued from the other.

Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found that the
								Athenians had already taken Mende; 
							 and therefore staying there (for he thought it impossible to pass
								over into Pallene and to recover Mende), he kept good watch upon
								Torone.

For about the time that these things passed amongst the Lyncesteans,
								the Athenians, after all was in readiness, set sail for Mende and
								Scione with fifty galleys (whereof ten were of Chios) and a thousand
								men of arms of their own city, six hundred archers, a thousand
								Thracian mercenaries, and other targetiers of their own confederates
								thereabouts, under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and
								Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephes.

These, launching from Potidaea with their galleys and putting in at
								the temple of Neptune, marched presently against the Mendaeans. 
							 The Mendaeans with their own forces, three hundred of Scione that
								came to aid them, and the aids of the Peloponnesians, in all seven
								hundred men of arms, and Polydamidas their commander, were encamped
								upon a strong hill without the city.

Nicias, with a hundred and twenty lightarmed soldiers of Methone and
								sixty chosen men of arms of Athens and all his archers, attempting
								to get up by a path that was in the hill's side, was wounded in the
								attempt and could not make his way by force. 
							 And Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, going another way
								further about, as he climbed the hill, being hard of access, was
								quite disordered;

and the whole army wanted little of being utterly discomfited. 
							 So for this day, seeing the Mendaeans and their confederates stood to
								it, the Athenians retired and pitched their camp; 
							 and at night the Mendaeans retired into the city.

The next day the Athenians, sailing about unto that part of the city
								which is towards Scione, seized on the suburbs, and all that day
								wasted their fields, no man coming forth to oppose them (for there
								was also sedition in the city); 
							 and the three hundred Scionaeans the night following went home
								again.

The next day Nicias, with the one half of the army, marched to the
								confines and wasted the territory of the Scionaeans; 
							 and Nicostratus at the same time, with the other half, sat down
								against the city before the higher gates towards Potidaea.

Polydamidas (for it fell out that the Mendaeans and their aids had
								their arms lying within the wall in this part) set his men in order
								for the battle and encouraged the Mendaeans to make a sally.

But when one of the faction of the commons in sedition said, to the
								contrary, that they would not go out and that it was not necessary
								to fight, and was upon this contradiction by Polydamidas pulled and
								molested, the commons in passion presently took up their arms and
								made towards the Peloponnesians and such other with them as were of
								the contrary faction;

and falling upon them put them to flight, partly with the suddenness
								of the charge and partly through the fear they were in of the
								Athenians, to whom the gates were at the same time opened. 
							 For they imagined that this insurrection was by some appointment made
								between them.

So they fled into the citadel, as many as were not presently slain,
								which was also in their own hands before. 
							 But the Athenians (for now was Nicias also come back, and at the
								town-side) rushed into the city with the whole army and rifled it,
								not as opened to them by agreement, but as taken by force; 
							 and the captains had much ado to keep them that they also killed not
								the men.

After this, they bade the Mendaeans use the same form of government
								they had done before, and to give judgment upon those they thought
								the principal authors of the revolt amongst themselves. 
							 Those that were in the citadel they shut up with a wall reaching on
								both sides to the sea, and left a guard to defend it. 
							 And having thus gotten Mende, they led their army against Scione.

The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians, coming out against them,
								possessed themselves of a strong hill before the city, which if the
								enemy did not win, he should not be able to enclose the city with a
								wall.

The Athenians, having strongly charged them [with shot] and beaten
								the defendants from it, encamped upon the hill, and after they had
								set up their trophy, prepared to build their wall about the
								city.

Not long after, whilst the Athenians were at work about this, those
								aids that were besieged in the citadel of Mende, forcing the watch
								by the sea-side, came by night, and escaping most of them through
								the camp before Scione, put themselves into that city.

As they were enclosing of Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to the
								Athenian commanders and concluded a peace with the Athenians, upon
								hatred to Brasidas about the retreat made out of Lyncus, having then
								immediately begun to treat of the same.

For it happened also at this time that Ischagoras, a Lacedaemonian,
								was leading an army of foot unto Brasidas. 
							 And Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, seeing the peace
								was made, to give some clear token that he would be firm, and partly
								because he himself desired not that the Peloponnesians should come
								any more into his territories, wrought with his hosts in Thessaly,
								having in that kind ever used the prime men, and so stopped the army
								and munition as they would not so much as try the Thessalians
								[whether they would let them pass or not].

Nevertheless Ischagoras and Ameinias and Aristeus themselves went on
								to Brasidas, as sent by the Lacedaemonians to view the state of
								affairs there, and also took with them from Sparta, contrary to the
								law, such men as were but in the beginning of their youth to make
								them governors of cities rather than commit the cities to the care
								of such as were there before. 
							 And Clearidas, the son of Cleonymus, they made governor of
								Amphipolis; 
							 and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander, governor of Torone.

The same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespians,
								laying Atticism to their charge. 
							 And though they had ever meant to do it, yet now it was easier,
								because the flower of their youth was slain in the battle against
								the Athenians.

The temple of Juno in Argos was also burnt down the same summer, by
								the negligence of Chrysis the priest, who, having set a burning
								torch by the garlands, fell asleep, insomuch as all was on fire and
								flamed out before she knew.

Chrysis, the same night, for fear of the Argives, fled presently to
								Phlius; 
							 and they, according to the law formerly used, chose another priest in
								her room, called Phaeinis. 
							 Now, when Chrysis fled, was the eighth year of this war ended, and
								half of the ninth.

Scione, in the very end of this summer, was quite enclosed; 
							 and the Athenians, having left a guard there, went home with the rest
								of their army.

The winter following nothing was done between the Athenians and
								Lacedaemonians because of the truce. 
							 But the Mantineans and the Tegeatae, with the confederates of both,
								fought a battle at Laodicium, in the territory of Orestis, wherein
								the victory was doubtful; 
							 for either side put to flight one wing of their enemies, both sides
								set up trophies, and both sides sent of their spoils unto
								Delphi.

Nevertheless, after many slain on either side, and equal battle which
								ended by the coming of night, the Tegeatae lodged all night in the
								place and erected their trophy then presently; 
							 whereas the Mantineans turned to Bucolion and set up their trophy
								afterwards.

The same winter ending and the spring now approaching, Brasidas made
								an attempt upon Potidaea. 
							 For coming by night, he applied his ladders and was thitherto
								undiscerned. 
							 He took the time to apply his ladders when the bell passed by, and
								before he that carried it to the next returned. 
							 Nevertheless, being discovered, he scaled not the wall, but presently
								again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day.

So ended this winter, and the ninth year of this war written by
								Thucydides.

The summer following, the truce for a year, which was to last till
								the Pythian holidays, expired. 
							 During this truce, the Athenians removed the Delians out of Delos,
								because [though they were consecrated, yet] for a certain crime
								committed of old they esteemed them polluted persons; 
							 because also they thought there wanted this part to make perfect the
								purgation of the island, in the purging whereof, as I declared
								before, they thought they did well to take up the sepulchres of the
								dead. 
							 These Delians seated themselves afterwards, every one as he came, in
								Adramyttium in Asia, a town given unto them by Pharnaces.

After the truce was expired, Cleon prevailed with the Athenians to be
								sent out with a fleet against the cities lying upon Thrace. 
							 He had with him of Athenians twelve hundred men of arms and three
								hundred horsemen, of confederates more, and thirty galleys.

And first arriving at Scione, which was yet besieged, he took aboard
								some men of arms of those that kept the siege and sailed into the
								haven of the Colophonians, not far distant from the city of
								Torone.

And there, having heard by fugitives that Brasidas was not in Torone
								nor those within sufficient to give him battle, he marched with his
								army to the city and sent ten of his galleys about into the
								haven.

And first he came to the new wall, which Brasidas had raised about
								the city to take in the suburbs, making a breach in the old wall
								that the whole might be one city.

And Pasitelidas, a Lacedaemonian, captain of the town, with the
								garrison there present came to the defence and fought with the
								Athenians that assaulted it. 
							 But being oppressed, and the galleys which were before sent about
								being by this time come into the haven, Pasitelidas was afraid lest
								those galleys should take the town, unfurnished of defendants,
								before he could get back, and that the Athenians on the other side
								should win the wall and he be intercepted between them both;

and thereupon abandoned the wall and ran back into the city. 
							 But the Athenians that were in the galleys, having taken the town
								before he came, and the land-army following in after him without
								resistance and entering the city by the breach of the old wall, slew
								some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans on the place;

and some others, amongst whom was the captain Pasitelidas, they took
								alive.

Brasidas was now coming with aid towards Torone, but, advertised by
								the way that it was already lost, went back again, being about forty
								furlongs short of preventing it. 
							 Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the haven,
								another at the wall. 
							 The women and children of the Toronaeans they made slaves; 
							 but the men of Torone and the Peloponnesians and such Chalcideans as
								were amongst them, in all about seven hundred, they sent away
								prisoners to Athens. 
							 The Peloponnesians were afterwards at the making of the peace
								dismissed; 
							 the rest were redeemed by the Olynthians by exchange of man for
								man.

About the same time the Boeotians took Panactum, a fort of the
								Athenians standing in their confines, by treason.

Cleon, after he had settled the garrison in Torone, went thence by
								sea about the mountain Athos [to make war] against Amphipolis.

About the same time Phaeax the son of Erasistratus, who with two
								others was sent ambassador into Italy and Sicily, departed from
								Athens with two galleys.

For the Leontines, after the Athenians upon the making of the peace
								were gone out of Sicily, received many strangers into the freedom of
								their city;

and the commons had a purpose also to have made division of the
								land. 
							 But the great men, perceiving it, called in the Syracusians and drave
								the commons out; 
							 and they wandered up and down, every one as he chanced;

and the great men, upon conditions agreed on with the Syracusians,
								abandoning and deserting that city, went to dwell with the privilege
								of free citizens in Syracuse. 
							 After this again, some of them upon dislike relinquished Syracuse and
								seized on Phoceae, a certain part of the city of the Leontines, and
								upon Bricinniae, a castle in the Leontine territory. 
							 Thither also came unto them most of the commons that had before been
								driven out, and settling themselves, made war from those places of
								strength.

Upon intelligence hereof the Athenians sent Phaeax thither to
								persuade their confederates there and, if they could, all the
								Sicilians jointly to make war upon the Syracusians, that were now
								beginning to grow great, to try if they might thereby preserve the
								common people of the Leontines.

Phaeax arriving prevailed with the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines; 
							 but the business finding a stop at Gela, he went unto no more, as
								conceiving he should not be able to persuade them. 
							 So he returned through the cities of the Siculi unto Catana, having
								been at Bricinniae by the way and there encouraged them to hold
								out; 
							 and from Catana he set sail and departed.

In his voyage to Sicily, both going and coming, he dealt as he went
								by with sundry cities also of Italy to enter into friendship with
								the Athenians. 
							 He also lighted on those Locrians which having dwelt once in Messana
								were afterwards driven out again, being the same men which, after
								the peace in Sicily, upon a sedition in Messana, wherein one of the
								factions called in the Locrians, had been then sent to inhabit
								there, [and now were sent away again]; 
							 for the Locrians held Messana for a while.

Phaeax, therefore, chancing to meet with these as they were going to
								their own city, did them no hurt, because the Locrians had been in
								speech with him about an agreement with the Athenians.

For when the Sicilians made a general peace, these only of all the
								confederates refused to make any peace at all with the
								Athenians. 
							 Nor indeed would they have done it now but that they were constrained
								thereunto by the war they had with the Itoneans and Melaeans, their
								own colonies and borderers. 
							 And Phaeax after this returned to Athens.

Cleon, who was now gone from Torone and come about to Amphipolis,
								making Eion the seat of the war, assaulted the city of Stageirus, a
								colony of the Andrians, but could not take it; 
							 but Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he took by assault.

And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas to will him to come to him
								with his forces, according to the league, and other ambassadors into
								Thrace unto Polles, king of the Odomantians, to take up as many
								mercenary Thracians as he could, he lay still in Eion to expect
								their coming.

Brasidas upon notice hereof, sat down over against him at
								Cerdylium. 
							 This is a place belonging to the Argilians, standing high and beyond
								the river, not far from Amphipolis, and from whence he might discern
								all that was about him. 
							 So that Cleon could not but be seen if he should rise with his army
								to go against Amphipolis, which he expected he would do, and that in
								contempt of his small number he would go up with the forces he had
								then present.

Withal he furnished himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians,
								and took unto him all his Edonians, both horsemen and
								targetiers. 
							 He had also of Myrcinians and Chalcideans a thousand targetiers,
								besides them in Amphipolis.

But for men of arms, his whole number was at the most two thousand,
								and of Grecian horsemen three hundred. 
							 With fifteen hundred of these came Brasidas and sat down at
								Cerdylium; 
							 the rest stood ready ordered with Clearidas, their captain, within
								Amphipolis.

Cleon for a while lay still, but was afterwards forced to do as was
								expected by Brasidas.

For the soldiers being angry with their stay there, and recounting
								with themselves what a command his would be, and with what ignorance
								and cowardice against what skill and boldness of the other, and how
								they came forth with him against their wills, he perceived their
								muttering, and being unwilling to offend them with so long a stay in
								one place, dislodged and led them forward.

And he took the same course there, which having succeeded well before
								at Pylus gave him cause to think himself to have some judgment. 
							 For he thought not that any body would come forth to give him battle,
								and gave out he went up principally to see the place, and stayed for
								greater forces, not to secure him in case he should be compelled to
								fight, but that he might therewith environ the city on all sides at
								once, and in that manner take it by force.

So he went up and set his army down on a strong hill before
								Amphipolis, standing himself to view the fens of the river Strymon
								and the situation of the city towards Thrace;

and thought he could have retired again at his pleasure, without
								battle. 
							 For neither did any man appear upon the walls nor come out of the
								gates, which were all fast shut. 
							 Insomuch as he thought he had committed an error in coming without
								engines, because he thought he might by such means have won the
								city, as being without defendants.

Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians remove, came down also from
								Cerdylium and put himself into Amphipolis.

He would not suffer them to make any sally nor to face the Athenians
								in order of battle, mistrusting his own forces, which he thought
								inferior, not in number (for they were in a manner equal) but in
								worth (for such Athenians as were there were pure, and the Lemnians
								and Imbrians which were amongst them were of the very ablest); 
							 but prepared to set upon them by a wile.

For if he should have showed to the enemy both his number and their
								armour, such as for the present they were forced to use, he thought
								that thereby he should not so soon get the victory as by keeping
								them out of sight and out of their contempt till the very point.

Wherefore choosing to himself a hundred and fifty men of arms and
								committing the charge of the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to set
								suddenly upon them before they should retire, as not expecting to
								take them so alone another time if their succours chanced to
								arrive. 
							 And when he had called his soldiers together to encourage them and to
								make known unto them his design, he said as followeth:

Men of Peloponnesus, as for your country, how
									by valour it hath ever retained her liberty, and that being
									Dorians you are now to fight against Ionians, of whom you were
									ever wont to get the victory, let it suffice that I have touched
									it thus briefly.

But in what manner I intend to charge, that I am now to inform
									you of, lest the venturing by few at once, and not all together,
									should seem to proceed from weakness and so dishearten you.

I do conjecture that it was in contempt of us, and as not
									expecting to be fought withal, that the enemy both came up to
									this place, and that they have now betaken themselves carelessly
									and out of order to view the country.

But he that best observing such errors in his enemies shall also
									to his strength give the onset, not always openly and in ranged
									battle, but as is best for his present advantage, shall for the
									most part attain his purpose.

And these wiles carry with them the greatest glory of all, by
									which, deceiving most the enemy, a man doth most benefit his
									friends.

Therefore whilst they are secure without preparation, and intend,
									for aught I see, to steal away rather than to stay, I say, in
									this their looseness of resolution, and before they put their
									minds in order, I for my part with those I have chosen will, if
									I can, before they get away fall in upon the midst of their army
									running.

And you, Clearidas, afterwards, as soon as you shall see me to
									have charged and, as it is probable, to have put them into
									affright, take those that are with you, both Amphipolitans and
									all the rest of the confederates, and setting open the gates run
									out upon them, and with all possible speed come up to stroke of
									hand.

For there is great hope this way to terrify them, seeing they
									which come after are ever of more terror to the enemy than those
									that are already present and in fight.

And be valiant, as is likely you should that are a Spartan; 
								 and you, confederates, follow manfully, and believe that the
									parts of a good soldier are willingness, sense of shame, and
									obedience to his leaders; 
								 and that this day you shall either gain yourselves liberty by
									your valour, and to be called confederates of the
									Lacedaemonians, or else not only to serve the Athenians
									yourselves, and at the best, if you be not led captives nor put
									to death, to be in greater servitude than before, but also to be
									the hinderers of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians.

But be not you cowards, seeing how great a matter is at
									stake; 
								 and I, for my part, will make it appear that I am not more ready
									to persuade another than to put myself into action.

When Brasidas had thus said, he both prepared to go out himself, and
								also placed the rest that were with Clearidas before the gates
								called the Thracian gates to issue forth afterwards as was
								appointed.

Now Brasidas having been in sight when he came down from Cerdylium
								and again when he sacrificed in the city by the temple of Pallas,
								which place might be seen from without, it was told Cleon [whilst
								Brasidas was ordering of his men] (for he was at this time gone off
								a little to look about him) that the whole army of the enemies was
								plainly to be discerned within the town, and that the feet of many
								men and horses, ready to come forth, might be discerned from under
								the gate.

Hearing this, he came to the place; 
							 and when he saw it was true, being not minded to fight until his aids
								arrived, and yet making no other account but that his retreat would
								be discovered, he commanded at once to give the signal of retreat,
								and that as they went the left wing should march foremost, which was
								the only means they had to withdraw towards Eion.

But when he thought they were long about it, causing the right wing
								to wheel about and lay open their disarmed parts to the enemy, he
								led away the army himself.

Brasidas at the same time, having spied his opportunity and that the
								army of the Athenians removed, said to those about him and the rest:
									 
 These men stay not for us; 
									 it is apparent by the wagging of their spears and of their
										heads; 
									 for where such motion is, they use not to stay for the charge
										of the enemy;

therefore open me some body the gates appointed
									and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon them. 
 
							 Then he went out himself at the gate towards the trench, and which
								was the first gate of the long wall, which then was standing; 
							 and at high speed took the straight way, in which, as one passeth by
								the strongest part of the town, there standeth now a trophy, and
								charging upon the midst of the Athenian army, which was terrified
								both with their own disarray and the valour of the man, forced them
								to fly.

And Clearidas, as was appointed, having issued out by the Thracian
								gates, was withal coming upon them.

And it fell out that the Athenians, by this unexpected and sudden
								attempt, were on both sides in confusion; 
							 and the left wing which was next to Eion, and which indeed was
								marching away before, was immediately broken off from the rest of
								the army and fled. 
							 When that was gone, Brasidas coming up to the right wing, was there
								wounded.

The Athenians saw not when he fell; 
							 and they that were near took him up and carried him off. 
							 The right wing stood longer to it: and though Cleon himself presently
								fled (as at first he intended not to stay) and was intercepted by a
								Myrcinian targetier and slain, yet his men of arms, casting
								themselves into a circle on the [top of a little] hill, twice or
								thrice resisted the charge of Clearidas and shrunk not at all, till
								begirt with the Myrcinian and Chalcidean horse and with the
								targetiers, they were put to flight by their darts.

Thus the whole army of the Athenians, getting away with much ado over
								the hills and by several ways, all that were not slain upon the
								place or by the Chalcidean horse and targetiers, recovered Eion.

The other side taking up Brasidas out of the battle, and having so
								long kept him alive, brought him yet breathing into the city; 
							 and he knew that his side had gotten the victory, but expired shortly
								after.

When Clearidas with the rest of the army were returned from pursuit
								of the enemy, they rifled those that were slain and erected a
								trophy.

After this the confederates, following the corpse of Brasidas, all of
								them in their arms, buried him in the city, at the public charge, in
								the entrance of that which is now the market place. 
							 And the Amphipolitans afterwards, having taken in his monument with a
								wall, killed unto him as to a hero, honoured him with games and
								anniversary sacrifice, and attributed their colony unto him as to
								the founder, pulling down the edifices of Agnon, and defacing
								whatsoever monument might maintain the memory of his foundation. 
							 This they did both for that they esteemed Brasidas for their
								preserver and also because at this time, through fear of the
								Athenians, they courted the Lacedaemonians for a league. 
							 As for Agnon, because of their hostility with the Athenians, they
								thought it neither expedient for them to give him honours, nor that
								they would be acceptable unto him if they did.

The dead bodies they rendered to the Athenians, of whom there were
								slain about six hundred, and but seven of the other side, by reason
								that it was no set battle, but fought upon such an occasion and
								precedent affright.

After the dead were taken up, the Athenians went home by sea; 
							 and Clearidas and those with him stayed to settle the estate of
								Amphipolis.

About the same time of the summer now ending, Ramphias, Autocharidas,
								and Epicydidas, Lacedaemonians, were leading a supply towards the
								parts upon Thrace of nine hundred men of arms; 
							 and when they were come to Heracleia in Trachinia, they stayed there
								to amend such things as they thought amiss.

Whilst they stayed, this battle was fought; 
							 and the summer ended.

The next winter, they that were with Ramphias went presently forward
								as far as [the hill] Pierium in Thessaly. 
							 But the Thessalians forbidding them to go on, and Brasidas, to whom
								they were carrying this army, being dead, they returned homewards,
								conceiving that the opportunity now served not, both because the
								Athenians were upon this overthrow gone away and for that they
								themselves were unable to perform any of those designs which the
								other had intended.

But the principal cause of their return was this: that they knew at
								their coming forth that the Lacedaemonians had their minds more set
								upon a peace than war.

Presently after the battle of Amphipolis and return of Ramphias out
								of Thessaly, it fell out that neither side did any act of war but
								were inclined rather to a peace; 
							 the Athenians for the blow they had received at Delium, and this
								other a little after at Amphipolis, and because they had no longer
								that confident hope in their strength on which they relied when
								formerly they refused the peace, as having conceived upon their
								present success that they should have had the upper hand;

also they stood in fear of their own confederates, lest emboldened by
								these losses of theirs they should more and more revolt; 
							 and repented that they made not the peace after their happy success
								at Pylus, when occasion was offered to have done it honourably;

and the Lacedaemonians on the other side did desire peace because the
								war had not proceeded as they expected; 
							 for they had thought they should in a few years have warred down the
								power of Athens by wasting their territory; 
							 and because they were fallen into that calamity in the island, the
								like whereof had never happened unto Sparta before; 
							 because also their country was continually ravaged by those of Pylus
								and Cythera, and their Helotes continually fled to the enemy; 
							 and because they feared lest those which remained, trusting in them
								that were run away, should in this estate of theirs raise some
								innovation, as at other times before they had done.

Withal it happened that the thirty years' peace with the Argives was
								now upon the point of expiring; 
							 and the Argives would not renew it without restitution made them of
								Cynuria; 
							 so that to war against the Argives and the Athenians, both at once,
								seemed impossible. 
							 They suspected also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would
								revolt to the Argives, as indeed it came afterwards to pass.

These things considered, it was by both parts thought good to
								conclude a peace, but especially by the Lacedaemonians for the
								desire they had to recover their men taken in the island. 
							 For the Spartans that were amongst them were both of the prime men of
								the city and their kinsmen.

And therefore they began to treat presently after they were
								taken; 
							 but the Athenians, by reason of their prosperity, would not lay down
								the war at that time on equal terms. 
							 But after their defeat at Delium, the Lacedaemonians, knowing they
								would be apter now to accept it, made that truce for a year, during
								which they were to meet and consult about a longer time.

But when also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at
								Amphipolis, and that both Cleon and Brasidas were slain, the which
								on either side were most opposite to the peace, the one for that he
								had good success and honour in the war, the other because in quiet
								times his evil actions would more appear and his calumniations be
								the less believed, those two that in the two states aspired most to
								be chief, Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and Nicias, the son of
								Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of
								his time, did most of all other desire to have the peace go
								forward. 
							 Nicias because he was desirous, having hitherto never been
								overthrown, to carry his good fortune through and to give both
								himself and the city rest from their troubles for the present, and
								for the future to leave a name that in all his time he had never
								made the commonwealth miscarry; 
							 which he thought might be done by standing out of danger and by
								putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; 
							 and to stand out of danger is the benefit of peace. 
							 Pleistoanax had the same desire because of the imputation laid upon
								him about his return from exile by his enemies, that suggested unto
								the Lacedaemonians upon every loss they received that the same
								befell them for having, contrary to the law, repealed his
								banishment.

For they charged him further that he and his brother Aristocles had
								suborned the prophetess of Delphi to answer the deputies of the
								Lacedaemonians, when they came thither, most commonly with this:
								that they should bring back the seed of the semigod, the son of
								Jupiter, out of a strange country into his own; 
							 and that if they did not, they should plough their land with a silver
								plough;

and so at length to have made the Lacedaemonians, nineteen years
								after, with such dances and sacrifices as they who were the first
								founders of Lacedaemon had ordained to be used at the enthroning of
								their kings, to fetch him home again; 
							 who lived in the meantime in exile in the mountain Lycaeum, in a
								house whereof the one half was part of the temple of Jupiter, for
								fear of the Lacedaemonians, as being suspected to have taken a bribe
								to withdraw his army out of Attica.

Being troubled with these imputations and considering with himself,
								there being no occasion of calamity in time of peace and the
								Lacedaemonians thereby recovering their men, that he also should
								cease to be obnoxious to the calumniations of his enemies whereas,
								in war, such as had charge could not but be quarrelled upon their
								losses—he was therefore forward to have the peace concluded.

And this winter they fell to treaty, and withal the Lacedaemonians
								braved them with a preparation already making against the spring,
								sending to the cities about for that purpose, as if they meant to
								fortify in Attica, to the end that the Athenians might give them the
								better ear. 
							 When after many meetings and many demands on either side, it was at
								last agreed that peace should be concluded, each part rendering what
								they had taken in the war, save that the Athenians should hold
								Nisaea (for when they [likewise] demanded Plataea and the Thebans
								answered that it was neither taken by force nor by treason, but
								rendered voluntarily, the Athenians said that they also had Nisaea
								in the same manner), the Lacedaemonians calling together their
								confederates, and all but the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and
								Megareans, (for these disliked it) giving their votes for the ending
								of the war, they concluded the peace, and confirmed it to the
								Athenians with sacrifice, and swore it, and the Athenians again unto
								them, upon these articles:

"The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their confederates have made
								peace and sworn it, city by city, as followeth:

"Touching the public temples, it shall be lawful to whomsoever will
								to sacrifice in them and to have access unto them and to ask counsel
								of the oracles in the same and to send their deputies unto them,
								according to the custom of his country, securely both by sea and
								land. 

							 "The whole place consecrate and temple of Apollo in Delphi, and
								Delphi itself, shall be governed by their own law, taxed by their
								own state, and judged by their own judges, both city and territory,
								according to the institution of the place.

"The peace shall endure between the Athenians with their confederates
								and the Lacedaemonians with their confederates for fifty years, both
								by sea and land, without fraud and without harm-doing.

"It shall not be lawful to bear arms with intention of hurt, neither
								for the Lacedaemonians and their confederates against the Athenians
								nor for the Athenians and their confederates against the
								Lacedaemonians by any art or machination whatsoever; 
							 if any controversy shall arise between them, the same shall be
								decided by law and by oath, in such manner as they shall agree
								on.

"The Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall render Amphipolis to
								the Athenians; 
							 the inhabitants of whatsoever city the Lacedaemonians shall render
								unto the Athenians shall be at liberty to go forth whither they will
								with bag and baggage. 

							 "Those cities which paid the tribute taxed in the time of Aristides,
								continuing to pay it, shall be governed by their own laws. 
							 And now that the peace is concluded, it shall be unlawful for the
								Athenians or their confederates to bear arms against them or to do
								them any hurt as long as they shall pay the said tribute; 
							 the cities are these: Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus,
								Spartolus;

and they shall be confederates of neither side, neither of the
								Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians;

but if the Athenians can persuade these cities unto it, then it shall
								be lawful for the Athenians to have them for confederates, having
								gotten their consent. 

							 "The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall inhabit their own
								cities on the same conditions with the Olynthians and
								Acanthians. 

							 "The Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall render Panactum unto
								the Athenians. 

							 "And the Athenians shall render to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium,
								Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante; 
							 they shall likewise deliver whatsoever Lacedaemonians are in the
								prison of Athens or in any prison of what place soever in the
								Athenian dominion, and dismiss all the Peloponnesians besieged in
								Scione and all that Brasidas did there put in, and whatsoever
								confederates of the Lacedaemonians are in prison, either at Athens
								or in the Athenian state. 

							 "And the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall deliver
								whomsoever they have in their hands of the Athenians or their
								confederates in the same manner.

"Touching the Scionaeans, Toronaeans, and Sermylians, and whatsoever
								other city belonging to the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with
								them what they think fit.

"The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedaemonians and their
								confederates, city by city; 
							 and that oath shall be the greatest that in each city is in use. 
							 The thing that they shall swear shall be this: 'I stand to these
								articles and to this peace, truly and sincerely.' 
							 And the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall take the same
								oath to the Athenians.

This oath they shall on both sides every year renew and shall erect
								pillars [inscribed with this peace] at Olympia, Pythia, and in the
								Isthmus; 
							 at Athens, within the citadel; 
							 and at Lacedaemon, in the Amyclaeum.

"And if anything be on either side forgotten, or shall be thought fit
								upon good deliberation to be changed, it shall be lawful for them to
								do it, in such manner as the Lacedaemonians and Athenians shall
								think fit, jointly.

"This peace shall take beginning from the 24th of the month
								Artemisium, Pleistolas being ephore at Sparta, and the 5th of
								Elaphebolium, after the account of Athens, Alcaeus being archon.

They that took the oath and sacrificed, were
										these. 
									 Of the Lacedaemonians: Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis,
										Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocaridas,
										Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas,
										Laphilus. 
									 Of the Athenians these: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches,
										Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus,
										Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates,
										Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

This peace was made in the very end of winter and the spring then
								beginning presently after the City Bacchanals and [full] ten years
								and some few days over after the first invasion of Attica and the
								beginning of this war.

But now for the certainty hereof, let a man consider the times
								themselves and not trust to the account of the names of such as in
								the several places bare chief offices or for some honour to
								themselves had their names ascribed for marks to the actions
								foregoing. 
							 For it is not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office,
								or who in the midst, or how he was, when anything fell out.

But if one reckon the same by summers and winters, according as they
								are written, he shall find by the two half years which make the
								whole, that this first war was of ten summers and as many winters
								continuance.

The Lacedaemonians (for it fell unto them by lot to begin the
								restitution) both dismissed presently those prisoners they had then
								in their hands and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras, Menas, and
								Philocharidas, into the parts upon Thrace with command to Clearidas
								to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and requiring the rest of
								their confederates there to accept of the peace in such manner as
								was for every of them accorded.

But they would not do it because they thought it was not for their
								advantage; 
							 and Clearidas also, to gratify the Chalcideans, surrendered not the
								city, alleging that he could not do it whether they would or
								not.

And coming away soon after with those ambassadors to Lacedaemon, both
								to purge himself, if he should be accused by those with Ischagoras
								for disobeying the state's command, and also to try if the peace
								might by any means be shaken; 
							 when he found it firm, he himself, being sent back by the
								Lacedaemonians with command principally to surrender the place, and
								if he could not do that, then to draw thence all the Peloponnesians
								that were in it, immediately took his journey.

But the confederates chanced to be present themselves in
								Lacedaemon; 
							 and the Lacedaemonians required such of them as formerly refused that
								they would accept the peace. 
							 But they, upon the same pretence on which they had rejected it
								before, said that unless it were more reasonable they would not
								accept it.

And the Lacedaemonians, seeing they refused, dismissed them and by
								themselves entered with the Athenians into a league, because they
								imagined that the Argives would not renew their peace (because they
								had refused it before when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos, and
								held them for no dangerous enemies without the Athenians); 
							 and also conceived that by this means the rest of Peloponnesus would
								not stir; 
							 for if they could, they would turn to the Athenians.

Wherefore the ambassadors of Athens being then present, and
								conference had, they agreed; 
							 and the oath and league was concluded on in the terms following:

"The Lacedaemonians shall be confederates with the Athenians for
								fifty years. 

							 "If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedaemonians and do the
								Lacedaemonians any harm, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians
								against them in the strongest manner they can possibly; 
							 but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone
								away, then that city shall be held as enemy both to the
								Lacedaemonians and to the Athenians and shall be warred upon by them
								both; 
							 and both cities shall again lay down the war jointly; 
							 and this is to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.

"And if any enemy shall invade the territories of the Athenians and
								do the Athenians any harm, then the Lacedaemonians shall aid the
								Athenians against them in the strongest manner they can
								possibly; 
							 but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone
								away, then shall that city be held for enemy both to the
								Lacedaemonians and to the Athenians and shall be warred upon by
								both;

and both the cities shall again lay down the war together; 
							 and this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely. 

							 "If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall assist the
								Lacedaemonians with all their strength possible.

"These things shall be sworn unto by the same men on either side that
								swore the peace and shall be every year renewed by the
								Lacedaemonians [at their] coming to the Bacchanals at Athens and by
								the Athenians [at their] going to the Hyacinthian feast at
								Lacedaemon;

and either side shall erect a pillar [inscribed with this league],
								one at Lacedaemon, near unto Apollo in the Amyclaeum, another at
								Athens, near Minerva in the citadel.

"If it shall seem good to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians to add or
								take away anything touching the league, it shall be lawful for them
								to do it jointly.

Of the Lacedaemonians, took the oath these:
										Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis,
										Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas,
										Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas,
										Laphilus. 
									 Of the Athenians: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias,
										Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus,
										Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates,
										Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This league was made not long after the peace; 
							 and the Athenians delivered to the Lacedaemonians the men they had
								taken in the island; 
							 and by this time began the summer of the eleventh year. 
							 And hitherto hath been written these ten years, which this first war
								continued without intermission.

After the peace and league made between the Lacedaemonians and
								Athenians after the ten years' war, Pleistolas being ephore at
								Lacedaemon and Alcaeus archon of Athens, though there were peace to
								those that had accepted it, yet the Corinthians and some cities of
								Peloponnesus endeavoured to overthrow what was done, and presently
								arose another stir by the confederates against Lacedaemon.

And the Lacedaemonians also after a while became suspect unto the
								Athenians for not performing somewhat agreed on in the articles.

And for six years and ten months they abstained from entering into
								each other's territories with their arms; 
							 but the peace being weak, they did each other abroad what harm they
								could, and in the end were forced to dissolve the peace made after
								those ten years, and fell again into open war.

This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to
								point, by summers and winters, as everything came to pass, until
								such time as the Lacedaemonians and their confederates had made an
								end of the Athenian dominion and had taken their long walls and
								Pieraeus. 
							 To which time, from the beginning of the war, it is in all
								twenty-seven years.

As for the composition between, if any man shall think it not to be
								accounted with the war, he shall think amiss. 
							 For let him look into the actions that passed as they are distinctly
								set down and he shall find that that deserveth not to be taken for a
								peace, in which they neither rendered all nor accepted all,
								according to the articles. 
							 Besides, in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and in other actions,
								it was on both sides infringed; 
							 moreover, the confederates on the borders of Thrace continued in
								hostility as before; 
							 and the Boeotians had but a truce from one ten days to another.

So that with the first ten years' war, and with this doubtful
								cessation, and the war that followed after it, a man shall find,
								counting by the times, that it came to just so many years and some
								few days, and that those who built upon the prediction of the
								oracles have this number only to agree.

And I remember yet that from the very beginning of this war and so on
								till the end it was uttered by many that it should be of thrice nine
								years' continuance.

And for the time thereof I lived in my strength and applied my mind
								to gain an accurate knowledge of the same. 
							 It happened also that I was banished my country for twenty years,
								after my charge at Amphipolis; 
							 whereby being present at the affairs of both, and especially of the
								Lacedaemonians by reason of my exile, I could at leisure the better
								learn the truth of all that passed.

The quarrels, therefore, and perturbations of the peace, after those
								ten years, and that which followed, according as from time to time
								the war was carried, I will now pursue.

After the concluding of the fifty years' peace and the league which
								followed, and when those ambassadors which were sent for out of the
								rest of Peloponnesus to accept the said peace were departed from
								Lacedaemon, the Corinthians (the rest going all to their own
								cities), turning first to Argos, entered into treaty with some of
								the Argive magistrates to this purpose:

that the Lacedaemonians having made a peace and league with the
								Athenians, their hitherto mortal enemies, tending not to the
								benefit, but to the enslaving of Peloponnesus, it behoved them to
								consider of a course for the safety of the same, and to make a
								decree that any city of the Grecians that would, and were a free
								city, and admitted the like and equal trials of judgment with
								theirs, might make a league with the Argives for the one mutually to
								aid the other; 
							 and to assign them a few men, with absolute authority from the state,
								to treat with; 
							 and that it should not be motioned to the people, to the end that, if
								the multitude would not agree to it, it might be unknown that ever
								they had made such a motion; 
							 affirming that many would come into this confederacy upon hatred to
								the Lacedaemonians.

And the Corinthians, when they had made this overture, went home.

These men of Argos having heard them and reported their proposition
								both to the magistrates and to the people, the Argives ordered the
								same accordingly and elected twelve men with whom it should be
								lawful for any Grecian to make the league that would, except the
								Lacedaemonians and Athenians, with neither of which they were to
								enter into any league without the consent of the Argive people.

And this the Argives did the more willingly admit, as well for that
								they saw the Lacedaemonians would make war upon them (for the truce
								between them was now upon expiring), as also because they hoped to
								have the principality of Peloponnesus. 
							 For about this time Lacedaemon had but a bad report and was in
								contempt for the losses it had received. 
							 And the Argives in all points were in good estate, as not having
								concurred in the Attic war, but rather been at peace with both, and
								thereby gotten in their revenue.

Thus the Argives received into league all such Grecians as came unto
								them.

First of all, therefore, came in the Mantineans and their
								confederates, which they did for fear of the Lacedaemonians. 
							 For a part of Arcadia, during the war of Athens, was come under the
								obedience of the Mantineans, over which they thought the
								Lacedaemonians, now they were at rest, would not permit them any
								longer to command; 
							 and therefore they willingly joined with the Argives, as being, they
								thought, a great city, ever enemy to the Lacedaemonians, and
								governed as their own by democracy.

When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of Peloponnesus began also
								to mutter amongst themselves that it was fit for them to do the
								like; 
							 conceiving that there was somewhat in it more than they knew that
								made the Mantineans to turn; 
							 and were also angry with the Lacedaemonians, amongst many other
								causes, for that it was written in the articles of the Attic peace
								that it should be lawful to add unto or take away from the same,
								whatsoever should seem good to the two cities of the Lacedaemonians
								and the Athenians.

For this was the article that the most troubled the Peloponnesians
								and put them into a jealousy that the Lacedaemonians might have a
								purpose, joining with the Athenians, to bring them into
								subjection; 
							 for in justice, the power of changing the articles ought to have been
								ascribed to all the confederates in general.

Whereupon, many, fearing such an intention, applied themselves to the
								Argives, every one severally striving to come into their league.

The Lacedaemonians, perceiving this stir to begin in Peloponnesus,
								and that the Corinthians were both the contrivers of it and entered
								themselves also into the league with Argos, sent ambassadors unto
								Corinth with intention to prevent the sequel of it: and accused them
								both for the whole design and for their own revolt in particular,
								which they intended to make from them to the league of the Argives,
								saying that they should therein infringe their oath and that they
								had already done unjustly to refuse the peace made with the
								Athenians; 
							 forasmuch as it is an article of their league that what the major
								part of the confederates should conclude, unless it were hindered by
								some god or hero, the same was to stand good.

But the Corinthians, those confederates which had refused the peace
								as well as they being now at Corinth (for they had sent for them
								before), in their answer to the Lacedaemonians did not openly allege
								the wrongs they had received; 
							 as that the Athenians had not restored Solium nor Anactorium nor
								anything else they had in this war lost; 
							 but pretended not to betray those of Thrace, for that they had in
								particular taken an oath to them, both when together with Potidaea
								they first revolted and also another afterwards.

And therefore, they said, they did not break the oath of their league
								by rejecting the peace with Athens. 
							 For having sworn unto them by the gods, they should in betraying them
								offend the gods. 
							 And whereas it is said 
 unless some god or
										hero hinder it, 
 this appeareth to be a divine
								hindrance.

Thus they answered for their old oath. 
							 Then, for their league with the Argives, they gave this answer:

that when they had advised with their friends, they would do
								afterwards what should be just. 
							 And so the ambassadors of Lacedaemon went home. 
							 At the same time were present also in Corinth the ambassadors of
								Argos to invite the Corinthians to their league, and that without
								delay. 
							 But the Corinthians appointed them to come again at their next
								sitting.

Presently after this came unto them an ambassage also from
								Eleians; 
							 and first they made a league with the Corinthians, and going thence
								to Argos, made a league with the Argives, according to the
								declaration before mentioned. 
							 The Eleians had a quarrel with the Lacedaemonians concerning
								Lepreum.

For the Lepreates having heretofore warred on certain of the
								Arcadians, and for their aid called the Eleians into their
								confederacy with condition to give the moiety of the land [to be won
								from them], when the war was ended, the Eleians gave unto the
								Lepreates the whole land to be enjoyed by themselves, with an
								imposition thereon of a talent to be paid to Jupiter Olympian, which
								they continued to pay till the beginning of the Athenian war.

But afterwards upon pretense of that war giving over the payment, the
								Eleians would have forced them to it again. 
							 The Lepreates for help having recourse to the Lacedaemonians, and the
								cause being referred to their decision, the Eleians afterwards, upon
								suspicion that the Lacedaemonians would not do them right, renounced
								the reference and wasted the territory of the Lepreates.

The Lacedaemonians nevertheless gave sentence that the Lepreates
								should be at liberty to pay it or not, and that the Eleians did the
								injury;

and because the Eleians had not stood to the reference, the
								Lacedaemonians put into Lepreum a garrison of men at arms. 
							 The Eleians, taking this as if the Lacedaemonians had received their
								revolted city, and producing the article of their league 
 that what every one possessed when they
										entered into the Attic war, the same they should possess
										when they gave it over, 
 revolted to the Argives as
								wronged and entered league with them as is before related.

After these came presently into the Argive league the Corinthians and
								the Chalcideans upon Thrace. 
							 The Boeotians also and Megareans threatened as much; 
							 but because they thought the Argive democracy would not be so
								commodious for them, who were governed according to the government
								of the Lacedaemonians, by oligarchy, they stirred no further in it.

About the same time of this summer the Athenians expugned Scione,
								slew all that were within it at man's estate, made slaves of the
								women and children, and gave their territory to the Plataeans. 
							 They also replanted the Delians in Delos, both in consideration of
								the defeats they had received after their expulsion, and also
								because the oracle at Delphi had commanded it.

The Phoceans and Locrians also began a war at that time against each
								other.

And the Corinthians and Argives, being now league, went to Tegea to
								cause it to revolt from the Lacedaemonians, conceiving it to be an
								important piece [of Peloponnesus], and making account, if they
								gained it to their side, they should easily obtain the whole.

But when the Tegeates refused to become enemies to the
								Lacedaemonians, the Corinthians, who till then had been very
								forward, grew less violent and were afraid that no more of the rest
								would come in.

Nevertheless they went to the Boeotians, and solicited them to enter
								into league with them and the Argives and to do as they did. 
							 And the Corinthians further desired the Boeotians to go along with
								them to Athens and to procure for them the like ten days' truce to
								that which was made between the Athenians and Boeotians presently
								after the making of the fifty years' peace, on the same terms as the
								Boeotians had it; 
							 and if the Athenians refused, then to renounce theirs and make no
								more truces hereafter without the Corinthians.

The Corinthians having made this request, the Boeotians willed them,
								touching the league with the Argives, to stay a while longer, and
								went with them to Athens, but obtained not the ten days' truce; 
							 the Athenians answering that if the Corinthians were confederates
								with the Lacedaemonians, they had a peace already.

Nevertheless the Boeotians would not relinquish their ten days'
								truce, though the Corinthians both required the same and affirmed
								that it was so before agreed on. 
							 Yet the Athenians granted the Corinthians a cessation of arms, but
								without solemn ratification.

The same summer the Lacedaemonians with their whole power, under the
								conduct of Pleistonanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the
								Lacedaemonians, made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, subjects
								of the Mantineans, partly as called in by occasion of sedition and
								partly because they intended, if they could, to demolish a
								fortification which the Mantineans had built and kept with a
								garrison in Cypsela, in the territory of the Parrhasians towards
								Sciritis of Laconia.

The Lacedaemonians therefore wasted the territory of the
								Parrhasians. 
							 And the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the custody of the
								Argives, came forth to aid the Parrhasians their confederates; 
							 but being unable to defend both the fort of Cypsela and the cities of
								the Parrhasians too, they went home again.

And the Lacedaemonians, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty
								and demolished the fortification, went home likewise.

The same summer, when those soldiers which went out with Brasidas and
								of which Clearidas after the making of the peace had the charge were
								returned from the parts upon Thrace, the Lacedaemonians made a
								decree that those Helotes which had fought under Brasidas should
								receive their liberty and inhabit where they thought good. 
							 But not long after they placed them, together with such others as had
								been newly enfranchised, in Lepreum, a city standing in the confines
								between Laconia and the Eleians, with whom they were now at
								variance.

Fearing also lest those citizens of their own, which had been taken
								in the island and had delivered up their arms to the Athenians,
								should upon apprehension of disgrace for that calamity, if they
								remained capable of honours, make some innovation in the state, they
								disabled them [though] some of them were in office already. 
							 And their disablement was this: that they should neither bear office,
								nor be capable to buy and sell. 
							 Yet in time they were again restored to their former honours.

The same summer also the Dictideans took Thyssus, a town in Mount
								Athos, and confederate of the Athenians.

This whole summer there was continual commerce between the Athenians
								and the Peloponnesians; 
							 nevertheless they began, both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians,
								to have each other in suspicion immediately after the peace, in
								respect of the places not yet mutually surrendered.

For the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to make restitution
								first, had not rendered Amphipolis and the other cities, nor had
								caused the peace to be accepted by the confederates upon Thrace, nor
								by the Boeotians nor Corinthians, though they had ever professed
								that in case they refused they would join with the Athenians to
								bring them to it by force, and had prefixed a time (though not by
								writing) within the which such as entered not into this peace were
								to be held as enemies unto both.

The Athenians, therefore, when they saw none of this really
								performed, suspected that they had no sincere intention, and
								thereupon refused to render Pylus when they required it; 
							 nay, they repented that they had delivered up the prisoners they took
								in the island; 
							 and detained the rest of the towns they then held till the
								Lacedaemonians should have performed the conditions on their part
								also.

The Lacedaemonians to this alleged that they had done what they were
								able to do, for they had delivered the Athenian prisoners that were
								in their hands and had withdrawn their soldiers from the parts upon
								Thrace, and whatsoever else was in their own power to perform; 
							 but Amphipolis, they said, was not in their power to surrender; 
							 that they would endeavour to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians to
								accept the peace, and to get Panactum restored, and all the Athenian
								prisoners in Boeotia to be sent home;

and therefore desired them to make restitution of Pylus, or, if not
								so, at least to draw out of it the Messenians and Helotes, as they
								for their part had drawn their garrisons out of the towns upon
								Thrace;

and if they thought good, to keep it with a garrison of
								Athenians. 
							 After divers and long conferences had this summer, they so far
								prevailed with the Athenians at the last as they drew thence all the
								Messenians and Helotes and all other Laconian fugitives and placed
								them in Cranii, a city of Cephallenia.

So for this summer there was peace and free passage from one to
								another.

In the beginning of winter (for now there were other ephores in
								office; 
							 not those in whose time the peace was made, but some of them that
								opposed it), ambassadors being come from the confederates, and the
								Athenian, Boeotian, and Corinthian ambassadors being [already]
								there, and having had much conference together but concluded
								nothing, Cleobulus and Xenares, ephores that most desired the
								dissolution of the peace, when the rest of the ambassadors were gone
								home, entered into private conference with the Boeotians and
								Corinthians, exhorting them to run both the same course; 
							 and advised the Boeotians to endeavour first to make a league
								themselves with the Argives and then to get the Argives together
								with themselves into a league with the Lacedaemonians, for that they
								might by this means avoid the necessity of accepting the peace with
								Athens; 
							 for the Lacedaemonians would more regard the friendship and league of
								the Argives than the enmity and dissolution of the peace with the
								Athenians; 
							 for they knew the Lacedaemonians had ever desired to have Argos their
								friend upon any reasonable conditions, because they knew that their
								war without Peloponnesus would thereby be a great deal the
								easier.

Wherefore they entreated the Boeotians to put Panactum into the hands
								of the Lacedaemonians, to the end that, if they could get Pylus for
								it in exchange, they might make war against the Athenians the more
								commodiously.

The Boeotians and Corinthians, being dismissed by Xenares and
								Cleobulus, and all the other Lacedaemonians of that faction, with
								these points to be delivered to their commonwealths, went to their
								several cities.

And two men of Argos, of principal authority in that city, having
								waited for and met with them by the way, entered into a treaty with
								them about a league between the Argives and the Boeotians as there
								was between them and the Corinthians and the Eleians and Mantineans
								already; 
							 for they thought, if it succeeded, they might [the more] easily have
								either war or peace (forasmuch as the cause would now be common),
								either with the Lacedaemonians or whomsoever else it should be
								needful. 
							 When the Boeotian ambassadors heard this, they were well pleased.

For as it chanced, the Argives requested the same things of them,
								that they by their friends in Lacedaemon had been sent to procure of
								the Argives. 
							 These men therefore of Argos, when they saw that the Boeotians
								accepted of the motion, promised to send ambassadors to the
								Boeotians about it, and so departed.

When the Boeotians were come home, they related there what they had
								heard both at Lacedaemon and by the way from the Argives. 
							 The governors of Boeotia were glad thereof, and much more forward in
								it now than formerly they had been, seeing that not only their
								friends in Lacedaemon desired, but the Argives themselves hastened
								to have done the self-same thing.

Not long after this the ambassadors came to them from Argos to
								solicit the dispatch of the business before propounded; 
							 but the governors of Boeotia commended [only] the proposition and
								dismissed them with promise to send ambassadors about the league to
								Argos.

In the meantime the governors of Boeotia thought fit that an oath
								should first be taken by themselves and by the ambassadors from
								Corinth, Megara, and the confederates upon Thrace to give mutual
								assistance upon any occasion to them that should require it and
								neither to make war nor peace without the common consent; 
							 and next that the Boeotians and Megareans (for these two ran the same
								course) should make a league with the Argives.

But before this oath was [to be] taken, the governors of Boeotia
								communicated the business to the four Boeotian councils, in the
								which the whole authority of the state consisteth, and withal
								presented their advice that any city that would might join with them
								in the like oath for mutual assistance.

But they that were of these councils approved not the proposition,
								because they feared to offend the Lacedaemonians in being sworn to
								the Corinthians that had revolted from their confederacy. 
							 For the governors of Boeotia had not reported unto them what had
								passed at Lacedaemon, how Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephores, and
								their friends there had advised them to enter first into league with
								the Argives and Corinthians and then afterwards to make the same
								league with the Lacedaemonians; 
							 for they thought that the councils, though this had never been told
								them, would have decreed it no otherwise than they upon
								premeditation should advise.

So the business was checked and the ambassadors from Corinth and from
								the cities upon Thrace departed without effect. 
							 And the governors of Boeotia, that were before minded, if they had
								gotten this done, to have league themselves also with the Argives,
								made no mention of the Argives in the councils at all nor sent the
								ambassadors to Argos, as they had before promised; 
							 but a kind of carelessness and delay possessed the whole business.

The same winter the Olynthians took Mecyberne, held with a garrison
								of the Athenians, by assault.

After this the Lacedaemonians (for the conferences between the
								Athenians and Lacedaemonians about reciprocal restitution continued
								still), hoping that if the Athenians should obtain from the
								Boeotians Panactum, that then they also should recover Pylus, sent
								ambassadors to the Boeotians with request that Panactum and the
								Athenian prisoners might be put into the hands of the
								Lacedaemonians, that they might get Pylus restored in exchange.

But the Boeotians answered that unless the Lacedaemonians would make
								a particular league with them as they had done with the Athenians,
								they would not do it. 
							 The Lacedaemonians, though they knew they should therein wrong the
								Athenians, for that it was said in the articles that neither party
								should make either league or war without the other's consent, yet
								such was their desire to get Panactum to exchange it for Pylus, and
								withal they that longed to break the peace with Athens were so eager
								in it, that at last they concluded a league with the Boeotians,
								winter then ending and the spring approaching; 
							 and Panactum was presently pulled down to the ground. 
							 So ended the eleventh year of this war.

In the spring following, the Argives, when they saw that the
								ambassadors which the Boeotians promised to send unto them came not,
								and that Panactum was razed, and that also there was a private
								league made between the Boeotians and the Lacedaemonians, were
								afraid lest they should on all hands be abandoned, and that the
								confederates would all go to the Lacedaemonians.

For they apprehended that the Boeotians had been induced both to raze
								Panactum and also to enter into the Athenian peace by the
								Lacedaemonians; 
							 and that the Athenians were privy to the same, so that now they had
								no means to make league with the Athenians neither; 
							 whereas before they made account that if their truce with the
								Lacedaemonians continued not, they might upon these differences have
								joined themselves to the Athenians.

The Argives being therefore at a stand and fearing to have war all at
								once with the Lacedaemonians, Tegeats, Boeotians, and Athenians,
								[as] having formerly refused the truce with the Lacedaemonians and
								imagined to themselves the principality of all Peloponnesus, they
								sent ambassadors with as much speed as might be, Eustrophus and
								Aeson, persons as they thought most acceptable unto them, with this
								cogitation, that by compounding with the Lacedaemonians as well as
								for their present estate they might, howsoever the world went, they
								should at least live at quiet.

When these ambassadors were there, they fell to treat of the articles
								upon which the agreement should be made.

And at first the Argives desired to have the matter referred, either
								to some private man or to some city, concerning the territory of
								Cynuria, about which they have always differed, as lying on the
								borders of them both (it containeth the cities of Thyrea and
								Anthena, and is possessed by the Lacedaemonians). 
							 But afterwards, the Lacedaemonians not suffering mention to be made
								of that, but that if they would have the truce go on as it did
								before, they might, the Argive ambassadors got them to yield to
								this: that for the present an accord should be made for fifty
								years; 
							 but withal, that it should be lawful nevertheless, if one challenged
								the other thereunto, both for Lacedaemon and Argos to try their
								titles to this territory by battle, so that there were in neither
								city a plague nor a war to excuse them (as once before they had
								done, when, as both sides thought, they had the victory); 
							 and that it should not be lawful for one part to follow the chase of
								the other further than to the bounds either of Lacedaemon or
								Argos.

And though this seemed to the Lacedaemonians at first to be but a
								foolish proposition, yet afterwards, because they desired by all
								means to have friendship with the Argives, they agreed unto it and
								put into writing what they required. 
							 Howsoever, before the Lacedaemonians would make any full conclusion
								of the same, they willed them to return first to Argos and to make
								the people acquainted with it, and then, if it were accepted, to
								return at the Hyacinthian feast and swear it. 
							 So these departed.

Whilst the Argives were treating about this, the Lacedaemonian
								ambassadors, Andromedes and Phaedimus and Antimenidas, commissioners
								for receiving of Panactum and the prisoners from the Boeotians to
								render them to the Athenians, found that Panactum was demolished,
								and that their pretext was this: that there had been anciently an
								oath, by occasion of difference between the Athenians and them, that
								neither part should inhabit the place solely, but jointly both. 
							 But for the Athenian prisoners, as many as the Boeotians had, they
								that were with Andromedes received, convoyed, and delivered them
								unto the Athenians, and withal told them of the razing of Panactum,
								alleging it as rendered in that no enemy of Athens should dwell in
								it hereafter.

But when this was told them, the Athenians made it a heinous matter,
								for that they conceived that the Lacedaemonians had done them wrong,
								both in the matter of Panactum, which was pulled down and should
								have been rendered standing, and because also they had heard of the
								private league made with the Boeotians, whereas they had promised to
								join with the Athenians in compelling such to accept of the peace as
								had refused it. 
							 Withal they weighed whatsoever other points the Lacedaemonians had
								been short in, touching the performance of the articles, and thought
								themselves abused; 
							 so that they answered the Lacedaemonian ambassadors roughly and
								dismissed them.

This difference arising between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians,
								it was presently wrought upon by such also of Athens as desired to
								have the peace dissolved.

Amongst the rest was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, a man, though
								young in years, yet in the dignity of his ancestors honoured as much
								as any man of what city soever. 
							 Who was of opinion that it was better to join with the Argives, not
								only for the matter itself, but also out of stomach labouring to
								cross the Lacedaemonians, because they had made the peace, by the
								means of Nicias and Laches, without him, whom for his youth they had
								neglected and not honoured as for the ancient hospitality between
								his house and them had been requisite; 
							 which his father had indeed renounced, but he himself, by good
								offices done to those prisoners which were brought from the island,
								had a purpose to have renewed.

But supposing himself on all hands disparaged, he both opposed the
								peace at first, alleging that the Lacedaemonians would not be
								constant and that they had made the peace only to get the Argives by
								that means away from them and afterwards to invade the Athenians
								again when they should be destitute of their friends; 
							 and also, as soon as this difference was on foot, he sent presently
								to Argos of himself, willing them with all speed to come to Athens,
								as being thereunto invited, and to bring with them the Eleians and
								Mantineans to enter with the Athenians into a league, the
								opportunity now serving, and promising that he would help them all
								he could.

The Argives, having heard the message, and knowing that the Athenians
								had made no league with the Boeotians, and that they were at great
								quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, neglected the ambassadors they had
								then in Lacedaemon, whom they had sent about the truce, and applied
								themselves to the Athenians, with this thought: that if they should
								have war, they should by this means be backed with a city that had
								been their ancient friend, governed like their own by democracy, and
								of greatest power by sea. 
							 Whereupon they presently sent ambassadors to Athens to make a
								league;

and together with theirs went also the ambassadors of the Eleians and
								Mantineans.

Thither also with all speed came the Lacedaemonian ambassadors,
								Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, persons accounted most gracious
								with the Athenians, for fear, lest in their passion they should make
								a league with the Argives, and withal to require the restitution of
								Pylus for Panactum, and to excuse themselves concerning their league
								with the Boeotians, as not made for any harm intended to the
								Athenians.

Now speaking of these things before the council, and how that they
								were come thither with full power to make agreement concerning all
								controversies betwixt them, they put Alcibiades into fear, lest, if
								they should say the same before the people, the multitude would be
								drawn unto their side, and so the Argive league fall off.

But Alcibiades deviseth against them this plot. 
							 He persuaded the Lacedaemonians not to confess their plenary power
								before the people, and giveth them his faith that then Pylus should
								be rendered (for he said he would persuade the Athenians to it as
								much as he now opposed it), and that the rest of their differences
								should be compounded.

This he did to alienate them from Nicias; 
							 and that by accusing them before the people as men that had no true
								meaning nor ever spake one and the same thing, he might bring on the
								league with the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans. 
							 And it came to pass accordingly.

For when they came before the people, and to the question whether
								they had full power of concluding, had, contrary to what they had
								said in council, answered No, the Athenians
								would no longer endure them, but gave ear to Alcibiades, that
								exclaimed against the Lacedaemonians far more now than ever; 
							 and were ready then presently to have the Argives and those others
								with them brought in, and to make the league; 
							 but an earthquake happening before anything was concluded, the
								assembly was adjourned.

In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though the Lacedaemonians had been
								abused, and he himself also deceived touching their coming with full
								power to conclude, yet he persisted to affirm that it was their best
								course to be friends with the Lacedaemonians and to defer the
								Argives' business till they had sent to the Lacedaemonians again to
								be assured of their intention, saying that it was honour unto
								themselves and dishonour to the Lacedaemonians to have the war put
								off. 
							 For, for themselves, being in estate of prosperity, it was best to
								preserve their good fortune as long as they might; 
							 whereas to the other side, who were in evil estate, it should be in
								place of gain to put things as soon as they could to the hazard.

So he persuaded them to send ambassadors, whereof himself was one, to
								require the Lacedaemonians, if they meant sincerely, to render
								Panactum standing, and also Amphipolis; 
							 and if the Boeotians would not accept of the peace, then to undo
								their league with them, according to the article that the one should
								not make league with any without the consent of the other.

They willed him to say further that they themselves also, if they had
								had the will to do wrong, had ere this made a league with the
								Argives, who were present then at Athens for the same purpose.

And whatsoever they had to accuse the Lacedaemonians of besides, they
								instructed Nicias in it and sent him and the other his
								fellow-ambassadors away. 
							 When they were arrived and had delivered what they had in charge, and
								this last of all, that the Athenians would make league with the
								Argives unless the Lacedaemonians would renounce their league with
								the Boeotians if the Boeotians accepted not the peace, the
								Lacedaemonians denied to renounce their league with the
								Boeotians; 
							 for Xenares, the ephore, and the rest of that faction carried it; 
							 but at the request of Nicias they renewed their former oath. 
							 For Nicias was afraid he should return with nothing done and be
								carped at (as after also it fell out) as author of the Lacedaemonian
								peace.

At his return, when the Athenians understood that nothing was
								effected at Lacedaemon, they grew presently into choler; 
							 and apprehending injury (the Argives and their confederates being
								there present, brought in by Alcibiades), they made a peace and a
								league with them in these words:

"The Athenians and Argives and Mantineans and Eleians, for themselves
								and for the confederates commanded by every of them, have made an
								accord for one hundred years, without fraud or damage, both by sea
								and land.

It shall not be lawful for the Argives nor Eleians nor Mantineans nor
								their confederates to bear arms against the Athenians or the
								confederates under the command of the Athenians or their
								confederates by any fraud or machination whatsoever. 

							 "And the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans have made league with
								each other for one hundred years on these terms:

"If any enemy shall invade the territory of the Athenians, then the
								Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans shall go unto Athens to assist
								them, according as the Athenians shall send them word to do, in the
								best manner they possibly can. 
							 But if the enemy, after he have spoiled the territory, shall be gone
								back, then their city shall be held as an enemy to the Argives,
								Eleians, Mantineans, and Athenians, and war shall be made against it
								by all those cities; 
							 and it shall not be lawful for any of those cities to give over the
								war without the consent of all the rest. 

							 "And if an enemy shall invade the territory, either of the Argives or
								of the Eleians or of the Mantineans, then the Athenians shall come
								unto Argos, Elis, and Mantineia to assist them, in such sort as
								those cities shall send them word to do, in the best manner they
								possibly can.

But if the enemy, after he hath wasted their territory, shall be gone
								back, then their city shall be held as an enemy both to the
								Athenians and also to the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and war
								shall be made against it by all those cities; 
							 and it shall not be lawful for any of them to give over the war
								against that city without the consent of all the rest.

"There shall no armed men be suffered to pass through the dominions
								either of themselves or of any the confederates under their several
								commands to make war in any place whatsoever, unless by the suffrage
								of all the cities, Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, their passage
								be allowed. 

							 "To such as come to assist any of the other cities, that city which
								sendeth them shall give maintenance for thirty days after they shall
								arrive in the city that sent for them;

and the like at their going away; 
							 but if they will use the army for a longer time, then the city that
								sent for them shall find them maintenance, at the rate of three
								oboles of Aegina a day for a man of arms, and of a drachma of Aegina
								for a horseman. 

							 "The city which sendeth for the aids shall have the leading and
								command of them whilst the war is in their own territory;

but if it shall seem good unto these cities to make a war in common,
								then all the cities shall equally participate of the command. 

							 "The Athenians shall swear unto the articles both for themselves and
								for their confederates; 
							 and the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and the confederates of
								these shall every one swear unto them city by city.

And their oath shall be the greatest that by custom of the several
								cities is used, and with most perfect hosts, and in these words: 'I
								will stand to this league, according to the articles thereof,
								justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress the same by
								any art or machination whatsoever.' 

							 "This oath shall be taken at Athens by the senate and the officers of
								the commons, and administered by the Prytanes.

At Argos it shall be taken by the senate and the council of eighty
								and by the Artynae, and administered by the council of eighty. 
							 At Mantineia it shall be taken by the procurators of the people and
								by the senate and by the rest of the magistrates, and administered
								by the theori and by the tribunes of the soldiers. 
							 At Elis it shall be taken by the procurators of the people and by the
								officers of the treasury and by the council of six hundred, and
								administered by the procurators of the people and by the keepers of
								the law.

"This oath shall be renewed by the Athenians, who shall go to Elis
								and to Mantineia and to Argos thirty days before the Olympian
								games; 
							 and by the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, who shall come to Athens
								ten days before the Panathenaean holidays.

"The articles of this league and peace and the oath shall be
								inscribed in a pillar of stone by the Athenians in the citadel; 
							 by the Argives in their market place within the precincts of the
								temple of Apollo; 
							 and by the Mantineans in their market place within the precinct of
								the temple of Jupiter. 
							 And at the Olympian games now at hand, there shall be jointly erected
								by them all a brazen pillar in Olympia [with the same
								inscription].

If it shall seem good to any of these cities
										to add anything to these articles, whatsoever shall be
										determined by them all in common council, the same shall
										stand good.

Thus was the league and the peace concluded; 
							 and that which was made before between the Lacedaemonians and the
								Athenians was, notwithstanding, by neither side renounced.

But the Corinthians, although they were the confederates of the
								Argives, yet would they not enter into this league; 
							 nay, though there were made a league before this between [them and]
								the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans that where one there all should
								have war or peace, yet they refused to swear to it, but said that
								their league defensive was enough, whereby they were bound to defend
								each other but not to take part one with another in invading.

So the Corinthians fell off from their confederates and inclined
								again to the Lacedaemonians.

This summer were celebrated the Olympian games, in which
								Androsthenes, an Arcadian, was the first victor in the exercise
								called Pancratium. 
							 And the Lacedaemonians were by the Eleians prohibited the temple
								there, so as they might neither sacrifice nor contend for the prizes
								amongst the rest; 
							 for that they had not paid the fine set upon them, according to an
								Olympic law, by the Eleians, that laid to their charge that they had
								put soldiers into the fort of Phyrcon and into Lepreum in the time
								of the Olympic truce. 
							 The fine amounted unto two thousand minae, which was two minae for
								every man of arms, according to the law.

But the Lacedaemonians, by their ambassadors which they sent thither,
								made answer that they had been unjustly condemned, alleging that the
								truce was not published in Lacedaemon when their soldiers were sent
								out.

To this the Eleians said again that the truce was already begun
								amongst themselves, who used to publish it first in their own
								dominion; 
							 and thereupon, whilst they lay still and expected no such matter, as
								in time of truce, the Lacedaemonians did them the injury
								unawares.

The Lacedaemonians hereunto replied that it was not necessary to
								proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lacedaemon at all if they
								thought themselves wronged already; 
							 but rather, if they thought themselves not wronged yet, then to do it
								by way of prevention, that they should not arm against them
								afterwards.

The Eleians stood stiffly in their first argument, that they would
								never be persuaded but injury had been done them, but were
								nevertheless contented if they would render Lepreum, both to remit
								their own part of the money and also to pay that part for them which
								was due unto the god.

When this would not be agreed unto, they then required this: not that
								they should render Lepreum, unless they would, but that then they
								should come to the altar of Jupiter Olympian, seeing they desired to
								have free use of the temple, and there before the Grecians to take
								an oath to pay the fine at least hereafter.

But when the Lacedaemonians refused that also, they were excluded the
								temple, the sacrifices, and the games, and sacrificed at home; 
							 but the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreates, were all admitted
								to be spectators.

Nevertheless, the Eleians, fearing lest they would come and sacrifice
								there by force, kept a guard there of their youngest men in arms, to
								whom were added Argives and Mantineans, of either city one thousand,
								and certain Athenian horsemen, who were then at Argos waiting the
								celebration of the feast.

For a great fear possessed all the assembly lest the Lacedaemonians
								should come upon them with an army; 
							 and the rather because Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, a
								Lacedaemonian, had been whipped by the serjeants upon the race; 
							 for that when his chariot had gotten the prize, after proclamation
								made that the chariot of the Boeotian state had won it (because he
								himself was not admitted to run), he came forth into the race and
								crowned his charioteer, to make it known that the chariot was his
								own. 
							 This added much unto their fear, and they verily expected some
								accident to follow. 
							 Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians stirred not; 
							 and the feast passed over.

After the Olympian games, the Argives and their confederates went to
								Corinth to get the Corinthians into their league. 
							 And the Lacedaemonian ambassadors chanced to be there also; 
							 and after much conference and nothing concluded, upon occasion of an
								earthquake they brake off the conference and returned every one to
								his own city. 
							 And so this summer ended.

The next winter, the men of Heracleia in Trachinia fought a battle
								against the Aenianians, Dolopians, Melians, and certain
								Thessalians.

For the neighbour cities were enemies to this city, as built to the
								prejudice only of them; 
							 and both opposed the same from the time it was first founded,
								annoying it what they could; 
							 and also in this battle overcame them and slew Xenares, a
								Lacedaemonian, their commander, with some others, Heracleots. 
							 Thus ended this winter, and the twelfth year of this war.

In the very beginning of the next summer, the Boeotians took
								Heracleia, miserably afflicted, into their own hands, and put
								Hegesippidas, a Lacedaemonian, out of it for his evil
								government. 
							 They took it because they feared lest, whilst the Lacedaemonians were
								troubled about Peloponnesus, it should have been taken in by the
								Athenians. 
							 Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians were offended with them for doing
								it.

The same summer Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, being general of the
								Athenians, by the practice of the Argives and their confederates,
								went into Peloponnesus, and having with him a few men at arms and
								archers of Athens and some of the confederates which he took up
								there as he passed through the country with his army, both ordered
								such affairs by the way concerning the league as was fit; 
							 and coming to the Patreans, persuaded them to build their walls down
								to the seaside, and purposed to raise another wall himself towards
								Rhium in Achaia. 
							 But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others as this wall would
								have prejudiced came forth and hindered him.

The same summer fell out a war between the Epidaurians and the
								Argives; 
							 the pretext thereof was about a beast for sacrifice, which the
								Epidaurians ought to have sent in consideration of their pastures to
								Apollo Pythius, and had not done it, the Argives being the principal
								owners of the temple. 
							 But Alcibiades and the Argives had indeed determined to take in the
								city, though without pretence at all, both that the Corinthians
								might not stir and also that they might bring the Athenian succours
								from Aegina into those parts, a nearer way than by compassing the
								promontory of Scyllaeum. 
							 And therefore the Argives prepared, as of themselves, to exact the
								sacrifice by invasion.

About the same time also the Lacedaemonians, with their whole forces,
								came forth as far as Leuctra, in the confines of their own territory
								towards Lycaeum, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus,
								their king. 
							 No man knew against what place they intended the war; 
							 no, not the cities themselves out of which they were levied.

But when in the sacrifices which they made for their passage the
								tokens observed were unlucky, they went home again and sent word
								about to their confederates (being now the month Carneius) to
								prepare themselves, after the next feast of the new moon (kept by
								the Dorians), to be again upon their march.

The Argives, who set forth the twentysixth day of the month before
								Carneius, though they celebrated the same day, yet all the time they
								continued invading and wasting Epidauria.

And the Epidaurians called in their confederates to help them,
								whereof some excused themselves upon the quality of the month; 
							 and others came but to the confines of Epidauria and there stayed.

Whilst the Argives were in Epidauria, the ambassadors of divers
								cities, solicited by the Athenians, met together at Mantineia, where
								in a conference amongst them Euphamidas of Corinth said that their
								actions agreed not with their words; 
							 forasmuch as whilst they were sitting there to treat of a peace, the
								Epidaurians with their confederates and the Argives stood armed, in
								the meantime, against each other in order of battle; 
							 that it was therefore fit that somebody should go first unto the
								armies from either side and dissolve them, and then come again and
								dispute of peace.

This advice being approved, they departed, and withdrew the Argives
								from Epidauria. 
							 And meeting afterwards again in the same place, they could not for
								all that agree; 
							 and the Argives again invaded and wasted Epidauria. 

							 The Lacedaemonians also drew forth their army against Caryae;

but then again, their sacrifice for passage being not to their mind,
								they returned.

And the Argives, when they had spoiled about the third part of
								Epidauria, went home likewise. 
							 They had the assistance of one thousand men of arms of Athens, and
								Alcibiades their commander; 
							 but these hearing that the Lacedaemonians were in the field, and
								seeing now there was no longer need of them, departed. 
							 And so ended this summer.

The next winter the Lacedaemonians, unknown to the Athenians, put
								three hundred garrison soldiers under the command of Agesippidas
								into Epidaurus by sea.

For which cause the Argives came and expostulated with the Athenians
								that whereas it was written in the articles of the league that no
								enemy should be suffered to pass through either of their dominions,
								yet had they suffered the Lacedaemonians to pass by sea; 
							 and said they had wrong, unless the Athenians would again put the
								Messenians and Helotes into Pylus against the Lacedaemonians.

Hereupon the Athenians, at the persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote upon
								the Laconian pillar, [under the inscription of the peace], that the
								Lacedaemonians had violated their oath; 
							 and they drew the Helotes out of Cranii and put them again into Pylus
								to infest the territory with driving off booties;

but did no more. 

							 All this winter, though there was war between the Argives and
								Epidaurians, yet was there no set battle, but only ambushes and
								skirmishes, wherein were slain on both sides such as it chanced.

But in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, the Argives
								came to Epidaurus with ladders, as destitute of men by reason of the
								war, thinking to have won it by assault, but returned again with
								their labour lost. 
							 And so ended this winter, and the thirteenth year of this war.

In the middle of the next summer, the Lacedaemonians, seeing that the
								Epidaurians their confederates were tired and that of the rest of
								the cities of Peloponnesus some had already revolted and others were
								but in evil terms, and apprehending that if they presented it not
								the mischief would spread still further, put themselves into the
								field with all their own forces, both of themselves and their
								Helotes, to make war against Argos, under the conduct of Agis, the
								son of Archidamus, their king.

The Tegeats went also with them, and of the rest of Arcadia all that
								were in the Lacedaemonian league. 
							 But the rest of their confederates, both within Peloponnesus and
								without, were to meet together at Phlius; 
							 that is to say, of the Boeotians five thousand men of arms and as
								many light-armed, five hundred horse, and to every horseman another
								man on foot, of Corinthians two thousand men of arms, and of the
								rest more or less as they were; 
							 but the Phliasians, because the army was assembled in their own
								territory, put forth their whole power.

The Argives, having had notice both formerly of the preparation of
								the Lacedaemonians and afterward of their marching on to join with
								the rest at Phlius, brought their army likewise into the field. 
							 They had with them the aids of the Mantineans and their confederates
								and three thousand men of arms of the Eleians;

and marching forward, met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium, a town of
								Arcadia, each side seizing on a hill. 
							 And the Argives prepared to give battle to the Lacedaemonians whilst
								they were single. 
							 But Agis, dislodging his army by night, marched on to Phlius to the
								rest of the confederates, unseen.

Upon knowledge hereof, the Argives betimes in the morning retired
								first to Argos and afterwards to the forest of Nemea, by which they
								thought the Lacedaemonians and their confederates would fall in.

But Agis came not the way which they expected, but with the
								Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, whom he acquainted with
								his purpose, took another more difficult way to pass and came down
								into the Argive plains. 
							 The Corinthians also, and Pellenians and Phliasians, marched another
								troublesome way. 
							 [Only] the Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians were appointed to
								come down by the way of the forest of Nemea, in which the Argives
								were encamped, to the end that if the Argives should turn head
								against the Lacedaemonians, these might set upon them at the back
								with their horse.

Thus ordered, Agis entered into the plains and spoiled Saminthus and
								some other towns thereabouts.

Which when the Argives understood, they came out of the forest
								somewhat after break of day to oppose them, and lighting among the
								Phliasians and Corinthians, slew some few of the Phliasians, but had
								more slain of their own by the Corinthians, though not many.

The Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians marched forward towards
								Nemea and found that the Argives were departed; 
							 for when they came down and saw their country wasted, they put
								themselves into order of battle. 
							 And the Lacedaemonians on the other side did the same;

and the Argives stood intercepted in the midst of their enemies. 
							 For in the plain between them and the city stood the Lacedaemonians
								and those with them; 
							 above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; 
							 and towards Nemea were the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. 
							 And horsemen they had none; 
							 for the Athenians alone of all their confederates were not yet
								come.

Now the generality of the army of the Argives and their confederates
								did not think the danger present so great as indeed it was, but
								rather that the advantage in the battle would be their own; 
							 and that the Lacedaemonians were intercepted, not only in the Argives
								territory, but also hard by the city.

But two men of Argos, Thrasyllus, one of the five commanders of the
								army, and Alciphron, entertainer of the Lacedaemonians, when the
								armies were even ready to join, went unto Agis and dealt with him to
								have the battle put off, forasmuch as the Argives were content and
								ready both to propound and accept of equal arbitrators in whatsoever
								the Lacedaemonians should charge them withal, and in the meantime to
								have peace with them solemnly confirmed.

This these Argives said of themselves, without the command of the
								generality. 
							 And Agis, of himself likewise, accepting their proposition without
								deliberation, had with the major part, and having communicated it
								only to some one or more of those that had charge in the army, made
								truce with them for four months, in which space they were to perform
								the things agreed upon betwixt them; 
							 and then presently he withdrew his army without giving account to any
								of the rest of the league why he did so.

The Lacedaemonians and the confederates followed Agis, according to
								the law, as being their general, but among themselves taxed him
								exceedingly; 
							 for that having a very fair occasion of battle, the Argives being
								inclosed on all sides both by their horse and foot, he yet went his
								way doing nothing worthy the great preparation they had made.

For this was, in very truth, the fairest army that ever the Grecians
								had in the field unto this day. 
							 But it was most to be seen when they were all together in the forest
								of Nemea, where the Lacedaemonians were with their whole forces,
								besides the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians,
								Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; 
							 and these all chosen men of their several cities and such as were
								thought a match not only for the league of the Argives but for such
								another added to it.

The army, thus offended with Agis, departed, and were dissolved every
								man to his home.

The Argives were much more offended with those of their city, which
								without the consent of the multitude had made the truce, they also
								supposing that the Lacedaemonians had escaped their hands in such an
								advantage as they never had the like before, in that the battle was
								to have been fought under the city walls and with the assistance of
								many and good confederates.

And in their return they began to stone Thrasyllus at the Charadrum,
								the place where the soldiers, before they enter into the city from
								warfare, use to have their military causes heard. 
							 But he, flying to the altar, saved himself; 
							 nevertheless they confiscated his goods.

After this, the Athenians coming in with the aid of one thousand men
								of arms and three hundred horse under the conduct of Laches and
								Nicostratus, the Argives (for they were afraid for all this to break
								the truce with the Lacedaemonians) willed them to be gone again; 
							 and when they desired to treat, would not present them to the people
								till such time as the Mantineans and Eleians, who were not yet gone,
								forced them unto it by their importunity.

Then the Athenians, in the presence of Alcibiades, that was
								ambassador there, spake unto the Argives and their confederates,
								saying that the truce was unduly made without the assent of the rest
								of their confederates, and that now (for they were come time enough)
								they ought to fall again to the war;

and did by their words so prevail with the confederates that they
								all, save the Argives, presently marched against Orchomenus of
								Arcadia.

And these, though satisfied, stayed behind at first, but afterwards
								they also went, and sitting down before Orchomenus, jointly besieged
								and assaulted the same, desiring to take it in as well for other
								causes as chiefly for that the hostages which the Arcadians had
								given to the Lacedaemonians were there in custody.

The Orchomenians, fearing the weakness of their walls, and the
								greatness of the army, and lest they should perish before any relief
								could arrive, yielded up the town on conditions to be received into
								the league, give hostages for themselves, and to surrender the
								hostages held there by the Lacedaemonians into the hands of the
								Mantineans.

The confederates after this, having gotten Orchomenus, sat in council
								about what town they should proceed against next. 
							 The Eleians gave advice to go against Lepreum, but the Mantineans
								against Tegea. 
							 And the Argives and Athenians concurred in opinion with the
								Mantineans.

But the Eleians, taking it in evil part that they did not decree to
								go against Lepreum, went home. 
							 But the rest prepared themselves at Mantineia to go against Tegea,
								which also some within had a purpose to put into their hands.

The Lacedaemonians, after their return from Argos with their four
								months' truce, severely questioned Agis for that, upon so fair an
								opportunity as they never had before, he subdued not Argos to the
								state; 
							 for so many and so good confederates would hardly be gotten together
								again at one time.

But when also the news came of the taking of Orchomenus, then was
								their indignation much greater; 
							 and they presently resolved, contrary to their own custom, in their
								passion, to raze his house, and fine him in the sum of ten thousand
								drachmes.

But he besought them that they would do neither of these things yet,
								and promised that, leading out the army again, he would by some
								valiant action cancel those accusations; 
							 or, if not, they might proceed afterwards to do with him whatsoever
								they thought good.

So they forbore both the fine and the razing of his house, but made a
								decree for that present, such as had never been before, that ten
								Spartans should be elected and joined with him as councillors,
								without whom it should not be lawful for him to lead the army into
								the field.

In the meantime came news from their side in Tegea that, unless they
								came presently with aid, the Tegeans would revolt to the Argives and
								their confederates, and that they wanted little of being revolted
								already.

Upon this, the Lacedaemonians with speed levied all their forces,
								both of themselves and their Helotes, in such number as they had
								never done before,

and marched unto Oresteium in Maenalia, and appointed the Arcadians,
								such as were of their league, to assemble and follow them at the
								heels to Tegea. 
							 The Lacedaemonians, being come entire to Oresteium, from thence sent
								back the sixth part of their army, in which they put both the
								youngest and the eldest sort, for the custody of the city, and with
								the rest marched on to Tegea; 
							 and not long after arrived also their confederates of Arcadia.

They also sent to Corinth, and to the Boeotians, Phoceans, and
								Locrians to come with their aids with all speed to Mantineia. 
							 But these had too short a warning; 
							 nor was it easy for them, unless they came all together and stayed
								for one another, to come through the enemy's country, which lay
								between and barred them of passage. 
							 Nevertheless, they made what haste they could.

And the Lacedaemonians, taking with them their Arcadian confederates
								present, entered into the territory of Mantineia, and pitching their
								camp by the temple of Hercules, wasted the territory about.

The Argives and their confederates, as soon as they came in sight,
								seized on a certain place fortified by nature and of hard access and
								put themselves into battle array.

And the Lacedaemonians marched presently towards them and came up
								within a stone or a dart's cast. 
							 But then one of the ancient men of the army cried out unto Agis
								(seeing him to go on against a place of that strength) that he went
								about to amend one fault with another, signifying that he intended
								to make amends for his former retreat from Argos, which he was
								questioned for, with his now unseasonable forwardness.

But he, whether it were upon that increpation or some other sudden
								apprehension of his own, presently withdrew his army before the
								fight began, and marching unto the territory of Tegea, turned the
								course of the water into the territory of Mantineia;

touching which water, because into what part soever it had his course
								it did much harm to the country, the Mantineans and Tegeans were at
								wars. 
							 Now his drift was, by the turning of that water to provoke those
								Argives and their confederates which kept the hill, when they should
								hear of it, to come down and oppose them, that so they might fight
								with them in the plain.

And by that time he had stayed about the water a day, he had diverted
								the stream. 
							 The Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at this their
								sudden retreat from so near them and knew not what to make of
								it. 
							 But when after the retreat they returned no more in sight, and that
								they themselves, lying still on the place, did not pursue them, then
								began they anew to accuse their commanders, both for suffering the
								Lacedaemonians to depart formerly, when they had them inclosed at so
								fair an advantage before Argos, and now again for not pursuing them
								when they ran away, but giving them leave to save themselves, and
								betraying the army.

The commanders for the present were much troubled hereat; 
							 but afterwards they drew down the army from the hill, and coming
								forth into the plain, encamped as to go against the enemy.

The next day, the Argives and their confederates put themselves into
								such order as, if occasion served, they meant to fight in; 
							 and the Lacedaemonians returning from the water to the temple of
								Hercules, the same place where they had formerly encamped, perceived
								the enemies to be all of them in order of battle hard by them, come
								down already from the hill.

Certainly the Lacedaemonians were more affrighted at this time than
								ever they had been to their remembrance before. 
							 For the time they had to prepare themselves was exceedingly
								short; 
							 and such was their diligence that every man fell immediately into his
								own rank, Agis, the king, commanding all according to the law.

For whilst the king hath the army in the field, all things are
								commanded by him; 
							 and he signifieth what is to be done to the polemarchi, they to the
								lochagi, these to the pentecontateres, and these again to the
								enomotarchi, who lastly make it known, every one to his own
								enomotia.

In this manner, when they would have anything to be done, their
								commands pass through the army and are quickly executed. 
							 For almost all the Lacedaemonian army, save a very few, are captains
								of captains; 
							 and the care of what is to be put in execution lieth upon many.

Now their left wing consisted of the Sciritae, which amongst the
								Lacedaemonians have ever alone that place. 
							 Next to these were placed the Brasideian soldiers lately come out of
								Thrace, and with them those that had been newly made free. 
							 After them in order the rest of the Lacedaemonians, band after
								band; 
							 and by them Arcadians, first the Heraeans, after these the
								Maenalians. 
							 In the right wing were the Tegeats, and a few Lacedaemonians in the
								point of the same wing. 
							 And upon the outside of either wing, the horsemen.

So stood the Lacedaemonians. 
							 Opposite to them, in the right wing, stood the Mantineans, because it
								was upon their own territory; 
							 and with them such Arcadians as were of their league. 
							 Then the thousand chosen Argives, which the city had for a long time
								caused to be trained for the wars at the public charge, and next to
								them the rest of the Argives. 
							 After these, the Cleonaeans and Orneates, their confederates. 
							 And lastly, the Athenians, with the horsemen (which were also theirs)
								had the left wing.

This was the order and preparation of both the armies. 
							 The army of the Lacedaemonians appeared to be the greater.

But what the number was, either of the particulars of either side or
								in general, I could not exactly write. 
							 For the number of the Lacedaemonians, agreeable to the secrecy of
								that state, was unknown; 
							 and of the other side, for the ostentation usual with all men
								touching the number of themselves, was unbelieved. 
							 Nevertheless, the number of the Lacedaemonians may be attained by
								computing thus.

Besides the Sciritae, which were six hundred, there fought in all
								seven regiments; 
							 in every regiment were four companies, in each company were four
								enomotiae, and of every enomotia there stood in front four; 
							 but they were not ranged all alike in file, but as the captains of
								bands thought it necessary; 
							 but the army in general was so ordered as to be eight men in
								depth. 
							 And the first rank of the whole, besides the Sciritae, consisted of
								four hundred and forty-eight soldiers.

Now when they were ready to join, the commanders made their
								hortatives, every one to those that were under his own command. 
							 To the Mantineans it was said that they were to fight for their
								territory, and concerning their liberty and servitude; 
							 that the former might not be taken from them, and that they might not
								again taste of the latter. 
							 The Argives were admonished that whereas anciently they had the
								leading of Peloponnesus, and in it an equal share, they should not
								now suffer themselves to be deprived of it for ever; 
							 and that withal, they should now revenge the many injuries of a city,
								their neighbour and enemy. 
							 To the Athenians, it was remembered how honourable a thing it would
								be for them, in company of so many and good confederates, to be
								inferior to none of them; 
							 and that if they had once vanquished the Lacedaemonians in
								Peloponnesus, their own dominion would become both the more assured
								and the larger by it; 
							 and that no other would invade their territory hereafter.

Thus much was said to the Argives and their confederates. 
							 But the Lacedaemonians encouraged one another both of themselves and
								also by the manner of their discipline in the war, taking
								encouragement, being valiant men, by the commemoration of what they
								already knew; 
							 as being well acquainted that a long actual experience conferred more
								to their safety than any short verbal exhortation, though never so
								well delivered.

After this followed the battle. 
							 The Argives and their confederates marched to the charge with great
								violence and fury. 
							 But the Lacedaemonians slowly and with many flutes, according to
								their military discipline, not as a point of religion, but that,
								marching evenly and by measure, their ranks might not be distracted,
								as the greatest armies, when they march in the face of the enemy,
								use to be.

Whilst they were yet marching up, Agis, the king thought of this
								course. 
							 All armies do thus. 
							 In the conflict they extend their right wing so as it cometh in upon
								the flank of the left wing of the enemy: and this happeneth for that
								every one, through fear, seeketh all he can to cover his unarmed
								side with the shield of him that standeth next to him on his right
								hand, conceiving that to be so locked together is their best
								defence. 
							 The beginning hereof is in the leader of the first file on the right
								hand, who ever striving to shift his unarmed side from the enemy,
								the rest upon like fear follow after. 
							 And at this time, the Mantineans in the right wing had far
								encompassed the Sciritae;

and the Lacedaemonians on the other side, and the Tegeats, were come
								in yet further upon the flank of the Athenians, by as much as they
								had the greater army.

Wherefore Agis, fearing lest his left wing should be encompassed, and
								supposing the Mantineans to be come in far, signified unto the
								Sciritae and Brasideians to draw out part of their bands, and
								therewith to equalise their left wing to the right wing of the
								Mantineans; 
							 and into the void space he commanded to come up Hipponoidas and
								Aristocles, two colonels, with their bands out of the right wing,
								and to fall in there and make up the breach, conceiving that more
								than enough would still be remaining in their right wing, and that
								the left wing opposed to the Mantineans would be the stronger.

But it happened (for he commanded it in the very onset and on the
								sudden) both that Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to go to the
								place commanded (for which they were afterwards banished Sparta, as
								thought to have disobeyed out of cowardice), and that the enemy had
								in the meantime also charged; 
							 and when those which he commanded to go to the place of the Sciritae
								went not, they could no more reunite themselves nor close again the
								empty space.

But the Lacedaemonians, though they had the worst at this time in
								every point for skill, yet in valour they manifestly showed
								themselves superior.

For after the fight was once begun, notwithstanding that the right
								wing of the Mantineans did put to flight the Sciritae and
								Brasideians, and that the Mantineans together with their
								confederates and those thousand chosen men of Argos, falling upon
								them in flank by the breach not yet closed up, killed many of the
								Lacedaemonians, and put to flight and chased them to their
								carriages, slaying also certain of the elder sort left there for a
								guard, so as in this part the Lacedaemonians were overcome, yet with
								the rest of the army, and especially the middle battle where Agis
								was himself, and those which are called 
 the
										three hundred horsemen 
 about him, they charged upon
								the eldest of the Argives, and upon those which are named 
 the five cohorts, 
 and upon the
								Cleonaeans and Orneates, and certain Athenians arranged amongst
								them, and put them all to flight;

in such sort as many of them never struck stroke, but as soon as the
								Lacedaemonians charged gave ground presently, and some for fear to
								be overtaken were trodden under foot.

As soon as the army of the Argives and their confederates had in this
								part given ground, they began also to break on either side. 
							 The right wing of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeats had now with their
								surplusage of number hemmed the Athenians in, so as they had the
								danger on all hands, being within the circle, pent up, and without
								it, already vanquished.

And they had been the most distressed part of all the army had not
								their horsemen come in to help them.

Withal it fell out that Agis, when he perceived the left wing of his
								own army to labour, namely, that which was opposed to the Mantineans
								and to those thousand Argives, commanded the whole army to go and
								relieve the part overcome. 
							 By which means the Athenians and such of the Argives as, together
								with them, were overlaid, whilst the army passed by and declined
								them, saved themselves at leisure. 
							 And the Mantineans with their confederates and those chosen Argives
								had no more mind now of pressing upon their enemies, but seeing
								their side was overcome and the Lacedaemonians approaching them,
								presently turned their backs.

Of the Mantineans the greatest part were slain; 
							 but of those chosen Argives the most were saved; 
							 by reason the flight and going off was neither hasty nor long. 
							 For the Lacedaemonians fight long and constantly, till they have made
								the enemy to turn his back; 
							 but that done, they follow him not far.

Thus, or near thus, went the battle, the greatest that had been of a
								long time between Grecians and Grecians, and of two the most famous
								cities.

The Lacedaemonians, laying together the arms of their slain enemies,
								presently erected a trophy and rifled their dead bodies. 
							 Their own dead they took up and carried them to Tegea, where they
								were also buried, and delivered to the enemy theirs under truce.

Of the Argives, and Orneates, and Cleonaeans were slain seven
								hundred; 
							 of the Mantineans, two hundred; 
							 and of the Athenians with the Aeginetae, likewise two hundred, and
								both the captains. 
							 The confederates of the Lacedaemonians were never pressed, and
								therefore their loss was not worth mentioning; 
							 and of the Lacedaemonians themselves, it is hard to know the
								certainty; 
							 but it is said there were slain three hundred.

When it was certain they would fight, Pleistoanax, the other king of
								the Lacedaemonians, and with him both old and young, came out of the
								city to have aided the army, and came forth as far as Tegea, but
								being advertised of the victory, they returned.

And the Lacedaemonians sent out to turn back also those confederates
								of theirs which were coming to them from Corinth and from without
								the isthmus. 
							 And then they also went home themselves, and having dismissed their
								confederates (for now were the Carneian holidays), celebrated that
								feast.

Thus in this one battle they wiped off their disgrace with the
								Grecians; 
							 for they had been taxed both with cowardice for the blow they
								received in the island and with imprudence and slackness on other
								occasions. 
							 But after this, their miscarriage was imputed to fortune, and for
								their minds they were esteemed to have been ever the same they had
								been.

The day before this battle it chanced also that the Epidaurians with
								their whole power invaded the territory of Argos, as being emptied
								much of men, and whilst the Argives were abroad, killed many of
								those that were left behind to defend it.

Also three thousand men of Elis and a thousand Athenians, besides
								those which had been sent before, being come after the battle to aid
								the Mantineans, marched presently all to Epidaurus and lay before it
								all the while the Lacedaemonians were celebrating the Carneian
								holidays; 
							 and assigning to every one his part, began to take in the city with a
								wall.

But the rest gave over; 
							 only the Athenians quickly finished a fortification (which was their
								task), wherein stood the temple of Juno. 
							 In it amongst them all they left a garrison, and went home every one
								to his own city. 
							 And so this summer ended.

In the beginning of the winter following, the Lacedaemonians,
								presently after the end of the Carneian holidays, drew out their
								army into the field, and being come to Tegea, sent certain
								propositions of agreement before to Argos.

There were, before this time, many citizens in Argos well affected to
								the Lacedaemonians and that desired the deposing of the Argive
								people; 
							 and now after the battle they were better able by much to persuade
								the people to composition than they formerly were.

And their design was, first, to get a peace made with the
								Lacedaemonians, and after that a league, and then at last to set
								upon the commons. 

							 There went thither Lichas the son of Archesilaus, entertainer of the
								Argives in Lacedaemon, and brought to Argos two propositions: one of
								war, if the war were to proceed; 
							 another of peace, if they were to have peace. 
							 And after much contradiction (for Alcibiades was also there), the
								Lacedaemonian faction, that boldly now discovered themselves,
								prevailed with the Argives to accept the proposition of peace, which
								was this:

"It seemeth good to the council of the Lacedaemonians to accord with
								the Argives on these articles: 
							 "The Argives shall redeliver unto the Orchomenians their children,
								and unto the Maenalians their men, and unto the Lacedaemonians those
								men that are at Mantineia; 
							 they shall withdraw their soldiers from Epidaurus and raze the
								fortification there.

"And if the Athenians depart not from Epidaurus [likewise], they
								shall be held as enemies both to the Argives and to the
								Lacedaemonians and also to the confederates of them both.

"If the Lacedaemonians have any men of theirs in custody, they shall
								deliver them every one to his own city.

"And for so much as concerneth the god, the Argives shall accept
								composition with the Epidaurians, upon an oath which they shall
								swear, touching that controversy;

and the Argives shall give the form of that oath. 

							 "All the cities of Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be free
								according to their patrial laws.

"If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into it to do it harm, the
								Argives shall come forth to defend the same, in such sort as in a
								common council shall by the Peloponnesians be thought
								reasonable.

"The confederates of the Lacedaemonians without Peloponnesus shall
								have the same conditions which the confederates of the Argives and
								of the Lacedaemonians have, every one holding his own. 

							 "This composition is to hold from the time that they shall both parts
								have showed the same to their confederates and obtained their
								consent.

And if it shall seem good to either part to
										add or alter anything, their confederates shall be sent unto
										and made acquainted therewith.

These propositions the Argives accepted at first; 
							 and the army of the Lacedaemonians returned from Tegea to their own
								city. 
							 But shortly after, when they had commerce together, the same men went
								further, and so wrought that the Argives, renouncing their league
								with the Mantineans, Eleians, and Athenians, made league and
								alliance with the Lacedaemonians in this form.

"It seemeth good to the Lacedaemonians and Argives to make league and
								alliance for fifty years on these articles: 
							 "That either side shall allow unto the other equal and like trials of
								judgment, after the form used in their cities. 

							 "That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus (this league and
								alliance comprehending also them) shall be free both from the laws
								and payments of any other city than their own, holding what they
								have and affording equal and like trials of judgment according to
								the form used in their several cities.

"That every of the cities confederate with the Lacedaemonians,
								without Peloponnesus, shall be in the same condition with the
								Lacedaemonians; 
							 and the confederates of the Argives in the same with the Argives,
								every one holding his own.

"That if at any time there shall need an expedition to be taken in
								common, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall consult thereof and
								decree as shall stand most with equity towards the confederates.

And that if any controversy arise between any of the cities, either
								within or without Peloponnesus, about limits or other matter, they
								also shall decide it. 
							 
 
 That if any confederate city be at
										contention with another, it shall have recourse to that city
										which they both shall think most indifferent; 
									 but the particular men of any one city shall be judged
										according to the law of the same.

Thus was the peace and league concluded; 
							 and whatsoever one had taken from the other in the war, or whatsoever
								one had against another otherwise, was all acquitted. 
							 Now, when they were together settling their business, they ordered
								that the Argives should neither admit herald nor ambassage from the
								Athenians till they were gone out of Peloponnesus and had quit the
								fortification, nor should make peace or war with any without consent
								of the rest.

And amongst other things which they did in this heat, they sent
								ambassadors from both their cities to the towns lying upon Thrace
								and unto Perdiccas, whom they also persuaded to swear himself of the
								same league. 
							 Yet he revolted not from the Athenians presently, but intended it,
								because he saw the Argives had done so, and was himself also
								anciently descended out of Argos. 
							 They likewise renewed their old oath with the Chalcideans and took
								another besides it. 
							 The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, requiring them to
								abandon the fortification they had made against Epidaurus.

And the Athenians, considering that the soldiers they had in it were
								few in respect to the many others that were with them in the same,
								sent Demosthenes to fetch them away. 
							 He, when he was come and had exhibited for a pretence a certain
								exercise of naked men without the fort, when the rest of the
								garrison were gone forth to see it, made fast the gates; 
							 and afterwards having renewed the league with the Epidaurians, the
								Athenians by themselves put the fort into their hands.

After the revolt of the Argives from the league, the Mantineans also,
								though they withstood it at first, yet being too weak without the
								Argives, made their peace with the Lacedaemonians and laid down
								their command over the other cities.

And the Lacedaemonians and Argives with a thousand men of either city
								having joined their arms, the Lacedaemonians first, with their
								single power, reduced the government of Sicyon to a smaller
								number; 
							 and then they both together dissolved the democracy at Argos. 
							 And the oligarchy was established conformable to the state of
								Lacedaemon. 

							 These things passed in the end of winter and near the spring. 
							 And so ended the fourteenth year of this war.

The next summer the Dictidears seated in Mount Athos revolted from
								the Athenians to the Chalcideans. 

							 And the Lacedaemonians ordered the state of Achaia after their own
								form, which before was otherwise.

But the Argives, after they had by little and little assembled
								themselves and recovered heart, taking the time when the
								Lacedaemonians were celebrating their exercises of the naked youth,
								assaulted the few; 
							 and in a battle fought within the city, the commons had the
								victory; 
							 and some they slew, others they drave into exile.

The Lacedaemonians, though those of their faction in Argos sent for
								them, went not a long time after; 
							 yet at last they adjourned the exercises and came forth with
								intention of giving them aid. 
							 But hearing by the way at Tegea that the few were overcome, they
								could not be entreated by such as had escaped thence to go on, but
								returning, went on with the celebration of their exercises.

But afterwards, when there came ambassadors unto them, both from the
								Argives in the city, and from them that were driven out, there being
								present also their confederates, and much alleged on either side,
								they concluded at last that those in the city had done the wrong and
								decreed to go against Argos with their army;

but many delays passed, and much time was spent between. 
							 In the meantime the common people of Argos, fearing the
								Lacedaemonians and regaining the league with Athens, as conceiving
								the same would turn to their very great advantage, raised long walls
								from their city down to the sea-shore, to the end that if they were
								shut up by land, they might yet with the help of the Athenians bring
								things necessary into the city by sea.

And with this their building some other cities of Peloponnesus were
								also acquainted. 
							 And the Argives universally, themselves and wives and servants,
								wrought at the wall, and had workmen and hewers of sto<*> 
							 from Athens. 
							 So this summer ended.

The next winter the Lacedaemonians, understanding that they were
								fortifying, came to Argos with their army, they and their
								confederates all but the Corinthians; 
							 and some practice they had beside within the city itself of
								Argos. 
							 The army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the
								Lacedaemonians.

But those things which were practising in Argos and supposed to have
								been already mature did not then succeed. 
							 Nevertheless they took the walls that were then in building and razed
								them to the ground; 
							 and then, after they had taken Hysiae, a town in the Argive
								territory, and slain all the freemen in it, they went home and were
								dissolved every one to his own city.

After this, the Argives went with an army into Phliasia, which when
								they had wasted, they went back. 
							 They did it because the men of Phlius had received their outlaws; 
							 for there the greatest part of them dwelt.

The same winter the Athenians shut up Perdiccas in Macedonia [from
								the use of the sea], objecting that he had sworn the league of the
								Argives and Lacedaemonians; 
							 and that when they had prepared an army, under the command of Nicias,
								the son of Niceratus, to go against the Chalcideans upon Thrace and
								against Amphipolis, he had broken the league made betwixt them and
								him, and by his departure was the principal cause of the dissolution
								of that army, and was therefore an enemy. 
							 And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war.

The next summer went Alcibiades to Argos with twenty galleys and took
								thence the suspected Argives and such as seemed to savour of the
								Lacedaemonian faction, to the number of three hundred, and put them
								into the nearest of the islands subject to the Athenian state. 

							 The Athenians made war also against the isle of Melos, with thirty
								galleys of their own, six of Chios, and two of Lesbos. 
							 Wherein were of their own twelve hundred men of arms, three hundred
								archers, and twenty archers on horseback; 
							 and of their confederates and islanders, about fifteen hundred men of
								arms.

The Melians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and therefore refused
								to be subject, as the rest of the islands were, unto the Athenians,
								but rested at the first neutral; 
							 and afterwards, when the Athenians put them to it by wasting of their
								land, they entered into open war.

Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and
								Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, being encamped upon their land with
								these forces, before they would hurt the same sent ambassadors to
								deal with them first by way of conference. 
							 These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring before the multitude,
								but commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates
								and the few; 
							 and they accordingly said as followeth:

Athenians. 
								 
 Since we may not speak to the multitude,
										for fear lest when they hear our persuasive and unanswerable
										arguments all at once in a continued oration, they should
										chance to be seduced (for we know that this is the scope of
										your bringing us to audience before the few), make surer yet
										that point, you that sit here; 
									 answer you also to every particular, not in a set speech, but
										presently interrupting us whensoever anything shall be said
										by us which shall seem unto you to be otherwise. 
									 And first answer us whether you like this motion or
									not?

Whereunto the council of the Melians answered: 
 The equity of a leisurely debate is not to be found
										fault withal; 
									 but this preparation of war, not future but already here
										present, seemeth not to agree with the same. 
									 For we see that you are come to be judges of the conference,
										and that the issue of it, if we be superior in argument and
										therefore yield not, is likely to bring us war, and if we
										yield, servitude.

Ath. 
								 
 Nay, if you be come together to reckon up
										suspicions of what may be, or to any other purpose than to
										take advice upon what is present and before your eyes, how
										to save your city from destruction, let us give over. 
									 But if this be the point, let us speak to it.

Mel. 
								 
 It is reason, and pardonable for men in our
										cases, to turn both their words and thoughts upon divers
										things. 
									 Howsoever, this consultation being held only upon the point
										of our safety, we are content, if you think good, to go on
										with the course you have propounded.

Ath. 
								 
 As we therefore will not, for our parts,
										with fair pretences, as, that having defeated the Medes, our
										reign is therefore lawful, or that we come against you for
										injury done, make a long discourse without being
										believed; 
									 so would we have you also not expect to prevail by saying
										either that you therefore took not our parts because you
										were a colony of the Lacedaemonians or that you have done us
										no injury. 
									 But out of those things which we both of us do really think,
										let us go through with that which is feasible, both you and
										we knowing that in human disputation justice is then only
										agreed on when the necessity is equal; 
									 whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they
										can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can
										get.

Mel. 
								 
 Well then (seeing you put the point of
										profit in the place of justice), we hold it profitable for
										ourselves not to overthrow a general profit to all men,
										which is this: that men in danger, if they plead reason and
										equity, nay, though somewhat without the strict compass of
										justice, yet it ought ever to do them good. 
									 And the same most of all concerneth you, forasmuch as you
										shall else give an example unto others of the greatest
										revenge that can be taken if you chance to miscarry.

Ath. 
 
							 
 As for us, though our dominion should cease,
									yet we fear not the sequel. 
								 For not they that command, as do the Lacedaemonians, are cruel to
									those that are vanquished by them (yet we have nothing to do now
									with the Lacedaemonians), but such as having been in subjection
									have assaulted those that commanded them and gotten the
									victory.

But let the danger of that be to ourselves. 
								 In the meantime we tell you this: that we are here now both to
									enlarge our own dominion and also to confer about the saving of
									your city. 
								 For we would have dominion over you without oppressing you, and
									preserve you to the profit of us both.

Mel. 
								 
 But how can it be profitable for us to
										serve, though it be so for you to command?

Ath. 
								 
 Because you, by obeying, shall save
										yourselves from extremity; 
									 and we, not destroying you, shall reap profit by you.

Mel. 
								 
 But will you not accept that we remain
										quiet and be your friends (whereas before we were your
										enemies), and take part with neither?

Ath. 
								 
 No. 
									 For your enmity doth not so much hurt us as your friendship
										will be an argument of our weakness and your hatred of our
										power amongst those we have rule over.

Mel. 
								 
 Why? 
									 Do your subjects measure equity so, as to put those that
										never had to do with you, and themselves, who for the most
										part have been your own colonies, and some of them after
										revolt conquered, into one and the same
									consideration?

Ath. 
								 
 Why not? 
									 For they think they have reason on their side, both the one
										sort and the other, and that such as are subdued are subdued
										by force, and such as are forborne are so through our
										fear. 
									 So that by subduing you, besides the extending of our
										dominion over so many more subjects, we shall assure it the
										more over those we had before, especially being masters of
										the sea, and you islanders, and weaker (except you can get
										the victory) than others whom we have subdued
									already.

Mel. 
								 
 Do you think then, that there is no
										assurance in that which we propounded? 
									 For here again (since driving us from the plea of equity you
										persuade us to submit to your profit), when we have shewed
										you what is good for us, we must endeavour to draw you to
										the same, as far forth as it shall be good for you also. 
									 As many therefore as now are neutral, what do you but make
										them your enemies, when, beholding these your proceedings,
										they look that hereafter you will also turn your arms upon
										them? 
									 And what is this, but to make greater the enemies you have
										already, and to make others your enemies, each against their
										wills, that would not else have been so?

Ath. 
								 
 We do not think that they shall be ever the
										more our enemies, who inhabiting anywhere in the continent,
										will be long ere they so much as keep guard upon their
										liberty against us. 
									 But islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders offended
										with the necessity of subjection which they are already in,
										these may indeed, by unadvised courses, put both themselves
										and us into apparent danger.

Mel. 
								 
 If you then to retain your command, and
										your vassals to get loose from you, will undergo the utmost
										of danger, would it not in us, that be already free, be
										great baseness and cowardice if we should not encounter
										anything whatsoever rather than suffer ourselves to be
										brought into bondage?

Ath. 
								 
 No, if you advise rightly. 
									 For you have not in hand a match of valour upon equal terms,
										wherein to forfeit your honour, but rather a consultation
										upon your safety that you resist not such as be so far your
										overmatches.

Mel. 
								 
 But we know that, in matter of war, the
										event is sometimes otherwise than according to the
										difference of number in sides; 
									 and that if we yield presently, all our hope is lost; 
									 whereas if we hold out, we have yet a hope to keep ourselves
										up.

Ath. 
								 
 Hope, the comfort of danger, when such use
										it as have to spare, though it hurt them, yet it destroys
										them not. 
									 But to such as set their rest upon it (for it is a thing by
										nature prodigal), it at once by failing maketh itself
										known; 
									 and known, leaveth no place for future caution.

Which let not be your own case, you that are but weak and
										have no more but this one stake. 
									 Nor be you like unto many men, who, though they may presently
										save themselves by human means, will yet, when upon pressure
										of the enemy their most apparent hopes fail them, betake
										themselves to blind ones, as divination, oracles, and other
										such things which with hopes destroy men.

Mel. 
								 
 We think it, you well know, a hard matter
										for us to combat your power and fortune, unless we might do
										it on equal terms. 
									 Nevertheless we believe that, for fortune, we shall be
										nothing inferior, as having the gods on our side, because we
										stand innocent against men unjust; 
									 and for power, what is wanting in us will be supplied by our
										league with the Lacedaemonians, who are of necessity
										obliged, if for no other cause, yet for consanguinity's sake
										and for their own honour, to defend us. 
									 So that we are confident, not altogether so much without
										reason as you think.

Ath. 
								 
 As for the favour of the gods, we expect to
										have it as well as you; 
									 for we neither do nor require anything contrary to what
										mankind hath decreed, either concerning the worship of the
										gods or concerning themselves.

For of the gods we think according to the common opinion; 
								 and of men, that for certain by necessity of nature they will
									everywhere reign over such as they be too strong for. 
								 Neither did we make this law nor are we the first that use it
									made; 
								 but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so
									also we use it, knowing that you likewise, and others that
									should have the same power which we have, would do the same.

So that forasmuch as toucheth the favour of the gods, we have in
									reason no fear of being inferior. 
								 And as for the opinion you have of the Lacedaemonians, in that
									you believe they will help you for their own honour, we bless
									your innocent minds, but affect not your folly.

For the Lacedaemonians, though in respect of themselves and the
									constitutions of their own country they are wont for the most
									part to be generous; 
								 yet in respect of others, though much might be alleged, yet the
									shortest way one might say it all thus: that most apparently of
									all men, they hold for honourable that which pleaseth, and for
									just that which profiteth. 
								 And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now absurd means of
									safety.

Mel. 
								 
 Nay, for this same opinion of theirs, we
										now the rather believe that they will not betray their own
										colony, the Melians, and thereby become perfidious to such
										of the Grecians as be their friends and beneficial to such
										as be their enemies.

Ath. 
								 
 You think not, then, that what is
										profitable must be also safe, and that which is just and
										honourable must be performed with danger, which commonly the
										Lacedaemonians are least willing of all men to undergo [for
										others].

Mel. 
								 
 But we suppose that they will undertake
										danger for us rather than for any other; 
									 and that they think that we will be more assured unto them
										than unto any other, because for action, we lie near to
										Peloponnesus, and for affection, are more faithful than
										others for our nearness of kin.

Ath. 
								 
 The security of such as are at wars
										consisteth not in the good will of those that are called to
										their aid, but in the power of those means they excel
										in. 
									 And this the Lacedaemonians themselves use to consider more
										than any; 
									 and therefore, out of diffidence in their own forces, they
										take many of their confederates with them, though to an
										expedition but against their neighbours. 
									 Wherefore it is not likely, we being masters of the sea, that
										they will ever pass over into an island.

Mel. 
								 
 Yea, but they may have others to send; 
									 and the Cretic sea is wide, wherein to take another is harder
										for him that is master of it than it is for him that will
										steal by to save himself.

And if this course fail, they may turn their arms against
										your own territory or those of your confederates not invaded
										by Brasidas. 
									 And then you shall have to trouble yourselves no more about a
										territory that you have nothing to do withal, but about your
										own and your confederates.

Ath. 
								 
 Let them take which course of these they
										will that you also may find by experience and not be
										ignorant that the Athenians never yet gave over siege for
										fear of any diversion upon others.

But we observe that, whereas you said you would consult of your
									safety, you have not yet in all this discourse said anything
									which a man relying on could hope to be preserved by; 
								 the strongest arguments you use are but future hopes; 
								 and your present power is too short to defend you against the
									forces already arranged against you. 
								 You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless, excluding
									us, you make amongst yourselves some more discreet
									conclusion;

for [when you are by yourselves], you will no more set your
									thoughts upon shame, which, when dishonour and danger stand
									before men's eyes, for the most part undoeth them. 
								 For many, when they have foreseen into what dangers they were
									entering, have nevertheless been so overcome by that forcible
									word dishonour that that which is but called dishonour hath
									caused them to fall willingly into immedicable calamities, and
									so to draw upon themselves really, by their own madness, a
									greater dishonour than could have befallen them by fortune.

Which you, if you deliberate wisely, will take heed of, and not
									think shame to submit to a most potent city, and that upon so
									reasonable conditions as of league and of enjoying your own
									under tribute; 
								 and seeing choice is given you of war or safety, do not out of
									peevishness take the worse. 
								 For such do take the best course who, though they give no way to
									their equals, yet do fairly accommodate to their superiors, and
									towards their inferiors use moderation.

Consider of it, therefore, whilst we stand off; 
								 and have often in your mind that you deliberate of your country,
									which is to be happy or miserable in and by this one
									consultation.

So the Athenians went aside from the conference; 
							 and the Melians, after they had decreed the very same things which
								before they had spoken, made answer unto them in this manner:

Men of Athens, our resolution is no other
										than what you have heard before; 
									 nor will we, in a small portion of time, overthrow that
										liberty in which our city hath remained for the space of
										seven hundred years since it was first founded. 
									 But trusting to the fortune by which the gods have preserved
										it hitherto and unto the help of men, that is, of the
										Lacedaemonians, we will do our best to maintain the
										same.

But this we offer: to be your friends, enemies to neither
										side, and you to depart out of our land, after agreement
										such as we shall both think fit.

Thus the Melians answered. 
							 To which the Athenians, the conference being already broken off,
								replied thus: 
 You are the only men, as it
										seemeth to us, by this consultation, that think future
										things more certain than things seen, and behold things
										doubtful, through desire to have them true, as if they were
										already come to pass. 
									 As you attribute and trust the most unto the Lacedaemonians,
										and to fortune and hopes, so will you be the most
										deceived.

This said, the Athenian ambassadors departed to their camp. 
							 And the commanders, seeing that the Melians stood out, fell presently
								to the war, and dividing the work among the several cities,
								encompassed the city of the Melians with a wall.

The Athenians afterwards left some forces of their own and of their
								confederates for a guard both by sea and land, and with the greatest
								part of their army went home. 
							 The rest that were left besieged the place.

About the same time the Argives, making a road into Phliasia, lost
								about eighty of their men by ambush laid for them by the men of
								Phlius and the outlaws of their own city.

And the Athenians that lay in Pylus fetched in thither a great booty
								from the Lacedaemonians. 
							 Notwithstanding which, the Lacedaemonians did not war upon them [as]
								renouncing the peace, but gave leave by edict only to any of their
								people that would to take booties reciprocally in the territory of
								the Athenians.

The Corinthians also made war upon the Athenians; 
							 but it was for certain controversies of their own, and the rest of
								Peloponnesus stirred not.

The Melians also took that part of the wall of the Athenians, by an
								assault in the night, which looked towards the market place, and
								having slain the men that guarded it, brought into the town both
								corn and other provision, whatsoever they could buy for money, and
								so returned and lay still. 
							 And the Athenians from thenceforth kept a better watch. 
							 And so this summer ended.

The winter following, the Lacedaemonians being about to enter with
								their army into the territory of the Argives, when they perceived
								that the sacrifices which they made on the border for their passage
								were not acceptable, returned. 
							 And the Argives, having some of their own city in suspicion in regard
								of this design of the Lacedaemonians, apprehended some of them, and
								some escaped.

About the same time the Melians took another part of the wall of the
								Athenians, they that kept the siege being then not many.

But this done, there came afterwards some fresh forces from Athens,
								under the conduct of Philocrates, the son of Demeas.

And the town being now strongly besieged, there being also within
								some that practised to have it given up, they yielded themselves to
								the discretion of the Athenians, who slew all the men of military
								age, made slaves of the women and children, and inhabited the place
								with a colony sent thither afterwards of five hundred men of their
								own.

The same winter the Athenians, with greater forces than they had
								before sent out with Laches and Eurymedon, resolved to go again into
								Sicily, and, if they could, wholly to subdue it, being for the most
								part ignorant both of the greatness of the island, and of the
								multitude of people, as well Greeks as barbarians, that inhabited
								the same, and that they undertook a war not much less than the war
								against the Peloponnesians.

For the compass of Sicily is little less than eight days' sail for a
								ship; 
							 and though so great, is yet divided with no more than twenty
								furlongs, sea measure, from the continent.

It was inhabited in old time thus, and these were the nations that
								held it: The most ancient inhabitants in a part thereof are said to
								have been the Cyclopes and Laestrigones, of whose stock and whence
								they came or to what place they removed I have nothing to say. 
							 Let that suffice which the poets have spoken and which every
								particular man hath learned of them.

After them, the first that appear to have dwelt therein are the
								Sicanians, as they say themselves, nay, before the other, as being
								the natural breed of the island. 
							 But the truth is, they were Iberians, and driven away by the Ligyans
								from the banks of Sicanus, a river on which they were seated in
								Iberia. 
							 And the island from them came to be called Sicania, which was before
								Trinacria. 
							 And these [two] inhabit yet in the western parts of Sicily.

After the taking of Illium, certain Trojans, escaping the hands of
								the Grecians, landed with small boats in Sicily; 
							 and having planted themselves on the borders of the Sicanians, both
								the nations in one were called Elymi; 
							 and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. 
							 Hard by these came and dwelled also certain Phoceans, who, coming
								from Troy, were by tempest carried first into Africa and thence into
								Sicily.

But the Siculi passed out of Italy (for there they inhabited), flying
								from the Opici, having, as is most likely and as it is reported,
								observed the strait, and with a fore wind gotten over in boats which
								they made suddenly on the occasion, or perhaps by some other
								means. 

							 There is at this day a people in Italy called Siculi. 
							 And Italy itself got that name after the same manner from a king of
								Arcadia called Italus.

Of these a great army crossing into Sicily overthrew the Sicanians in
								battle and drave them into the south and west parts of the same; 
							 and instead of Sicania, caused the island to be called Sicilia; 
							 and held and inhabited the best of the land for near three hundred
								years after their going over, and before any of the Grecians came
								thither. 
							 And till now they possess the midland and north parts of the
								island.

Also the Phoenicians inhabited the coast of Sicily on all sides,
								having taken possession of certain promontories and little islands
								adjacent, for trade's sake with the Sicilians. 
							 But after that many Grecians were come in by sea, the Phoenicians
								abandoned most of their former habitations, and uniting themselves,
								dwelt in Motya and Soloeis and Panormus, upon the borders of the
								Elymi, as relying upon their league with the Elymi, and because also
								from thence lay the shortest cut over unto Carthage. 
							 These were the barbarians, and thus they inhabited Sicily.

Now for Grecians, first a colony of Chalcideans, under Thucles, their
								conductor, going from Euboea, built Naxos and the altar of Apollo
								Archegetes, now standing without the city, upon which the
								ambassadors employed to the oracles, as often as they launch from
								Sicily, are accustomed to offer their first sacrifice.

The next year Archias, a man of the Herculean family, carried a
								colony from Corinth and became founder of Syracuse, where first he
								drave the Siculi out of that island in which the inner part of the
								city now standeth, not now environed wholly with the sea as it was
								then.

And in process of time, when the city also that is without was taken
								in with a wall, it became a populous city. 
							 In the fifth year after the building of Syracuse, Thucles and the
								Chalcideans, going from Naxos, built Leontium, expelling thence the
								Siculi, and after that Catana; 
							 but they that went to Catana chose Euarchus for their founder.

About the same time in Sicily arrived also Lamis, with a colony from
								Megara, and first built a certain town called Trotilus, upon the
								river Pantacius, where for a while after he governed the estate of
								his colony in common with the Chalcideans of Leontium. 
							 But afterwards, when he was by them thrust out, and had builded
								Thapsus, he died; 
							 and the rest going from Thapsus, under the conduct of Hyblon, a king
								of the Siculi, built Megara, called Megara-Hyblaea.

And after they had there inhabited two hundred and forty-five years,
								they were by Gelon, a tyrant of Syracuse, put out both of the city
								and territory. 
							 But before they were driven thence, namely one hundred years after
								they had built it, they sent out Pammilus and built the city of
								Selinus. 
							 This Pammilus came to them from Megara, their own metropolitan city,
								and so together with them founded Selinus.

Gela was built in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse, by Antiphemus,
								that brought a colony out of Rhodes, and by Entymus, that did the
								like out of Crete, jointly. 
							 This city was named after the name of the river Gela; 
							 and the place where now the city standeth, and which at first they
								walled in, was called Lindii.

And the laws which they established were the Doric. 
							 About one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, they of
								Gela built the city of Acragante, calling the city after the name of
								the river; 
							 and for their conductors chose Aristonous and Pystilus, and gave unto
								them the laws of Gela.

Zancle was first built by pirates that came from Cume, a Chalcidean
								city in Opicia; 
							 but afterwards there came a multitude, and helped to people it, out
								of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; 
							 and their conductors were Perieres and Crataemenes, one of Cume, the
								other of Chalcis. 
							 And the name of the city was at first Zancle, so named by the
								Sicilians because it hath the form of a sickle, and the Sicilians
								call a sickle zanclon. But these inhabitants
								were afterwards chased thence by the Samians and other people of
								Ionia that in their flight from the Medes fell upon Sicily.

After this, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drave out the Samians, and
								peopling the city with a mixed people of them and his own, instead
								of Zancle called the place by the name of his own country from
								whence he was anciently descended, Messana.

After Zancle was built Himera, by Eucleides, Simus, and Sacon, the
								most of which colony were Chalcideans; 
							 but there were also amongst them certain outlaws of Syracuse, the
								vanquished part of a sedition, called the Myletidae. 
							 Their language grew to a mean between the Chalcidean and Doric; 
							 but the laws of the Chalcidean prevailed.

Acrae and Casmenae were built by the Syracusians, Acrae twenty years
								after Syracuse, and Casmenae almost twenty after Acrae.

Camarina was at first built by the Syracusians, very near the hundred
								and thirty-fifth year of their own city, Dascon and Menecolus being
								the conductors. 
							 But the Camarinaeans having been by the Syracusians driven from their
								seat by war for revolt, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, in process of
								time, taking of the Syracusians that territory for ransom of certain
								Syracusian prisoners, became their founder, and placed them in
								Camarina again. 
							 After this again, having been driven thence by Gelon, they were
								planted the third time in the same city.

These were the nations, Greeks and barbarians, that inhabited
								Sicily. 
							 And though it were thus great, yet the Athenians longed very much to
								send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all under their
								subjection, which was the true motive, but as having withal this
								fair pretext of aiding their kindred and new confederates.

But principally they were instigated to it by the ambassadors of
								Egesta, who were at Athens and earnestly pressed them thereto. 
							 For bordering on the territory of the Selinuntians, they had begun a
								war about certain things concerning marriage and about a piece of
								ground that lay doubtfully between them. 
							 And the Selinuntians, having leagued themselves with the Syracusians,
								infested them with war both by sea and by land. 
							 Insomuch as the Egestaeans, putting the Athenians in mind of their
								former league with the Leontines made by Laches, prayed them to send
								a fleet thither in their aid, alleging, amongst many other things,
								this as principal: that if the Syracusians, who had driven the
								Leontines from their seat, should pass without revenge taken on
								them, and so proceed, by consuming the rest of the allies of the
								Athenians there, to get the whole power of Sicily into their hands,
								it would be dangerous lest hereafter some time or other, being
								Dorians, they should with great forces aid the Dorians for affinity,
								and being a colony of the Peloponnesians join with the
								Peloponnesians that sent them out, to pull down the Athenian
								empire; 
							 that it were wisdom, therefore, with those confederates they yet
								retain, to make head against the Syracusians; 
							 and the rather, because for the defraying of the war the Egestaeans
								would furnish money sufficient of themselves.

Which things when the Athenians had often heard in their assemblies
								from the mouths of the Egestaean ambassadors and of their advocates
								and patrons, they decreed to send ambassadors to Egesta to see,
								first, whether there were in their treasury and temples so much
								wealth as they said there was, and to bring word in what terms the
								war stood between that city and the Selinuntians. 
							 And ambassadors were sent into Sicily accordingly.

The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, all but
								the Corinthians, having drawn out their forces into the territory of
								the Argives, wasted a small part of their fields and carried away
								certain cart-loads of their corn. 
							 Thence they went to Orneae, and having placed there the Argive
								outlaws, left with them a few others of the rest of the army; 
							 and then making a composition for a certain time, that they of Orneae
								and those Argives should not wrong each other, they carried their
								army home.

But the Athenians arriving not long after with thirty galleys and six
								hundred men of arms, the people of Argos came also forth with their
								whole power, and joining with them, sat down betimes in the morning
								before Orneae. 
							 But when at night the army went somewhat far off to lodge, they
								within fled out; 
							 and the Argives, the next day perceiving it, pulled Orneae to the
								ground and went home.

And so also did the Athenians not long after with their galleys. 
							 Also the Athenians transported certain horsemen by sea, part of their
								own and part Macedonian fugitives that lived with them, into Methone
								and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas.

And the Lacedaemonians sent unto the Chalcideans upon Thrace, who
								held peace with the Athenians from ten days to ten days, appointing
								them to aid Perdiccas. 
							 But they refused. 
							 And so ended the winter, and the sixteenth year of this war written
								by Thucydides.

The next summer, early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors
								returned from Sicily, and the ambassadors of Egesta with them, and
								brought in silver uncoined sixty talents, for a month's pay of sixty
								galleys, which they would entreat the Athenians to send thither.

And the Athenians, having called an assembly and heard both from the
								Egestaean and their own ambassadors, amongst other persuasive but
								untrue allegations, touching their money, how they had great store
								ready both in their treasury and temples, decreed the sending of
								sixty galleys into Sicily, and Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias,
								Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, the son of Xenophanes,
								for commanders with authority absolute; 
							 the which were to aid the people of Egesta against the Selinuntians,
								and withal, if they had time to spare, to plant the Leontines anew
								in their city, and to order all other the affairs of Sicily as they
								should think most for the profit of the Athenians.

Five days after this the people assembled again to consult of the
								means how most speedily to put this armada in readiness and to
								decree such things as the generals should further require for the
								expedition.

But Nicias, having heard that himself was chosen for one of the
								generals, and conceiving that the state had not well resolved, but
								affected the conquest of all Sicily, a great matter, upon small and
								superficial pretences, stood forth, desiring to have altered this
								the Athenians' purpose, and spake as followeth:

"Though this assembly was called to deliberate of our preparation and
								of the manner how to set forth our fleet for Sicily, yet to me it
								seemeth that we ought rather once again to consult whether it be not
								better not to send it at all than, upon a short deliberation in so
								weighty an affair and upon the credit of strangers, to draw upon
								ourselves an impertinent war.

For my own part, I have honour by it; 
							 and for the danger of my person, I esteem it the least of all men
								(not but that I think him a good member of the commonwealth that
								hath regard also to his own person and estate; 
							 for such a man especially will desire the public to prosper for his
								own sake): but as I have never spoken heretofore, so nor now will I
								speak anything that is against my conscience, for gaining to myself
								a pre-eminence of honour: but that only which I apprehend for the
								best.

And although I am sure that if I go about to persuade you to preserve
								what you already hold, and not to hazard things certain for
								uncertain and future, my words will be too weak to prevail against
								your humour; 
							 yet this I must needs let you know, that neither your haste is
								seasonable nor your desires easy to be achieved.

"For I say that going thither you leave many enemies here behind you,
								and more you endeavour to draw hither.

You perhaps think that the league will be firm that you have made
								with the Lacedaemonians; 
							 which, though as long as you stir not, may continue a league in name
								(for so some have made it of their own side ), yet if any
								considerable forces of ours chance to miscarry, our enemies will
								soon renew the war, as having made the peace constrained by
								calamities, and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than
								ourselves; 
							 besides, in the league itself we have many things controverted. 
							 And some there be that refuse utterly to accept it, and they none of
								the weakest;

whereof some are now in open war against us, and others, because the
								Lacedaemonians stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to
								ten days, and so are contented yet to hold their hands.

But, peradventure, when they shall hear that our power is distracted,
								which is the thing we now hasten to do, they will be glad to join in
								the war with the Sicilians against us, the confederacy of whom they
								would heretofore have valued above many other.

It behoveth us therefore to consider of these things and not to run
								into new dangers when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled,
								nor seek a new dominion before we assure that which we already
								have. 
							 For the Chalcideans of Thrace, after so many years' revolt, are yet
								unreduced; 
							 and from others in divers parts of the continent we have but doubtful
								obedience. 
							 But the Egestaeans, being forsooth our confederates and wronged, they
								in all haste must be aided; 
							 though to right us on those by whom we have a long time ourselves
								been wronged, that we defer.

"And yet if we should reduce the Chalcideans into subjection, we
								could easily also keep them so; 
							 but the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet being many and far
								off, we should have much ado to hold them in obedience. 
							 Now it were madness to invade such, whom conquering you cannot keep,
								and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt the
								same again.

As for the Sicilians, it seemeth unto me, at least as things now
								stand, that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall under
								the dominion of the Syracusians than they are now; 
							 and yet this is it that the Egestaeans would most affright us
								with.

For now the states of Sicily, in several, may perhaps be induced, in
								favour of the Lacedaemonians, to take part against us; 
							 whereas then, being reduced into one, it is not likely they would
								hazard with us state against state. 
							 For by the same means that they, joining with the Peloponnesians, may
								pull down our dominion, by the same it would be likely that the
								Peloponnesians would subvert theirs.

The Grecians there will fear us most if we go not at all; 
							 next, if we but show our forces and come quickly away. 
							 But if any misfortune befall us, they will presently despise us and
								join with the Grecians here to invade us. 
							 For we all know that those things are most admired which are farthest
								off, and which least come to give proof of the opinion conceived of
								them.

And this, Athenians, is your own case with the Lacedaemonians and
								their confederates, whom because beyond your hope you have overcome
								in those things for which at first you feared them, you now in
								contempt of them turn your arms upon Sicily.

But we ought not to be puffed up upon the misfortunes of our enemies,
								but to be confident then only when we have mastered their
								designs. 
							 Nor ought we to think that the Lacedaemonians set their minds on
								anything else but how they may yet for the late disgrace repair
								their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow, and the rather
								because they have so much and so long laboured to win an opinion in
								the world of their valour.

The question with us therefore, if we be well advised, will not be of
								the Egestaeans in Sicily, but how we may speedily defend our city
								against the insidiation of them that favour the oligarchy.

"We must remember also that we have had now some short recreation
								from a late great plague and great war, and thereby are improved
								both in men and money, which it is most meet that we should spend
								here upon ourselves and not upon those outlaws which seek for aid,
								seeing it maketh for them to tell us a specious lie; 
							 who, contributing only words whilst their friends bear all the
								danger, if they speed well, shall be disobliged of thanks, if ill,
								undo their friends for company.

Now if there be any man here that for ends of his own, as being glad
								to be general, especially being yet too young to have charge in
								chief, shall advise the expedition to the end he may have admiration
								for his expense upon horses and help from his place to defray that
								expense, suffer him not to purchase his private honour and splendour
								with the danger of the public fortune. 
							 Believe rather that such men, though they rob the public, do
								nevertheless consume also their private wealth. 
							 Besides, the matter itself is full of great difficulties, such as it
								is not fit for a young man to consult of, much less hastily to take
								in hand.

"And I, seeing those now sit by and abet the same man, am fearful of
								them; 
							 and I do on the other side exhort the elder sort (if any of them sit
								near those other) not to be ashamed to deliver their minds freely,
								as fearing that if they gave their voice against the war they should
								be esteemed cowards, nor to doat (as they do) upon things absent,
								knowing that by passion the fewest actions and by reason the most do
								prosper; 
							 but rather for the benefit of their country, which is now cast into
								greater danger than ever before, to hold up their hands on the other
								side and decree that the Sicilians, within the limits they now
								enjoy, not misliked by you, and with liberty to sail by the shore in
								the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the Sicilian sea, shall possess
								their own and compound their differences between themselves.

And for the Egestaeans, to answer them in particular thus: that as
								without the Athenians they had begun the war against the
								Selinuntians, so they should without them likewise end it; 
							 and that we shall no more hereafter, as we have used to do, make such
								men our confederates, as when they do injury, we must maintain it,
								and when we require their assistance, cannot have it.

And you, the president, if you think it your
										office to take care of the commonwealth and desire to be a
										good member of the same, put these things once more to the
										question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. 
									 Think (if you be afraid to infringe the orders of the
										assembly) that before so many witnesses it will not be made
										a crime, but that you shall be rather thought a physician of
										your country, that hath swallowed down evil counsel. 
									 And he truly dischargeth the duty of a president who
										laboureth to do his country the most good, or at least will
										not willingly do it hurt.

Thus spake Nicias. 
							 But the most of the Athenians that spake after him were of opinion
								that the voyage ought to proceed, the decree already made not to be
								reversed; 
							 yet some there were that said to the contrary.

But the expedition was most of all pressed by Alcibiades, the son of
								Cleinias, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, with whom he
								was likewise at odds in other points of state, and also for that he
								had glanced at him invidiously in his oration, but principally for
								that he affected to have charge, hoping that himself should be the
								man to subdue both Sicily and Carthage to the state of Athens, and
								withal, if it succeeded, to increase his own private wealth and
								glory.

For being in great estimation with the citizens, his desires were
								more vast than for the proportion of his estate, both in maintaining
								of horses and other his expenses, was meet;

which proved afterwards none of the least causes of the subversion of
								the Athenian commonwealth. 
							 For most men fearing him, both for his excess in things that
								concerned his person and form of life and for the greatness of his
								spirit in every particular action he undertook, as one that aspired
								to the tyranny, they became his enemy. 
							 And although for the public he excellently managed the war, yet every
								man, privately displeased with his course of life, gave the charge
								of the wars to others, and thereby not long after overthrew the
								state.

Alcibiades at this time stood forth and spake to this effect:

"Men of Athens, it both belongeth unto me more than to any other to
								have this charge; 
							 and withal I think myself (for I must needs begin with this, as
								having been touched by Nicias) to be worthy of the same. 
							 For those things for which I am so much spoken of do indeed purchase
								glory to my progenitors and myself;

but to the commonwealth they confer both glory and profit. 
							 For the Grecians have thought our city a mighty one, even above the
								truth, by reason of my brave appearance at the Olympic games,
								whereas before they thought easily to have warred it down. 
							 For I brought thither seven chariots and not only won the first,
								second, and fourth prize, but carried also in all other things a
								magnificence worthy the honour of the victory. 
							 And in such things as these, as there is honour to be supposed
								according to the law, so is there also a power conceived upon sight
								of the thing done.

As for my expenses in the city upon setting forth of shows, or
								whatsoever else is remarkable in me, though naturally it procure
								envy in other citizens, yet to strangers this also is an argument of
								our greatness. 
							 Now, it is no unprofitable course of life when a man shall at his
								private cost not only benefit himself but also the commonwealth.

Nor doth he that beareth himself high upon his own worth and refuseth
								to make himself fellow with the rest wrong the rest; 
							 for if he were in distress, he should not find any man that would
								share with him in his calamity. 
							 Therefore, as we are not so much as saluted when we be in misery, so
								let them likewise be content to be contemned of us when we
								flourish;

or if they require equality, let them also give it. 
							 I know that such men, or any man else that excelleth in the glory of
								anything whatsoever, shall as long as he liveth be envied,
								principally of his equals, and then also of others amongst whom he
								converseth; 
							 but with posterity they shall have kindred claimed of them, though
								there be none; 
							 and his country will boast of him, not as of a stranger or one that
								had been a man of lewd life, but as their own citizen and one that
								had achieved worthy and laudable acts.

This being the thing I aim at and for which I am renowned, consider
								now whether I administer the public the worse for it or not. 
							 For having reconciled unto you the most potent states of Peloponnesus
								without much either danger or cost, I compelled the Lacedaemonians
								to stake all that ever they had upon the fortune of one day of
								Mantineia.

And this hath my youth and madness, supposed to have been very
								madness, with familiar and fit words wrought upon the power of the
								Peloponnesians, and shewing reason for my passion, made my madness
								now no longer to be feared. 
							 But as long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is esteemed fortunate,
								make you use of both our services. 
							 And abrogate not your decree touching the voyage into Sicily, as
								though the power were great you are to encounter withal.

For the number wherewith their cities are populous is but of
								promiscuous nations, easily shifting and easily admitting new
								comers, and consequently not sufficiently armed, any of them, for
								the defence of their bodies, nor furnished, as the custom of the
								place appointeth, to fight for their country.

But what any of them thinks he may get by fair speech or snatch from
								the public by sedition, that only he looks after, with purpose, if
								he fail, to run the country. 
							 And it is not likely that such a rabble should either with one
								consent give ear to what is told them or unite themselves for the
								administration of their affairs in common;

but if they hear of fair offers, they will one after one be easily
								induced to come in, especially if there be seditions amongst them,
								as we hear there are.

And the truth is, there are neither so many men of arms as they boast
								of, nor doth it appear that there are so many Grecians there in all
								as the several cities have every one reckoned for their own
								number. 
							 Nay, even Greece hath much belied itself, and was scarce sufficiently
								armed in all this war past.

So that the business there, for all that I can by fame understand, is
								even as I have told you, and will yet be easier. 
							 For we shall have many of the barbarians, upon hatred of the
								Syracusians, to take our parts against them there; 
							 and if we consider the case aright, there will be nothing to hinder
								us at home.

For our ancestors, having the same enemies which they say we leave
								behind us now in our voyage to Sicily, and the Persian besides, did
								nevertheless erect the empire we now have by our only odds of
								strength at sea.

And the hope of the Peloponnesians against us was never less than now
								it is, though their power were also as great as ever; 
							 for they would be able to invade our land, though we went not into
								Sicily; 
							 and by sea they can do us no harm though we go, for we shall leave a
								navy sufficient to oppose theirs behind us.

"What therefore can we allege with any probability for our
								backwardness; 
							 or what can we pretend unto our confederates for denying them
								assistance? 
							 Whom we ought to defend, were it but because we have sworn it to
								them, without objecting that they have not reciprocally aided
								us. 
							 For we took them not into league that they should come hither with
								their aids, but that by troubling our enemies there they might
								hinder them from coming hither against us.

And the way whereby we, and whosoever else hath dominion hath gotten
								it, hath ever been the cheerful succouring of their associates that
								required it, whether they were Greeks or barbarians. 
							 For if we should all sit still, or stand to make choice which were
								fit to be assisted and which not, we should have little under our
								government of the estates of other men, but rather hazard our
								own.

For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to
								defend themselves against him when he shall invade, but to
								anticipate him, that he invade not at all. 
							 Nor is it in our power to be our own carvers how much we will have
								subject to us; 
							 but considering the case we are in, it is as necessary for us to seek
								to subdue those that are not under our dominion, as to keep so those
								that are; 
							 lest if others be not subject to us, we fall in danger of being
								subjected unto them.

Nor are we to weigh quietness in the same balance that others do,
								unless also the institution of this state were like unto that of
								other states. 
							 Let us rather make reckoning by enterprising abroad to increase our
								power at home, and proceed on our voyage that we may cast down the
								haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians and show them the contempt and
								slight account we make of our present ease by undertaking this our
								expedition into Sicily.

Whereby, either conquering those states we shall become masters of
								all Greece, or weaken the Syracusians, to the benefit of ourselves
								and our confederates. 
							 And for our security to stay, if any city shall come to our side, or
								to come away if otherwise, our galleys will afford it.

For in that we shall be at our own liberty, though all the Sicilians
								together were against it. 
							 
								 
 Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only
										to laziness and to the stirring of debate between the young
										men and the old, avert you from it; 
									 but with the same decency wherewith your ancestors,
										consulting young and old together, have brought our dominion
										to the present height, endeavour you likewise to enlarge the
										same. 
									 And think not that youth or age, one without the other, is of
										any effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and the
										exactest judgments tempered together is it that doth the
										greatest good; 
									 and that a state as well as any other thing will, if it rest,
										wear out of itself, and all men's knowledge decay; 
									 whereas by the exercise of war experience will continually
										increase, and the city will get a habit of resisting the
										enemy, not with words, but action.

In sum, this is my opinion: that a state accustomed to be active,
									if it once grow idle, will quickly be subjected by the
									change; 
								 and that they of all men are most surely planted that with most
									unity observe the present laws and customs, though not always of
									the best.

Thus spake Alcibiades. 
							 The Athenians, when they had heard him, together with the Egestaeans
								and Leontine outlaws, who being then present entreated, and
								objecting to them their oath, begged their help in form of
								suppliants, were far more earnestly bent upon the journey than they
								were before.

But Nicias, when he saw he could not alter their resolution with his
								oration, but thought he might perhaps put them from it by the
								greatness of the provision, if he should require it with the most,
								stood forth again and said in this manner.

"Men of Athens, forasmuch as I see you violently bent on this
								expedition, such effect may it take as is desired. 
							 Nevertheless I shall now deliver my opinion upon the matter as it yet
								standeth.

As far as we understand by report, we set out against great cities,
								not subject one to another, nor needing innovation, whereby they
								should be glad, out of hard servitude, to admit of easier masters,
								nor such as are likely to prefer our government before their own
								liberty; 
							 but many (as for one island), and those Greek cities.

For besides Naxos and Catana (which too I hope will join with us for
								their affinity with the Leontines), there are other seven, furnished
								in all respects after the manner of our own army, and especially
								those two against which we bend our forces most, Selinus and
								Syracuse.

For there are in them many men of arms, many archers, many darters,
								besides many galleys and a multitude of men to man them. 
							 They have also store of money, both amongst private men and in their
								temples. 
							 This have the Selinuntians. 
							 The Syracusians have a tribute beside, coming in from some of the
								barbarians. 
							 But that wherein they exceed us most is this: that they abound in
								horses, and have corn of their own, not fetched in from other
								places.

"Against such a power we shall therefore need not a fleet only, and
								with it a small army, but there must great forces go along of land
								soldiers, if we mean to do anything worthy of our design and not to
								be kept by their many horsemen from landing; 
							 especially if the cities there, terrified by us, should now hold all
								together, and none but the Egestaeans prove our friends and furnish
								us with a cavalry to resist them.

And it would be a shame either to come back with a repulse or to send
								for a new supply afterwards, as if we had not wisely considered our
								enterprise at first. 
							 Therefore we must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing
								that we go far from home and are to make war in a place of
								disadvantage, and not as when we went as confederates to aid some of
								our subjects here at home, where we had easy bringing in of
								necessaries to the camp from the territories of friends. 
							 But we go far off, and into a country of none but strangers, and from
								whence in winter there can hardly come a messenger unto us in so
								little as four months.

"Wherefore I am of opinion that we ought to take with us many men of
								arms of our own, of our confederates, and of our subjects; 
							 and also out of Peloponnesus as many as we can get, either for love
								or money; 
							 and also many archers and slingers, whereby to resist their
								cavalry; 
							 and much spare shipping, for the more easy bringing in of
								provision. 
							 Also our corn, I mean wheat and barley parched, we must carry with us
								from hence in ships; 
							 and bakers from the mills, hired and made to work by turns, that the
								army, if it chance to be weatherbound, may not be in want of
								victual. 
							 For being so great, it will not be for every city to receive it. 
							 And so for all things else, we must as much as we can provide them
								ourselves and not rely on others. 
							 Above all, we must take hence as much money as we can; 
							 for as for that which is said to be ready at Egesta, think it ready
								in words, but not in deeds.

For although we go thither with an army not
										only equal unto theirs, but also (excepting their men of
										arms for battle) in everything exceeding it, yet so shall we
										scarce be able both to overcome them and withal to preserve
										our own.

We must also make account that we go to inhabit some city in that
									foreign and hostile country, and either the first day we come
									thither to be presently masters of the field, or failing, be
									assured to find all in hostility against us.

Which fearing, and knowing that the business requires much good
									advice and more good fortune (which is a hard matter, being we
									are but men), I would so set forth as to commit myself to
									fortune as little as I may and take with me an army that in
									likelihood should be secure.

And this I conceive to be both the surest course for the city in
									general and the safest for us that go the voyage. 
								 If any man be of a contrary opinion, I resign him my
								place.

Thus spake Nicias, imagining that either the Athenians would, upon
								the multitude of the things required, abandon the enterprise; 
							 or if he were forced to go, he might go with the more security.

But the Athenians gave not over the desire they had of the voyage for
								the difficulty of the preparation, but were the more inflamed
								thereby to have it proceed; 
							 and the contrary fell out of that which he before expected. 
							 For they approved his counsel and thought now there would be no
								danger at all.

And every one alike fell in love with the enterprise: the old men,
								upon hope to subdue the place they went to, or that at least so
								great a power could not miscarry; 
							 and the young men, upon desire to see a foreign country and to gaze,
								making little doubt but to return with safety. 
							 As for the common sort and the soldiers, they made account to gain by
								it not only their wages for the time, but also so to amplify the
								state in power as that their stipend should endure forever.

So that through the vehement desire thereunto of the most, they also
								that liked it not, for fear if they held up their hands against it
								to be thought evil-affected to the state, were content to let it
								pass.

And in the end a certain Athenian stood up and, calling upon Nicias,
								said he ought not to shift off nor delay the business any longer,
								but to declare there before them all what forces he would have the
								Athenians to decree him.

To which unwillingly he answered and said he would consider of it
								first with his fellow-commanders. 
							 Nevertheless, for so much as he could judge upon the sudden, he said
								there would need no less than one hundred galleys, whereof for
								transporting of men of arms, so many of the Athenians' own as they
								themselves should think meet, and the rest to be sent for to their
								confederates; 
							 and that of men of arms in all, of their own and of their
								confederates, there would be requisite no less than five thousand,
								but rather more, if they could be gotten; 
							 and other provision proportionable. 
							 As for archers, both from hence and from Crete, and slingers, and
								whatsoever else should seem necessary, they would provide it
								themselves and take it with them.

When the Athenians had heard him, they presently decreed that the
								generals should have absolute authority, both touching the greatness
								of the preparation and the whole voyage, to do therein as should
								seem best unto them for the commonwealth.

And after this, they went in hand with the preparation accordingly,
								and both sent unto the confederates and enrolled soldiers at
								home. 
							 The city had by this time recovered herself from the sickness and
								from their continual wars, both in number of men fit for the wars,
								grown up after the ceasing of the plague, and in store of money
								gathered together by means of the peace; 
							 whereby they made their provisions with much ease. 
							 And thus were they employed in preparations for the voyage.

In the meantime the Mercuries of stone throughout the whole city of
								Athens (now there were many of these of square stone set up by the
								law of the place, and many in the porches of private houses and in
								the temples) had in one night most of them their faces pared.

And no man knew who had done it; 
							 and yet great rewards out of the treasury had been propounded to the
								discoverers, and a decree made that if any man knew of any other
								profanation, he might boldly declare the same, were he citizen,
								stranger, or bondman.

And they took the fact exceedingly to heart as ominous to the
								expedition and done withal upon conspiracy for alteration of the
								state and dissolution of the democracy.

Hereupon, certain strangers dwelling in the city and certain
								serving-men revealed something, not about the Mercuries, but of the
								paring of the statues of some other of the gods, committed formerly
								through wantonness and too much wine by young men; 
							 and withal, how they had in private houses acted the mysteries of
								their religion in mockery; 
							 amongst whom they also accused Alcibiades.

This they that most envied Alcibiades, because he stood in the way
								that they could not constantly bear chief sway with the people,
								making account to have the primacy if they could thrust him out,
								took hold of and exceedingly aggravated, exclaiming that both the
								mockery of the mysteries and the paring of the Mercuries tended to
								the deposing of the people, and that nothing therein was done
								without him, alleging for argument his other excess in the ordinary
								course of his life, not convenient in a popular estate.

He at that present made his apology and was there ready, if he had
								done any such thing, to answer it before he went the voyage (for by
								this time all their preparation was in readiness) and to suffer
								justice if he were guilty and if absolved to resume his charge,

protesting against all accusations to be brought against him in his
								absence, and pressing to be put to death then presently if he had
								offended, and saying that it would not be discreetly done to send
								away a man accused of so great crimes with the charge of such an
								army before his trial.

But his enemies, fearing lest if he came then to his trial he should
								have had the favour of his army and lest the people, which loved him
								because the Argives and some of the Mantineans served them in this
								war only for his sake, should have been mollified, put the matter
								off and hastened his going out by setting on other orators to advise
								that for the present he should go, and that the setting forward of
								the fleet should not be retarded, and that at his return he should
								have a day assigned him for his trial; 
							 their purpose being, upon further accusation, which they might easily
								contrive in his absence, to have him sent for back to make his
								answer. 
							 And thus it was concluded that Alcibiades should go.

After this, the summer being now half spent, they put to sea for
								Sicily. 
							 The greatest part of the confederates and the ships that carried
								their corn and all the lesser vessels and the rest of the provision
								that went along, they before appointed to meet [upon a day set] at
								Corcyra, thence all together to cross over the Ionian gulf to the
								promontory of Iapygia. 
							 But the Athenians themselves and as many of their confederates as
								were at Athens, upon the day appointed, betimes in the morning came
								down into Peiraeus and went aboard to take sea. 
							 With them came down in a manner the whole multitude of the city, as
								well inhabitants as strangers, the inhabitants to follow after such
								as belonged unto them, some their friends, some their kinsmen, and
								some their children, filled both with hope and lamentations;

hope of conquering what they went for, and lamentation as being in
								doubt whether ever they should see each other any more, considering
								what a way they were to go from their own territory; 
							 (and now when they were to leave one another to danger, they
								apprehended the greatness of the same more than they had done before
								when they decreed the expedition: nevertheless their present
								strength, by the abundance of everything before their eyes prepared
								for the journey, gave them heart again in beholding it); 
							 but the strangers and other multitude came only to see the shew, as
								of a worthy and incredible design.

For this preparation, being the first Grecian power that ever went
								out of Greece from one only city, was the most sumptuous and the
								most glorious of all that ever had been sent forth before it to that
								day. 
							 Nevertheless, for number of galleys and men of arms, that which went
								forth with Pericles to Epidaurus and that which Agnon carried with
								him to Potidaea was not inferior to it. 
							 For there went four thousand men of arms, three hundred horse, and
								one hundred galleys out of Athens itself, and out of Lesbos and
								Chios fifty galleys, besides many confederates that accompanied him
								in the voyage.

But they went not far and were but meanly furnished. 
							 Whereas this fleet, as being to stay long abroad, was furnished for
								both kinds of service, in which of them soever it should have
								occasion to be employed, both with shipping and land-soldiers.

For the shipping, it was elaborate with a great deal of cost, both of
								the captains of galleys and of the city. 
							 For the state allowed a drachma a day to every mariner; 
							 the empty galleys which they sent forth, being of nimble ones sixty
								and of such as carried their men of arms forty more, and the
								captains of galleys both put into them the most able servants, and
								besides the wages of the state, unto the [uppermost bank of oars,
								called the] Thranitae, and to the servants, gave somewhat of their
								own, and bestowed great cost otherwise every one upon his own
								galley, both in the badges and other rigging, each one striving to
								the utmost to have his galley, both in some ornament and also in
								swiftness, to exceed the rest. 
							 And for the land forces, they were levied with exceeding great
								choice, and every man endeavoured to excel his fellow in the bravery
								of his arms and utensils that belonged to his person.

Insomuch as amongst themselves it begat quarrel about precedency, but
								amongst other Grecians, a conceit that it was an ostentation rather
								of their power and riches than a preparation against an enemy.

For if a man enter into account of the expense, as well of the public
								as of private men that went the voyage, namely, of the public, what
								was spent already in the business, and what was to be given to the
								commanders to carry with them, and of private men, what every one
								had bestowed upon his person and every captain on his galley,
								besides what every one was likely, over and above his allowance from
								the state, to bestow on provision for so long a warfare, and what
								the merchant carried with him for traffic, he will find the whole
								sum carried out of the city to amount to a great many talents.

And the fleet was no less noised amongst those against whom it was to
								go for the strange boldness of the attempt and gloriousness of the
								show than it was for the excessive report of their number, for the
								length of the voyage, and for that it was undertaken with so vast
								future hopes in respect of their present power.

After they were all aboard, and all things laid in that they meant to
								carry with them, silence was commanded by the trumpet; 
							 and after the wine had been carried about to the whole army, and all,
								as well the generals as the soldiers, had drunk a health to the
								voyage, they made their prayers, such as by the law were appointed
								for before their taking sea, not in every galley apart, but all
								together, the herald pronouncing them.

And the company from the shore, both of the city and whosoever else
								wished them well, prayed with them. 
							 And when they had sung the Paean and ended the health, they put forth
								to sea; 
							 and having at first gone out in a long file, galley after galley,
								they after went a vie by Aegina. 
							 Thus hasted these to be at Corcyra, to which place also the other
								army of the confederates were assembling.

At Syracuse they had advertisement of the voyage from divers
								places; 
							 nevertheless it was long ere anything would be believed. 
							 Nay, an assembly being there called, orations were made, such as
								follow, on both parts, as well by them that believed the report
								touching the Athenian army to be true as by others that affirmed the
								contrary. 
							 And Hermocrates the son of Hermon, as one that thought he knew the
								certainty, stood forth and spake to this effect:

"Concerning the truth of this invasion, though perhaps I shall be
								thought, as well as other men, to deliver a thing incredible, and
								though I know that such as be either the authors or relaters of
								matter incredible shall not only not persuade, but be also accounted
								fools, nevertheless, I will not fear thereof hold my tongue, as long
								as the commonwealth is in danger, being confident that I know the
								truth hereof somewhat more certainly than others do.

The Athenians are bent to come even against us (which you verily
								wonder at), and that with great forces both for the sea and land,
								with pretence indeed to aid their confederates the Egestaeans and
								replant the Leontines; 
							 but in truth they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and
								especially of this city of ours, which obtained, they make account
								to get the rest with ease.

Seeing then they will presently be upon us, advise with your present
								means how you may with most honour make head against them, that you
								may not be taken unprovided through contempt nor be careless through
								incredulity, and that such as believe it may not be dismayed with
								their audaciousness and power.

For they are not more able to do hurt unto us than we be unto
								them. 
							 Neither indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some advantage
								unto us; 
							 nay, it will be much the better for us in respect of the rest of the
								Sicilians. 
							 For being terrified by them, they will the rather league with us. 
							 And if we either vanquish or repulse them without obtaining what they
								came for (for I fear not at all the effecting of their purpose),
								verily it will be a great honour to us, and in my opinion not
								unlikely to come to pass. 
							 For in truth there have been few great fleets, whether of Grecians or
								barbarians, sent far from home that have not prospered ill.

Neither are these that come against us more in number than ourselves
								and the neighboring cities; 
							 for surely we shall all hold together upon fear. 
							 And if for want of necessaries in a strange territory they chance to
								miscarry, the honour of it will be left to us against whom they bend
								their councils, though the greatest cause of their overthrow should
								consist in their own errors.

Which was also the case of these very Athenians, who raised
								themselves by the misfortune of the Medes (though it happened for
								the most part contrary to reason); 
							 because in name they went only against the Athenians. 
							 And that the same shall now happen unto us is not without
								probability.

Let us therefore with courage put in
										readiness our own forces; 
									 let us send to the Siculi to confirm those we have, and to
										make peace and league with others; 
									 and let us send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily to show
										them that it is a common danger, and into Italy to get them
										into our league, or at least that they receive not the
										Athenians.

And in my judgment it were our best course to send also to
									Carthage, for even they are not without expectation of the same
									danger. 
								 Nay, they are in a continual fear that the Athenians will bring
									war upon them also, even to their city. 
								 So that upon apprehension that if they neglect us the trouble
									will come home to their own door, they will perhaps, either
									secretly or openly or some way assist us. 
								 And of all that now are, they are the best able to do it, if they
									please. 
								 For they have the most gold and silver, by which the wars and all
									things else are the best expedited.

Let us also send to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, praying them not
									only to send their succours hither with speed, but also to set
									on foot the war there.

But that which I think the best course of all, though through an
									habit of sitting still you will hardly be brought to it, I will
									nevertheless now tell you what it is. 
								 If the Sicilians all together, or if not all, yet if we and most
									of the rest, should draw together our whole navy, and with two
									months' provision go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the
									promontory of Iapygia, and let them see that they must fight for
									their passage over the Ionian gulf before they fight for Sicily,
									it would both terrify them the most and also put them into a
									consideration that we, as the watchmen of our country, come upon
									them out of an amicable territory (for we shall be received at
									Tarentum), whereas they themselves have a great deal of sea to
									pass with all their preparations and cannot keep themselves in
									their order for the length of the voyage; 
								 and that for us it will be an easy matter to assail them, coming
									up slowly as they do and thin.

Again, if lightening their galleys, they shall come up to us more
									nimbly and more close together, we shall charge upon them
									already wearied, or we may, if we please, retire again into
									Tarentum. 
								 Whereas they, if they come over but with a part of their
									provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of
									victuals in those desert parts, and either staying be there
									besieged, or, attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest of
									their provision, and be dejected, as not assured of the cities
									whether they will receive them or not.

I am therefore of opinion that dismayed with this reckoning they
									will either not put over at all from Corcyra, or whilst they
									spend time in deliberating and in sending out to explore how
									many and in what place we are, the season will be lost and
									winter come; 
								 or deterred with our unlookedfor opposition, they will give over
									the voyage. 
								 And the rather for that as I hear the man of most experience
									amongst their commanders hath the charge against his will and
									would take a light occasion to return if he saw any considerable
									stop made by us in the way.

And I am very sure we should be voiced amongst them to the
									utmost. 
								 And as the reports are, so are men's minds; 
								 and they fear more such as they hear will begin with them than
									such as give out that they will no more but defend themselves,
									because then they think the danger equal.

Which would be now the case of the Athenians. 
								 For they come against us with an opinion that we will not fight,
									deservedly contemning us because we joined not with the
									Lacedaemonians to pull them down.

But if they should see us once bolder than they looked for, they
									would be terrified more with the unexpectedness than with the
									truth of our power itself. 
								 Be persuaded therefore, principally to dare to do this, or if not
									this, yet speedily to make yourselves otherwise ready for the
									war, and every man to remember that though to show contempt of
									the enemy be best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations
									are the surest that are made with fear and opinion of
									danger. 
								 As for the Athenians, they come; 
								 and I am sure are already in the way and want only that they are
									not now here.

Thus spake Hermocrates. 
							 But the people of Syracuse were at much strife amongst themselves,
								some contending that the Athenians would by no means come and that
								the reports were not true, and others that if they came they would
								do no more harm than they were likely again to receive. 
							 Some contemned and laughed at the matter; 
							 but some few there were that believed Hermocrates and feared the
								event.

But Athenagoras, who was chief magistrate of the people, and at that
								time most powerful with the commons, spake as followeth:

"He is either a coward or not well affected to the state, whosoever
								he be, that wishes the Athenians not to be so mad as coming hither
								to fall into our power. 
							 As for them that report such things as these and put you into fear,
								though I wonder not at their boldness, yet I wonder at their folly,
								if they think their ends not seen.

For they that are afraid of anything themselves will put the city
								into affright that they may shadow their own with the common
								fear. 
							 And this may the reports do at this time, not raised by chance, but
								framed on purpose by such as always trouble the state.

But if you mean to deliberate wisely, make not your reckoning by the
								reports of these men but by that which wise men and men of great
								experience, such as I hold the Athenians to be, are likely to
								do.

For it is not probable that, leaving the Peloponnesians and the war
								there not yet surely ended, they should willingly come hither to a
								new war no less the former, seeing, in my opinion, they may be glad
								that we invade not them, so many and so great cities as we are.

"And if indeed they come, as these men say they will, I think Sicily
								more sufficient to dispatch the war than Peloponnesus, as being in
								all respects better furnished, and that this our own city is much
								stronger than the army which they say is now coming, though it were
								twice as great as it is. 
							 For I know they neither bring horses with them nor can they get any
								here, save only a few from the Egestaeans, nor have men of arms so
								many as we, in that they are to bring them by sea. 
							 For it is a hard matter to come so far as this by sea, though they
								carried no men of arms in their galleys at all, if they carry with
								them all other their necessaries, which cannot be small against so
								great a city.

So that I am so far from the opinion of these others that I think the
								Athenians, though they had here another city as great as Syracuse,
								and confining on it, and should from thence make their war, yet
								should not be able to escape from being destroyed, every man of
								them, much less now, when all Sicily is their enemy. 
							 For in their camp, fenced with their galleys, they shall be cooped up
								and from their tents and forced munition never be able to stir far
								abroad without being cut off by our horsemen. 
							 In short, I think they shall never be able to get landing, so much
								above theirs do I value our own forces.

"But these things, as I said before, the Athenians, considering, I am
								very sure will look unto their own;

and our men talk here of things that neither are or ever will be, who
								I know have desired, not only now but ever, by such reports as these
								or by worse, or by their actions, to put the multitude in fear that
								they themselves might rule the state. 
							 And I am afraid, lest attempting it often, they may one day effect
								it; 
							 and for us, we are too poor-spirited either to foresee it ere it be
								done, or foreseeing to prevent it.

By this means our city is seldom quiet, but subject to sedition and
								contention, not so much against the enemy as within itself, and
								sometimes also to tyranny and usurpation. 
							 Which I will endeavour (if you will second me) so to prevent
								hereafter as nothing more of this kind shall befall you;

which must be done, first by gaining you the multitude, and then by
								punishing the authors of these plots, not only when I find them in
								the action (for it will be hard to take them so), but also for those
								things which they would and cannot do. 
							 For one must not only take revenge upon an enemy for what he hath
								already done, but strike him first for his evil purpose; 
							 for if a man strike not first, he shall first be stricken. 
							 And as for the few, I shall in somewhat reprove them, in somewhat
								have an eye to them, and in somewhat advise them. 
							 For this, I think, will be the best course to avert them from their
								bad intentions.

Tell me forsooth (I have asked this question often), you that are the
								younger sort, What would you have? 
							 Would you now bear office? 
							 The law allows it not; 
							 and the law was made because ye are not [now] sufficient for
								government, not to disgrace you when you shall be sufficient. 
							 But forsooth, you would not be ranked with the multitude! 
							 But what justice is it, that the same men should not have the same
								privileges?

"Some will say that the democracy is neither a well-governed nor a
								just state, and that the most wealthy are aptest to make the best
								government. 
							 But I answer first, democracy is a name of the
								whole, oligarchy but of a part. 
							 Next, though the rich are indeed fittest to keep the treasure, yet
								the wise are the best counsellors, and the multitude, upon hearing,
								the best judge. 
							 Now in a democracy all these, both jointly and severally, participate
								equal privileges.

But in the oligarchy they allow indeed to the multitude a
								participation of all dangers, but in matters of profit, they not
								only encroach upon the multitude, but take from them and keep the
								whole. 
							 Which is the thing that you the rich and the younger sort affect, but
								in a great city cannot possibly embrace. 
							 But yet, O ye the most unwise of all men, unless you know that what
								you affect is evil, and if you know not that, you are the most
								ignorant of all the Grecians I know; 
							 or, ye most wicked of all men, if knowing it you dare do this.

Yet I say, inform yourselves better or
										change your purpose and help to amplify the common good of
										the city, making account that the good amongst you shall not
										only have an equal but a greater share therein than the rest
										of the multitude; 
									 whereas if you will needs have all, you shall run the hazard
										of losing all. 
									 Away therefore with these rumours, as discovered and not
										allowed.

For this city, though the Athenians come, will be able to defend
									itself with honour. 
								 And we have generals to look to that matter. 
								 And if they come not (which I rather believe), it will not, upon
									the terror of your reports, make choice of you for commanders
									and cast itself into voluntary servitude; 
								 but taking direction of itself, it both judgeth your words
									virtually as facts, and will not upon words let go her present
									liberty, but endeavour to preserve it by not committing the same
									actually to your discretion.

Thus said Athenagoras. 
							 Then one of their generals, rising up, forbade any other to stand
								forth, and spake himself to the matter in hand to this effect:

It is no wisdom, neither for the speakers to
										utter such calumnies one against another, nor for the
										hearers to receive them. 
									 We should rather consider, in respect of these reports, how
										we may in the best manner, both every one in particular and
										the city in general, be prepared to resist them when they
										come.

And if there be no need, yet to furnish the city with horses and
									arms and other habiliments of war can do us no hurt.

As for the care hereof and the musters, we will look to it, and
									will send men abroad both to the cities and for spials, and do
									whatsoever else is requisite. 
								 Somewhat we have done already; 
								 and what more we shall hereafter find meet, we will from time to
									time report unto you. 
 

							 Which when the general had said, the Syracusians dissolved the
								assembly.

The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, both they and their
								confederates. 
							 And first the generals took a view of the whole army and put them
								into the order wherein they were to anchor and make their naval
								camp; 
							 and having divided them into three squadrons, to each squadron they
								assigned a captain by lot, to the end that being at sea they might
								not come into want of water or harbours or any other necessaries
								where they chanced to stay; 
							 and that they might otherwise be the more easy to be governed when
								every squadron had his proper commander.

After this they sent before them three galleys into Italy and Sicily
								to bring them word what cities in those parts would receive them,
								whom they appointed to come back and meet them that they might know
								whether they might be received or not before they put in.

This done, the Athenians with all their provisions put out from
								Corcyra towards Sicily, having with them in all one hundred and
								thirty-four galleys and two Rhodian long-boats of fifty oars
								a-piece. 
							 Of these, a hundred were of Athens itself, whereof sixty were
								expedite, the other forty for transportation of soldiers; 
							 the rest of the navy belonged to the Chians and other the
								confederates. 
							 Of men of arms they had in all five thousand one hundred. 
							 Of these, there were of the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred
								enrolled and seven hundred more [of the poorer sort, called] Thetes,
								hired for defence of the galleys. 
							 The rest were of their confederates, some of them being their
								subjects: of Argives there were five hundred; 
							 of Mantineans and mercenaries, two hundred and fifty. 
							 Their archers in all, four hundred and eighty, of which eighty were
								Cretans. 
							 Rhodian slingers they had seven hundred. 
							 Of lightarmed Megarean fugitives, one hundred and twenty; 
							 and in one vessel made for transportation of horses, thirty horsemen.

These were the forces that went over to the war at first. 
							 With these went also thirty ships carrying necessaries, wherein went
								also the bakers and masons and carpenters and all tools of use in
								fortification; 
							 and with these thirty ships went one hundred boats by constraint, and
								many other ships and boats that voluntarily followed the army for
								trade; 
							 which then passed all together from Corcyra over the Ionian gulf.

And the whole fleet being come to the promontory of Iapygia and to
								Tarentum and such other places as every one could recover, they went
								on by the coast of Italy, neither received of the states there into
								any city nor allowed any market, having only the liberty of
								anchorage and water (and that also at Tarentum and Locri denied
								them), till they were at Rhegium, where they all came together again
								and settled their camp in the temple of Diana (for neither there
								were they suffered to come in) without the city, where the Rhegians
								allowed them a market.

And when they had drawn their galleys to land, they lay still. 
							 Being here, they dealt with the Rhegians, who were Chalcideans, to
								aid the Leontines, Chalcideans likewise. 
							 To which was answered that they would take part with neither, but
								what the rest of the Italians should conclude, that also they would
								do.

So the Athenians lay still, meditating on their Sicilian business,
								how they might carry it the best, and withal expected the return
								from Egesta of the three galleys which they had sent before them,
								desiring to know if so much money were there or not, as was reported
								by their messengers at Athens.

The Syracusians in the meantime from divers parts and also from their
								spies had certain intelligence that the fleet was now at Rhegium:
								and therefore made their preparations with all diligence and were no
								longer incredulous, but sent unto the Siculi, to some cities men to
								keep them from revolting, to others, ambassadors, and into such
								places as lay upon the sea, garrisons; 
							 and examined the forces of their own city, by a view taken of the
								arms and horse, whether they were complete or not, and ordered all
								things as for a war at hand and only not already present.

The three galleys sent before to Egesta returned to the Athenians at
								Rhegium and brought word that for the rest of the money promised
								there was none, only there appeared thirty talents.

At this the generals were presently discouraged, both because this
								first hope was crossed, and because also the Rhegians, whom they had
								already begun to persuade to their league, and whom it was most
								likely they should have won, as being of kin to the Leontines and
								always heretofore favourable to the Athenian state, now refused. 
							 And though to Nicias this news from the Egestaeans was no more than
								he expected, yet to the other two it was extreme strange.

But the Egestaeans, when the first ambassadors from Athens went to
								see their treasure, had thus deceived them. 
							 They brought them into the temple of Venus in Eryx and showed them
								the holy treasure, goblets, flagons, censers, and other furniture,
								in no small quantity; 
							 which being but silver, appeared to the eye a great deal above their
								true value in money. 
							 Then they feasted such as came with them in their private houses, and
								at those feastings exhibited all the gold and silver vessels they
								could get together, either in the city of Egesta itself, or could
								borrow in other as well Phoenician as Grecian cities, for their
								own.

So all of them in a manner making use of the same plate, and much
								appearing in every of those houses, it put those which came with the
								ambassadors into a very great admiration, insomuch as at their
								return to Athens they strove who should first proclaim what wealth
								they had seen.

These men, having both been abused themselves and having abused
								others, when it was told that there was no such wealth in Egesta,
								were much taxed by the soldiers. 
							 But the generals went to counsel upon the business in hand.

Nicias was of this opinion: that it was best to go presently with the
								whole fleet to Selinus, against which they were chiefly set forth,
								and if the Egestaeans would furnish them with money for the whole
								army, then to deliberate further upon the occasion; 
							 if not, then to require maintenance for the sixty galleys set forth
								at their own request, and staying with them by force or composition
								to bring the Selinuntians and them to a peace; 
							 and thence passing along by other of those cities, to make a show of
								the power of the Athenian state, and of their readiness to help
								their friends and confederates; 
							 and so to go home, unless they could light on some quick and
								unthought-of means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some
								of the other cities to their own league; 
							 and not to put the commonwealth in danger at her own charges.

Alcibiades said it would not do well to have come out from Athens
								with so great a power and then dishonourably without effect to go
								home again; 
							 but rather to send heralds to every city but Selinus and Syracuse and
								assay to make the Siculi revolt from the Syracusians and others to
								enter league with the Athenians, that they might aid them with men
								and victual; 
							 and first to deal with the Messanians, as being seated in the passage
								and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming in, and having a
								port and harbour sufficient for their fleet; 
							 and when they had gained those cities, and knew what help they were
								to have in the war, then to take in hand Syracuse and Selinus,
								unless these would agree with the Egestaeans and the other suffer
								the Leontines to be replanted.

But Lamachus was of opinion that it was best to go directly to
								Syracuse and to fight with them as soon as they could at their city
								whilst they were yet unfurnished and their fear at the greatest.

For that an army is always most terrible at first, but if it stay
								long ere it come in sight, men recollect their spirits and contemn
								it the more when they see it. 
							 Whereas if it come upon them suddenly while they expect it with fear,
								it would the more easily get the victory, and everything would
								affright them, as the sight of it (for then they would appear most
								for number) and the expectation of their sufferings, but especially
								the danger of a present battle.

And that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages
								without, as not believing they would come; 
							 and though they should be already gotten in, yet the army, being
								master of the field and sitting. down before the city, could want no
								money;

and the other Sicilians would then neglect leaguing with the
								Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, no longer standing off and
								spying who should have the better. 
							 And for a place to retire unto and anchor in, he thought Megara most
								fit: being desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor
								land.

Lamachus said, but came afterwards to the opinion of Alcibiades. 
							 After this, Alcibiades, with his own galley having passed over to
								Messana, and propounded to them a league and not prevailed, they
								answering that they would not let the army in but allow them only a
								market without the walls, returned back to Rhegium.

And presently the generals, having out of the whole fleet manned
								threescore galleys and taken provision aboard, went along the shore
								to Naxos, having left the rest of the army with one of the generals
								at Rhegium.

The Naxians having received them into the city, they went on by the
								coast to Catana. 
							 But the Catanaeans receiving them not (for there were some within
								that favoured the Syracusians), they entered the river of
								Terias;

and having stayed there all that night, went the next day towards
								Syracuse leisurely with the rest of their galleys; 
							 but ten they sent before into the great haven, [not to stay, but] to
								discover if they had launched any fleet there, and to proclaim from
								their galleys that the Athenians were come to replant the Leontines
								on their own, according to league and affinity, and that therefore
								such of the Leontines as were in Syracuse, should without fear go
								forth to the Athenians as to their friends and benefactors.

And when they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the city and
								the havens and the region where they were to seat themselves for the
								war, they returned to Catana.

An assembly being called at Catana, though they refused to receive
								the army they admitted the generals and willed them to speak their
								minds. 
							 And whilst Alcibiades was in his oration and the citizens at the
								assembly, the soldiers, having secretly pulled down a little gate
								which was but weakly built, entered the city and were walking up and
								down in the market.

And the Catanaeans, such as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army
								within, for fear stole presently out of the town, being not
								many. 
							 The rest concluded the league with the Athenians and willed them to
								fetch in the rest of the army from Rhegium.

After this, the Athenians went back to Rhegium, and rising from
								thence, came to Catana with their whole army together.

Now they had news from Camarina that if they would come thither, the
								Camarinaeans would join with them, and that the Syracusians were
								manning their navy. 
							 Whereupon with the whole army they went along the coast, first to
								Syracuse, where not finding any navy manned, they went on to
								Camarina. 
							 And being come close up to the shore, they sent a herald unto
								them. 
							 But the Camarinaeans would not receive the army, alleging that they
								had taken an oath not to receive the Athenians with more than one
								galley unless they should have sent for more of their own
								accord.

Having lost their labour, they departed, and landed in a part of the
								territory of Syracuse, and had gotten some booty. 
							 But the Syracusian horsemen coming out and killing some stragglers of
								the light-armed, they returned again to Catana.

Here they find the galley called Salaminia, come thither from Athens,
								both for Alcibiades, who was commanded to come home to purge himself
								of such things as were laid to his charge by the state, and also for
								other soldiers that were with him, whereof some were accused for
								profanation of the mysteries and some also for the Mercuries.

For the Athenians, after the fleet was put to sea, proceeded
								nevertheless in the search of those that were culpable, both
								concerning the mysteries and the Mercuries. 
							 And making no inquiry into the persons of the informers, but through
								jealousy admitting of all sorts, upon the reports of evil men
								apprehended very good citizens and cast them into prison, choosing
								rather to examine the fact and find the truth by torments, than that
								any man, how good soever in estimation, being once accused should
								escape unquestioned.

For the people, having by fame understood that the tyranny of
								Peisistratus and his sons was heavy in the latter end, and withal,
								that neither themselves nor Harmodius, but the Lacedaemonians
								overthrew it, were ever fearful, and apprehended every thing
								suspiciously.

For the fact of Aristogeiton and Harmodius was undertaken upon an
								accident of love, which unfolding at large, I shall make appear that
								neither any other, nor the Athenians themselves, report any
								certainty either of their own tyrants or of the fact.

For the old Peisistratus dying in the tyranny, not Hipparchus, as the
								most thing, but Hippias, who was his eldest son, succeeded in the
								government. 
							 Now Harmodius, a man in the flower of his youth, of great beauty, was
								in the power of one Aristogeiton, a citizen of a middle condition
								that was his lover.

This Harmodius, having been solicited by Hipparchus, the son of
								Peisistratus, and not yielding, discovered the same unto
								Aristogeiton. 
							 He apprehending it (as lovers use) with a great deal of anguish and
								fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him away by
								force, fell presently, as much as his condition would permit, to a
								contriving how to pull down the tyranny.

In the meantime Hipparchus, having again attempted Harmodius and not
								prevailed, intended, though not to offer him violence, yet in
								secret, as if forsooth he did it not for that cause, to do him some
								disgrace.

For neither was the government otherwise heavy till then, but carried
								without their evil will. 
							 And to say the truth, these tyrants held virtue and wisdom in great
								account for a long time, and taking of the Athenians but a twentieth
								part of their revenues, adorned the city, managed their wars, and
								administered their religion worthily.

In other points they were governed by the laws formerly established,
								save that these took a care ever to prefer to the magistracy men of
								their own adherence. 
							 And amongst many that had the annual office of archon, Peisistratus
								also had it, the son of Hippias, of the same name with his
								grandfather, who also, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of
								the twelve gods in the market place and that other in the temple of
								Apollo Pythius.

And though the people of Athens, amplifying afterwards that altar
								which was in the market place, thereby defaced the inscription; 
							 yet that upon the altar that is in the temple of Apollo Pythius is to
								be seen still, though in letters somewhat obscure, in these
								words: 
							 
 
									 Peisistratus the son of Hippias 
									 Erected this to stand 
									 l'th' Temple of Apollo Pythius, 
									 Witness of his command.

And that Hippias, being the elder brother, had the government, I can
								affirm, as knowing it by a more exact relation than other men; 
							 and it may be known also by this: It appears that of all the
								legitimate brethren, this only had children, as is both signified by
								the altar and also by that pillar which for a testimony of the
								injustice of the tyrants was erected in the Athenian citadel. 
							 In which there is no mention of any son of Thessalus or of
								Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine,
								the daughter of Callias, the son of Hyperechidas;

for it is probable that the eldest was first married. 
							 And in the forepart of the pillar, his name after his father's was
								the first, not without reason, as being both next him in age and
								having also enjoyed the tyranny.

Nor indeed could Hippias have easily taken on him the government on a
								sudden, if his brother had died seized of the tyranny, and he been
								the same day to settle it on himself. 
							 Whereas he retained the same with abundant security, both for the
								customary fear in the people and diligence in the guard, and was not
								to seek like a younger brother, to whom the government had not
								continually been familiar.

But Hipparchus came to be named for his misfortune, and thereby grew
								an opinion afterwards that he was also tyrant.

This Harmodius therefore that denied his suit, he disgraced as he
								before intended. 
							 For when some had warned a sister of his, a virgin, to be present to
								carry a little basket in a procession, they rejected her again when
								she came and said that they had never warned her at all, as holding
								her unworthy the honour.

This was taken heavily by Harmodius; 
							 but Aristogeiton, for his sake, was far more exasperated than he. 
							 Whereupon, with the rest of the conspirators, he made all things
								ready for the execution of the design. 
							 Only they were to stay the time of the holiday called the Great
								Panathenaea, upon which day only such citizens as lead the
								procession might, without suspicion, be armed in good number. 
							 And they were to begin the fact themselves; 
							 but the rest were to help them against the halberdiers.

Now the conspirators, for their better security, were not many; 
							 for they hoped that such also as were not privy to it, if they saw it
								once undertaken, being upon this occasion armed, would assist in the
								recovery of their own liberty.

When this holiday was come, Hippias was gone out of the city into the
								place called Cerameicum with his guard of halberdiers, and was
								ordering the procession how it was to go. 
							 And Harmodius and Aristogeiton, with each of them a dagger, proceeded
								to the fact.

But when they saw one of the conspirators familiarly talking with
								Hippias (for Hippias was very affable to all men), they were afraid
								and believed that they were discovered and must presently have been
								apprehended.

They resolved therefore (if it were possible) to be revenged first
								upon him that had done them the wrong, and for whose sake they had
								undergone all this danger, and, furnished as they were, ran
								[furiously] into the city, and finding Hipparchus at a place called
								Leocorium, without all regard of themselves fell upon him, and with
								all the anger in the world, one upon jealousy, the other upon
								disgrace, struck and slew him.

Aristogeiton, for the present, by means of the great confluence of
								people, escaped through the guard, but taken afterwards, was
								ungently handled; 
							 but Harmodius was slain upon the place.

The news being brought to Hippias in the Cerameicum, he went not
								towards the place where the fact was committed, but presently unto
								those that were armed for the solemnity of the shows and were far
								off, that he might be with them before they heard of it; 
							 and composing his countenance [as well as he could] to dissemble the
								calamity, pointed to a certain place and commanded them to repair
								thither without their arms.

Which they did accordingly, expecting that he would have told them
								somewhat. 
							 But having commanded his guard to take those arms away, he then fell
								presently to picking out of such as he meant to question and
								whosoever else was found amongst them with a dagger. 
							 For with shields and spears to be in [the head of] the procession was
								of custom.

Thus was the enterprise first undertaken upon quarrel of love, and
								then upon a sudden fear followed this unadvised adventure of
								Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

And after this time the tyranny grew sorer to the Athenians than it
								had been before. 
							 And Hippias, standing more in fear, not only put many of the citizens
								to death, but also cast his eye on the states abroad to see if he
								might get any security from them in this alteration at home.

He therefore afterwards (though an Athenian and to a Lampsacen) gave
								his daughter Archedice unto Aeantidas, the son of Hippocles, tyrant
								of Lampsacus, knowing that the Lampsacens were in great favour with
								King Darius. 
							 And her sepulchre is yet to be seen with this inscription: 
							 
 
									 Archedice, the daughter of King Hippias, 
									 Who in his time 
									 Of all the potentates of Greece was prime, 
									 This dust doth hide. 
									 Daughter, wife, sister, mother unto kings she was, 
									 Yet free from pride.

And Hippias, after he had reigned three years more in Athens, and was
								in the fourth deposed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled
								Alcmaeonides, went under truce to Sigeium, and to Aeantidas at
								Lampsacus, and thence to King Darius; 
							 from whence, twenty years after in his old age, he came to Marathon
								with the Medan army.

The people of Athens bearing this in mind, and remembering all they
								had heard concerning them, were extremely bitter and full of
								jealousy towards those that had been accused of the mysteries, and
								thought all to have been done upon some oligarchical or tyrannical
								conspiracy.

And whilst they were passionate upon this surmise, many worthy men
								had already been cast in prison; 
							 and yet they were not likely so to give over, but grew daily more
								savage, and sought to apprehend more still. 
							 Whilst they were at this pass, a prisoner that seemed most to be
								guilty was persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to accuse
								somebody, whether it were true or not true; 
							 (for it is but conjectural on both sides; 
							 nor was there ever, then or after, any man that could say certainly
								who it was that did the deed);

who brought him to it by telling him that though he had not done it,
								yet he might be sure to save his own life and should deliver the
								city from the present suspicion; 
							 and that he should be more certain of his own safety by a free
								confession than by coming to his trial if he denied it.

Hereupon, he accused both himself and others for the Mercuries. 
							 The people of Athens, gladly receiving the certainty (as they
								thought) of the fact, and having been much vexed before to think
								that the conspirators should never [perhaps] be discovered to their
								multitude, presently set at liberty the accuser and the rest with
								him whom he had not appeached; 
							 but for those that were accused, they appointed judges, and all they
								apprehended they executed; 
							 and having condemned to die such as fled, they ordained a sum of
								money to be given to those that should slay them.

And though it were all this while uncertain whether they suffered
								justly or unjustly, yet the rest of the city had a manifest ease for
								the present.

But touching Alcibiades, the Athenians took it extreme ill through
								the instigation of his enemies, the same that had opposed him before
								he went. 
							 And seeing it was certain, as they thought, for the Mercuries, the
								other crime also concerning the mysteries, whereof he had been
								accused, seemed a great deal the more to have been committed by him
								upon the same reason and conspiracy against the people.

For it fell out withal, whilst the city was in a tumult about this,
								that an army of the Lacedaemonians was come as far as the isthmus
								upon some design against the Boeotians. 
							 These therefore they thought were come thither not against the
								Boeotians, but by appointment of him, and that if they had not first
								apprehended the persons appeached, the city had been betrayed. 
							 And one night they watched all night long in their arms in the temple
								of Theseus within the city.

And the friends of Alcibiades in Argos were at the same time
								suspected of a purpose to set upon the people there; 
							 whereupon the Athenians also delivered unto the Argive people those
								hostages which they held of theirs in the islands to be slain.

And there were presumptions against Alcibiades on all sides. 
							 Insomuch, as purposing by law to put him to death, they sent, as I
								have said, the galley called Salaminia into Sicily both for him and
								the rest with him that had been accused;

but gave command to those that went not to apprehend him, but to bid
								him follow them to make his purgation, because they had a care not
								to give occasion of stir either amongst their own or their enemy's
								soldiers, but especially because they desired that the Mantineans
								and the Argives, who they thought followed the war by his
								persuasion, might not depart from the army.

So he and the rest accused with him in his own galley, in company of
								the Salaminia, left Sicily and set sail for Athens. 
							 But being at Thurii they followed no further, but left the galley and
								were no more to be found, fearing indeed to appear to the
								accusation.

They of the Salaminia made search for Alcibiades and those that were
								with him for a while, but not finding him, followed on their course
								for Athens. 
							 Alcibiades, now an outlaw, passed shortly after in a small boat from
								Thurii into Peloponnesus; 
							 and the Athenians, proceeding to judgment upon his not appearing,
								condemned both him and them to death.

After this, the Athenian generals that remained in Sicily, having
								divided the army into two and taken each his part by lot, went with
								the whole towards Selinus and Egesta with intention both to see if
								the Egestaeans would pay them the money and withal to get knowledge
								of the designs of the Selinuntians and learn the state of their
								controversy with the Egesteans.

And sailing by the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand, on
								that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they came to Himera, the
								only Grecian city in that part of Sicily;

which not receiving them, they went on, and by the way took Hyccara,
								a little town of the Sicanians enemy to the Egestaeans, and a
								sea-town; 
							 and having made the inhabitants slaves, delivered the town to the
								Egestaeans, whose horse-forces were there with them. 
							 Thence the Athenians with their landsmen returned through the
								territory of the Siculi to Catana; 
							 and the galleys went about with the captives.

Nicias going with the fleet presently from Hyccara to Egesta, when he
								had dispatched with them his other business and received thirty
								talents of money, returned to the army. 
							 The captives they ransomed, of which they made one hundred and twenty
								talents more.

Then they sailed about to their confederates of the Siculi,
								appointing them to send their forces; 
							 and with the half of their own they came before Hybla in the
								territory of Gela, an enemy city, but took it not. 
							 And so ended this summer.

The next winter the Athenians fell presently to make preparation for
								their journey against Syracuse; 
							 and the Syracusians, on the other side, prepared to invade the
								Athenians.

For seeing the Athenians had not presently, upon the first fear and
								expectation of their coming, fallen upon them, they got every day
								more and more heart. 
							 And because they went far from them into those other parts of Sicily,
								and assaulting Hybla could not take it, they contemned them more
								than ever, and prayed their commanders (as is the manner of the
								multitude when they be in courage), seeing that the Athenians came
								not unto them, to conduct them to Catana.

And the Syracusian horsemen, which were ever abroad for scouts,
								spurring up to the camp of the Athenians, amongst other scorns asked
								them whether they came not rather to dwell in the land of another
								than to restore the Leontines to their own.

The Athenian generals, having observed this and being desirous to
								draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might be from the
								city, to be able in the meantime without impeachment, going thither
								in the night by sea, to seize on some convenient place to encamp
								in; 
							 for they knew they should not be able to do it so well in the face of
								an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, for that
								the Syracusian horsemen being many would greatly annoy the
								light-armed and other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen
								there; 
							 whereas thus they might possess themselves of a place where the horse
								could not do them any hurt at all to speak of (now the Syracusian
								outlaws that were with them had told them of a place near the temple
								Olympieium, which also they seized); I say, the Athenian generals,
								to bring this their purpose to effect contrived the matter thus:

They send a man, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and in the
								opinion of the Syracusian commanders no less a friend of theirs. 
							 This man was a Catanaean and said he came from Catana, from such and
								such, whose names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of their
								well-willers in that city.

He told them that the Athenians lay every night within the town and
								far from their arms; 
							 and that if with the whole power of their city, at a day appointed
								betimes in a morning they would come to their camp, those friends of
								the Syracusians would shut the Athenians in and set on fire their
								galleys, by which means the Syracusians, assaulting the pallisado,
								might easily win the camp, and that the Catanaeans that were to help
								them herein were many, and those he came from already prepared for
								it.

The Syracusian commanders, having been also otherwise encouraged, and
								having intended a preparation to go against Catana thought this
								messenger had not come, did so much the more unadvisedly believe the
								man, and straightways being agreed of the day on which they were to
								be there, sent him away. 
							 These commanders (for by this time the Selinuntians and some other
								their confederates were come in) appointed the Syracusians
								universally to set forwards by a day. 
							 And when all their necessaries were in readiness and the day at hand
								on which they were to be there, they set forwards towards Catana and
								encamped the night following upon the banks of the river Simaethus
								in the territory of the Leontines.

The Athenians, upon advertisement that they were set forth, rising
								with their whole army, both themselves and such of the Siculi and
								others as went with them, and going aboard their galleys and boats,
								in the beginning of the night set sail for Syracuse.

In the morning betimes the Athenians disbarked over against
								Olympieium to make their camp. 
							 And the Syracusian horsemen, who were at Catana before the rest,
								finding the camp risen, came back to the foot and told them; 
							 whereupon they went all together back to the aid of the city.

In the meantime, the way the Syracusians had to go being long, the
								Athenians had pitched their camp at leisure in a place of advantage,
								wherein it was their own power to begin battle when they list, and
								where both in and before the battle the Syracusian horsemen could
								least annoy them. 
							 For on one side there were walls and houses and trees and a lake that
								kept them off; 
							 on the other side steep rocks;

and having felled trees hard by and brought them to the seaside, they
								made a pallisado both before their galleys and towards Dascon. 
							 And on that part that was most accessible to the enemy, they made a
								fort with stone (the best they could find, but unwrought) and with
								wood, and withal pulled down the bridge of the river Anapus.

Whilst this was doing, there came none to empeach them from the
								city. 
							 The first that came against them were the Syracusian horsemen, and by
								and by after, all the foot together. 
							 And though at first they came up near unto the camp of the Athenians,
								yet after, seeing the Athenians came not out against them, they
								retired again, and crossing to the other side of the Helorine
								highway, stayed there that night.

The next day the Athenians and their confederates prepared to fight,
								and were ordered thus: The Argives and the Mantineans had the right
								wing, the Athenians were in the middle, and the rest of their
								confederates in the other wing. 
							 That half of the army which stood foremost was ordered by eight in
								file; 
							 the other half towards their tents, ordered likewise by eights, was
								cast into the form of a long square and commanded to observe
								diligently where the rest of the army was in distress and to make
								specially thither. 
							 And in the midst of these so arranged were received such as carried
								the weapons and tools of the army.

The Syracusians arranged their men of arms, who were Syracusians of
								all conditions and as many of their confederates as were present, by
								sixteen in file (they that came to aid them, were chiefly the
								Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of the Geloans, about two
								hundred, and of the Camarinaeans, about twenty horsemen and fifty
								archers); 
							 the cavalry they placed in the right point of the battle, being in
								all no less than a thousand two hundred, and with them the
								darters.

But the Athenians intending to begin the battle, Nicias went up and
								down the army, from one nation to another, to whom and to all in
								general he spake to this effect:

What need I, sirs, to make a long
										exhortation when this battle is the thing for which we all
										came hither? 
									 For in my opinion, the present preparation is more able to
										give you encouragement than any oration how well soever
										made, if with a weak army.

For where we are together, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and
									the best of the islanders, how can we choose among so many and
									good confederates, but conceive great hope of the victory; 
								 especially against tag and rag, and not chosen men, as we are
									ourselves, and against Sicilians, who though they contemn us,
									cannot stand against us, their skill not being answerable to
									their courage?

It must be remembered also that we be far from our own and not
									near to any amicable territory but such as we shall acquire by
									the sword. 
								 My exhortation to you, I am certain, is contrary to that of the
									enemy. 
								 For they say to theirs, 'You are to fight for your country.' 
								 I say to you, You are to fight out of your
									country, where you must either get the victory, or not easily
									get away; 
								 for many horsemen will be upon us.

Remember therefore every man his own worth, and charge
									valiantly; 
								 and think the present necessity and strait we are in to be more
									formidable than the enemy.

Nicias, having thus exhorted the army, led it presently to the
								charge. 
							 The Syracusians expected not to have fought at that instant; 
							 and the city being near, some of them were gone away; 
							 and some for haste came in running; 
							 and though late, yet every one, as he came, put himself in where was
								the greatest number. 
							 For they wanted neither willingness nor courage, either in this or
								any other battle, being no less valiant, so far forth as they had
								experience, than the Athenians; 
							 but the want of this made them, even against their wills, to abate
								also somewhat of their courage. 
							 Nevertheless though they thought not the Athenians would have begun
								the battle, and were thereby constrained to fight upon a sudden, yet
								they resumed their arms and came presently forward to the
								encounter.

And first, the casters of stones and slingers and archers of either
								side skirmished in the midst between the armies, mutually chasing
								each other, as amongst the light-armed was not unlikely. 
							 After this, the soothsayers brought forth their sacrifices according
								to the law of the place; 
							 and the trumpets instigated the men of arms to the battle.

And they came on to fight, the Syracusians for their country and
								their lives for the present, and for their liberty in the
								future; 
							 on the other side, the Athenians to win the country of another and
								make it their own and not to weaken their own by being
								vanquished; 
							 the Argives and other free confederates, to help the Athenians to
								conquer the country they came against and to return to their own
								with victory; 
							 and their subject confederates came also on with great courage,
								principally for their better safety, as desperate if they overcame
								not, and withal upon the by, that by helping the Athenians to subdue
								the country of another, their own subjection might be the easier.

After they were come to hand-strokes, they fought long on both
								sides. 
							 But in the meantime there happened some claps of thunder and flashes
								of lightning together with a great shower of rain; 
							 insomuch as it added to the fear of the Syracusians, that were now
								fighting their first battle and not familiar with the wars; 
							 whereas to the other side that had more experience, the season of the
								year seemed to expound that accident;

and their greatest fear proceeded from the so long resistance of
								their enemies, in that they were not all this while overcome. 
							 When the Argives first had made the left wing of the Syracusians to
								give ground, and after them the Athenians had also done the like to
								those that were arranged against them, then the rest of the
								Syracusian army was presently broken and put to flight.

But the Athenians pursued them not far, because the Syracusian
								horsemen, being many and unvanquished, whensoever any men of arms
								advanced far from the body of the army, charged upon them and still
								drave them in again;

but having followed as far as safely they might in great troops, they
								retired again and erected a trophy. 
							 The Syracusians, having rallied themselves in the Helorine way and
								recovered their order as well as they could for that time, sent a
								guard into Olympieium, lest the Athenians should take the treasure
								there, and returned with the rest of the army into the city.

The Athenians went not to assault the temple, but gathering together
								their dead, laid them upon the funeral fire, and stayed that night
								upon the place. 
							 The next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their
								dead, of whom and of their confederates were slain about two hundred
								and sixty; 
							 and gathered up the bones of their own. 
							 Of the Athenians and their confederates there died about fifty. 
							 And thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, they
								returned to Catana.

For it was now winter; 
							 and to make war there, they thought it yet unpossible before they had
								sent for horsemen to Athens and levied other amongst their
								confederates there in Sicily, to the end they might not be
								altogether over-mastered in horse; 
							 and before they had also both levied money there and received more
								from Athens and made league with certain cities, which they hoped
								after this battle would the more easily hearken thereunto, and
								before they had likewise provided themselves of victuals and other
								things necessary, as intending the next spring to undertake Syracuse
								again.

With this mind they went to winter at Naxos and Catana. 

							 The Syracusians, after they had buried their dead, called an
								assembly;

and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to any
								in wisdom, and in war both able for his experience and eminent for
								his valour, standing forth gave them encouragement and would not
								suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. 
							 Their courage, he said, was not overcome, though their want of order
								had done them hurt.

And yet in that they were not so far inferior as it was likely they
								would have been, especially being (as one may say) homebred
								artificers, against the most experienced in the war of all the
								Grecians.

That they had also been hurt by the number of their generals and
								commanders—for there were fifteen that commanded in chief—and by the
								many supernumerary soldiers under no command at all. 
							 Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful leaders, and prepare
								armour this winter for such as want it, to increase as much as might
								be the number of their men of arms, and compel them in other things
								to the exercise of discipline, in all reason they were to have the
								better of the enemy. 
							 For valour they had already, and to keep their order would be learnt
								by practice; 
							 and both of these would still grow greater: skill, by practising with
								danger; 
							 and their courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of
								skill.

And for their generals, they ought to choose them few and absolute,
								and to take an oath unto them to let them lead the army wheresoever
								they thought best. 
							 For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the
								better be concealed and all things would be put in readiness with
								order and less tergiversation.

The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all that he advised
								and elected three generals, him, Heracleides, the son of Lysimachus,
								and Sicanus, the son of Exekestus.

They sent also ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as well to
								obtain a league with them as also to persuade the Lacedaemonians to
								make a hotter war against the Athenians and to declare themselves in
								the quarrel of the Syracusians, thereby either to withdraw them from
								Sicily or to make them the less able to send supply to their army
								which was there already.

The Athenian army at Catana sailed presently to Messana to receive it
								by treason of some within; 
							 but the plot came not to effect. 
							 For Alcibiades, when he was sent for from his charge, being resolved
								to fly and knowing what was to be done, discovered the same to the
								friends of the Syracusians in Messana, who with those of their
								faction slew such as were accused, and being armed upon occasion of
								the sedition, obtained to have the Athenians kept out.

And the Athenians, after thirteen days' stay, troubled with
								tempestuous weather, provision also failing and nothing succeeding,
								returned again to Naxos; 
							 and having fortified their camp with a pallisado, they wintered
								there, and dispatched a galley to Athens for money and horsemen to
								be with them early in the spring.

The Syracusians this winter raised a wall before their city, all the
								length of the side towards Epipolae, including Temenites, to the
								end, if they chanced to be beaten, they might not be so easily
								enclosed as when they were in a narrower compass. 
							 And they put a guard into Megara and another into Olympieium, and
								made pallisadoes on the seaside at all the places of landing.

And knowing that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched with
								all the power of the city unto Catana, and after they had wasted the
								territory and burnt the cabins and camp where the Athenians had
								lodged before, returned home.

And having heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors to Camarina,
								according to a league made before in the time of Laches, to try if
								they could win them to their side, they also sent ambassadors to
								oppose it. 
							 For they suspected that the Camarinaeans had sent those succours in
								the former battle with no great good will; 
							 and that now they would take part with them no longer, seeing the
								Athenians had the better of the day, but would rather join with the
								Athenians upon the former league.

Hermocrates, therefore, and others being come to Camarina from the
								Syracusians, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians, when the
								assembly was met, Hermocrates, desiring to increase their envy to
								the Athenians, spake unto them to this effect:

"Men of Camarina, we come not hither upon fear that the forces of the
								Athenians here present may affright you, but lest their speeches
								which they are about to make may seduce you before you have also
								heard what may be said by us.

They are come into Sicily with that pretence indeed which you hear
								given out, but with that intention which we all suspect; 
							 and to me they seem not to intend the replantation of the Leontines,
								but rather our supplantation. 
							 For surely it holdeth not in reason that they who subvert the cities
								yonder should come to plant any city here; 
							 nor that they should have such a care of the Leontines, because
								Chalcideans, for kindred's sake, when they keep in servitude the
								Chalcideans themselves of Euboea, of whom these here are but the
								colonies.

But they both hold the cities there and attempt those here in one and
								the same kind. 
							 For when the Ionians and the rest of the confederates, their own
								colonies, had willingly made them their leaders in the war to avenge
								them of the Medes, the Athenians, laying afterwards to their charge,
								to some the not sending of their forces, to some their war amongst
								themselves, and so to the rest the most colourable criminations they
								could get, subdued them all to their obedience.

And it was not for the liberty of the Grecians that these men, nor
								for the liberty of themselves that the Grecians made head against
								the Medes; 
							 but the Athenians did it to make them serve not the Medes but them,
								and the Grecians to change their master, as they did, not for one
								less wise, but for one worse wise.

"But in truth we come not to accuse the Athenian state, though it be
								obnoxious enough, before you that know sufficiently the injuries
								they have done, but far rather to accuse ourselves, who, though we
								have the examples before our eyes of the Grecians there brought into
								servitude for want of defending themselves, and though we see them
								now, with the same sophistry of replanting the Leontines and their
								kindred and aiding of their confederates the Egestaeans, prepare to
								do the like unto us, do not yet unite ourselves and with better
								courage make them to know that we be not Ionians nor Hellespontines
								nor islanders, that changing serve always the Mede or some other
								master, but that we are Dorians and freemen, come to dwell here in
								Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free country.

Shall we stand still till we be taken city after city when we know
								that that only way we are conquerable; 
							 and when we find them wholly bent to this, that by drawing some from
								our alliance with their words, and causing some to wear each other
								out with war upon hope of their confederacy, and winning others by
								other fit language, they may have the power to do us hurt? 
							 But we think, though one of the same island perish, yet if he dwell
								far off, the danger will not come to us; 
							 and before it arrive, we count unhappy only him that suffereth before
								us.

"If any therefore be of this opinion, that it is not he but the
								Syracusian that is the Athenian's enemy, and thinketh it a hard
								matter that he should endanger himself for the territory that is
								mine, I would have him to consider that he is to fight not chiefly
								for mine, but equally for his own in mine, and with the more safety
								for that I am not destroyed before and he thereby destitute of my
								help, but stand with him in the battle. 
							 Let him also consider that the Athenians come not hither to punish
								the Syracusians for being enemies to you, but by pretence of me to
								make himself the stronger by your friendship.

If any man here envieth or also feareth us (for the strongest are
								still liable unto both), and would therefore wish that the
								Syracusians might be weakened to make them more modest, but not
								vanquished for their own safety's sake, that man hath conceived a
								hope beyond the power of man. 
							 For it is not reasonable that the same man should be the disposer
								both of his desires and of his fortune.

And if his aim should fail him, he might, deploring his own misery,
								peradventure wish to enjoy my prosperity again. 
							 But this will not be possible to him that shall abandon me and not
								undertake the same dangers, though not in title, yet in effect the
								same that I do. 
							 For though it be our power in title, yet in effect it is your own
								safety you defend.

And you men of Camarina, that are borderers and likely to have the
								second place of danger, you should most of all have foreseen this
								and not have aided us so dully. 
							 You should rather have come to us; 
							 and that which, if the Athenians had come first against Camarina, you
								should in your need have implored at our hands, the same you should
								now also have been seen equally to hearten us withal to keep us from
								yielding. 
							 But as yet, neither you nor any of the rest have been so forward.

"Perhaps, upon fear, you mean to deal evenly between us both and
								allege your league with the Athenians. 
							 You made no league against your friends, but against your enemies, in
								case any should invade you; 
							 and by it you are also tied to aid the Athenians when others wrong
								them; 
							 but not when, as now, they wrong their neighbour. 
							 For even the Rhegians, who are also Chalcideans, refuse to help them
								in replanting the Leontines, though these also be Chalcideans.

And then it were a hard case if they, suspecting a bad action under a
								fair justification, are wise without a reason; 
							 and you, upon pretence of reason, should aid your natural enemies and
								help them that most hate you to destroy your more natural
								kindred. 

							 "But this is no justice;

to fight with them is justice, and not to stand in fear of their
								preparation. 
							 Which, if we hold together, is not terrible, but is, if contrarily
								(which they endeavour) we be disunited. 
							 For neither when they came against us, being none but ourselves, and
								had the upperhand in battle, could they yet effect their
								purpose; 
							 but quickly went their ways.

There is no reason therefore we should be
										afraid when we are all together, but that we should have the
										better will to unite ourselves in a league; 
									 and the rather because we are to have aid from Peloponnesus,
										who every way excel these men in military sufficiency. 
									 Nor should you think that your purpose to aid neither, as
										being in league with both, is either just in respect of us
										or safe for yourselves;

for it is not so just in substance as it is in the pretence. 
								 For if through want of your aid the assailed perish and the
									assailant become victor, what do you by your neutrality but
									leave the safety of the one undefended and suffer the other to
									do evil? 
								 Whereas it were more noble in you, by joining with the wronged
									and with your kindred, both to defend the common good of Sicily
									and keep the Athenians, as your friends, from an act of
									injustice.

To be short, we Syracusians say that to demonstrate plainly to
									you or to any other the thing you already know is no hard
									matter; 
								 but we pray you, and withal if you reject our words we protest,
									that whereas the Ionians, who have ever been our enemies, do
									take counsel against us, you, that are Dorians as well as we,
									betray us.

And if they subdue us, though it be by your counsels that they do
									it, yet they only shall have the honour of it; 
								 and for the prize of their victory, they will have none other but
									even the authors of their victory; 
								 but if the victory fall unto us, even you also, the cause of this
									our danger, shall undergo the penalty.

Consider therefore now and take your choice whether you will have
									the servitude without the present danger, or saving yourselves
									with us, both avoid the dishonour of having a master and escape
									our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be lasting.

Thus spake Hermocrates. 
							 After him Euphemus, ambassador from the Athenians, spake thus:

"Though our coming were to renew our former league, yet seeing we are
								touched by the Syracusian, it will be necessary we speak something
								here of the right of our dominion.

And the greatest testimony of this right he hath himself given, in
								that he said the Ionians were ever enemies to the Dorians. 
							 And it is true. 
							 For being Ionians, we have ever endeavoured to find out some means or
								other how best to free ourselves from subjection to the
								Peloponnesians, that are Dorians, more in number than we and
								dwelling near us.

After the Medan war, having gotten us a navy, we were delivered
								thereby from the command and leading of the Lacedaemonians, there
								being no cause why they should rather be leaders of us than we of
								them save only that they were then the stronger. 
							 And when we were made commanders of those Grecians which before lived
								under the king, we took upon us the government of them, because we
								thought that, having power in our hands to defend ourselves, we
								should thereby be the less subject to the Peloponnesians. 
							 And to say truth, we subjected the Ionians and islanders (whom the
								Syracusians say we brought into bondage being our kindred) not
								without just cause;

for they came with the Medes against ours, their mother city, and for
								fear of losing their wealth durst not revolt, as we did, that
								abandoned our very city. 
							 But as they were content to serve, so they would have imposed the
								same condition upon us.

"For these causes we took upon us our dominion over them, both as
								worthy of the same, in that we brought the greatest fleet and
								promptest courage to the service of the Grecians, whereas they, with
								the like promptness in favour of the Medes, did us hurt; 
							 and also as being desirous to procure ourselves a strength against
								the Peloponnesians.

And follow any other we will not, seeing we alone have pulled down
								the barbarian and therefore have right to command, or at least have
								put ourselves into danger more for the liberty of the Peloponnesians
								than of all the rest of Greece, and our own besides. 
							 Now to seek means for one's own preservation is a thing
								unblameable. 
							 And as it is for our own safety's cause that we are now here, so also
								we find that the same will be profitable for you.

Which we will make plain from those very things which they accuse,
								and you, as most formidable, suspect us of, being assured that such
								as suspect with vehement fear, though they may be won for the
								present with the sweetness of an oration, yet when the matter comes
								to performance, will then do as shall be most for their turn.

"We have told you that we hold our dominion yonder upon fear; 
							 and that upon the same cause we come hither now, by the help of our
								friends to assure the cities here, and not to bring you into
								subjection but rather to keep you from it.

"And let no man object that we be solicitous for those that are
								nothing to us; 
							 for as long as you be preserved and able to make head against the
								Syracusians, we shall be the less annoyed by their sending of forces
								to the Peloponnesians.

And in this point you are very much unto us. 
							 For the same reason it is meet also that we replant the
								Leontines; 
							 not to subject them, as their kindred in Euboea, but to make them as
								puissant as we can, that, being near, they may from their own
								territory weaken the Syracusians in our behalf.

For as for our wars at home, we are a match for our enemies without
								their help; 
							 and the Chalcidean (whom having made a slave yonder, the Syracusian
								said, we absurdly attempt to vindicate into liberty here) is most
								beneficial to us there without arms, paying money only; 
							 but the Leontines, and our other friends here, are the most
								profitable to us when they are most in liberty.

"Now to a tyrant or city that reigneth, nothing can be thought absurd
								if profitable, nor any man a friend that may not be trusted to. 
							 Friend or enemy he must be, according to the several occasions. 
							 But here it is for our benefit not to weaken our friends, but by our
								friends' strength to weaken our enemies. 
							 This you must needs believe, inasmuch as yonder also we so command
								over our confederates as every of them may be most useful to us:

the Chians and Methymnaeans redeem their liberty with providing us
								some galleys; 
							 the most of the rest, with a tribute of money somewhat more
								pressing. 
							 Some again of our confederates are absolutely free, notwithstanding
								that they be islanders and easy to be subdued; 
							 the reason whereof is this: they are situate in places commodious
								about Peloponnesus.

It is probable, therefore, that here also we will so order our
								affairs as shall be most for our own turn and most according to our
								fear, as we told you, of the Syracusians. 
							 For they affect a dominion over you, and having by advantage of your
								suspicion of us drawn you to their side, will themselves by force,
								or (if we go home without effect) by your want of friends, have the
								sole command of Sicily, which, if you join with them, must of
								necessity come to pass. 
							 For neither will it be easy for us to bring so great forces again
								together, nor will the Syracusians want strength to subdue you if we
								be absent. 
							 Him that thinketh otherwise, the thing itself convinceth.

"For when you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear you
								pretended was only this: that if we neglected you, the Syracusians
								would subdue you, and we thereby should participate of the
								danger.

And it were unjust that the argument you would needs have to prevail
								then with us should now have no effect with yourselves, or that you
								should be jealous of the much strength we bring against the power of
								the Syracusians when much rather you should give the less ear unto
								them. 
							 We cannot so much as stay here without you;

and if becoming perfidious we should subdue these states, yet we are
								unable to hold them, both in respect of the length of the voyage and
								for want of means of guarding them, because they be great and
								provided after the manner of the continent. 
							 Whereas they, not lodged near you in a camp, but inhabiting near you
								in a city of greater power than this of ours, will be always
								watching their advantages against you;

and when an opportunity shall be offered against any of your cities,
								will be sure not to let it slip. 
							 This they have already made to appear, both in their proceedings
								against the Leontines, and also otherwise. 
							 And yet have these the face to move you against us that hinder this,
								and that have hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their
								hands.

But we, on the other side, invite you to a far more real safety, and
								pray you not to betray that safety which we both of us hold from one
								another at this present, but to consider that they by their own
								number have way to you always, though without confederates, whereas
								you shall seldom have so great an aid again to resist them. 
							 Which if through your jealousy you suffer to go away without effect,
								or if it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least part of the
								same, when their coming can no more do you good.

But, Camarinaeans, be neither you nor others
										moved with their calumnies. 
									 We have told you the very truth why we are suspected; 
									 and summarily we will tell it you again, claiming to prevail
										with you thereby.

We say we command yonder lest else we should obey, and we assert
									into liberty the cities here lest else we should be harmed by
									them; 
								 many things we have to be doing, because many things we are
									forced to beware of; 
								 and both now and before, we came not uncalled, but called as
									confederates to such of you as suffer wrong.

Make not yourselves judges of what we do, nor go about as censors
									(which were now hard to do) to divert us; 
								 but as far as this busy humour and fashion of ours may be for
									your own service, so far take and use it; 
								 and think not the same hurtful alike to all, but that the
									greatest part of the Grecians have good by it.

For in all places, though we be not of any side, yet both he that
									looketh to be wronged and he that contriveth to do the wrong, by
									the obviousness of the hope that the one hath of our aid and of
									the fear that the other hath of their own danger if we should
									come, are brought by necessity, the one to moderation against
									his will, the other into safety without his trouble.

Refuse not therefore the security now present, common both to us
									that require it, and to yourselves. 
								 But do as others use to do: come with us, and instead of
									defending yourselves always against the Syracusians, take your
									turn once and put them to their guard as they have done
								you.

Thus spake Euphemus. 
							 The Camarinaeans stood thus affected: they bare good will to the
								Athenians, save that they thought they meant to subjugate
								Sicily; 
							 and were ever at strife with the Syracusians about their borders. 
							 Yet because they were afraid that the Syracusians, that were near
								them, might as well get the victory as the other, they had both
								formerly sent them some few horse, and also now resolved for the
								future to help the Syracusians, but underhand and as sparingly as
								possible; 
							 and withal that they might no less seem to favour the Athenians than
								the Syracusians, especially after they had won a battle, to give for
								the present an equal answer unto both.

So after deliberation had, they answered thus: that forasmuch as they
								that warred were both of them their confederates, they thought it
								most agreeable to their oath for the present to give aid to
								neither.

And so the ambassadors of both sides went their ways. 

							 And the Syracusians made preparations for the war by themselves. 

							 The Athenians, being encamped at Naxos, treated with the Siculi to
								procure as many of them as they might to their side.

Of whom, such as inhabited the plain and were subject to the
								Syracusians for the most part held off; 
							 but they that dwelt in the most inland parts of the island, being a
								free people, and ever before dwelling in villages, presently agreed
								with the Athenians, and brought corn into the army, and some of them
								also money.

To those that held off the Athenians went with their army; 
							 and some they forced to come in and others they hindered from
								receiving the aids and garrisons of the Syracusians. 
							 And having brought their fleet from Naxos, where it had been all the
								winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at Catana and
								re-erected their camp formerly burnt by the Syracusians.

They sent a galley also to Carthage to procure amity and what help
								they could from thence; 
							 and into Hetruria, because some cities there had of their own accord
								promised to take their parts. 
							 They sent likewise to the Siculi about them and to Egesta, appointing
								them to send in all the horse they could, and made ready bricks and
								iron and whatsoever else was necessary for a siege, and every other
								thing they needed, as intending to fall in hand with the war early
								the next spring.

The ambassadors of Syracuse which were sent to Corinth and
								Lacedaemon, as they sailed by, endeavoured also to move the Italians
								to a regard of this action of the Athenians.

Being come to Corinth, they spake unto them and demanded aid upon the
								title of consanguinity. 
							 The Corinthians, having forthwith for their own part decreed
								cheerfully to aid them, sent also ambassadors from themselves along
								with these to Lacedaemon to help them to persuade the Lacedaemonians
								both to make a more open war against the Athenians at home and to
								send some forces also into Sicily.

At the same time that these ambassadors were at Lacedaemon from
								Corinth, Alcibiades was also there with his fellow fugitives, who
								presently upon their escape passed over from Thurii first to
								Cyllene, the haven of the Eleians, in a ship, and afterwards went
								thence to Lacedaemon, sent for by the Lacedaemonians themselves,
								under public security.

For he feared them for his doings about Mantineia. 
							 And it fell out that in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians the
								Corinthians, Syracusians, and Alcibiades made all of them the same
								request. 
							 Now the ephores and magistrates, though intending to send ambassadors
								to Syracuse to hinder them from compounding with the Athenians,
								being yet not forward to send them aid, Alcibiades stood forth and
								sharpened the Lacedaemonians, inciting them with words to this
								effect:

"It will be necessary that I say something first concerning mine own
								accusation, lest through jealousy of me you bring a prejudicate ear
								to the common business.

My ancestors having on a certain quarrel renounced the office of
								receiving you, I was the man that restored the same again and showed
								you all possible respect, both otherwise and in the matter of your
								loss at Pylus. 
							 Whilst I persisted in my good will to you, being to make a peace at
								Athens, by treating the same with my adversaries, you invested them
								with authority and me with disgrace.

For which cause, if in applying myself afterwards to the Mantineans
								and Argives, or in anything else I did you hurt, I did it
								justly; 
							 and if any man here were causelessly angry with me then when he
								suffered, let him be now content again when he knows the true cause
								of the same. 
							 Or if any man think the worse of me for inclining to the people, let
								him acknowledge that therein also he is offended without a
								cause.

For we have been always enemies to tyrants; 
							 and what is contrary to a tyrant is called the people; 
							 and from thence hath continued our adherence to the multitude. 
							 Besides, in a city governed by democracy, it was necessary in most
								things to follow the present course; 
							 nevertheless we have endeavoured to be more moderate than suiteth
								with the now headstrong humour of the people.

But others there have been, both formerly and now, that have incited
								the common people to worse things than I; 
							 and they are those that have also driven out me.

But as for us, when we had the charge of the whole, we thought it
								reason, by what form it was grown most great and most free and in
								which we received it, in the same to preserve it. 
							 For though such of us as have judgment do know well enough what the
								democracy is, and I no less than another (insomuch as I could
								inveigh against it; 
							 but of confessed madness nothing can be said that is new), yet we
								thought it not safe to change it when you our enemies were so near
								us.

"Thus stands the matter touching my own accusation. 
							 And concerning what we are to consult of, both you and I, if I know
								anything which you yourselves do not, hear it now.

We made this voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue the
								Sicilians, after them the Italians, after them, to assay the
								dominion of Carthage, and Carthage itself.

If these or most of these enterprises succeeded, then next we should
								have undertaken Peloponnesus, with the accession both of the Greek
								forces there and with many mercenary barbarians, Iberians and others
								of those parts, confessed to be the most warlike of the barbarians
								that are now. we should also have built many galleys besides these
								which we have already (there being plenty of timber in Italy); 
							 with the which besieging Peloponnesus round, and also taking the
								cities thereof with our land forces, upon such occasions as should
								arise from the land, some by assault and some by siege, we hoped
								easily to have debelled it and afterwards to have gotten the
								dominion of all Greece.

As for money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places
								we should have conquered there, besides what here we should have
								found, would sufficiently have furnished us.

"Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have heard what is
								the design of the fleet now gone; 
							 and which the generals there, as far as they can, will also put in
								execution. 
							 Understand next that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot possibly
								hold out.

For the Sicilians, though inexpert, if many of them unite may well
								subsist; 
							 but that the Syracusians alone, with their whole power already beaten
								and withal kept from the use of the sea, should withstand the forces
								of the Athenians already there is a thing impossible. 
							 And if their city should be taken, all Sicily is had, and soon after
								Italy also;

and the danger from thence which I foretold you would not be long ere
								it fell upon you. 
							 Let no man therefore think that he now consulteth of Sicily only but
								also of Peloponnesus, unless this be done with speed.

Let the army you send be of such as being aboard may row and landing
								presently be armed; 
							 and (which I think more profitable than the army itself) send a
								Spartan for commander, both to train the soldiers already there and
								to compel unto it such as refuse. 
							 For thus will your present friends be the more encouraged, and such
								as be doubtful come to you with the more assurance. 
							 It were also good to make war more openly upon them here, that the
								Syracusians, seeing your care, may the rather hold out, and the
								Athenians be less able to send supply to their army.

You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in the territory of Athens, a
								thing which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for the
								only evil they have not yet tasted in this war.

And the way to hurt an enemy most is to know certainly what he most
								feareth and to bring the same upon him. 
							 For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most as having the
								precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. 
							 As for the commodities which yourselves shall reap and deprive the
								enemy of by so fortifying, letting much pass, I will sum you up the
								principal. 
							 Whatsoever the territory is furnished withal will come most of it
								unto you, partly taken and partly of its own accord.

The revenue of the silver mines in Laurium and whatsoever other
								profit they have from their land or from their courts of justice
								will presently be lost; 
							 and, which is worse, their confederates will be remiss in bringing in
								their revenue and will care little for the Athenians if they believe
								once that you follow the war to the utmost. 
							 That any of these things be put in act speedily and earnestly, men of
								Lacedaemon, it resteth only in yourselves; 
							 for I am confident, and I think I err not, that all these things are
								possible to be done.

Now I must crave this: that I be neither the
										worse esteemed for that, having once been thought a lover of
										my country, I go now amongst the greatest enemies of the
										same against it, nor yet mistrusted as one that speaketh
										with the zeal of a fugitive.

For though I fly from the malice of them that drave me out, I
									shall not, if you take my counsel, fly your profit.

Nor are you enemies so much, who have hurt but your enemies, as
									they are that have made enemies of friends. 
								 I love not my country as wronged by it, but as having lived in
									safety in it.

Nor do I think that I do herein go against any country of mine,
									but that I far rather seek to recover the country I have
									not. 
								 And he is truly a lover of his country not that refuseth to
									invade the country he hath wrongfully lost, but that desires so
									much to be in it as by any means he can he will attempt to
									recover it.

I desire you therefore, Lacedaemonians, to make use of my service
									in whatsoever danger or labour confidently, seeing you know,
									according to the common saying, if I did hurt you much when I
									was your enemy, I can help you much when I am your friend. 
								 And so much the more in that I know the state of Athens and but
									conjectured at yours. 
								 And considering you are now in deliberation upon a matter of so
									extreme importance, I pray you think not much to send an army
									both into Sicily and Attica, as well to preserve the great
									matters that are there with the presence of a small part of your
									force, as also to pull down the power of the Athenians both
									present and to come, and afterwards to dwell in safety
									yourselves, and to have the leading of all Greece, not forced,
									but voluntary and with their good affection.

Thus spake Alcibiades. 
							 And the Lacedaemonians, though before this they had a purpose of
								their own accord to send an army against Athens but had delayed and
								neglected it, yet when these particularly were delivered by him,
								they were a great deal the more confirmed in the same, conceiving
								that what they had heard was from one that evidently knew it.

Insomuch as they had set their minds already upon the fortifying of
								Deceleia and upon the sending of some succours into Sicily for the
								present. 
							 And having assigned Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, unto the
								Syracusian ambassadors for chief commander, they willed him to
								consider, both with them and the Corinthians, how best for their
								present means and with greatest speed some help might be conveyed
								unto them in Sicily.

He thereupon appointed the Corinthians to send him two galleys
								presently to Asine, and to furnish the rest they meant to send, and
								to have them ready to sail when occasion should serve.

This agreed upon, they departed from Lacedaemon. 

							 In the meantime the galley arrived at Athens which the generals sent
								home for money and horsemen. 
							 And the Athenians, upon hearing, decreed to send both provision and
								horsemen to the army. 
							 So the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war written by
								Thucydides.

In the very beginning of the next spring the Athenians in Sicily
								departed from Catana and sailed by the coast to Megara of
								Sicily. 
							 The inhabitants whereof, in the time of the tyrant Gelon, the
								Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven out and now possess
								the territory themselves. 
							 Landing here, they wasted the fields;

and having assaulted a certain small fortress of the Syracusians, not
								taking it, they went presently back, part by land and part by sea,
								unto the river Tereas. 
							 And landing again in the plain fields, wasted the same and burnt up
								their corn; 
							 and lighting on some Syracusians, not many, they slew some of them,
								and having set up a trophy, went all again on board their
								galleys.

Thence they returned to Catana and took in victual; 
							 then with their whole army they went to Centoripa, a small city of
								the Siculi, which yielding on composition, they departed, and in
								their way burnt up the corn of the Inessaeans and the Hyblaeans.

Being come again to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty
								horsemen arrived from Athens, without horses, though not without the
								furniture, supposing to have horses there, and thirty archers on
								horseback, and three hundred talents of silver.

The same spring the Lacedaemonians led forth their army against Argos
								and went as far as to Cleonae; 
							 but an earthquake happening, they went home again. 
							 But the Argives invaded the territory of Thyrea, confining on their
								own, and took a great booty from the Lacedaemonians, which they sold
								for no less than twenty-five talents.

Not long after, the commons of Thespiae set upon them that had the
								government, but not prevailing, were part apprehended and part
								escaped to Athens, the Athenians having also aided them.

The Syracusians the same summer, when they heard that the Athenians
								had horsemen sent to them from Athens and that they were ready now
								to come against them, conceiving that if the Athenians gat not
								Epipolae, a rocky ground and lying just against the city, they would
								not be able, though masters of the field, to take in the city with a
								wall, intended therefore, lest the enemy should come secretly up, to
								keep the passages by which there was access unto it with a
								guard.

For the rest of the place is to the outside high and steep, falling
								to the city by degrees, and on the inside wholly subject to the
								eye. 
							 And it is called by the Syracusians Epipolae, because it lieth above
								the level of the rest.

The Syracusians, coming out of the city with their whole power into a
								meadow by the side of the river Anapus betimes in the morning (for
								Hermocrates and his fellow-commanders had already received their
								charge), were there taking a view of their arms; 
							 but first they had set apart seven hundred men of arms, under the
								leading of Diomilus, an outlaw of Andros, both to guard Epipolae and
								to be ready together quickly upon any other occasion wherein there
								might be use of their service.

The Athenians the day following, having been already mustered, came
								from Catana with their whole forces and landed their soldiers at a
								place called Leon, six or seven furlongs from Epipolae, unperceived,
								and laid their navy at anchor under Thapsus. 
							 Thapsus is almost an island, lying out into the sea and joined to the
								land with a narrow isthmus, not far from Syracuse, neither by sea
								nor land. 
							 And the naval forces of the Athenians, having made a pallisado across
								the said isthmus, lay there quiet.

But the land soldiers marched at high speed towards Epipolae and gat
								up by Euryelus before the Syracusians could come to them from out of
								the meadow where they were mustering.

Nevertheless they came on, every one with what speed he could, not
								only Diomilus with his seven hundred, but the rest also. 
							 They had no less to go from the meadow than twenty-five furlongs
								before they could reach the enemy.

The Syracusians, therefore, coming up in this manner and thereby
								defeated in battle at Epipolae, withdrew themselves into the
								city. 
							 But Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the rest.

The Athenians after this erected a trophy and delivered to the
								Syracusians the bodies of their dead under truce, and came down the
								next day to the city. 
							 But when none came out to give them battle, they retired again, and
								built a fort upon Labdalum, in the very brink of the precipices of
								Epipolae, on the side that looketh towards Megara, for a place to
								keep their utensils and money in when they went out either to fight
								or to work.

Not long after, there came unto them from Egesta three hundred
								horsemen, and from the Siculi, namely the Naxians and some others,
								about one hundred; 
							 and the Athenians had of their own two hundred and fifty for which
								they had horses, part from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans, and part
								they bought. 
							 So that they had together in the whole, six hundred and fifty
								horsemen.

Having put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians went down to Syca and
								raised there a wall in circle very quickly, so that they struck a
								terror into the Syracusians with the celerity of the work. 
							 Who, therefore, coming forth, intended to have given them battle and
								no longer to have neglected the matter.

But when the armies were one set against the other, the Syracusian
								generals, perceiving their own to be in disarray and not easily to
								be embattled, led them again into the city, save only a certain part
								of their horsemen; 
							 which staying, kept the Athenians from carrying of stone and
								straggling far abroad from their camp.

But the Athenians with one squadron of men of arms, together with
								their whole number of horse, charged the horsemen of the Syracusians
								and put them to flight, of whom they slew a part, and erected a
								trophy for this battle of horse.

The next day the Athenians fell to work upon their wall to the north
								side of their circular wall, some building and some fetching stone
								and timber, which they still laid down toward the place called
								Trogilus, in the way by which the wall should come with the shortest
								compass from the great haven to the other sea.

The Syracusians, by the persuasion of their generals, and principally
								of Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with their whole power
								against the Athenians any more, but thought fit rather, in the way
								where the Athenians were to bring their wall, to raise a
								counterwall; 
							 which, if they could but do before the wall of the Athenians came on,
								it would exclude their further building; 
							 and if the Athenians should set upon them as they were doing it, they
								might send part of the army to defend it, and pre-occupy the
								accesses to it with a pallisado;

and if they would come with their whole army to hinder them, then
								must they also be forced to let their own work stand still. 
							 Therefore they came out, and beginning at their own city, drew a
								cross-wall beneath the circular fortifications of the Athenians, and
								set wooden turrets upon it, made of the olive trees which they
								felled in the ground belonging to the temple.

The Athenian navy was not yet come about into the great haven from
								Thapsus, but the Syracusians were masters of the places near the
								sea; 
							 and the Athenians brought their provision to the army from Thapsus by
								land.

The Syracusians, when they thought both their pallisado and wall
								sufficient, and considering that the Athenians came not to impeach
								them in the work, as they that feared to divide their army and to be
								thereby the more easy to be fought withal, and that also hasted to
								make an end of their own wall wherewith to encompass the city, left
								one squadron for a guard of their works and retired with the rest
								into the city. 
							 And the Athenians cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their
								water to drink was conveyed under ground into the town. 
							 And having observed also that about noon the Syracusians kept within
								their tents, and that some of them were also gone into the city, and
								that such as were remaining at the pallisado kept but negligent
								watch, they commanded three hundred chosen men of arms, and certain
								other picked out and armed from amongst the unarmed, to run suddenly
								to that counterwall of the Syracusians. 
							 The rest of the army, divided in two, went one part with one of the
								generals to stop the succour which might be sent from the city, and
								the other with the other general to the pallsado next to the gate of
								the [counter-wall].

The three hundred assaulted and took the pallisado, the guard
								whereof, forsaking it, fled within the wall into the temple
								ground; 
							 and with them entered also their pursuers; 
							 but after they were in were beaten out again by the Syracusians and
								some slain, both of the Argives and Athenians, but not many.

Then the whole army went back together and pulled down the wall and
								plucked up the pallisado, the pales whereof they carried with them
								to their camp and erected a trophy.

The next day, the Athenians, beginning at their circular wall, built
								onwards to that crag over the marshes, which on that part of
								Epipolae looketh to the great haven, and by which the way to the
								haven, for their wall to come through the plain and marsh, was the
								shortest.

As this was doing, the Syracusians came out again and made another
								pallisado, beginning at the city, through the middle of the marsh,
								and a ditch at the side of it, to exclude the Athenians from
								bringing their wall to the sea.

But the Athenians, when they had finished their work as far as to the
								crag, assaulted the pallisado and trench of the Syracusians
								again. 
							 And having commanded their galleys to be brought about from Thapsus
								into the great haven of Syracuse, about break of day went straight
								down into the plain, and passing through the marsh, where the ground
								was clay and firmest, [and partly] upon boards and planks, won both
								the trench and pallisado, all but a small part, betimes in the
								morning, and the rest not long after.

And here also they fought, and the victory fell to the Athenians; 
							 the Syracusians, those of the right wing, fled to the city, and they
								of the left, to the river. 
							 The three hundred chosen Athenians, desiring to cut off their
								passage, marched at high speed towards the bridge.

But the Syracusians, fearing to be prevented (for most of the
								horsemen were in this number), set upon these three hundred, and
								putting them to flight, drave them upon the right wing of the
								Athenians, and following, affrighted also the foremost guard of the
								wing.

Lamachus, seeing this, came to aid them with a few archers from the
								left wing of their own and with [all] the Argives, and passing over
								a certain ditch, having but few with him, was deserted and slain
								with some six or seven more. 
							 These the Syracusians hastily snatched up and carried into a place of
								safety beyond the river; 
							 and when they saw the rest of the Athenian army coming towards them,
								they departed.

In the meantime, they that fled at first to the city, seeing how
								things went, took heart again, and re-embattled themselves against
								the same Athenians that stood ranged against them before; 
							 and withal sent a certain portion of their army against the circular
								fortification of the Athenians upon Epipolae, supposing to find it
								without defendants and so to take it.

And they took and demolished the outworks ten plethers in length; 
							 but the circle itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be left
								within it for infirmity. 
							 For he commanded his servants to set fire on all the engines and
								whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall:

knowing there was no other possible means to save themselves for want
								of men. 
							 And it fell out accordingly, for by reason of this fire they came no
								nearer, but retired. 
							 For the Athenians, having by this time beaten back the enemy below,
								were coming up to relieve the circle; 
							 and their galleys withal (as is before mentioned) were going about
								from Thapsus into the great haven.

Which they above perceiving, speedily made away, they and the whole
								army of the Syracusians, into the city, with opinion that they could
								no longer hinder them, with the strength they now had, from bringing
								their wall through unto the sea.

After this the Athenians erected a trophy and delivered to the
								Syracusians their dead under truce; 
							 and they on the other side delivered to the Athenians the body of
								Lamachus and of the rest slain with him. 
							 And their whole army, both land and sea forces, being now together,
								they began to enclose the Syracusians with a double wall from
								Epipolae and the rocks unto the seaside.

The necessaries of the army were supplied from all parts of
								Italy. 
							 And many of the Siculi, who before stood aloof to observe the way of
								fortune, took part now with the Athenians, to whom came also three
								penteconteri, [long boats of fifty oars apiece,] from Hetruria;

and divers other ways their hopes were nourished. 
							 For the Syracusians also, when there came no help from Peloponnesus,
								made no longer account to subsist by war; 
							 but conferred, both amongst themselves and with Nicias, of
								composition; 
							 for Lamachus being dead, the sole command of the army was in him.

And though nothing were concluded, yet many things (as was likely
								with men perplexed, and now more straitly besieged than before) were
								propounded unto Nicias, and more amongst themselves. 
							 And the present ill success had also spread some jealousy amongst
								them, one of another. 
							 And they discharged the generals under whose conduct this happened,
								as if their harm had come either from their unluckiness or from
								their perfidiousness, and chose Heracleides, Eucles, and Tellias in
								their places.

Whilst this passed, Gylippus of Lacedaemon and the Corinthian galleys
								were already at Leucas, purposing with all speed to go over into
								Sicily. 
							 But when terrible reports came unto them from all hands, agreeing in
								an untruth, that Syracuse was already quite enclosed, Gylippus had
								hope of Sicily no longer; 
							 but desiring to assure Italy, he and Pythen, a Corinthian, with two
								Laconic and two Corinthian galleys, with all speed crossed the Ionic
								sea to Tarentum; 
							 and the Corinthians were to man ten galleys of their own, two of
								Leucas, and three of Ambracia, and come after. 
							 Gylippus went first from Tarentum to Thurii, as ambassador, by his
								father's right, who was free of the city of Tarentum;

but not winning them to his side, he put out again, and sailed along
								the coast of Italy. 
							 Passing by the Terinaean gulf, he was put from the shore by a wind
								which in that quarter bloweth strongly against the north, and driven
								into the main sea; 
							 and after another extreme tempest brought in again into Tarentum,
								where he drew up such of his galleys as had been hurt by the weather
								and repaired them.

Nicias, hearing that he came, contemned the small number of his
								galleys, as also the Thurians had before, supposing them furnished
								as for piracy, and appointed no watch for them yet.

About the same time of this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded the
								territory of Argos, they and their confederates, and wasted a great
								part of their land. 
							 And the Athenians aided the Argives with thirty galleys; 
							 which most apparently broke the peace between them and the
								Lacedaemonians.

For before, they went out from Pylus with the Argives and Mantineans
								but in the nature of freebooters, and that also not into Laconia,
								but other parts of Peloponnesus. 
							 Nay, when the Argives have often entreated them but only to land with
								their arms in Laconia, and having wasted never so little of their
								territory to return, they would not. 
							 But now, under the conduct of Pythodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus,
								they landed in the territory of Epidaurus Limera and in Prasiae, and
								there and in other places wasted the country, and gave unto the
								Lacedaemonians a most justifiable cause to fight against the
								Athenians.

After this, the Athenians being departed from Argos with their
								galleys, and the Lacedaemonians gone likewise home, the Argives
								invaded Phliasia, and when they had wasted part of their territory,
								and killed some of their men, returned.

Gylippus and Pythen, having repaired their galleys, from Tarentum
								went along the coast to Locri Epizephyrii. 
							 And upon certain intelligence now that Syracuse was not wholly
								enclosed, but coming with an army there was entrance still by
								Epipolae, they consulted whether it were better to take Sicily on
								their right hand and adventure into the town by sea, or on the left
								and so first to go to Himera, and then taking along both them and as
								many other as they could get to their side, to go into it by
								land.

And it was resolved to go to Himera, the rather because the four
								Attic galleys, which Nicias, though he contemned them before, had
								now when he heard they were at Locri sent to wait for them, were not
								arrived yet at Rhegium. 
							 Having prevented this guard, they crossed the strait, and touching at
								Rhegium and Messana by the way, came to Himera.

Being there, they prevailed so far with the Himeraeans that they not
								only followed them to the war themselves, but also furnished with
								armour such of Gylippus and Pythen's mariners as wanted; 
							 for at Himera they had drawn their galleys to land. 
							 They likewise sent to the Selinuntians to meet them at a place
								assigned with their whole army.

The Geloans also, and other of the Siculi, promised to send them
								forces, though not many, being much the willinger to come to the
								side both for that Archonidas was lately dead (who reigning over
								some of the Siculi in those parts, and being a man of no mean power,
								was friend to the Athenians), and also for that Gylippus seemed to
								come from Lacedaemon with a good will to the business.

Gylippus, taking with him of his own mariners and sea-soldiers, for
								whom he had gotten arms, at the most seven hundred, and Himeraeans
								with armour and without in the whole one thousand, and one hundred
								horse, and some light-armed Selinuntians, with some few horse of the
								Geloans, and of the Siculi in all about one thousand, marched with
								these towards Syracuse.

In the meantime, the Corinthians with the rest of their galleys
								putting to sea from Leucas, made after [as they were] every one with
								what speed he could; 
							 and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though the last that
								set forth, arrived first at Syracuse with one galley, and but a
								little before the coming of Gylippus. 
							 And finding them ready to call an assembly about an end of the war,
								he hindered them from it and put them into heart, relating how both
								the rest of the galleys were coming, and also Gylippus, the son of
								Cleandridas, for general, sent unto them by the Lacedaemonians.

With this the Syracusians were re-confirmed, and went presently out
								with their whole army to meet him, for they understood now that he
								was near.

He, having taken Iegas, a fort, in his way as he passed through the
								territory of the Siculi, and embattled his men, cometh to Epipolae,
								and getting up by Euryelus, where also the Athenians had gotten up
								before, marched together with the Syracusians towards the wall of
								the Athenians.

At the time when he arrived, the Athenians had finished a double wall
								of seven or eight furlongs towards the great haven, save only a
								little next the sea, which they were yet at work on. 
							 And on the other side of their circle, towards Trogilus and the other
								sea, the stones were for the most part laid ready upon the
								place; 
							 and the work was left in some places half, and in some wholly
								finished. 
							 So great was the danger that Syracuse was now brought into.

The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of Gylippus, though somewhat
								troubled at first, yet put themselves in order to receive him. 
							 And he, making a stand when he came near, sent a herald to them,
								saying that if they would abandon Sicily within five days with bag
								and baggage, he was content to give them truce.

Which the Athenians contemning, sent him away without any answer. 
							 After this, they were putting themselves into order of battle one
								against another;

but Gylippus, finding the Syracusians troubled and not easily falling
								into their ranks, led back his army in a more open ground. 
							 Nicias led not the Athenians out against him, but lay still at his
								own fortification. 
							 And Gylippus, seeing he came not up, withdrew his army into the top
								called Temenites, where he lodged all night.

The next day, he drew out the greater part of his army and embattled
								them before the fortification of the Athenians that they might not
								send succour to any other place; 
							 but a part also they sent to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and
								slew all those they found within it; 
							 for the place was out of sight to the Athenians.

The same day the Syracusians also took an Athenian galley as it
								entered into the great haven.

After this, the Syracusians and their confederates began a wall
								through Epipolae, from the city towards the single cross wall
								upwards, that the Athenians, unless they could hinder it, might be
								excluded from bringing their own wall any further on.

And the Athenians by this time, having made an end of their wall to
								the sea, were come up again; 
							 and Gylippus (for some part of the wall was but weak), rising with
								his army by night, went to assault it.

But the Athenians, also knowing it (for they lodged all night without
								the wall), went presently to relieve it; 
							 which Gylippus perceiving, again retired. 
							 And the Athenians, when they had built it higher, kept the watch in
								this part themselves, and divided the rest of the wall to the charge
								of their confederates. 
							 Also it seemed good to Nicias to fortify the place called
								Plemmyrium.

It is a promontory over against the city, which, shooting into the
								entrance of the great haven, straiteneth the mouth of the same; 
							 which fortified, he thought would facilitate the bringing in of
								necessaries to the army. 
							 For by this means, their galleys might ride nearer to the haven of
								the Syracusians, and not upon every motion of the navy of the
								enemies to be to come out against them, as they were before, from
								the bottom of the [great] haven. 
							 And he had his mind set chiefly now upon the war by sea, seeing his
								hopes by land diminished since the arrival of Gylippus.

Having therefore drawn his army and galleys to that place, he built
								about it three fortifications, wherein he placed his baggage, and
								where now also lay at road both his great vessels of carriage and
								the nimblest of his galleys.

Hereupon principally ensued the first occasion of the great loss of
								his sea soldiers. 
							 For having but little water, and that far to fetch, and his mariners
								going out also to fetch in wood, they were continually intercepted
								by the Syracusian horsemen, that were masters of the field. 
							 For the third part of the Syracusian cavalry were quartered in a
								little town called Olympieium to keep those in Plemmyrium from going
								abroad to spoil the country.

Nicias was advertised moreover of the coming of the rest of the
								Corinthian galleys, and sent out a guard of twenty galleys with
								order to wait for them about Locri and Rhegium and the passage there
								into Sicily.

Gylippus in the meantime went on with the wall through Epipolae,
								using the stones laid ready there by the Athenians, and withal drew
								out the Syracusians and their confederates beyond the point of the
								same, and ever as he brought them forth put them into their
								order;

and the Athenians, on the other side, embattled themselves against
								them. 
							 Gylippus, when he saw his time, began the battle; 
							 and being come to hands, they fought between the fortifications of
								them both, where the Syracusians and their confederates had no use
								at all of their horsemen.

The Syracusians and their confederates being overcome, and the
								Athenians having given them truce to take up their dead and erected
								a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army and told them that this was
								not theirs, but his own fault, who, by pitching the battle so far
								within the fortifications, had deprived them of the use both of
								their cavalry and darters;

and that therefore he meant to bring them on again, and wished them
								to consider that for forces they were nothing inferior to the
								enemy; 
							 and for courage, it were a thing not to be endured that, being
								Peloponnesians and Dorians, they should not master and drive out of
								the country Ionians, islanders, and a rabble of mixed nations.

After this, when he saw his opportunity, he brought out the army
								again. 
							 Nicias and the Athenians, who thought it necessary, if not to begin
								the battle, yet by no means to set light by the wall in hand (for by
								this time it wanted but little of passing the point of theirs, and
								proceeding, would give the enemy advantage, both to win if he
								fought, and not to fight unless he listed), did therefore also set
								forth to meet the Syracusians.

Gylippus, when he had drawn his men of arms farther without the walls
								than he had done before, gave the onset. 
							 His horsemen and darters he placed upon the flank of the Athenians,
								in ground enough, to which neither of their walls extended.

And these horsemen, after the fight was begun, charging upon the left
								wing of the Athenians next them, put them to flight; 
							 by which means the rest of the army was by the Syracusians overcome
								likewise and driven headlong within their fortifications.

The night following, the Syracusians brought up their wall beyond the
								wall of the Athenians so as they could no longer hinder them, but
								should be utterly unable, though masters of the field, to enclose
								the city.

After this, the other twelve galleys of the Corinthians, Ambraciotes,
								and Leucadians, undescried of the Athenian galleys that lay in wait
								for them, entered the haven, under the command of Erasinides, a
								Corinthian, and helped the Syracusians to finish what remained to
								the cross wall.

Now Gylippus went up and down Sicily, raising forces both for sea and
								land and soliciting to his side all such cities as formerly either
								had not been forward or had wholly abstained from the war.

Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracusians and Corinthians, were
								sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth to procure new forces to be
								transported either in ships or boats, or how they could; 
							 because the Athenians had also sent to Athens for the like.

In the meantime, the Syracusians both manned their navy and made
								trial of themselves, as intending to take in hand that part also,
								and were otherwise exceedingly encouraged.

Nicias perceiving this and seeing the strength of the enemy and his
								own necessities daily increasing, he also sent messengers to Athens,
								both at other times and often, upon the occasion of every action
								that passed, and now especially, as finding himself in danger, and
								that unless they quickly sent for those away that were there
								already, or sent a great supply unto them, there was no hope of
								safety.

And fearing lest such as he sent, through want of utterance or
								judgment or through desire to please the multitude, should deliver
								things otherwise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter,
								conceiving that thus the Athenians should best know his mind,
								whereof no part could now be suppressed by the messenger, and might
								therefore enter into deliberation upon true grounds.

With these letters and other their instructions, the messengers took
								their journey. 
							 And Nicias, in the meantime having a care to the well guarding of his
								camp, was wary of entering into any voluntary dangers.

In the end of this summer, Euetion, general for the Athenians, with
								Perdiccas, together with many Thracians, warring against Amphipolis,
								took not the city, but bringing his galleys about into Strymon,
								besieged it from the river, lying at Imeraeum. 
							 And so this summer ended.

The next winter, the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens, and
								having spoken what they had in charge, and answered to such
								questions as they were asked, they presented the letter; 
							 which the clerk of the city, standing forth, read unto the Athenians,
								containing as followeth:

"Athenians, you know by many other my letters what hath passed
								formerly; 
							 nor is it less needful for you to be informed of the state we are in,
								and to take counsel upon it, at this present.

When we had in many battles beaten the Syracusians, against whom we
								were sent, and had built the walls within which we now lie, came
								Gylippus a Lacedaemonian, with an army out of Peloponnesus, and also
								out of some of the cities of Sicily, and in the first battle was
								overcome by us; 
							 but in the second, forced by his many horsemen and darters, we
								retired within our works.

Whereupon giving over our walling up of the city for the multitude of
								our enemies, we now sit still. 
							 Nor can we indeed have the use of our whole army, because some part
								of the men of arms are employed to defend our walls. 
							 And they have built a single wall up to us, so that now we have no
								more means to enclose it, except one should come with a great army
								and win that cross wall of theirs by assault.

And so it is that we who seemed to besiege others are besieged
								ourselves for so much as concerneth the land; 
							 for we cannot go far abroad by reason of their cavalry.

"They have also sent ambassadors for another army into
								Peloponnesus; 
							 and Gylippus is gone amongst the cities of Sicily, both to solicit
								such to join with him in the war as have not yet stirred, and of
								others to get, if he can, both more land soldiers and more munition
								for their navy.

For they intend, as I have been informed, both to assault our wall by
								land with their army and to make trial what they are able to do with
								their navy by sea.

For though our fleet (which they also have heard) were vigorous at
								first, both for soundness of the galleys and entireness of the men,
								yet our galleys are now soaked with lying so long in the water and
								our men consumed.

For we want the means to haul a-land our galleys and trim them,
								because the galleys of the enemy, as good as ours and more in
								number, do keep us in a continual expectation of assault, which they
								manifestly endeavour.

And seeing it is in their own choice to attempt or not, they have
								therefore liberty to dry their galleys at their pleasure; 
							 for they lie not, as we, in attendance upon others.

"Nay, we could hardly do it, though we had many galleys spare, and
								were not constrained, as now, to keep watch upon them with our whole
								number. 
							 For should we abate though but a little of our observance, we should
								want provision; 
							 which, as we are, being to pass so near their city, is brought in
								with difficulty.

And hence it is that our mariners both formerly have been and are now
								wasted. 
							 For our mariners, fetching wood and water and foraging far off, are
								intercepted by the horsemen; 
							 and our slaves, now we are on equal terms, run over to the enemy. 
							 As for strangers, some of them having come aboard by constraint,
								return presently to their cities; 
							 and others having been levied at first with great wages, thinking
								they came to enrich themselves rather than to fight, now they see
								the enemy make so strong resistance, both otherwise beyond their
								expectation and especially with their navy, partly take pretext to
								be gone that they may serve the enemy, and partly, Sicily being
								large, shift themselves away every one as he can. 
							 Some there are also, who having bought here Hyccarian slaves, have
								gotten the captains of galleys to accept of them in the room of
								themselves, and thereby destroyed the purity of our naval strength.

"To you I write, who know how small a time any fleet continueth in
								the height of vigour, and how few of the mariners are skilful both
								how to hasten the course of a galley and how to contain the oar.

But of all, my greatest trouble is this: that being general, I can
								neither make them do better (for your natures are hard to be
								governed) nor get mariners in any other place (which the enemy can
								do from many places), and must of necessity have them from whence we
								brought both those we have and those we have lost. 
							 For our now confederate cities, Naxos and Catana, are not able to
								supply us.

Had the enemy but that one thing more, that the towns of Italy that
								now send us provision, seeing what estate we are now in and you not
								helping us, would turn to them, the war were at an end and we
								expugned without another stroke.

"I could have written to you other things more pleasing than these,
								but not more profitable, seeing it is necessary for you to know
								certainly the affairs here when you go to council upon them. 
							 Withal, because I know your natures to be such as though you love to
								hear the best, yet afterwards when things fall not out accordingly
								you will call in question them that write it, I thought best to
								write the truth for my own safety's sake.

And now think thus: that though we have
										carried ourselves, both captains and soldiers, in that for
										which we came at first hither, unblameably, yet since all
										Sicily is united against us and another army expected out of
										Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for those we have here are
										not enough for the enemy's present forces) either to send
										for these away, or to send hither another army, both of land
										and sea soldiers, no less than the former, and money not a
										little; 
									 and also a general to succeed me, who am able no longer to
										stay here, being troubled with the stone [in the
										kidneys].

I must crave your pardon. 
								 I have done you many good services in the conducts of your armies
									when I had my health. 
								 What you will do, do in the very beginning of spring, and delay
									it not. 
								 For the enemy will soon have furnished himself of his Sicilian
									aids; 
								 and though those from Peloponnesus will be later, yet if you look
									not to it, they will get hither partly unseen, as before, and
									partly by preventing you with speed.

These were the contents of the letter of Nicias. 
							 The Athenians, when they had heard it read, though they released not
								Nicias of his charge, yet for the present, till such time as others
								chosen to be in commission might arrive, they joined with him two of
								those that were already in the army, Menander and Euthydemon, to the
								end that he might not sustain the whole burthen alone in his
								sickness.

They concluded likewise to send another army, as well for the sea as
								the land, both of Athenians enrolled and of their confederates. 
							 And for fellow-generals with Nicias, they elected Demosthenes, the
								son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles. 
							 Eurymedon they sent away presently for Sicily, about the time of the
								winter solstice, with ten galleys and twenty talents of silver, to
								tell them there that aid was coming and that there was care taken of
								them.

But Demosthenes, staying, made preparation for the voyage to set out
								early the next spring; 
							 and sent unto the confederates, appointing what forces they should
								provide, and to furnish himself amongst them with money and galleys
								and men of arms.

The Athenians sent also twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, to watch
								that none should go over into Sicily from Corinth or
								Peloponnesus.

For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors were come to them and had
								brought news of the amendment of the affairs in Sicily, thought it
								was well that they had sent thither those other galleys before; 
							 but now they were encouraged a great deal more, and prepared men of
								arms to be transported into Sicily in ships;

and the Lacedaemonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnesus. 
							 The Corinthians manned fiveand-twenty galleys to present battle to
								the fleet that kept watch at Naupactus, that the ships with the men
								of arms, whilst the Athenians attended these galleys so embattled
								against them, might pass by unhindered.

The Lacedaemonians, as they intended before, and being also
								instigated to it by the Syracusians and Corinthians, upon
								advertisement now of the Athenians' new supply for Sicily, prepared
								likewise to invade Attica, thereby to divert them. 
							 And Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Deceleia,
								and by no means to war remissly.

But the Lacedaemonians were heartened thereunto principally because
								they thought the Athenians having in hand a double war, one against
								them and another against the Sicilians, would be the easier pulled
								down, and because they conceived the breach of the last peace was in
								themselves. 
							 For in the former war, the injury proceeded from their own side, in
								that the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace; 
							 and because also, whereas it was inserted in the former articles that
								arms should not be carried against such as would stand to trial of
								judgment, they had refused such trial when the Athenians offered
								it. 
							 And they thought all their misfortunes had deservedly befallen them
								for that cause, remembering amongst others, the calamity at
								Pylus.

But when the Athenians with a fleet of thirty sail had spoiled part
								of the territory of Epidaurus and of Prasiae and other places, and
								their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylus had taken booty in the
								country about, and seeing that as often as there arose any
								controversy touching any doubtful point of the articles, the
								Lacedaemonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it, then
								indeed, the Lacedaemonians, conceiving the Athenians to be in the
								same fault that themselves had been in before, betook themselves
								earnestly to the war.

And this winter, they sent about unto their confederates to make
								ready iron, and all instruments of fortification. 
							 And for the aid they were to transport in ships to the Sicilians,
								they both made provision amongst themselves and compelled the rest
								of Peloponnesus to do the like. 
							 So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of the war written by
								Thucydides.

The next spring, in the very beginning, earlier than ever before, the
								Lacedaemonians and their confederates entered with their army into
								Attica, under the command of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their
								king. 
							 And first they wasted the champagne country, and then went in hand
								with the wall at Deceleia, dividing the work amongst the army,
								according to their cities.

This Deceleia is from the city of Athens at the most but one hundred
								and twenty furlongs, and about as much or a little more from
								Boeotia. 
							 This fort they made in the plain, and in the most opportune place
								that could be to annoy the Athenians, and in sight of the city.

Now the Peloponnesians and their confederates in Attica went on with
								their fortification. 
							 They in Peloponnesus sent away their ships with the men of arms about
								the same time into Sicily, of which the Lacedaemonians, out of the
								best of their Helotes and men made newly free, sent in the whole six
								hundred, and Eccritus, a Spartan, for commander; 
							 and the Boeotians three hundred, under the conduct of Xenon and
								Nicon, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian.

And these set forth first, and put to sea at Taenarus in Laconia. 
							 After them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hundred more,
								part from the city itself of Corinth and part mercenary Arcadians,
								and Alexarchus, a Corinthian, for captain. 
							 The Sicyonians also sent two hundred with them that went from
								Corinth, and Sargeus, a Sicyonian, for captain.

Now the twenty-five Corinthian galleys that were manned in winter lay
								opposite to the twenty galleys of Athens which were at Naupactus
								till such time as the men of arms in the ships from Peloponnesus
								might get away; 
							 for which purpose they were also set out at first, that the Athenians
								might not have their minds upon these ships so much as upon the
								galleys.

In the meantime also the Athenians, whilst Deceleia was fortifying,
								in the beginning of the spring, sent twenty galleys about
								Peloponnesus under the command of Charicles, the son of Apollodorus,
								with order when he came to Argos to take aboard the men of arms
								which the Argives were to send them, according to league;

and sent away Demosthenes (as they intended before) into Sicily, with
								threescore galleys of Athens and five of Chios, and one thousand two
								hundred men of arms of the roll of Athens, and as many of the
								islanders as they could get, provided by their subject confederates
								of all other necesseries for the war. 
							 But he had order to join first with Charicles and help him to make
								war first upon Laconia.

So Demosthenes went to Aegina and stayed there both for the remnant
								of his own army, if any were left behind, and for Charicles till he
								had taken aboard the Argives.

In Sicily, about the same time of the spring, Gylippus also returned
								to Syracuse, bringing with him from the cities he had dealt withal
								as great forces as severally he could get from them.

And having assembled the Syracusians, he told them that they ought to
								man as many galleys as they could and make trial of a battle by
								sea; 
							 and that he hoped thereby to perform somewhat to the benefit of the
								war which should be worthy the danger.

Hermocrates also was none of the least means of getting them to
								undertake the Athenians with their navy, who told them that neither
								the Athenians had this skill by sea hereditary or from everlasting,
								but were more inland men than the Syracusians, and forced to become
								seamen by the Medes, and that to daring men, such as the Athenians
								are, they are most formidable that are as daring against them; 
							 for wherewith they terrify their neighbours, which is not always the
								advantage of power, but boldness of enterprising, with the same
								shall they in like manner be terrified by their enemies.

He knew it, he said, certainly, that the Syracusians, by their
								unexpected daring to encounter the Athenian navy, would get more
								advantage in respect of the fear it would cause than the Athenians
								should endamage them by their odds of skill. 
							 He bade them therefore to make trial of their navy and to be afraid
								no longer.

The Syracusians, on these persuasions of Gylippus and Hermocrates,
								and others if any were, became now extremely desirous to fight by
								sea, and presently manned their galleys.

Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew out his whole power of land
								soldiers in the beginning of night, meaning to go himself and
								assault the fortifications in Plemmyrium; 
							 withal the galleys of the Syracusians, by appointment, thirty-five of
								them came up towards it out of the great haven; 
							 and forty-five more came about out of the little haven, where also
								was their arsenal, with purpose to join with those within and to go
								together to Plemmyrium that the Athenians might be troubled on both
								sides.

But the Athenians having quickly manned sixty galleys to oppose them,
								with twenty-five of them they fought with the thirty-five of the
								Syracusians in the great haven, and with the rest went to meet those
								that came about from the little haven. 
							 And these fought presently before the mouth of the great haven and
								held each other to it for a long time, one side endeavouring to
								force, the other to defend the entrance.

In the meantime, Gylippus (the Athenians in Plemmyrium being now come
								down to the water side, and having their minds busied upon the fight
								of the galleys) betimes in the morning and on a sudden assaulted the
								fortifications before they could come back again to defend them, and
								possessed first the greatest and afterwards the two lesser; 
							 for they that watched in these, when they saw the greatest so easily
								taken, durst stay no longer.

They that fled upon the losing of the first wall and put themselves
								into boats and into a certain ship got hardly into the camp; 
							 for whilst the Syracusians in the great haven had yet the better in
								the fight upon the water, they gave them chase with one nimble
								galley. 
							 But by that time that the other two walls were taken, the Syracusians
								upon the water were overcome; 
							 and the Athenians which fled from those two walls got to their camp
								with more ease.

For those Syracusian galleys that fought before the haven's mouth,
								having beaten back the Athenians, entered in disorder, and falling
								foul one on another, gave away the victory unto the Athenians, who
								put to flight not only them, but also those other by whom they had
								before been overcome within the haven, and sunk eleven galleys of
								the Syracusians and slew most of the men aboard them, save only the
								men of three galleys, whom they took alive.

Of their own galleys they lost only three. 
							 When they had drawn to land the wreck of the Syracusian galleys and
								erected a trophy in the little island over against Plemmyrium, they
								returned to their camp.

The Syracusians, though such were their success in the battle by sea,
								yet they won the fortification in Plemmyrium, and set up three
								trophies, for every wall one. 
							 One of the two walls last taken they demolished; 
							 but two they repaired and kept with a garrison.

At the taking of these walls, many men were slain and many taken
								alive; 
							 and their goods, which altogether was a great matter, were all
								taken. 
							 For the Athenians using these works for their storehouse, there was
								in them much wealth and victual belonging unto merchants and much
								unto captains of galleys. 
							 For there were sails within it for forty galleys, besides other
								furniture, and three galleys drawn to land.

And this loss of Plemmyrium was it that most and principally impaired
								the Athenians' army. 
							 For the entrance of their provision was now no longer safe; 
							 for the Syracusians lying against them there with their galleys kept
								them out, and nothing could be brought in unto them but by
								fight; 
							 and the army besides was thereby otherwise terrified and dejected.

After this the Syracusians sent out twelve galleys under the command
								of Agatharchus, a Syracusian. 
							 Of which one carried ambassadors into Peloponnesus to declare what
								hope they had now of their business and to instigate them to a
								sharper war in Attica. 
							 The other eleven went into Italy, upon intelligence of certain
								vessels laden with commodities coming to the Athenian army, which
								also they met with and destroyed most of them;

and the timber, which for building of galleys the Athenians had ready
								framed, they burned in the territory of Caulonia. 
							 After this they went to Locri;

and riding here, there came unto them one of the ships that carried
								the men of arms of the Thespians, whom the Syracusians took aboard
								and went homeward by the coast.

The Athenians that watched for them with twenty galleys at Megara
								took one of them and the men that were in her, but could not take
								the rest, so that they escaped through to Syracuse.

There was also a light skirmish in the haven of Syracuse, about the
								piles which the Syracusians had driven down before their old
								harbour, to the end that the galleys might ride within and the
								Athenians not annoy them by assault. 
							 The Athenians, having brought to the place a ship of huge greatness,
								fortified with wooden turrets and covered against fire, caused
								certain men with [little] boats to go and fasten cords unto the
								piles, and so broke them up with craning.

Some also the divers did cut up with saws. 
							 In the meantime the Syracusians from the harbour and they from the
								great ship shot at each other, till in the end the greatest part of
								the piles were by the Athenians gotten up. 
							 But the greatest difficulty was to get up those piles which lay
								hidden.

For some of them they had so driven in as that they came not above
								the water, so that he that should come near was in danger to be
								thrown upon them as upon a rock. 
							 But these also, for reward, the divers went down and sawed
								asunder. 
							 But the Syracusians continually drave down other in their stead.

Other devices they had against each other, as was not unlikely
								between armies so near opposed; 
							 and many light skirmishes passed, and attempts of all kinds were put
								in execution.

The Syracusians moreover sent ambassadors, some Corinthians, some
								Ambraciotes, and some Lacedaemonians, unto the cities about them to
								let them know that they had won Plemmyrium and that in the battle by
								sea they were not overcome by the strength of the enemy, but by
								their own disorder; 
							 and also to show what hope they were in in other respects, and to
								entreat their aid both of sea and land forces; 
							 forsomuch as the Athenians expecting another army, if they would send
								aid before it came whereby to overthrow that which they had now
								there, the war would be at an end. 
							 Thus stood the affairs of Sicily.

Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he was to carry to the
								succour of those in Sicily were gotten together, put to sea from
								Aegina, and sailing into Peloponnesus, joined with Charicles and the
								thirty galleys that were with him. 
							 And having taken aboard some men of arms of the Argives, came to
								Laconia, and first wasted part of the territory of Epidaurus
								Limera.

From thence going to that part of Laconia which is over against the
								island Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo, they wasted a
								part of the country and fortified an isthmus there, both that the
								Helotes might have a refuge in it running away from the
								Lacedaemonians and that freebooters from thence, as from Pylus,
								might fetch in prizes from the territory adjoining.

As soon as the place was taken in, Demosthenes himself went on to
								Corcyra, to take up the confederates there, with intent to go thence
								speedily into Sicily. 
							 And Charicles, having stayed to finish and put a garrison into the
								fortification, went afterwards with his thirty galleys to
								Athens; 
							 and the Argives also went home.

The same winter also came to Athens a thousand and three hundred
								targetiers, of those called Machaerophori of the race of them that
								are called Dii, and were to have gone with Demosthenes into
								Sicily.

But coming too late, the Athenians resolved to send them back again
								into Thrace, as being too chargeable a matter to entertain them only
								for the war in Deceleia; 
							 for their pay was to have been a drachma a man by the day.

For Deceleia, being this summer fortified first by the whole army and
								then by the several cities maintained with a garrison by turns, much
								endamaged the Athenians and weakened their estate, both by
								destroying their commodities and consuming of their men, so as
								nothing more.

For the former invasions, having been short, hindered them not from
								reaping the benefit of the earth for the rest of the time. 
							 But now, the enemy continually lying upon them, and sometimes with
								greater forces, sometimes of necessity with the ordinary garrison
								making incursions and fetching in booty, Agis, the king of
								Lacedaemon, being always there in person and diligently prosecuting
								the war, the Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted.

For they were not only deprived of the fruit of the land, but also
								above twenty thousand of their slaves fled over to the enemy,
								whereof the greatest part were artificers; 
							 besides they lost all their sheep and oxen. 
							 And by the continual going out of the Athenian horsemen, making
								excursions to Deceleia and defending the country, their horses
								became partly lamed through incessant labour in rugged grounds and
								partly wounded by the enemy.

And their provision, which formerly they used to bring in from Euboea
								by Oropus the shortest way, through Deceleia by land, they were now
								forced to fetch in by sea at great cost about the promontory of
								Sunium. 
							 And whatsoever the city was wont to be served withal from without, it
								now wanted, and instead of a city was become as it were a fort.

And the Athenians, watching on the battlements of the wall, in the
								day time by turns, but in the night, both winter and summer, all at
								once (except the horsemen), part at the walls and part at the arms,
								were quite tired.

But that which pressed them most was that they had two wars at
								once. 
							 And yet their obstinacy was so great as no man would have believed
								till now they saw it. 
							 For being besieged at home from the fortification of the
								Peloponnesians, no man would have imagined that they should not only
								not have recalled their army out of Sicily, but have also besieged
								Syracuse there, a city of itself no less than Athens; 
							 and therein so much have exceeded the expectation of the rest of the
								Grecians both in power and courage (who in the beginning of this war
								conceived that if the Peloponnesians invaded their territory, some
								of them, that they might hold out two years, others three, no man
								more), as that in the seventeenth year after they were first invaded
								they should have undertaken an expedition into Sicily, and being
								every way weakened already by the former war, have undergone
								another, not inferior to that which they had before with the
								Peloponnesians.

Now their treasure being by these wars and by the detriment sustained
								from Deceleia and other great expenses that came upon them at a very
								low ebb, about this time they imposed on such as were under their
								dominion a twentieth part of all goods passing by sea for a tribute,
								by this means to improve their comings in. 
							 For their expenses were not now as before, but so much greater by how
								much the war was greater, and their revenue besides cut off.

The Thracians, therefore, that came too late to go with Demosthenes,
								they presently sent back, as being unwilling to lay out money in
								such a scarcity, and gave the charge of carrying them back to
								Diitrephes, with command as he went along those coasts (for his way
								was through the Euripus), if occasion served, to do somewhat against
								the enemy.

He accordingly landed them by Tanagra and hastily fetched in some
								small booty. 
							 Then going over the Euripus from Chalcis in Euboea, he disbarked
								again in Boeotia and led his soldiers towards Mycalessus, and lay
								all night at the temple of Mercury undiscovered, which is distant
								from Mycalessus about sixteen furlongs.

The next day he cometh to the city, being a very great one, and
								taketh it; 
							 for they kept no watch nor expected that any man would have come in
								and assaulted them so far from the sea. 
							 Their walls also were but weak, in some places fallen down, and in
								others low-built, and their gates open through security.

The Thracians, entering into Mycalessus, spoiled both houses and
								temples, slew the people without mercy on old or young, but killed
								all they could light on, both women and children, yea, and the
								labouring cattle, and whatsoever other living thing they saw. 
							 For the nation of the Thracians, where they dare, are extreme bloody,
								equal to any of the barbarians. 
							 Insomuch as there was put in practice at this time, besides other
								disorder, all forms of slaughter that could be imagined;

they likewise fell upon the schoolhouse, which was in the city a
								great one, and the children newly entered into it; 
							 and killed them every one. 
							 And the calamity of the whole city, as it was as great as ever befell
								any, so also was it more unexpected and more bitter.

The Thebans, hearing of it, came out to help them, and overtaking the
								Thracians before they had gone far, both recovered the booty and
								chased them to the Euripus and to the sea, where the galleys lay
								that brought them. 
							 Some of them they killed;

of those most in their going aboard, for swim they could not, and
								such as were in the [small] boats, when they saw how things went
								a-land, had thrust off their boats, and lay without the Euripus. 
							 In the rest of the retreat, the Thracians behaved themselves not
								unhandsomely against the Theban horsemen, by whom they were charged
								first; 
							 but running out, and again rallying themselves in a circle, according
								to the manner of their country, defended themselves well and lost
								but few men in that action. 
							 But some also they lost in the city itself, whilst they stayed behind
								for pillage. 
							 But in the whole of thirteen hundred there were slain [only] two
								hundred and fifty.

Of the Thebans and others that came out to help the city, there were
								slain, horsemen and men of arms, one with another about twenty; 
							 and amongst them Scirphondas of Thebes, one of the governors of
								Boeotia: and of the Mycallesians there perished a part. 
							 Thus went the matter at Mycalessus, the loss which it received being,
								for the quantity of the city, no less to be lamented than any that
								happened in the whole war.

Demosthenes, going from Corcyra after his fortifying in Laconia,
								found a ship lying in Pheia of Elis, and in her certain men of arms
								of Corinth, ready to go into Sicily. 
							 The ship he sunk; 
							 but the men escaped, and afterwards, getting another ship, went on in
								their voyage.

After this, Demosthenes, being about Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took
								aboard their men of arms and sent to Naupactus for the
								Messenians. 
							 From thence he crossed over to the continent of Acarnania, to Alyzea
								and Anactorium, which belonged to the Athenians.

Whilst he was in these parts, he met with Eurymedon out of Sicily,
								that had been sent in winter unto the army with commodities, who
								told him amongst other things how he had heard by the way after he
								was at sea that the Syracusians had won Plemmyrium.

Conon also, the captain of Naupactus, came to them and related that
								the twenty-five galleys of Corinth that lay before Naupactus would
								not give over war and yet delayed to fight, and therefore desired to
								have some galleys sent him, as being unable with his eighteen to
								give battle to twenty-five of the enemy.

Whereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten galleys more to those at
								Naupactus, the nimblest of the whole fleet, by Conon himself, and
								went themselves about furnishing of what belonged to the army. 
							 Of whom Eurymedon went to Corcyra, and having appointed them there to
								man fifteen galleys, levied men of arms; 
							 for now giving over his course to Athens, he joined with Demosthenes,
								as having been elected with him in the charge of general; 
							 and Demosthenes took up slingers and darters in the parts about
								Acarnania.

The ambassadors of the Syracusians, which after the taking of
								Plemmyrium had been sent unto the cities about, having now obtained
								and levied an army amongst them, were conducting the same to
								Syracuse. 
							 But Nicias, upon intelligence thereof, sent unto such cities of the
								Siculi as had the passages and were their confederates, the
								Centoripines, Halicyaeans, and others, not to suffer the enemy to go
								by, but to unite themselves and stop them, for that they would not
								so much as offer to pass any other way, seeing the Agrigentines had
								already denied them.

When the Sicilians were marching, the Siculi, as the Athenians had
								desired them, put themselves in ambush in three several places, and
								setting upon them unawares and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred
								of them, and all the ambassadors save only one, a Corinthian, which
								conducted the rest that escaped, being about fifteen hundred, to
								Syracuse.

About the same time came unto them also the aid of the Camarinaeans,
								five hundred men of arms, three hundred darters, and three hundred
								archers. 
							 Also the Geloans sent them men for five galleys, besides four hundred
								darters and two hundred horsemen.

For now all Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, but
								all the rest, who before stood looking on, came in to the Syracusian
								side against the Athenians.

[Nevertheless], the Syracusians, after this blow received amongst the
								Siculi, held their hands and assaulted not the Athenians for a
								while. 

							 Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having their army now ready, crossed over
								from Corcyra and the continent with the whole army to the promontory
								of Iapygia. 
							 From thence they went to the Choerades, islands of Iapygia, and here
								took in certain Iapygian darters to the number of two hundred and
								fifty, of the Messapian nation.

And having renewed a certain ancient alliance with Artas, who reigned
								there and granted them those darters, they went thence to
								Metapontum, a city of Italy. 
							 There, by virtue of a league, they got two galleys and three hundred
								darters, which taken aboard, they kept along the shore till they
								came to the territory of Thurii.

Here they found the adverse faction to the Athenians to have been
								lately driven out in a sedition.

And because they desired to muster their army here, that they might
								see if any were left behind, and persuade the Thurians to join with
								them freely in the war, and, as things stood, to have for friends
								and enemies the same that were so to the Athenians; 
							 they stayed about that in the territory of the Thurians.

The Peloponnesians and the rest, who were at the same time in the
								twenty-five galleys that for safeguard of the ships lay opposite to
								the galleys before Naupactus, having prepared themselves for battle,
								and with more galleys, so as they were little inferior in number to
								those of the Athenians, went to an anchor under Irineus of Achaia in
								Rhypica. 
							 The place where they rode was in form like a half moon;

and their land forces they had ready on either side to assist them,
								both Corinthians and their other confederates of those parts,
								embattled upon the points of the promontory; 
							 and their galleys made up the space between, under the command of
								Polyanthes, a Corinthian.

Against these the Athenians came up with thirty-three galleys from
								Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. 
							 The Corinthians at first lay still;

but afterwards when they saw their time, and the signal given, they
								charged the Athenians and the fight began. 
							 They held each other to it long. 
							 The Athenians sank three galleys of the Corinthians;

and though none of their own were sunk, yet seven were made
								unserviceable, which, having encountered the Corinthian galleys
								a-head, were torn on both sides between the beaks and the oars by
								the beaks of the Corinthian galleys, made stronger for the same
								purpose. 
							 After they had fought with equal fortune, and so as both sides
								challenged the victory;

though yet the Athenians were masters of the wrecks, as driven by the
								wind into the main, and because the Corinthians came not out to
								renew the fight, they at length parted. 
							 There was no chasing of men that fled, nor a prisoner taken on either
								side; 
							 because the Peloponnesians and Corinthians fighting near the land
								easily escaped, nor was there any galley of the Athenians sunk.

But when the Athenians were gone back to Naupactus, the Corinthians
								presently set up a trophy as victors, in regard that more of the
								Athenian galleys were made unserviceable than of theirs, and thought
								themselves not to have had the worse for the same reason that the
								others thought themselves not to have had the better. 
							 For the Corinthians think they have the better when they have not
								much the worse; 
							 and the Athenians think they have the worse when they have not much
								the better.

And when the Peloponnesians were gone and their army by land
								dissolved, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaia, as if the
								victory had been theirs, distant from Erineus, where the
								Peloponnesians rode, about twenty furlongs. 
							 This was the success of that battle by sea.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put in readiness to
								go with them seven hundred men of arms and three hundred darters,
								commanded their galleys to go along the coast to Croton, and
								conducted their land soldiers, having first taken a muster of them
								all upon the side of the river Sybaris, through the territory of the
								Thurians.

But coming to the river Hylias, upon word sent them from the men of
								Croton that if the army went through their territory it should be
								against their will, they marched down to the seaside and to the
								mouth of the river Hylias, where they stayed all that night and were
								met by their galleys. 
							 The next day embarking, they kept along the shore and touched at
								every town saving Locri till they arrived at Petra in the territory
								of Rhegium.

The Syracusians in the meantime, upon intelligence of their coming
								on, resolved to try again what they could do with their navy and
								with their new supply of landmen, which they had gotten together on
								purpose to fight with the Athenians before Demosthenes and Eurymedon
								should arrive.

And they furnished their navy, both otherwise and according to the
								advantages they had learnt in the last battle, and also made shorter
								the heads of their galleys, and thereby stronger, and made beaks to
								them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with rafters
								fastened to the sides of the galleys, both within and without, of
								six cubits long, in such manner as the Corinthians had armed their
								galleys a-head to fight with those before Naupactus.

For the Syracusians made account that against the Athenian galleys
								not so built, but weak before, as not using so much to meet the
								enemy a-head as upon the side by fetching a compass, they could not
								but have the better, and that to fight in the great haven, many
								galleys in not much room was an advantage to them; 
							 for that using the direct encounter, they should break with their
								firm and thick beaks the hollow and infirm foreparts of the galleys
								of their enemies;

and that the Athenians, in that narrow room, would want means both to
								go about and to go through them, which was the point of art they
								most relied on. 
							 For as for their passing through, they would hinder it themselves as
								much as they could; 
							 and for fetching compass, the straitness of the place would not
								suffer it.

And that fighting a-head, which seemed before to be want of skill in
								the masters [to do otherwise], was what they would now principally
								make use of; 
							 for in this would be their principal advantage. 
							 For the Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the
								land, which was but a little way off and little in compass, near
								their own camp; 
							 and of the rest of the haven themselves should be masters.

And the enemy being pressed, could not choose, thronging together
								into a little room and all into one and the same place, but disorder
								one another, which was indeed the thing that in all their battles by
								sea did the Athenians the greatest hurt, having not, as the
								Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to retire unto. 
							 And to go about into a place of more room, they having it in their
								power to set upon them from the main sea, and to retire again at
								pleasure, they should never be able, especially having Plemmyrium
								for enemy, and the haven's mouth not being large.

The Syracusians, having devised thus much over and above their former
								skill and strength, and far more confident now since the former
								battle by sea, assaulted them both with their army and with their
								navy at once.

The landmen from the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little and
								brought them to the wall of the Athenians' camp upon the side toward
								the city; 
							 and from Olympieium, the men of arms, all that were there, and the
								horsemen and light armed of the Syracusians came up to the wall on
								the other side. 
							 And by and by after, came sailing forth also the galleys of the
								Syracusians and their confederates.

The Athenians, that thought at first they would have made the attempt
								only with their landmen, seeing also the galleys on a sudden coming
								towards them, were in confusion; 
							 and some of them put themselves in order upon and before the walls
								against those that came from the city; 
							 and others went out to meet the horsemen and darters that were coming
								in great numbers and with speed from Olympieium and the parts
								without; 
							 others again went aboard, and withal came to aid those ashore. 
							 But when the galleys were manned they put off, being seventy-five in
								number, and those of Syracuse about eighty.

Having spent much of the day in charging and retiring and trying each
								other, and performed nothing worth the mentioning, save that the
								Syracusians sank a galley or two of the Athenians, they parted
								again; 
							 and the land soldiers retired at the same time from the wall of the
								Athenian camp.

The next day the Syracusians lay still without showing any sign of
								what they meant to do. 
							 Yet Nicias, seeing that the battle by sea was with equality and
								imagining that they would fight again, made the captains to repair
								their galleys, such as had been torn, and two great ships to be
								moored without those piles which he had driven into the sea before
								his galleys, to be instead of a haven enclosed.

These ships he placed about two acres' breadth asunder, to the end,
								if any galley chanced to be pressed, it might safely run in and
								again go safely out at leisure. 
							 In performing of this the Athenians spent a whole day from morning
								until night.

The next day the Syracusians assaulted the Athenians again with the
								same forces, both by sea and land, that they had done before, but
								begun earlier in the morning;

and being opposed fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of
								the day now again as before in attempting upon each other without
								effect. 
							 Till at last Ariston, the son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the most
								expert master that the Syracusians had in their fleet, persuaded the
								commanders in the navy to send to such in the city as it belonged to
								and command that the market should be speedily kept at the seaside,
								and to compel every man to bring thither whatsoever he had fit for
								meat and there to sell it, that the mariners, disbarking, might
								presently dine by the galleys' side, and quickly again, unlooked
								for, assault the Athenians afresh the same day.

This advice being liked, they sent a messenger and the market was
								furnished. 
							 And the Syracusians suddenly rowed astern towards the city, and
								disbarking, dined there right on the shore.

The Athenians, supposing they had retired towards the city as
								vanquished, landed at leisure, and amongst other business went about
								the dressing of their dinner, as not expecting to have fought again
								the same day. 
							 But the Syracusians, suddenly going aboard, came towards them
								again;

and the Athenians, in great tumult and for the most part undined,
								embarking disorderly, at length with much ado went out to meet
								them. 
							 For a while they held their hands on both sides and but observed each
								other.

But anon after, the Athenians thought not fit by longer dallying to
								overcome themselves with their own labour, but rather to fight as
								soon as they could, and thereupon at once with a joint shout charged
								the enemy, and the fight began.

The Syracusians received [and resisted] their charge, and fighting,
								as they had before determined, with their galleys head to head with
								those of the Athenians, and provided with beaks for the purpose,
								brake the galleys of the Athenians very much between the heads of
								the galleys and the oars. 
							 The Athenians were also annoyed much by the darters from the decks,
								but much more by those Syracusians who, going about in small boats,
								passed under the rows of the oars of the enemy's galleys, and coming
								close to their sides, threw their darts at the mariners from thence.

The Syracusians, having fought in this manner with the utmost of
								their strength, in the end gat the victory; 
							 and the Athenians, between the [two] ships, escaped into their
								harbour.

The Syracusian galleys chased them as far as to those ships; 
							 but the dolphins hanging from the masts over the entrance of the
								harbour forbade them to follow any further.

Yet there were two galleys, which upon a jollity after victory
								approached them, but both were lost, of which one with her men and
								all was taken.

The Syracusians, after they had sunk seven galleys of the Athenians
								and torn many more, and of the men had taken some alive and killed
								others, retired, and for both the battles erected trophies, and had
								already an assured hope of being far superior by sea, and also made
								account to subdue the army by land. 
							 And they prepared to assault them again in both kinds.

In the meantime Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian
								supply, being about seventy-three galleys, and men of arms, of their
								own and of their confederates, about five thousand, besides darters,
								as well barbarians as Greeks, not a few, and slingers and archers,
								and all other provision sufficient.

For the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their
								confederates to see no end of their danger, and that,
								notwithstanding the fortifying in Deceleia, another army should come
								now equal and like unto their former, and that their power should be
								so great in every kind. 
							 And on the other side, it was a kind of strengthening after weakness
								to the Athenian army that was there before.

Demosthenes, when he saw how things stood, and thinking it unfit to
								loiter and fall into Nicias' case-for Nicias, who was formidable at
								his first coming, when he set not presently upon Syracuse but
								wintered at Catana, both grew into contempt and was prevented also
								by the coming of Gylippus thither with an army out of
								Peloponnesus; 
							 the which, if Nicias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never
								been so much as sent for; 
							 for supposing themselves to have been strong enough alone, they had
								at once both found themselves too weak and the city been enclosed
								with a wall; 
							 whereby, though they had sent for it, it could not have helped them
								as it didDemosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he also even
								at the present and the same day was most terrible to the enemy,
								intended with all speed to make use of this present terribleness of
								the army.

And having observed that the cross wall of the Syracusians, wherewith
								they hindered the Athenians from enclosing the city, was but single,
								and that if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolae and
								again of the camp there, the same might easily be taken (for none
								would have stood against them), hasted to put it to trial, and
								thought it his shortest way to the dispatching of the war.

For either he should have success, he thought, and so win Syracuse,
								or he would lead away the army and no longer without purpose consume
								both the Athenians there with him and the whole state.

The Athenians therefore went out and first wasted the territory of
								the Syracusians about the river Anapus, and were the stronger, as at
								first, both by sea and land. 
							 For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against them, but only
								with their horsemen and darters from Olympieium.

After this, Demosthenes thought good to try the wall which the
								Athenians had built to enclose the city withal with engines. 
							 But seeing the engines were burnt by the defendants fighting from the
								wall, and that having assaulted it in divers parts with the rest of
								his army he was notwithstanding put back, he resolved to spend the
								time no longer, but having gotten the consent of Nicias and the rest
								in commission thereunto, to put in execution his design for
								Epipolae, as was before intended.

By day it was thought impossible not to be discovered, either in
								their approach or in their ascent. 
							 Having therefore first commanded to take five days' provision of
								victual, and all the masons and workmen, as also store of casting
								weapons, and whatsoever they might need, if they overcame, for
								fortification, he and Eurymedon and Menander, with the whole army,
								marched about midnight to Epipolae, leaving Nicias in the camp.

Being come to Epipolae at Euryelus, where also the army went up
								before, they were not only not discovered by the Syracusians that
								kept the watch, but ascending took a certain fortification of the
								Syracusians there and killed part of them that kept it.

But the greatest number, escaping, ran presently to the camps, of
								which there were in Epipolae three walled about without the city,
								one of Syracusians, one of other Sicilians, and one of confederates,
								and carried the news of their coming in, and told it to those six
								hundred Syracusians that kept this part of Epipolae at the first,
								who presently went forth to meet them.

But Demosthenes and the Athenians lighting on them, though they
								fought valiantly, put them to flight, and presently marched on,
								making use of the present heat of the army to finish what he came
								for before it were too late; 
							 and others [going on] in their first course took the cross-wall of
								the Syracusians, they flying that kept it, and were throwing down
								the battlements thereof.

The Syracusians and their confederates, and Gylippus and those with
								him, came out to meet them from their camps; 
							 but because the attempt was unexpected and in the night, they charged
								the Athenians timorously, and were even at first forced to
								retire.

But as the Athenians advanced more out of order, [chiefly] as having
								already gotten the victory, but desiring also quickly to pass
								through all that remained yet unfoughten with, lest through their
								remissness in following they might again rally themselves, the
								Boeotians withstood them first, and charging, forced them to turn
								their backs.

And here the Athenians were mightily in disorder and perplexed, so
								that it hath been very hard to be informed of any side in what
								manner each thing passed. 
							 For if in the day time, when things are better seen, yet they that
								are present cannot tell how all things go, save only what every man
								with much ado seeth near unto himself, how then in a battle by night
								(the only one that happened between great armies in all this war)
								can a man know anything for certain?

For though the moon shined bright, yet they saw one another no
								otherwise than as by the moonlight was likely, so as to see a body,
								but not be sure whether it were a friend or not.

And the men of arms on both sides, being not a few in number, had but
								little ground to turn in. 
							 Of the Athenians, some were already overcome, others went on in their
								first way. 
							 Also a great part of the rest of the army was already part gotten up
								and part ascending, and knew not which way to march. 
							 For after the Athenians once turned their backs, all before them was
								in confusion;

and it was hard to distinguish of anything for the noise. 
							 For the Syracusians and their confederates prevailing encouraged each
								other and received the assailants with exceeding great shouts (for
								they had no other means in the night to express themselves); 
							 and the Athenians sought each other and took for enemies all before
								them, though friends and of the number of those that fled, and by
								often asking the word, there being no other means of distinction,
								all asking at once they both made a great deal of stir amongst
								themselves and revealed the word to the enemy. 
							 But they did not in like manner know the word of the Syracusians,
								because these, being victorious and undistracted, knew one another
								better;

so that when they lighted on any number of the enemy, though they
								themselves were more, yet the enemy escaped as knowing the
								watchword; 
							 but they, when they could not answer, were slain.

But that which hurt them most was the tune of the Paean, which being
								in both armies the same, drave them to their wits' end. 
							 For the Argives and Corcyraeans and all other of the Doric race on
								the Athenians' part, when they sounded the Paean, terrified the
								Athenians on one side; 
							 and the enemy terrified them with the like on the other side.

Wherefore at the last, falling one upon another in divers parts of
								the army, friends against friends, and countrymen against
								countrymen, they not only terrified each other, but came to
								handstrokes and could hardly again be parted.

As they fled before the enemy, the way of the descent from Epipolae
								by which they were to go back being but strait, many of them threw
								themselves down from the rocks, and died so. 
							 And of the rest that gat down safely into the plain, though the
								greatest part, and all that were of the old army by their knowledge
								of the country, escaped into the camp; 
							 yet of these that came last, some lost their way, and straying in the
								fields, when the day came on were cut off by the Syracusian horsemen
								that ranged the country about.

The next day the Syracusians erected two trophies, one in Epipolae at
								the ascent and another where the first check was given by the
								Boeotians. 
							 The Athenians received their dead under truce. 
							 And many there were that died, both of themselves and of their
								confederates;

but the arms taken were more than for the number of the slain. 
							 For of such as were forced to quit their bucklers and leap down from
								the rocks, though some perished, yet some there also were that
								escaped.

After this, the Syracusians, having by such unlooked-for prosperity
								recovered their former courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen galleys to
								Agrigentum, being in sedition, to bring that city, if they could, to
								their obedience. 
							 And Gylippus went again to the Sicilian cities by land to raise yet
								another army, as being in hope to take the camp of the Athenians by
								assault, considering how the matter had gone in Epipolae.

In the meantime the Athenian generals went to council upon their late
								overthrow and present general weakness of the army. 
							 For they saw not only that their designs prospered not, but that the
								soldiers also were weary of staying.

For they were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause,
								this being the time of the year most obnoxious to diseases, and the
								place where they lay moorish and noisome; 
							 and all things else appeared desperate.

Demosthenes thought fit to stay no longer, and since the execution of
								his design at Epipolae had failed, delivered his opinion for going
								out of the haven whilst the seas were open and whilst, at least with
								this addition of galleys, they were stronger than the army of the
								enemy.

For it was better, he said, for the city to make war upon those which
								fortify against them at home than against the Syracusians, seeing
								they cannot now be easily overcome; 
							 and there was no reason why they should spend much money in lying
								before the city. 
							 This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was unwilling to
								have their weakness discovered, and, by decreeing of their departure
								openly with the votes of many, to make known the same to the
								enemy; 
							 for if at any time they had a mind to be gone, they should then be
								less able to do it secretly.

Besides, the estate of the enemy, inasmuch as he understood it better
								than the rest, put him into some hope that it might yet grow worse
								than their own, in case they pressed the siege, especially being
								already masters of the sea, far and near, with their present
								fleet. 
							 There was moreover a party for the Athenians in Syracuse that desired
								to betray the state into their hands, and that sent messengers unto
								him and suffered him not to rise and be gone.

All which he knowing, though he were in truth doubtful what opinion
								to be of, and did yet consider, nevertheless openly in his speech he
								was against the withdrawing of the army, and said that he was sure
								the people of Athens would take it ill if he went thence without
								their order; 
							 for that they were not to have such judges as should give sentence
								upon their own sight of things done rather than upon the report of
								calumniators, but such as would believe whatsoever some fine speaker
								should accuse them of. 
							 That many, nay most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their
								misery, will there cry out on the contrary, and say the generals
								have betrayed the state and come away for a bribe.

That he would not, therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so
								well, choose to be put to death unjustly and charged with a
								dishonourable crime by the Athenians rather than, if he must needs
								do one, to suffer the same at the hand of the enemy by his own
								adventure. 
							 And yet, he said, the state of the Syracusians was still inferior to
								their own.

For paying much money to strangers and laying out much more on forts
								[without and about the city], having also had a great navy a year
								already in pay, they must needs want money at last, and all these
								things fail them. 
							 For they have spent already two thousand talents, and are much in
								debt besides. 
							 And whensoever they shall give over this course and make pay no
								longer, their strength is gone, as being auxiliary and not
								constrained to follow the war as the Athenians are.

Therefore it was fit, he said, to stay close to the city and not to
								go away as if they were too weak in money, wherein they were much
								superior.

Nicias, when he spake this, assured them of it, as knowing the state
								of Syracuse precisely and their want of money, and that there were
								some that desired to betray the city to the Athenians and sent him
								word not to go. 
							 Withal he had now confidence in the fleet, which, as being before
								overcome, he had not.

As for lying where they did, Demosthenes would by no means hear of
								it. 
							 But if the army might not be carried away without order from the
								Athenians but must needs stay in Sicily, then, he said, they might
								go to Thapsus or Catana, from whence by their landmen they might
								invade and turn much of the country to them and wasting the fields
								of the enemies, weaken the Syracusians; 
							 and be to fight with their galleys in the main sea, and not in a
								narrow (which is the advantage of the enemy), but in a wide place,
								where the benefit of skill should be theirs, and where they should
								not be forced, in charging and retiring, to come up and fall off in
								narrow and circumscribed limits.

In sum, he said, he by no means liked to stay where they were, but
								with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be
								gone. 
							 Eurymedon also gave the like counsel.

Nevertheless, upon the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of
								sloth and procrastination in the business, and a suspicion withal
								that the asseveration of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he
								knew above the rest. 
							 And thereupon the Athenians deferred their going thence and stayed
								upon the place.

In the meantime Gylippus and Sicanus returned unto Syracuse. 
							 Sicanus without his purpose at Agrigentum, for whilst he was yet in
								Gela, the sedition which had been raised in the behalf of the
								Syracusians was turned into friendship; 
							 but Gylippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides
								the men of arms, which having set forth from Peloponnesus in ships
								the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of
								Afric.

For having been driven into Afric, and the Cyrenaeans having given
								them two galleys with pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the
								Euesperitae besieged by the Africans; 
							 and having overcome the Africans, they went over to Neapolis, a town
								of traffic belonging to the Carthagenians, where the passage into
								Sicily is shortest, and but two days and a night's sail over; 
							 and from thence they crossed the sea to Selinus.

As soon as they were come, the Syracusians again presently prepared
								to set upon the Athenians, both by sea and land. 
							 The Athenian generals, seeing them have another army, and their own
								not bettering but every day growing worse than other, but especially
								as being pressed to it by the sickness of the soldiers, repented now
								that they removed not before; 
							 and Nicias, being now no longer against it as he was but desirous
								only that it might not be concluded openly, gave order unto all as
								secretly as was possible to put forth of the harbour and to be ready
								when the sign should be given.

But when they were about it and everything was ready, the moon
								happened to be eclipsed; 
							 for it was full moon. 
							 And not only the greatest part of the Athenians called upon the
								generals to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to
								superstition and observations of that kind somewhat too much) said
								that it should come no more into debate whether they should go or
								not till the three times nine days were past which the soothsayers
								appoint in that behalf. 
							 And the Athenians, though upon going, stayed still for this reason.

The Syracusians, also having intelligence of this, were encouraged
								unto the pressing of the Athenians much the more, for that they
								confessed themselves already too weak for them, both by sea and
								land; 
							 for else they would never have sought to have run away. 
							 Besides, they would not have them sit down in any other part of
								Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on; 
							 but had rather thereright, and in a place most for their own
								advantage, compel them to fight by sea.

To which end they manned their galleys; 
							 and after they had rested as long as was sufficient, when they saw
								their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp. 
							 And some small number of men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians
								sallied out against them by certain gates; 
							 and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat them
								back into the camp. 
							 But the entrance being strait, there were seventy of the horsemen
								lost, and men of arms some, but not many.

The next day they came out with their galleys, seventy-six in number,
								and the Athenians set forth against them with eightysix; 
							 and being come together, they fought.

Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians, and desiring
								to encompass the galleys of the enemies, drew forth his own galleys
								in length more towards the shore, and was cut off by the
								Syracusians, that had first overcome the middle battle of the
								Athenians, from the rest, in the bottom and inmost part of the
								haven, and both slain himself, and the galleys that were with him
								lost. 
							 And that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased and
								driven ashore.

Gylippus, when he saw the navy of the enemy vanquished and carried
								past the piles and their own harbour, came with a part of his army
								to the pier to kill such as landed and to cause that the Syracusians
								might the easier pull the enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof
								themselves were masters.

But the Tuscans, who kept guard in that part for the Athenians,
								seeing them coming that way in disorder, made head, and charging
								these first, forced them into the marsh called Lysimeleia.

But when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and their
								confederates came to help them, then also the Athenians, to help the
								Tuscans and for fear to lose their galleys, fought with them; 
							 and having overcome them, pursued them, and not only slew many of
								their men of arms, but also saved the most of their galleys and
								brought them back into the harbour. 
							 Nevertheless the Syracusians took eighteen and slew the men taken in
								them.

And amongst the rest they let drive before the wind (which blew right
								upon the Athenians) an old ship full of faggots and brands set on
								fire to burn them. 
							 The Athenians on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy,
								devised remedies for the fire, and having quenched the flame and
								kept the ship from coming near, escaped that danger.

After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the battle by
								sea, and for the men of arms which they intercepted above before the
								camp, where also they took the horses. 
							 And the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight of
								those footmen which the Tuscans drave into the marsh and for those
								which they themselves put to flight with the rest of the army.

When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their fleet (for
								they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with
								Demosthenes), the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of
								heart. 
							 And as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of
								the voyage.

For having come against these cities, the only ones that were for
								institution like unto their own and governed by the people as well
								as themselves, and which had a navy and horses and greatness, seeing
								they could create no dissension amongst them about change of
								government to win them that way, nor could subdue it with the
								greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but
								misprospered in most of their designs, they were then at their wits'
								end; 
							 but now, when they were also vanquished by sea (which they would
								never have thought), they were much more dejected than ever.

The Syracusians went presently about the haven without fear and
								meditated how to shut up the same that the Athenians might not steal
								away without their knowledge, though they would.

For now they studied not only how to save themselves, but how to
								hinder the safety of the Athenians. 
							 For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, that their own strength
								was at this present the greater, and that if they could vanquish the
								Athenians and their confederates both by sea and land, it would be a
								mastery of great honour to them amongst the rest of the
								Grecians. 
							 For all the rest of Greece should be one part freed by it, and the
								other part out of fear of subjection hereafter; 
							 for it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remainder of
								their strength, to sustain the war that would be made upon them
								afterwards. 
							 And they, being reputed the authors of it, should be had in
								admiration, not only with all men now living, but also with
								posterity.

And to say truth, it was a worthy mastery, both for the causes shewn
								and also for that they became victors not of the Athenians only but
								many others, their confederates; 
							 nor again they themselves alone but their confederates also, having
								been in joint command with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, and
								both exposed their city to the first hazard, and of the business by
								sea performed the greatest part themselves.

The greatest number of nations, except the general roll of those
								which in this war adhered to Athens and Lacedaemon, were together at
								this one city.

And this number on both sides, against Sicily and for it, some to
								help win and some to help save it, came to the war at Syracuse, not
								on any pretence of right nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as
								profit or necessity severally chanced to induce them. 
							 The Athenians, being Ionic, went against the Syracusians, that be
								Doric, voluntarily.

With these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians and Imbrians,
								and the Aeginetae that dwelt in Aegina then, all of the same
								language and institutions with themselves; 
							 also the Hestiaeans of Euboea. 
							 Of the rest, some went with them as their subjects and some as their
								free confederates and some also hired.

Subjects and tributaries: as the Eretrians, Chalcideans, Styrians,
								and Carystians, from Euboea; 
							 Ceians, Andrians, Tenians, from out of the islands; 
							 Milesians, Samians, and Chians, from Ionia.

Of these the Chians followed them as free, not as tributaries of
								money, but of galleys. 
							 And these were almost all of them Ionians, descended from the
								Athenians, except only the Carystians, that are of the nation of the
								Dryopes. 
							 And though they were subjects and went upon constraint, yet they were
								Ionians against Dorians. 
							 Besides these there went with them Aeolians, namely, the
								Methymnaeans, subjects to Athens, not tributaries of money but of
								galleys; 
							 and the Tenedians and Aenians, tributaries. 
							 Now here, Aeolians were constrained to fight against Aeolians,
								namely, against their founders the Boeotians, that took part with
								the Syracusians.

But the Plataeans, and only they, being Boeotians, fought against
								Boeotians upon just quarrel. 
							 The Rhodians and Cythereans, Doric both, by constraint bore arms; 
							 one of them, namely the Cythereans, a colony of the Lacedaemonians,
								with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians that were with
								Gylippus;

and the other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent
								Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but
								against their own colony, the Geloans, which took part with the
								Syracusians. 
							 Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there went with them the
								Cephallenians and Zacynthians, not but that they were free states,
								but because they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athenians, who
								were masters of the sea.

And the Corcyraeans, being not only Doric but Corinthians, fought
								openly against both Corinthians and Syracusians, though a colony of
								the one and of kin to the other, which they did necessarily (to make
								the best of it), but indeed no less willingly, in respect of their
								hatred to the Corinthians. 
							 Also the Messenians, now so called, in Naupactus, were taken along to
								this war, and the Messenians at Pylus, then holden by the
								Athenians.

Moreover the Megarean outlaws, though not many, by advantage taken of
								their misery, were fain to fight against the Selinuntians that were
								Megareans likewise. 
							 But now the rest of their army was rather voluntary.

The Argives not so much for the league as for their enmity against
								the Lacedaemonians and their present particular spleen, followed the
								Athenians to the war, though Ionic, against Dorians. 
							 And the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries went with them as
								men accustomer ever to invade the enemy shewed them; 
							 and now for gain had for enemies, as much as any, those other
								Arcadians which went thither with the Corinthians. 
							 The Cretans and Aetolians were all mercenary; 
							 and it fell out that the Cretans, who together with the Rhodians were
								founders of Gela, not only took not part with their colony, but
								fought against it willingly for their hire. 
							 And some Acarnanians also went with them for gain;

but most of them went as confederates, in love to Demosthenes and for
								good will to the state of Athens. 
							 And thus many within the bound of the Ionian gulf.

Then of Italians, fallen into the same necessity of seditious times,
								there went with them to this war the Thurians and Metapontians; 
							 of Greek Sicilians, the Naxians and Catanaeans. 
							 Of barbarian, the Egestaeans, who also drew with them the most of
								those Greek Sicilians. 
							 Without Sicily, there went with them some Tuscans, upon quarrels
								between them and the Syracusians, and some Iapygian mercenaries. 
							 These were the nations that followed the army of the Athenians.

On the other side, there opposed them on the part of the Syracusians,
								the Camarinaeans their borderers; 
							 and beyond them again the Geloans;

and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond them again the same
								way, the Selinuntians. 
							 These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Afric. 
							 Then the Himeraeans, on the side that lieth on the Tyrrhene sea,
								where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and only aided
								them.

These were their confederates of the Greek nation within Sicily, all
								Dorians and free states. 
							 Then of the barbarians there, they had the Siculi, all but what
								revolted to the Athenians. 
							 For Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedaemonians sent them a Spartan
								commander, with some Helotes and the rest freedmen. 
							 Then aided them both with galleys and with land men the Corinthians
								only; 
							 and for kindred's sake, the Leucadians and Ambraciotes; 
							 out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians; 
							 and Sicyonians on constraint; 
							 and from without Peloponnesus, the Boeotians.

To the foreign aids the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities,
								added more in every kind than as much again; 
							 for they got together men of arms, galleys, and horses, great store,
								and other number in abundance. 
							 And to all these again the Syracusians themselves added, as I may
								say, about as much more, in respect of the greatness both of their
								city and of their danger.

These were the succours assembled on either part, and which were then
								all there; 
							 and after them came no more, neither to the one side nor the
								other.

No marvel then if the Syracusians thought it a noble mastery if to
								the victory by sea already gotten they could add the taking of the
								whole Athenian army, so great as it was, and hinder their escape
								both by sea and land.

Presently therefore they fall in hand with stopping up the mouth of
								the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide, with galleys laid
								cross and lighters and boats upon their anchors; 
							 and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary in case the
								Athenians would hazard another battle, meditating on no small
								matters in anything.

The Athenians, seeing the shutting up of the haven and the rest of
								the enemy's designs, thought good to go to council upon it.

And the generals and commanders of regiments having met and
								considered their present want, both otherwise and in this, that they
								neither had provision for the present (for upon their resolution to
								be gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the sending in of
								any more), nor were likely to have for the future unless their navy
								got the upper hand, they resolved to abandon their camp above and to
								take in some place, no greater than needs they must, near unto their
								galleys, with a wall, and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with
								the rest of the army, and to man every galley they had, serviceable
								and less serviceable; 
							 and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if
								they gat the victory, to go to Catana; 
							 if not, to make their retreat in order of battle by land (having
								first set fire on their navy) the nearest way unto some amicable
								place, either barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to
								reach unto before the enemy.

As they had concluded, so they did. 
							 For they both came down to the shore from their camp above and also
								manned every galley they had and compelled to go aboard every man of
								age of any ability whatsoever.

So the whole navy was manned to the number of one hundred and ten
								galleys, upon which they had many archers and darters, both
								Acarnanians and other strangers, and all things else provided
								according to their means and purpose.

And Nicias, when almost everything was ready, perceiving the soldiers
								to be dejected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their
								custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity of victual desirous as
								soon as could be to fight, called them together and encouraged them
								then the first time with words to this effect:

"Soldiers, Athenians, and other our confederates, [though] the trial
								at hand will be common to all alike and will concern the safety and
								country no less of each of us than of the enemy (for if our galleys
								get the victory, we may every one see his native city again),

yet ought we not to be discouraged like men of no experience, who
								failing in their first adventures, ever after carry a fear suitable
								to their misfortunes.

But you Athenians here present, having had experience already of many
								wars, and you our confederates, that have always gone along with our
								armies, remember how often the event falleth out otherwise in war
								than one would think; 
							 and in hope that fortune will once also be of our side, prepare
								yourselves to fight again in such manner as shall be worthy the
								number you see yourselves to be.

"What we thought would be helps in the narrowness of the haven,
								against such a multitude of galleys as will be there and against the
								provision of the enemy upon their decks, whereby we were formerly
								annoyed, we have with the masters now considered them all, and as
								well as our present means will permit, made them ready.

For many archers and darters shall go aboard: and that multitude,
								which if we had been to fight in the main sea we would not have
								used, because by slugging the galleys it would take away the use of
								skill, will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to make
								a landfight from our galleys.

We have also devised, instead of what should have been provided for
								in the building of our galleys, against the thickness of the beaks
								of theirs, which did most hurt us, to lash their galleys unto ours
								with iron grapnels, whereby (if the men of arms do their part) we
								may keep the galleys which once come close up from falling back
								again.

For we are brought to a necessity now of making it a land-fight upon
								the water; 
							 and it will be the best for us neither to fall back ourselves nor to
								suffer the enemy to do so, especially when, except what our men on
								land shall make good, the shore is altogether hostile.

"Which you remembering, must therefore fight it out to the utmost and
								not suffer yourselves to be beaten back unto the shore;

but when galley to galley shall once be fallen close, never think any
								cause worthy to make you part unless you have first beaten off the
								men of arms of the enemy from their decks. 
							 And this I speak to you rather that are the men of arms than to the
								mariners, inasmuch as that part belongeth rather unto you that fight
								above;

and in you it lieth even yet to achieve the victory for the most part
								with the landmen. 
							 Now for the mariners, I advise, and withal beseech them, not to be
								too much daunted with the losses past, having now both a greater
								number of galleys and greater forces upon the decks. 
							 Think it a pleasure worth preserving that being taken, by your
								knowledge of the language and imitation of our fashions, for
								Athenians (though you be not so), you are not only admired for it
								through all Greece, but also partake of our dominion in matter of
								profit no less than ourselves, and for awfulness to the nations
								subject and protection from injury, more.

You therefore that alone participate freely of our dominion cannot
								with any justice betray the same. 
							 In despite therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often
								vanquished, and of the Sicilians, who as long as our fleet was at
								the best durst never so much as stand us, repel them; 
							 and make it appear that your knowledge, even with weakness and loss,
								is better than the strength of another with fortune.

Again, to such of you as are Athenians, I
										must remember this: that you have no more such fleets in
										your harbours, nor such able men of arms, and that if aught
										happen to you but victory, your enemies here will presently
										be upon you at home; 
									 and those at home will be unable to defend themselves both
										against those that shall go hence and against the enemy that
										lieth there already. 
									 So one part of us shall fall into the mercy of the
										Syracusians, against whom you yourselves know with what
										intent you came hither;

and the other part, which is at home, shall fall into the hands
									of the Lacedaemonians. 
								 Being therefore in this one battle to fight both for yourselves
									and them, be therefore valiant now if ever; 
								 and bear in mind every one of you that you that go now aboard are
									the land forces, the sea forces, the whole estate and great name
									of Athens. 
								 For which, if any man excel others in skill or courage, he can
									never shew it more opportunely than now, when he may both help
									himself with it and the whole.

Nicias, having thus encouraged them, commanded presently to go
								aboard. 
							 Gylippus and the Syracusians might easily discern that the Athenians
								meant to fight by seeing their preparation. 
							 Besides, they had advertisement of their purpose to cast iron
								grapnels into their galleys;

and as for everything else, so also for that they had made
								provision. 
							 For they covered the fore-part of their galleys and also the decks
								for a great way, with hides, that the grapnels cast in might slip
								and not be able to take hold.

When all was ready, Gylippus likewise and the other commanders used
								unto their soldiers this hortative:

"That not only our former acts have been honourable, but that we are
								to fight now also for further honour, men of Syracuse and
								confederates, the most of you seem to know already; 
							 for else you never would so valiantly have undergone it; 
							 and if there be any man that is not so sensible of it as he ought, we
								will make it appear unto him better.

For whereas the Athenians came into this country with design first to
								enslave Sicily and then, if that succeeded, Peloponnesus and the
								rest of Greece, and whereas already they had the greatest dominion
								of any Grecians whatsoever, either present or past, you, the first
								that ever withstood their navy, wherewith they were everywhere
								masters, have in the former battles overcome them, and shall in
								likelihood overcome them again in this.

For men that are cut short where they thought themselves to exceed
								become afterwards further out of opinion with themselves than they
								would have been if they had never thought so; 
							 and when they come short of their hope in things they glory in, they
								come short also in courage of the true strength of their forces. 
							 And this is likely now to be the case of the Athenians.

"Whereas with us it falleth out that our former courage, wherewith
								though unexperienced we durst stand them, being now confirmed, and
								an opinion added of being the stronger, giveth to every one of us a
								double hope. 
							 And in all enterprises the greatest hope conferreth for the most part
								the greatest courage.

As for their imitation of our provisions, they are things we are
								acquainted withal, and we shall not in any kind be unprovided for
								them. 
							 But they, when they shall have many men of arms upon their decks,
								being not used to it, and many, as I may term them, land-darters,
								both Acarnanians and others, who would not be able to direct their
								darts though they should sit, how can they choose but put the
								galleys into danger and be all in confusion amongst themselves,
								moving in a fashion not their own?

As for the number of their galleys, it will help them nothing, if any
								of you fear also that, as being to fight against odds in number. 
							 For many in little room are so much the slower to do what they
								desire, and easiest to be annoyed by our munition. 
							 But the very truth you shall now understand by these things, whereof
								we suppose we have most certain intelligence.

Overwhelmed with calamities and forced by the difficulties which they
								are in at this present, they are grown desperate, not trusting to
								their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the decision of
								fortune, as well as they may, that so they may either go out by
								force or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose
								estates cannot change into the worse.

Against such confusion, therefore, and
										against the fortune of our greatest enemies now betraying
										itself into our hands, let us fight with anger, and with an
										opinion not only that it is most lawful to fulfil our
										hearts' desire upon those our enemies that justified their
										coming hither as a righting of themselves against an
										assailant, but also that to be revenged on an enemy is both
										most natural and, as is most commonly said, the sweetest
										thing in the world.

And that they are our enemies, and our greatest enemies, you all
									well enough know, seeing them come hither into our dominion to
									bring us into servitude. 
								 Wherein if they had sped, they had put the men to the greatest
									tortures, the women and children to the greatest dishonesty, and
									the whole city to the most ignominious name in the world.

In regard whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be so
									tender as to think it gain if they go away without putting you
									to further danger; 
								 for so they mean to do, though they get the victory; 
								 but effecting (as it is likely we shall) what we intend, both to
									be revenged of these and to deliver unto all Sicily their
									liberty, which they enjoyed before but now is more assured. 
								 Honourable is that combat and rare are those hazards wherein the
									failing bringeth little loss and the success a great deal of
									profit.

When Gylippus and the commanders of the Syracusians had in this
								manner encouraged their soldiers, they presently put their men on
								board, perceiving the Athenians to do the same.

Nicias, perplexed with this present estate, and seeing how great and
								how near the danger was, being now on the point to put forth from
								the harbour, and doubting, as in great battles it falleth out that
								somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and that he had not yet
								sufficiently spoken his mind, called unto him again all the captains
								of galleys and spake unto them every one by their fathers, their
								tribes, and their proper names, and entreated every one of them that
								had reputation in any kind not to betray the same, and those whose
								ancestors were eminent not to deface their hereditary virtues,
								remembering them of their country's liberty and the uncontrolled
								power of all men to live as they pleased; 
							 and saying whatsoever else in such a pinch men are accustomed, not
								out of their store, to utter things stale, and in all occasions the
								same, touching their wives, children, and patrial gods, but such
								things as being thought by them available in the present
								discouragement, they use to cry into their ears.

And when he thought he had admonished them, not enough, but as much
								as the time would permit him, he went his way and drew out those
								forces that were to serve on land on the seaside and embattled them
								so as they might take up the greatest length of ground they were
								able, thereby so much the more to confirm the courage of them that
								were aboard.

And Demosthenes, Menander, and Eudemus (for those of the Athenian
								commanders went aboard), putting forth of the harbour, went
								immediately to the lock of the haven and to the passage that was
								left open with intention to force their way out.

But the Syracusians and their confederates, being out already with
								the same number of galleys they had before, disposed part of them to
								the guard of the open passage and the rest in circle about the
								haven, to the end they might fall upon the Athenians from all parts
								at once, and that their land forces might withal be near to aid them
								wheresoever the galleys touched. 
							 In the Syracusian navy commanded Sicanus and Agatharchus, each of
								them over a wing; 
							 and Pythen, with the Corinthians, had the middle battle.

After the Athenians were come to the lock of the haven, at the first
								charge they overcame the galleys placed there to guard it, and
								endeavoured to break open the bars thereof. 
							 But when afterwards the Syracusians and confederates came upon them
								from every side, they fought not at the lock only but also in the
								haven itself; 
							 and the battle was sharp, and such as there had never before been the
								like.

For the courage wherewith the mariners on both sides brought up their
								galleys to any part they were bidden was very great, and great was
								the plotting and counterplotting and contention one against another
								of the masters; 
							 also the soldiers, when the galleys boarded each other, did their
								utmost to excel each other in all points of skill that could be used
								upon the decks; 
							 and every man, in the place assigned him, put himself forth to appear
								the foremost.

But many galleys falling close together in a narrow compass (for they
								were the most galleys that in any battle they had used, and fought
								in the least room, being little fewer on the one side and the other
								than two hundred), they ran against each other but seldom, because
								there was no means of retiring nor of passing by, but made assaults
								upon each other oftener, as galley with galley, either flying or
								pursuing, chanced to fall foul.

And as long as a galley was making up, they that stood on the decks
								used their darts and arrows and stones in abundance; 
							 but being once come close, the soldiers at hand-strokes attempted to
								board each other.

And in many places it so fell out, through want of room, that they
								which ran upon a galley on one side were run upon themselves on the
								other; 
							 and that two galleys, or sometimes more, were forced to lie aboard of
								one; 
							 and that the masters were at once to have a care, not in one place
								only but in many together, how to defend on the one side and how to
								offend on the other; 
							 and the great noise of many galleys fallen foul of one another both
								amazed them and took away their hearing of what their directors
								directed.

For they directed thick and loud on both sides, not only as art
								required but out of their present eagerness; 
							 the Athenians crying out to theirs to force the passage, and now if
								ever valiantly to lay hold upon their safe return to their
								country; 
							 and the Syracusians and their confederates to theirs, how honourable
								a thing to every one of them it would be to hinder their escape and
								by this victory to improve every man the honour of his own
								country.

Moreover, the commanders of either side, where they saw any man
								without necessity to row a-stem, would call unto the captain of the
								galley by his name and ask him, the Athenians, whether he retired
								because he thought the most hostile land to be more their friend
								than the sea, which they had so long been masters of; 
							 the Syracusians theirs, whether when they knew that the Athenians
								desired earnestly by any means to fly, they would nevertheless fly
								from the flyers.

Whilst the conflict was upon the water, the land men had a conflict
								and sided with them in their affections, they of the place
								contending for increase of the honours they had already gotten, and
								the invaders fearing a worse estate than they were already in.

For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their
								galleys, were in such a fear of the event as they had never been in
								the like, and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight upon the
								water with very different passions.

For the sight being near, and not looking all of them upon one and
								the same part, he that saw their own side prevail took heart and
								fell to calling upon the gods that they would not deprive them of
								their safety, and they that saw them have the worse not only
								lamented but shrieked outright, and had their minds more subdued by
								the sight of what was done than they that were present in the battle
								itself. 
							 Others that looked on some part where the fight was equal, because
								the contention continued so as they could make no judgment on it,
								with gesture of body on every occasion agreeable to their
								expectation, passed the time in a miserable perplexity. 
							 For they were ever within a little either of escaping or of
								perishing.

And one might hear in one and the same army, as long as the fight
								upon the water was indifferent, at one and the same time
								lamentations, shouts that they won, that they lost, and whatsoever
								else a great army in great danger is forced differently to
								utter.

They also that were aboard suffered the same, till at last the
								Syracusians and their confederates, after long resistance on the
								other side, put them to flight, and manifestly pressing, chased them
								with great clamour and encouragement of their own to the shore.

And the sea forces, making to the shore, some one way and some
								another, except only such as were lost by being far from it, escaped
								into the harbour. 
							 And the army that was upon the land, no longer now of different
								passions, with one and the same vehemence, all with shrieks and
								sighs unable to sustain what befel, ran part to save the galleys,
								part to the defence of the camp, and the residue, who were far the
								greatest number, fell presently to consider every one of the best
								way to save himself.

And this was the time wherein of all other they stood in greatest
								fear, and they suffered now the like to what they had made others to
								suffer before at Pylus. 
							 For the Lacedaemonians then, besides the loss of their fleet, lost
								the men which they had set over into the island; 
							 and the Athenians now, without some accident not to be expected, were
								out of all hope to save themselves by land.

After this cruel battle, and many galleys and men on either side
								consumed, the Syracusians and their confederates, having the
								victory, took up the wreck and the bodies of their dead, and
								returning into the city, erected a trophy.

But the Athenians, in respect of the greatness of their present loss,
								never thought upon asking leave to take up their dead or wreck, but
								fell immediately to consultation how to be gone the same night.

And Demosthenes, coming unto Nicias, delivered his opinion for going
								once again aboard and forcing the passage, if it were possible,
								betimes the next morning, saying that their galleys which were yet
								remaining and serviceable were more than those of the enemy; 
							 for the Athenians had yet left them about sixty, and the Syracusians
								under fifty.

But when Nicias approved the advice and would have manned out the
								galleys, the mariners refused to go aboard, as being not only
								dejected with their defeat, but also without opinion of ever having
								the upperhand any more. 
							 Whereupon they now resolved all to make their retreat by land.

But Hermocrates of Syracuse, suspecting their purpose, and
								apprehending it as a matter dangerous that so great an army, going
								away by land and sitting down in some part or other of Sicily,
								should there renew the war, repaired unto the magistrates and
								admonished them that it was not fit, through negligence, to suffer
								the enemy in the night time to go their ways (alleging what he
								thought best to the purpose), but that all the Syracusians and their
								confederates should go out and fortify in their way and prepossess
								all the narrow passages with a guard.

Now they were all of them of the same opinion no less than himself
								and thought it fit to be done; 
							 but they conceived withal that the soldier now joyful and taking his
								ease after a sore battle, being also holiday (for it was their day
								of sacrifice to Hercules), would not easily be brought to obey. 
							 For through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of them,
								being holiday, be drinking, and look for anything rather than to be
								persuaded at this time to take up arms again and go out.

But seeing the magistrates upon this consideration thought it hard to
								be done, Hermocrates, not prevailing, of his own head contrived
								this. 
							 Fearing lest the Athenians should pass the worst of their way in the
								night and so at ease out-go them, as soon as it grew dark he sent
								certain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, to the
								Athenian camp; 
							 who, approaching so near as to be heard speak, called to some of them
								to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians (for
								Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence) and bade
								them to advise Nicias not to dislodge that night for that the
								Syracusians had beset the ways;

but that the next day, having had the leisure to furnish their army,
								they might march away.

Upon this advertisement they abode that night, supposing it had been
								without fraud. 
							 And afterwards, because they went not presently, they thought good to
								stay there that day also, to the end that the soldiers might pack up
								their necessaries as commodiously as they could, and begone, leaving
								all things else behind them save what was necessary for their
								bodies.

But Gylippus and the Syracusians, with their land forces, went out
								before them, and not only stopped up the ways in the country about
								by which the Athenians were likely to pass and kept a guard at the
								fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood embattled to receive and
								stop their army in such places as they thought convenient. 
							 And with their galleys they rowed to the harbour of the Athenians and
								towed their galleys away from the shore. 
							 Some few whereof they burnt, as the Athenians themselves meant to
								have done, but the rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in
								any place to drive ashore, they afterwards hauled into the city.

After this, when everything seemed unto Nicias and Demosthenes
								sufficiently prepared, they dislodged, being now the third day from
								their fight by sea.

It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars, as that
								they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that
								instead of their great hopes they had endangered both themselves and
								the state, but also for the dolorous objects which were presented
								both to the eye and mind of every of them in particular in the
								leaving of their camp.

For their dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the
								ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief. 
							 But the living that were sick or wounded both grieved them more than
								the dead, and were more miserable.

For with entreaties and lamentations they put them to a stand,
								pleading to be taken along by whomsoever they saw of their fellows
								or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their comrades, and
								following as far as they were able; 
							 and when the strength of their bodies failed, that they could go no
								further, with ah-mes! and imprecations were there left. 
							 Insomuch as the whole army, filled with tears and irresolute, could
								hardly get away, though the place were hostile and they had suffered
								already, and feared to suffer in the future, more than with tears
								could be expressed; 
							 but hung down their heads and generally blamed themselves. 
							 For they seemed nothing else but even the people of some great city
								expugned by siege and making their escape.

For the whole number that marched were no less one with another than
								forty thousand men. 
							 Of which not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought
								he should have occasion to use, but also the men of arms and
								horsemen, contrary to their custom, carried their victuals under
								their arms, partly for want and partly for distrust of their
								servants, who from time to time ran over to the enemy; 
							 but at this time went the greatest number. 
							 And yet what they carried was not enough to serve the turn, for not a
								jot more provision was left remaining in the camp.

Neither were the sufferings of others and that equal division of
								misery, which nevertheless is wont to lighten it in that we suffer
								with many, at this time so much as thought light in itself. 
							 And the rather because they considered from what splendour and glory
								which they enjoyed before into how low an estate they were now
								fallen. 
							 For never Grecian army so differed from itself.

For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed
								in greater fear of being made slaves themselves; 
							 and instead of prayers and hymns with which they put to sea, they
								went back again with the contrary maledictions; 
							 and whereas they came out seamen, they departed landmen, and relied
								not upon their naval forces but upon their men of arms. 
							 Nevertheless, in respect of the great danger yet hanging over them,
								these miseries seemed all [but] tolerable.

Nicias, perceiving the army to be dejected, and the great change that
								was in it, came up to the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as
								far as for the present means he was able. 
							 And as he went from part to part he exalted his voice more than ever
								before, both as being earnest in his exhortation and because also he
								desired that the benefit of his words might reach as far as might
								be.

Athenians and confederates, we must hope
										still, even in our present estate. 
									 Men have been saved ere now from greater dangers than these
										are. 
									 Nor ought you too much to accuse yourselves, either for your
										losses past, or the undeserved miseries we are now in.

Even I myself, that have the advantage of none of you in strength
									of body (you see how I am in my sickness), nor am I thought
									inferior to any of you for prosperity past, either in respect of
									mine own private person or otherwise, am nevertheless now in as
									much danger as the meanest of you. 
								 And yet I have worshipped the gods frequently according to the
									law and lived justly and unblameably towards men.

For which cause my hope is still confident of the future, though
									these calamities, as being not according to the measure of our
									desert, do indeed make me fear. 
								 But they may perhaps cease. 
								 For both the enemies have already had sufficient fortune, and the
									gods, if any of them have been displeased with our voyage, have
									already sufficiently punished us.

Others have invaded their neighbours as well as we; 
								 and as their offence, which proceeded of human infirmity, so
									their punishment also hath been tolerable. 
								 And we have reason now both to hope for more favour from the gods
									(for our case deserveth their pity rather than their hatred) and
									also not to despair of ourselves, seeing how good and how many
									men of arms you are, marching together in order of battle. 
								 Make account of this, that wheresoever you please to sit down,
									there presently of yourselves you are a city, such as not any
									other in Sicily can either easily sustain if you assault or
									remove if you be once seated.

Now for your march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to it
									yourselves, making no other account, any of you, but what place
									soever he shall be forced to fight in, the same, if he win it,
									must be his country and his walls.

March you must with diligence, both night and day alike, for our
									victual is short; 
								 and if we can but reach some amicable territory of the Siculi
									(for these are still firm to us for fear of the Syracusians),
									then you may think yourselves secure. 
								 Let us therefore send before to them and bid them meet us and
									bring us forth some supplies of victual.

In sum, soldiers, let me tell you it is necessary that you be
									valiant; 
								 for there is no place near where, being cowards, you can possibly
									be saved; 
								 whereas if you escape through the enemies at this time, you may
									every one see again whatsoever anywhere he most desires; 
								 and the Athenians may re-erect the great power of their city, how
									low soever fallen. 
								 For the men, not the walls nor the empty galleys, are the
									city.

Nicias, as he used this hortative, went withal about the army, and
								where he saw any man straggle and not march in his rank, he brought
								him about and set him in his place. 
							 Demosthenes, having spoken to the same or like purpose, did as much
								to those soldiers under him.

And they marched forward, those with Nicias in a square battalion,
								and then those with Demosthenes in the rear. 
							 And the men of arms received those that carried the baggage and the
								other multitude within them.

When they were come to the ford of the river Anapus, they there found
								certain of the Syracusians and their confederates embattled against
								them on the bank; 
							 but these they put to flight, and having won the passage marched
								forward. 
							 But the Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and their
								light-armed plied them with their darts in the flank.

This day the Athenians marched forty furlongs, and lodged that night
								at the foot of a certain hill. 
							 The next day, as soon as it was light, they marched forwards about
								twenty furlongs, and descending into a certain champaign ground,
								encamped there, with intent both to get victual at the houses (for
								the place was inhabited) and to carry water with them thence; 
							 for before them, in the way they were to pass, for many furlongs
								together there was but little to be had.

But the Syracusians in the meantime got before them and cut off their
								passage with a wall. 
							 This was at a steep hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a
								torrent with steep and rocky banks;

and it is called Acraeum Lepas. 
							 The next day the Athenians went on; 
							 and the horsemen and darters of the Syracusians and their
								confederates, being a great number of both, pressed them so with
								their horses and darts that the Athenians after long fight were
								compelled to retire again into the same camp, but now with less
								victual than before, because the horsemen would suffer them no more
								to straggle abroad.

In the morning betimes they dislodged and put themselves on their
								march again, and forced their way to the hill which the enemy had
								fortified, where they found before them the Syracusian foot
								embattled in great length above the fortification [on the hill's
								side];

for the place itself was but narrow. 
							 The Athenians coming up assaulted the wall; 
							 but the shot of the enemy, who were many, and the steepness of the
								hill (for they could easily cast home from above) making them unable
								to take it, they retired again and rested.

There happened withal some claps of thunder and a shower of rain, as
								usually falleth out at this time of the year, being now near autumn,
								which further disheartened the Athenians, who thought that also this
								did tend to their destruction.

Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians sent part of
								their army to raise a wall at their backs, in the way they had
								come; 
							 but this the Athenians hindered by sending against them part of
								theirs.

After this, the Athenians retiring with their whole army into a more
								champaign ground, lodged there that night, and the next day went
								forward again. 
							 And the Syracusians with their darts, from every part round about,
								wounded many of them; 
							 and when the Athenians charged, they retired, and when they retired,
								the Syracusians charged, and that especially upon the hindmost, that
								by putting to flight a few they might terrify the whole army.

And for a good while the Athenians in this manner withstood them; 
							 and afterwards, being gotten five or six furlongs forward, they
								rested in the plain; 
							 and the Syracusians went from them to their own camp.

This night it was concluded by Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the
								miserable estate of their army, and the want already of all
								necessaries, and that many of their men in many assaults of the
								enemy were wounded, to lead away the army as far as they possibly
								could; 
							 not the way they purposed before, but toward the sea, which was the
								contrary way to that which the Syracusians guarded.

Now this whole journey of the army lay not towards Catana, but
								towards the other side of Sicily, Camarina and Gela, and the cities,
								as well Grecian as barbarian, that way. 
							 When they had made many fires accordingly, they marched in the
								night;

and (as usually it falleth out in all armies, and most of all in the
								greatest, to be subject to affright and terror, especially marching
								by night and in hostile ground, and the enemy near) were in
								confusion. 
							 The army of Nicias, leading the way, kept together and got far
								afore;

but that of Demosthenes, which was the greater half, was both severed
								from the rest and marched more disorderly.

Nevertheless, by the morning betimes they got to the seaside, and
								entering into the Helorine way they went on towards the river
								Cacyparis, to the end when they came thither to march upwards along
								the river's side through the heart of the country. 
							 For they hoped that this way the Siculi, to whom they had sent, would
								meet them.

When they came to the river, here also they found a certain guard of
								the Syracusians stopping their passage with a wall and with
								piles. 
							 When they had quickly forced this guard, they passed the river and
								again marched on to another river, called Erineus; 
							 for that was the way which the guides directed them.

In the meantime the Syracusians and their confederates, as soon as
								day appeared and that they knew the Athenians were gone, most of
								them accusing Gylippus as if he had let them go with his consent,
								followed them with speed the same way, which they easily understood
								they were gone, and about dinner time overtook them.

When they were come up to those with Demosthenes, who were the
								hindmost and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other
								part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night, they
								fell upon them and fought. 
							 And the Syracusian horsemen hemmed them in and forced them up into a
								narrow compass, the more easily now because they were divided from
								the rest.

Now the army of Nicias was gone by this time one hundred and fifty
								furlongs further on. 
							 For he led away the faster because he thought not that their safety
								consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily, but rather in a
								speedy retreat, and then only fighting when they could not
								choose.

But Demosthenes was both in greater and more continual toil, in
								respect that he marched in the rear and consequently was pressed by
								the enemy; 
							 and seeing the Syracusians pursuing him, he went not on but put his
								men in order to fight, till by his stay he was encompassed and
								reduced, he and the Athenians with him, into great disorder. 
							 For being shut up within a place enclosed round with a wall, and
								which on either side had a way [open] amongst abundance of olive
								trees, they were charged from all sides at once with the enemy's
								shot.

For the Syracusians assaulted them in this kind, and not in close
								battle, upon very good reason. 
							 For to hazard battle against men desperate was not so much for theirs
								as for the Athenians' advantage. 
							 Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves
								somewhat, because they were loth to wear themselves out before the
								end of the business, and thought by this kind of fight to subdue and
								take them alive.

Whereupon, after they had plied the Athenians and their confederates
								all day long from every side with shot and saw that with their
								wounds and other annoyance they were already tired, Gylippus and the
								Syracusians and their confederates first made proclamation that if
								any of the islanders would come over to them, they should be at
								liberty. 
							 And the men of some few cities went over.

And by and by after, they made agreement with all the rest that were
								with Demosthenes that they should deliver up their arms, and none of
								them be put to death, neither violently, nor by bonds, nor by want
								of the necessities of life.

And they all yielded, to the number of six thousand men; 
							 and the silver they had, they laid it all down, casting it into the
								hollow of targets, and filled with the same four targets. 
							 And these men they carried presently into the city. 

							 Nicias, and those that were with him, attained the same day to the
								river Erineus, which passing, he caused his army to sit down upon a
								certain ground more elevate than the rest.

Where the Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, that those
								with Demosthenes had yielded themselves, and willed him to do the
								like. 
							 But he, not believing it, took truce for a horseman to enquire the
								truth.

Upon return of the horseman and word that they had yielded, he sent a
								herald to Gylippus and the Syracusians, saying that he was content
								to compound on the part of the Athenians to repay whatsoever money
								the Syracusians had laid out, so that his army might be suffered to
								depart, and that till payment of the money were made, he would
								deliver them hostages, Athenians, every hostage rated as a
								talent.

But Gylippus and the Syracusians, refusing the condition, charged
								them, and having hemmed them in, plied them with shot, as they had
								done the other army, from every side till evening.

This part of the army was also pinched with the want both of victual
								and other necessaries. 
							 Nevertheless, observing the quiet of the night, they were about to
								march. 
							 But no sooner took they their arms up than the Syracusians perceiving
								it gave the alarm.

Whereupon the Athenians, finding themselves discovered, sat down
								again, all but three hundred, who breaking by force through the
								guards, marched as far as they could that night.

And Nicias, when it was day, led his army forward, the Syracusians
								and their confederates still pressing them in the same manner,
								shooting and darting at them from every side.

The Athenians hasted to get the river Asinarus, not only because they
								were urged on every side by the assault of the many horsemen and
								other multitude and thought to be more at ease when they were over
								the river, but out of weariness also and desire to drink.

When they were come unto the river, they rushed in without any order,
								every man striving who should first get over. 
							 But the pressing of the enemy made the passage now more
								difficult. 
							 For being forced to take the river in heaps, they fell upon and
								trampled one another under their feet; 
							 and falling amongst the spears and utensils of the army, some
								perished presently; 
							 and others, catching hold one of another, were carried away together
								down the stream.

And [not only] the Syracusians standing along the farther bank, being
								a steep one, killed the Athenians with their shot from above as they
								were many of them greedily drinking and troubling one another in the
								hollow of the river;

but the Peloponnesians came also down and slew them with their
								swords, and those especially that were in the river. 
							 And suddenly the water was corrupted; 
							 nevertheless they drunk it, foul as it was with blood and mire; 
							 and many also fought for it.

In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river, and the army was
								utterly defeated, part at the river, and part (if any gat away) by
								the horsemen, Nicias yielded himself unto Gylippus (having more
								confidence in him than in the Syracusians) to be for his own person
								at the discretion of him and the Lacedaemonians, and no further
								slaughter to be made of the soldiers.

Gylippus from thenceforth commanded to take prisoners. 
							 So the residue, except such as were hidden from them (which were
								many), they carried alive into the city. 
							 They sent also to pursue the three hundred which brake through their
								guards in the night, and took them.

That which was left together of this army to the public was not
								much; 
							 but they that were conveyed away by stealth were very many;

and all Sicily was filled with them, because they were not taken, as
								those with Demosthenes were, by composition. 
							 Besides, a great part [of these] were slain; 
							 for the slaughter [at this time] was exceeding great, none greater in
								all the Sicilian war. 
							 They were also not a few that died in those other assaults in their
								march. 
							 Nevertheless, many also escaped, some then presently and some by
								running away after servitude; 
							 the rendezvous of whom was Catana.

The Syracusians and their confederates, being come together, returned
								with their prisoners, all they could get, and with the spoil into
								the city.

As for all the other prisoners of the Athenians and their
								confederates, they put them into the quarries as the safest
								custody. 
							 But Nicias and Demosthenes they killed, against Gylippus' will. 
							 For Gylippus thought the victory would be very honourable if, over
								and above all his other success, he could carry home both the
								generals of the enemy to Lacedaemon.

And it fell out that one of them, Demosthenes, was their greatest
								enemy for the things he had done in the island and at Pylus; 
							 and the other, upon the same occasion, their greatest friend. 
							 For Nicias had earnestly laboured to have those prisoners which were
								taken in the island to be set at liberty by persuading the Athenians
								to the peace.

For which cause the Lacedaemonians were inclined to love him; 
							 and it was principally in confidence of that that he rendered himself
								to Gylippus. 
							 But certain Syracusians, as it is reported, some of them for fear
								(because they had been tampering with him) lest being put to the
								torture he might bring them into trouble, whereas now they were well
								enough; 
							 and others, especially the Corinthians, fearing he might get away by
								corruption of one or other, being wealthy, and work them some
								mischief afresh, having persuaded their confederates to the same,
								killed him.

For these, or for causes near unto these, was he put to death; 
							 being the man that, of all the Grecians of my time, had least
								deserved to be brought to so great a degree of misery.

As for those in the quarries, the Syracusians handled them at first
								but ungently. 
							 For in this hollow place, first the sun and suffocating air (being
								without roof) annoyed them one way; 
							 and on the other side, the nights coming upon that heat, autumnal and
								cold, put them, by reason of the alteration, into strange
								diseases;

especially doing all things, for want of room, in one and the same
								place, and the carcasses of such as died of their wounds or change
								[of air] or other like accident lying together there on heaps. 
							 Also the smell was intolerable; 
							 besides that they were afflicted with hunger and thirst. 
							 For for eight months together, they allowed no more but to every man
								a cotyle of water by the day and two cotyles of corn. 
							 And whatsoever misery is probable that men in such a place may
								suffer, they suffered.

Some seventy days they lived thus thronged. 
							 Afterwards, retaining the Athenians, and such Sicilians and Italians
								as were of the army with them, they sold the rest.

How many were taken in all it is hard to say exactly; 
							 but they were seven thousand at the fewest.

And this was the greatest action that happened in all this war, or at
								all, that we have heard of amongst the Grecians, being to the
								victors most glorious and most calamitous to the vanquished.

For being wholly overcome in every kind and receiving small loss in
								nothing, their army and fleet and all [that ever they had] perished
								(as they use to say) with an universal destruction. 
							 Few of many returned home. 
							 And thus passed the business concerning Sicily.

When the news was told at Athens, they believed not a long time,
								though it were plainly related and by those very soldiers that
								escaped from the defeat itself that all was so utterly lost as it
								was. 
							 When they knew it, they were mightily offended with the orators that
								furthered the voyage, as if they themselves had never decreed
								it. 
							 They were angry also with those that gave out prophecies and with the
								soothsayers and with whosoever else had at first by any divination
								put them into hope that Sicily should be subdued.

Every thing, from every place, grieved them; 
							 and fear and astonishment, the greatest that ever they were in, beset
								them round. 
							 For they were not only grieved for the loss which both every man in
								particular and the whole city sustained of so many men of arms,
								horsemen, and serviceable men, the like whereof they saw was not
								left, but seeing they had neither galleys in their haven nor money
								in their treasury nor furniture in their galleys, were even
								desperate at that present of their safety; 
							 and thought the enemy out of Sicily would come forthwith with their
								fleet into Peiraeus, especially after the vanquishing of so great a
								navy, and that the enemy here would surely now, with double
								preparation in every kind, press them to the utmost both by sea and
								land and be aided therein by their revolting confederates.

Nevertheless, as far as their means would stretch, it was thought
								best to stand it out and, getting materials and money where they
								could have it, to make ready a navy and to make sure of their
								confederates, especially those of Euboea; 
							 and to introduce a greater frugality in the city, and to erect a
								magistracy of the elder sort, as occasion should be offered to
								preconsult of the business that passed.

And they were ready, in respect of their present fear (as is the
								people's fashion), to order every thing aright. 
							 And as they resolved this, so they did it. 
							 And the summer ended.

The winter following, upon the great overthrow of the Athenians in
								Sicily, all the Grecians were presently up against them. 
							 Those who before were confederates of neither side thought fit no
								longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the war, but to go against
								the Athenians of their own accord, as having not only every one
								severally this thought, that had the Athenians prospered in Sicily
								they would afterwards have come upon them also, but imagined withal
								that the rest of the war would be but short, whereof it would be an
								honour to participate. 
							 And such of them as were confederates of the Lacedaemonians longed
								now more than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their great
								toil.

But above all, the cities subject to the Athenians were ready, even
								beyond their ability, to revolt; 
							 as they that judged according to their passion, without admitting
								reason in the matter, that the next summer they were to remain with
								victory.

But the Lacedaemonians themselves took heart, not only from all this,
								but also principally from that, that their confederates in Sicily
								with great power, having another navy now necessarily added to their
								own, would in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the
								spring.

And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without delay to
								fall close to the war, making account, if this were well ended, both
								to be free hereafter from any more such dangers as the Athenians, if
								they had gotten Sicily, would have put them into, and also, having
								pulled them down, to have the principality of all Greece now secure
								unto themselves.

Whereupon Agis, their king, went out with a part of his army the same
								winter from Deceleia and levied money amongst the confederates for
								the building of a navy; 
							 and turning into the Melian gulf, upon an old grudge took a great
								booty from the Oetaeans, which he made money of, and forced those of
								Pthiotis, being Achaians, and others in those parts subjects to the
								Thessalians (the Thessalians complaining and unwilling) to give them
								hostages and money. 
							 The hostages he put into Corinth, and endeavoured to draw them into
								the league.

And the Lacedaemonians imposed upon the states confederate, the
								charge of building one hundred galleys; 
							 that is to say, on their own state and on the Boeotians, each
								twenty-five; 
							 on the Phoceans and Locrians, fifteen; 
							 on the Corinthians, fifteen; 
							 on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians, ten; 
							 and on the Megareans, Troezenians, and Hermionians, ten. 
							 And put all things else in readiness presently with the spring to
								begin the war.

The Athenians also made their preparations as they had designed,
								having gotten timber and built their navy this same winter, and
								fortified the promontory of Sunium that their cornboats might come
								about in safety. 
							 Also they abandoned the fort in Laconia, which they had built as they
								went by for Sicily. 
							 And generally where there appeared expense upon anything unuseful,
								they contracted their charge.

Whilst they were on both sides doing thus, there came unto Agis about
								their revolt from the Athenians, first the ambassadors of the
								Euboeans. 
							 Accepting the motion, he sent for Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas,
								and for Melanthus from Lacedaemon to go commanders into Euboea. 
							 Whom, when he was come to him with about three hundred freedmen, he
								was now about to send over. 
							 But in the meantime came the Lesbians, they also desiring to
								revolt;

and by the means of the Boeotians Agis changed his former resolution
								and prepared for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of Euboea, and
								assigned them Alcamenes, the same that should have gone into Euboea,
								for their governor; 
							 and the Boeotians promised them ten galleys and Agis other ten. 
							 Now this was done without acquainting therewith the state of
								Lacedaemon.

For Agis, as long as he was about Deceleia with the power he had, had
								the law in his own hands to send what army and whither he listed and
								to levy men and money at his pleasure. 
							 And at this time, the confederates of him (as I may call them) did
								better obey him than the confederates of the Lacedaemonians did them
								at home; 
							 for having the power in his hands, he was terrible wheresoever he
								came. 
							 And he was now for the Lesbians.

But the Chians and Erythraeans, they also desiring to revolt, went
								not to Agis, but to the Lacedaemonians in the city; 
							 and with them went also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieutenant
								to king Darius in the low countries of Asia. 
							 For Tissaphernes also instigated the Peloponnesians and promised to
								pay their fleet.

For he had lately begged of the king the tribute accruing in his own
								province; 
							 for which he was in arrearage, because he could receive nothing out
								of any of the Greek cities by reason of the Athenians. 
							 And therefore he thought by weakening the Athenians to receive his
								tribute the better, and withal to draw the Lacedaemonians into a
								league with the king; 
							 and thereby, as the king had commanded, to kill or take alive
								Amorges, Pissuthnes' bastard son, who was in rebellion against him
								about Caria. 
							 The Chians, therefore, and Tissaphernes followed this business
								jointly.

Calligeitus, the son of Laophon, a Magarean, and Timagoras the son of
								Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both banished their own cities and abiding
								with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnaces, came also about the same
								time to Lacedaemon, sent by Pharnabazus to procure a fleet for the
								Hellespont, that he also, if he could, might cause the Athenian
								cities in his province to revolt for his tribute's sake, and be the
								first to draw the Lacedaemonians into league with the king, just the
								same things that were desired before by Tissaphernes.

Now Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, there was great
								canvassing at Lacedaemon between the one side that persuaded to send
								to lonia and Chios and the other that would have the army and fleet
								go first into the Hellespont. 
							 But the Lacedaemonians indeed approved best by much of the business
								of the Chians and of Tissaphernes.

For with these co-operated Alcibiades, hereditary guest and friend of
								Endius, the ephore of that year, in the highest degree; 
							 insomuch as in respect of that guesthood, Alcibiades' family received
								a Laconic name. 
							 For Endius was called Endius Alcibiadis.

Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians sent first one Phrynis, a man of
								those parts, to Chios to see if the galleys they had were so many as
								they reported and whether the city were otherwise so sufficient as
								it was said to be. 
							 And when the messenger brought back word that all that had been said
								was true, they received both the Chians and the Erythraeans
								presently into their league and decreed to send them forty galleys,
								there being at Chios, from such places as the Chians named, no less
								than sixty already.

And of these at first they were about to send out ten, with
								Melancridas for admiral; 
							 but afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, for Melancridas they
								sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten galleys they went about the
								making ready of five only in Laconia. 
							 So the winter ended, and nineteenth year of this war written by
								Thucydides.

In the beginning of the next summer, because the Chians pressed to
								have the galley sent away and feared lest the Athenians should get
								notice what they were doing (for all their ambassadors went out by
								stealth), the Lacedaemonians send away to Corinth three Spartans to
								will them with all speed to transport their galleys over the isthmus
								to the other sea towards Athens, and to go all to Chios, as well
								those which Agis had made ready to go to Lesbos as the rest; 
							 the number of the galleys of the league which were then there being
								forty wanting one.

But Calligeitus and Timagoras, who came from Pharnabazus, would have
								no part in this fleet that went for Chios, nor would deliver the
								money, twenty-five talents, which they had brought with them to pay
								for their setting forth, but made account to go out with another
								fleet afterwards by themselves.

When Agis saw that the Lacedaemonians meant to send first to Chios,
								he resolved not of any other course himself; 
							 but the confederates assembling at Corinth went to council upon the
								matter and concluded thus: that they should go first to Chios under
								the command of Chalcideus, who was making ready the five galleys at
								Laconia; 
							 and then to Lesbos under the charge of Alcamenes, intended also to be
								sent thither by Agis; 
							 and lastly into Hellespont, in which voyage they ordained that
								Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, should have the command;

and concluded to carry over the isthmus first the one half of their
								galleys, and that those should presently put to sea, that the
								Athenians might have their minds more upon those than on the other
								half to be transported afterwards.

For they determined to pass that sea openly, contemning the weakness
								of the Athenians in respect they had not any navy of importance yet
								appearing. 
							 As they resolved, so presently they carried over one-and-twenty
								galleys.

But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Corinthians were unwilling
								to go along before they should have ended the celebration of the
								Isthmian holidays, then come. 
							 Hereupon Agis was content that they for their parts should observe
								the Isthmian truce, and he, therefore, to take the fleet upon
								himself as his own.

But the Corinthians not agreeing to that, and the time passing away,
								the Athenians got intelligence the easier of the practice of the
								Chians and sent thither Aristocrates, one of their generals, to
								accuse them of it. 
							 The Chians denying the matter, he commanded them for their better
								credit to send along with him some galleys for their aid due by the
								league;

and they sent seven. 
							 The cause why they sent these galleys was the many not acquainted
								with the practice, and the few and conscious not willing to undergo
								the enmity of the multitude without having strength first, and their
								not expecting any longer the coming of the Lacedaemonians, because
								they had so long delayed them.

In the meantime the Isthmian games were celebrating, and the
								Athenians (for they had word sent them of it) came and saw; 
							 and the business of the Chians grew more apparent. 
							 After they went thence, they took order presently that the fleet
								might not pass from Cenchreiae undiscovered.

And after the holidays were over, the Corinthians put to sea for
								Chios under the conduct of Alcamenes. 
							 And the Athenians at first with equal number came up to them and
								endeavoured to draw them out into the main sea; 
							 but seeing the Peloponnesians followed not far, but turned another
								way, the Athenians went also from them. 
							 For the seven galleys of Chios, which were part of this number, they
								durst not trust.

But afterwards having manned thirty-seven others, they gave chase to
								the enemy by the shore and drave them into Peiraeus in the territory
								of Corinth (this Peiraeus is a desert haven, and the utmost upon the
								confines of Epidauria). 
							 One galley that was far from land the Peloponnesians lost;

the rest they brought together into the haven. 
							 But the Athenians charging them by sea with their galleys, and withal
								setting their men a-land, mightily troubled and disordered them,
								brake their galleys upon the shore, and slew Alcamenes, their
								commander. 
							 And some they lost of their own.

The fight being ended, they assigned a sufficient number of galleys
								to lie opposite to those of the enemy and the rest to lie under a
								little island not far off, in which also they encamped, and sent to
								Athens for a supply.

For the Peloponnesians had with them for aid of their galleys the
								Corinthians the next day,. and not long after, divers others of the
								inhabitants thereabouts. 
							 But when they considered that the guarding of them in a desert place
								would be painful, they knew not what course to take; 
							 and once they thought to have set the galleys on fire; 
							 but it was concluded afterwards to draw them to the land and guard
								them with their landmen till some good occasion should be offered
								for their escape. 
							 And Agis also, when he heard the news, sent unto them Thermon, a
								Spartan.

The Lacedaemonians, having been advertised of the departure of these
								galleys from the isthmus (for the ephores had commanded Alcamenes
								when he put to sea to send them word by a horseman), were minded
								presently to have sent away also the five galleys also that were in
								Laconia, and Chalcideus the commander of them, and with him
								Alcibiades. 
							 But afterwards, as they were ready to go out, came the news of the
								galleys chased into Peiraeus, which so much discouraged them, in
								respect they stumbled in the very entrance of the Ionic war, that
								they purposed now not only not to send away those galleys of their
								own but also to call back again some of those that were already at
								sea.

When Alcibiades saw this, he dealt with Endius and the rest of the
								ephores again not to fear the voyage, alleging that they would [make
								haste, and] be there before the Chians should have heard of the
								misfortune of the fleet, and that as soon as he should arrive in
								Ionia himself, he could easily make the cities there to revolt by
								declaring unto them the weakness of the Athenians and the diligence
								of the Lacedaemonians, wherein he should be thought more worthy to
								be believed than any other.

Moreover to Endius he said that it would be an honour in particular
								to him that Ionia should revolt and the king be made confederate to
								the Lacedaemonians by his own means, and not to have it the mastery
								of Agis;

for he was at difference with Agis. 
							 So having prevailed with Endius and the other ephores, he took sea
								with five galleys, together with Chalcideus of Lacedaemon, and made
								haste.

About the same time came back from Sicily those sixteen galleys of
								the Peloponnesians, which, having aided Gylippus in that war, were
								intercepted by the way about Leucadia and evil entreated by
								twenty-seven galleys of Athens, that watched thereabouts under the
								command of Hippocles, the son of Menippus, for such galleys as
								should return out of Sicily. 
							 For all the rest, saving one, avoiding the Athenians, were arrived in
								Corinth before.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, kept prisoner every man
								they met with by the way, to the end that notice might not be given
								of their passage. 
							 And touching first at Corycus in the continent, where also they
								dismissed those whom they had apprehended, after conference there
								with some of the conspirators of the Chians, that advised them to go
								to the city without sending them word before, they came upon the
								Chians suddenly and unexpected.

It put the commons into much wonder and astonishment; 
							 but the few had so ordered the matter beforehand that an assembly
								chanced to be holden at the same time. 
							 And when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the same and told
								them that many galleys were coming to them, but not that those other
								galleys were besieged in Peiraeus, the Chians first and afterwards
								the Erythraeans revolted from the Athenians.

After this they went with three galleys to Clazomenae and made that
								city to revolt also. 
							 And the Clazomenians presently crossed over to the continent and
								there fortified Polichna, lest they should need a retiring place
								from the little island wherein they dwelt. 
							 The rest also, all that had revolted, fell to fortifying and making
								of preparation for the war.

This news of Chios was quickly brought to the Athenians, who,
								conceiving themselves to be now beset with great and evident danger,
								and that the rest of the confederates, seeing so great a city to
								revolt, would be no longer quiet, in this their present fear decreed
								that those thousand talents, which through all this war they had
								affected to keep untouched, forthwith abrogating the punishment
								ordained for such as spake or gave their suffrages to stir it,
								should now be used, and therewith galleys not a few manned. 
							 They decreed also to send thither out of hand, under the command of
								Strombichides, the son of Diotimus, eight galleys of the number of
								those that besieged the enemy at Peiraeus; 
							 the which, having forsaken their charge to give chase to the galleys
								that went with Chalcideus, and not able to overtake them, were now
								returned; 
							 and shortly after also to send Thrasycles to help them with twelve
								galleys more, which also had departed from the same guard upon the
								enemy.

And those seven galleys of Chios, which likewise kept watch at
								Peiraeus with the rest, they fetched from thence, and gave the
								bondmen that served in them their liberty, and the chains to those
								that were free. 
							 And instead of all those galleys that kept guard upon the galleys of
								the Peloponnesians, they made ready other with all speed in their
								places, besides thirty more, which they intended to furnish out
								afterwards. 
							 Great was their diligence; 
							 and nothing was of light importance that they went about for the
								recovery of Chios.

Strombichides in the meantime arrived at Samos, and taking into his
								company one Samian galley, went thence to Teos and entreated them
								not to stir. 
							 But towards Teos was Chalcideus also coming with twenty-three galleys
								from Chios, and with him also the land forces of the Clazomenians
								and Erythraeans.

Whereof Strombichides having been advertised, he put forth again
								before his arrival, and standing off at sea, when he saw the many
								galleys that came from Chios, he fled towards Samos, they following
								him. 
							 The land forces the Teians would not at first admit;

but after this flight of the Athenians, they brought them in. 
							 And these for the most part held their hands for a while, expecting
								the return of Chalcideus from the chase; 
							 but when he stayed somewhat long, they fell of themselves to the
								demolishing of the wall built about the city of Teos by the
								Athenians towards the continent, wherein they were also helped by
								some few barbarians that came down thither under the leading of
								Tages, deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into
								Samos, armed the mariners that were in the galleys of Peloponnesus
								and left them in Chios, instead of whom they manned with mariners of
								Chios both those and twenty galleys more; 
							 and with this fleet they went to Miletus with intent to cause it to
								revolt.

For the intention of Alcibiades, that was acquainted with the
								principal Milesians, was to prevent the fleet which was to come from
								Peloponnesus and to turn these cities first, that the honour of it
								might be ascribed to the Chians, to himself, to Chalcideus, and (as
								he had promised) to Endius that set them out, as having brought most
								of the cities to revolt with the forces of the Chians only and of
								those galleys that came with Chalcideus.

So these, for the greatest part of their way undiscovered, and
								arriving not much sooner than Strombichides and Thrasycles (who now,
								chancing to be present with [those] twelve galleys from Athens,
								followed them with Strombichides), caused the Milesians to
								revolt. 
							 The Athenians following them at the heels with nineteen galleys,
								being shut out by the Milesians, lay at anchor at Lada, an island
								over against the city.

Presently upon the revolt of Miletus was made the first league
								between the king and the Lacedaemonians by Tissaphernes and
								Chalcideus, as followeth:

"The Lacedaemonians and their confederates have made a league with
								the king and Tissaphernes on these articles: 
							 "Whatsoever territory or cities the king possesseth and his ancestors
								have possessed, the same are to remain the king's. 

							 "Whatsoever money or other profit redounded to the Athenians from
								their cities, the king and the Lacedaemonians are jointly to hinder,
								so as the Athenians may receive nothing from thence, neither money
								nor other thing.

"The king and the Lacedaemonians and their confederates are to make
								joint war against the Athenians. 
							 And without consent of both parts it shall not be lawful to lay down
								the war against the Athenians, neither for the king nor for the
								Lacedaemonians and their confederates.

If any shall revolt from the king, they
										shall be enemies to the Lacedaemonians and their
										confederates; 
									 and if any shall revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their
										confederates, they shall in like manner be enemies to the
										king.

This was the league. 
							 Presently after this the Chians set out ten galleys more and went to
								Anaea, both to hearken what became of the business at Miletus and
								also to cause the cities thereabouts to revolt.

But word being sent them from Chalcideus to go back, and that Amorges
								was at hand with his army, they went thence to the temple of
								Jupiter.

[Being there] they described sixteen galleys more, which had been
								sent out by the Athenians under the charge of Diomedon after the
								putting to sea of those with Thrasycles, upon sight of whom they
								fled, one galley to Ephesus, the rest towards Teos. 
							 Four of them the Athenians took, but empty, the men having gotten on
								shore; 
							 the rest escaped into the city of Teos.

And the Athenians went away again towards Samos. 
							 The Chians, putting to sea again with the remainder of their fleet
								and with the land forces, caused first Lebedos to revolt and then
								Erae; 
							 and afterwards returned, both with their fleet and landmen, every one
								to his own.

About the same time, the twenty galleys of Peloponnesus, which the
								Athenians had formerly chased into Peiraeus, and against whom they
								now lay with a like number, suddenly forced their passage, and
								having the victory in fight, took four of the Athenian galleys, and
								going to Cenchreiae, prepared afresh for their voyage to Chios and
								Ionia. 
							 At which time there came also unto them from Lacedaemon for
								commander, Astyochus, who was now admiral of the whole navy. 
							 When the landmen were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes himself came
								thither with his forces;

and he also demolished the wall, as much as was left standing, and
								went his way again. 
							 Not long after the going away of him, came thither Diomedon with ten
								galleys of Athens. 
							 And having made a truce with the Teians, that he also might be
								received, he put to sea again and kept the shore to Erae and
								assaulted it, but failing to take it, departed.

It fell out about the same time that the commons of Samos, together
								with the Athenians who were there with three galleys, made an
								insurrection against the great men and slew of them in all about two
								hundred. 
							 And having banished four hundred more and distributed amongst
								themselves their lands and houses (the Athenians having now, as
								assured of their fidelity, decreed them their liberty), they
								administered the affairs of the city from that time forward by
								themselves, no more communicating with the Geomori nor permitting
								any of the common people to marry with them.

After this, the same summer, the Chians, as they had begun,
								persevering in their earnestness to bring the cities to revolt, even
								without the Lacedaemonians, [with their single forces], and desiring
								to make as many fellows of their danger as they were able, made war
								by themselves with thirteen galleys against Lesbos; 
							 which was according to what was concluded by the Lacedaemonians,
								namely, to go thither in the second place, and thence into the
								Hellespont. 
							 And withal the land forces, both of such Peloponnesians as were
								present and of their confederates thereabouts, went along by them to
								Clazomenae and Cyme, these under the command of Eualas a Spartan,
								and the galleys, of Deiniades, a man of the parts thereabouts.

The galleys putting in at Methymna, caused that city to revolt first.

Now Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, having set forth as he
								intended from Cenchreiae, arrived at Chios. 
							 The third day after his coming thither came Leon and Diomedon into
								Lesbos with twenty-five galleys of Athens; 
							 for Leon came with a supply of ten galleys more from Athens
								afterwards.

Astyochus, in the evening of the same day, taking with him one galley
								more of Chios, took his way toward Lesbos to help it what he could,
								and put in at Pyrrha, and the next day at Eressos. 
							 Here he heard that Mytilene was taken by the Athenians, even with the
								shout of their voices.

For the Athenians, coming unexpected, entered the haven, and having
								beaten the galleys of the Chians, disbarked and overcame those that
								made head against them and won the city.

When Astyochus heard this, both from the Eressians and from those
								Chian galleys that came from Methymna with Eubulus, which having
								been left there before, as soon as Mytilene was lost fled, and three
								of them chanced to meet with him (for one was taken by the
								Athenians), he continued his course for Mytilene no longer; 
							 but having caused Eressos to revolt, and armed the soldiers he had
								aboard, made them to march toward Antissa and Methymna by land,
								under the conduct of Eteonicus; 
							 and he himself, with his own galleys and those three of Chios, rowed
								thither along the shore, hoping that the Methymnaeans, upon sight of
								his forces, would take heart and continue in their revolt.

But when in Lesbos all things went against him, he re-embarked his
								army and returned to Chios. 
							 And the landmen that were aboard, and should have gone into
								Hellespont, went again into their cities. 
							 After this came to them six galleys to Chios, of those of the
								confederate fleet at Cenchreiae.

The Athenians, when they had reestablished the state of Lesbos, went
								thence and took Polichna, which the Clazomenians had fortified in
								the continent, and brought them all back again into the city which
								is in the island, save only the authors of the revolt; 
							 for these got away to Daphnus. 
							 And Clazomenae returned to the obedience of the Athenians.

The same summer, those Athenians that with twenty galleys lay in the
								isle of Lada before Miletus, landing in the territory of Miletus at
								Panormus, slew Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian commander, that came
								out against them but with a few, and set up a trophy, and the third
								day after departed. 
							 But the Milesians pulled down the trophy, as erected where the
								Athenians were not masters.

Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian galleys that were at Lesbos,
								made war upon the Chians by sea from the isles called Oenussae,
								which lie before Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum (forts they
								held in Erythraea), and from Lesbos. 
							 They that were aboard were men of arms of the roll, compelled to
								serve in the fleet. 
							 With these they landed at Cardamyle;

and having overthrown the Chians that made head in a battle at
								Bolissus, and slain many of them, they recovered from the enemy all
								the places of that quarter. 
							 And again they overcame them in another battle at Phanae, and in a
								third at Leuconium. 
							 After this, the Chians went out no more to fight; 
							 by which means the Athenians made spoil of their territory,
								excellently well furnished.

For except it were the Lacedaemonians, the Chians were the only men
								that I have heard of that had joined advisedness to prosperity, and
								the more their city increased, had carried the more respect in the
								administration thereof to assure it.

Nor ventured they now to revolt (lest any man should think that, in
								this act at least, they regarded not what was the safest) till they
								had many and strong confederates with whose help to try their
								fortune, nor till such time as they perceived the people of Athens
								(as they themselves could not deny) to have their estate after the
								defeat in Sicily reduced to extreme weakness. 
							 And if through human misreckoning they miscarried in aught, they
								erred with many others, who in like manner had an opinion that the
								state of the Athenians would quickly have been overthrown.

Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their lands spoiled, some
								within undertook to make the city return unto the Athenians. 
							 Which though the magistrates perceived, yet they themselves stirred
								not; 
							 but having received Astyochus into the city with four galleys that
								were with him from Erythraea, they took advice together, how by
								taking hostages, or some other gentle way, to make them give over
								the conspiracy. 
							 Thus stood the business with the Chians.

In the end of this summer a thousand five hundred men of arms of
								Athens, and a thousand of Argos (for the Athenians had put armour
								upon five hundred light-armed of the Argives), and of other
								confederates a thousand more, with forty-eight galleys, reckoning
								those which were for transportation of soldiers, under the conduct
								of Phrynicus, Onomacles, and Scironides, came in to Samos, and
								crossing over to Miletus encamped before it.

And the Milesians issued forth with eight hundred men of arms of
								their own, besides the Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus and
								some auxiliar strangers with Tissaphernes (Tissaphernes himself
								being also there with his cavalry) and fought with the Athenians and
								their confederates.

The Argives, who made one wing of themselves, advancing before the
								rest and in some disorder, in contempt of the enemy as being Ionians
								and not likely to sustain their charge, were by the Milesians
								overcome, and lost no less than three hundred of their men.

But the Athenians, when they had first overthrown the Peloponnesians
								and then beaten back the barbarians and other multitude and not
								fought with the Milesians at all (for they, after they were come
								from the chase of the Argives and saw their other wing defeated,
								went into the town), sat down with their arms, as being now masters
								of the field, close under the wall of the city.

It fell out in this battle that on both sides the Ionics had the
								better of the Dorics. 
							 For the Athenians overcame the opposite Peloponnesians, and the
								Milesians the Argives. 
							 The Athenians, after they had erected their trophy, the place being
								an isthmus, prepared to take in the town with a wall, supposing if
								they got Miletus, the other cities would easily come in.

In the meantime it was told them about twilight that the
								five-and-fifty galleys from Peloponnesus and Sicily were hard by and
								only not already come. 
							 For there came into Peloponnesus out of Sicily, by the instigation of
								Hermocrates to help to consummate the subversion of the Athenian
								state, twenty galleys of Syracuse and two of Selinus; 
							 and the galleys that had been preparing in Peloponnesus being then
								also ready, they were, both these and the other, committed to the
								charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus, the
								admiral; 
							 and they put in first at Eleus, an island over against Miletus.

And being advertised there that the Athenians lay before the town,
								they went from thence into the gulf of Iasus to learn how the
								affairs of the Milesians stood.

Alcibiades coming a horseback to Teichiussa of the territory of
								Miletus, in which part of the gulf the Peloponnesian galleys lay at
								anchor, they were informed by him of the battle; 
							 for Alcibiades was, with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes, present
								in it. 
							 And he exhorted them, unless they meant to lose what they had in
								lonia and the whole business, to succour Miletus with all speed and
								not to suffer it to be taken in with a wall.

According to this, they concluded to go the next morning and relieve
								it. 
							 Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Derus of the arrival of
								those galleys, his colleagues advising to stay and fight it out with
								their fleet, said that he would neither do it himself nor suffer
								them to do it, or any other, as long as he could hinder it.

For seeing he might fight with them hereafter, when they should know
								against how many galleys of the enemy and with what additions to
								their own, sufficiently and at leisure made ready, they might do it,
								he would never, he said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness
								(for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their navy give way
								upon occasion;

but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a great
								baseness to be beaten), be swayed to hazard battle against reason
								and not only to dishonour the state but also to cast it into extreme
								danger, seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit
								with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor urged by
								precedent necessity, to undertake, how then without constraint to
								seek out voluntary, dangers?

Therefore he commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that
								were wounded and their landmen and whatsoever utensils they brought
								with them; 
							 but to leave behind whatsoever they had taken in the territory of the
								enemy to the end that their galleys might be the lighter;

and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they had all their fleet
								together, to make out against the enemy as occasion should be
								offered. 
							 As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution, and was
								esteemed a wise man, not then only, but afterwards, nor in this
								only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of.

Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory
								unperfect, dislodged from before Miletus. 
							 From Samos the Argives, in haste and in anger for their overthrow,
								went home.

The Peloponnesians, setting forth betimes in the morning from
								Teichiussa, put in at Miletus and stayed there one day. 
							 The next day they took with them those galleys of Chios which had
								formerly been chased together with Chalcideus, and meant to have
								returned to Teichiussa to take aboard such necessaries as they had
								left ashore.

But as they were going, Tissaphernes came to them with his landmen
								and persuaded them to set upon Iasus, where Amorges, the king's
								enemy, then lay. 
							 Whereupon they assaulted lasus upon a sudden; 
							 and they within not thinking but they had been the fleet of the
								Athenians, took it.

The greatest praise in this action was given to the Syracusians. 
							 Having taken Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, but a rebel to
								the king, the Peloponnesians delivered him to Tissaphernes to carry
								him if he would to the king, as he had order to do. 
							 The city they pillaged, wherein, as being a place of ancient riches,
								the army got a very great quantity of money.

The auxiliary soldiers of Amorges they received, without doing them
								hurt, into their own army, being for the most part
								Peloponnesians. 
							 The town itself they delivered to Tissaphernes, with all the
								prisoners, as well free as bond, upon composition with him, at a
								Daric state by the poll. 
							 And so they returned to Miletus.

And from hence they sent Pedaritus, the son of Leon, whom the
								Lacedaemonians had sent hither to be governor of Chios, to Erythrae,
								and with him the bands that had aided Amorges by land, and made
								Philip governor there in Miletus. 
							 And so this summer ended.

The next winter, Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrison into
								Iasus, came to Miletus; 
							 and for one month's pay, which was promised on his part at
								Lacedaemon, he gave unto the soldiers through the whole fleet after
								an Attic drachma a man by the day. 
							 But for the rest of the time he would pay but three oboles till he
								had asked the king's pleasure; 
							 and if the king commanded it, then he said he would pay them the full
								drachma.

Nevertheless upon the contradiction of Hermocrates, general of the
								Syracusians (for Theramenes was but slack in exacting pay, as not
								being general, but only to deliver the galleys that came with him to
								Astyochus), it was agreed that but for the five galleys that were
								over and above, they should have more than three oboles a man. 
							 For to fifty-five galleys he allowed three talents a month, and to as
								many as should be more than that number, after the same proportion.

The same winter the Athenians that were at Samos (for there were now
								come in thirty-five galleys more from home, with Charminus,
								Strombichides, and Euctemon, their commanders), having gathered
								together their galleys, as well those that had been at Chios as all
								the rest, concluded, distributing to every one his charge by lot, to
								go lie before Miletus with a fleet, but against Chios to send out
								both a fleet and an army of landmen.

And they did so. 
							 For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty galleys and
								part of those thousand men of arms that went to Miletus, which they
								carried along with them in vessels for transportation of soldiers,
								according to their lot went to Chios; 
							 and the rest, remaining at Samos with seventy-four galleys, were
								masters of the sea, and went to Miletus.

Astyochus, who was now in Chios requiring hostages in respect of the
								treason, after he heard of the fleet that was come with Theramenes
								and that the articles of the league with Tissaphernes were mended,
								gave over that business, and with ten galleys of Peloponnesus and
								ten of Chios, went thence and assaulted Pteleum;

but not being able to take it, he kept by the shore to
								Clazomenae. 
							 There he summoned those within to yield, with offer to such of them
								as favoured the Athenians that they might go up and dwell at
								Daphnus. 
							 And Tamos, the deputy lieutenant of Ionia, offered them the same.

But they not hearkening thereunto, he made an assault upon the city,
								being unwalled; 
							 but when he could not take it, he put to sea again, and with a mighty
								wind was himself carried to Phocaea and Cume; 
							 but the rest of the fleet put in at Marathusa, Pele, and Drimyssa,
								islands that lie over against Clazomenae.

After they had stayed there eight days in regard of the winds,
								spoiling and destroying, and partly taking aboard whatsoever goods
								of the Clazomenians lay without, they went afterwards to Phocaea and
								Cume to Astyochus.

While Astyochus was there, the ambassadors of the Lesbians came unto
								him, desiring to revolt from the Athenians. 
							 And as for him, they prevailed with him; 
							 but seeing the Corinthians and the other confederates were unwilling
								in respect of their former ill success there, he put to sea for
								Chios. 
							 Whither, after a great tempest, his galleys, some from one place and
								some from another, at length arrived all.

After this, Pedaritus, who was now at Erythrae, whither he was come
								from Miletus by land, came over with his forces into Chios. 
							 Besides those forces he brought over with him, he had the soldiers
								which were of the five galleys that came thither with Chalcideus and
								were left there, to the number of five hundred, and armour to arm
								them.

Now some of the Lesbians having promised to revolt, Astyochus
								communicated the matter with Pedaritus and the Chians, alleging how
								meet it would be to go with a fleet and make Lesbos to revolt, for
								that they should either get more confederates, or failing, they
								should at least weaken the Athenians. 
							 But they gave him no ear; 
							 and for the Chian galleys, Pedaritus told him [plainly] he should
								have none of them.

Whereupon Astyochus, taking with him five galleys of Corinth, a sixth
								of Megara, one of Hermione, and those of Laconia which he brought
								with him, went towards Miletus to his charge, mightily threatening
								the Chians, in case they should need him, not to help them.

When he was come to Corycus in Erythraea, he stayed there. 
							 And the Athenians from Samos lay on the other side of the point, the
								one not knowing that the other was so near.

Astyochus, upon a letter sent him from Pedaritus, signifying that
								there were come certain Erythraean captives dismissed from Samos
								with design to betray Erythrae, went presently back to Erythrae; 
							 so little he missed of falling into the hands of the Athenians.

Pedaritus also went over to him; 
							 and having narrowly enquired touching these seeming traitors, and
								found that the whole matter was but a pretence which the men had
								used for their escape from Samos, they acquitted them, and departed
								one to Chios, the other, as he was going before, towards Miletus.

In the meantime, the army of the Athenians, being come about by sea
								from Corycus to Arginum, lighted on three long-boats of the Chians,
								which when they saw they presently chased. 
							 But there arose a great tempest; 
							 and the long-boats of Chios with much ado recovered the harbour. 
							 But of the Athenian galleys, especially such as followed them
								furthest, there perished three, driven ashore at the city of
								Chios; 
							 and the men that were aboard them were part taken and part slain. 
							 The rest of the fleet escaped into a haven called Phoenicus, under
								the hill Mimas, from whence they got afterwards to Lesbos and there
								fortified.

The same winter, Hippocrates, setting out from Peloponnesus with ten
								galleys of Thurium, commanded by Dorieus, the son of Diogoras, with
								two others, and with one galley of Laconia and one of Syracuse, went
								to Cnidus. 
							 This city was now revolted from Tissaphernes;

and the Peloponnesians that lay at Miletus, hearing of it, commanded
								that, the one half of their galleys remaining for the guard of
								Cnidus, the other half should go about Triopium and help to bring in
								the ships which were to come from Egypt. 
							 This Triopium is a promontory of the territory of Cnidus, lying out
								in the sea and consecrated to Apollo.

The Athenians, upon advertisement hereof, setting forth from Samos,
								took those galleys that kept guard at Triopium; 
							 but the men that were in them escaped to land. 
							 After this they went to Cnidus, which they assaulted and had almost
								taken, being without wall.

And the next day they assaulted it again; 
							 but being less able to hurt it now than before, because they had
								fenced it better this night, and the men also were gotten into it
								that fled from their galleys under Triopium, they invaded and wasted
								the Cnidian territory, and so went back to Samos.

About the same time, Astyochus being come to the navy at Miletus, the
								Peloponnesians had plenty of all things for the army. 
							 For they had not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers also had store
								of money yet remaining of the pillage of Iasus. 
							 And the Milesians underwent the war with a good will.

Nevertheless, the former articles of the league made by Chalcideus
								with Tissaphernes seemed defective and not so advantageous to them
								as to him. 
							 Whereupon they agreed to new ones, in the presence of Tissaphernes,
								which were these:

"The agreement of the Lacedaemonians and their confederates with king
								Darius and his children and with Tissaphernes for league and amity
								according to the articles following:

"Whatsoever territories and cities do belong unto king Darius, or
								were his father's or his ancestors', against these shall neither the
								Lacedaemonians go to make war nor any way to annoy them; 
							 neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor their confederates exact tribute
								of any of those cities. 
							 Neither shall king Darius, nor any under his dominion, make war upon
								or any way annoy the Lacedaemonians or any of the Lacedaemonian
								confederates.

"If the Lacedaemonians or their confederates shall need anything of
								the king, or the king of the Lacedaemonians or their confederates,
								what they shall persuade each other to do, if they do it, shall be
								good.

"They shall both of them make war jointly against the Athenians and
								their confederates; 
							 and when they shall give over the war, they shall also do it
								jointly. 

							 "Whatsoever army shall be in the king's country, sent for by the
								king, the king shall defray.

If any of the cities comprehended in the
										league made with the king shall invade the king's
										territories, the rest shall oppose them and defend the king
										to the utmost of their power. 
									 If any city of the king's, or under his dominion, shall
										invade the Lacedaemonians or their confederates, the king
										shall make opposition and defend them to the utmost of his
										power.

After this accord made, Theramenes delivered his galleys into the
								hands of Astyochus and, putting to sea in a light-horseman, is no
								more seen.

The Athenians that were now come with their army from Lesbos to
								Chios, and were masters of the field and of the sea, fortified
								Delphinium, a place both strong to the landward, and that had also a
								harbour for shipping, and was not far from the city itself of
								Chios.

And the Chians, as having been disheartened in divers former battles,
								and otherwise not only not mutually well affected but jealous one of
								another (for Tydeus and his accomplices had been put to death by
								Pedaritus for Atticism, and the rest of the city was kept in awe,
								but by force, and for a time), stirred not against them.

And for the causes mentioned, not conceiving themselves, neither with
								their own strength nor with the help of those that Pedaritus had
								with him, sufficient to give them battle, they sent to Miletus to
								require aid from Astyochus. 
							 Which when he denied them, Pedaritus sent letters to Lacedaemon
								complaining of the wrong.

Thus proceeded the affairs of the Athenians at Chios. 
							 Also their fleet at Samos went often out against the fleet of the
								enemy at Miletus; 
							 but when theirs would never come out of the harbour to encounter
								them, they returned to Samos and lay still.

The same winter, about the solstice, went out from Peloponnesus
								towards Ionia those twenty-seven galleys which at the procurement of
								Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus were made ready by
								the Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus. 
							 The commander of them was Antisthenes, a Spartan, with whom the
								Lacedaemonians sent eleven Spartans more to be of council with
								Astyochus, whereof Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, was one.

These had commission that when they should be arrived at Miletus,
								besides their general care to order everything to the best, they
								should send away these galleys, either the same or more or fewer,
								into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus if they so thought fit, and to
								appoint Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, that went along in them,
								for commander; 
							 and that the same eleven, if they thought it meet, should put
								Astyochus from his charge and ordain Antisthenes in his place; 
							 for they had him in suspicion for the letters of Pedaritus.

These galleys, holding their course from Malea through the main sea
								and arriving at Melos, lighted on ten galleys of the Athenians,
								whereof three they took, but without the men, and fired them. 
							 After this, because they feared lest those Athenian galleys that
								escaped from Melos should give notice of their coming to those in
								Samos (as also it fell out), they changed their course and went
								towards Crete; 
							 and having made their voyage the longer that it might be the safer,
								they put in at Caunus in Asia.

Now from thence, as being in a place of safety, they sent a messenger
								to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy.

The Chians and Pedaritus about the same time, notwithstanding [their
								former repulse, and] that Astyochus was still backward, sent
								messengers to him, desiring him to come with his whole fleet to help
								them, being besieged, and not to suffer the greatest of their
								confederate cities in all Ionia to be thus shut up by sea and
								ravaged by land, as it was.

For the Chians having many slaves, more than any one state except
								that of the Lacedaemonians, whom for their offences they the more
								ungently punished because of their number, many of them, as soon as
								the Athenians appeared to be settled in their fortifications, ran
								over presently to them; 
							 and were they, that knowing the territory so well, did it the
								greatest spoil.

Therefore the Chians said he must help them whilst there was hope and
								possibility to do it, Delphinium being still in fortifying and
								unfurnished, and greater fences being in making both about their
								camp and fleet. 
							 Astyochus, though he meant it not before, because he would have made
								good his threats, yet when he saw the confederates were willing, he
								was bent to have relieved them.

But in the meantime came the messenger from the twentyseven galleys
								and from the Lacedaemonian counsellors that were come to Caunus. 
							 Astyochus, therefore, esteeming the wafting in of these galleys,
								whereby they might the more freely command the sea, and the safe
								coming in of those Lacedaemonians, who were to look into his
								actions, a business that ought to be preferred above all other,
								presently gave over his journey for Chios and went towards
								Caunus.

As he went by the coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis, being unwalled
								and thrown down by an earthquake which had happened there, the
								greatest verily in man's memory, and rifled it, the inhabitants
								being fled into the mountains; 
							 and overrunning the country, made booty of all that came in his way,
								saving of freemen, and those he dismissed.

From Cos he went by night to Cnidus, but found it necessary, by the
								advice of the Cnidians, not to land his men there, but to follow as
								he was after those twenty galleys of Athens, wherewith Charminus,
								one of the Athenian generals gone out from Samos, stood watching for
								those twenty-seven galleys that were come from Peloponnesus, the
								same that Astyochus himself was going to convoy in.

For they at Samos had had intelligence from Miletus of their
								coming; 
							 and Charminus was lying for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the
								coast of Lycia; 
							 for by this time he knew that they were at Caunus.

Astyochus, therefore, desiring to outgo the report of his coming,
								went as he was to Syme, hoping to find those galleys out from the
								shore. 
							 But [a shower of] rain, together with the cloudiness of the sky, made
								his galleys to miss their course in the dark and disordered
								them.

The next morning, the fleet being scattered, the left wing was
								manifestly described by the Athenians, whilst the rest wandered yet
								about the island. 
							 And thereupon Charminus and the Athenians put forth against them with
								twenty galleys, supposing they had been the same galleys they were
								watching for from Caunus;

and presently charging, sunk three of them and hurt others, and were
								superior in the fight till such time as, contrary to their
								expectation, the greater part of the fleet came in sight and
								enclosed them about.

They then betook themselves to flight; 
							 and with the loss of six galleys the rest escaped into the island of
								Teuglussa, and from thence to Halicarnassus. 
							 After this the Peloponnesians, putting in at Cnidus and joining with
								those seven-and-twenty galleys that came from Caunus, went all
								together to Syme, and having there erected a trophy, returned again
								and lay at Cnidus.

The Athenians, when they understood what had passed in this battle,
								went from Samos with their whole navy to Syme. 
							 But neither went they out against the navy in Cnidus, nor the navy
								there against them. 
							 Whereupon they took up the furniture of their galleys at Syme, and
								assaulted Loryma, a town in the continent, and so returned to
								Samos. 

							 The whole navy of the Peloponnesians, being at Cnidus, was [now] in
								repairing and refurnishing with such things as it wanted;

and withal those eleven Lacedaemonians conferred with Tissaphernes
								(for he also was present) touching such things as they disliked in
								the articles before agreed on, and concerning the war, how it might
								be carried for the future in the best and most advantageous manner
								for them both.

But Lichas was he that considered the business more nearly, and said
								that neither the first league nor yet the later by Theramenes was
								made as it ought to have been; 
							 and that it would be a very hard condition that whatsoever
								territories the king and his ancestors possessed before he should
								possess the same now; 
							 for so he might bring again into subjection all the islands, and the
								sea, and the Locrians, and all as far as Boeotia; 
							 and the Lacedaemonians, instead of restoring the Grecians into
								liberty, should put them into subjection to the rule of the
								Medes.

Therefore he required other and better articles to be drawn, and not
								to stand to these; 
							 as for pay, in the new articles they would require none. 
							 But Tissaphernes, chafing at this, went his way in choler, and
								nothing was done.

The Peloponnesians, solicited by messengers from the great men of
								Rhodes, resolved to go thither, because they hoped it would not
								prove impossible with their number of seamen and army of land
								soldiers to bring that island into their power; 
							 and withal supposed themselves able, with their present confederates,
								to maintain their fleet without asking money any more of
								Tissaphernes.

Presently therefore, the same winter, they put forth from Cnidus, and
								arriving in the territory of Rhodes at Cameirus, first frighted the
								commons out of it, that knew not of the business, and they fled. 
							 Then the Lacedaemonians called together both these and the Rhodians
								of the two cities Lindus and Ielysus and persuaded them to revolt
								from the Athenians. 
							 And Rhodes turned to the Peloponnesians.

The Athenians at the same time, hearing of their design, put forth
								with their fleet from Samos, desiring to have arrived before them,
								and were seen in the main sea, too late, though not much. 
							 For the present they went away to Chalce, and thence back to
								Samos; 
							 but afterwards they came forth with their galleys divers times, and
								made war against Rhodes from Chalce, Cos, and Samos.

Now the Peloponnesians did no more to the Rhodians but levy money
								amongst them to the sum of thirty-two talents; 
							 and otherwise for fourscore days that they lay there, having their
								galleys hauled ashore, they meddled not.

In this time, as also before the going of the Peloponnesians to
								Rhodes, came to pass the things that follow. 
							 Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus in battle at Miletus, being
								suspected by the Peloponnesians, and Astyochus having received
								letters from them from Lacedaemon to put him to death (for he was an
								enemy to Agis, and also otherwise not well trusted), retired to
								Tissaphernes first, for fear, and afterwards to his power hindered
								the affairs of the Peloponnesians.

And being in everything his instructor, he not only cut shorter their
								pay, insomuch as from a drachma he brought it to three oboles, and
								those also not continually paid, advising Tissaphernes to tell them
								how that the Athenians, men of a long continued skill in naval
								affairs, allowed but three oboles to their own, not so much for want
								of money, but lest the mariners, some of them growing insolent by
								superfluity, should disable their bodies by spending their money on
								such things as would weaken them, and others should quit the galleys
								with the arrear of their pay in their captains' hands for a
								pawn;

but also gave counsel to Tissaphernes to give money to the captains
								of the galleys and to the generals of the several cities, save only
								those of Syracuse, to give way unto it. 
							 For Hermocrates, [the general of the Syracusians,] was the only man,
								that in the name of the whole league stood against it.

And for the cities that came to require money, he would put them back
								himself and answer them in Tissaphernes' name, and say, namely to
								the Chians, that they were impudent men, being the richest of the
								Grecian states and preserved by strangers, to expect nevertheless
								that others, for their liberty, should not only venture their
								persons but maintain them with their purses;

and to other states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their
								money before they revolted that they might serve the Athenians, not
								to bestow as much or more now upon themselves;

and told them that Tissaphernes, now he made war at his own charges,
								had reason to be sparing; 
							 but when money should come down from the king he would give them
								their full pay and assist the cities as should be fit.

Moreover, he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end
								of the war, nor to fetch in the Phoenician fleet which was making
								ready, nor take more men into pay, whereby to put the whole power
								both by sea and land into the hands of one, but to let the dominion
								remain divided into two, that the king, when one side troubled him,
								might set upon it with the other;

whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one, he will want
								by whom to pull down those that hold it unless with great danger and
								cost he should come and try it out himself; 
							 but thus the danger would be less chargeable, he being but at a small
								part of the cost; 
							 and he should wear out the Grecians one against another and himself
								in the meantime remain in safety.

He said further that the Athenians were fitter to partake dominion
								with him than the other for that they were less ambitious of power
								by land and that their speeches and actions tended more to the
								king's purpose; 
							 for that they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, that is to
								say, for themselves as touching the dominion by sea, and for the
								king as touching the Grecians in the king's territories; 
							 whereas the Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, were come to set them
								free; 
							 and it was not likely but that they that were come to deliver the
								Grecians from the Grecians will, if they overcome the Athenians,
								deliver them also from the barbarians.

He gave counsel therefore, first to wear them out both and then, when
								he had clipped, as near as he could, the wings of the Athenians, to
								dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his country.

And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accordingly, as far as by his
								actions can be conjectured. 
							 For hereupon he gave himself to believe Alcibiades as his best
								counsellor in these affairs, and neither paid the Peloponnesians
								their wages nor would suffer them to fight by sea; 
							 but pretending the coming of the Phoenician fleet, whereby they might
								afterwards fight with odds, he overthrew their proceedings and
								abated the vigour of their navy, before very puissant, and was in
								all things else more backward than he could possibly dissemble.

Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissaphernes to this whilst he
								was with them, partly because he thought the same to be indeed the
								best course, but partly also to make way for his own return into his
								country, knowing that if he destroyed it not, the time would one day
								come that he might persuade the Athenians to recall him. 
							 And the best way to persuade them to it, he thought, was this: to
								make it appear unto them that he was powerful with Tissaphernes.

Which also came to pass. 
							 For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos saw what power he had with
								him, the captains of galleys and principal men there, partly upon
								Alcibiades' own motion, who had sent to the greatest amongst them
								that they should remember him to the best sort and say that he
								desired to come home so the government might be in the hands of a
								few, not of evil persons nor yet of the multitude that cast him out,
								and that he would bring Tissaphernes to be their friend, [and to war
								on their side], but chiefly of their own accords had their minds
								inclined to the deposing of the popular government.

This business was set on foot first in the camp and from thence
								proceeded afterwards into the city. 
							 And certain persons went over to Alcibiades out of Samos and had
								conference with him. 
							 And when he had undertaken to bring to their friendship first
								Tissaphernes and then the king, in case the government were taken
								from the people, for then, he said, the king might the better rely
								upon them, they that were of most power in the city, who also were
								the most toiled out, entered into great hope both to have the
								ordering of the state at home themselves and victory also over the
								enemy.

And when they came back to Samos, they drew all such as were for
								their purpose into an oath of conspiracy with themselves, and to the
								multitude gave it out openly that if Alcibiades might be recalled
								and the people put from the government, the king would turn their
								friend and furnish them with money.

Though the multitude were grieved with this proceeding for the
								present, yet for the great hope they had of the king's pay they
								stirred not. 
							 But they that were setting up the oligarchy, when they had
								communicated thus much to the multitude, fell to consideration anew
								and with more of their complices of the things spoken by
								Alcibiades.

And the rest thought the matter easy and worthy to be believed; 
							 but Phrynichus, who yet was general of the army, liked it not, but
								thought, as the truth was, that Alcibiades cared no more for the
								oligarchy than the democracy, nor had any other aim in it but only
								by altering the government that then was to be called home by his
								associates; 
							 and said they were especially to look to this, that they did not
								mutiny for the king, who could not very easily be induced (the
								Peloponnesians being now as much masters at sea as themselves, and
								having no small cities within his dominions) to join with the
								Athenians, whom he trusted not, and to trouble himself, when he
								might have the friendship of the Peloponnesians, that never did him
								hurt;

as for the confederate cities to whom they promise oligarchy, in that
								they themselves do put down the democracy, he said, he knew full
								well that neither those which were already revolted would the sooner
								return to, nor those that remained be ever the more confirmed in
								their obedience thereby;

for they would never be so willing to be in subjection either to the
								few or to the people, as they would be to have their liberty, which
								side soever it were that should give it them, but would think that
								even those which are termed the good men, if they had the
								government, would give them as much to do as the people, being
								contrivers and authors to the people of doing those mischiefs
								against them, out of which they make most profit unto
								themselves; 
							 and that if the few had the rule, then they should be put to death
								unheard and more violently than by the former;

whereas the people is their refuge and moderator of the others'
								insolence. 
							 This, he said, he was certain that the cities thought; 
							 in that they had learned the same by the actions themselves; 
							 and that therefore what was yet propounded by Alcibiades, he by no
								means approved.

But those of the conspiracy there assembled, not only approved the
								present proposition, but also made preparation to send Pisander and
								others ambassadors to Athens to negotiate concerning the reduction
								of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the democracy, and the procuring
								unto the Athenians the friendship of Tissaphernes.

Now Phrynichus, knowing that an overture was to be made at Athens for
								the restoring of Alcibiades and that the Athenians would embrace it,
								and fearing lest being recalled he should do him a mischief (in
								regard he had spoken against it) as one that would have hindered the
								same, betook himself to this course:

He sends secret letters to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian general, who
								was yet about Miletus, and advertised him that Alcibiades undid
								their affairs and was procuring the friendship of Tissaphernes for
								the Athenians, writing in plain terms the whole business and
								desiring to be excused if he rendered evil to his enemy with some
								disadvantage to his country.

Astyochus had before this laid by the purpose of revenge against
								Alcibiades, especially when he was not in his own hands. 
							 And going to him to Magnesia and to Tissaphernes, related unto them
								what advertisement he had received from Samos, and made himself the
								appeacher. 
							 For he adhered, as was said, to Tissaphernes for his private lucre,
								both in this and in divers other matters;

which was also the cause that concerning the pay, when the abatement
								was made, he was not so stout in opposing it as he ought to have
								been.

Hereupon Alcibiades sendeth letters presently to those that were in
								office at Samos, accusing Phrynichus of what he had done and
								requiring to have him put to death. 
							 Phrynichus, perplexed with this discovery and brought into danger
								indeed, sends again to Astyochus, blaming what was past as not well
								concealed, and promised now to be ready to deliver unto him the
								whole army at Samos to be destroyed; 
							 writing from point to point (Samos being unwalled) in what manner he
								would do it, and saying that since his life was brought in danger,
								they could not blame him though he did this or any other thing
								rather than be destroyed by his most deadly enemies. 
							 This also Astyochus revealed unto Alcibiades.

But Phrynichus having had notice betimes how he abused him, and that
								letters of this from Alcibiades were in a manner come, he
								anticipates the news himself, and tells the army that whereas Samos
								was unwalled and the galleys rid not all within, the enemy meant to
								come and assault the harbour; 
							 that he had sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore
								with all speed to raise a wall about the city and to put garrisons
								into other places thereabouts. 
							 Now Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his own power to
								see it done.

They then fell to walling, whereby Samos (which they meant to have
								done howsoever) was so much the sooner walled in. 
							 Not long after came letters from Alcibiades that the army was
								betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy purposed to invade the
								harbour where they lay.

But now they thought not Alcibiades worthy to be believed, but rather
								that having foreseen the design of the enemy, he went about, out of
								malice, to fasten it upon Phrynichus as conscious of it
								likewise. 
							 So that he did him no hurt by telling it, but bare witness rather of
								that which Phrynichus had told them of before.

After this Alcibiades endeavouredd to incline and persuade
								Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians. 
							 For though Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because their
								fleet was greater than that of the Athenians, yet if he had been
								able, he had a good will to have been persuaded by him, especially
								in his anger against the Peloponnesians after the dissension at
								Cnidus about the league made by Theramenes (for they were already
								fallen out, the Peloponnesians being about this time in Rhodes). 
							 Wherein that which had been before spoken by Alcibiades, how that the
								coming of the Lacedaemonians was to restore all the cities to their
								liberty, was now verified by Lichas, in that he said it was an
								article not to be suffered that the king should hold those cities
								which he and his ancestors then or before had holden. 
							 Alcibiades, therefore, as one that laboured for no trifle, with all
								his might applied himself to Tissaphernes.

The Athenian ambassadors sent from Samos with Pisander, being arrived
								at Athens, were making their propositions to the people, and related
								unto them summarily the points of their business, and principally
								this, that if they would call home Alcibiades, and not suffer the
								government to remain in the hands of the people in such manner as it
								did, they might have the king for their confederate, and get the
								victory of the Peloponnesians.

Now when many opposed that point touching the democracy, and the
								enemies of Alcibiades clamoured withal that it would be a horrible
								thing he should return by forcing the government, when the
								Eumolpidae and Ceryces bare witness against him concerning the
								mysteries for which he fled and prohibited his return under their
								curse, Pisander, at this great opposition and querimony, stood out,
								and going amongst them took out one by one those that were against
								it, and asked them whether, now that the Peloponnesians had as many
								galleys at sea to oppose them as they themselves had, and
								confederate cities more than they, and were furnished with money by
								the king and Tissaphernes, the Athenians being without, they had any
								other hope to save their state but by persuading the king to come
								about to their side.

And they that were asked having nothing to answer, then in plain
								terms he said unto them: 
 This you cannot
										now obtain, except we administer the state with more
										moderation and bring the power into the hands of a few that
										the king may rely upon us. 
									 And we deliberate at this time, not so much about the form as
										about the preservation of the state; 
									 for if you mislike the form, you may change it again
										hereafter. 
									 And let us recall Alcibiades, who is the only man that can
										bring this to pass.

The people, hearing of the oligarchy, took it very heinously at
								first; 
							 but when Pisander had proved evidently that there was no other way of
								safety, in the end, partly for fear and partly because they hoped
								again to change the government, they yielded thereunto.

So they ordered that Pisander and ten others should go and treat both
								with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades as to them should seem best.

Withal, upon the accusation of Pisander against Phrynichus, they
								discharged both Phrynichus and Scironides, his fellow-commissioner,
								of their command, and made Diomedon and Leon generals of the fleet
								in their places. 
							 Now the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus and said he had
								betrayed Iasus and Amorges was only this: he thought him a man unfit
								for the business now in hand with Alcibiades.

Pisander, after he had gone about to all those combinations (which
								were in the city before for obtaining of places of judicature and of
								command), exhorting them to stand together and advise about deposing
								the democracy, and when he had dispatched the rest of his business
								so as there should be no more cause for him to stay there, took sea
								with those other ten to go to Tissaphernes.

Leon and Diomedon, arriving the same winter at the Athenian fleet,
								made a voyage against Rhodes, and finding there the Peloponnesian
								galleys drawn up to land, disbarked and overcame in battle such of
								the Rhodians as made head, and then put to sea again and went to
								Chalce. 
							 After this they made sharper war upon them from Cos. 
							 For from thence they could better observe the Peloponnesian navy when
								it should put off from the land.

In this while there arrived at Rhodes Xenophontidas, a Laconian, sent
								out of Chios from Pedaritus, to advertise them that the
								fortification of the Athenians there was now finished and that
								unless they came and relieved them with their whole fleet, the state
								of Chios must utterly be lost. 
							 And it was resolved to relieve them.

But Pedaritus in the meantime, with the whole power both of his own
								auxiliary forces and of the Chians, made an assault upon the
								fortification which the Athenians had made about their navy, part
								whereof he won, and had gotten some galleys that were drawn
								a-land. 
							 But the Athenians, issuing out upon them, first put to flight the
								Chians, and then overcame also the rest of the army about Pedaritus,
								and slew Pedaritus himself, and took many of the Chians prisoners
								and much armour.

After this the Chians were besieged both by sea and land more
								narrowly, and great famine was in the city. 

							 Pisander, and the other Athenian ambassadors that went with him, when
								they came to Tissaphernes, began to confer about the agreement.

But Alcibiades (for he was not sure of Tissaphernes, because he stood
								in fear too much of the Peloponnesians, and had a purpose besides,
								as Alcibiades himself had taught him, to weaken both sides [yet
								more]), betook himself to this shift: that Tissaphernes should break
								off the treaty by making to the Athenians exorbitant demands.

And it seemed that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing,
								Tissaphernes for fear, and Alcibiades for that when he saw
								Tissaphernes not desirous to agree, [though the offers were never so
								great], he was unwilling to have the Athenians think he could not
								persuade him to it, but rather that he was already persuaded and
								willing, and that the Athenians came not to him with sufficient
								offers.

For Alcibiades being the man that spake for Tissaphernes, though he
								were also present, made unto them such excessive demands that though
								the Athenians should have yielded to the greatest part of them, yet
								it must have been attributed to them that the treaty went not
								on. 
							 For they demanded, first, that all Ionia should be rendered; 
							 then again, the adjacent islands and other things; 
							 which the Athenians stood not against. 
							 In fine, at the third meeting, when he feared now plainly to be found
								unable to make good his word, he required that they should suffer
								the king to build a navy and sail up and down by their coast
								wheresoever and with what number soever of galleys he himself should
								think good. 
							 Upon this the Athenians would treat no longer, esteeming the
								conditions intolerable and that Alcibiades had abused them, and so
								went away in a chafe to Samos.

Presently after this, the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus
								with intent both to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus and
								also (as soon as he should have agreed unto new articles, such as he
								could get) to give the fleet their pay, and not to fall directly out
								with them for fear lest so many galleys, wanting maintenance, should
								either be forced by the Athenians to fight and so be overcome, or,
								emptied of men, the business might succeed with the Athenians
								according to their own desire without him. 
							 Besides, he was afraid lest looking for maintenance they should make
								spoil in the continent.

In consideration and foresight of all which things he desired to
								counterpoise the Grecians. 
							 And sending for the Peloponnesians, he gave them their pay, and now
								made the third league, as followeth:

"In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas being
								ephor in Lacedaemon, agreement was made in the plain of Maeander
								between the Lacedaemonians and their confederates on one part and
								Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces on the other
								part concerning the affairs of the king and of the Lacedaemonians
								and their confederates.

"That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to the king shall be the
								king's still;

and that concerning his own countries, it shall be lawful for the
								king to do whatsoever he shall think meet. 

							 "That the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall not invade any
								the territories of the king to harm them;

nor the king, the territories of the Lacedaemonians or their
								confederates. 

							 "If any of the Lacedaemonians or their confederates shall invade the
								king's country to do it hurt, the Lacedaemonians and their
								confederates shall oppose it; 
							 and if any of the king's country shall invade the Lacedaemonians or
								their confederates to do them hurt, the king shall oppose it.

"That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates agreed on, maintain
								the present fleet till the king's fleet arrive.

"That when the king's navy shall be come, the Lacedaemonians and
								their confederates shall maintain their own navy themselves, if they
								please; 
							 or if they will have Tissaphernes to maintain it, he shall do it; 
							 and that the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, at the end of the
								war, repay Tissaphernes whatsoever money they shall have received of
								him.

When the king's galleys shall be arrived,
										both they and the galleys of the Lacedaemonians and their
										confederates shall make the war jointly, according as to
										Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their confederates
										shall seem good; 
									 and if they will give over the war against the Athenians,
										they shall give it over in the same manner.

Such were the articles. 
							 After this Tissaphernes prepared for the fetching in of the
								Phoenician fleet, according to the agreement, and to do whatsoever
								else he had undertaken, desiring to have it seen, at least, that he
								went about it.

In the end of this winter, the Boeotians took Oropus by treason. 
							 It had in it a garrison of Athenians. 
							 They that plotted it were certain Eretrians and some of Oropus
								itself, who were then contriving the revolt of Euboea. 
							 For the place being built to keep Eretria in subjection, it was
								impossible, as long as the Athenians held it, but that it would much
								annoy both Eretria and the rest of Euboea.

Having Oropus in their hands already, they came to Rhodes to call the
								Peloponnesians into Euboea. 
							 But the Peloponnesians had a greater inclination to relieve Chios now
								distressed, and putting to sea, departed out of Rhodes with their
								whole fleet.

When they were come about Triopium, they described the Athenian fleet
								in the main sea going from Chalce. 
							 And neither side assaulting other, they put in, the one fleet at
								Samos, the other at Miletus; 
							 for the Peloponnesians saw they could not pass to relieve Chios
								without a battle. 
							 Thus ended this winter, and the twentieth year of this war written by
								Thucydides.

The next summer, in the beginning of the spring, Dercylidas, a
								Spartan, was sent by land into Hellespont with a small army to work
								the revolt of Abydos, a colony of the Milesians. 
							 And the Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochus was at a stand how
								to help them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to hazard
								a battle by sea.

Now whilst Astyochus lay at Rhodes, they had received into the city
								of Chios, after the death of Pedaritus, one Leon, a Spartan, that
								came along with Antisthenes as a private soldier, and with him
								twelve galleys that lay at the guard of Miletus, whereof five were
								Thurians, four Syracusians, one of Anaea, one of Miletus, and one of
								Leon's own.

Whereupon the Chians, issuing forth with the whole force of the city,
								seized a certain place of strength and put forth thirty-six galleys
								against thirty-two of the Athenians and fought. 
							 After a sharp fight, wherein the Chians and their associates had not
								the worst, and when it began to be dark, they retired again into the
								city.

Presently after this, Dercylidas being arrived now in Hellespont from
								Miletus by land, Abydos revolted to him and to Pharnabazus; 
							 and two days after revolted Lampsacus.

Strombichides, having intelligence of this, made haste thither from
								Chios with four-and-twenty sail of Athenians, those being also of
								that number which transported his men of arms. 
							 And when he had overcome the Lampsacenes that came out against him,
								and taken Lampsacus, being an open town, at the first shout of their
								voices, and made prize of all the goods they found and of the
								slaves, he placed the freemen there again and went against
								Abydos.

But when that city neither yielded nor could be taken by assault, he
								crossed over from Abydos to the opposite shore; 
							 and in Sestos, a city of Chersonesus, possessed heretofore by the
								Medes, he placed a garrison for the custody of the whole Hellespont.

In the meantime not only the Chians had the sea at more command, but
								Astyochus also and the army at Miletus, having been advertised of
								what passed in the fight by sea, and that Strombichides and those
								galleys with him were gone away, took heart.

And Astyochus, going to Chios with two galleys, fetched away the
								galleys that were there, and with the whole fleet now together went
								against Samos. 
							 But seeing they of Samos, by reason of their jealousy one towards
								another, came not against him, he went back again to Miletus.

For it was about this time that the democracy was put down at
								Athens. 

							 For after that Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors that had been with
								Tissaphernes were come to Samos, they both assured their affairs yet
								better in the army and also provoked the principal men of the
								Samians to attempt with them the erecting of the oligarchy, though
								there were then an insurrection amongst them against the
								oligarchy.

And withal the Athenians at Samos, in a conference amongst
								themselves, deliberated how, since Alcibiades would not, to let him
								alone; 
							 for indeed they thought him no fit man to come into an oligarchy; 
							 but for themselves, seeing they were already engaged in the danger,
								to take care both to keep the business from a relapse and withal to
								sustain the war and to contribute money and whatsoever else was
								needful with alacrity out of their private estates, and no more to
								toil for other than themselves.

Having thus advised, they sent Pisander with half the ambassadors
								presently home, to follow the business there, with command to set up
								the oligarchy in all the cities they were to touch at by the
								way; 
							 the other half they sent about, some to one part [of the state] and
								some to another.

And they sent away Diotrephes to his charge, who was now about Chios,
								chosen to go governor of the cities upon Thrace. 

							 He, when he came to Thasos, deposed the people.

And within two months at most after he was gone, the Thasians
								fortified their city, as needing no longer an aristocracy with the
								Athenians but expecting liberty every day by the help of the
								Lacedaemonians. 
							 For there were also certain of them with the Peloponnesians driven
								out by the Athenians;

and these practised with such in the city as were for their purpose
								to receive galleys into it and to cause it to revolt. 
							 So that it fell out for them just as they would have it, and that
								estate of theirs was set up without their danger and that the people
								was deposed that would have withstood it.

Insomuch as at Thasos it fell out contrary to what those Athenians
								thought which erected the oligarchy; 
							 and so, in my opinion, it did in many other places of their
								dominion. 
							 For the cities, now grown wise and withal resolute in their
								proceedings, sought a direct liberty and preferred not before it
								that outside of a well-ordered government introduced by the
								Athenians.

They with Pisander, according to the order given them, entering into
								the cities as they went by, dissolved the democracies; 
							 and having in some places obtained also an aid of men of arms, they
								came to Athens, and found the business, for the greatest part,
								dispatched to their hands by their accomplices before their
								coming.

For certain young men, combining themselves, had not only murdered
								Androcles privily, a principal patron of the popular government and
								one that had his hand the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades
								(whom they slew for two causes: for the sway he bare amongst the
								people, and to gratify Alcibiades, who they thought would return and
								get them the friendship of Tissaphernes), but had also made away
								divers men unfit for their design in the same manner.

They had withal an oration ready made, which they delivered in
								public, wherein they said that there ought none to receive wages but
								such as served in the wars, nor to participate of the government
								more than five thousand, and those, such as by their purses and
								persons were best able to serve the commonwealth.

And this with the most carried a good shew, because they that would
								set forward the alteration of the state were to have the managing of
								the same. 
							 Yet the people and the Council of the Bean met still, but debated
								nothing, save what the conspirators thought fit; 
							 nay, all that spake were of that number, and had considered before
								what they were to say.

Nor would any of the rest speak against them, for fear, because they
								saw the combination was great; 
							 and if any man did, he was quickly made away by one convenient means
								or other, and no inquiry made after the deed-doers, nor justice
								prosecuted against any that was suspected. 
							 But the people were so quiet and so afraid that every man thought it
								gain to escape violence though he said never a word.

Their hearts failed them because they thought the conspirators more
								indeed than they were; 
							 and to learn their number, in respect of the greatness of the city
								and for that they knew not one another, they were unable.

For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that was angry
								at it to bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged on them that
								conspired; 
							 for he must have told his mind either to one he knew not or to one he
								knew and trusted not.

For the popular approached each other, every one with jealousy, as if
								they thought him of the plot. 
							 For indeed there were such amongst them as no man would have thought
								would ever have turned to the oligarchy; 
							 and those were they that caused in the many that diffidence, and by
								strengthening the jealousy of the popular one against another,
								conferred most to the security of the few.

During this opportunity, Pisander and they that were with him, coming
								in, fell in hand presently with the remainder of the business. 
							 And first they assembled the people and delivered their opinion for
								ten men to be chosen with power absolute to make a draught of laws,
								and having drawn them, to deliver their opinion at a day appointed
								before the people, touching the best form of government for the
								city.

Afterwards, when that day came, they summoned the assembly to
								Colonus, which is a place consecrated to Neptune without the city,
								about two furlongs off. 
							 And they that were appointed to write the laws, presented this, and
								only this: That it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver
								whatsoever opinion he pleased; 
							 imposing of great punishments upon whosoever should either accuse any
								that so spake of violating the laws or otherwise do him hurt.

Now here indeed it was in plain terms propounded that not any
								magistracy of the form before used might any longer be in force, nor
								any fee belong unto it; 
							 but that five Prytanes might be elected, and these five choose a
								hundred, and every one of this hundred take unto him three
								others; 
							 and these four hundred, entering into the council-house, might have
								absolute authority to govern the state as they thought best and to
								summon the five thousand as oft as to them it should seem good.

He that delivered this opinion was Pisander, who was also otherwise
								openly the forewardest to put down the democracy. 
							 But he that contrived the whole business, how to bring it to this
								pass, and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon, a man for virtue
								not inferior to any Athenian of his time, and the ablest of any man
								both to devise well and also to express well what he had
								devised; 
							 and though he came not into the assemblies of the people nor
								willingly to any other debatings, because the multitude had him in
								jealousy for the opinion they had of the power of his eloquence, yet
								when any man that had occasion of suit, either in the courts of
								justice or in the assembly of the people, came to him for his
								counsel, this one man was able to help him most.

The same man, when afterwards the government of The Four Hundred went
								down and was vexed of the people, was heard plead for himself, when
								his life was in question for that business, the best of any man to
								this day.

Phrynichus also shewed himself an earnest man for the oligarchy, and
								that more earnestly than any other, because he feared Alcibiades and
								knew him to be acquainted with all his practices at Samos with
								Astyochus, and thought in all probability that he would never return
								to live under the government of the few. 
							 And this man, in any matter of weight, appeared the most sufficient
								to be relied on.

Also Theramenes, the son of Agnon, an able man both for elocution and
								understanding, was another of the principal of those that overthrew
								the democracy. 

							 So that it is no marvel if the business took effect, being by many
								and wise men conducted, though it were a hard one. 
							 For it went sore with the Athenian people, almost a hundred years
								after the expulsion of the tyrants, to be now deprived of their
								liberty, having not only not been subject to any, but also for the
								half of this time been inured to dominion over others.

When the assembly, after it had passed these things, no man
								contradicting, was dissolved, then afterwards they brought The Four
								Hundred into the council-house in this manner. 
							 The Athenians were evermore partly on the walls and partly at their
								arms in the camp in regard of the enemy that lay at Deceleia.

Therefore, on the day appointed, they suffered such as knew not their
								intent to go forth as they were wont. 
							 But to such as were of the conspiracy they quietly gave order not to
								go to the camp itself but to lag behind at a certain distance, and
								if any man should oppose what was in doing, to take arms and keep
								them back.

They to whom this charge was given were [the] Andrians, Tenians,
								three hundred Carystians, and such of the colony of Aegina which the
								Athenians had sent thither to inhabit, as came on purpose to this
								action with their own arms.

These things thus ordered, The Four Hundred, with every man a secret
								dagger, accompanied with one hundred and twenty young men of Greece,
								whom they used for occasions of shedding of blood, came in upon the
								Counsellers of the Bean as they sat in the council-house and
								commanded them to take their salary and be gone, which also they
								brought ready with them, for the whole time they were behind, and
								paid it to them as they went out.

And the rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet. 

							 The Four Hundred, being now entered into the councilhouse, created
								Prytanes amongst themselves by lot, and made their prayers and
								sacrifices to the gods, all that were before usual at the entrance
								upon the government.

And afterwards receding far from that course which in the
								administration of the state was used by the people, saving that for
								Alcibiades' sake they recalled not the outlaws, in other things they
								governed the commonwealth imperiously, and not only slew some,
								though not many, such as they thought fit to be made away, and
								imprisoned some, and confined others to places abroad, but also sent
								heralds to Agis, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was then at
								Deceleia, signifying that they would come to composition with him,
								and that now he might better treat with them than he might before
								with the unconstant people.

But he, not imagining that the city was yet in quiet nor willing so
								soon to deliver up their ancient liberty, but rather that if they
								saw him approach with great forces they would be in tumult, not yet
								believing fully but that some stir or other would arise amongst
								them, gave no answer at all to those that came from The Four Hundred
								touching the composition, but having sent for new and great forces
								out of Peloponnesus, came down himself not long after, both with the
								army at Deceleia and those new comers, to the Athenian walls, hoping
								that they would fall into his hands according to his desire, at
								least the more easily for their confusion, or perhaps at the very
								first shout of their voices, in respect of the tumult that in all
								likelihood was to happen both within and without the city. 
							 For, as for the long walls, in regard of the few defendants likely to
								be found upon them, he thought he could not fail to take them.

But when he came near, and the Athenians were without any the least
								alteration within, and had with their horsemen which they sent out,
								and a part of their men of arms and of their light-armed and of
								their archers, overthrown some of his men that approached too near
								and gotten some arms and bodies of the slain, rectified thus, he
								withdrew his army again.

And himself, and such as were with him before, stayed in their places
								at Deceleia; 
							 but as for those that came last, after they had stayed awhile in the
								country, he sent them home again. 
							 After this The Four Hundred, notwithstanding their former repulse,
								sent ambassadors unto Agis anew; 
							 and he now receiving them better, by his advice they sent ambassadors
								also to Lacedaemon about an agreement, being desirous of peace.

They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to satisfy the army and to tell
								them that the oligarchy was not set up to any prejudice of the city
								or citizens, but for the safety of the whole state; 
							 and that they which had their hands in it were five thousand and not
								four hundred only; 
							 notwithstanding that the Athenians, by reason of warfare and
								employment abroad, never assembled, of how great consequence soever
								was the matter to be handled, so frequent as to be five thousand
								there at once.

And having in other things instructed them how to make the best of
								the matter, they sent them away immediately after the government was
								changed, fearing, as also it fell out, lest the seafaring multitude
								would not only not continue in this oligarchical form themselves,
								but the mischief beginning there would depose them also.

For in Samos there was a commotion about the oligarchy already; 
							 and this that followeth happened about the same time that The Four
								Hundred were set up in Athens.

Those Samians that had risen against the nobility and were of the
								people's side, turning when Pisander came thither at the persuasion
								of him and of those Athenians in Samos that were his accomplices,
								conspired together to the number of three hundred and were to have
								assaulted the rest as popular.

And one Hyperbolus, a lewd fellow, who, not for any fear of his power
								or for any dignity, but for wickedness of life and dishonour he did
								the city, had been banished by ostracism, they slew, abetted therein
								both by Charminus, one of the commanders, and by other Athenians
								that were amongst them, who had given them their faith. 
							 And together with these, they committed other facts of the same kind,
								and were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side.

But they, having gotten notice thereof, made known the design both to
								the generals, Leon and Diomedon (for these, being honoured by the
								people, endured the oligarchy unwillingly), and also to Thrasybulus
								and Thrasyllus, whereof one was captain of a galley and the other
								captain of a band of men of arms, and to such others continually as
								they thought stood in greatest opposition to the conspirators; 
							 and required of them that they would not see them destroyed and Samos
								alienated from the Athenians by the only means of which their
								dominion had till this time kept itself in the state it is in.

They, hearing it, went to the soldiers and exhorted them one by one
								not to suffer it, especially to the Paralians, who were all
								Athenians and freemen, come thither in the galley called Paralus,
								and had always before been enemies to the oligarchy.

And Leon and Diomedon, whensoever they went forth any whither, left
								them certain galleys for their guard, so that when the three hundred
								assaulted them, the commons of the Samians, with the help of all
								these, and especially of the Paralians, had the upperhand, and of
								the three hundred slew thirty. 
							 Three of the chief authors they banished, and burying in oblivion the
								fault of the rest, governed the state from that time forward as a
								democracy.

The Paralus, and in it Chaereas, the son of Archestratus, a man of
								Athens, one that had been forward in the making of this change, the
								Samians and the soldiers dispatched presently away to Athens, to
								advertise them of what was done; 
							 for they knew not yet that the government was in the hands of The
								Four Hundred.

When they arrived, The Four Hundred cast some two or three of these
								of the Paralus into prison; 
							 the rest, after they had taken the galley from them and put them
								aboard another military galley, they commanded to keep guard about
								Euboea.

But Chaereas, by some means or other getting presently away, seeing
								how things went, came back to Samos and related to the army all that
								the Athenians had done, aggravating it to the utmost, as that they
								punished every man with stripes to the end that none should
								contradict the doings of those that bore rule; 
							 and that their wives and children at home were abused; 
							 and that they had an intention further to take and imprison all that
								were of kin to any of the army which was not of their faction, to
								the intent to kill them if they of Samos would not submit to their
								authority. 
							 And many other things he told them, adding lies of his own.

When they heard this, they were ready at first to have fallen upon
								the chief authors of the oligarchy and upon such of the rest as were
								partakers of it. 
							 Yet afterwards, being hindered by such as came between and advised
								them not to overthrow the state, the enemy lying so near with their
								galleys to assault them, they gave it over.

After this, Thrasybulus, the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus (for these
								were the principal authors of the change), determining now openly to
								reduce the state at Samos to a democracy, took oaths of all the
								soldiers, especially of the oligarchicals, the greatest they could
								devise, both that they should be subject to the democracy and agree
								together and also that they should zealously prosecute the war
								against the Peloponnesians, and withal be enemies to The Four
								Hundred and not to have to do with them by ambassadors.

The same oath was taken by all the Samians that were of age; 
							 and the Athenian soldiers communicated with them their whole affairs,
								together with whatsoever should succeed of their dangers; 
							 for whom and for themselves, they made account there was no refuge of
								safety; 
							 but that if either The Four Hundred or the enemy at Miletus overcame
								them, they must needs perish.

So there was a contention at this time, one side compelling the city
								to a democracy, the other, the army to an oligarchy.

And presently there was an assembly of the soldiers called, wherein
								they deprived the former commanders, and such captains of galleys as
								they had in suspicion, of their charge, and chose others, both
								captains of galleys and commanders, in their places, of which
								Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. 
							 And they stood up and encouraged one another, both otherwise and with
								this:

that they had no cause to be dejected for the city's revolting from
								them; 
							 for they at Athens, being the lesser part, had forsaken them, who
								were not only the greater part, but also every way the better
								provided.

For they, having the whole navy, could compel the rest of the cities
								subject unto them to pay in their money as well now as if they were
								to set out from Athens itself. 
							 And that they also had a city, namely Samos, no weak one, but even
								such a one as, when they were enemies, wanted little of taking the
								dominion of the sea from the Athenians. 
							 That the seat of the war was the same it was before; 
							 and that they should be better able to provide themselves of things
								necessary, having the navy, than they should be that were at home in
								the city. 
							 And that they at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peiraeus,
								both formerly by the favour of them at Samos;

and that now also, unless they restore them the government, they
								shall again be brought to that pass that those at Samos shall be
								better able to bar them the use of the sea than they shall be to bar
								it them of Samos.

That it was a trifle and worth nothing, which was conferred to the
								overcoming of the enemy by the city, and a small matter it would be
								to lose it, seeing they had neither any more silver to send them
								(for the soldiers shifted for themselves), nor yet good direction,
								which is the thing for which the city hath the command of the
								armies. 
							 Nay, that in this point they erred which were at Athens, in that they
								had abrogated the laws of their country; 
							 whereas they at Samos did both observe the same themselves and
								endeavour to constrain the other to do so likewise. 
							 So that such of them in the camp as should give good council were as
								good as they in the city.

And that Alcibiades, if they would decree his security and his
								return, would with all his heart procure the king to be their
								confederate. 
							 And that which is the main thing, if they failed of all other helps,
								yet with so great a fleet they could not fail of many places to
								retire to, in which they might find both city and territory.

When they had thus debated the matter in the assembly and encouraged
								one another, they made ready, as at other times, whatsoever was
								necessary for the war. 
							 And the ten ambassadors which were sent to Samos from The Four
								Hundred, hearing of this by the way at Delos, whither they were come
								already, stayed still there.

About the same time also, the soldiers of the Peloponnesian fleet at
								Miletus murmured amongst themselves that Astyochus and Tissaphernes
								overthrew the state of their affairs. 
							 Astyochus in refusing to fight, both before, when their own fleet was
								stronger and that of the Athenians but small, and also now, whilst
								they were said to be in sedition and their fleet divided; 
							 and in expecting the Phoenician fleet, in fame, not in fact to come
								from Tissaphernes; 
							 and Tissaphernes, in that he not only brought not in that fleet of
								his but also impaired theirs by not giving them their pay, neither
								fully nor continually; 
							 and that they therefore ought no longer to delay time, but to hazard
								battle. 
							 This was urged principally by the Syracusians.

Astyochus and the confederates, when they heard of the murmur and had
								in council resolved to fight, especially after they were informed
								that Samos was in a tumult, putting forth with their whole fleet to
								the number of one hundred and twelve sail, with order given to the
								Milesians to march by land to the same place, went to Mycale.

But the Athenians, being come out from Samos with their fleet of
								eighty-two galleys, and riding now at Glauce of the territory of
								Mycale ([for] in this part [toward Mycale] Samos is but a little way
								from the continent), when they described the Peloponnesian fleet
								coming against them, put in again to Samos, as not esteeming
								themselves a sufficient number to hazard their whole fortune on the
								battle.

Besides, they stayed for the coming of Strombichides from Hellespont
								to their aid (for they saw that they of Miletus had a desire to
								fight) with those galleys that went from Chios against Abydos; 
							 for they had sent unto him before.

So these retired into Samos. 
							 And the Peloponnesians, putting in at Mycale, there encamped, as also
								did the land-forces of the Milesians and others of the country
								thereabouts.

The next day, when they meant to have gone against Samos, they
								received news that Strombichides with his galleys was arrived out of
								Hellespont, and thereupon returned presently to Miletus.

Then the Athenians on the other side, with the addition of these
								galleys, went to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail,
								intending to fight; 
							 but when nobody came out against them, they likewise went back to
								Samos.

Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who
								refused to come out against the enemy, as holding themselves with
								their whole fleet too weak to give them battle, and were now at a
								stand how to get money for the maintenance of so great a number of
								galleys, sent Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, with forty galleys,
								according to the order at first from Peloponnesus, to
								Pharnabazus.

For not only Pharnabazus himself had sent for and promised to pay
								them, but they were advertised besides by ambassadors that Byzantium
								had a purpose to revolt.

Hereupon, these Peloponnesian galleys, having put out into the main
								sea to the end that they might not be seen as they passed by, and
								tossed with tempests, part of them, which were the greatest number,
								and Clearchus with them, got into Delos, and came afterwards to
								Miletus again; 
							 but Clearchus went thence again into the Hellespont by land and had
								the command there; 
							 and part under the charge of Helixus, a Megarean, which were ten
								sail, went safely through into the Hellespont and caused Byzantium
								to revolt.

And after this, when they of Samos heard of it, they sent certain
								galleys into Hellespont to oppose them and to be a guard to the
								cities thereabouts; 
							 and there followed a small fight between them of eight galleys to
								eight, before Byzantium.

In the meantime, they that were in authority at Samos, and especially
								Thrasybulus, who after the form of government changed was still of
								the mind to have Alcibiades recalled, at length in an assembly
								persuaded the soldiers to the same. 
							 And when they had decreed for Alcibiades both his return and his
								security, he went to Tissaphernes and fetched Alcibiades to Samos,
								accounting it their only means of safety to win Tissaphernes from
								the Peloponnesians to themselves.

An assembly being called, Alcibiades complained of and lamented the
								calamity of his own exile, and speaking much of the business of the
								state gave them no small hopes of the future time, hyperbolically
								magnifying his own power with Tissaphernes to the end that both they
								which held the oligarchy at home might the more fear him, and so the
								conspiracies dissolve, and also those at Samos the more honour him
								and take better heart unto themselves; 
							 and withal, that the enemy might object the same to the utmost to
								Tissaphernes and fall from their present hopes.

Alcibiades therefore, with the greatest boast that could be, affirmed
								that Tissaphernes had undertaken to him that as long as he had
								anything left, if he might but trust the Athenians they should never
								want for maintenance; 
							 no, though he should be constrained to make money of his own bed; 
							 and that he would fetch the Phoenician fleet, now at Aspendus, not to
								the Peloponnesians but to the Athenians; 
							 and that then only he would rely upon the Athenians when Alcibiades
								called home should undertake for them.

Hearing this and much more, they chose him presently for general
								together with those that were before, and committed unto them the
								whole government of their affairs. 
							 And now there was not a man that would have sold his present hopes,
								both of subsisting themselves and being revenged of The Four
								Hundred, for any good in the world, and were ready even then, upon
								those words of his, contemning the enemy there present, to set sail
								for Peiraeus.

But he, though many pressed it, by all means forbade their going
								against Peiraeus, being to leave their enemies so near; 
							 but since they had chosen him general, he was, he said, to go to
								Tissaphernes first and to dispatch such business with him as
								concerned the war.

And as soon as the assembly brake up, he took his journey
								accordingly, to the end that he might seem to communicate everything
								with him, and for that he desired also to be in more honour with
								him, and to show that he was general and a man capable to do him
								good or hurt. 
							 And it happened to Alcibiades that he awed the Athenians with
								Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

When the Peloponnesians that were at Miletus heard that Alcibiades
								was gone home, whereas they mistrusted Tissaphernes before, now they
								much more accused him.

For it fell out that when at the coming of the Athenians with their
								fleet before Miletus they refused to give them battle, Tissaphernes
								became thereby a great deal slacker in his payment;

and besides that he was hated by them before this for Alcibiades'
								sake, the soldiers now, meeting in companies apart, reckoned up one
								to another the same matters which they had noted before, and some
								also, men of value and not the common soldier alone, recounted this
								withal, how they had never had their full stipend; 
							 that the allowance was but small, and yet not continually paid; 
							 and that unless they either fought or went to some other place where
								they might have maintenance, their men would abandon the fleet; 
							 and that the cause of all this was in Astyochus, who for private
								lucre gave way to the humour of Tissaphernes.

Whilst these were upon this consideration, there happened also a
								certain tumult about Astyochus.

For the mariners of the Syracusians and Thurians, by how much they
								were a multitude that had greater liberty than the rest, with so
								much the stouter importunity they demanded their pay. 
							 And he not only gave them somewhat an insolent answer but also
								threatened Dorieus, that amongst the rest spake for the soldiers
								under himself, and lift up his staff against him.

When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry like seamen indeed,
								all at once, and were running upon Astyochus to have stricken
								him. 
							 But foreseeing it, he fled to an altar, and was not stricken, but
								they were parted again.

The Milesians also took in a certain fort in Miletus, built by
								Tissaphernes, having privily assaulted it, and cast out the garrison
								that was within it. 
							 These things were by the rest of the confederates, and especially by
								the Syracusians, well approved of;

but Lichas liked them not, saying it behoved the Milesians and the
								rest dwelling within the king's dominion to have obeyed Tissaphernes
								in all moderate things, and till such time as the war should have
								been well dispatched to have courted him. 
							 And the Milesians, for this and other things of this kind, were
								offended with Lichas, and afterwards when he died of sickness, would
								not permit him to be buried in that place where the Lacedaemonians
								then present would have had him.

Whilst they were quarrelling about their business with Astyochus and
								Tissaphernes, Mindarus cometh in from Lacedaemon to succeed
								Astyochus in his charge of the fleet; 
							 and as soon as he had taken the command upon him, Astyochus
								departed.

But with him Tissaphernes sent a Carian named Gauleites, one that
								spake both the languages, both to accuse the Milesians about the
								fort and also to make an apology for himself, knowing that the
								Milesians went principally to exclaim upon him, and that Hermocrates
								went with them and would bewray how Tissaphernes undid the business
								of the Peloponnesians with Alcibiades, and dealt on both hands.

For he was continually at enmity with him about the payment of the
								soldiers' wages; 
							 and in the end, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and
								other commanders of the Syracusian fleet, namely, Potamis, Myscon,
								and Demarchus, were arrived at Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy
								upon him, being an outlaw, than before, and accused him, amongst
								other things, that he had asked him money, and because he could not
								have it became his enemy.

So Astyochus and Hermocrates and the Milesians went their way to
								Lacedaemon. 

							 Alcibiades by this time was come back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

And those ambassadors of The Four Hundred, which had been sent out
								before to mollify and to inform those of Samos, came from Delos now
								whilst Alcibiades was present. 
							 An assembly being called, they were offering to speak.

But the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out to have
								them put to death for that they had deposed the people; 
							 yet afterwards with much ado they were calmed and gave them
								hearing.

They declared that the change had been made for the preservation of
								the city, not to destroy it nor to deliver it to the enemy; 
							 for they could have done that before now when the enemy during their
								government assaulted it, that every one of The Five Thousand was to
								participate of the government in their turns; 
							 and their friends were not, as Chaereas had laid to their charge,
								abused, nor had any wrong at all, but remained every one quietly
								upon his own.

Though they delivered this and much more, yet the soldiers believed
								them not, but raged still and declared their opinions, some in one
								sort some in another, most agreeing in this to go against
								Peiraeus. 
							 And now Alcibiades appeared to be the first and principal man in
								doing service to the commonwealth. 
							 For when the Athenians at Samos were carried headlong to invade
								themselves, in which case most manifestly the enemy had presently
								possessed himself of Ionia and Hellespont, [it was thought that] he
								was the man that kept them from it.

Nor was there any man at that time able to have held in the multitude
								but himself.

He both made them to desist from the voyage and rated off from the
								ambassadors those that were in their own particular incensed against
								them. 
							 Whom also he sent away, giving them their answer himself: That he
								opposed not the government of The Five Thousand, but willed them to
								remove The Four Hundred and to establish the council that was before
								of five hundred;

that if they had frugally cut off any expense so that such as were
								employed in the wars might be the better maintained, he did much
								commend them for it. 
							 And withal he exhorted them to stand out and give no ground to their
								enemies, for that as long as the city held out, there was great hope
								for them to compound;

but if either part miscarry once, either this at Samos or the other
								at Athens, there would none be left for the enemy to compound
								withal. 

							 There chanced to be present also the ambassadors of the Argives, sent
								unto the popular faction of the Athenians in Samos to assist
								them.

These Alcibiades commended and appointed to be ready when they should
								be called for and so dismissed them. 
							 These Argives came in with those of the Paralus, that had been
								bestowed formerly in the military galley by The Four Hundred to go
								about Euboea and to convoy Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias,
								ambassadors from The Four Hundred, to Lacedaemon. 
							 These, as they sailed by Argos, seized on the ambassadors and
								delivered them as principal men in deposing of the people to the
								Argives, and returned no more to Athens, but came with the galley
								they then were in to Samos and brought with them these ambassadors
								from the Argives.

The same summer, Tissaphernes, at the time that the Peloponnesians
								were offended with him most, both for the going home of Alcibiades
								and divers other things, as now manifestly Atticizing, with purpose,
								as indeed it seemed, to clear himself to them concerning his
								accusations, made ready for his journey to Aspendus for the
								Phoenician fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with him, saying
								that he would substitute Tamos, his deputy lieutenant over the army,
								to pay the fleet whilst himself was absent.

This matter is diversly reported, and it is hard to know with what
								purpose he went to Aspendus and yet brought not the fleet away with
								him. 
							 For it is known that one hundred and forty-seven sail of Phoenicians
								were come forward as far as Aspendus;

but why they came not through, the conjectures are various. 
							 Some think it was upon design (as he formerly intended) to wear out
								the Peloponnesian forces; 
							 for which cause also Tamos, who had that charge, made no better but
								rather worse payment than himself. 
							 Others, that having brought the Phoenicians as far as Aspendus, he
								might dismiss them for money, for he never meant to use their
								service. 
							 Some again said it was because they exclaimed so against it at
								Lacedaemon, and that it might not be said he abused them, but that
								he went openly to a fleet really set out. 

							 For my own part, I think it most clear that it was to the end to
								consume and to balance the Grecians that he brought not those
								galleys in;

consuming them, in that he went thither and delayed the time; 
							 and equalizing them, in that bringing them to neither he made neither
								party the stronger. 
							 For if he had had a mind to end the war, it is manifest he might have
								been sure to have done it. 
							 For if he had brought them to the Lacedaemonians, in all reason he
								had given them the victory, who had a navy already rather equal than
								inferior to that of their enemies.

But that which hurt them most was the pretence he alleged for not
								bringing the fleet in. 
							 For he said they were not so many sail as the king had ordained to be
								gotten together. 
							 But sure he might have ingratiated himself more in this business by
								dispatching it with less of the king's money than by spending
								more.

But whatsoever was his purpose, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and was
								with the Phoenicians; 
							 and by his own appointment the Peloponnesians sent Philip, a
								Lacedaemonian, with him with two galleys as to take charge of the
								fleet.

Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes was gone to Aspendus,
								goes after him with thirteen galleys, promising to those at Samos a
								safe and great benefit, which was that he would either bring those
								Phoenician galleys to the service of the Athenians, or at least
								hinder their coming to the Peloponnesians; 
							 knowing, as is likely, the mind of Tissaphernes by long acquaintance,
								that he meant not to bring them on, and desiring, as much as he
								could, to procure him the ill will of the Peloponnesians for the
								friendship shown to himself and to the Athenians that he might
								thereby the better engage him to take their part. 
							 So he presently put to sea, holding his course for Phaselis and
								Caunus upwards.

The ambassadors of The Four Hundred being returned from Samos to
								Athens and having related what they had in charge from Alcibiades,
								how that he exhorted them to hold out and not give ground to the
								enemy, and that he had great hopes to reconcile them to the army and
								to overcome the Peloponnesians, whereas many of the sharers in the
								oligarchy were formerly discontented and would gladly, if they could
								have done it safely, have quitted the business, they were now a
								great deal more confirmed in that mind.

And already they had their meetings apart and did cast aspersions on
								the government, and had for their ringleaders some of the heads of
								the oligarchicals and such as bare office amongst them, as
								Theramenes, the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates, the son of Scellius,
								and others, who though they were partakers with the foremost in the
								affairs of state, yet feared, as they said, Alcibiades and the army
								at Samos; 
							 and joined in the sending of ambassadors to Lacedaemon, because they
								were loth, by singling themselves from the greater number, to hurt
								the state, not that they dismissed the state into the hands of a
								very few, but said that The Five Thousand ought in fact to be
								assigned, and not in voice only, and the government to be reduced to
								a greater equality.

And this was indeed the form pretended in words by The Four
								Hundred. 
							 But the most of them, through private ambition, fell upon that by
								which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is chiefly
								overthrown. 
							 For at once they claimed every one not to be equal but to be far the
								chief. 
							 Whereas in a democracy, when election is made, because a man is not
								overcome by his equals, he can better brook it.

But the great power of Alcibiades at Samos and the opinion they had
								that the oligarchy was not like to last was it that most evidently
								encouraged them; 
							 and thereupon they every one contended who should most eminently
								become the patron of the people.

But those of The Four Hundred that were most opposite to such a form
								of government, and the principal of them, both Phrynichus, who had
								been general at Samos and was ever since at difference with
								Alcibiades, and Aristarchus, a man that had been an adversary to the
								people both in the greatest manner and for the longest time, and
								Pisander and Antiphon, and others of the greatest power, not only
								formerly, as soon as they entered into authority and afterwards when
								the state at Samos revolted to the people, sent ambassadors to
								Lacedaemon and bestirred themselves for the oligarchy, and built a
								wall in the place called Eetioneia; 
							 but much more afterwards, when their ambassadors were come from Samos
								and that they saw not only the populars but also some others of
								their own party, thought trusty before, to be now changed.

And to Lacedaemon they sent Antiphon and Phrynichus with ten others
								with all possible speed, as fearing their adversaries both at home
								and at Samos, with commission to make a peace with the
								Lacedaemonians on any tolerable conditions whatsoever or
								howsoever; 
							 and in this time went on with the building of the wall in Eetioneia
								with greater diligence than before.

The scope they had in this wall, as it was given out by Theramenes,
								[the son of Agnon], was not so much to keep out those of Samos in
								case they should attempt by force to enter into Peiraeus as at their
								pleasure to be able to let in both the galleys and the land forces
								of the enemies.

For this Eetioneia is the pier of the Peiraeus, close unto which is
								the mouth of the haven. 
							 And therefore they built this wall so to another wall that was built
								before to the continent that a few men lying within it might command
								the entrance. 
							 For the end of each wall was brought to the tower upon the [very]
								mouth of the haven, as well of the old wall towards the continent as
								of the new which was built within it to the water.

They built also an open ground-gallery, an exceeding great one and
								close to their new wall within Peiraeus, and were masters of it, and
								constrained all men as well to bring thither their corn which they
								had already come in, as to unload there whatsoever should come in
								afterward, and to take and sell it from thence.

These things Theramenes murmured at long before; 
							 and when the ambassadors returned from Lacedaemon without compounding
								for them all in general, he gave out that this wall would endanger
								the undoing of the city.

For at this very instant there happened to be riding on the coast of
								Laconia fortytwo galleys, amongst which were some of Tarentum, some
								of Locri, some Italians, and some Sicilians, set out from
								Peloponnesus at the instance of the Euboeans, bound for Euboea and
								commanded by Hegesandridas, the son of Hegesander, a Spartan. 
							 And these Theramenes said were coming not so much towards Euboea as
								towards those that fortified in Eetioneia, and that if they were not
								looked to, they would surprise the city.

Now some matter might indeed be gathered also from those that were
								accused, so that it was not a mere slander. 
							 For their principal design was to retain the oligarchy with dominion
								over their confederates; 
							 but if they failed of that, yet being masters of the galleys and of
								the fortification, to have subsisted free themselves; 
							 if barred of that, then rather than to be the only men to suffer
								death under the restored democracy, to let in the enemy; 
							 and without either navy or fortification to have let what would have
								become of the city and to have compounded for the safety of their
								own persons.

Therefore they went diligently on with the fortification, wherein
								were wickets and entries and backways for the enemy, and desired to
								have it finished in time.

And though these things were spoken but amongst a few before and in
								secret, yet when Phrynichus, after his return from his Lacedaemonian
								ambassage, was by a certain watchman wounded treacherously in the
								market place when it was full, as he went from the councilhouse, and
								not far from it fell instantly dead, and the murtherer gone, and
								that one of his complices, an Argive, taken by The Four Hundred and
								put to the torture, would confess no man of those named to him nor
								anything else saving this, that many men used to assemble at the
								house of the captain of the watch and at other houses; 
							 then at length, because this accident bred no alteration, Theramenes
								and Aristocrates, and as many other either of The Four Hundred or
								out of that number as were of the same faction proceeded more boldly
								to assault the government. 
							 For now also the fleet, being come about from Laconia and lying upon
								the coast of Epidaurus, had made incursions upon Aegina.

And Theramenes thereupon alleged that it was improbable that those
								galleys holding their course for Euboea would have put in at Aegina
								and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus, unless they had
								been sent for by such men as he had ever accused of the same; 
							 and that therefore there was no reason any longer to sit still.

And in the end, after many seditious and suspicious speeches, they
								fell upon the state in good earnest. 
							 For the soldiers that were in Peiraeus employed in fortifying
								Eetioneia (amongst whom was also Aristocrates, captain of a band of
								men, and his band with him) seized on Alexicles, principal commander
								of the soldiers under The Four Hundred, an eminent man of the other
								side, and carrying him into a house, kept him in hold.

As soon as the news hereof was brought unto The Four Hundred, who
								chanced at the same time to be sitting in the council-house, they
								were ready all of them presently to have taken arms, threatening
								Theramenes and his faction.

He to purge himself was ready to go with them and to help to rescue
								Alexicles, and taking with him one of the commanders who was also of
								his faction, went down into Peiraeus. 
							 To help him went also Aristarchus and certain horsemen of the younger
								sort. 
							 Great and terrible was the tumult. 
							 For in the city they thought Peiraeus was already taken and him that
								was laid in hold slain; 
							 and in Peiraeus they expected every hour the power of the city to
								come upon them.

At last the ancient men, stopping them that ran up and down the city
								to arm themselves, and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the city's host,
								being then there, going boldly and close up to every one he met and
								crying out unto them not to destroy their country when the enemy lay
								so near waiting for an advantage, with much ado quieted them and
								held their hands from spilling their own blood.

Theramenes, coming into Peiraeus (for he also had command over the
								soldiers), made a shew by his exclaiming of being angry with
								them; 
							 but Aristarchus and those that were of the contrary side were
								extremely angry in good earnest.

Nevertheless the soldiers went on with their business and repented
								not a jot of what they had done. 
							 Then they asked Theramenes if he thought this fortification were made
								to any good end and whether it were not better to have it
								demolished.

And he answered that if they thought good to demolish it, he also
								thought the same. 
							 At which word they presently got up, both the soldiers and also many
								others of Peiraeus, and fell a digging down of the wall. 
							 Now the provocation that they used to the multitude was in these
								words, that whosoever desired that the sovereignty should be in The
								Five Thousand instead of The Four Hundred ought also to set himself
								to the work in hand.

For notwithstanding all this, they thought fit as yet to veil the
								democracy with the name of The Five Thousand and not to say plainly
								whosoever will have the sovereignty in the people, lest The Five
								Thousand should have been extant indeed, and so a man by speaking to
								some or other of them might do hurt to the business through
								ignorance. 
							 And for this cause it was that The Four Hundred would neither let The
								Five Thousand be extant nor yet let it be known that they were
								not. 
							 For to make so many participant of the affairs of state they thought
								was a direct democracy, but to have it doubtful would make them
								afraid of one another.

The next day, The Four Hundred, though out of order, yet met together
								in the council-house, and the soldiers in Peiraeus, having enlarged
								Alexicles whom they had before imprisoned, and quite razed the
								fortification, came into the theatre of Bacchus near to Munychia and
								there sat down with their arms; 
							 and presently, according as they had resolved in an assembly then
								holden, marched into the city and there sat down again in the temple
								of Castor and Pollux.

To this place came unto them certain men elected by The Four Hundred,
								and man to man reasoned and persuaded with such as they saw to be of
								the mildest temper both to be quiet themselves and to restrain the
								rest, saying that not only The Five Thousand should be made known
								who they were, but that out of these such should be chosen in turns
								to be of The Four Hundred as The Five Thousand should think good,
								and entreating them by all means that they would not in the meantime
								overthrow the city and force it into the hand of the enemy.

Hereupon the whole number of the men of arms, after many reasons
								alleged to many men, grew calmer and feared most the loss of the
								whole city. 
							 And it was agreed betwixt them that an assembly should be held for
								making of accord in the temple of Bacchus at a day assigned.

When they came to the temple of Bacchus and wanted but a little of a
								full assembly, came news that Hegesandridas with his forty-two
								galleys came from Megara along the coast towards Salamis. 
							 And now there was not a soldier but thought it the very same thing
								that Theramenes and his party had before told them, that those
								galleys were to come to the fortification, and that it was now
								demolished to good purpose.

But Hegesandridas, perhaps upon appointment, hovered upon the coast
								of Epidaurus and thereabouts; 
							 but it is likely that in respect of the sedition of the Athenians he
								stayed in those parts with hope to take hold of some good
								advantage.

Howsoever it was, the Athenians, as soon as it was told them, ran
								presently with all the power of the city down to Peiraeus, less
								esteeming their domestic war than that of the common enemy, which
								was not now far off but even in the haven. 
							 And some went aboard the galleys that were then ready, some launched
								the rest, and others ran to defend the walls and mouth of the haven.

But the Peloponnesian galleys, being now gone by and gotten about the
								promontory of Sunium, cast anchor between Thoricus and Prasiae and
								put in afterwards at Oropus.

The Athenians with all speed, constrained to make use of tumultuary
								forces, such as a city in time of sedition might afford, and
								desirous with all haste to make good their greatest stake (for
								Euboea, since they were shut out of Attica, was all they had), sent
								a fleet under the command of Timocharis to Eretria.

Which arriving, with those galleys that were in Euboea before, made
								up the number of six-and-thirty sail. 
							 And they were presently constrained to hazard battle; 
							 for Hegesandridas brought out his galleys from Oropus when he had
								first there dined. 
							 Now Oropus is from Eretria about threescore furlongs of sea.

Whereupon the Athenians also, as the enemy came towards them, began
								to embark, supposing that their soldiers had been somewhere near
								unto the galleys. 
							 But it fell out that they were gone abroad to get their dinner, not
								in the market (for by set purpose of the Eretrians, to the end that
								the enemy might fall upon the Athenians that embarked slowly before
								they were ready and force them to come out and fight, nothing was
								there to be sold), but in the utmost houses of the city.

There was besides a sign set up at Eretria to give them notice at
								Oropus at what time to set forward. 
							 The Athenians, drawn out by this device and fighting before the haven
								of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless for a while; 
							 but afterwards they turned their backs and were chased ashore.

Such as fled to the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their
								friend, were handled most cruelly and slaughtered by them of the
								town; 
							 but such as got to the fort in Eretria, holden by the Athenians,
								saved themselves; 
							 and so did so many of their galleys as got to Chalcis.

The Peloponnesians, after they had taken twenty-two Athenian galleys
								with the men, whereof some they slew and some they took prisoners,
								erected a trophy; 
							 and not long after, having caused all Euboea to revolt save only
								Oreus, which the Athenians held with their own forces, they settled
								the rest of their business there.

When the news of that which had happened in Euboea was brought to
								Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest astonishment that
								ever they had been in before. 
							 For neither did their loss in Sicily, though then thought great, nor
								any other at any time so much affright them as this.

For now when the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no
								more galleys nor men to put aboard, when they were in sedition
								amongst themselves and in continual expectation of falling together
								by the ears, then in the neck of all arrived this great calamity,
								wherein they not only lost their galleys, but also, which was worst
								of all, Euboea, by which they [had] received more commodity than by
								Attica.

How then could they choose but be dejected? 
							 But most of all they were troubled, and that for the nearness, with a
								fear lest upon this victory the enemy should take courage and come
								immediately into Peiraeus, now empty of shipping, of which they
								thought nothing wanting, but that they were not there already.

And had they been anything adventurous, they might easily have done
								it; 
							 and then, had they stayed there and besieged them, they had not only
								increased the sedition but also compelled the fleet to come away
								from Ionia to the aid of their kindred and of the whole city, though
								enemies to the oligarchy, and in the meantime gotten the Hellespont,
								Ionia, the Islands, and all places even to Euboea, and, as one may
								say, the whole Athenian empire into their power.

But the Lacedaemonians, not only in this but in many other things,
								were most commodious enemies to the Athenians to war withal. 
							 For being of most different humours, the one swift, the other
								slow; 
							 the one adventurous, the other timorous; 
							 the Lacedaemonians gave them great advantage, especially when their
								greatness was by sea. 
							 This was evident in the Syracusians, who, being in condition like
								unto them, warred best against them.

The Athenians upon this news made ready, notwithstanding, twenty
								galleys, and called an assembly, one then presently in the place
								called Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at other times, in
								which having deposed The Four Hundred, they decreed the sovereignty
								to The Five Thousand, of which number were all such to be as were
								charged with arms; 
							 and from that time forward to salariate no man for magistracy, with a
								penalty on the magistrate receiving the salary to be held for an
								execrable person.

There were also divers other assemblies held afterwards, wherein they
								elected law-makers, and enacted other things concerning the
								government. 
							 And now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have
								ordered their state aright; 
							 which consisted now of a moderate temper, both of the few and of the
								many. 
							 And this was the first thing that after so many misfortunes past made
								the city again to raise her head.

They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades and those that were in
								exile with him, and sending to him and to the army at Samos, willed
								them to fall in hand with their business.

In this change Pisander and Alexicles, and such as were with them,
								and they that had been principal in the oligarchy, immediately
								withdrew themselves to Deceleia. 
							 Only Aristarchus (for it chanced that he had charge of the soldiers)
								took with him certain archers of the most barbarous and went with
								all speed to Oenoe.

This was a fort of the Athenians in the confines of Boeotia; 
							 and (for the loss that the Corinthians had received by the garrison
								of Oenoe) was by voluntary Corinthians and by some Boeotians by them
								called in to aid them now besieged.

Aristarchus, therefore, having treated with these, deceived those in
								Oenoe and told them that the city of Athens had compounded with the
								Lacedaemonians and that they were to render up the place to the
								Boeotians, for that it was so conditioned in the agreement. 
							 Whereupon, believing him as one that had authority over the soldiery
								and knowing nothing because besieged, upon security for their pass
								they gave up the fort.

So the Boeotians receive Oenoe; 
							 and the oligarchy and sedition at Athens cease.

About the same time of this summer, when none of those whom
								Tissaphernes at his going to Aspendus had substituted to pay the
								Peloponnesian navy at Miletus did it, and seeing neither the
								Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes came to them, and seeing Philip,
								that was sent along with him, and also another, one Hippocrates, a
								Spartan, that was lying in Phaselis, had written to Mindarus, the
								general, that the fleet was not to come at all and in every thing
								Tissaphernes abused them; 
							 seeing also that Pharnabazus had sent for them and was willing, upon
								the coming to him of their fleet, for his own part also as well as
								Tissaphernes, to cause the rest of the cities within his own
								province to revolt from the Athenians; 
							 then at length, Mindarus, hoping for benefit by him, with good order
								and sudden warning that the Athenians at Samos might not be aware of
								their setting forth, went into the Hellespont with seventythree
								galleys, besides sixteen which the same summer were gone into the
								Hellespont before and had overrun part of Chersonnesus. 
							 But tossed with the wind she was forced to put in at Icarus; 
							 and after he had stayed there through ill weather some five or six
								days, he arrived at Chios.

Thrasyllus having been advertised of his departure from Miletus, he
								also puts to sea from Samos with five-and-fifty sail, hasting to be
								in the Hellespont before him.

But hearing that he was in Chios and conceiving that he would stay
								there, he appointed spies to lie in Lesbos and in the continent over
								against it, that the fleet of the enemy might not remove without his
								knowledge; 
							 and he himself, going to Methymna, commanded provision to be made of
								meal and other necessaries, intending, if they stayed there long, to
								go from Lesbos and invade them in Chios. 
							 Withal, because Eressos was revolted from Lesbos, he purposed to go
								thither with his fleet;

if he could, to take it in. 
							 For the most potent of the Methymnaean exiles had gotten into their
								society about fifty men of arms out of Cume and hired others out of
								the continent, and with their whole number in all three hundred,
								having for their leader Anaxarchus, a Theban, chosen in respect of
								their descent from the Thebans, first assaulted Methymna. 
							 But beaten in the attempt by the Athenian garrison that came against
								them from Mytilene and again in a skirmish without the city driven
								quite away, they passed by the way of the mountain to Eressos, and
								caused it to revolt.

Thrasyllus therefore intended to go thither with his galleys and to
								assault it. 
							 At his coming he found Thrasybulus there also before him with five
								galleys from Samos, for he had been advertised of the outlaws coming
								over;

but being too late to prevent them, he went to Eressos and lay before
								it at anchor. 
							 Hither also came two galleys of Methymna that were going home from
								the Hellespont; 
							 so that they were in all threescore and seven sail, out of which they
								made an army, intending with engines, or any other way they could,
								to take Eressos by assault.

In the meantime, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet that was at
								Chios, when they had spent two days in victualling their galleys and
								had received of the Chians three Chian tessaracostes a man, on the
								third day put speedily off from Chios and kept far from the shore,
								that they might not fall amongst the galleys at Eressos.

And leaving Lesbos on the left hand, went to the continent side, and
								putting in at a haven in Craterei, belonging to the territory of
								Phocaea, and there dining, passed along the territory of Cume, and
								came to Arginusae in the continent over against Mytilene, where they
								supped.

From thence they put forth late in the night and came to Harmatus, a
								place in the continent over against Methymna; 
							 and after dinner going a great pace by Lectus, Larissa, Hamaxitus,
								and other the towns in those parts, came before midnight to
								Rhoeteium; 
							 this now is in Hellespont. 
							 But some of his galleys put in at Sigeium and other places
								thereabouts.

The Athenians that lay with eighteen galleys at Sestos knew that the
								Peloponnesians were entering into the Hellespont by the fires, both
								those which their own watchmen put up and by the many which appeared
								on the enemies' shore; 
							 and therefore the same night in all haste as they were, kept the
								shore of Chersonnesus towards Elaeus, desiring to get out into the
								wide sea and to decline the fleet of the enemy, and went out unseen
								of those sixteen galleys that lay at Abydos, though these had
								warning before from the fleet of their friends that came on to watch
								them narrowly that they went not out.

But in the morning, being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus and
								chased by him, they could not all escape, but the most of them got
								to the continent and into Lemnos;

only four of the hindmost were taken near Elaeus, whereof the
								Peloponnesians took one with the men in her that had run herself
								aground at the temple of Protesilaus, and two other without the men,
								and set fire on a fourth, abandoned upon the shore of Imbros.

After this they besieged Elaeus the same day with those galleys of
								Abydos which were with them, and with the rest, being now altogether
								fourscore and six sail. 
							 But seeing it would not yield, they went away to Abydos.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their spies, and not
								imagining that the enemy's fleet could have gone by without their
								knowledge, and attended at leisure the assault of Eressos, when now
								they knew they were gone, immediately left Eressos and hasted to the
								defence of Hellespont.

By the way they took two galleys of the Peloponnesians that, having
								ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy than the
								rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athenians. 
							 The next day they came to Elaeus and stayed; 
							 and thither from Imbros came unto them those other galleys that had
								escaped from the enemy. 
							 Here they spent five days in preparation for a battle.

After this, they fought in this manner: The Athenians went by the
								shore, ordering their galleys one by one, towards Sestos. 
							 The Peloponnesians also, when they saw this, brought out their fleet
								against them from Abydos.

Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in length, the
								Athenians along the shore of Chersonnesus, beginning at Idacus and
								reaching as far as Arrhiana, threescore and six galleys; 
							 and the Peloponnesians, from Abydos to Dardanum, fourscore and six
								galleys.

In the right wing of the Peloponnesians were the Syracusians; 
							 in the other, Mindarus himself and those galleys that were
								nimblest. 
							 Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left wing and Thrasybulus
								the right; 
							 and the rest of the commanders, every one the place assigned him.

Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the first onset and with
								their left wing to over-reach the right wing of the Athenians and
								keep them from going out, and to drive those in the middle to the
								shore which was near. 
							 The Athenians, who perceived it, where the enemy went about to cut
								off their way out, put forth the same way that they did and outwent
								them;

the left wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this time
								beyond the point called Cynos-sema. 
							 By means whereof that part of the fleet which was in the midst became
								both weak and divided, especially when theirs was the less
								fleet; 
							 and the sharp and angular figure of the place about Cynos-sema took
								away the sight of what passed there from those that were on the
								other side.

The Peloponnesians, therefore, charging this middle part, both drave
								their galleys to the dry land, and being far superior in fight, went
								out after them and assaulted them upon the shore.

And to help them neither was Thrasybulus able, who was in the right
								wing, for the multitude of the enemies that pressed him; 
							 nor Thrasyllus in the left wing, both because he could not see what
								was done for the promontory of Cynos-sema and because also he was
								kept from it by the Syracusians and others, lying upon his hands no
								fewer in number than themselves. 
							 Till at last the Peloponnesians, bold upon their victory, chasing
								some one galley some another, fell into some disorder in a part of
								their army.

And then those about Thrasybulus, having observed that the opposite
								galleys sought now no more to go beyond them, turned upon them, and
								fighting put them presently to flight; 
							 and having also cut off from the rest of the fleet such galleys of
								the Peloponnesians, of that part that had the victory, as were
								scattered abroad, some they assaulted, but the greatest number they
								put into affright unfoughten. 
							 The Syracusians also, whom those about Thrasyllus had already caused
								to shrink, when they saw the rest fly fled outright.

This defeat being given and the Peloponnesians having for the most
								part escaped first to the river Pydius and afterwards to Abydos,
								though the Athenians took but few of their galleys (for the
								narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to the enemy a short retreat),
								yet the victory was the most seasonable to them that could be.

For having till this day stood in fear of the Peloponnesian navy,
								both for the loss which they had received by little and little and
								also for their great loss in Sicily, they now ceased either to
								accuse themselves or to think highly any longer of the naval power
								of their enemies.

The galleys they took were these: eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of
								Ambracia two, of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, one
								apiece. 
							 Of their own they lost fifteen.

When they had set up a trophy in the promontory of Cynossema and
								taken up the wrecks and given truce to the enemies to fetch away the
								bodies of their dead, they presently sent away a galley with a
								messenger to carry news of the victory to Athens.

The Athenians, upon the coming in of this galley hearing of their
								unexpected good fortune, were encouraged much after their loss in
								Euboea and after their sedition, and conceived that their estate
								might yet keep up if they plied the business courageously.

The fourth day after this battle, the Athenians that were in Sestos,
								having hastily prepared their fleet, went to Cyzicus, which was
								revolted; 
							 and espying, as they passed by, the eight galleys come from Byzantium
								riding under Harpagium and Priapus, set upon them, and having also
								overcome those that came to their aid from the land, took them. 
							 Then coming to Cyzicus, being an open town, they brought it again
								into their own power and levied a sum of money amongst them.

The Peloponnesians in the meantime, going from Abydos to Elaeus,
								recovered as many of their galleys [formerly] taken as remained
								whole; 
							 the rest the Elaeusians [had] burnt. 
							 They also sent Hippocrates and Epicles into Euboea to fetch away the
								fleet that was there.

About the same time also returned Alcibiades to Samos with his
								thirteen galleys from Caunus and Phaselis, reporting that he had
								diverted the Phoenician fleet from coming to the Peloponnesians and
								that he had inclined Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians
								more than he was before.

Thence manning out nine galleys more, he exacted a great sum of money
								of the Hallicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. 
							 Being now almost autumn, he returned to Samos.

The Peloponnesians being now in Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are
								Aeolians) received into the city men of arms from Abydos by land
								through mount Ida, upon injury that had been done them by Arsaces, a
								deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

This Arsaces, having feigned a certain war, not declared against
								whom, had formerly called out the chiefest of the Delians (the which
								in hallowing of Delos by the Athenians were turned out and had
								planted themselves in Adramyttium) to go with him to this war; 
							 and when under colour of amity and confederacy he had drawn them out,
								he observed a time when they were at dinner, and having hemmed them
								in with his own soldiers, murdered them with darts.

And therefore, for this act's sake fearing lest he might do some
								unlawful prank against them also, and for that he had otherwise done
								them injury, they cast his garrison out of their citadel.

Tissaphernes, hearing of this, being the act of the Peleponnesians as
								well as that at Miletus or that at Cnidus (for in those cities his
								garrisons had also been cast out in the same manner), and conceiving
								that he was deeply charged to them, and fearing lest they should do
								him some other hurt, and withal not enduring that Pharnabazus should
								receive them and with less time and cost speed better against the
								Athenians than he had done, resolved to make a journey to them in
								the Hellespont, both to complain of what was done at Antandros and
								to clear himself of his accusations the best he could, as well
								concerning the Phoenician fleet as other matters. 
							 And first he put in at Ephesus and offered sacrifices to Diana.

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the
								one-and-twentieth year [of this war] shall be complete.